The Pattern of China’s Global Activity:
Foreign Policy Instruments in Central Asia and Africa

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Abstract: In this work, first, the question of conceptualization of “Power” in the Theory of International Relations will be analyzed. Secondly, I will investigate which type of “power” China is exercising in the neighboring Central Asian region as well as the geographically remote African continent. To be exact, I will apply the classification of power suggested by researchers Barnett and Duvall (2005): compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power to analyze the question: which instruments or type of power is using China in order to spread its influence in the aforementioned areas? In closing, this paper argues that both in Central Asia and Africa China is not using any kind of compulsory power instead prefers to exercise other forms of power such as, for instance, institutional and productive powers.

Keywords: Africa, Central Asia, Foreign Policy Instruments, Classification of Power
1. Introduction.

In the present paper, I have an intention to answer the following research questions:

- Does China use a similar pattern: the same foreign policy instruments to spread its political, economic and cultural influence in the neighboring Central Asian region and the geographically remote African continent?
- What are the main limitations the Realism school of thought (e.g. John J. Mearsheimer 2014) to explain China’s influence in Central Asia and Africa?
- What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the concept of power suggested by researchers Barnett and Duvall (2005) to analyze China’s foreign policy patterns and instruments?

Hypothesis:

Could we assume that due to historical, political and cultural environment differences (in Central Asia and Africa), China is using different instruments to spread its influence in the aforementioned areas or is the present assumption wrong, and China uses the same pattern: foreign policy instruments in both regions.

2. Conceptualization of Power in Theory of International Relations

The concept of power is widely used in International Relations terminology. I concur with the statement of the researcher K. Boulding: "because power is a multidimensional concept, it is difficult to quantify and measure it." (Boulding 1989, 20). Since power is a multidimensional concept, International Relations theorists suggest different typologies of power such as: Civilian Power (Duchène 1972; Duchène 1973), Destructive, Productive and Integrative Power (Boulding 1989), hard and soft power (Morgenthau1950a; Morgenthau 1950b, 833-54; Nye 2000, 153-71), Normative Power (Manners 2002, 235–58; Manners 2008, 45-60), direct and indirect power; as well as the classification of different dimensions: political, military, economic, informational-technological power.

How is it possible to define “Power”? The notion of hard or real power presumably means consideration of power from the realist theoretical school perspective. Meaning consideration of power as availability of particular political, economic instruments, in order to “influence another to do what it would not otherwise do.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 13) The present assumption of consideration of power from the realist school perspective was dominant
for many years among International Relations scholars. However, one limitation of this approach was the confusion of the notion of "power" with "force." As Boulding correctly mentions: “Force is linked to the concept of domination, which indeed, is only a small part of the general nature of power. There is a certain tendency among humans to identify power with the capacity for victory that is, overcoming some other person, will, or institution.” (Boulding 1989, 16). The researcher Boulding suggests his own classifications of power, adding destructive and also productive and integrative power. Under destructive power he understands “different aspects, reflected in means of destruction (arms forces, weapons etc.)” (Boulding 1989, 24), in contrast productive and integrative power he defines as powers that: “involve the capacity to build organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire loyalty, to bind people together, to develop legitimacy.” (Boulding 1989, 25)

Thus, as we see, Boulding goes beyond the realist notion in understanding power. Already by the beginning of 1970's ideas of consideration of power not only as an instrument of political pressure, but also in other forms such as economic cooperation were becoming more popular. In 1972 François Duchêne suggested to consider Europe as a „civilian power” which was „long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne 1973, 19) As it is visible the researcher argues that power could be considered not only in its narrow, but in a broad meaning: as power to spread values, civilian norms and particular models of political institutions. At the beginning of the 1990's an American researcher Joseph Nye coined the notion of “soft power” which he defines as “power to make other want the same as yourself.” (Nye 1990, 153-71)

The understanding of power in the works of Ian Manners (2009) “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms” is also alluring. He suggests the consideration of the power of Europe not from the realist or liberalist schools, but from the English School perspective. Manners assumes that member states of a pluralistic security community, to be exact of the European Union, not just form a particular type of identity that distinguishes them from others, but also exercise a different type of power –normative power in its external relations. Thus, Manners distinguishes different types of actions/powers that the EU uses such as Persuasion and argumentation; Invoking norms; Shaping the discourse; Showing example; Conferral of prestige or shame. (Manners 2002 in Gerrits 2009, 31).

