

Determinants of Re-Autocratization: An Empirical Analysis from 1996 to 2013

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Abstract

During the 1990s, research in the political sciences within the framework of the transition paradigm focused mainly on democratization and consolidation. However, in recent years a growing debate concerning the decline of democratic quality and breakdown of democracies has emerged. In this paper, the collapse of electoral democracies (referred to as re-autocratizations) will be operationalized using a minimalistic conception of democracy and analyzed globally in the timeframe from 1996 to 2013 using logistic regression. Significant effects for economic growth rates and governance performance are found.

Keywords

Breakdown of democracy, re-autocratization, regime change, transformations, transitions, logistic regression analysis

Introduction²⁰

The third wave of democratization resulted in a worldwide increase of the number and quality of democracies. Especially the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union led to optimistic expectations concerning the trajectories of those transformations. The *transition paradigm* assumes that all countries of the third wave moving away from autocracy are on the way to become a democracy (e.g. Carothers 2002: 6; Levitsky and Way 2015: 49). Consequently, academia focused mainly on the determinants of democratizations and democratic consolidations (Ambrosio 2010: 375f.; Erdmann 2011: 7).

Since the mid-2000s, the transition paradigm has been increasingly challenged. As early as the mid-1990s –at the peak of democracy optimism– Huntington proclaimed that third wave democracies might face a reverse wave as well: “History unfolds in a dialectic fashion. Any substantial movement in one direction tends eventually to lose its momentum and to generate countervailing forces” (1996: 5). Whether we are currently facing a reverse wave is much debated. On the one hand it is argued that the empiric data is not yet sufficient support for assumption of an arising reverse wave²¹. On the other hand, increasing numbers of hybridizations and losses of democratic quality are identified and interpreted as a sign for a possibly upcoming reverse wave²².

This debate gave an impetus to the research on autocracies (Thiery 2015: 419). Furthermore, the research on autocracies was invigorated by the fact that not all countries that previously were considered *in transition* actually ever reached full democracy. Many introduced democratic institutions, but reasonable doubts concerning the democratic quality remain (Schmotz 2015: 561). Gero Erdmann (2011: 28ff.) makes a strong plea for the study of reverse transitions and broadly traces the contours of a potential future research agenda.

This paper examines why some democracies endure, while in other cases autocracies or hybrid regimes are re-established, henceforward called re-autocratizations. The applied conceptualizations of re-autocratization rests on a minimalistic institutional definition of democracies. After terminological

²⁰ This paper is a shortened and revised version of my master thesis. The original thesis was published in German language and can be accessed here: <http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/politik/publikationen/AP81.pdf>. I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Dr. Klaus Segbers and Cosima Glahn for their valuable inputs and support.

²¹ Schmitter (2015) argues that there is a crisis of democracy due to dissatisfaction with its way of functioning despite a general desire for democracy. Levitsky and Way (2015) argue that new democracies are strikingly robust. Currently we do not face a reverse wave, but a saturation.

²² Based upon the Freedom in the World Index, Puddington (2008) views the developments as a setback for democracy. Diamond (2015) claims that if the current democratic recession eventuates in “swing states” such as India it might be the forerunner of a reverse wave.

preliminary considerations and a review of available literature, the mainly endogenous determinants of re-autocratizations are analyzed in a logistic regression for 1382 country years (102 countries in between 1996 and 2013), of which 32 are considered re-autocratizations.

Literature Review

Köllner and Kailitz (2013: 2) decompose the research on autocracy and autocratizations in two phases. The first phase emerged after the Second World War and focused on totalitarian regimes and classifications (Hartmann 2015: 100ff). Nevertheless, the three volume work *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1978) can be considered a cornerstone of the research on re-autocratizations. With increasing democracy optimism however, the academic interest in autocracies wore off until the late 1990s. At the latest since the color revolutions, the field of research experienced renewed interest. In this new phase, the emphasis is placed on autocratic stability (e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2006), instability or the breakdown of authoritarian and hybrid regimes (e.g. Geddes *et al.* 2014; Brownlee 2009), or classification of autocratic systems (e.g. Cheibub *et al.* 2010). Furthermore, conceptual and empiric research on re-autocratizations was performed.

Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) operationalize autocracy and democracy as a dichotomy using selected variables of the 21-point Polity Index (PI). For a country year to be considered democratic, the score of the variable *Executive recruitment* needs to be six or above, and *Competitiveness of Political Participation* needs to score above three. In an event-history model they find that wealthy democracies are less prone to regime changes in support of assumptions of modernization theory. However, they do not find a significant correlation between presidentialism and the chance of re-autocratization and therefore challenge previous structural assumptions.

