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Editorial message

Dear reader,

On behalf of the POLITIKON editorial board, I have the honor to present the current issue of the Journal.

POLITIKON is an important pillar of IAPSS; it represents the academic side of the association, and also the bond with the young political science community. After two years without publishing the Journal, the current IAPSS Executive Committee together with the new editorial board, decided to stick with this project in a different way: this is the first online issue of POLITIKON. The idea of changing from print to online came out for the benefit of the increasing number of IAPSS members around the world. We have the commitment to reach every place in which Political Science is developing.

This issue has an important connotation: we live in a changing time, in which citizens do not feel identified nor represented by their politicians and political institutions. From the Arab Spring to the hatching of the economic crisis, the roll of citizens has become more important and, in this, young people have a specific roll to play. For that reason, it is quite important to participate in the building of new ideas, to criticize the established order and to look forward to better times. As young political scientists we should analyze these phenomena and contribute to change.

POLITIKON is a Journal that gives the opportunity to discuss those new political scenarios, to learn and to be heard.

Keeping with tradition, POLITIKON has maintained its high standard evaluation method; the current Board enjoyed the collaboration of a high quality reviewing team[1], and with the support of the prestigious Advisory Board, in which we have the honorable presence of Professors *Manuel Garreton, João Carlos Espada, Carole Pateman, Leonardo Morlino, Gian Franco Pasquino and Phillip Schmitter*.

This new beginning is exciting but implicates a big effort for the editorial team. We are thankful to all the authors who submitted their contributions, showing that POLITIKON is an important pillar for young political science students.

The present number critically evaluates different aspects of the international community, from the problem of democratic deficit and its challenges, to nation-building and security policies towards processes of national identity building.

The article **Yes" or "no": an analysis of the 2010 referendum in Turkey,** written by Ozden Melis Ulug and Arda Bilgen, analyzes the results of the 2010 constitutional referendum to amend the Constitution of 1982. The study presents a snapshot and evaluation of the 2010 referendum campaign according to relevant theories of psychology and political science in order to explain the social effects that its process revealed. This article contributes to the explanation of both psychological and political factors in referenda.

Mikheil Shavtvaladze in **Electoral Reform in a Post-Soviet Republic: the case of Georgia** aims to contribute to comparative electoral studies in the post-soviet

[1] We want to thank to the honorable reviewing team for its important contribution: Felipe Nunes, Alicia Lisidini, Elisabete Azevedo-Harman, Sander van Hamperen and Ana Isabel Xavier

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sphere, with particular focus on Georgia. The author examines the major features of the recent electoral reform in Georgia in line with the "theory of post-soviet regime change" and analyzes the extent of the reform's trustworthiness in terms of holding free and fair competitive elections in Georgia. The author concludes the research demonstrating that this particular case of electoral reform can be adequately explained by the aforementioned theory on post-soviet regime change.

Understanding Russian aggression towards Georgia: an expected-utility approach, an article by Michael J. Langlois, seeks to understand the motives of Russian aggression against Georgia. The author asks if the plan was an attempt to restrain Georgia from formally joining the Western coalition, or whether the decision was more complex: could Russia hope to gain the key role in the oil trade routes by initiating the conflict? Could Russia´s goal be the prevention of Georgia's acceptance into NATO? To answer these questions, Langlois used the expected-utility model developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, aiming to accurately elucidate Russia's conflict decision.

Going to the other side of the word, Denisse Rodriguez Olivari in her article **Why corruption is perceived to be higher in poor countries than in richer countries?: a critical assessment of the Corruption Perception Index** examines why corruption is perceived to be higher in poor countries, than in richer countries. The author analyzes the argument that narratives of corruption have an impact on the definition, perception and measurement of the phenomenon. The article therefore assesses the implications of these three dimensions in the construction of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The author aims to examine the instrument of

measurement in order to disaggregate the usual discourse on the subject and supporting ideas behind corruption as it is being measured nowadays.

Isabella Hermann in **Psychology, Political Psychology and International Relation – What are we talking about?** analyzes how psychology and international relations theory share an ambivalent relationship. The author bases the argument on the idea that psychology is neglected within international relations theory building. However, leaving psychology out of it is not understandable from a psychological point of view since the differentiation between "rationality" on the one side and "irrationality" on the other side is artificial and contra-empirical.

In the article **Security, Violence and the Sacred,** Manuel Mireanu argues that the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-foreigners violence in Europe in the last few years, and their consequential labeling as a threat to citizens' security, should be seen not only as effects of government practices. Instead, violence should be seen as a constitutive force of the community. This paper focuses on the nexus between security, violence and the sacred. The author adopts René Girard's work on the 'scapegoat' to interpret how violence and the sacred converge on the security demands of the population.

In the article **A Constant 'State of War' Or A 'Dog-Eat-Dog' System? A Critical Analysis of (Neo)realist Perspectives on World Affairs,** written by Nathan Andrews, the author examines the (neo)realist approach to world affairs, especially since this approach purports to deal with the 'here and now' of international politics. The author emphasizes that (Neo) realism often presents a world that is anarchic, bound by state power and self-interest. This paper investigates realism, particularly the realism of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, to ascertain the extent to which

the assumptions these authors present explain the nature and scope of international relations.

Dawn Walsh in his article **Taoisigh & Prime Ministers' policies towards extremists in Northern Ireland 1985-1996: A Learning Process?** analyzes the effects of policy changes incorporated by the British and Irish governments. In this paper the author presents several possible explanations to the case of policy changes effected by the British and Irish governments in relation to negotiating with extremists in Northern Ireland during the 1985-1996 period.

In the article **Post-Genocide Rwanda A Better Alternative to Prevent the Recurrence of Violence**, Martina De Donno seeks to demonstrate that the statement of Toft that emphasizes in the rebel military victories as a result in an enduring peace and democratization, in the long-term it is unlikely to be effective, especially in Rwanda. The author explains her position about the possible resolution that The 'Rwandan path to democracy' could be the cause of possible future violence, and not the solution to it.

Finally, in the article written by Özgur Tezer, **A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey-European Union Relations within the Context of Five Phase Spiral Model: Human Rights Dimension**, the author analyzes the European Union-Turkey relations with regard to human rights reforms in Turkey and particularly the European institutions' impact on the reform process that they promote in the country. In order to understand Turkey's case, the author uses a constructivist approach and the Five Phase Spiral Model, which introduces a sociological point of view to world politics.

As can clearly be understood, this issue offers a spectacular variety of themes to reflect on and discuss.

We hope you enjoy the papers, and feel motivated to submit your own contribution for the upcoming issues.

Keep the IAPSS spirit.

Gabriela Marzonetto, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo

POLITIKON Editorial board 2012-2013

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"Yes" or "No": An Analysis of the 2010 Referendum in Turkey

Özden Melis Uluğ[2] , Arda Bilgen [3]

Abstract

Referendums are used as last-ditch devices to resolve issues in certain contexts. This was the case in Turkey, as the current Justice and Development Party government decided to hold a constitutional referendum on September 12, 2010 to amend the current Constitution of 1982, ratified by the military junta of 1980-1983. At the end, 58% of the voters voted "Yes", as opposed to 42% of "No" votes. However, despite its enormous political and social impact, the subject remains under-researched and in need of explanation. This study gives a snapshot and evaluation of the 2010 referendum campaign according to relevant theories of psychology and political science. Accordingly, this study denotes eleven interrelated factors of crucial importance in similar referendums and discusses their representation in the context of referendum, thus, contributes to the literature in terms of explaining both psychological and political factors in the referendums.

Introduction

In many modern democracies, a great number of elections, referendums, and voting processes take place every year in order to enable the voters to shape their future on the basis of their decision and will. In this process, while some of the voters value for certain aspects of a candidate, party or ideology, some vote in an irresponsible manner. The latter case is more common in the cases of referendums in some countries, as voters are generally little informed of what or who they vote for. Even though politicians usually dislike referendums (Butler and Ranney 1994), there is an optimistic suggestion that voters' political interest and engagement, along with their political knowledge, will increase as a function of more frequent use of the referendum (Qvortrup 2005).

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In some occasions, it is a common practice for political party leaders to refer to referendums as ultimum remedium for resolving issues. This was the case in Turkey in the recent past, as a constitutional referendum was held on September 12, 2010. The main reason for referring to a referendum was that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, henceforth AKP) government, amidst objections of the opposition parties in the parliament, wanted to amend the current Constitution of 1982, which was ratified by a popular referendum during the military junta of 1980-1983. In this context, the AKP government decided to hold a referendum as a last resort solution to achieve its goal(s) in a legitimate and democratic way.

To this end, the AKP conducted a very comprehensive and successful campaign. Despite the political and psychological significance of this successful campaign, however, the subject remains under-researched and in need of explanation. This study aims to evaluate the AKP's 2010 referendum campaign for a new constitution that would include 26 amendments regarding the equality before the law, right to privacy, freedom of movement, children's rights, right to organize labour, right to petition, loss of membership in parliament, administration of parliament, recourse to judicial review, public service, inspection of judicial services, military justice, constitutional court, supreme council of judges and prosecutors and economic planning in Turkey from psychological and political perspectives. In addition, the study will try to explain what factors are of crucial importance in similar referendums, and thus, contribute to the literature in terms of understanding both psychological and political factors in the referendums.

In accordance with that, in the first section of the study, a background of the referendum will be given. Following this, the campaign activities and how the AKP won the referendum will be evaluated by incorporating different theories, models, and study results in a concise yet comprehensive manner.

Background

On September 12, 1980, Turkish Armed Forces staged a military coup and two years later prepared a constitution, which was indeed not a civil constitution, for ratification. The AKP was the first political party to amend that many articles at once, partly because of being the first political party to rule the country without a coalition since the military agreed to pass the government to the Motherland Party in 1983. The AKP, as well as the main opposition party Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,

henceforth CHP) aimed to change the Constitution of 1982 on the grounds that the country was in dire need of a new, civil constitution and the "people" were expecting a change after almost three decades.

With that aim in their mind, the AKP conducted a serious referendum campaign and gave the clear message to the electorate regarding the necessity to amend the Constitution of 1982. In this process, the AKP and some other right-wing parties such as the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) and the Great Union Party (Buyuk Birlik Partisi) supported the "Yes" for the constitutional change, while the opposition parties such as the "social democrat" CHP, the "far-right" Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, henceforth MHP), and other impotent left-wing parties supported the "No" campaign to these amendments in the referendum. Throughout the referendum process, the AKP emphasized that the constitutional amendments would make Turkey a more democratic and stable country. In return, the CHP claimed that the AKP had a hidden Islamist agenda to set up their own cadre in constitutional court to violate the judiciary independence, change Turkey's republican regime in the future, and challenge the secular foundations of the country. On the other hand, pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi, henceforth BDP) boycotted the referendum on the grounds that the changes in the new constitution were irrelevant to Turkey's democratization process. Amidst such debates, the AKP won the referendum at the end of the process, as the 58% of the voters voted "Yes" and 42% voted "No". The following section will try to evaluate the factors behind this success.

Evaluation

Indeed, there are numerous factors for the victory of the AKP. Under the light of the political and psychological theories, models, and results of the previous studies, it can be suggested that these factors of success include (1) active leadership, (2) mass commercialization, (3) social influence, (4) unity and articulate messages, (5) effective use of the media, (6) effective use of popular figures and organizations, (7) use of negative emotions to influence opinions, (8) positive and negative advertisement, (9) financial support and huge election budget, (10) religion, and (11) expert power. Below, each one of them will be discussed in a concise, yet informative manner.

Active Leadership

According to Bean and Mughan (1989), political party leaders are increasingly at the heart of party struggle in democracies. Specifically with the media's ever more significant role in the dissemination of political information and the structuring of political discussion, party leaders are among the primary means by which political parties project themselves and shape popular images. Similarly in the literature, it is generally indicated that the active leadership is needed for good teaching both in the schools and projects. In line with that, it is arguable that the party leaders need to perform active leadership in order to "teach" the issue at hand and transfer information.

This was what Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan aimed to do during the referendum campaign. He visited 36 out of 81 different provinces in Turkey, including Istanbul, Ankara, Bingol, Malatya and Bursa in order to effectively run the referendum campaign in a short period of time. He not only attended the mass meetings in provinces, but also participated in the "iftar tents", where people break their fast in the evenings during Ramadan in 2010, to be in closer interaction with the electorate. In these meetings, he and his member of parliaments (MPs) had close contacts with the local people and explained them why casting the "Yes" vote would be in their and Turkey's best interest. To further influence the voters, Prime Minister Erdoğan engaged in demagoguery at times. For instance, he cried in the parliament for people who were executed because of their left/communist political leanings after another coup in 1971. He pretended to take the revenge of these people in the referendum, even though his and his party's ideology were quietly opposite of them. Apparently, through this, he aimed to show that he and his party felt sorrow for all people, regardless of their political views, and shared their grief. In addition, he indeed aimed to get support from the electorate from the left-wing.

Mass Commercialization

According to the mere exposure theory, if a person experiences a new/simple stimulus repeatedly, it brings about more positive affect for the object, idea, or phenomenon at hand (Atkin and Heald 1976). The AKP exposed their "Yes" campaign to almost every person in the public through the effective and widespread use of billboards, cloth banners, flags, and brochures with their slogans and ideas on them. During the campaign, a person, whether at home or out, was bombarded with the AKP's messages conveyed through pamphlets, TV programs, radio shows. To illustrate, during the above-mentioned mass meetings, the AKP distributed t-shirts, cloth bags, badges, car air

fresheners, stickers, bottle waters, hand fans and hats with their referendum slogans on them. These were quite important materials for the people at that time, as the referendum campaign was in August, arguably the hottest month in Turkey. In addition, large billboards were rented by the AKP to inform the public about their campaign. The slogan of the AKP, "Our love is people; our decision is yes", was visible at all times during the campaign. In other words, the AKP endeared itself to the electorate by exposing more and more.

Social Influence

Social influence theory posits that public compliance can be created "through normative social influence, where people conform essentially to be liked by their peers" (Fein, Goethals, and Kugler 2007). Moreover, another study result interested in Canadian Referendum in 1992 shows that, according to the consensus estimates, the more a voter is exposed to friends and family members who supported the "Yes" campaign, the higher the estimates of the "Yes" vote in the eyes of that voter. Hence, it is more probable that the voter will support and vote on the "Yes" side (Koestner et al. 1995). This phenomenon is called "false consensus bias". According to Koestner et al. (1995), "the referendum context ensured that there was a built-in contingency between the behaviour of the reference group and the individual making the estimate." Therefore, if the estimate results of referendum are similar to their estimates, they are more likely to vote on the "Yes" sides.

This was the case in Turkey, as well. The results of the public opinion surveys conducted before the referendum were generally showing that "Yes" votes were ahead of "No" votes. Furthermore, the survey companies that were supportive of the AKP displayed the results more biased as "Yes" was by a great amount ahead of "No". When the voters believed that their friends and the people in their environment supported one party or one ideology which was also supported by survey opinions, they were more likely to support it in order not to be 'out of group'. The AKP was very successful on showing to the public that there was a high consensus on supporting "Yes", even though it was not totally reflecting the reality regarding the results. Through that tactic, the AKP might have increased the possibility for the electorate to vote for "Yes" by showing there is a high support for "Yes".

Unity and Articulate Messages

In order to better communicate with the electorate and show its unity and team-spirit for better results, the AKP prepared a guide to direct the entire party members in their local branches. To this end, a guidance of 23 rules that included suggestions towards the simplicity and visibility of the conveyed messages was distributed. It was strongly recommended that the discourses were adapted to the understanding levels of people. This phenomenon can be explained by the elaboration likelihood model (Dainton 2004), which argues that there are two possible routes or methods of influence which are centrally routed messages (more complex) and peripherally routed messages (less complex). Elaborated messages are ineffective when targeted participants are incapable of receiving the message. Therefore, such campaigns use peripherally routed messages that are incomplex. The results after the referendum demonstrated that there was a negative correlation between the educational level and the inclination to cast "Yes" vote. Given that, it was understandable that the AKP refrained from using centrally routed (complex) messages and adapted the discourses and messages according to the level of understanding of the electorate.

Effective Use of the Media

In the literature of psychology, it is argued that national elections in most societies have become oriented toward candidate-centred media campaigns (McAllister 2001). It is further argued that party leaders packaged and presented through the electronic media and this type of canvassing produces tangible electoral gains. Similarly, Hillygus (2005) shows that mobilization, specifically among voters who previously not planning to cast their votes, increases with high exposure to campaign advertising and personal vote persuasion. The results of the referendum demonstrate that the AKP was very successful in using the media and advertisements as a tool to influence and persuade the electorate, as well as to explain its goals and ideology. Especially in terms of appearance, Prime Minister Erdoğan and cabinet members were almost always on mainstream TV channels during the campaign process, and always prepared to discuss their prospects with the opposition parties. Moreover, specifically Prime Minister Erdoğan paid extra attention in order to prevent the media from spoiling the essence of his and his party's campaign messages. To illustrate, at one occasion when Erdoğan encountered a difficult question on a very popular TV program, Siyaset Meydani (Political Arena) on August 23, 2010, he refrained

from answering a challenging question. Instead of trying to answer the question, he scolded the moderator for asking such a question.

Effective Use of Popular Figures and Organizations

The above-mentioned elaboration likelihood model (Dainton 2004) indicates that simple messages are more preferable for voters to understand the issue better. Accordingly, using agents such as popular figures and organizations to convey messages in a simple form instead of a complex form greatly helps the electorate body comprehend the gist of any message and party's goals. In line with that, The AKP used popular writers, columnists, singers, and the presidents of very popular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Turkey during the campaign. These figures explained what they would vote for in the referendum to support the AKP. Even one of the arabesque singers composed a rhythmic song to explain why he votes "Yes". Also, Erdoğan visited a great number of NGOs and associations including TÜSİAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) and asked–even forced–them to explain their position. As the president of TÜSİAD did not want to reveal the organization's position, Erdoğan went too far to and stated that people who decided not to vote would be neutralized and people who voted for "No" would be "Coup-lovers". In a similar vein, Egemen Bağış, the current minister for the European Union affairs and Turkey's chief negotiator with the EU, stated that the mental health and patriotism of those whose vote is "No" to the amendments in the referendum should be questioned. The results suggest that these popular figures and organizations helped the AKP spread their referendum campaign messages out and increase their "Yes" votes at the end of the process.

Use of Negative Emotions to Influence Opinions

Jerit (2004) suggests that in order to mobilize their party's base and also attract the support of the uncommitted voters, political candidates have the incentive to refer to arguments that evoke emotions such as fear, anxiety, and anger. Evoking these emotions gives political candidates the opportunity to underline consensual values. According to one of the social judgment theories, attitudes affect behaviour since, your attitude toward a candidate will influence whether you vote for him/her (Dainton 2004). The theory argues that there should be "latitude of acceptance" which includes all ideas that are acceptable for the person to be persuaded.

Under this light, it is fair to argue that the AKP induced fear and anxiety during campaign activities. As mentioned before, the Party labelled those who would vote for "No" in the referendum as "Coup-lovers". This was an informed choice, as the 1980 coup was staged on the very same day, September 12, and had very negative connotations for the majority of people in Turkey. As countless number of people, regardless of their political leanings, were killed or tortured due to the 1980 coup, nobody would normally like to remember this day in Turkey. Bearing this in mind, Prime Minister Erdoğan reminded the voters in many occasions that they had to vote for "Yes" in order not to face a similar catastrophic coup again. In other words, the idea and fear of "another coup" was used as a political weapon to garner the support of the people who suffered from the past coups. Therefore, the AKP's campaign was well designed according to social judgment theory, as, in the referendum context, the idea of not facing a new coup fell within the border of latitude of acceptance for people who suffered from 1980 coup.

Positive and Negative Advertisement

King and McConnell (2003) argue that positive advertisement is effective in winning the case for the sponsoring candidate, while negative advertisement is effective in creating a less favourable image of the candidates and minimizing the likelihood of voting for the targeted candidate. In this context, even though there is the high risk that negative political advertising can produce a boomerang effect that may create more negative feelings toward the sponsor rather than the target, Prime Minister Erdoğan not only conducted a positive campaign for himself and his party, but also did a negative advertising for opposition party leaders. He fiercely attacked Kemal Kilicdaroğlu (the leader of the CHP) and Devlet Bahceli (the leader of the MHP), especially during mass meetings. Erdoğan's move was not only successful in terms of increasing the "Yes" votes, but also increasing the election turnout (77%), as, according to the mobilization hypothesis (Martin 2004), negative information attracts attention, people pay more attention to negative information than positive one, therefore, turnout rate in the election is increased by the negative stimulants.

Financial Support and Huge Election Budget

The public choice theory (Brodsky and Thompson 1993) suggests that most of the voters behave in self-interested (private-regarding) ways, rather than in selfless (public-regarding) ways. Supporting this, the study results of Bullock, Gaddie, and Ferrington

(2002) show that when more money is spent for the campaign, there is more stimulated environment. In accordance with that, the more the environment is stimulated, the more a political party gets participation. As is well known, the AKP granted the voters with low socio-economic levels coal and food supplies, as it did in every election process. Additionally, the municipalities of the AKP allowed everyone to use big buses and minibuses–covered by the campaign slogans–for free to attend their mass meetings. These municipalities even employed the supporters. With full awareness that the more they give financially to the electorate, the more votes they will win, the AKP spent 25.282.162 TL (approximately £10.826.986) for the campaign activities, accordingly to parliamentary documents (2010). In brief, there was a highly stimulated environment all around Turkey and the voters were inclined to vote "Yes" due to their short-term betterment in financial conditions.

Religion

Religion affects political behaviour of large groups of voters (Powell and Self 2002). The AKP is widely defined as a conservative democrat party with Islamic roots or leanings. The Party's nature paved the way for the emergence of a close connection between the AKP and the controversial Gulen Movement, whose goal is to teach a moderate form of Islam worldwide under the teachings of the exiled Islamic theologian/preacher Fethullah Gulen. During the campaign, Gulen himself addressed his followers in millions and explained the importance of casting a "Yes" vote in the referendum by stating that he wished they had a chance to raise the dead people from their graves and urge them to cast 'yes' votes at the referendum. In a similar vein, one of the Turkish Islamist opinion leaders, Abdullah Büyük, stated that if people vote "yes" with faith, they would deserve a place in the heaven. In this context, the AKP successfully influenced the voting behaviour of the electorate through linking religion and politics, as well as using powerful, credible, and popular people to affect masses.