Evidently, American and European researchers distinguish different dimensions of power. However, the question may arise: why is there such a long discourse to the problem of conceptualization of Power and how does this relate to China’s foreign policy? I suppose some
of aforementioned definitions of power have certain limitations. One of them, from my point of view, is the consideration of power only in one dimension, for instance, hard power as a military strength and/or pressure, soft power as a spread of influence due to culture and education, normative power as invoking and shaping norms.

In this paper I would like to draw your attention to and suggest considering the question of China’s influence in Central Asia and Africa through the typology of power, which was elaborated in year 2005 by researchers Raymond Duvall and Michael Barnett. I concur with the statement of these authors that: “power is essentially contested concept…and works in various forms and has various expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2).

Barnett and Duvall suggest the following typology of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power.

**Compulsory** power concept in Barnett and Duvall understanding resembles a realism school approach: “it operates, for example, when one state threatens another and says: “change your policies or else.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3).

In contrast to Compulsory - **Institutional Power** refers to “indirect control over others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long term advantage and to the disadvantage of others.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3) Actors, while exercising this type of power, are paying more attention to formal and informal institutions, norms and practices.

Institutional Power should not be confused with **Structural Power**; that operates with broader concepts and instruments such as "one expression of this form of power is the working capitalist world-economy in producing social positions of capital and labor with their respective different abilities to alter circumstances and fortunes.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3) Structural power is not just about exercising indirect control through institutions, but rather about construction and promotion of particular models of social – economic development such as, for example, The Washington Consensus or in our case the Beijing Model, etc.

Lastly researchers distinguish **Productive Power**, which is “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification.” (Barnett and Duval 2005, 3). Put simply, it means operationalization with particular norms and standards or “labels”: such as: “civilized”, “rogue state”, “European”, “unstable” “Western”, “Democratic” etc. (Ibid. 21).
It is a visible present typology of power suggested by Barnett and Duvall and is quite comprehensive and encompasses different dimensions of power. To my point of view, the usage of this typology of power gives more possibilities to unpack the problem and to consider the influence of China in Central Asia and Africa in all its manifestations.

3. China’s Foreign Policy Concepts and Limitations of the Realism School

Before making an extensive analysis of China’s exercise of power in Central Asia and Africa based on Barnetts and Duvall's classification, let us pay attention to the evolution of foreign policy concepts of China. I suppose such a short overview is essential, as it will give us the possibility to understand how the notion of “Power” is differently interpreted or comprehended by Chinese foreign policy makers rather than by their Western colleagues.

The American scholar John J. Mearsheimer (2010) argues that: “Beijing does not possess a formidable military today, and it is certainly in no position to pick a fight with the United States. This is not to say that China is a paper tiger, but it does not have the capability to cause much trouble, even in the Asia-Pacific region. However, that situation is expected to change markedly over time, in which case China will have significant offensive capability. Then, we will see how committed it is to the status quo. But right now we cannot tell much about China's future behavior because it has such limited capability to act aggressively.” (Mearsheimer 2010, 381–396)

As is visible from the position of Mearsheimer, he understands and measures the power of China (and the US) only in terms of offensive capability. To my point of view such understanding of power has certain serious limitations such as a serious underestimation of other capabilities of China. Probably what Mearsheimer sees as the weakness could be considered as a strength and a key to success of China. If we look to foreign policy concepts of China it is clear that China currently has enough capabilities to act both peacefully and aggressively, but to act aggressively seems to China to be unnecessary as such behavior could cause unnecessary fear of the world community and may alienate both developed and developing countries from China.