Kapstein and Converse (2008a) analyze failed democratizations between 1960 and 2004. Referring to open questions and contradictions regarding the application of modernization theory to young democracies, they argue that the main focus should be placed on political institutions. They find that reversals are more likely in parliamentary democracies. Due to the weak status of parliaments in young democracies, they cannot live up to their intended role and put constraints on the executive power. Kapstein and Converse chose a dichotomous differentiation between democratizations and their reverse based on the PI. A democratization is measured when the PI increases within three years by six points. Conversely, an autocratization is measured when PI decreases by six points within three years. Kapstein and Converse find 123 democratizations, of which 56 were reversed. However,

of the 123 measured democratizations 40 did not reach the level of a full democracy, but remained partially democratic (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 2f.). In theory, cases where a six-point decrease results in an anocratic regime are possible. Those would be placed in the same category as six-point decreases, which result in (full) autocracies. The authors acknowledge this problem, but do not further investigate it, for the lack of empiric cases (Kapstein and Converse 2008b: 2f.). However, it needs to be questioned whether autocratizations where the outcome is anocratic (i.e. a score of -1) are subject to the same mechanisms as autocratizations, where a fully-fledged autocracy (i.e. a score of -6 or below) is the result. The same applies on the democratic end of the scale. Therefore, using intervals seems to be more suited to measure the loss of democratic quality rather than regime changes. Furthermore, Vreeland (2003: 7) finds that the PI is not a continuous measure and claims that it can be considered ordinal at most. Therefore, the assumption of equidistant values cannot be made. Ordinal scales can be subject to a ranking, but are not suitable for addition or subtraction.²³

Ko Maeda (2010) differentiates between endogenous and exogenous breakdowns of democracy. Endogenous breakdowns originate from within the government, exogenous breakdowns from without (Ibid.: 1130). A breakdown of democracy is measured when the PI falls below the threshold value of six points. With a survival analysis between 1950 and 2004, Maeda finds that endogenous breakdowns are not correlated with the macroeconomic situation, while exogenous breakdowns are less frequent the better the economic situation (Ibid.: 1141ff.).

These studies use a continuous measure of regime type which is based on a broad conception of democracy. However, for the empirical analysis, they define thresholds or intervals that allow a recoding as a nominal variable (measuring whether the regime change occurred or not). Both Maeda and Kapstein & Converse use the same data set but define different thresholds for the measurement of the breakdown of a regime.

In contrast to these studies, Milan Svolik (2008) chooses a minimalist conception of democracy and focuses on the length of democratic spells. He splits his data in failed democracies and currently existing democracies and performs a survival analysis. He finds that the chance for survival increases with the age of a democracy. The hazard rate for re-autocratization is among others increased by poor economic development, presidentialism, and a military authoritarian legacy. This however only applies to transitional (young) democracies. Therefore, Svolik advocates to distinguish between

²³ Same criticism applies to the level of measurement of the Freedom in the World Index (Vreeland 2003: 5).

factors that increase the hazard rate for autocratizations and factors that support consolidation (Svolik 2008: 166)

Gero Erdmann (2011) also examines whether the conditions which make democratization possible differ from those for the decline of democracy. He analyzes changes in the *Freedom in the World* Score in between 1974 and 2008. Changes with the result “not free” are operationalized as collapse of democracy, and changes with the result “partly free” as hybridizations. He finds 52 cases of democratic decline, of which only four lead to a breakdown of democracy. Bringing those categories to a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), he finds that younger democracies are more likely to experience decline of democracy. Furthermore, correlations with the macro-economic development and economic performance are confirmed. Erdmann concludes that the loss of democratic quality does not necessarily lead to hybridizations or collapse of democracy (Erdmann 2011: 17).

Besides the empirical studies, there is also a conceptual debate on the hypothesis, whether re-autocratizations are facilitated by mechanism of diffusion. Lucan Way argues that there is an increased “authoritarian aggressiveness” (Way 2016: 74). Autocrats attack democracy promotion by offering autocratic alternatives. However, these tactics are still ineffective and in some cases unintendedly lead to democratization (Ibid.: 71ff.). Especially Russia and China are identified as main players in this field and much attention is paid to the increasingly difficult circumstances of non-governmental organizations (Ambrosio 2010; Cooley 2015).