Expert Power

Social influence theory can be explained as the process by which individuals make real changes to their feelings and behaviours as a result of interaction with others who are perceived to be similar, desirable, or expert (Rashotte 2007). Research on political persuasion also demonstrates that the effectiveness of a message depends largely on the

credibility, authority, and likability of the message source (as cited in Hillygus 2004). In other words, in close relation with the factor above, people can easily be influenced by the expert power, which depends on the target's attributing superior knowledge and experience to the agent or person. In the context on the relationship between religion and voting behaviour in the referendum, it can be argued that the followers of the Gulen Movement or other devout persons found these religious figures/experts credible, believed in them, and casted their votes accordingly. Thus, the AKP used very prominent figures in Turkey including politicians, experts in economy, and religion and public opinion leaders to influence big masses through their expertise, credibility, authority and likeability.

Conclusion

This study gives the snapshot of the 2010 referendum campaign in Turkey and evaluates it according to relevant psychology and political science theories, models, and previous study results. In the light of the findings, it can be argued that the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan together were quite successful in the referendum campaign in terms of meeting the expectations of the voters and taking the sociological, psychological, political, and economic realities of the country into account prior to formulating the campaign strategy. The results of the referendum, with 58% in favour and 42% against, are supportive of this claim as well.

This study indicates that the AKP has better understood the dynamics of the Turkish society and political life and formulated its policies and election/referendum strategies accordingly. This crucial factor brought victory to the party on September 12, 2010, as it did previous election victories in the past decade. It appears that in different occasions and context, other political parties in different countries or of different political leanings would implement certain strategies and tactics the AKP has implemented so far. Last, but not least, taking the theories drawn from the areas of politics and psychology into account to understand why and how a political party succeeds or the factors behind the high turnout rate would generously help.

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Electoral Reform in a Post-Soviet Republic: the case of Georgia

Mikheil Shavtvaladze[4]

Abstract

The paper aims to contribute to the comparative electoral studies in post-soviet sphere, with particular focus on Georgia. Specifically, I tried to examine the major features of the recent electoral reform in Georgia in line with the "theory of post-soviet regime change" and analyzed the extent of the reform's trustworthiness in terms of holding free and fair competitive elections in Georgia. The summary of conclusions drawn from the analysis shows that this particular case of electoral reform can be adequately explained by the theory on post-soviet regime change.

Introduction

Holding free and fair competitive elections (Lipset and Lakin 2004, 19), guaranteeing peaceful and constituional transfer of power, is yet unachievable for Georgia. The absence of such independent electoral system poses serious problems to further democratization process in country and continues to be a major source of political and social unrest. Between 2008 and 2009, large-scale anti-government demonstrations were unleashed in Georgia's capital Tbilisi largely due to the disputed extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2008.

According to the official results on these controversial elections, Mikheil Saakashvili won the presidential elections with minor advantage garnering just 53.41 per cent (Civil Georgia 2008) of votes from 56.18 per cent of voter turnout. As for the 2008 parliamentary elections, despite a low voter turnout of 53.9 per cent (Civil Georgia 2008), the ruling (UNM) United National Party, receiving 59.31 per cent of votes, ensured 119 of the 150 parliamentary seats. Due to such unequal configuration of the parliamentary seats, strongly favorable to the ruling party, Georgia once again ended up with one-party rule.

Incurring severe criticism domestically and internationally, the government of Georgia was forced to make significant efforts to restore its shattered image and prove its commitment to democratic credentials. As a result, it introduced the direct election of the

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mayor, yet applicable only for Tbilisi, by amending the Electoral Code of Georgia in December 2009 (Transparency International Georgia 2010, 3). Moreover, important attempts were made to hold 30 May 2010 municipal elections in accordance with legal procedures.

However, despite these steps to improve the electoral system and its legal framework over the past years, serious deficiencies yet remain. As a result, public trust toward electoral administration continues to be low and divided. Based on the CRRC's Caucasus Barometer 2010 survey results, only 5 per cent of the households in Georgia disagree completely with the statement that election administration is politically biased. Whereas, 29 per cent agreed somewhat that election administration is politically biased. However, one third of respondents did not know the answer regarding this statement (Caucasus Research Resource Centers 2010).

Moreover, based on the interim and final reports prepared by competent local and international observer organizations, serious legal and procedural deficiencies were detected during the 2010 local self-government elections in Georgia, risking further deterioration of the confidence of voters in the electoral process (The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe 2010).

For example, the EU mission reported that specific legal and procedural violations were identified in relation to the protracted vote counting process and doubtful practices of voter mobilization and control (The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe 2010). Furthermore, the mission indicated that the pre-election period was not free from intimidation and bullying tactics. Significant shortcomings also were detected with respect to misuse of administrative resources and the appeal procedure (The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe 2010).

In addition, based on the final report on the monitoring results of the May 30 municipal elections, the Transparency International Georgia points that creating unequal conditions for the political contestants (Transparency International Georgia 2010) during the pre-election period in favor of the ruling party remains to be subject of serious concern. Specifically, allocation of budget funds for the election campaign purposes, illegal use of human and material resources of the government agencies during the campaign and pressure on political opponents and voters aggravates the idea to establish truly

competitive level playing field for all participants (Transparency International Georgia 2010).

Most recent demonstration of such power abuse from the government of Georgia was measures taken against the Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who recently announced his intention to enter into Georgian politics with the aim to challenge Saakashvili's regime in forthcoming elections. Faced with such strong opponent, the government turned to the drastic actions by stripping Ivanishvili of his Georgian citizenship (The Economist 2012), under the pretext that he was at the same time holder of French and Russian citizenships.

Furthermore, the government initiated the draft law that envisaged further restriction of the rules regarding the party financing by empowering the Chamber of Control (Georgia's internal auditing agency) to oversee the processes. As a result, the Chamber of Control launched "widespread questioning of opposition party members and supporters throughout Georgia" (Amnesty International 2012) that ended up with" the selective examination of only opposition party members and presumed supporters" (Amnesty International 2012).

However, sensing strong backlash as from international as well as from local civil society organizations regarding these draconian and politically motivated moves, aimed only to intimidate opposition groups , the government started to reconsider the motions.

In this article, firstly I intend to discuss major features of recent electoral reforms in Georgia. Secondly, I want to analyze to what extent these reforms are trustworthy in terms of holding free and fair competitive elections and ensuring government's accountability in Georgia.

Briefly on electoral systems

As for electoral systems and their basic functions, they can be defined as "the means by which votes are translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office" (Farrell 2006, 3). Hence, the design of the electoral system largely determines how easier or difficult it would for concrete politician or party to win mandates (Farrell 2006, 3). For their part, corresponding electoral laws regulate the electoral systems.

It is noteworthy also to mention that electoral systems in general are designed to perform a number of contradictory functions such as reflect voters' wishes, form a strong

and stable government and elect qualified cadres for offices (Farrell 2006, 3). Correspondingly, the central concern of a debate on electoral systems usually focuses on which type of system to choose one that produces strong and stable government or one that ensures "the inclusion of minority voices" (Norris 1997, 5) in legislature.

Given that, classification of electoral systems, despite their diverse nature, is possible based on what results a particular electoral system brings in the process of transforming "votes into seats" (Farrell 2006, 4). Consequently, two types of electoral outcomes, proportional or non-proportional (Farrell 2006, 4), can be observed.

If the main distinguishing characteristic of the PR system is "the proportionality of votes to seats" (Norris 1997, 7), in contrast, non-proportional systems tend to ensure any particular party with clear majority of parliamentary seats facilitating the party to form strong and stable government. While PR system in most cases produces coalition government, non-proportional system, on the other hand, usually generates single-party governments.

Apart of electoral outcomes, comparison and classification of electoral systems can be also achieved through identification and examination of their major elements, which in turn are the mechanisms responsible for translating votes into seats. Hence, based on the research results of leading political scientists in this area of study, three main electoral variables can be highlighted: electoral formula, district magnitude and ballot structure (Lijphart 1990, 3).

Speaking about electoral formula, it is a mechanism, which translates votes into seats. On its part, there are various forms of plurality, PR and mixed systems. With regard to district magnitude, firstly, it implies to what magnitude certain electoral district has, based on the registered voters, and secondly, how many representatives a district will have in legislature. Hence, district magnitude has substantial influence on the proportionality of electoral outcomes, implying that the greater the electoral magnitude the more proportionally are votes reflected in seats (Farrell 2006, 6). Lastly, the ballot structure defines "whether the voter votes for a candidate or a party and whether the voter makes a single choice or expresses a series of preferences" (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2008, 5).

Concerning the dilemma of which electoral system to choose specifically by a post-soviet country such as Georgia, among most countries in Latin America, Southern Europe

and later East and Central Europe, almost none of them selected plurality/majority systems. Instead, their growing sympathy was showed towards mixed electoral systems, which represent some combinations of plurality/majority and proportional systems (e.g. the German model).

Electoral system in Georgia: some basic aspects

According to the existing Electoral Code of Georgia, "elections in Georgia shall be held on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot". As for the voting rights, based on the electoral code, every citizen of Georgia from the 18 years of age has the right to vote (The Electoral Code of Georgia 2005). Georgia, under the current Constitution, is the presidential state with unicameral parliament (Parliament of Georgia n.d.). Accordingly, the President of Georgia is elected for a five-year term "by absolute majority vote through a two-round system" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012).

As to the supreme legislative body of Georgia, the parliament, composed of 150 seats, is elected in every four year. Besides, Georgia elects its parliament through "mixed" electoral system (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2011), implying that 75 members from 150 are elected through "a closed-list proportional system" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012), while the other 75 members are elected "by majority vote in single-member constituencies" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012).

To win parliamentary seats under the proportional system, the parties should surpass 5 percent threshold (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2011). However, in case of electing parliamentary members by majority vote, if none of the candidate gathers "30 percent of valid vote" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012), second round of voting will be scheduled "between the two leading candidates" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012). Furthermore, based on both systems, voting will not be considered valid, unless "at least 50 percent of the registered electors" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012)vote for the poll. Besides, voting is not compulsory in Georgia (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2011).

It is notable to emphasize that the legislative power of the Georgian parliament is limited by the parliaments of the Georgia's Autonomous Republics of Adjara and Abkhazia. Correspondingly, the Supreme Council of Adjara (parliament) is also elected by mixed electoral system (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2006, 5). Prior to the constitutional

changes in 2005, the parliament of Georgia consisted of 235 delegates, from which 150 were elected through a proportional system and 85 through majority/plurality system.

Moreover, municipal elections in Georgia occur in every four years based on mixed electoral system. While, regional representative bodies are elected "by a plurality/majority multi-member system" (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2006, 5), Tbilisi *Sakrebulo* (City Council), consisting of 50 seats, are elected by means of mixed system. Unlike Tbilisi, where "the threshold in the PR tier is 4 percent" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012), in other parts of Georgia, it is 5 percent. Additionally, except of Tbilisi, "mayors in other cities are not directly elected" (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) 2012).

Most expert around the world agree that for building truly democratic country it is essential for elections to be free, fair and competitive to ensure that its result are recognized as by political contestants as well as by voters. Considering this, some politicians from both government and opposition groups with support of local and international civil society organizations decided to start negotiations with the aim to improve further the existing electoral system of Georgia.

However, to carry out truly efficient and meaningful electoral reforms in any particular country factors such as political system, societal structure, ethnic, religious and language diversities should be taken into account. Hence, speaking on Georgia's political system, specifically on the party system in Georgia, serious challenges can be detected. Many experts in Georgia characterize the existing party system as a weak or a loose multiparty system dominated by one party rule. Despite large number (about 180) of political organizations registered in Georgia, only a very few of them are actively participating in Georgia's political life.

Therefore, the problems faced by Georgia's party system are as follow. First, it is a weak institutionalization of parties, meaning that in successive elections parties change dramatically, hence every new election brings new types of parties and blocs. Moreover, parties in Georgia fail to be closely connected to the social groups they represent, which results in their very low mandate of legitimacy. Second, the public in Georgia usually grants low credibility to parties, and their preferences during the elections are largely determined by the party leaders and personalities rather than their programs. Third, usually

opposition parties are largely fragmented but ideologically polarized. The ways of their cooperation are limited with creation of election blocs, common fractions usually in parliament and tactical alliance on concrete issues. Besides, cleavages between the ruling party and opposition can escalate to personal attacks and violent scuffles.

Negotiation failure to reach broad consensus on electoral matters

Due to growing interest displayed by Georgian public towards the upcoming parliamentary (October 2012) and presidential elections (October 2013), the representatives from the ruling party and several opposition parties initiated series of negotiations over the electoral related issues. Particularly, among those parties that participated in this negotiation process, the ruling National Movement party expressed the government's position, whereas the coalition of eight opposition parties (e.g. Christian-Democratic Movement (CDM), New Rights, National Forum, Our Georgia Free Democrats (OGFD), Conservative Party, Republican Party, Georgia's Way and Party of People) exhibited alternative views.

As a result, through these negotiations, along with many other pressing issues, two major problems were highlighted with regard to Georgia's electoral system. Hence, the first problem is that the principle of equality is violated and the second is that the election outcomes are not proportional. In case of first problem, pertaining to "to undermining the principle equality of the vote" (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2011, 7), the existing wide disparity among the constituencies in Georgia results in unequal distribution of voting population. For instance, the voter population in Georgia's smallest single-mandate electoral district is about 6000, whereas "over 150 000 voters in the largest one" (Civil.ge 2012).

As for the second problem related to the proportionality of electoral outcomes, under the current system a party winning 30 or 35 percent of votes can form "a constitutional majority in parliament" (Transparency International Georgia 2011). Given that, the current electoral system in Georgia fails to ensure that the votes garnered by any political party at the national level will be reflected proportionally in parliamentary seats won by party.

Considering these shortcomings in the current electoral system, the coalition of eight opposition parties, with the aim to address these issues, put forward their proposals.

Based on the first proposal, the changes will apply only to the single-member majority vote system. Namely, those electoral districts with more voting population will be allowed to choose several parliamentary members (Transparency International Georgia 2011). At the same time, the number of electoral districts will be reduced by merging those "historically/geographically related" (Transparency International Georgia 2011) districts with less dense voting populations.

After the ruling National Movement party's strong disapproval of the proposal, the opposition's Group of Eight presented its final vision on electoral reform. According to the "new package of reforms" (Rousseau 2011), the current Georgia's electoral system should be replaced by the new one, more resembling to the "German model" (Rousseau 2011). In particular, 100 out of 150 parliamentary seats will be elected by closed-list proportional system, while the remaining 50 seats according to majority vote. Hence, contrary to the "winner takes all" (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2008, 14) approach of the current electoral system, the major principle of this proposed model is to reflect more proportionally electoral votes in parliamentary seats. For example, in the last parliamentary elections, the ruling National Movement party won 59 percent of votes that translated into 119 seats, instead of 89 seats, as the German model would have suggested.

Additionally, the project proposed by the opposition group envisaged increase of the electoral threshold from 30 to 50 percent. Such proposition can be explained by the idea that the 50 percent barrier would induce MPs "to be more accountable to a greater majority of the voting public" (Rousseau 2011). Moreover, based on this proposed package, the number of constituencies will be reduced from 75 to 50. It should be noted, however, that the government in 2005, adopted the system similar to final proposal offered by the Group of Eight, but it was replaced by the existing system in 2008 (Transparency International Georgia 2011).

Apart of severe criticism of the recommendations offered by the coalition, the governing party responded by its own package of electoral reform. Namely, according to this bid, in largest constituencies, with more than 100 000 voting population, "the number of majoritarian MPs" (Transparency International Georgia 2011)would increase from one to two. Consequently, such changes, all things being equal, will increase the share of majoritarian MPs from 75 to 83, subsequently reducing the number of MPs elected

"through the proportional party list system" (Transparency International Georgia 2011) from 75 to 67.

With respect to the negotiations process, it was not without interruptions and it disrupted several times especially at the end of the process, due to disagreements over such important issues as the introduction of biometric ID cards. As a result, the representatives from both sides often accused each other in thwarting negotiations by resorting to the language of ultimatums. However, the debates on the electoral matters that lasted ten months, suddenly was suspended in June 2011.

The main reason of such break up was the decision of two opposition parties, the Christian-Democratic Movement (CDM) and New Rights, to defect from the Group of Eight and sign the agreement with the ruling National Movement party (UNM) on the new project. It is also important to note that the author and initiator of these amendments is the governing party, and as to the amendments, they were adopted by the parliament in the last year's autumn.

Consequently, the newly adopted package envisages the following changes in the Georgia's current electoral system: first, increase of parliamentary seats from 150 to 190, from which 107 seats will be allocated to the MPs elected by the closed-list proportional system, whereas remaining 83 to the MPs elected through the single-member majority vote system. Second, the special commission will be established which will "oversee the compilation of voter lists" (Corso 2011). Moreover, an opposition party representative will chair the commission, which in turn will be composed of equal numbers of "UNM, opposition and non-governmental organization representatives" (Corso 2011). Third, those parties, which exceed the five percent threshold, will receive one million lari (about 595,000 USD). Finally, another commission will be set up "to monitor media election coverage and the use of administrative resources" (Corso 2011).

As a result, despite the above-mentioned electoral changes, the remaining six-opposition party (from the Group of Eight) and civil society representatives agree that these amendments are not sufficient for holding genuinely fair and democratic elections in Georgia. For instance, according to the Transparency International-Georgia, "the proposed changes fall short of substantive election reform" (Corso 2011). Moreover, the changes proposed by the ruling party fail to address the issue with regard to proportionality of votes to seats - "a system that will give a party more than 67 percent

representation in parliament with significantly less than 67 percent public support is a bad system" (Mullen 2011).

Given that, the final agreement cannot be regarded as the result of broad consensus among the ruling party, opposition and civil society groups but rather it more resembled to "a carter-like deal" (Gel'Man 2008, 7) that are quite common among those hybrid regimes in the post-soviet sphere, which are inclined more towards to the authoritarianism. Hence, in this particular case, after teen months of negotiations, the "deal" was closed between "the dominant actor" (e.g. UNM) and its "subordinated actors" (e.g. CDM and New Rights Party). Based on this theory, while the ruling party shared some of its powers with these two opposition groups, it retained "control over major decisions without constraints" (Gel'Man 2008, 7) from these actors.

Therefore, this type of agreement fails to ensure such competitive political environment that will conducive to truly fair and democratic elections in Georgia.

Conclusion

The Georgia's electoral dynamics of the past twenty years clearly showed that the current electoral system needs serious overhaul to pave the way for genuinely free, fair and competitive elections in Georgia. Although the ruling party, opposition and civil society representatives took a positive step in starting negotiations over the electoral matters, these efforts proved to be unsuccessful. Since, the agreement reached by the sides was not the outcome of the broad consensus but rather the "facade" that further undermined the credibility of the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Georgia.

Besides, the outcome of the negotiation points to the fact that under the Georgia's current rule, characterized as a "semi-authoritarian" (Mitchell 2012) regime, the governing National Movement party is unwilling to enable the opposition groups to be more substantially involved in the Georgian politics. Consequently, to retain its current overwhelming power, as legislative as well as executive and judicial, the Georgia's current governing party shares insignificant resources with those parties loyal to the government. Given that, the electoral reform failed to end with tangible results beneficial to the Georgian public. It rather concluded as a cartel-like deal favorable only to the narrow part of the governing elite.

Even though fewer time has left before the upcoming parliamentary elections, still there is chance to bring the existing electoral system to more in line with the democratic standards and values. First, it is important to increase the threshold from 30 to 50 percent for the MPs elected through a single-member majority vote system. However, the degree of transparency, fairness and efficiency of the reform would largely depend on the government's willingness, opposition political parties' active engagement, civil society's productive involvement and the international community's sustainable support. Furthermore, the current media's role to cover the processes objectively must be also taken into consideration. Since today, the Georgian media, especially TV stations, experiences heavy political and economic pressure from the government.

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Understanding Russian Aggression Towards Georgia: An Expected-Utility Approach[5]

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Abstract

Did Russia initiate conflict with Georgia in an attempt to restrain Georgia from formally joining the Western coalition, or was the decision more complex? What did Russia hope to gain from initiating conflict? What value did Russia assign to maintaining an interest in regional oil trade routes, in which Georgia straddles an important route to the Caspian Sea region? How was the potential incorporation of Georgia into NATO factored into Russia's decision? To answer these questions, I used the expected-utility model developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. In this analysis, policy preferences and power measurements were considered to determine that Russia's decision was rationally selected based on a positive expected-utility calculation. I attempted to explain whether this model's explanatory and predictive capabilities could accurately elucidate Russia's conflict decision. Furthermore, within the context of the expected-utility model, what can we expect about Russian-Georgian relations in the future?

Introduction

The primary research question of this study was derived through an interest in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. Was Russia's decision to initiate conflict with Georgia rationally based on a positive expected-utility calculation? Since the decision process of the Russian leaders cannot be known for sure, the underlying question is if Russia had a positive expected-utility and therefore could have been expected. Fundamentally, then, this study is a test of the expected-utility theory and its usefulness in understanding contemporary conflicts between states. A positive expected-utility is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the decision to initiate conflict if the decision is rational (Bueno de

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Mesquita, 1981: p.182). For this statement to hold true, there are five assumptions detailed in *The War Trap* by Bueno de Mesquita that I will explain in the literature review.

Theoretical Foundations – Literature Review

The seminal study on expected-utility theory was by Bueno de Mesquita in 1981 called *The War Trap*. Bueno de Mesquita believed that he could develop a theory that accounted for conflicts explained by other theories, while at the same time able to account for the anomalies past theories could not. I believe that Bueno de Mesquita's work builds upon the neo-realist paradigm of Ken Waltz. Bueno de Mesquita proposes that his theory accounts for the necessary, but not the sufficient conditions for war. In addition, Bueno de Mesquita's work is unique since the calculation of expected-utility is from the perspective of a single leader.