For many years China has been following foreign policy strategy which is based on works such politicians as Zheng Bijian as well as Deng Xiaoping (1970-s of “Peaceful Rise Concept” which main slogan sounds: “Hide Brightness, Nourish Obscurity” (Leonard 2008, 112)
As the researcher Leonard writes that ancient Chinese scholars distinguish between two kinds of order: The Wang- “centered around a dominant superpower, but its primacy based on benign government rather on coercion or territorial expansion.” (Leonard 2008, 112). This concept was applied to neighboring countries. And also The “Ba” concept was a classic hegemonic system: “where the most powerful nation imposed order on its periphery through force” (Leonard 2008, 112)

For many centuries, China was following present foreign policy concepts in relation to foreign countries. If we look to the 20th century, after 1949 and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, we see that Chinese scholars and politicians intentionally followed the course directed on hiding the rise and economic development of China from the outer world. For instance, in 1970 the scholar Zheng Bijian and later, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the “Peaceful Rise Concept” of China, which was based on principles: “Hide Brightness, Nourish Obscurity” (1970-s). In order for the world not to see the Chinese rise as a threat, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed a foreign policy concept, which later became known as the foreign policy formula of “24 hieroglyphs." Xiaoping argued that China in order to be successful both in domestic and foreign policy the country has to follow only few rules: to stay "in the shadows", “calmly observe”, “stay strongly on feet’s”, "behave modestly", “do not pretend to be a leader” (or “do not show that the country is pretending to become a leader.” (Shestakov 2012)

In his public speeches Deng Xiaoping has stressed that China will not follow the road of Germany and Japan after the First and Second World Wars. Also, it will not act as the Soviet Union which cut off relations with other countries. On the contrary, "China would be integrated into economic globalization, providing markets and economic opportunities for the rest of the world.” (Leonard 2008: 89) Following this wise strategic foreign policy concept China achieved remarkable results in a very short period. A discourse analysis of speeches of Chinese politicians at 1980, 1990, and later 2000 on official diplomatic visits to Asian countries, Latin America, Africa would reveal often used words such as "win-win situation," "development and aid," "mutual understanding." (Hu Jintao 2005, Xi Jinping 2014). However, currently (approximately after 2010) it feels like a change in the discourse. For instance, proclamation of such concepts of development as a “Chinese Dream” (2012) could signalize a significant shift from the principle of hiding of the leadership to acknowledgement of China’s superior role in the world economy and politics. Currently, military experts argue that China should play a more active role and: “abandon its victim complex” (Leonard 2008, 89).
Summarizing some points for this sub-Chapter it possible to come to the conclusion that the argument of Mearsheimer is not convincing enough. China is capable of showing its power and already is indeed showing it, but in different manifestations using different rhetoric and foreign policy instruments.

In the next Chapter using Barnett and Duvall's classification of power, we will analyze the question: what kind of instrument and types of power is China applying in Central Asia and Africa?

4. China’s Exercise of Power in Central Asia

It is possible to distinguish different periods in the development of mutual relations between China and the five Central Asian Republics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the appearance on the political map near the Chinese border of newly independent Central Asian states, all sides were interested in clarification of the questions concerning border issues. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (countries bordering China) created one joint delegation in their negotiations with China. On the agenda were not only the questions of delimitation and demarcation of borders but also confidence-building measures (CBMs) and reduction of military forces in border areas. After six years of negotiations, finally on 26 April 1996 in Shanghai during the Summit meeting by the Heads of Russia, three Central Asian states and China the Shanghai agreement of 1996 was signed. One year later, the Moscow Agreement 1997 was signed with four additional protocols defining the area of CBMs application, verification and compliance measures. Those documents became cornerstone documents of the Shanghai Five. After the joining of Uzbekistan in 2001, the country that does not have common borders with China, the Shanghai Five was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The next period starting from 2001, after 9/11 and the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, China was mainly concerned with military-security questions in its relations with Central Asian countries. Afghanistan has common borders with three SCO full member states: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China and two the SCO observer countries: Pakistan and Iran. This means that Afghanistan is surrounded almost from all sides by the SCO countries. Officially Afghanistan does not request observer status or full membership in the organization till 2011. Instability in Afghanistan leads to increasing the flow of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorist

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6 Shanghai Cooperation Organization granted Afghanistan observer status in 2012.
networks. Taking into account these facts, China as well as Russia during this period was concerned mainly with security issues, and in 2001 countries decided to establish the SCO Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RAS). The main aim of RAS became: the fight against “3-isms”: terrorism, extremism and separatism.