The concept of re-autocratizations

Transformations from democracy to autocracy can be as diverse as their democratic counterpart. Recently, Nancy Bermeo has described this diversity as follows:

Backsliding can take us to different endpoints at different speeds [...] Democratic backsliding can thus constitute democratic breakdown or simply the serious weakening of existing democratic institutions for undefined ends. When backsliding yields situations that are fluid and ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes particularly difficult." (Bermeo 2016: 6)

The terminology applied to those different types of transformations is still under construction. Firstly, the loss of democratic quality has been inter alia named democratic backsliding (Aleman and

Yang 2011)²⁴, hybridization (Erdmann 2011) or democratic erosion (Bermeo 2016). The outcome of those processes remains undefined. Especially the term hybridization refers to diminished subtypes of democracy as an outcome. Secondly, complete regime changes have been called collapse of democracy (Diskin *et al.* 2005), breakdown of democracy (Maeda 2010) or (re-)autocratization (Merkel 2010). The former two terms are ambiguous: The collapse of a regime does not automatically lead to the introduction of an opposite regime. As noted above, not all transformations of the third wave of democracy did in fact lead to the consolidation of democratic institutions and norms. The same applies to regime changes in the opposite direction: breakdown of democracy does not necessarily imply that the initial democracy won't be followed by another democratic regime. The term re-autocratizations shall bypass this ambiguity.

From Electoral Democracy to Re-Autocratization

Re-autocratizations are considered regime changes which replace a democracy with an autocracy. The liberal qualities of the initial regime are not taken into consideration. Regimes are socially constructed (Albrecht and Frankenberger 2010: 49). For the purpose of measurement they need to be attributed to observational concepts. The accentuation or disregard of characteristic indicators is dependent on the conceptualization of the regime type in question. There are countless conceptualizations and operationalizations of democracy. Autocracy however, is in most cases conceptualized as the residual category of democracy: anything non-democratic is considered autocratic (Ibid.: 38). This democracy bias is also reflected in the available data sets. Whereas their objective is to measure all regime types, they are more or less a measurement of the degree of democracy (Hartmann 2015: 149).

I conceptualize re-autocratizations on the basis of a minimalistic democracy concept focusing on the institution of elections. For elections to qualify as democratic, certain standards summarized under the concept of contestation need to be met: “1) ex ante uncertainty, 2) ex post irreversibility, and 3) repeatability” (Cheibub *et al.* 1996: 49). The focus on the institution of elections is based on a Schumpeterian conceptualization of democracy as a method:

The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.” (Schumpeter 1950: 269)

²⁴ However, the term backsliding has also been applied on complete regime collapses, e.g. by Ulfelder and Lustik (2007).

Whereas this operationalization draws a clear line between democracies and autocracies, doubts on the democratic qualities of electoral democracies are reasonable. Given the emergence of hybrid regimes and especially competitive authoritarianism, this dichotomous approach might be outdated. Therefore, the conceptualization of re-autocratization on the basis of electoral democracies bears the risk of oversimplification.

The alternative approach would be the usage of a broad democracy concept including political freedom or the regimes responsiveness to the preferences of the people (Schmidt 2010: 212f.). However, these broad concepts make it difficult to define a line between autocracy and democracy. Therefore, these conceptualizations prove very useful when analyzing the loss of democratic quality, but have weaknesses when looking specifically at the breakdown of democracies and the introduction of autocratic ruling.

Operationalization of Re-Autocratizations

As the conceptualization of re-autocratizations is based on a minimal concept of democracy, a nominal indicator differentiating between autocracy and democracy is sufficient. For the measurement, the list of electoral democracies provided by Freedom House is used. The list of electoral democracies indicates whether a country is considered an electoral democracy. This classification is based on the evaluation of the electoral process in the Freedom in the World data set. The data is available annually from 1989. To represent re-autocratizations the data set will be recoded as follows.

0 = no Re-Autocratization

1 = Re-Autocratization

As re-autocratizations only occur in electoral democracies, only years marked as such are coded 0. All autocratic country years are coded *missing values*. The first year of an autocratic spell is coded 1.

Furthermore, generally instable states which oscillate between electoral democracy and autocracy on a regular basis could degrade the validity of the data. Therefore, a temporal minimal requirement is introduced. Electoral democracies must have existed for three years prior to a regime change for this regime change to qualify as a re-autocratization. Any earlier regime changes are considered indicators of general instability of the regime in question. The duration of three years has not been chosen arbitrarily. This minimal temporal requirement encompasses that at least half of the first legislative

period was an electoral democracy.²⁵ Therefore, cases in which an autocrat used democratic elections to rise to power to then introduce autocratic ruling are censored out. Three years exceeds the criterion introduced by Brownlee (2009: 528) whereby three out of four years need to be democratic to be considered a democratization and exceeds Erdmanns (2011: 11) criterion of two years.

Operationalization of Explanatory Variables

Different theoretic approaches allow the analysis and explanation of re-autocratizations. The basis of the research on regime changes are the transformation theories, focusing on the functional differentiation of the system, structural properties, culture and the choices of political elites.

It is assumed that regime changes are a complex phenomenon. Therefore mono-causal explanations are insufficient (e.g. Erdmann 2011: 18; Merkel and Thiery 2007: 192). In this paper, assumptions of modernization theory and structuralist assumptions are combined. The explanatory variables are grouped in two dimensions: a socio-economic dimension and a politico-institutional dimension.