Mesquita complains about the vast array of plausible, but mutually contradictory hypotheses about the causes of war. It is Mesquita's hope to deliver a comprehensive theory about the conditions for war. For example, Mesquita argues that many other theories are pieces to a greater puzzle that have yet to be put together into a coherent general theory. Mesquita clarifies his arguments by detailing two assumptions that are too commonly relied upon and are wrong. The first assumption that he disagrees with is the notion of a world community of nations. The second assumption that he disagrees with is the argument that states are actors themselves. According to Mesquita, leaders of nations are the actors; however, without that distinction between state and leader "most theorists implicitly assume that all decision makers share the same propensity to take risks" (Ibid. 1981, p.11). Mesquita goes on to argue that "treating individuals with such diverse attitudes toward risk as if they follow the same rules of decision making so misrepresents reality that logically and historically incorrect generalizations are bound to result" (Ibid. 1981, p.12).

Although there is an obvious departure from structural realism, Mesquita does agree with Waltz's analysis of the international system. For instance, at a fundamental level Mesquita's work agrees with Waltz on the notion of an anarchic international system. Furthermore, Mesquita agrees with the state centrism assumption in that states are the most important entities; however, he deviates by focusing on the leadership decisions of those states. The rationality assumption is clearly the basis of where Mesquita's theory comes from as he contends leaders are rational utility maximizers. Mesquita also agrees with the power assumption since a state's strength is a core component of the expected-utility figure, especially in bilateral conflicts. As a result, I argue that Waltz would classify

Mesquita within the third image level of analysis. I believe a first image categorization would not be correct since Mesquita does not argue that human nature is the reason for war. Instead individuals determine their behavior through an amoral expected-utility calculation with other states. A second image classification is also incorrect because Mesquita does not designate between good and evil states. Instead, Mesquita, like Waltz, sees an anarchic international system where each state secures its own safety. I also argue that Mesquita's theory is in line with Waltz's elements of system structure. Each state calculates its own expected-utility without interference from other states. At least at the international level, states perform the same functions as in the unit functional homogeneity argument. Similar to Waltz, Mesquita's theory places importance on the distribution of capabilities between states.

Expected-Utility Model Foundation

The foundation of Mesquita's expected-utility model can best be explained when Mesquita states that "we rarely think of the planning and calculating that precedes the battle. Yet for all the emotion of the battlefield, the premeditation of war is a rational process consisting of careful, deliberate calculations" (Ibid. 1981, p.19). Mesquita is arguing that war does not occur by accident. According to Mesquita, war is "premeditated," where military actions do not occur by chance. The determinants of the size of expected gains or losses of going to war depend on the following three aspects: The relative strength of the attacked and the defender, the value the attacker places on changes in policies that the attacker may be forced to accept if it loses, and the relative strength and interests of all other states that might intervene in the war. These three aspects are at the foundation of Mesquita's calculation of expected-utility.

Mesquita's expected-utility model is broken down between bilateral wars and multilateral wars. "In a bilateral war, success affords one [country] the subsequent opportunity to influence the policies of the adversary, making them more consistent with one's own interests" (Ibid. 1981, p.46). In other words, this is what success means for the winner of a bilateral war. Mesquita defines bilateral wars as "pure competition" mechanisms, which means under bilateral conditions, there is a zero-sum game. Essentially, country A's losses are country B's gains, and vice versa. Moreover, Mesquita argues that the expected-utility calculation in a bilateral context is solely determined by the relative power differences between the two states. In multilateral interactions, Mesquita

uses a complex expected-utility calculation that includes the proportional utility contributions of supporting states into the basic bilateral calculation. Items such as the intensity of support from other states matters, and the level of risks are considered by Mesquita to determine the actual values of utility.

Mesquita lays out some expected-utility decision rules which are logical extensions of his basic theory. First, an attacking country must derive a net gain in utility by initiating the conflict; otherwise it would irrational to attack if you would lose utility. Second, Mesquita argues that risk-acceptant and risk-neutral decision makers should be expected to meet the necessary conditions for war more often than risk-averse decision makers. This makes sense because by nature a risk-averse person would avoid risky situations, and would need to receive a higher expected-utility to initiate conflict.

Mesquita clearly lists five assumptions of his expected-utility theory. I adopt only the first two assumptions into this study for reasons I will explain later. The first assumption is that war decision making is dominated by a single, strong leader. The second assumption is that leaders are rational expected-utility maximizers. The third assumption is that the differences in leaders' orientations toward risk taking influence decision making. The fourth assumption is that uncertainty about the likely behavior of other states in the event of war affects decision making. The fifth assumption is the power a state can use in a war declines as the site of the war becomes geographically distant from the nation.

In the expected-utility model Mesquita operationalizes utility as a direct, positive function of the degree to which they share a common policy perspective. Furthermore, utilities are determined by the congruence of policy ends between states. In fact, Mesquita states that the "expected utility of the war strategy is simply the sum of the utilities of the possible outcomes times their probabilities" (Ibid. 1981, p.36).

Assumptions

In addition to the first two assumptions by Bueno de Mesquita, I propose that the Russian-Georgian conflict should be treated as a bilateral conflict. I believe that Russia did not expect other nations to intervene militarily, since at first it was a minor conflict. The conflict itself arose from people living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia who wanted to rejoin with Russia. Georgia's decision to reincorporate those separatists caused Russia to intervene to aide their loyalists living in Georgia. When Russia made the decision to broaden the conflict and invade the Georgian capital, however, Russia was met with

international pressure to stop. The decision to broaden the conflict, however, is the decision I examine with the expected-utility model.

By assuming bilateral conflict, I will not include the following three variables from The War Trap: loss of strength gradient, risk, and uncertainty. The loss of strength gradient variable will not be used since Russia and Georgia border each other and therefore the loss of strength gradient is zero. Risk and uncertainty will not be considered since both variables are used in multilateral expected-utility calculations only (Bueno de Mesquita 1981: p.122 – 25).

Proposition

The proposition in this study examines the contention that Russia wanted to maintain its reputation in the region. I argue that Russia had a direct interest in preventing the Georgian government from forcefully reincorporating South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia may have feared a setback in regional influence and may have believed that Georgia's actions could embolden other former Soviet republics like Ukraine to oppose Russia. Even more, Russia may fear that former Soviet nations could join NATO. This fear is not unfounded as NATO has promised to add Georgia as a member nation at a later date. Also, Russia wants to control the oil pipeline that runs through Georgia from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, which bypasses Russian authority. It is possible that Russia, in an attempt to maintain its influence and reputation in the region, attacked Georgia as an example for other former Soviet nations.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study tests whether or not Russia had a positive expected-utility when conflict began:

H1: Russia had a positive expected-utility calculation when it decided to initiate conflict with Georgia.

Data and Methods

I have chosen to examine the hypotheses and research questions outlined above with an available data type study. The data used in this study came from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset for country capabilities, and from the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) database for country relationship information.

UNTS Database

The UNTS database was used instead of data on formal military alliances from the COW alliance database[7]. UNTS is an online searchable database that maintains records on all formal relationships between two countries that were registered with the United Nations. Each relationship is coded with a unique registration number, and in most cases a link to the full-text document is available. This database allows quick and up-to-date access to data which can be used to examine contemporary conflicts when other data is unavailable. Even more, the UNTS is ideal for small scope projects since you can easily modify the search criteria to your specifications. The data retrieved from the UNTS database included all treaties and agreements which Russia and Georgia were involved in. There were a total of 59 individual relationships, which could be reduced to 31 unique cases because of redundant agreements between the same countries within the same years. For example, in 2008 Russia made two agreements with Latvia on the same day, therefore it was counted as one agreement between Russia and Latvia in 2008. These 31 cases were used to estimate the level of congruence in policy preferences between Russia and Georgia.

COW Dataset

Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores from the COW database were used to estimate military power and thus the probability of a win or loss relative to the other country. As Mesquita explains, the CINC scores are calculated by incorporating the proportion of "three theoretically distinct dimensions of national capabilities: military, industrial, and demographic" (see Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972; Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1992; Bennett and Stam, 2004).

Expected-Utility Calculation

The key factors of the expected-utility model are shown below in Table 1. These factors in the model were derived from *The War Trap*. Although I use different sources for data, the equation and the factors that comprise the model remain the same. The

[7] I will explain how I operationalized this source and used it to measure utility, or policy congruence, when I discuss independent variables.

interpretation of two of the key factors should be explained further: tau-b and $E(U_{ij})$. Tau-b can be interpreted as the magnitude of the relationship between two countries. The range of values for tau-b is from -1.0 to 1.0. In this study, the magnitude of the relationship signifies the level of agreement in terms of policy preferences between Russia and Georgia. $E(U_{ij})$ or the expected-utility country (i) has for country (j) represents the value assigned to the amount of gain or loss from war or peace respectfully. In other words, a positive expected-utility means that conflict is likely to result in favorable gains in terms of realigning the defeated country's policies to match your own (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). The expected-utility equation used in this study is listed just below Table 1.

Table 1: Expected-Utility Key Factors

	Utility	Probability	Expected-Utility
Interpretation	Policy preference congruence	Power, Likelihood of victory/defeat	Value gained from victory/defeat
Statistic	Kendall's tau-b	CINC score	$E(U_{ij})$*, Expected-Utility of Russia (i) to Georgia (j)

* $E(U_{ij}) = P_i * (1-U_{ij}) + (1-P_i) * (U_{ij} - 1)$ (Bueno de Mesquita 1981: p.47, eqn 1)
where, $U_{ij} = tau_{(i,j)}$, and where $P_i = raw\_cap_{ij}$ or CINC score (Singer, et al., 1972)

Temporal and Spatial Domain

The temporal domain for this study runs from 1998 to 2008; however it is focused on the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. In its original conception, expected-utility calculations were derived from the policy preferences and power capabilities in the form of CINC scores of two states during the year leading up to the conflict until three months prior to the military action (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981: p.114). Since formal alliance data and CINC scores are only available until 2000 and 2001 respectfully from the Correlates of War project (COW), I have adjusted the temporal domain of the study. For reasons that will be explained in the independent variables section, I found it necessary to include relationships over the past ten years.

The spatial domain for this study includes the countries of Russia and Georgia. These countries have had a long history of stressful relations over both the Russian separatists living in Georgia and over the potential incorporation of Georgia into NATO. Focusing on a single conflict between the two countries in 2008 is admittedly narrow and will not offer much in terms of generalizability. Such a narrow study, however, is the only reasonable way to test an expected-utility theory of a contemporary conflict when the data

is not available. The selection of the two countries is interesting because the analysis is a test of the expected-utility theory.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the decision to initiate conflict or not. In this study, the only dependent variable of interest is if Russia chose to initiate conflict with Georgia. Obviously Russia did initiate a conflict with Georgia, but this study is an attempt to find if that initiation decision was based on a positive expected utility calculation.

Independent Variables

Utility: The concept of utility in the context of this study refers to the level of policy preferences congruence between Russia and Georgia. Policy congruence, as first conceptualized in *The War* Trap, is measured by formal alliance agreement between two countries. Since formal alliance data is only available until 2000 from COW, I have conceptualized a surrogate measure of formal relationships using data from the UNTS database. Therefore, I operationalized utility by calculating how related the sets of relationships are between Russia and Georgia using Kendall's tau-b. I have coded the relationships in the UNTS database as either an "Agreement" or a "Treaty", or 1 and 2, respectfully. Treaties include all formal treaties between two or more countries. Agreements include all economic and political agreements between two or more countries. Since there can be three distinct ordered classifications (Treaty, Agreement, or No Formal Relationship) the variable is ordinal. As a result, if there is a Treaty and an Agreement within the same year with the same member countries, then only the Treaty was counted since it is a stronger relationship.

The decision to use a substitute measure for formal alliances was based *The War Trap*, where he explains his wish to include other measures of utility rather than only formal military alliances in future small scope projects (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981: p.114). For instance, relationships such as economic integration and other political agreements could be considered (ibid, p.115). I have accounted for all relationships that either Russia or Georgia are involved in that were registered with the United Nations from 1998-2008. Expected-utility scores were calculated between Russia and Georgia from 1998–2006 and from 2007-2008. Since the conflict occurred in 2008, I argue that the policy preferences during the 2007 and 2008 are relevant to understand the decision for conflict.

Probability: The independent variable of probability in this study refers to a country's power and the likelihood that the country will win a conflict. To estimate this probability, CINC scores have been used as a measure of power. These CINC scores, however, are only available until 2001 from the COW project's alliance database. As a result, I have averaged the CINC scores for Russia and Georgia for the ten years leading to 2001. The notation (P_i), as seen in Table 1, represents the probability of a win or Russia's CINC score for Georgia. Similarly, ($1-P_i$) represents the probability of a loss. As the founders of the COW project point out, there are some problems with conceptualizing power in terms of a standard score, "various caveats must be made concerning the validity of the indicators the project selected; the first of these is comparison, which relies on the sometimes questionable assumption that equal values of the same indicator make equal contributions to capability" (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972).

Findings

The policy congruence between Russia and Georgia is best summarized in the form of contingency tables and is shown in Table 2 and Table 3. The country abbreviations were adopted from the COW project. The relationships in these tables exist between either Russia or Georgia and other countries. In addition, the relationships represented are all bilateral in that there is a direct connection between two of the countries. Where Russia and Georgia agree, with Finland in table 3 for example, it means that both Russia and Georgia have a unique relationship with Finland during the 2007–2008 timeframe. Kendall's tau-b, which is indicated below both Table 2 and 3, represents the magnitude of congruence. As explained earlier, there are two represented time frames: 1998–2006 and 2007–2008. It is interesting to note that from 1998 to 2006 Russia and Georgia had no relationships in common, and thus the tau-b or utility value was -1.000. In other words, Russia and Georgia had completely different policy preferences. From 2007 to 2008, Russia and Georgia had five relationships in common, which reduced the magnitude of the negative relationship indicated by the tau-b or utility value of -0.420. Either way, Russia and Georgia have very divergent policy preferences.

Table 2: Congruence of Interests between Russia and Georgia 1998 - 2006

1998 - 2006		Georgia		
		No Formal Relationship	Agreement	Treaty
Russia	No Formal Relationship			GMY, FRN
	Agreement			
	Treaty	BLR, KYR, KZK, BEL, CZR, BRA, IRN, PAR, USA, KOR		

* Kendall's tau-b= -1.000, sig. = .053, N = 12

Table 3: Congruence of Interests between Russia and Georgia 2007 - 2008

2007 - 2008		Georgia		
		No Formal Relationship	Agreement	Treaty
Russia	No Formal Relationship		TUR, EST, ISR	UKR
	Agreement	ARG, AUL, FRN, NEW, UKG, NOR, POL, SAF	USA, FIN, LAT	GMY
	Treaty	MEX, VEN	KZK	

* Kendall's tau-b = -.420, sig. = .021, N = 19

Another interesting note is that Russia and Georgia have no treaties in common. Do strong formal ties like treaties mean that countries are less likely to attack? If so, is the lack of treaties in common a factor that lead to the Russian-Georgian conflict? Although formal testing of this idea is beyond the range of this study, it does add to the strength of using an expected-utility model to examine conflict decisions since common treaties are lacking in the Russian-Georgian context.

Over time there was an increase in the number of dissimilar relationships between Russia and Georgia leading up to the conflict in 2008 (see figure 1). Since the last conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2002[8], Russia and Georgia had continually added dissimilar relationships. This could be interpreted to mean that since 2002, Russian and Georgian policy preferences have continually diverged. Even more, from 2006 to 2008 Russia and

[8] Related to the Chechen rebels and was coded by the International Military Intervention dataset as a conflict (see Kingasani and Pickering 2008).

Georgia increased the number of dissimilar relationships from 12 to 26. Of the five similar relationships that were added from 2006 to 2008, three were either economic or environmental in nature while only two were strong political relationships. The trend of increasingly dissimilar relationships paints a clear picture that diverging policy preferences were building up until the conflict in 2008.

Figure 1: Accumulated Level of Policy Congruence between Russia and Georgia



The expected-utility scores calculated based on the model explained earlier are represented in Tables 4 and 5 below[9]. So, from 1998 to 2006 Russia expected to gain a utility value of 1.962 if it succeeded in a conflict with Georgia. Similarly, from 2007 to 2008, Russia expected to gain a utility value of 1.393 if it succeeded in a conflict with Georgia. These numbers only explain that since Russia had a positive expected-utility in both timeframes, a conflict initiation with Georgia would be rational in strictly cost-benefit terms. By looking at Figure 1 again, however, we see that the trend of increasingly dissimilar relationships really tell the story of the conflict in 2008. It is worth noting that during the overall time period from 1998 to 2008, Russia maintained a positive expected-utility[10].

Table 4: Expected-Utility Scores 1998 - 2006

[9] Note that since risk, uncertainty, and loss of strength are not factored into this study (since it is being viewed as a bilateral conflict) the expected-utility for Georgia is simply the opposite of Russia's expected-utility.
[10] Overall 1998 – 2008: Kendall's tau-b = -.617, sig. = .000, N = 31, E (Uij) = 1.586

1998 - 2006	Utility	Probability	Expected-Utility
Russia (i)	-1.000	0.99	E(Ui) = 1.962
Georgia (j)	1.000	0.01	E(Uj) = -1.962

Table 5: Expected-Utility Scores 2007 - 2008

2007 - 2008	Utility	Probability	Expected-Utility
Russia (i)	-0.420	0.99	E(Ui) = 1.393
Georgia (j)	0.420	0.01	E(Uj) = -1.393

These findings, therefore, do support the hypothesis that Russia did have a positive expected utility when it decided to initiate conflict with Georgia. In other words, Russia's decision to initiate conflict with Georgia to stop the reincorporation of the Russian separatists was rational in a strictly cost-benefit sense.

Discussion

The proposition in this study appears to be supported, but in no way is proven by this single study. The proposition about Russia's reputation seems like a plausible explanation for the conflict. Russia may have feared other former Soviet nations could be emboldened if Georgia was allowed to suppress the Russian separatists. Even more, defiance in the face of Russia could also encourage the former Soviet nations to consider joining NATO. It is also possible that Russia had an economic, as well as, a security interest in the oil route running through Georgia by maintaining Russian loyalists living in Georgia. Did Russia attack Georgia for these reasons? Although the answer could be yes, it would take additional studies about the region and the relationships of former Soviet nations with Russia for a clearer picture. An elaborate game theoretic model may help to explain the relationship between Russia and Georgia and the decisions that led to conflict in a future study.

Finally, when data from the COW dataset becomes available through 2008, it would be interesting to compare my results using UNTS with results using COW alliance data. If they provide similar results, then the use of UNTS could be justified for other

contemporary conflict studies using expected-utility when traditional data sources are not yet available.

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Why corruption is perceived to be higher in poor countries than in richer countries?: a critical assessment of the Corruption Perception Index

Denisse Rodriguez Olivari[11]

Abstract:

This article will critically examine why corruption is perceived to be higher in poor countries, than in richer countries. It will be argued that narratives corruption has an impact on its definition, perception and measurement of this phenomenon. This article will therefore assess the implications of these three dimensions in the construction of one of the most commonly consulted instrument on the subject, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). A further analysis of such instrument will help to disaggregate the usual discourse on the subject and supporting ideas behind corruption as it is being measured nowadays.

Corruption is considered a major obstacle to achieve economic development by international financial agencies such as the World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that the increasing concern on governance and corruption (or the lack of thereof) emerged in response to the failure of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (Polzer 2001; Doig & Marquette 2005; Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009). Since the good governance agenda is mainly promoted by these organisations, an assessment of the perception of corruption cannot dismiss the power and influence of the underlying narrative of the IFIs.

This article will proceed as follows. The first section will provide an analysis of the discourse of corruption as a Western, business-centric, and culture-blind notion that determines how corruption is defined, how it is perceived, and ultimately how it is measured. The second part will examine the CPI according to the three dimensions mentioned previously. Also, it will give an account of the CPI sources, advantages and disadvantages, and its overall influence as a global barometer on corruption. Finally, this article will offer a critical assessment on this troublesome issue and possible ways to shift the debate around the usual notions around it.

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Zaman and Ur-Rahim indicate that since racial superiority is outmoded and no longer politically correct, the imperative to drive world politics is now governance indicators (including corruption) which give the 'rich and powerful countries' a moral right to advise and compel the lesser countries to perform according to higher, this is, their standards (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:123). As part of good governance, corruption is a universal notion strategically used by developed countries to reinforce moral, economic and political Western constructions that continues to reproduce power asymmetries between the 'North' and the 'South' (Crush 1995; Bracking 2007; De Maria 2008b).

Furthermore, it is widely argued that corruption is not only higher in non-Western (poor) countries, but it is culturally intrinsic to them (Bracking 2007:15). The idea of a 'culture of corruption' in many developing countries is a sign of a Western discourse. For example, Szeftel (1998:221) quotes a former British Tory MP, Matthew Parris: "corruption has become an African epidemic. It is impossible to overstate the poisoning of human relations and the paralysing of initiative that the corruption on the African scale brings". In addition, an American diplomat said that "you can no longer buy an African state; you can only rent one by the day" (Charlton & May 1989 cited in Szeftel 1998:223). Both remarks support the idea of corruption as a widespread practice in many countries, especially African ones.

In addition, this global yardstick is culture-blind. As Kurer points out (2005:225), "what the public condemns as a 'corrupt act' in the West today has not been so condemned in the past, nor is it generally condemned elsewhere". At the same time, what constitute a corrupt act in the West might not be considered as corrupt in non-Western countries. Because culture is a set of belief and values about what is desirable or not, the definition, perception and measurement of corruption might differ as well (Seleim & Bontis 2009; Melgar et al. 2010). For instance, corruption in Africa, and well as in other poor regions, is mostly related to 'politics of the belly', or the daily struggle against poverty, disease and exploitation" (Bayart 1993 cited in De Maria 2008b:185), whereas in developed countries corruption might manifest through financial crimes or influence peddling. As a result, this Western discourse deslegitimises Southern states' polities. At the same time, anti-corruption campaigns neglects local cultures and traditions with different views of the public and private spheres, conflict of interests, and corruption which have emerged from

former Western rules (de Sousa et al. 2009). Moreover, it is likely that donors use the label of 'corrupt state' as a basis for aid allocation (Galtung 2005:17).