If we look at the period starting from 2011 until the present time, it is possible to observe a further institutionalization process of the SCO, in particular in the economic field. For instance, on the 6th of December 2013 the SCO members as well as observer states and dialogue partners (Afghanistan, Belarus, India, Mongolia, Shri-Lanka, Turkey) signed the Memorandum on establishment of the SCO Energy Club. Unfortunately, the text of the Memorandum was not published in the media and also was not available on the official web-site of the Organization. From media sources and interviews of government authorities it is known that the Energy Club has the following goals: “to enhance dialogue among member states to ensure energy security, harmonization of energy policies, coordination and comprehensive discussion of strategies for cooperation in various energy sectors.” (Yanovski 2013) In spite of skepticism towards functionality of the present structure, some European authors argue the Energy club cannot become Asian alternative of OPEC, the role of the SCO Energy Club should not be underestimated. At least taking into account that: “The SCO members states together hold about 25% of world oil reserves, more than 50% of global gas reserves, 35% of coal, and about half of the world's known uranium reserves.” (Bushyev and Pervukhin 2013)

After this overview, the question may arise: how is it possible to measure the power and influence of China in CA region? Let us now apply Barnett and Duvall's classification of power to analyze this question.

**Compulsory Power:** As mentioned above, compulsory power is better explained by the definition of Robert Dahl: “as the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 13). This could include the use of political, economic resources of "pressure." As already mentioned in the second Chapter while making analysis of foreign policy concepts of China, a country in their relations in particular with neighboring countries avoids using any types of direct pressure, threats and intimidation or punishment measures. This could be explained first of all by the fact that in general China's foreign policy concepts are based on principles of hiding brightness, calm observation, non-interference in internal affairs, etc. Secondly, from my point of view, one of the reasons could be an unwillingness of China to directly confront Russia. China understands that the CA region still remains under the sphere of direct influence of Russia. Thus, any kind of offensive behavior towards any of CA country
could be interpreted by Russia as a direct threat to their national security. Thus, China certainly is not using and probably is not intending to use any kind of compulsory power in this region.

Regarding **Institutional Power**, as Barnett and Duvall argue, “the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non actions) and conditions of existence of others.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 51). Establishment of such an Organization like the SCO and now within the SCO creation of such sub-structures in different dimensions like the SCO Energy Club, the SCO Bank,7 the SCO Antiterrorist-structure, the Consortium of the SCO Universities etc., shows that China definitely exercises this type of power.

**Structural Power:** As mentioned above, structural power is more than just the establishment of institutions or the exercise of direct control over actions of others. “Structural power concerns the determination of social capacities and interests…It operates covertly to the extent that it generates the social powers, values and interpretations of reality that deeply structure internal control.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 19). In contrast to European actors such as European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE etc., which often use “political conditionality”, “carrots and sticks” policy (Youngs 2001) and demanding from CA leaders to improve national legislation to strengthen democratic participation of citizens and protect human rights, China never uses such rhetoric in its relations with CA country leaders. Thus, certainly in the eyes of Central Asian politicians China seems a generous and agreeable friend.

**Productive Power:** is one of the interesting dimensions in the typology of Barnett and Duvall, because it deals with the “discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 13). If we look at the legal framework of mutual cooperation, usually almost in all official documents/declarations, China uses such expressions as “strategic partnership”, "mutual trust", “mutually beneficial relationships.” (China Central Television 2013) Except from this

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7 A decision on setting up an SCO Bank for Development and a Development Fund was signed on 5-th of December 2012 during the meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government in Bishkek.
standard diplomatic language China spares no compliments towards its neighbors, for instance, “China and Kazakhstan - are good neighbors, friends and partners! China has always attached great importance to the development of mutual relations with Kazakhstan. China is willing, together with Kazakhstan to expand the actual cooperation in various fields in order to bring to a new level of development our bilateral strategic partnership.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2010). Certainly it is possible to provide other examples, in general, to stress that China never criticizes CA states and tries to use expressions such “friends and equal partners.” (Ibid)