Socio-Economic Dimension

Building on modernization theory, the socio-economic dimension includes the effect of the degree of modernization, GDP growth rates and the income distribution.

The *Degree of Modernization* (IV₁) is operationalized using the Human Development Index (HDI), which includes the components life expectancy, educational level and GDP. It is hypothesized that the higher the human development, the lower the chances for re-autocratization.

The effect of economic growth rates is puzzling. The theoretic assumptions and empirical findings on their correlation with democratic stability are conflicting. Even though high growth rates are associated with improvements of the living standard, they might challenge democracy due to a sudden crash of traditional values. Lipset hypothesized a functional interdependence between different factors of modernization, such as income, education or democratic values. Unbalanced development in these factors might challenge democracy:

We know that development efforts, projects that interrupt the life styles and the social relationships of people and change level of expectation, as a result, may make people

²⁵ I am not aware of a global analysis of the length of legislative periods. The argument is based on a study of the length of legislative periods in six consolidated democracies between 1960 and 2005. The average length of legislative periods was 3.5 years. The maximum constitutionally legal legislative period was 5 years (Markwardt 2008: 93).

vulnerable to recruitment by extremist movements, religious or secular.” (Lipset 1994: 17)

In contrast, Przeworski and Limongi (1997: 167f.) find that growth generally correlates positively with democratic survival and that bad economic performance is rather a thread to democratic survival.

In this paper both extreme growth and economic crisis are hypothesized to be destabilizing factors for democracy and therefore increase the chance for re-autocratization. In order to test this u-shaped correlation, a transformed version of the annual per-capita GDP is included. Based on the per-capita GDP for each country year, the relative change of the GDP over the 5 past years is calculated. Crisis does not necessarily mean negative growth. Growth that is below the average can be experienced by the population or instrumentalized by non-democratic forces as a crisis. Therefore, the growth rates for each country year will be centered on the median²⁶ of the growth rates in this country during the period under research. As it is hypothesized that both crisis and excessive growth are destabilizing, the absolute values of the centered growth rates are used. This variable then indicates the strength of the deviation of the relative growth of the per-capita GDP over the past five years from the average growth, irrespective whether it is positive or negative. The variable is named *Growth* (IV₂). The higher the *Growth* (meaning the higher the positive or negative deviation from average growth rates) is the higher is the chance for re-autocratization.

The assumption of power dispersion, as a structuralist enhancement of modernization theory, is that power resources need to be distributed equitably for democracy to be stable.

Democracy [...] is a delicate political arrangement that comes into place under a very special set of circumstances. Have too much inequality and asset specificity and a country is almost certain to be perennially under dictatorship. If by chance democracy is introduced in a country whose levels of inequality and/or asset specificity exceed a certain threshold, the country is likely to experience political unrest and revert back to authoritarianism.” (Aleman and Yang 2011: 6)

A widely available measure of distribution of resources is the *Distribution of Income* (IV₃). Even though this relates only to one specific power resource, it still might bring interesting results. The

²⁶ The centering is conducted on the median in order to minimize the impact of outliers.

distribution of the income is included using the GINI-Index. It is hypothesized that the more dispersed the income the lower the chances of re-autocratization.

Politico-Institutional Dimension

Within the structuralist approaches to democratic (in)-stability and transformations, the focus is put on institutions and structure of power (Merkel and Thiery 2007: 192). The constitutional design of a democracy is a central factor. One prominent assumption advocated by Juan Linz (Linz 1990: 51) is that parliamentary democracies are more stable than presidential democracies. The dual power legitimation and the *winner takes all* elections are assumed to have destabilizing potential. However, as seen in the literature review, the empirical results are contradictory. I follow Linz' argumentation and hypothesize that in presidential and semi-presidential democracies the chance for re-autocratization is higher than in parliamentary democracies. For the variable *System of Government* (IV₄) presidentialism and semi-presidentialism will be included as dummy variables.

Furthermore it is assumed that inefficient and ineffective governance lead to general dissatisfaction with the political system and thus instability. Only good governance allows the effects of modernization and economic growth to have a stabilizing effect on a democracy:

Without significant improvements in governance, economic growth will not take off or be sustainable. Without legal and political institutions to control corruption, punish cheating, and ensure a level economic and political playing field, pro-growth policies will be ineffective and their economic benefits will be overshadowed or erased.” (Diamond 2008: 42)

If politics for example are shaped by corruption or the general perception of ineffectiveness and inefficiency, the political system will be instable. The *World Governance Indicator* (WGI) measures perceived governance in six components. However, on the basis of conceptual doubts²⁷ only three of those components are included: *Government Effectiveness*, *Regulatory Quality* and *Control of Corruption*. All three components capture the citizens perception of the issue (Kraay *et al.* 2010: 3). As the components are highly correlated, for the statistical analysis they will be combined to the variable

²⁷ The component *Voice and Accountability* inter alia includes whether citizen can select the government. *Political Stability and Absence of Violence* measures the likelihood that a government will be overthrown violently. Both are directly related to the concept of re-autocratization. *Rule of Law* is not directly related to the concept of electoral democracy, however, I assume that rule of law is an integral part of contestation. To avoid circular argumentation, all three are omitted.