Having said that, the analysis of corruption is flawed because it has a narrow approach. In this sense, measurement indicators, as well as anti-corruption campaigns, will follow this logic. Consequently, both elements will fail in its objectives because there are failing to address the real dimension of the problem (Szeftel 1988; Polzer 2001; Stefes 2007; Bracking 2007; De Maria 2008b).

The first element to disaggregate is the concept of corruption itself. The most common definition is "the misuse of public office for private gain" (Transparency International 2003; Kurer 2005; Svensson 2005; World Bank 2005; Seleim & Bontis 2009; Melgar et al. 2010). Furthermore, according to De Maria (2008b:186), the Economist Intelligence Unit (one of CPI sources), refers to "misuse of public office for personal (or party political) financial gain". These definitions raise several questions. The first one is related to the scope of corruption. Apparently, there is no difference in the impact or volume of corrupt transactions. The second one refers to emphasis on public office. This narrow approach overlooks other in the private sector such as "collusion between firms or misuse of corporate assets that imposes costs on consumers and investors" (Svensson 2005:21). Thirdly, the use of the term 'misuse' denotes a legal standard of what constitute a legal or illegal activities, and it can only be applicable according to the particular legal framework of each state (Svensson 2005:20). The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) use this concept to influence how corruption is being measured (Bracking 2007:15).

The second element in the analysis is the perception of corruption. According to Melgar et al. (2010:120), "high levels of corruption perception could have more devastating effects than corruption itself". For instance, it might seem that corruption is acceptable and worthwhile to imitate, increasing (involuntarily) the incidence of corrupts acts (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:122). Certainly, one reason for higher perception of corruption among poor countries is the idea proposed by Melgar et al. (2010:129) that "better economic performance reduces corruption perception, and macroeconomic instability has the opposite effect". As a result, Latin American, African and Asian countries, as well as ex-socialist states, tend to perceive higher corruption than other countries. A 98 percent correlation between log (GNP per capita) and corruption in 2005 revealed that "'corruption' is another name for 'poverty' while 'honesty' is another name for 'wealth'"

(Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:122). Additionally, greater levels of inequality also determine a higher level of corruption perception (Melgar et al. 2010:122).

Thirdly, measurement of corruption still lacks of a precise standard to measure. The most popular indicator is the number of bribes paid to government officials. Zaman and Ur-Rahim (2009:119) go on to say that corruption cannot be measure because it needs to be measurable. For instance, Pakistani officials calculate the cost of smuggling and lowered the tariff rate at the level which equal to the bribe (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:120). Consequently, the lack of a clear-cut definition of corruption will cause a narrow measurement instrument as well.

Transparency International (TI) is trend-setter organisation in the study of corruption (De Maria 2008b). It was initially conceived as a "coalition to curb corruption in international business transactions" (Galtung 2005:3). Certainly, most of the publications are focused on business-oriented indicators. However, TI has move a step forward introducing a Bribe Perception Index, and incorporating a broader notion of corruption in its latest edition of Corruption Perception Index. This document is the most prominent instrument in the study of corruption. It is argued that it has raised awareness of the problem (Galtung 2005), and influences a country's political trajectory (Galtung 2005; Stefes 2007).

This section will re assessment the potential and limitations of the CPI. This index is constructed through the inputs from non-residents experts, both-resident and non-resident business leaders, and also number of surveys (Bowman et al. 2007:438). De Maria (2008b) classifies the nine sources used by Transparency International to construct the CPI: the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, Institute for Management Development, Merchant International Group, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, UN Economic Commission for Africa, World Economic Forum, World Markets Research Centre. One major criticism of the CPI is what it actually measures. For De Maria (2008b:189), the CPI does not measure corruption per se, but it measures "perception-based epiphenomenal proxies of it". For instance, the World Bank survey measures the proxy values of accountability and transparency because a "high degree of accountability and transparency discourages corruption" (World Bank 2005:41). Apparently, there is risk of 'reification' or "thinking of a common manifestation of a concept as if it was the concept itself" (Babbie 1995 cited in De Maria 2008b:189).

Furthermore, perception-based interviews can be influenced by media or personal experiences. For example, the Executive Opinion survey made by the World Economic Forum asks "how common are un-documented extra payments or bribes from one private to another to secure business". The respondents are not required to have witnesses the acts (De Maria 2008b:191). Additionally, when non-residents experts are interviewed, the fact that "they are not used to local customs and language, unfamiliar with uses and practices" (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:121) might produce biased results. Thus, evidence suggests that most of the sources used by Transparency International to construct the CPI are heavily dependent on perception of wealthy businessmen. In the same way, Galtung (2005) believes that there is no proof that business perception is any more valid than perceptions from victims of corruption.

Returning to the features of the CPI's sources, it is worthwhile to point out that five of them measure only competitiveness and economic environment. Also, six of them do not publicly disclose their methodologies or results (De Maria 2008b:190). In consequence, most information relates to 'business corruption'. By 2008, four out these nine sources were international risk management and business surveys organisations such as the Institute for Management Development's (IMD) World Competitiveness Year Book as well as World Economic Forum's (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report (De Maria 2008b:189). Finally, De Maria highlights that only six provide information about African countries, and four of them were exclusively business management surveys. This might shed light on the high perception of corruption in poor countries, and reinforcing the idea that corruption is a culturally-rooted institution. However, by 2010, TI includes new sources such as the Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and the Bertelsmann Foundation. All these three sources focus on transparency, accountability and corruption on the public sector (Transparency International 2010).

Yet, what TI identifies as corruption is highly misleading. The Corruption Perception Index measures perceptions of businessmen regarding corruption in various countries (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:120). Since the CPI contains samples from residents and foreigners (businessmen), it is not affected by the level of tolerance for corruption in the country (Galtung 2005:4). For example, De Maria (2008b:192) argues that,

> *"a young executive from Finland (CPI low-level "corruption") newly arrived in Uganda answering poll questions about his or her perceptions of Ugandan "corruption" may talk up their "awareness". However, a long-term expatriate resident from Hungary (CPI middle-level*

"corruption") may talk down their perceptions of Ugandan "corruption", even though both may have had the same matters in mind when they responded to the polls".

CPI classification has several consequences. First, a country that would like to lower its corruption perception ranking would be interested in hiring "Madison Avenue experts, and invite foreign businessmen on special tours" (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009:122). Thus, there will be efforts on propaganda rather than policy change. On the other hand, high corruption may lead to an involuntary promotion of corruption, giving the impression that it is customary, and goes unpunished as it was mentioned previously (Zaman and Ur-Rahim 2009; Melgar et al. 2010). Furthermore, Galtung (2005:2) indicates that CPI's blind spot is the "[it] casts a spotlight on the major bribe takers of the world; it lets the major bribe givers and safe havens of looted funds off the hook".

CPI index provides a limited approach of corruption, and hence a limited measurement of it as well. This might be one of the reasons why poor countries are perceived as more corrupt. The business-centric focus and the universalism of the notion presented by this index shed light on the generalisation impression than poor countries are *per se* more corrupt than rich countries. For instance, emphasis on public office neglects to address the problem accurately. In the case of corporations in USA, it is well-known that "influential politicians or generals (or relatives) at fat consultant fees, and end up winning enormous government contracts. The volume of a small number of such transactions is greater than the total estimated volume of bribes for many LDC's ranked as highly corrupt" (Zaman & Ur-Rahim 2009:188).

Nonetheless, there are other instruments of measurement such as the International Country Risk Guide (which indicate the likelihood that high government officials will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are expected throughout government tiers); and the Control of Corruption (with a broader definition of corruption) that could help to measure corruption in a more accurate way. However, according to Svensson (2005:22), a correlation between these three instruments shows that they were highly correlated (Control of Corruption and CPI is 0.97 and, CPI and International Country Risk Guide is 0.75). In other words, most of the instruments measuring corruption (regardless of their sources) offer similar results.

This article set out to disaggregate elements of corruption to understand why poor countries are perceived as more corrupt than rich countries. Overall, a narrow conceptualisation of corruption considers as corrupt acts within public office. As it was mentioned, in poor countries these kinds of transactions are quite common, especially in countries with systemic corruption. However, they are doomed to score poorly in international rankings. This idea does not imply that these countries do not need to eradicate any form or corruption, nor improve governance quality but they should move beyond a Western ownership of the definition of corruption as it is perceived today. The business and foreign bias in CPI reveals serious weaknesses for an integral study of corruption worldwide.

As Zaman and Ur-Rahim (2009:119) argue, the target of proposed measure needs to be measurable. Also, the goals of measurement need to be specified. In order to obtain accurate measurement it is need to establish a prior definition. Moreover, a broader definition of corruption as 'an outcome of a country's legal, economic, cultural and political institutions' will require taking into consideration culture, historic age, actual social climate, and social groups (Gallup 1999:1).

The potential of CPI cannot be neglected. It offers a barometer that includes a worldwide sample based on several sources. Furthermore, it provides incentives for 'corrupt' countries to perform better, and maybe discourages 'clean' countries to improve their efforts. Either way, it provides a measurement on corruption, or proxies of what corruption really is. In addition, it is important to mention the shift towards a more broad definition of corruption in Transparency International. For example, the Corruption Perception Index 2010 defines corruption as the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain, encompassing practices in both the public and private sectors" (Transparency International 2010:4), including the private office as well. Yet the CPI still ranks countries according to perception of corruption only in the public sector.

Transparency international has franchised the growth and collaboration of local chapters. According to de Sousa (2009), TI is represented in more than 90 countries among developed and developing countries with different levels of democracy. It managed to launch worldwide campaigns raising awareness globally. However, it also led to transforming this organisation into a resource-draining, bureaucratic and conservative institution (De Sousa 2009:203).

The problem with the discourse behind corruption is that it does not estimate the impact or volume of corruption. In this case, as Zaman and Ur-Rahim (2009) assert, Bush lied to the public claiming that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction through misleading CIA reports. For the authors, this misuse of public office and betrayal of public trust is perhaps the single most massive corrupt transaction in the history of mankind. The combined monetary value of all petty bureaucratic corruption in the poorer countries pales in comparison. However, poor countries are still perceived as more corrupt. Thus, current instruments should focus on the characteristics, volume and impact of current instruments rather than the number of them. A phenomenon of such complexity as corruption does not have adequate measurement standards.

Another innovation in the study of corruption is the inclusion of 'culturally-sensitive' approaches to improve assessment of corruption in determined regions or geographical areas, as well, as economic performance or degree of development. Indeed, "one does not condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration camp" (Rose-Ackerman 1978 cited in Kurer 2005:225)

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Psychology, Political Psychology and International Relations – What are we talking about?

Isabella Hermann[12]

Abstract:

Psychology and international relations theory (IR) share an ambivalent relationship. On the one side psychology is neglected within the theory building of IR, on the other side there exists a large history of psychological approaches within the discipline, as well as interdisciplinary research in the field of political psychology. However, leaving psychology out of IR is not understandable from a psychological point of view since the differentiation between "rationality" on the one side and "irrationality" as psychology on the other side is artificial and contra-empirical. Systematically and naturally incorporating psychology – as for example motives and emotions – in IR would mean to understand international phenomena more profoundly and closer to reality.

Psychology and international relations theory (IR) have an ambivalent relationship. With social and cognitive psychological findings international phenomena could be explained, understood and anticipated better and more correctly. That is because the application of only structural approaches using rational choice is extremely biased and cannot alone suffice to project resilient explanations of incidents within the international system. Even more, "rationality" as given by the image of the homo economicus "has little power to make valid predictions about political phenomena" (Simon, 1985, 293). In contrast to that "psychology" as basic motives or emotions of humans is no external factor

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inflicting men's rationality. As inherent part of anyone of us, without emotions for example, any decision-making at all would be impossible – be it "rational" or not (Stein, 2008). Thus, while on the one side rational choice theorists still think "that they can achieve predictive power using rational assumptions", on the other side "most psychologists might find it absurd that anyone would assume that individuals are rational" (McDermott, 2004, 12-13). But still – even if improving – the inclusion of psychological findings remains on the fringes of the established theoretical building of IR. With this article I pursue two different aims. First, there is to be shown – even though psychology still is no central issue – how diverse and confusing its incorporation within the academic field of IR already is. Therefore, there is provided an overview of how one might approximate to the field without forgetting about vital areas. After that there is shed light on the specific demands and critics regarding the shortcomings of concretely incorporating psychology in IR. A stronger and more systematic inclusion of psychology within IR, particularly on motives and emotions, would yield tremendous benefits for research.

IR and Psychology – A confusing field

Even though the disjunction between "psychology" on the one side and "rationality" on the other side seems totally artificial and stands against modern psychological findings, the neglect of psychological approaches is even more astonishing, since psychology at least understood in an anthropological sense was an integral part of IR when it emerged and developed in the 20th century as academic field. It was not before the 1930s and 1940s when the discipline *de facto* began to form a common sense with the theoretical conception of realism as a critique to an utopian idealism which apparently had failed with World War II (Brown, 2001, 24-30). As key figure of that time counts Hans Morgenthau, who for many probably is the founding father of IR, He built his realism on the psychological motive par excellence: power. All men are driven by the aspiration to power and it is power all states and the statesmen respectively seek to maintain, increase or demonstrate (Morgenthau, 1946, 1967). Until the 1970s Morgenthau's main work "Politics among Nations" of 1948 was the most cited one and a main reference point for further theoretical development (Jacob, 2003, 35). However, it would become outdated in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist "Theory of International Politics" (Waltz, 1979), where he aims to explain international politics with the necessities and forces of the anarchic structure of

the international system. In 1959 Waltz had already categorized Morgenthau's work as "first image analysis" using only individuals as reference points for research (Waltz, 2001). The three images categorization – the second image using the state as reference object for analysis and the third the international system – is still prevailing as standard model to organize theories and concepts of IR. The first image having "limits of its serviceability" (ibid., 40) is in that context defined as rather short-sighted and antiquated. This negative connotation because of the first-image-ascription together with the reductionist picture of men being solely power seekers might be the reason why most researchers nowadays engaging in psychology do not relate to or even mention these origins of IR.

However things become even more confusing when we take a look on the interdisciplinary field of political psychology. Since psychology can be defined as the science of mind and behavior with reference to an individual or a group or in relation to a particular field of knowledge or activity (Merriam-Webster, 2011), political psychology "applies what is known about human psychology to the study of politics" (Sears et al. 2003, 3), "uses psychology to explain political behavior" (Cottam et al., 2010, ix) or studies "mental processes that underlie political judgments and decision making" (Kuklinski, 2002a, 2). Of course, one has to confess that within the field political science draws more on psychology than being the other way round (Houghton, 2009, 22). Political psychology in its modern sense began to shape in the first half of the twentieth century with personality studies of political leaders by using psychoanalysis. This was followed by a behavioralist focus on political attitudes, public opinion and voting behavior starting in the 1940s. However, it was not until the 1970s when the field started to institutionalize and to professionalize with evermore seminars held at universities, by the publishing of the first Handbook of Political Psychology and the founding of the International Society for Political Psychology (ISPP) (Houghton, 2009, 23). That is also the time when a third wave of political psychology can be located, starting to deal with international politics issues such as decision-making, political believes, deterrence, nationalism, ethnic conflict etc. (Cottam et al., 2010, 6; Houghton, 2009, 26). Interestingly enough, this interest in "immaterial factors" such as mutual perceptions, othering of groups, beliefs or identities overlap in parts strongly with social constructivist and less strong but still with postpositivist approaches that emerged within IR in the course of the "constructivist turn" at the end of the 1980s.

Political psychology as a quite young interdisciplinary endeavor conceivably not only coincides with IR research, but belongs often inherently to IR. Thus, on the one side there are scholars dealing with political psychology with reference to IR issues, but might not regard themselves as part of the IR academia and on the other side there are IR-scholars applying psychology but do not even use the term "political psychology" in their work at all. This confusing overlapping of research might cause a waste of resources as scholars coming from different fields and vantage points knowingly and not knowingly reinvent in fact the same things over again. There might indeed be a consensus with regards to the basic definition, history and main findings. However, the ambiguity what political psychology is and what it means for IR scholars engaging in psychology is obvious when one compares some handbooks on political psychology where there is to be found a whole variety from looking at this field rather as a task for psychologists (Kuklinski, 2002b) to perspectives that locate it merely inside the discipline of political science (Cottam et al., 2010; Houghton, 2009) or IR respectively (McDermott, 2004). Linked to that it is interesting to know that the well noted "The Oxford Handbook of International Relations" (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008) dedicates one of 44 chapters to "Psychological Approaches", however without referring once to a field known as political psychology.

Besides the young histories of this interdisciplinary field and IR as subdiscipline of political science, there is of course a long history of political theory that implicitly or explicitly uses psychological-anthropologic references to explain and understand human, social and political behavior. One can find such psychological references for example in the works of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes or Niccolò Machiavelli. Apparently, these findings are not covered within a political-psychology-IR-nexus, even though one might state that "political psychology is almost as old as political science itself" (Kuklinski, 2002a, 19). Political theory – where the study of these historical authors is usually localized – next to IR as another subdiscipline of political science normally does not have many points in contact with IR research, thus, there might be the danger of losing the greater picture within the general field of political science. However, political theory provides us with a new linkage point to the ambivalent relationship between psychology and IR going further and diving deeper into the discipline of IR itself than the above history of the development of political psychology. One should be aware of these diverse narratives and fields of research in order to not to miss some crucial developments.

Why Psychology is necessary in IR

After having given an overview of the complexities of the incorporation of psychology within IR, I will come back now to the concrete demands and necessities regarding psychology and IR – however this research field might be labeled. Many scholars address the lack of attention psychological factors have within IR's theoretical advancement. There are different yet intertwined strands of argument what the shortcomings of incorporating psychology are and how it should and could be better applied and integrated. Thus, one criticism targets the lacking attention of psychological factors regarded as micro level approaches. In this view IR is seen as a discipline dominated by macro level approaches working on the systemic level and excluding the individual and even groups; yet with their psychological condition as important actors individuals and groups have influence in the international system. Thus, most of the relevant and still prevailing theories like neorealism, neoliberalism or neoinstitutionalism work on the macro level above the individual. The problem with this may be twofold. First neorealism for example is surely convincing in explaining the larger picture and long-time tendencies of international relations, and this exactly is what Kenneth Waltz wanted to do. As Chris Brown puts it, for Waltz human nature is a vague concept that is neither specifiable nor understandable in any scientific way. Therefore human nature is not conducive to getting an understanding of social phenomena (Brown, 2001, 265). Yet the parsimony of the theory works against explaining or even understanding very concrete actions and particular decisions, most notably the end of the cold war – which was done by social constructivism. In similar ways the other theories mentioned work only above the individual – including even the metatheoretical advancement of social constructivism. Second, the "neo-theories" are based on a state or group model of the "homo economicus" meaning that the world is perceived rationally and decisions are made reasonably – a supposition that does not hold against empirical observation (Houghton, 2009, 216-19).

In very close connection to that first criticism of neglecting the micro level, but quite more far reaching is the critic on the traditional duality of micro and macro level analysis in general. Psychological concepts understood as first image individual actor approaches as well as social psychological findings on groups certainly do not solely suffice to study international politics but neither do macro-level ones that try to exclude psychology. On the one side without macro-analysis foundations psychological approaches to international relations tend to be utterly naive and raise "legitimate ground for

complaint" as "too often psychologists have been guilty of either reductionist dilettantism or of simplistic activism" (Tetlock and Goldgeier, 2000, 94) meaning that they reduce politics to psychology in ignoring that there effectively does exist some situationist determination (Kuklinski, 2002a, 9; Sullivan et al., 2002). But the flip side of the story is that without psychology there are equal shortcomings with macro or situationist approaches that claim to look at the international system objectively. A lot of debates on the IR macro-level are in fact based on different psychological assumptions. For example the question if a bipolar world is more stable than a multipolar world depends on very subjective different psychological views on how actors estimate varying polarity – not on any genuine objective estimation of the environment (Tetlock and Goldgeier, 2000, 94). Put in a general way that means that the actual concern is not about applying psychology or not, but "weather we will rely explicitly or implicitly, naively or with expertise, on such models" (Sullivan et al., 2002, 165). It is the deliberate and explicit integration of both, macrolevel as systemic and microlevel as psychological approaches, that promises a win-win-situation (Tetlock and Goldgeier, 2000) as without incorporating psychological insights "[k]ey puzzles will remain unresolved" (Goldgeier, 1997, 1).

Another criticism targets at how psychological factors are involved in IR specifically. One argument is that if psychology is applied on either image of analysis it is only the case to explain "irrational" actions of decision-makers meaning that they "miscalculate and misperceive the nature of their external environment" (Goldgeier, 1997, 138). Jonathan Mercer explicitly complains about the predominant duality between rationality on the one side and psychology understood as cognitive bias and emotion on the other side. Examples for works that use psychology only to explain "irrational" behavior are for example Jervis' "Perception and Misperception in International Politics" (1976), where he explains with the help of cognitive psychology how misperceptions such as incomplete information, stress, or cognitive bias leads to wrong decisions; also Lebow in his "Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis" (1981) traces non-rational decisions regarding the use of force back to psychological miscalculation and misjudgment, as does McDermott in "Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy" (1998) with "wrong" foreign policy decisions that are explained by prospect theory . On the contrary, Mercer in his "Reputation and International Politics" (1996) does not try to explain wrong decision-making with a psychological theory, but he challenges classic deterrence theory being taken for granted in stating that a state's reputation for resolve is measured against a state's actual commitment.