5. China’s Exercise of Power in Africa

China has recently become very active in such geographically remote area as the African continent. To provide a short overview to mutual relations, Chinese historians argue that Chinese traveler Zhang Tian in 138 BC brought information about the town, the description of which coincides, according to scientists, to the description of Alexandria capital of the Ptolemaic dynasty. Other scientists believe that China and African relations started in fifteen century, the era of the Ming Dynasty, when Admiral Jiang Xe discovered the continent during one of his trips. The Russian researcher Deych stresses that since the beginning of the colonization of Africa, relations with China were not developed, but revived again in the mid-nineteenth century, when colonists began to send Chinese workers to the continent, who together with Africans built a railway line in Senegal and also worked in Tanganyika and gold mines of the Transvaal. (Deych 2008)

China’s relations with African countries received a boost after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, which was attended by some representatives from African states, it has become obvious that China and some African countries share the view on some international problems. Together with the delegation of India Chinese representatives participated in the elaboration of "five principles" ("Pancasila"). “An important milestone in the development of Sino-African relations was the visit to Africa during 1963-1964 of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who stressed that China will provide support to African people in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and their national independence, will support a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment, will respect their sovereignty and will not-interfere in their internal affairs.” (Deych 2008,105).
Later, in the 1990's and 2000's, China paid more attention to the economic dimension in its relations with African countries, as growing industry in China required more energy and mineral resources and its thriving business needed output to external markets.

Since 2000, it is visible that there have been attempts from China to institutionalize their relations with Africa, through e.g. establishment of the Forum on China-African Cooperation. In 2006, the government published the document "PRC policy towards Africa ‘which outlines a plan of cooperation with African countries in various fields. ‘The document includes six sections: "The position and role of Africa’"," Sino-African relations, '" African policy of China"," Expansion of comprehensive cooperation between China and Africa "," Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and its follow-up "," Relations between China and African regional organizations." (Deych 2008, 107).

In the framework of one article certainly it is not feasible to cover all trends in mutual relations between China and all countries of the African continent since the continent is very diverse. It is however possible to mention that relations and attitudes of some African countries towards China vary depending on political and economic factors. For instance, China established diplomatic relations with about 50 countries of the African continent; however, four countries such as Burkina Faso, Gambia, Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe gave the preference and recognized the independence of Taiwan and regularly participate in the Forum of Taiwan-African Cooperation, a fact that strongly irritates China.

Let us now proceed to consider the exercise of power using Barnett and Duvall's classification:

**Compulsory Power:** On the African continent China is also not using any kind of compulsory power, even in relations with those countries that recognized the independence of Taiwan. In the case of Senegal and Chad, China decided to use different instruments, such as persuasion and demonstrating the economic profits of being friends with China rather than with Taiwan. In 2005, Chad and some other Africa countries suggested at the session of the UN General Assembly the question of Taiwan's participation in this organization and a more active role of the UN in maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. At that time the Permanent Representative of China to the UN Wang Guangya said that these proposals violate the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and those other countries should accept the fact that the only lawful representatives of China to the UN are representatives of PRC. After 2006, Chad drastically changed its foreign policy orientations in favor of China (PRC) and
recognized China’s One China Policy. Some researchers as Dittgen and Large explain these shift by political and economic profits: “recognizing Beijing would bring myriad short- and long-term advantages. President Déby stood to be empowered by aid, investment and military assistance from China.” (Dittgen and Large 2012, 1-2). Senegal also shifted its foreign policy orientations towards China, and in the long run, China expects that four other countries will follow these examples.

Institutional Power:

An important phenomenon in China’s relations with Africa was the China-Africa Forum on cooperation in Beijing in 2000 at the ministerial level. Speaking at the opening of the first meeting of the Forum in Beijing in October 2000, President Jiang Tse-ming called this Forum “a great undertaking in the history of Sino-African relations” (Dechy 2008, 113) In these Forums a Program of China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social development was adopted. At this point of time, we do not see any attempts from China to establish joint institutions or a separate organization with African countries, but probably in the long run such attempts could be expected.

Structural Power: absence of democratization and human rights rhetoric in their speeches and the principle of conditionality makes China, an attractive partner in eyes of African leaders. Some African leaders even argue that they should follow the path of China, which was also colonized by Westerners, but later, achieved remarkable economic success (even with an authoritarian system of governance).