Perceived Governance Performance (IV₅). Even though this is a subjective measure, it is assumed that the perception on these issues might be determining actions. It is hypothesized that high *Perceived Governance Performance* (IV₅) decreases the chances for re-autocratization.

Method

To test the determinants of re-autocratizations, a stepwise binary logistic regression is performed. This method allows the estimation of the (logarithmized) chance for binary dependent variables on the basis of the influence of independent variables. As re-autocratizations are rare events, logistic regression analysis is useful: non-linear relationships between dependent variables and independent variables are allowed (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007: 437).

Due to restrictions on the availability of data the analysis will be performed for the years 1996 to 2013. All countries with at least 1 000 000 inhabitants that experienced a democratic spell of three years or longer during the research period are included in the analysis.²⁸ In total 102 countries summing up to 1382 country years are analyzed.²⁹

Appendix 4 provides an overview of the tested independent variables. As some of the indicators for the independent variables are not available annually, trends were calculated in order to avoid excessive occurrence of missing values. However, the use of these trends might lead to data smoothing and ignore possible volatility. This is especially the case for the variable *Income Distribution*.

In the data set 32 cases of re-autocratization occur. This rarity requires specific consideration in the construction of the regression model. Firstly, regression models applied to rare data tend to underestimate the chance of the event (King and Zeng 2001: 138).³⁰ Secondly, as a rule of thumb there should be 10 cases in the smaller category of the dependent variable per included independent variable. Otherwise the model might suffer from overfitting, meaning that with each additional variable the measures of goodness increase while the variables remain insignificant (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007: 442). Applied to the analyzed data, this means that in each model not more than three

²⁸ Due to restrictions in the data availability (especially the World Governance Indicator and the GINI-Index) micro states cannot be included in the analysis. Appendix 1 provides an overview of all excluded states.

²⁹ The number of country year does not equal *102 countries * 17 years*. Firstly some countries were democratized during the research period. They are only included in the analyses, after the minimal temporal requirement has been met (see Appendix 2). Furthermore in some countries data is missing, therefore those years cannot be included in the regression analysis.

³⁰ To avoid this effect, King and Zeng (2001) propose to over- or undersample the data for the DV in order to improve the estimations. Despite conceptual doubts, both approaches were tested. The results were not much improved in comparison to the classical regression model used here.

variables should be included. Therefore, the regression is performed stepwise for each dimension. Firstly, the all the variables of one dimension are added to the model. Then insignificant variables are dropped. A final model will combine the best variables from both dimensions.

Analysis and findings

To avoid multicollinearity the variables should not be correlated. Appendix 5 shows the correlation coefficients in a cross table. Most of the correlations are on a low to moderate level and therefore acceptable. However, IV₁ *Degree of Modernization* and IV₅ *Perceived Governance Performance* are strikingly high correlated (0.81). for the stepwise regression models in the dimension this is no problem, as IV₁ and IV₅ are in different dimensions. However, in a final model these variables should not be combined.

Table 1: Determinants of Re-Autocratizations 1996-2013

	Socio-Economic Dimension		Politico-Institutional Dimension		Final Model
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	
Degree of Modernization	-0.0724** (-6.477)	-0.0715*** (-6.382)			
Growth	0.0141*** (3.667)	0.0144*** (3.743)			0.0085 (2.178)*
Income Distribution	-0.0125 (-0.598)				
Presidentialism (Dummy)			-0.4784 (-0.911)		
Semi-presidentialism (Dummy)			0.2198 (0.414)		
Perceived governance Performance			-2.6466*** (-5.864)	-2.6240*** (-5.944)	-2.6091*** (-5.859)
Constant	-1.4193* (-2.401)	-1.6992*** (-4.583)	-4.3964*** (-9.350)	-4.5361*** (-12.925)	-4.8956*** (-12.055)
R ² (Nagelkerke)	0.1927	0.1914	0.2440	0.2337	0.2478
Likelihood-Ratio Test	53.658***	53.291***	68.279***	65.347***	69.384***
N=1382 Binary logistic regression analysis. Dependent Variable: re-autocratization. Shown are the coefficients and in parentheses the z-values. Significance levels: *p<=0.05; **p<= 0.01; ***p<= 0.001, insignificant effects in grey Source: Author (data: see Table 1)					

Table 1 summarizes the results of the logistic regression model. In the socio-economic dimension, IV₁ *Degree of Modernization* has a significant negative effect and IV₃ *Growth* shows a significant positive effect on the chance of re-autocratization. The variable IV₂ *Income Distribution* is not significant. Dropping it in Model II has only a marginal effect on the measures of goodness. In the politico-

institutional dimension only IV₅ *Perceived Governance Performance* is significant and shows a negative effect on the chance of re-autocratization.