However, Mercer in transferring findings of social psychology to international politics is able to show that enemies in general are being perceived as more resolute than are allies or friends. This is due to the fact, then when someone behaves in our liking this is ascribed rather to the general circumstances, whereas when someone acts in our disliking, this is ascribed to the very character and bad intentions. Thus, Mercer concludes that if it is true that psychology only is useful to explain "mistakes (or deviations from rationality), then (1) rationality must be free of psychology; (2) psychological explanations require rational baselines; and (3) psychology cannot explain accurate judgments" (Mercer, 2005, 79) – three consequences that do not correspond with reality.

Tow research fields of psychology – emotions and motives

One particular interest when engaging in psychology are emotions. This field of research caught a relatively high degree of attention resulting in the assignment of an "emotional turn" with the beginning of the new millennium. Here we find for example prominent works by Crawford (2000) on passion, by Ross (2006) on constructivism and emotions, by Bleiker/Hutchison (2008) on emotions and world politics or Fattah/Fierke (2009) on emotions and political violence in the Middle East. These works understand emotions as a natural part of political decisions and actions, not as deviance from rationality – a general dominant view that is again keenly criticized my Mercer since it ignores the contribution of emotions to rational decision-making and draws only on emotion to explain so called irrational behavior. It is, however, according to the current state of research, that there are no rational decisions or actions without emotions (Mercer, 2005, 93ff.). Hence he stresses the importance of emotions as constituting and strengthening certain beliefs such as trust, nationalism, justice or credibility and concludes that insights to the importance of emotional beliefs would have policy implications for example in strategies to fight terrorism (Mercer, 2010). Mercer not only challenges the dualism of psychology and rationality but also the opinion that emotions as psychological part of human nature can only be a component of first image research – in contrast psychological findings regarding human nature can sure enough play a role in all three images of research (Mercer, 2006).

Besides that, motives – which are in fact psychologically preceding emotions – have also gained certain notice. Drawing also on philosophical writings, but explicitly on psychological and social psychological findings are for example works on recognition and

respect. These two concepts as motivational factors for political behavior of states and statesmen deliberately try to pose alternative explanations to a perspective of the international arena as neorealist self-help-system driven by the hunger for power and need for security. While the need for recognition is biologically inherent as to basically stabilize insecure state identities (Ringmar, 2002, 2008; Ringmar and Lindemann, 2011), respect is expected for very stable stately identities and might – if not paid adequately – cause uncooperative and defiant political actions (Wolf, 2008, 2011). In that sense one can state that "[w]hen striving for respect, actors seek adequate consideration of their a) physical presence, b) social importance, c) ideas and values, d) physical needs and interests, e) achievements, efforts, qualities and virtues, and f) rights" (Wolf, 2011, 112). These approaches might lead to a whole new reading of international crises and conflicts – for example the uncooperative role of Iran within the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program or the destructive role of Venezuela under the government of Hugo Chávez – that until now had been explained quite differently or had not been understood at all.

Summarizing, when psychology is to be and should be taken as a matter of course to enable corollary, better or new explanative models, the question remains what kind of methodology is there to be applied to find out about psychological motives such as respect or recognition or about emotions like humiliation or fear. Here occurs the problem, that one is dealing with innate factors that are inscribed naturally within the human being, but are of course very difficult to grasp within a positivist design. How can one ever "prove" the relevance of psychological factors not within a small-intergroup-setting but regarding one time international occurrences? On the other side, postpositivist or thick-constructivist discourse-analytical designs seem as well not suitable and viable as psychology is precisely not at all constructed but based in human biology. Thus, thin constructivist designs, which believe in the "existence" of immaterial factors such as identities and beliefs making up for the starting point of social construction, seem to be the most fruitful ones for an undertaking of incorporating psychology – at least, social constructivism itself with its focus on identities and beliefs might really profit from psychological findings. The crucial point in doing research is, however, that intersubjectivity, which signifies the mutual understanding of analysts, is enabled and granted. First as political scientists even if we engage in different subdisciplines like IR, political theory or even political psychology, second within the subdiscpline of IR itself equal if one engages in classic neorealist research with positivist designs or discourse

analysis. Otherwise there will sprout ever greater fragmentation both in the discipline of political science and the diverse research fields resulting in lacking scientific progress.

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A Constant 'State of War' Or A 'Dog-Eat-Dog' System? A Critical Analysis of (Neo)realist Perspectives on World Affairs

Nathan Andrews[13]

Abstract

It has become far too fashionable to adopt a (neo)realist approach to world affairs, especially since this approach purports to deal with the 'here and now' of international politics. While this perspective can be seductive and even dominating, it is imbued with certain shortfalls that cannot be left unchallenged. (Neo)realism often presents a world that is anarchic, bound by state power and self-interest. Although these are "real" features of world politics, an exclusive concentration on these aspects alone does not present a comprehensive understanding of what states do and why they do what they do. This paper investigates realism, particularly the realism of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, to ascertain the extent to which the assumptions these authors present explain the nature and scope of international relations. The contention is that (neo)realism's perspective on world affairs is unprogressive, non-transformative, and deterministic of state behaviour, a feature that makes its analysis limited even in capturing the 'here and now'.

Keywords: international relations (IR), (neo)realism, power, self-interest, morality/ethics

1. Introduction

The discourse of international relations (IR) is replete with many assumptions and predictions about the motives, interests and behaviour of actors on the international scene. There is, however, no consensus on what constitutes the theory of international relations.

This paper analyzes (political) realism and neorealism, particularly the ideas of

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Hans Morgenthau (1973[1948]) and Kenneth Waltz (1986; 1959), respectively. While these two theorists differ in some ways, I find in their arguments these core themes: 1) the question of having a "science" of IR, 2) the idea of state of nature, 3) the concept of power and order, and 4) the ethical challenge. The paper's focus will be on these four main themes, although it is admitted that there may be variations in the worldview of E. H. Carr for instance, who is considered a classical realist. The clarification is that while the new realists are more "self-consciously scientific" than their predecessors, there is no fundamental difference between the old and new especially regarding methodology (Gilpin, 1986: 307). The limits on this paper will not permit us to delve into the various strands of realism and neorealism, and thus I find Morgenthau and Waltz to be a fair representation of these two somewhat interrelated schools of thought. This does not mean that these two theorists represent the vast body of literature on (neo)realism.

The main premise with which this paper begins is that while the use of power and/or force is visible in world politics, it is not progressive or transformative to assume that the international system is anarchic, and that states dwell in an arranged structure where there is a perpetual balancing of power to ensure stability and maintain the status quo. What I mean by progressive and transformative is the ability of a theory (and its proponents) to revise, change, reinvent, and adapt itself to be useful in many contexts and paradigms. The subsequent question will be why a theory should be transformative; and the answer to this derives from the fact that the objects that IR theorists tend to study are not stationary entities which remain constant over time and space. Thus, any quest to illuminate the processes and practices they are engaged in should take account of both continuities and discontinuities instead of straightjacket monocausal assumptions. The nature of the realists' argument is often too constricted, disallowing this overhaul. The 'old school' critique is that realism, as the dominant theory at the time, could not predict the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Ruggie, 1998). This is mainly because the logic of anarchy and balance of power gave way to the triumph of a hegemon.

While the argument against (neo)realism might sound liberal in tone, it has to be clarified here that liberalism (or neoliberal institutionalism) certainly has its weaknesses, just like any other theory. The paper chooses to focus on what some may consider as dated readings mainly to show that the debates in the 'realist camp' has not changed that much since the mid-1950s, although there are some attempts to adapt the theory to recent trends – for instance, the growing need for reflexivity. The paper starts with a brief

account of the core assumptions that underlie realist thinking, particularly the assumptions spelt forth by Morgenthau. The second section will address the core themes within these assumptions and the final part discusses the current place of (neo)realism in IR theory. Revisiting such debates contributes to the ongoing discussion of issues such as war, peace, stability, and consensus in world politics, as these theories often inform international relations praxis.

2. Core Themes in (Neo)realist Assumptions

The core themes in Morgenthau's (1973[1948]) writing are based on his six principles of political realism where he argues that self-interest is the fundamental standard by which all political action should be judged and, in fact, directed. Waltz (1959) also posits that self-interest inhibit any recourse to morality. While some theorists have tried to reformulate these main principles for their own purposes (see Tickner, 1988 for instance), they remain the core assumptions of realism and it is based on these that we proceed with our analysis of (neo)realism. This section discusses the four main themes identified in the core assumptions in both Morgenthau and Waltz, including the question of having a 'science' of IR, the idea of state of nature, the concept of power and order, and the ethical or moral challenge to state behaviour and practices. There may be other themes inherent in the realist perspective but for the purpose and scope of this paper, concentration shall be on these four.

2.1 The question of having a "science" of IR

There is no unity in the discipline regarding the appropriate approaches to adopt in the study of world politics. At the least, there has been a contention between those who believe the inductive methodology of the natural and physical sciences can be applied (for instance, Kaplan, Neumann, Morgenstern, Modelski, among others) and those like Morgenthau and Waltz who belong to the so-called "classical" or "traditional" school. Both of them challenge the application of science to IR as a result of the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the material the observer has to deal with. I must indicate, however, that of the two, Waltz appears to have been the one to make 'real' efforts at constructing a theory that explains state behavior, a theory which lies within the broader framework of structuralism. On the question above, Morgenthau insists that even the science of economics which many assume is the most accurate of all social sciences is "incapable of

reliable prediction" (Morgenthau, 1973[1948]: 22). For Waltz, though the empirical approach is necessary it is not sufficient. On the idea of a metatheory of IR,Waltz expresses doubt since a macrotheory of IR for instance "would lack the practical implications of macroeconomic theory" (Waltz, 1986: 107). This is because change, stability or the behavior of states cannot be predicted as the economists can predict economic change. He thus suggests a "micropolitical approach" which will cover some matters and leave others aside. He admits that the predictions of his balance-of-power (BOP) theory are indeterminate, making falsification difficult. Morgenthau (1973[1948]: 21) maintains that "world affairs have surprises for whoever tries to read the future from his knowledge of the past and from the signs of the present." The implication here is that since we cannot give a good prediction about what states will do, we cannot have a "science" of international politics.

While I agree with them in principle that we cannot have a "meta-narrative" or theory that explains the entirety of world politics, there is a contradiction between the arguments they make and the propositions that follow. First, it would be useful to distinguish the Waltz of 1959 form Waltz of 1986. The former Waltz, in trying to understand the causes of war, focused on the systems level of analysis, looking at what he calls the "third image" – the international system. He later builds on his understanding of the system to construct a more structural analysis which espoused the balance-of-power (BOP) theory. Both analyses are behaviourist and have elements of scientism in them but specifically, his BOP theory follows a more game-theoretic, economic model based on a utilitarian actor (the unit/state) who continually rationalizes and calculates their actions in order to establish both their survival and the stability of the system. This position clearly contravenes his discounting of a 'science' of IR, as noted above. Besides, Waltz's theory ignores the influence of motives, ideology and the value-laden nature of the object of study. The argument here is that international affairs is a broad and diverse arena and cannot be explained in a cause-and-effect manner. Moreover, it becomes very problematic when explanations derived from such analyses are considered *general* theories. With my understanding of IR which encompasses the multiple interconnections and interface among diverse entities, including states, corporations, institutions and individuals, I will argue that both classical realism and neorealism fail at the attempt of constructing a theory that would apply in many contexts as they sought to do. It is static and deterministic to the extent that it disallows "effective change" that could cause the units as well as structure to interact with other variables outside the system.

The reason why the realism of E. H. Carr is not considered under this discussion is that he fits more into what Bull (1966) calls the 'classical' tradition or what Kaplan (1966) calls 'traditionalism', which sets him apart from the scientific-inductive tradition to which Waltz adheres. Although the scientific approach has become the "orthodox methodology" in the US and the IR discipline in general, Bull, who argues for the classical approaches, posits that the scientific approach is "positively harmful" (Bull, 1966: 366) to the field of study. He provides seven propositions to support this conclusion: 1) Abstinence from "intuitive guesses" or "wisdom literature" keeps practitioners of the scientific approach far removed from the substance of international politics, 2) While they advocate for the scientific approach, they employ the classical methods since most of their work consists of unsubstantiated and untestable judgements that are not established by the scientific method they employ, 3) Since only 'peripheral' topics have been dealt with in a scientific way, practitioners of this approach are not likely to make the progress they aspire to, 4) Their conception of the field of IR as the construction and manipulation of models is a great disservice because essentially these models lack internal rigor and consistency, 5)The fetish attachment to measurement or quantification by the scientific school distorts and impoverishes some of their cases, 6) The need for rigor and precision in IR has been amply accommodated within the classical approach, and 7) By ignoring history and philosophy, practitioners of the scientific approach have deprived themselves of the means of self-criticism and consequently have a narrow but arrogant view of the subjects.

Underlying this critique is the level of analysis problem (Singer, 1961) which is also referred to as the agent-structure problem (Wendt, 1987), the issue of whether it is the individual agent or the structure/system of states that deserve the focus of analysis. Some of the arguments against the scientific approach can be levelled against Waltz since of the two (Morgenthau and Waltz) he makes a concerted effort at constructing a structural model for the understanding of world affairs, a model with no agency. There is still no agreement on which of these two main theoretical/methodological approaches best captures the nature and scope of IR. As Bull critiques the scientific approach, traditionalism or the classical approach is also criticized for applying unfalsifiable generalizations that are "indiscriminately applied over enormous stretches of time and space" (Kaplan, 1966: 15). These have been contested methodological issues that remain unresolved but for the purpose of this paper, we insist that the idea of a scientific and deterministic IR is only an elusive convenience of scholarship which fails to represent the

subjectivities, diversity, and value-laden nature of the discipline. In fact, it is this positivist tone of (neo)realism that makes it a "theory-masked-as-method" which does not facilitate a proper understanding of IR, particularly regarding its treatment of the social world as "an external, objective, 'dump generality'" (Ashley, 1986: 281).

2.2. The idea of state of nature (self-interest vs. self-help)

Morgenthau's first premise is that the objective laws that govern politics have their roots in human nature, and since interest dominates actions, politics becomes governed by interest defined in terms of power. Waltz, on the other hand, believes that since man is the root of all evil, "he [man] is himself the root of the specific evil, war" (1959: 3). The point is that if humans derive their nature from society, then studying them can neither be separated from the study of society nor from the study of government, both of which are intertwined. In answering the question, where can we find the major causes of war? Waltz answers; "within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system" (1959: 12). The commonality between the two is the belief that self-interest rules. However, while Morgenthau stresses a constant struggle, a state of nature, and a war of all against all, Waltz insists on the state of war.

First, the idea of "politics in the absence of government" is where Waltz thinks the problem lies. It was the fear of returning to the solitary and brutish life of the state of nature that led human beings to enter the social contract, and to elect someone to possess all the powers they share in common. In Hobbes there was a sovereign, and in Locke, a political society with legislative, executive and federative powers to make sure the contract holds. With world affairs, "the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must" (Thucydides, 1951: 331). A universally accepted governing power is absent in international relations, or at least ineffective. However, to think of a state of constant chaos or anarchy condemns to futility efforts towards cooperation. The ideas of "state of nature" itself by Morgenthau and Waltz's "state of war" are both questionable if they derive from the Hobbesian perspective. Empirical evidence from Kropotkin (2006) shows how primitive human and animal communities were not always in a state of fierce competition to survive. He argues that history shows human beings posses the tendency to cooperate and to aid. So, man was not such a beast! Two things are implicit in this evidence. One, it is possible Morgenthau and Waltz misunderstood the "state of nature" and "state of war" ideas as derived from Hobbes and Locke, respectively. Two, it suggests there is a potential for

cooperation even within the anarchic international realm just as there was some cooperation in the so-called state of nature.

2.3 The concepts of power and order

With the idea of the state of nature and war arises the concept of power and the need to maintain order in the chaotic system of states. Waltz claims that international politics is characterized by the absence institutions that look more like government in the domestic realm; Morgenthau argues it is "the struggle for power" and regardless of whatever ultimate goals exist, "power is always the immediate aim" (1973[1948]: 27). Although efforts such as the League of Nations and the UN aimed at eliminating power from the international scene, he maintains that the struggle for power is universal across time and space. This universality of power derives from the insatiable human tendency for dominance. As such, the whole political life of a state, be it local or national, is a perpetual struggle for power –and states are condemned to this struggle in the international system.

Morgenthau's idea of "relative stability" and "peaceful conflict" could be compared to Waltz balance-of-power theory. Waltz proposes an international system made up of states as units within an abstract structure where states are ordered or arranged in terms of relative capability. The ordering principle here is decentralized and anarchic unlike a domestic system. To him, international-political systems are formed by "the coactions of self-regarding units" (Waltz, 1986: 84) whose survival or annihilation depends on their own efforts – which makes it a self-help system. Essentially, whether balance of power or the perpetual struggle for power, both of them glorify the idea of self-help. The only difference is that in Waltz's self-help system, "units worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior" (1986: 102) to co-act while still maintaining a measure of independence. In Morgenthau, however, the fierceness of the struggle does not guarantee anyone's security. We shall now turn to a critique of both Waltz's and Morgenthau's conception of power.

First, the extreme prominence Morgenthau gives to power makes his conception of IR myopic. He distinguishes between actions of a political nature (which takes into consideration power) and actions that are of some legal, economic, humanitarian or cultural nature. Yet, every action a state takes is of a political nature as the "political" does not only encapsulate the "vicissitudes of power"; calling some actions political and

relegating others to the non-political is like removing the limbs of an individual and yet claiming that he is a whole being, and should be able to do what every human being does. Morgenthau gets this wrong. This is not to say that power is not at play on the stage of world affairs, neither does it mean that states are altruistic entities seeking the welfare of all. If power did not exist, we would not have countries divided into first, second and third worlds, neither would we expect that members of one category need to help "the rest". If power was not at play, there would not be an ever-widening North-South divide (see Kacowicz 2007; Bowles, 2005) which has created the "castaways" of development Collier (2007) calls "the bottom billion." But this would not also mean that states are condemned to a perpetual struggle of diverse self-aggrandizing interests. While the UN and its affiliated agencies do not adequately perform the role of a universal, "truly governmental" power, the fact that the 192 states that make up the body have not abrogated it means there might be some value in cooperation or interdependence at the international level, which derives from mutual instead of self-interest.

Second, Waltz' focus on the state and causes of war is reductionist in terms of level of analysis, so is Morgenthau's idea of where power lies in the international system. The power he frequently refers to is power possessed by nation-states, not other actors that may exist within or outside the state. While he briefly mentions that domestic politics is also characterized by the struggle for power, he does not establish clearly what he means by "domestic". The claim is that actors operating on behalf of the state still work within the broader framework of state-interest and would usually separate the "official" from the "personal". But even beyond these state actors, we can cite examples of international organizations such as Amnesty International, Green Peace, Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, among other nonstate actors who influence world affairs. Thus, reducing the level of analysis to the state renders Morgenthau and Waltz's theory incapable of explaining the role the myriad actors in world affairs play. While the state still holds a good position in world politics, the 1648 Westphalian foundation on which it once stood faces the intercourse of many actors (state and nonstate) who do not only influence as Morgenthau would claim, but also may potentially weaken the pillars of the temple. Although the realist may cite the US invasion of Iraq and "war against terror" as evidence of dominance and international anarchy, the idea that a nonstate actor (al-Qaeda) managed to topple monumental buildings in a so-called powerful state would nullify aspects of their arguments.

Additionally, the use of "international system" in realist thinking is questionable. Waltz (1986: 70) argues that "a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units" and the structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible for one to think of the system as a whole. Yet, he says to be able to make a definition of structure theoretically useful, it has to be delinked from the characteristics of units, their behaviour and their interaction. A system would usually entail "an aggregation of diverse entities united by regular interaction according to a form of control" (cited in Gilpin, 1981: 26). In this way, we can talk of the digestive system, which represents an interaction right from the esophagus through to the rectum. Even from a limited knowledge in biology, it is quite obvious that one cannot remove any of the internal organs that form part of this digestive interface and still maintain it is a functional system; neither can one sufficiently justify the "power relations" between the small and big intestines without recognizing the role the veins, arteries and blood cells play in this interaction. To conceive of units within a structure that is self-enclosed and influential on the composite units without the units reacting to it or to some external factors outside of the structure is short-sighted. In sum, whether it is called a "system" or a "society of states" the argument is still reduced to one level – the state – ignoring other levels that could be incorporated into the analysis. Introducing other levels such as the social, economic, cultural and so forth makes a theory more adaptable to a variety of contexts without necessarily making it a "grand narrative".

Furthermore, Waltz's idea that the domestic is orderly and the international is disorderly is ambiguous. This means that the theory may apply in certain contexts but definitely does not explain the dichotomies of domestic and international politics worldwide. There are many instances where there is what he calls "government" and some kind of a hierarchy, yet order is absent. What would he say of such cases like Somalia where there has not been a formal government for a decade or so? What about Rwanda where, despite the installation of formal government, order has not yet prevailed? In most of these cases formal institutions accepted by all were in place before they retrogressed into disorder, and they have not be able to recuperate as Waltz claims the domestic will. This case basically refutes this statement: "National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation" (Waltz, 1986: 111). The paradox, however, is that sometimes international affairs is a realm of "relative order" while the domestic could be one of "relative disorder". Relative here means that none of these conditions is permanent, and

we cannot hold any theory constant in its ability to explain these phenomena. Recent developments in North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt, and presently Libya) and parts of the Middle East (for instance, Yemen and Syria) show that the domestic can be as anarchic as the international, even when it is perceived that systems and processes of *government*, instead of *governance*, are in place.

2.4 The ethical challenge

In the system both Morgenthau and Waltz describe, morality is scarce, if not completely absent. Realism insists "universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation [...]" (Morgenthau, 1973[1948]: 10). It is naive to assume that a diplomat will pursue moral goals as against the national interest since political prudence outweighs issues of morality, further limiting a normative IR theory. As such, there cannot be universality in a complex and diverse world but there is the UN Declaration of Human Rights for instance – an agreement by a large number of countries whom Morgenthau will claim co-exist in a "peaceful conflict". This declaration at least shows the potential for world leaders to agree on some elements of what can be called a moral/ethical standard of living.