Productive Power: Chinese leaders attempt in their public speeches to emphasize that China in comparison to Western countries has never colonized Africa and that both China and Africa suffered a lot during the times of Western colonization. "China will always be a friend, partner and brother of Africa - said President Hu Jintao- our cooperation will be based on “win-win” relations.” (Kurlantzick 2007: 43). These words usually find a sincere response of African leaders, for example, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe urged Africa: "to turn from the West and to focus on the development of relations with China, which is always respected Africans." (Dechy 2008, 113)

6. Conclusion
In this article, I attempted to answer the following main question: does China use a similar pattern in its foreign policy instruments in the neighboring Central Asian region and the geographically remote African continent?

In closing, it is possible to come to the following conclusion: both in Central Asia and Africa China is not using any kind of compulsory power or direct pressure. This could be explained by the fact that China is still following foreign policy concepts based on elaborated at the 1970's by Deng Xiaoping such as “24 hieroglyphs” formula. It was revealed that China prefers to exercise other forms of power such as, for instance, institutional power. Almost at the same period 2000, the Forum on China–African Relations was established as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asian region in 2001. In comparison to Central Asia, China has not yet established the separate Organization in African continent, however, in the long run, China could follow this tactic and create as in Central Asia within the SCO, a separate China–African Development Bank or the Energy club. After studying the works and interviews of many Central Asian and African leaders it has become obvious that political leaders prefer to deal with China rather than with Western partners due to the absence of the political conditionality principle in China’s foreign policy. China provides grants without asking CA and African leaders to democratize their countries; this fact is certainly regarded as a friendly act by leaders of CA and African countries. In terms of Productive power, it is visible that China uses almost the same bouquet of compliments towards both Central Asia and Africa such as: “We are friends, brothers and strategic partners”, “We have a common destiny”, “we developing countries should support each other”, “Developing country cannot colonize another developing country.” etc. (China`s Africa Policy 2006 in Zuolan 2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People`s Republic of China 2010).

In general, policies of China are very wise, and it is visible that the country has a long-term strategy in its relations with both regions. However, to my point of view, one of the serious weaknesses of China’s policies is that they are dealing only with political elites, but not with societies in these countries. China supports regimes and elites (both politically and financially) however, if the country is striving to become a global player they should not underestimate the demands and opinions of individuals and societal groups. I suppose such an underestimation of the role of societal groups could in the future cause some problems to China. Since, both in Central Asia and Africa there is growing discontent of the population towards China’s policies. For instance, both in CA and Africa the populations are against migration of Chinese workers to their countries. In some African countries, people are saying that Chinese workers take their
workplaces, and local industries are not developing because of the flow of Chinese production. Besides, violation of workers labor rights by some of Chinese companies cause protests in a number of African countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia. (Bardsley 2010). Moreover, enmity causes environmental pollution while extraction of energy resources by some of Chinese companies both in Central Asian countries and Africa (Bosshard 2008); these could be a hotbed of future tensions in mutual relations.

In general, possible to agree with the statement of Yan Xuetong who while answering the question of why the Chinese model of development is not as attractive as the US or European model, said:"The reason that other countries will accept it (US model) is that it would build it through domestic policy by becoming a model society that people want to be part of. We don't have it yet. At the moment, all of China's attractiveness comes from its economic power, but that cannot last. Money worship is not attractive enough. You need moral power.” (Leonard 2008, 112). Thus, in closing it is possible to stress that in spite of rapid economic development of China, the concept of the ‘Chinese Dream’ is and probably will not become as attractive as the “American Dream” in the 1990's because of the absence (according to Xuetong) of “moral power.” (Ibid.).

Analyzing the question of what are the main limitations the Realism school of thought possible to argue that some of the US scholars (e.g. Mearsheimer) while trying to measure capacities of China, pay more attention to military capabilities of China, however, China uses different foreign policy instruments and exercises in both regions/areas different types of power. Thus, answering the last question of what are the main strengths and weaknesses of the concept of Power suggested by Barnett and Duvall to analyze China’s foreign policy patterns and instruments, I think that the present classification has good potential, as it has the possibility to measure power in different dimensions. In terms of limitations of this typology, possible to argue that in spite of the fact that Barnett and Duvall distinguish four types of power, however present division of powers requires further elaboration. For instance, objective questions may arise: how should we classify economic help or economic aid, should economic help be considered as a compulsory or structural power? Thus, division among different typologies of power seems to my point of view rather conditional.
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