The dummy variables for the *System of Government* Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism are not significant. This might stem from the small number of events for each of the dummy variables and the reference category. For example only 6 cases of re-autocratization occurred in parliamentary democracies. The same problem occurs when including other classifications that split the data set, such as region or classification of income distribution. As these rarely create significant effects, preliminary conclusions on possible correlations can only be drawn from the comparison of frequencies (Appendix 6).

Final Model

Due to the high degree of correlation between IV₁ and IV₅ only one of them shall be included in the final model. As the degree of modernization shows a lower level of significance than perceived governance performance, this variable is dropped. In comparison to Model II the final model shows an increase in the measures of goodness. For the case of an average growth³¹ and a Perceived Governance Performance of 0³² the model estimates a chance for re-autocratization of 0.0075³³. If governance performance is perceived good, the chance decreases. Increasing deviation of the growth rates from the average decreases this chance.

For the final model, outliers and influential cases were investigated (Appendix 7). Influential cases have a disproportional high effect on the estimation of parameters in the regression model. Cases which experienced re-autocratizations despite a relatively low predicted chance yield high residuals. Cases without re-autocratizations despite a high predicted chance show high leverage. High leverage and residuals combined identify influential cases.

Four cases are identified as influential, all of which are re-autocratization. The data on outliers and influential cases encompasses important information. Firstly, e.g. the case of Liberia in the year 2000 shows high leverage. However, in the following year a re-autocratization occurred, which meets the criteria for an influential case. Therefore, the approach might be improved by a refinement of the time steps: Yearly observations do not distinguish between re-autocratizations at the beginning of the year or at the end. However, a re-autocratization in the first half of a year might be provoked by the

³¹ Meaning that the deviation from the average Growth over 5 years in the country is 0.

³² Slightly under average (See Appendix 4)

³³ Odds (e^{β})

IVs in the previous year. Furthermore, it might be necessary to not only look at yearly developments, but also include the effect of mid- and long-term developments on the chance of re-autocratization.

Repeated Re-Autocratizations

Despite the minimal temporal requirement, we can find countries in the data set that experienced two re-autocratizations in the period of research. Affected are Georgia (2003 and 2008), Guinea Bissau (2003³⁴ and 2010), Niger (1996 and 2009), Central African Republic (2001 and 2008), and Haiti (2000 and 2010). Due to the low number of cases, a split population analysis would not produce reliable results. However, comparing the mean values of the independent variables for the countries that did not experience a re-autocratization with those that experience re-autocratization once or twice, tendencies are revealed. The degree of modernization in countries that experienced re-autocratization twice is considerably lower than in countries with one re-autocratization. If the median is taken into consideration the distribution is obviously skewed to the left. Georgia has a relatively high degree of modernization and therefore increases the mean of the whole group.

The variables *Growth* and *Perceived Governance Performance* also confirm the hypothesized correlations. The perceived governance performance is lowest in countries with two re-autocratizations. Furthermore, the deviation of growth rates from the average growth rates are more erratic than in countries without or with single re-autocratizations.

Table 1: Single and Repeated Re-Autocratizations in Comparison

	No Re-Autocratization	Re-Autocratization (AV=1)	
	74 countries 1150 country years	<i>once</i> 23 countries 202 country years	<i>twice</i> 5 countries 30 country years
Degree of Modernization	74.80 (76.85)	52.92 (54.15)	41.94 (37.05)
Growth	32.64 % (23.37 %)	33.08 % (23.24 %)	39.64 % (37.21 %)
Perceived Governance Performance	0.57 (0.54)	-0.51 (-0.51)	-0.90 (-1.07)

Displayed are the mean and in parentheses the median.
Source: Author

³⁴ This re-autocratization not in the regression model, due to missing values for the independent variables.

Conclusions

Re-Autocratizations are more likely in countries with relatively low human development and the perception of bad governance (high corruption, low government effectiveness and regulatory qualities). Furthermore, excessive deviations from the average growth in a country, be it economic crisis or excessive economic growth, increase the chance for re-autocratization.