My argument is not that morality exists. The point is that there is the need for an acceptable moral code that will limit the use of force or resort to war. If morality was the main issue countries like China, for instance, might not have joined the UN as a result of its track record in human rights abuses: the same would have been the fate of some African states where the absence of rule of law, mass killings and genocides were obvious. Nonetheless, if morality was totally nonexistent states would not offer humanitarian assistance to people from whom they will gain no political or commercial returns. At some point, we might need to move beyond the realists' "doomsaying" to assess the feasibility of a normative IR. Here, the argument is not necessarily for Kant's (1795) idealist perpetual peace because such peace will require a more robust international society or community which seems far-fetched, for now.

In fact, it is the realist critique of morality that appears to be the most apparent (perhaps, 'real') feature of world politics today. While there exist the UN declaration and other statutory documents that speak to some kind of international concerted efforts towards "the universal good", there is still evidence of absolute neglect of "moral" concerns when it comes to foreign policy. We are aware of the claim by Kennan (1985/86)

that "government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them" and also Thucydides' assertion that in anarchy, the strong always wins. These claims derive from the cumbersomeness in defining morality or ethics, yet paying too much attention to Thucydides, as Welch (2003) argues, can be "largely pernicious" because it can potentially limit a conceptualization of "justice", "equality", and "fairness" – if only these words mean anything in actual practice.

This argument does not imply that because it is difficult to think of a universal morality, issues of morality do not apply to IR. To the strong states, morality is a relative term used to suit the particular action they wish to take to secure their interests. A case in point, which has almost become a cliché is IR discussions, is when the US defied all international laws governing sovereignty and noninterference to enter Iraq and then also to Afghanistan after the September 11 terrorist attacks. This even happened in the presence of the UN which is perceived by liberal institutionalists as representing the era of "governance without government" (see Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Ruggie, 2004), and thus showing that this architecture of global order is not formidable enough. Waltz (1959) will generalize that a foreign policy based on his third image (the international structure) "is neither moral nor immoral." States in Waltz's international system are regarded as acting units who are pressured by the system to behave in one way or the other in the sense that if, for instance, one state decides to "pare down their military establishment, other states will be able to pursue similar policies" (Waltz, 1959: 161). However, this is hardly the case because states cannot act in a purely rational manner unless they are fully convinced that others will do same. Rationality in such a system is so relative and fragile that no one would want to take chances.

Thomas Hobbes, for instance, saw no such thing as order present in a system with the absence of a superior governing power. According to him, "[…] the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without fear of some coercive power […]." (Hobbes, 2005; 596). For Waltz (1959), it is due to "the absence of truly governmental institutions" that war arises. In this instance, the "element of co-operation and regulated intercourse among states" (Bull, 1977: 41) is limited or even absent, and thus we assume its existence at our peril. This addition to the critique reveals the complexity of world politics and shows that we cannot simply hold on to a fixed and rigid explanation of how states behave or how they will behave in the future, and that no

single theory can claim to know the "truth". But in no way does it delimit the overall argument that has been pursued against (neo)realism so far.

3. Conclusion

Like Buzan notes, "power politics … and the dynamics of (in)security do seem to be universally relevant to international relations" (Buzan, 2000: 60). States are often self-interested in their actions, and the absence of a moral code or a universally accepted sovereign power to curb such interests and tendencies can extend this condition to higher, sometimes deplorable, proportions. However, to argue that state interest and power are the central underlying principles of state behaviour is inaccurate since in most cases there are so many interests (other than national) and motivations (other than political) that define the choices and decisions states make.

If considered in entirety, (neo)realism is rigid, deterministic and narrow in its description of the international political reality. Waltz in particular is limited in "his atomistic view of states, his rationalist assumptions about their behaviour and his view that the texture of international politics remains highly constant […]" (Joseph, 2010: 479). From the discussion above, it is clear that while power does not define the totality of state behaviour, there is the expression of power in many forms (military, social, political and economic), mostly by powerful states and especially when it suits their self-interests. However, in the context today's growing interdependence and the increasing role of numerous nonstate actors in international affairs, it would be naive to hold on strongly to realist assumptions and discount multidimensionality, intersectionality and contextuality. Let me note that there have been some attempts to synthesize realism with other theories such as constructivism (see Molloy, 2010) and with liberalism (or pluralism), and Marxism culminating in International Political Economy (see Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, 1998). These are useful configurations but until (neo)realism in itself is able to adapt itself to the changing nature of the discipline, it will remain unprogressive and unable to capture in any greater detail the phenomena that define IR both as a discipline and practice.

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Post-Genocide Rwanda

A Better Alternative to Prevent the Recurrence of Violence

Martina De Donno[14]

Abstract

M. D. Toft has argued that rebel military victories, that put an end to civil war, results in a higher likelihood of enduring peace and democratization. This research paper explains that, prima facie, this assumption could be the most desired outcome in order to stop violence, but in the long-term it is unlikely to be effective, specially in Rwanda. The 'Rwandan path to democracy', and the umpteenth construction of the identities in this country indeed could be the cause of possible future violence, and not the solution to it. A full respect of the logic of power-sharing and a genuine understanding of the identities instead represent the better alternative to construct a better Rwanda. Kaufmann (1996) stated that 'solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes'. This paper will prove that he is wrong.

Rwanda Beyond the Genocide: A Flawed Political Transition

When the Rwandan Patriotic Front seized power in 1994, putting an end to the genocide after its *military victory*, the party of Paul Kagame inherited a devastated country: about 1.1 million dead, 2 million refugees abroad, over 1 million internally displaced, tens of thousands of deeply traumatized genocide survivors, and over half a million 'old caseload' refugees returned in a chaotic fashion (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 178). The new government, charged of the political transition, a path that was to be ended with the elections in 2003, promised to comply with the norms of the Fundamental Law and the logic of *power-sharing* the Arusha Agreements contained, a cosmetic statement for international consumption. Instead, since mid-1994 constitutional production and amendments to the Fundamental Law made unilaterally by the RPF were instrumental in promoting a *tutsi-isation* of the Rwandan politics and in hiding the autocratic *ethnic majoritarianism* of the victor of the civil war. The RPF introduced a strong executive

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presidency, imposed the dominance of the RPF in the government, and redrew the composition of parliament. 'The amended Fundamental Law was, in effect, a subtle piece of constitutional engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF's hold on political power' (Reyntjens, p. 178). The Rwandan Constitution approved by referendum and the overwhelming victory of Paul Kagame and of the RPF in the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2003 went even beyond, representing ultimately the successful attempts to legitimize the regime and its authoritarian policies. The strengthening of a presidential regime, moreover, completely broke down the power-sharing arrangement, since 'a presidential government is incompatible and certainly not helpful to the logic of power-sharing' (Lijphart, 1990, p. 506). As a result, the RPF came to dominate the Rwandan politics and society by way of its military victory. Since then, it has promoted its '*path to democracy*', supported by a supposed national consensus and grassroots civil identity. Indeed, the government has planned a *top-down* program uniting all Rwandans, in order to foster reconciliation. The government's post-genocide re-education slogan goes 'There are no more Tutsi and Hutus; we are all Rwandans now'. However, the promotion of the *Rwandanness* ultimately was instrumental in masking the monopoly of the military and political power of the elite, the paradoxical 'new *akazu*' (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 187), and to label as *génocidiare* or *divisionist* the political opposition. Moreover, although the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the national jurisdiction and the *gacaca* process, the mechanisms that organized individual criminal trials of *retributive justice* for suspected perpetrators of genocide, encouraged conversation about the past and provided opportunities to reconcile, they nonetheless suffered from problems with due process and politicization, since the government forbade considerations of crimes committed during 1994 by the RPF (Longman, 2011, p. 2). The government domination of politics and civil society, the umpteenth manipulation of identities, the fear of being labeled as divisionist, the exclusion of angry and frustrated Hutus both inside and outside the country's weak borders, especially the ones at Congo and Zaire, all these features of a disastrously flawed political transition are the ingredients for a potential resurgence of the *security dilemma* within Rwanda, that can ultimately renew *political* violence and a prolonged period of destabilization into the whole Great Lakes region, if no *ethno-political* solutions are found. Arguably, 'ethnic identity is more important today than it was during preparations for the genocide' (Buckley-Zistel, 2004).

A Better Alternative to *Ethnic Majoritarianism*

Theorical Evidence

Seventeen years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has made significant progress on stability and economic development but remains highly authoritarian, a country where dissent is not tolerated and regime critics are harassed, arrested, and sometimes killed (Longman, p. 1). The military victory by the RPF has encouraged an exploitation of the 'genocide credit'. The rebels did not liberalize the political space, as M. D. Toft predicted; instead, they exploited the legacy of the past victory to hegemonize the country, masking it under the name of power-sharing and national unity, 'complex and opaque formulations purport to hide and perpetuate the monolithic exercise of power by the victory of civil war' (Reyntjens, 1996a p. 242.). Moreover, the security sector was reformed, but not in order to secure an endurable peace, as M. D. Toft expected (2010, p. 45). Instead, the weberian *monopoly over the legitimate use of force* was exploited to the purpose of monitoring the society: indeed, in Rwanda the reality of power is exercised also by the new army and by the powerful Department of Military Intelligence (Reyntjens, 1996a, p. 242).

A better alternative to the *ethnic majoritarianism* imposed by the victor was viable within Rwanda. A potential renewal of the *security dilemma* within the country could be prevented by addressing the causes of the conflict themselves. In this sense, Kaufmann is wrong in assessing that 'solutions to ethnic wars do not depend on their causes' (1996, p. 137). This better alternative is represented not by a *physical separation* of Hutus and Tutsis, as Kaufmann (p. 169) proposed: a huge relocation of the population, supported by international patrons, that however have already proved how impossible it is for them to fully engage in a no strategic zone, represent a naturally flawed solution. Instead, the opportunities to restore civil politics were present *in* the country and not in a separation of it: a full respect of the logic of *power-sharing* presented in the Arusha Agreements, to which the *greedy* parties were formally engaged, and an agreed policy in dealing with *grievances* represent the better solution to promote an endurable peace within the country.

An *Inclusive Power-sharing* **Approach: an Ethno-Political Solution to the Rwandan civil war**

Going back to the causes of a conflict is necessary to fully understand how a conflict can be solved. A high degree of mutual ethnic deprivation *and* discrimination

explains the high level of vicious violence between Hutus and Tutsis. On one hand, 'the use of the coercive apparatus, the distribution of political power, and the distribution of resources' (Hartzell, 1999, p. 7) have always been the *security concerns* of the parties in Rwanda. On the other hand, the manipulation of the identities by the elites has justified from time to time the inappropriate monopoly of the *res publica* and allowed a small inner circle within the elites to take advantage of it, against the other group, often forced by brute means to exile. The abrupt escalation to violence, that occurred in 1990, and turned suddenly into a civil war, was halted in 1993 by a power-sharing Agreement, supported by international and regional third-parties. This flawed Agreement, the main cause of the outbreak of the genocide, is always used as an example to show how the power-sharing cannot work as a means to prevent the recurrence of war, once conflict has destroyed inter-groups loyalties. 'Even if power-sharing can avert potential ethnic conflicts or dampen mild ones', the argument goes, 'it cannot bring peace under the conditions of intense violence and extreme ethnic mobilization that are likely to motivate intervention' (Kaufmann, p. 155). However, the power-sharing settlement contained in the Arusha Agreements failed to mitigate violence because of *external* causes, and not because of internal ones: the exclusion of a group by the *international* peacemakers, coupled with a lack of *international* commitment. In this sense, only an *inclusive* power-sharing (Spears, 2000), affecting the three *security concerns* of the parties (Hartzell, 1999), and implemented *without* the constant pressure of an uninvolved third-party could affect the *ripeness for resolution* (Zartman, 1989), thus eliminating the prospect for the appearance of a *systemic dilemma of power-sharing* (Fortna, 2008, p. 46). Walter (2002, p. 64) argued that 'the success of peace negotiations depends on the presence of third-party security guarantee'. The *commitment problem* in Rwanda could not be solved by relying on a third-party involvement, but instead by *empowering* the mechanisms of power-sharing itself. The sole promise of power-sharing could not fully engage *all* the parties and the elites at the same level. Varying degrees of commitment to a strategy exist because each part is mostly concerned about *relative gains*. In this sense, power-sharing settlements may be possible provided that they incorporate individuals and factions whose existing strategies are compatible with or can be incorporated into inclusive agreements, or whose strategies are flexible enough that they can be adjusted to consider inclusive agreements (Spears, p. 112). Arguably, the elites are more willing to cooperate when they realize that the agreement suit their interests and when they are threatened by the prospective of losing total power. The *inclusive* agreements are so viable when the incentives to exit from the power-sharing agreements are high,

while those in considering them, and the costs to enter them are low (Spears, p. 113). In this sense, civil war actors will seek to construct a power-sharing agreement that is most likely to address their three *security concerns* (Hartzell), if it reduces their sense of vulnerability and if it avoid the concentration of the power in the hands of a single group. According to Hartzell (p. 20), 'only by constructing institutionalized settlements can civil war opponents act to neutralize the security dilemma they face and facilitate the move by groups in society toward more cooperative relations'. A power-sharing agreement that contain rules *proportionally* structuring the security forces and the distribution of the political and economic power is so most likely to ensure cooperation: in order to neutralize the security dilemma, the Rwandan army need to be integrated by the antagonists' armed force, Hutus and Tutsis need to be proportionally represented in the governmental, electoral and administrative institutions, and policies assuring a proportional access to resources need to be implemented. In this way, the power-sharing agreement finds its legitimacy, since it is not viewed by the parties as a 'foreign imposed concept' (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 9). It represents moreover a way to accommodate all the conflicting political aspirations, to transform the *spoilers* into *stakeholders* (Hoddie, and Hartzell, 2010), and to pave the way to an *inclusive* reconciliation. Indeed, 'a government by many is more legitimate than the mere majority rule' (Lijphart, 1999), and it solves the *horizontal dilemma of power-sharing* (Jarstad, 2008, p. 131): thus, 'inclusion of warring parties in a power-sharing arrangement represent a *short-term* solution to violence' (Jarstad, p. 117). 'Although power-sharing agreements can solve the short-term problem to violence', some critics argue, 'it limits democracy in the long term' (Rothchild and Roeder, 2005, p. 36): 'there is a fundamental tension between power sharing's attempt to limit competition over the issues that are most divisive' (Daalder 1974: 607-608) and 'the democratic requirement that important policy concerns be openly debated and that elite decisions on such matters be submitted to the purview of the electorate through regular elections' (Schumpeter 1975; Dahl 1971). However, above all in the case of Rwanda, the power-sharing sharing solution coupled with a *bottom-up* understanding of the constructed ethnic identities, represent the sole way out to the implantation of a more democratic society: 'ethnic pluralism need to be reflected in the practices of competitively elected governments' (Glickman, 1998, p. 53). According to Glickman (1995, p. 3), indeed, 'ethnic conflict can readily coexist with institutions of democratic government if it finds expression as a group interest among other interests'. Political institutions are needed not only to avoid the resurgence of the

ethnic security dilemma, but also to reconcile competing demands. In this regard, Marian Ottaway (1995, p. 248) writes that 'a power-sharing pact may be the only attainable short-term goal compatible with long-term democratization'. 'Creating a new political system in which the parties to the conflict feel they have a stake, thus in a very positive sense co-opting all parties, government and rebels, in a new creation' (Zartman, 1995, p. 22) can help solving the long-term problems related with power-sharing agreement in an ethnically divided society. Indeed, 'democratic institutions may cause, rather than result from, a civic culture or a democratic personality' (Glickman, 1995, p. 41). Democratization is served not by 'trust and tolerance', but rather by 'very uncivic behavior such as warfare and internal social conflict (Lemarchand, 1992, p. 101). As discrimination, rather than deprivation alone, is the key factor behind this conflict, grievances need to be addressed in a *constructive* way so that a peaceful cohabitation in Rwanda could be feasible. 'Even identity conflicts, presumably the most difficult to solve because antagonists believe their very survival as a people is at stake, are amenable to negotiation and can produce stable settlements' (Hartzell, p. 18). According to Tarimo (2010, p. 301) the effort of promoting democracy cannot succeed without taking into account the challenge of appropriating ethnic identities into the structure of nation-state. Any project, which involves the mobilization of people, must take into account the cultural contexts in which individuals live, rather than those in which someone may think they ought to be living. In this sense, 'Rwandanness' is once again a 'fictive ethnicity', a fabrication by the elites of an 'imagined community' (Anderson, 2006), that however could not fit the reality. 'Ethnic identity, on one hand, when manipulated, can be the root cause of internal problems connected with disrespect of human rights and social justice. If appropriated properly, on the other hand, they could be ingredients required for the realization of the ideal of civil society, political integration, participation, and common good' (Tarimo, p. 300). When looking for *long-term* solutions to *ethno-political* competition and violence, identities need to be taken into consideration: ethnic identities indeed are *not* fixed by birth; if hardened by war, they are *not* extremely resistant to change. Cross-ethnic political appeals are *not* futile in restoring multi-ethnic civil politics, as Kaufmann (p. 139-140) argues. Instead, as constructivist scholars state, ethnic identities are socially constructed, they are fluid and subjective. The problematic construction of the nation-state in a deeply divided society and at the same time the need to solve the *vertical dilemma of power-sharing* is closely related with the 'challenge of integrating cultural identities in the processes of political integration and democratization' (Tarimo, p. 307). There exists hope for a better future in Rwanda because 'even in the most severely

divided society, ties of blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood' (Horowitz, 1985, p. 684).

Conclusion

After the genocide, Rwanda once again experienced a period of instability, in which the control of the state was still at stake, ethnicity was still externally imposed by the elites, and the war was not over. Even if today the regime has gained international praise for good governance and competent economic management, it is still tightening its control of Rwanda's social and political life (Longman, p. 1). The implantation of an *ethnic majoritarianism* is hardening the conflict and threatening a resurgence of violence. For a deeply-divided society like Rwanda, 'the majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous' (Lijphart, 1999, p. 32). The current exclusion of part of the society and the construction of an 'imagined community' is so likely to encourage a crisis of legitimacy within the country. An inclusive power-sharing and provision of mechanisms apt to integrate the identities in the process of political and social integration, instead, could be more likely to foster reconciliation and democratization within this war-torn country.

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Security, Violence and the Sacred

Manuel Mireanu[15]

Abstract

This paper argues that the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-foreigners violence in Europe in the last years, and their consequential labelling as a threat to the citizens' security, should be seen not only as effects of government practices. Rather, they should be seen as aspects of deeply embedded social phenomena, through which security and violence are generated and shaped from below, at the level of the society. Violence should be seen as a constitutive force of the community. This paper will then focus on the nexus between security, violence and the sacred. The sacred is able to situate the intrinsic violence of a community in a meaningful context, where its destructive force is converted into the generative force that reinforces the bonds between individuals. The work of Rene Girard on the 'scapegoat' will be used to interpret how violence and the sacred converge in the security demand of the population.

Introduction

The recent years have witnessed an increase in the cases of violence committed against foreigners, immigrants and Roma people across Europe. The perpetrators of these acts are not just the agents of the state, the police, the gendarmerie or the military. The sites of violence are not only asylum camps or prisons. More and more acts of violence against 'non-Europeans' are being caused by 'ordinary' people, in quotidian situations. Also, more and more 'hate-speech' is being vocalized towards foreigners in situations that are remote from the influence of the state apparatus. These are situations of extreme violence, such as street-level murders and fire bombings, usually performed by fascist young gangs, skinheads or para-military organizations (Macmaster, 2001: 190)

This observation would imply two different possible explanations. Either, on the one hand, the discourse of the extremist parties and of the government – politicians and technocrats together – has permeated the society so thoroughly that xenophobia has become embedded in the social imaginary of European citizens, and therefore the rise of

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violence can be attributed to a state-constructed discourse. On the other hand, another possible explanation looks at mechanisms that function at a more intimate level within a society. These mechanisms can be distinguished from the rhetoric of the state The first option would imply a focus on the practices of exclusion employed by the state, such as discourses of nationalism and the labelling of certain categories of persons as threats to the society. This would explain the emergence of violent acts as being generated and sustained at the institutional level by the state apparatus. The second explanation, however, would imply a more serious engagement with the dynamics of 'civil' society. It would require a more thorough understanding on the mechanisms of social action and collective movement, which would not focus only on the state rhetoric, but would look at the processes of the emergence of violence from the level of everyday social interactions.

This paper will follow the second direction, and it will provide an avenue? for interpreting the rise of violence against 'foreigners' in Europe as connected to an array of symbolic practices in which the sacred as a distinct category, plays a crucial part. Three forewarnings are in place, before the argument is developed. First, separating the state from the civil society is only an analytical move, and it serves to highlight two alternative processes of violence. Of course, this paper cannot sustain the argument that there is a sharp boundary between 'state' and 'society'. It also cannot be argued that there is a point after which the influence of the state discourse stops and the influence of the society's 'own' values and norms begins. The aim of operating this separation is merely to draw attention to the fact that in the discussion on the link between violence and security there has been too much emphasis on the role and influence of the state or state-sponsored actors. At the same time, the mechanisms through which the actions of the state find a fertile ground in the society have been largely ignored.

The second caveat is that this paper will not claim that the influence of the state and its agencies is not important, or that it is not able to account for the rise of violence against foreigners in Europe16. However, the argument is that even though focusing on the state and 'official' institutions might be a necessary endeavour, it is not a sufficient one, and it needs to be complemented with the second perspective. Third, this paper will not provide an exhaustive account of all the social mechanisms of social violence. There have been numerous studies and interpretation on the causes of violence, amounting to what is

[16] For an established analysis of the rise of the new extreme-right movements in Europe, see Kitschelt, 2007

already a considerable literature on this topic17. Rather, for reasons that will be spelled out later, the present paper focuses on the particular nexus of security, violence and sacred. The underlying assumption is that the analysis of contemporary security practices can be performed – theoretically and methodologically – by studying the sacred dimension of the mechanisms of collective violence.

Violence from below

The constant rise of xenophobia in Europe in the past decade is difficult to capture in numbers and data. However, there seems to be an acknowledged and official fact that, along with the high number of ultra-nationalist and extreme right political parties and movements that have risen to power in the last decade, there has also been a parallel inflation in a general xenophobic sentiment across the continent. In December 2007, the European Parliament issued a resolution[18] concerned with 'the rise of extremism in Europe', in which it expressed alarm for the 'resurgence in Europe of extremist movements and paramilitary groups and parties, some of which even have governmental responsibilities, which base their ideology, political discourse, practices and conduct on discrimination, including racism, intolerance, incitement to religious hatred, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, homophobia, misogyny and ultranationalism' (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). This kind of statements, however elusive and elliptic, point to a widespread phenomenon, which can be illustrated by some actual events that reflect its dimensions.

In November 2008, over 50 people were injured at a football match in Slovakia. Hooligans and neo-Nazi groups initiated the violent attacks, which were enmeshed in nationalistic rhetoric.[19] This episode is part of a wider trend of Eastern European xenophobic incidents related to race and nationality. In Romania, violence against Roma people is still a problem, after the beginning of the 1990's witnessed numerous cases of

[17] Among a myriad of titles, a useful reference that speaks to this paper's arguments as well, is Friedman, 2003

[18]'European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2007 on combating the rise of extremism in Europe' [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2007-0623&language=EN]

[19]The Slovakian-Hungarian Football War, December 5 2008, [http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2008/12/3/92953/2863]

ethic attacks.[20] In Germany, a recent study among young people revealed hostility towards foreigners and a growing rate of racist attitudes. At the same time, there is an increased affiliation with extreme-right movements among young people.[21] In the spring of 2011, far right paramilitary patrols harassed the Roma inhabitants of Hungarian villages with whips and dogs[22]; they also organized 'self-defence camps' with military training aimed explicitly at 'internal enemies'[23]; some representatives of these far right groups even talked about a 'civil war' between Hungarians and the Roma population of Hungary[24].

Italy has also seen the rise of street violence against Roma people, who are generally considered to be law-breakers and criminals. In February 2009 for example, 18 assaults were reported. These assaults are carried out by armed vigilante groups all across Italy. Aside from physical assaults with heavy objects, there were reported verbal aggressions and threats, as well as public instigations of extremist nature. A leaflet which appeared in Pesaro was captioned: 'Adolf Hitler taught us, it's not a crime to burn gypsies. 10, 100, 1000 patrols'.[25] In November 2011 in Torino, groups of vigilantes set fire to a Roma people's settlement.[26]

In the UK, the beginning of 2009 was also marked with violent xenophobic incidents. An Indian family reported how their house was attacked by a group of masked

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[20] Romanian Nationalism: Violence Toward the Roma (Gypsy) Minority, June 5 2008 [http://www.socyberty.com/History/Romanian-Nationalism-Violence-Toward-the-Roma-Gypsy-Minority.134119]

[21] Deutsche Welle - Xenophobia on the Rise Among German Youth, Study Says, March 17 2009 [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4106056,00.html]

[22] Athena Institute – Gyöngyöspata Assemblage, May 16 2011 [http://www.athenaintezet.eu/en/infocus/read/8]

[23] Huffington Post - Vedero, Hungary Far Right Group, Causes Roma Mass Evacuation With Training Camp , April 22 2011 [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/22/vedero-hungary-roma-_n_852491.html]

[24] The Contrarian Hungarian - Scandalous Jobbik "Civil War Tapes" (with transcript of Gyöngyöspata mayor's remarks), April 20 2012 [http://thecontrarianhungarian.wordpress.com/2012/04/20/scandalous-jobbik-civil-war-tapes-with-transcript-of-gyongyospata-mayors-remarks/] - JUST THE LINKS???? Please explain why you have chosen them, what is the subject.

[25] Italy, racism / violence against foreigners, February 28 2009 [http://de.indymedia.org/2009/02/242880.shtml]

[26]Torino, campo rom dato alle fiamme. Ecco il mostro della paura!, 11 December 2011 [http://www.osservatoriorepressione.org/2011/12/torino-campo-rom-dato-alle-fiamme-ecco.html]

youths. Racist graffiti was drawn on their door, and several windows were smashed.[27] In the context of the heated debates over immigrants in the UK, there is a general public concern that racial tensions will spill over into violence.[28] On top of all these events, let us not forget Norway's tragedy in 2011, when one single person, affiliated with the far-right, massacred more than 90 people.[29]

These examples, among many others, point to an emergent phenomenon of extremist violence against people of different race, nationality or ethnicity spreading across Europe. This is not a concerted form of violence, in that it does not manifest a coherent pattern of inception and propagation. Rather, it appears as a diffuse trend that can morph into various forms. It can be homophobic violence in Romania, anti-Roma patrols in Hungary, and anti-immigrant violence in Germany. It can be sparked by highly-mediatised events, like in Italy, or it can be the result of growing tensions and feelings of discontent, as in the UK. These events have in common the fact that there is always a clear boundary between the identity of the victim and that of the community[30] in whose name the violence is being perpetrated. The violence is always directed against individuals that are perceived to be 'alien' to the social group, and that are considered blameable for the group's misfortunes. In the Europe of the last decade, these victims have generally been immigrants, asylum seekers and Roma people.

Security and Violence

One body of literature that has tried to analyse and explain these processes is the literature on the securitization of immigrants[31]. This literature is useful because the general discourse

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[27]NewTown Abbey Times – Family Speaks out over Racism Terror, March 23 2009 [http://www.newtownabbeytoday.co.uk/news/FAMILY-SPEAK-OUT-OVER-RACISM.5105083.jp]

[28] BBC News - Britons fear race violence – poll, April 17 2008 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7352125.stm]

29 CBS News - Norway massacre's links to right-wing extremism, July 23 2011 [http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20082587-503543.html] -see previous remarks on links

30 Throughout this paper, a very minimal definition of community will be used, which is that of a social group held together by a perceived common identity. According to this definition, the common identity of the group becomes the highest stake for its existence. It is usually when this identity is perceived to be threatened that the existence of the community as such becomes perceived as endangered. See more detailed explanations in the next section.

[31] The process of 'securitization' implies a process through which a referent object begins to be considered as threatened and needs to be 'secured'. This securitization means that the 'threat' is identified and dealt with. In the general literature on securitization (Buzan et. al., 2008), the process of securitization involves a discursive move through which the threat is labelled as having an existential urgency. In other words, if it is not dealt with properly, the threat will end up destroying the referent object (the state, the identity of a social

presents immigrants and Roma groups as 'threats' to the identity of the population. In order for this identity to be 'saved', violent groups legitimize their attacks as a form of self-defence, as a way to ensure the security of the groups they claim to represent (Mireanu, 2012).

To begin with, Huysmans points to the fact that immigrants and refugees are being framed by the state as 'disturbing normal ways of life' within a society (Huysmans, 2006a: 45). Because of their perceived 'otherness', immigrants are seen as alien elements of the community – be it the neighbourhood, the nation, or even 'Europe' as a common identity, with the potential to disrupt its unity and well functioning. As such, their presence induces a climate of general 'unease', of fear and discomfort among the population (Bigo, 2002). In consequence, the immigrants are being perceived as a threat to the existential security of the community. Immigration becomes securitized, which means that it becomes the object of measures that are intended to articulate it as a coherent threat, and subsequently to address this threat with coercive means (Buzan et. al., 1998). Securitization processes articulates practices of exclusion and violence against the perceived threat (Shapiro, 2007). Moreover, the securitization of immigrants in particular serves to create a 'political community of the established'; therefore, the provision of security by the state is founded upon the creation of a climate of insecurity, in a process of mutual constitution of supply and demand (Huysmans, 2006a: 47). Violence against migrants is seen as a response to the 'unease' that is generated by their framing as a threat (Huysmans, 2006a: 58). In consequence, constructing unease and fear is a pre-condition to the manifestation of violence.

But how is this climate of unease produced? Two interwoven processes are put forward in order to explain this phenomenon: the politicians' search for legitimacy, and the *habitus* of the security professionals (Bigo, 2002). The first process is connected to the so called 'professionals of politics', which are agents situated in positions of political power, members of government, and individuals with high political authority and credibility. This is obvious from the explanation that is given for how this first process operates. Hence, Bigo is concerned with the political spectacle, that is, with the need of politicians to create situations as problematic, in order to manage them. In this way, the politicians justify their

group, the environment etc.) Dealing properly with the threat involves taking exceptional measures – actions that would normally not be allowed. More often than not, these actions lead to extreme violence such as war (Neumann, 1998).

own authority and legitimacy (Bigo, 2002: 68-69). At the same time, the political spectacle infuses a sense of self-conscience in the politicians, who begin to see themselves as fundamentally necessary for the preservation of the state's functionality. This necessity is captured by the 'politics of protection', which is the politically generated need of security in the face of daily dangers and risks (Huysmans, 2006b: 2). In this respect, the blame for the emerging xenophobia in Europe is explicitly placed on the discourse of political actors in search of legitimacy (Bigo et al, 2007: 21).

The picture gets complicated with the second process. The emergence of the field of the security professionals is strictly connected to the development of security technologies, the privatization of security, and the globalised neo-liberal discourse of technocratic governance (Bigo, 2002). These factors converge to establish a network of 'professionals of (in) security', which operates with its own systems of meaning, and with practices that display productive powers (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 458). These professionals have the legitimate and socially accepted level of expertise that allows them to decide whether something is a risk or not, and therefore, whether it can be labelled as a threat (Bigo, 2002: 74). In other words, security professionals provide the technical justification for securitization. Yet their contribution goes further, as the nature of their expertise is translated in the nature of the threat. With the evolution and growing sophistication of security devices, threats can be identified not only in the military capabilities of nation states, but also in isolated individuals. At the same time, the same technical evolution encourages the need to use advanced methods of control and surveillance (Bigo, 2008).

These factors produce a special type of technique, which Bigo calls the '*banopticon*' (Bigo, 2007). The banopticon is a technique of governing through which the entire population is under constant surveillance, but only certain groups are being coerced and excluded (Bigo, 2007: 16). Furthermore, the banopticon is a zone of indistinction, situated in-between inside and outside, at the margins of the rule of law, and as such a zone of exceptionality (Bigo, 2007: 5). However, within this zone of exceptionality the mechanisms of governing operate based on routines, and daily practices and norms (Huysmans, 2011). As such, the exception becomes the rule. The banopticon is an ensemble of practices and discourses of security which serves to survey and discipline the population. It is a '*dispositif*' of institutions, architectural structures, laws and administrative measures, that uses power at a micro level in order to control the transnational movement of people (Bigo, 2008: 32).

This technique is explicitly designed to address the problem of immigrants and 'foreign bodies' within a social group. As such, it operates not only on the widest territorial level – through surveillance and control – but also on the most intimate biological level, by introducing, for example, biometric identifiers.

In this way, the population is rendered passive, and its role diminished. Not only is there any place for resistance in this picture, but the passivity of the subjected populations appears to deny any trace of responsibility on behalf of individual actors. This is possible because the basic rationality of the banopticon is that of protection. However, protection here is seen less as opening the possibility of agency (or, in the words of Bigo, it is not '*pro-tegere*'), but as tutoring, as speaking in the name of the protected. Therefore, the voice of the protected is muted, and its agency is considerably reduced: "The agency of the protected […] is here turned to a passive voice, reducing the political life of the protected to a biological one" (Bigo, 2006: 92).

It is thus consistent with the theory of the securitization of immigrants to argue that this 'top-down' approach places great emphasis on the practices of the government and those of the security professionals, and in this way leaves out the possibility of independent collective action at the grass-root level. Ordinary forms of racism and xenophobia become in this way subsumed, and even determined by the banopticon and its practices (Bigo, 2007: 28). These practices, continuously developed and reinforced by politicians and security experts, have the overwhelming power of deciding on the nature of the threat, its incarnations in different types of individuals, as well as on the means to address this threat. The violence of security[32] therefore becomes truly monopolized by the State[33].

The argument of this paper, to reiterate, is not that such a picture is theoretically incoherent, nor that it depicts aspects that are far from reality. Rather, the argument is that

[32] On this issue, we have to stress the argument that violence and security are closely interrelated; from exceptional measures outside the realm of normal politics, to practices of surveillance, control and the ban, and finally to war itself, violence is the main modality of security (Neumann, 1998). Whether it is outright display of force, or a more subtle practice of domination through consent, security actions are predominantly violent.

[33] 'State' here is not seen as an institution, but in the Gramscian way, as a social relation - a 'historical bloc' with a hegemonic discourse (i.e. articulation of threats, risks and dangers, among others, and therefore, the definition of 'security') (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992). This historical bloc is comprised of politicians, security experts, administrative staff, the mass media, the police and the military, and to some extent, parts of the population that accepts (and sometimes benefits from) the hegemony of the State's practices.

such a picture inevitably omits an important part of the story. This other part consists of the actions and the discourses that occur and emerge at the population's level. It can hardly be the case that this population merely adopts certain discourses, as they are 'passed down' by the State. Rather, what is needed is an account of how the population is an active part of the discourses of security and violence. It would require an explanation of how this discourse is generated within the society as well. The above examples illustrate precisely these points. They showed instances of violence that occurred distinct from, or parallel to the State action; they reflect diffuse attitudes and silent processes that take place outside state policies. The level which will be under scrutiny in the next section is distinct from the policy sphere in which the State operates. It is the symbolic level, where the stakes of collective action are not necessarily connected to the day to day parameters of the state's action. Rather, the motivations in the symbolic level are related to the unconscious strata of a community's imaginary, they are related to concerns that transcend the horizons of time and space as captured by the political. This is not to say that the political is excluded, or that it does not have any influence over this realm. However, in order to fully grasp its significance on social action, the symbolic sphere has to be disentangled from the political one.

Violence and the Sacred

This section will provide an insight on how the stakes of the symbolic order operate at the society level. The argument here is that the violence inherent in some exclusionary practices against immigrants, such as xenophobia and racism, is a manifestation of the sacred. The sacred is viewed as a system of meanings that situates the subjectivity of individuals in a coherent set of values, practices and institutions. These values and practices, in turn, give the individual a sense of true being, in short, a consciousness (Rennie, 2006). The sacred does not belong to the 'real' (here, in the phenomenological sense), even though it is manifested in and through it (Saliba, 2006). It belongs to the symbolic realm, and as such, it is distinct – although central – to the political (Agamben, 1998).

The centrality and significance of the sacred in social practices has been underlined by historians of religion, such as Eliade, who argued that the rhythm of modern culture is permeated by moments of rupture, in which the normal course of things is interrupted by a symbolic event or action. This interruption is the *hierophany*, the manifestation of the sacred within the profane order, which is embodied in practices such as ceremonies,

celebrations, rites and rituals of all sorts. These moments of dis-order have specific functions in modern society, and as such they constitute an integral part of social ontology (Eliade, 2006: 18-20).

Taking this argument one step further, the sacred can be seen at the very root of a social group, in the sense that it constitutes the primordial essence of inter-individual relations. Rene Girard has shown how this is possible, by unearthing and analyzing the role of violence as a manifestation of the sacred. At the very heart of a community lies an initial act of violence, which generates social bonds and constitutes the order (Girard, 1993). This act of violence is the symbolic murder of the '*scapegoat'*. Girard uses examples from ancient mythology, especially Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* to illustrate what he calls the 'sacrificial crisis'. This is the moment when a society over-accumulates violence that cannot be neutralized by normal means (rites of purification, animal sacrifices). Therefore, this violence spills over in the group, endangering its very fabric.

In the course of this generalization of violence, differences between individuals are suppressed, since the guilt of the violent acts becomes symmetrical, and the violence evolves in ascending spirals. Thus, violence becomes the common denominator for everyone, and at the same time the community as such becomes disintegrated through inner conflict. In order to resolve this crisis, the myths show, and Girard interprets, one member of the community has to be sacrificed, to take all the guilt onto him/herself and serve as the scapegoat. Crucially, since violence erases difference, this scapegoat can be any member of the community (Girard, 2004); at the moment that s/he is designated, however, the scapegoat becomes the complete *alter*, the 'other' towards which the identity of the social group is re-established in a symmetrical way (Girard, 1992). The killing of the scapegoat is not homicide, but (contra Agamben's understanding of the *Homo sacer*) a sacrifice. The sacred dimension is thus revealed in the ultimate and creative act of violence[34] – the sacrifice of the scapegoat.

Demanding Security

[34] David Apter reminds us that violence creates not only a discourse, but also "(...)a form of capital, a monopolistic capital of truths and virtues, of logocentric closure. It produces a conveyance, people giving over a piece of their minds to the collective, enabling them to draw more power than they give up". (Apter, 1997: 13)

How is this relevant to the analysis of the securitization of immigrants? An analysis of the hierophany of violence points to the fact that labelling the migrant as a threat does not just serve the interests of politicians and of security experts. Rather, the immigrant serves the more subtle and symbolic function of the *scapegoat*. The violence directed towards migrants is not just the daily practices of the banopticon, a *dispositif* of constant surveillance and invisible coercion. Acting in ways that eventually lead to violence towards migrants seems to be an inherent logic of many societies. This logic is not motivated solely by a perceived existential threat, but also by the need to direct the violence that would otherwise destroy the very fabric of the society. Therefore, violence against the migrant is a symbolic act of social purification and reconsolidation. By driving the internal violence away from its members and towards the 'other', the community saves itself from destruction and reconfirms its own identity. This violence cannot always be expressed in an intense manner, partly because of the state's monopoly on coercive instruments.[35] Therefore, the society directs it as a *demand for security* to policy makers, and also to other social actors.[36] Repressed violence leads to the perception that the immigrant is a threat, and protection measures are demanded from the state. This is the nexus between security, violence and the sacred. And it is in this manner that security issues emerge initially outside the official state discourse and action, and then eventually get picked up by the state and re-directed back to the population.

35 This is to say that social groups do not always have the capabilities (time, strength, resources) to engage in open conflict with those that they consider to be scapegoats. The violence then gets dispersed and submerged, and is expressed in everyday acts. The examples of extremist violence that we have seen in the introduction to this paper can therefore be thought of as just the tip of an iceberg that has very deep roots within the core of the social imaginary.

36 This mechanism does not reflect a mere disposition of the society to become united in moments of crisis. Security may as well divide the people, not just bring them together. Rather, we can argue that this mechanism of security and common identity reflects something deeper, something related to profoundly rooted social fears and panics. Humans need security, as much as they need the feeling that they belong to a bigger collective. The two elements – security and identity – go together hand in hand. We would argue that there is a certain demand for security, articulated or not, but definitely felt by individuals.

The demand for security happens autonomously from the threat articulations of the state. Of course there can be no real separation between what the state says and what the society thinks, there is always an influence from the state towards society, if only for the fact that the state controls most of the information related to security and threats. But we can safely argue that the social demand for security can be distinct from the state's activity: it can posit different threats than the state does, or it can claim that some threats are more important than the state claims, or it can even claim the state itself as a threat. Moreover, these social processes can lead to deeply rooted perceptions of threat that can function independently of the state's policy. These rooted perceptions form imaginaries of threats that are highly conservative, stereotypical and taken for granted. This is why, when certain actors from the society claim to speak on behalf of it, they attempt to use these imaginaries in order to gain as much credibility as possible.

This is not to deny the importance of the interplay between the political and the technocratic in labelling the migrant as a threat. Yet, in parallel to these factors, the wide adhesion of the society to violent acts against migrants – ranging from surveillance to expulsion – has to be seen also in conjuncture to the symbolic function of the migrant as a scapegoat. The migrant is blamed for all the deficiencies of the society – unemployment, poverty, disorder, crime, amorality and so on. As such, any violence towards the migrant is legitimate, as it is part of the purifying ritual of social redemption. Symbolically sacrificing the migrant achieves two goals. On the one hand it re-directs the violence of the group away from its members and towards the victim. On the other hand, by removing this destructive force and the potentiality of conflict, it re-establishes social harmony.

Conclusion

This paper presented, of course, a highly stylized account of what is a complex phenomenon. However, at their very root, the social motivations behind tolerating and augmenting violence towards migrants in Europe are also based on such symbolic mechanisms. The rise of more and more xenophobic and new racist movements across Europe – all of which see migrants as the main problem – is an illustration of these processes of symbolic scapegoating, as a manifestation of the sacred and its functions. Yet, if their occurrence is continuously seen as a product of state rhetoric, and their most intimate rationales are not uncovered, their intrinsic violence will remain enigmatic.

Even more, analysing security as instrumental tactics of agents in pursuit for any kinds of capital and power, as revealing as they might be, ultimately remain trapped in an infertile pessimism. Reflecting upon the constructive side of security practices can shed light on the puzzle of their continuous and growing public support, which occurs in spite of numerous attempts to de-demonize the immigrants. Also, seeing the demand for security and violence not as a pathological trait or a side effect of state interference, but as an active and conscious move on behalf of a society that genuinely feels threatened, might point to better and victimless ways of managing unease. Conflict is an essential part of the political, and thus any polity will be faced with violence. However, understanding the mechanisms of this violence can help us manage it in ways that do not lead to social exclusion and bloodshed.

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A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey-European Union Relations within the Context of Five Phase Spiral Model: Human Rights Dimension

Özgür Tezer[37]

Abstract

This article analyzes the European Union-Turkey relations with regard to human rights reforms in Turkey and particularly the European institutions' impact on reformation process. It will be argued that the EU has been an active leverage especially after the post-Helsinki period. In this regard, this work will propose that in the absence of domestic forces the European Union promotes progressive steps in Turkey. By analyzing this process and correlation, on the theoretical basis this article will use the Constructivist approach and the Five Phase Spiral Model, which introduce sociological point of view to world politics, underline importance of normative structures. Basically, this work assesses the usefulness and validity of model and Constructivism as an explanation of the changes in the Turkish government's human rights practices.