As discussed above, the low number of 32 re-autocratizations in the analysis is a challenge. An expansion of the data set or application of other methods such as QcA could improve the estimations. The results presented here only give a rough impression, as the level of abstraction especially in case of the dependent variable is very high, and seems not suitable when taking hybrid regimes and electoral authoritarianism into consideration. Furthermore, whether the identified explanatory variables are genuinely determining democratic instability and re-autocratization, or if the same variables are applicable on authoritarian breakdowns and subsequent democratizations requires further investigation. Countries that experienced re-autocratization twice are assumed to not only have instable democracies, but also to not be able to stabilize autocratically.

The minimal temporal criterion was only applied to the democratic spell. Of the 28 countries that experienced one or more re-autocratizations during the research period 14 were again considered an electoral democracy in 2013. Some were re-autocratizations that were followed shortly by electoral democracies. Georgia (2003) and Bangladesh (2007) did not experience an autocratic spell after the re-autocratization. How do those cases differ from countries that took much longer until the next democratization or were not yet democratized again? What implications does the length of an autocratic spell following a re-autocratization have for the following democratic regimes and vice versa?

Looking at the regional distribution of re-autocratizations, more occurrences in Asia and Africa. However, these categories were not included as variables due to the small number of cases in each class. It might be interesting to investigate, whether there are specific mechanisms of diffusion in place in this region.

The absolute values for the centered growth rates did result in a significant effect. However, looking at the distribution of the growth rates, we find that the variable is not normally distributed: over average economic performance is more common than economic crisis. Furthermore the variable

ignores globalization. Looking at the annual trends globally (see Appendix 8), variance in the distribution is obvious and needs further investigation.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Excluded Countries

Countries that did not experience a democratic spell of at least three years during the research period: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauretania, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, The Gambia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Countries with a population below 1 000 000: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Montenegro, Nauru, Monaco, Palau, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Gren., Suriname, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Appendix 2: Countries in the Population without Re-Autocratization

Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic (from 1999), East Timor (from 2005), Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana (from 1999), Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi (from 1997), Mauritius, Mexico (from 2003), Moldova (from 1998), Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru (from 2004), Tanzania (from 2013), Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay.

Appendix 3: Overview of Countries that Experienced Re-Autocratizations

Country	Code	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Armenia	ARM																		
Bangladesh	BGD																		
Bosnia u. Herzegovina	BIH																		
Burundi	BDI																		
Central African Republic	CAF																		
Georgia	GEO																		
Guinea-Bissau	GNB																		
Haiti	HTI																		
Honduras	HND																		
Kenya	KEN																		
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ																		
Lesotho	LSO																		
Liberia	LBR																		
Madagascar	MDG																		
Mali	MLI																		
Mozambique	MOZ																		
Nepal	NPL																		
Nicaragua	NIC																		
Niger	NER																		
Nigeria	NGA																		
Pakistan	PAK																		
Philippines	PHL																		
Republic Congo	COG																		
Russia	RUS																		
Sri Lanka	LKA																		
Thailand	THA																		
Venezuela	VEN																		
Zambia	ZMB																		

Explanatory Note
 ■ Democratic year (dependent variable = 0)
 ■ Minimal temporal requirement. (dependent variable = missing value)
 ■ Year of re-autocratization (dependent variable = 1)
 ■ Missing value on the side of the independent variables. Country year cannot be included in the regression analysis.
 □ Autocratic year (dependent variable: missing value).
 Source: Author (Data: Freedom House 2015b)

Appendix 4: Independent Variables

Variable	Indicator (Source)	Information	Hypothesized correlation
<i>Socio-economic dimension</i>			
IV ₁ Degree of Modernization	HDI (UNDP 2014)	possible domain {0,100} 0 – no human development 100 – highest human development realized domain {0,70.1} ⁱ mean 46.46 median 48.7	Negative
IV ₂ Growth (absolute value centered)	Centered absolute value of the relative growth rates over 5 years of the GDP per capita in a country (World Bank 2014a, own calculations)	domain {0; 251.2} 0 – average growth rate 251.2 – largest deviation from average growth rate mean 32.92 median 23.80	Positive
IV ₃ Income Distribution	GINI (Worldbank 2013)	possible domain {0,100} 0 – maximum diffusion of income 100 – maximum concentration of income realized domain {0,46.70} ⁱ mean 16.64 median 13.9	Positive
<i>Politico-institutional dimension</i>			
IV ₄ System of Government	Presidentialism [Dummy] Semi-Presidentialism [Dummy] (Cheibub <i>et al.</i> 2010)	0 – no presidentialism 1 – presidentialism 0 – no semi-presidentialism 1 – semi-presidentialism Reference category: parliamentary system	Positive
IV ₅ Perceived Governance Performance	Index of three components of WGI -Control of Corruption -Government Effectiveness -Regulatory Quality (Worldbank 2014b)	Possible domain {-2.5,2.5} realized domain {-1,66,2.27} mean 0.38 median 0.20	negative
<p>ⁱ For the purpose of the logistic regression the lowest value of the original distribution of the variable was set 0, in order to ease the interpretation of the regression constant. It then indicates the additive effect unit for each unit above the lowest value in the dataset. The empirical distributions are IV₁ {24.30,94.40} and IV₃ {23.1,69.8}.</p> <p>Source: Author</p>			

Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix for the Variables

	DV	IV ₁	IV ₂	IV ₃	IV ₄		IV ₅
					Presidential	Semi-Presidential	
DV	1.00	-0.19***	0.07**	0.03	0.01	0.06	-0.18***
IV ₁		1.00	0.02	-0.46***	-0.24***	-0.07***	0.81***
IV ₂			1.00	-0.06**	-0.02	0.02	-0.03
IV ₃				1.00	0.53***	-0.26***	-0.46
IV ₄ Presidential					1.00	-0.43***	-0.30***
IV ₄ Semi-Presidential						1.00	-0.09**
IV ₅							1.00

Pearsons correlation coefficient.
Significance levels: *p<=0,05; **p<= 0,01; ***p<= 0,001, insignificant correlation coefficients in grey.
Source: Author (Data: see Table 1)

Appendix 6: Group Differences in the Frequency of Re-Autocratizations

Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Type of Government

	Parliamentary Systems n=536	Semi-Presidential Systems n=317	Presidential Systems n=326	Total N=1382
no Re-Autocratization (AV=0)	533 98.89 %	304 95.90 %	513 97.54 %	1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (AV=1)	6 1.11 %	13 4.10 %	13 2.46 %	32 2.32 %

Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage.
Source: Author

Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Region

	Africa n=157	Asia n=224	Latin America Caribbean n=319	Eastern Europe n=279	W. Europe N. America n=403	Total N=1382
no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)	151 96.18 %	209 93.30 %	314 98.43 %	273 97.84 %	403 100.00 %	1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (DV=1)	6 3.82 %	15 6.70 %	5 1.57 %	6 2.15 %	0 0.00 %	32 2.32 %

Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage.
Source: Author

Point of Time of First Democratization

	Before 1974 n=582	After 1974 n=800	Total N=1382
no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)	579 99.48 %	771 96.36 %	1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (DV=1)	3 0.51 %	29 3.63 %	32 2.32 %

Depicted is the number of country years and the column percentage.
Source: Author

Frequency of Re-Autocratizations by Grouped Income Diffusion

	high diffusion n=346	medium diffusion n=346	medium concentration n=344	High concentration n=346	total N=1 382
no Re-Autocratization (DV=0)	342 98.84 %	340 98.26 %	330 95.38 %	338 97.69 %	1350 97.68 %
Re-Autocratization (DV=1)	4 1.16 %	6 1.73 %	14 4.05 %	8 2.31 %	32 2.32 %

The grouping is conducted on the basis of the quartiles: 1st quartile 31.67, median 37.00, 3rd quartile 47.17.
Depicted are the country years per category and column percentage.
Source: Author


Appendix 7: Residuals and Leverage for Outlier Cases

Case number	Residuals	Leverage	Country	Year	Re-Autocratization	Growth ⁱ	Perceived Governance Performance
<i>High Residuals</i>							
1.256	16.18	0.00	Thailand	2005	Yes	-1.83	0.43
38	8.63	0.00	Armenia	2003	Yes	-4.48	-0.26
1060	7.58	0.00	Philippines	2007	Yes	25.84	0.08
743	7.54	0.00	Lesotho	1998	Yes	-29.02	-0.13
<i>High Leverage</i>							
1304	-0.59	0.12	Ukraine	2008	No	245,22	-0.71
1188	-0.43	0.09	Serbia	2005	No	251.19	-0.31
1303	-0.49	0.08	Ukraine	2007	No	223.03	-0.67
718	-1.19	0.07	Liberia	2000	No	105.96	-1.84

Case number	Residuals	Leverage	Country	Year	Re-Autocratization	Growth ⁱ	Perceived Governance Performance
<i>Influential Cases</i>							
471	7.26	0,01	Georgia	2008	Yes	167.33	0,30
139	2.42	0,03	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1999	Yes	173.91	-0.93
1.358	1.03	0.12	Venezuela	2008	Yes	204.61	-1.11
719	1.17	0.16	Liberia	2001	Yes	60.47	-1.68

ⁱ In this table the centered growth rates are depicted. The signs are included for reference.
Source: Author

Appendix 8: Annual Distribution of the Country Centered Growth Rates



Source: Author.