Key Words: Constructivist Approach, Five Phase Spiral Model, Human Rights, European Union-Turkey Relations

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War opened a new period namely "post-Cold War". This new period introduced changes to the international relations (IR) theory. Because at that time it was being thought that developments leading to the end of the Cold War could not explained by any of the dominant approaches of mainstream scholarship in IR theory. It was thought that the focus of dominant approaches was mainly on relations of great powers (material based side of relations); therefore social factors namely domestic/internal politics affecting the international environment and specifically USSR, were not seen important by them. In this context, they were accepted as alien to change and approaches that could not see derivative social effects leading to the end of the Cold War. Mainly it can be said that previous approaches took the world as out there that functions in line with

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a system free from values and neglected domestic developments and identities. In this context the world was taken as granted without questioning, and some other ontological and epistemological questions were left unexamined. It was believed that mainstream theories of that period and their explanatory mode were far from to explain phenomena of world affairs. For this reason, from the beginning of the post-Cold War era, to balance materialistic explanations; normative and subjective side of the world has been underlined.

In this context, after end of the Cold War dominant positivist assumptions of previous dominant scholarship were criticized and attacked by other approaches like constructivism. To form a new approach, constructivists began to work to destabilize the positivist/rationalist dominance; because it was believed that the end of the Cold War brought new interests to scene. For constructivists ideational, normative and cultural explanations turned to integral parts and variables to explain world affairs. It was assumed that states interpret and constitute the material world with their lenses, actions and beliefs that were formed by their interests and cultures. In this context, the world was assumed not only as material but also ideational entity. These above mentioned explanations and constructivism were summarized by Kulbakova as "*seeing the world as inextricably social and material, seeing people in their world as makers of the world, and seeing the world as a never-ending construction process.*" (**Wendt**, 1998, p. 101–117). The following part of this work will deal with constructivism and its basic assumptions that will be used as theoretical base for explanations.

II. Constructivism in International Relations

Nicolas Onuf initially introduced constructivism into international relations (IR). He described constructivism as "*people and societies construct or constitute each other.*" (**Onuf**, 1989, p. 36) Besides this, Emanuel Adler defined constructivism as a view that the manner in which material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depending on a dynamic and epistemic interpretation of the material world (**Adler**, 1997, p.332). He mentions that constructivism is interested in understanding how the material, subjective and inter subjective worlds interact in the construction of reality (**Adler**, 1997, p.332). It focuses exclusively on how structures constitute agent's identities and interests and seeks to explain how individual agents socially construct these structures in the first place (**Adler**, 1997, p. 330).

Some elements make constructivism different form of international relations theorizing. It is believed that global politics is guided by the inter-subjective shared ideas,

p. norms, values, rules and institutions which are held by actors. Constructivists direct their focuses on the inter-subjective part of knowledge and structures. In this context, they mainly underlined social aspect of human existence, role of shared ideas that constrain and shape behaviors or identities. It is believed that international structure consists of shared ideas, expectations and beliefs that give the world structure, order and stability (**Finnemore** and **Sikkink**, 1988). These inter-subjective meanings and identities include some discursive elements. Constructivist approach analyzes these discursive elements what Rationalists refer to as common knowledge (**Dessler**, 1989, pp. 441–73).

On the other, for constructivism ideational structure has transformative effects on actors that lead them to redefine their interests and identities in the process of interaction that enables and constrains them. It is also assumed that ideational structures and agents co-constitute and co-determine each other. This situation that gives agents and structure equal ontological status is called within agent-structure debate. In constructivism, it is argued that structures constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities. Structures on the other hand produced, reproduced, and altered by practices of agents.

They also question a priori and exogenously determined state interests and preferences and see them instead as endogenous to the interaction between agency and structure (**Wendt**, 1998, p.101). According to Wendt primordial interests and identities are not accepted, moreover structures are accepted as historically contingent product of human activity, of historical social practices that instantiate new social practices. They are against acceptance of human reality as constant entity and assume even the most embedded structures gradually changes (**Wendt**, 1998, pp.101–117).

According to constructivism objects of our knowledge are not independent from our interpretations, human consciousness and language. Constructivism especially underlines the role of language in social life, because it is given as medium for construction of inter-subjective meanings (**Berger** and **Luckmann**, 1967, p.173). They accept language as a mechanism leading to changes in core agent properties such as identity, behavior and interests, because it is thought that inter-subjective linguistic expressions present a potential for formation of reality and provide a source of change. These expressions also help to legitimize validity and internal coherence of collective understandings. This situation that can be described with term "linguistification" is accepted as a kind transformation process involves culturally transmitted and linguistically organized stock of interpretive patterns and constitutes individuals in inter-subjective life worlds and

reproduce structures (**Habermas**, 2003). According to Ba and Hoffman this transformation process and logic involves actor's words, deeds, namely discursive practices, shape agent's behaviors in which they live (**Ba** and **Hoffman**, 2003, pp.15–33).

These above mentioned inter-subjective linguistic expressions and patterns have crucial effects over other variables such as identity, interests and culture. Constructivism assumes that identity is formed in dialectical relationship between society and structure that are formed with above mentioned building blocks. Constructivists also think that identities that are formed by these building blocks render a certain level of predictability possible for agent's behaviors and identities. According to Berger and Luckmann "Once identity crystallized, it is modified and reshaped by social relations" (**Berger** and **Luckmann**, 1967, p.173). It is generally seen that linguistic expressions reflecting dominant values depend on historical, cultural, political contexts are used by international organizations to manipulate actors' preferences and identities in line with valid world standards that are generally defined by dominant powers. This manipulation process occurring both in domestic and international levels involves different learning and teaching processes as summarized in five phase spiral model. At the end of this process identities are shaped, accepted as the fundamental basis of interests and seen as lenses to shape and direct agent's actions and to determine roles or strategies in valid structures make easy to predict behaviors and their consequences (**Dassen**, 2002, pp.171–175). International organizations mostly with their overall normative frameworks create different manipulation processes in international politics and try to change actors' basic properties that are found in culture of actor.

Culture can be defined as a kind of basket from which actors take different elements and pieces them together to form another entity or create specific action. It is believed that culture either motivates agents to do certain acts or constrains them. In work of Berger and Luckmann culture is defined with concept of *symbolic universe* (**Berger** and **Luckmann**, 1967, pp.177). This symbolic universe contains norms, rules and values that are formed by society in history; shapes politics; ties individuals and collective identities; defines group boundaries; organizes actions; provides necessary framework helping agents to interpret motives of others; forms suitable environment for norm internalization affecting interests, identities and cultures of agents. Speech acts are other elements in constructivism that are mostly used by international networks. They are used to persuade or change agents' minds about what goals are valuable and about the roles they play (or should play) in social life (**Onuf**, 1989, p.66). After such a threshold level they are accepted

or seen as canonical structures performing important social construction work and creating new understandings and new social facts that re-configure or re-shape politics.

International organizations as will be mentioned later with their properties and strategies have transformative effects on identities and cultural patterns of states. It is believed that norms make important contributions to efforts of these international organizations, p. they are accepted as effective and influential tool kits of those organizations to change internal structures of agents create substantial and normative framework or development paths in parallel with valid standards within which agents conduct; and are used as benchmarks in norm socialization process. Due to their importance the next part will be about norms and their roles in constructivist approach.

III. Norms in Constructivist Approach

Definition of norms is one of the aims of constructivist work of constructivist work. Accordingly norms are defined as descriptions of collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity (**Katzenstein**, 1996, p.5). They serve as social facts that constrain the range of individuals' choices and prescribe appropriate behavior for a given context mostly corresponding to single standard of behavior. It is assumed that norms and rules are placed in the middle between agents and structures, and link them. This situation is described as a continuous *two-way* or *dialectic* process. It is argued that social structures continually impose behavioral limits on actors through norms and other forms of inter-subjective and collective knowledge; and in turn actors contribute to formation of this structure by continuous actions in accordance with limits (**Solomon**, 2006).

It is believed that they regularize agents' behaviors and produce social order. At the end they form advanced or complex patterns namely institutions. They create suitable or possible environments for agents to make possible habitualization process which agents conduct possible. The main aims of these institutions are transmission of knowledge to the next generations and setting cultural patterns for agents to channel them to one direction in the existence of other possibilities. In time their contents shape identity and interest of the target state, take states to particular role model and create a certain type of actor.

Constructivism suggests that norms are expressed through language and argumentation processes and this rhetorical argumentation process later determine what choices states have. All these processes are built into special vocabulary. This vocabulary

when enriched with maxims and proverbs can be collected or defined under the heading of collective explanatory schemes (**Berger** and **Luckmann**, 1967, p.94). These collective explanatory schemes which are created linguistically determine who can be a member of the international society (**Finnemore**, 1996, p.325–347). In other words, normative boundaries of membership of international community are drawn and strengthened by international organizations whose expertise and rational-legal authority find widespread consideration in international arena. Their prescriptions and guiding marks create a common consensus in internal environment for agents to form an order. Beside this their successive directives also motivate agents to behave within the acceptable standards, improve inherent coherence of norms and predictability of potential behaviors (**Lowe**, 2002, p.215).

Composition of all above mentioned components and processes bring norms power of legitimacy. In fact this composition generally is for explanation of already established order and increase cognitive validity of norms or their objectivated meanings. After such a threshold level norms are given as taken for granted and begin to make other competing institutions unpopular. By this way and with normative their formality they strengthen functional imperatives of already established institutional order. Legitimacy mostly turns to possible with help, codification, application or interpretation of norms. International organizations with their continuous efforts make important contributions to this process and try to decrease the length of necessary time of norm internalization. Their normative structures and directives also form necessary framework for legitimation.

Like individuals in domestic level socialized by communal norms, states are socialized by norms of international relations. These above mentioned processes that strengthen rule or norm, simultaneously increase possibility or level of obedience of states, because norms have a quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment in their internal structures. All these rules constitute a world culture that constitutes social agents and affects how they define their identities and interests. This world culture is assumed as ontologically primary, its rules and values create actors such as states, firms, organizations, and individuals (**Reus-Smith**, 2002, p.493). This creation occurs in processes of socialization and internalization that are mostly under supervision of international organizations. In this process actors believe and are prescribed that those norms are pre-conditions to being accepted as equal member of international arena.

In sum, rules and norms are accepted as necessary normative restrictions that include people in structures for motivation on behalf of themselves and others and in structures of social control.

It is believed that in international arena that is regarded as realm of obligation within which cooperation is prescribed to states through with norms. These prescriptions are mostly furnished and triggered by international organizations. Not knowing what their interests are, states thought by international agents to adopt policies which are in harmony with civilized modes of behavior. If international society is penetrated and structured in this way and non-state actors work in world society as norm entrepreneurs to shape the most basic principles of states, then it is increasingly difficult to sustain the idea of international society is a discrete social realm and even harder to limit political theory of international relations in itself (**Reus-Smith**, 2002).

Human rights that have been regarded as a tool in international relations and have formed collective explanatory schemes accepted as one of the most important constituents or indicators of valid and civilized normative structures or shared meanings. They are regarded as necessary conditions for international cooperation, peace and legitimacy; and seen as indispensable source for being accepted as member of international society and primary source of domestic normative change at the beginning of 1990s entered agendas of international networks, norm entrepreneurs and constructivism and are mostly used by them.

IV. Human Rights, International Networks, Normative Change and Constructivism

Human rights (HR) are given as a set of principled ideas about the treatment to which all individuals are entitled by virtue of being human (**Schimtz** and **Sikkink**, 2001). Over time these ideas have gained wide-spread appreciation as international norms defining what are important for humans to prosper, in terms of protection from mistreatmens and equipping with the elements necessary for a life in dignity. HR norms create a relationship between individual right holders and other entities, namely states having obligations (**Schimtz** and **Sikkink**, 2001).

The idea that the state should respect the HR of its citizens is an old one, dating back the writings of Locke and Rousseau and to the U.S. Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (**Ishay**, 1997, p. 138). It is believed

that the intellectual groundwork of the international HR development was mainly developed in Europe and the United States, but their establishment on the international arena has reflected culturally diverse sources. Work of Ishay gives extensive evidence on global sources of HR thinking and activism and the crucial role of non-Western participants in drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (**Ishay**, 1997, p. 138). Other international agreements ratified or signed after UDHR created standard international definitions and benchmarks for what constitutes international HR.

Prior to ratification of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in international law was being regarded as domestic affair that was perceived under jurisdiction or sovereignty of state. In other words, in the past, individuals were regarded as objects of state action, not international subjects having practical rights in international law. 1966 Covenants of the UN supplementing the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights detailed rules for civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (**Forsythe**, 1993, pp. 55-70). Especially developments from 1945 to 1970 revealed that individuals were subjects of international law and after these developments the scope of HR broadened. In addition to these 1975 Helsinki Accords initiated a new era in HR area. Helsinki process included political - economic rights, helped to re-legitimate HR as a diplomatic and international matter, and created a kind of suitable environment for other developments like protection of minority rights.

In 1980s for reasons of presence of the bipolar balance of the Cold War HR issues were overshadowed. But at that period NGOs and international networks were increasing their activities and becoming primary advocates of HR. These networks that were named as transnational advocacy networks by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink began to work internationally. (**Risse**-**Ropp**-**Sikkink**, 2001, pp.1–38). It has been seen that from their establishments, they have provided political spaces and communicative structures in which actors negotiate and internalize international HR norms. These political spaces have been named as international platforms. It is believed that these spaces took their roots from Helsinki Accord and its normative structure.

At beginning of 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the end of the Cold War new opportunities were being appeared in international arena to support international HR movements. With this way HR movements and their legitimation processes became salient, but at that point another problem arose about the adoptation method of internationalization of HR norms, p. Through which way(s) those norms would

be internalized by actors? By Diplomacy? By direct intervention? By legal mechanisms or by local activities? To create suitable tools independent monitoring mechanisms were introduced in Western Europe, the Western Hemisphere and Africa. For instance the Council of Europe was created with functional jurisdiction.

Since the beginning of 1990s many international agreements on creation and strengthening of the necessary institutional arrangements have pressured governments into respecting their citizens' rights and have advised internalization of international HR in domestic jurisdiction. In those years, these efforts especially intensified in Europe under the supervision of the Council of Europe and different bilateral agreements signed or ratified p. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, adoptation of high commissioner on national minorities and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. These agreements and international policies also have been supported by economic, political and military conditions. Generally there has been an overwhelming official consensus that at least discussion of HR is a proper international subject or policy matter, even if many disagreements remain over definition and implementation (**Forsythe**, 1991, pp. 55–70).

HR are generally in accordance with basic assumptions of constructivism, namely invented social constructions. They believe that these invented constructions like HR exist because people believe and act as if they exist. At the end these invented constructions shape politics and social world. Constructivists believe that HR are strong enough to diffuse or to affect different agents and their internal structures, because HR and related elements are shared in many cultures around the world. For constructivists the global acceptance of HR norms since 1945 followed a two-stage process, p. Norm emergence and norm cascade.

Norm emergence represents norm formation process ending at *tipping point* where norms are present for use or adoptation; the latter involves accepting, adoptation and internalization processes of norms. When it is looked closely it can be seen that international organizations have played important and active roles in both processes. Sometimes they codificated newly emerged norms and engrossed conventions; on the other hand with their enforcement mechanisms they triggered reformation processes in actors to internalize those codificated HR norms.

Networks and organization bring new ideas, norms and discourses into political debates. As mentioned before they create communication structures and discussion spheres, in which different actors negotiate the social, cultural and political meanings of international arena. Especially globalization and its by-product processes have reinforced the tendency to see international society as an enterprise association. In other words, globalization has increased the incentives of non-state organizations to find common interests to cooperate to meet objectives. As common denominator and value HR norms in these or at the end of these processes became a kind of test for government's political legitimacy. In this context, it is seen that the EU and UN have used these variables in different situations.

In sum, collapse of communist governments in Europe, growth of international and transnational HR organizations, developing international economic integration, transformation of production systems, labor markets have helped to increase attention on HR issues and encouraged demands for more and better modern HR norms. Also, it has been believed that respect for HR would result in stability, peace and prosperity within boundaries, in regions and international arena. In constructivist model many different methods have been created, but the Spiral Model of Human Rights Norm Socialization that was introduced by Finnemore and Sikkink has an important place in literature, because it gives importance to activities of international organizations and analyzes internal normative change in detailed way. This model converges and is used with persuasion.

Contrary to basic assumptions of coercion, persuasion is defined as active, often strategic inculcation of norms that are often identified with transnational *norm entrepreneurs'* activities, NGOs and transnational networks performing as agents of change (**Finnemore-Sikkink**, 1998, pp.887–917). Persuasion is not a simple process to manipulate or change state interests or behaviors. It requires argumentation and deliberation processes and efforts to change the minds of others. It aims not forcing actors to change their behaviors, contrarily aims convincing them to accept certain norms that were not accepted before or more important than they previously held. It is believed that persuasion is the best way to form long-term consensus on values or norms such as HR and to convince different people or agents coming from different cultural backgrounds. In persuasion process international networks and organizations try to form such a basis at least for minimum agreement or compromise for different agents.

It is accepted that persuaded actors internalize HR norms or rules of appropriate behavior, and redefine their interests and identities. At the end actors are consciously convinced the truth, validity or appropriateness of HR norm, belief or practice and change their minds. Consequently it is believed that international law influences state behavior through processes of social learning and other forms of information conveyance. Then at the end shared understanding is reached on mutually agreed procedural HR norms. Mutual compromise on overall values on common HR norms increase credibility of agents, reduce their internal uncertainties, mostly bring them stability and constitute suitable environments to render possible principles of accountability be applied to world politics.

Norm internalization occurs in HR socialization process. Socialization process is defined as the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community (**Zuern-Checkel**, 2005, p.1046). It is the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding or valid standards namely world culture. Socialization process reduces variety and makes valid patterns enduring. This mechanism includes a number of discursive and micro-processes to socialize recalcitrant states. In these micro-processes international organizations form new norms related with different needs of people. At the end norms acquire taken-for-granted quality. This taken-for-granted situation opens ways for other progressive steps for norm-breaking countries to comply with international HR norms.

International organizations as mentioned before use information, symbolic, leverage and accountability politics in internalization processes (**Keck-Sikkink**, 1998, p.2). They seek to strengthen generative and transformative power of HR norms and widen scope of their practice. Especially for HR norms after cascade level international organizations come to scene. NGOs and different organizations in this process firstly begin to pressure state decision-makers to change their policies in line with normative commitments. In this context, they firstly frame behavior as failing within the aegis of a certain HR norm, then name agents and seek to shame them into compliance by publicize how their behavior deviates from standard one. After then norm-violating states primarily begin to change their behaviors, but at firstly they pursue instrumental or material interests. They adjust their behaviors as to the international valid discourses or normative structure without believing in validity of them.

The next phases of this model reveal progressive developments' occurrence in norm-violating states. States begin to make cosmetic changes to pacify international and

domestic criticisms. Contrary to its different properties this stage prepares necessary pre-conditions for comprehensive normative changes. In this context, the next stages of norm socialization process bring institutionalization of HR norms into domestic law. Valid structures are changed by international organizations as teachers of agents who are open way for changes. Creation of new institutions, training of public officials and ratification of international treaties are among major changes that are observed in agents.

All the process can be summarized in the following explanations, p. Agents gradually adopt norms in response to external pressures that are firstly for purely instrumental reasons. National government then begin to change its rhetoric, gradually accepts the validity of international HR norms and start a process engaging in an argumentative process with their opponents. The more they accept the validity of norms, the more they are likely to institutionalize them in its domestic practices. HR norms then became standard operating procedures of domestic institutions. Once they institutionalized in this sense, changes in government and in individual leaders matter less and less.

In the following part of this paper, effects of international organizations will be analyzed within the context of Turkey and the European Union (EU) relations by emphasizing human rights issue. When it is thought in the context of agent-structure debate, it is possible to say that the EU with its normative structures, some pre-conditions and leverage politics triggered progressive HR developments in Turkey. In other words, it is assumed that the EU initiated a reformation process and has thought and forced Turkey into a kind of socialization process.

V. Human Rights Dimension of Turkey-EU Relations

For years, the EU membership has been seen as the most important target for Turkey that is seen as movement towards the West. Especially after 1999 Helsinki Summit mutual relations began to institutionalize and the EU started to monitor the political sphere in Turkey within the context of political criteria and related normative frameworks. HR has always been one of problematic areas that hindered the accession negotiations and candidature process of Turkey in previous years. Turkey in order to fulfill those criteria found itself in reformation and socialization process in HR area.

In fact, at first years the treaties established the European Community did not contain regulations regarding HR. This had been general approach in the EU. However, through the end of the Cold War the EU changed its HR policy. The collapse of the Soviet Block was seen as real starting point for developing more idealist HR policies. While

Maastricht Treaty mentioned '*the union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention [of]… Human Rights*', in 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam by changing its standing declared that the EU founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Nice Treaty in 2000 for the first time combined all the rights, legal instruments and conventions under one united framework.

As mentioned above, HR, since the beginning of 1990s, have occupied important place in foreign policy of the Union. In this context, the most apparent move of the Union was acceptance of Copenhagen Criteria, two conditions of which are foundation and maintenance of institutions for the protection of HR. These conditions have been used as entrance requirements for candidates. They are accepted within the context of democratic conditionality. HR has been chosen as the core strategy of the EU to persuade non-member states to comply with legitimate standards of the EU. Turkey after being recognized as candidate for the Union in 1999 began to face with these requirements that sometimes hindered accession process.

The next part of this paper will generally deal with conditionality effect of the EU over progressive HR developments in Turkey. This paper, in order to show transformative effect of the EU one of the powerful regional international organizations, will use historical facts, use documents, give some references to models created by constructivism and make short explanations about sub-periods until today.

The EU's interest in Turkey's HR records and Turkey's learning process began in 1980 after military intervention. During the Cold War Turkey had a quiet important geography for the Western World, but in the Post-Cold War period with shift to values such as democracy and HR Turkey's role and position changed (**Aybet**, 1999, p.50). After military intervention in Turkey political parties closed, democratic processes suspended, freedoms were restricted, new Constitution was prepared, universally accepted notions were removed from constitution and changed with national ones, National Security Council was introduced and in 1982 Constitution passage saying *based on HR* changed with *respectful of HR* (**Kılıç**, 2001, p. 89) was placed.

At the beginning response of the European Community (EC) was relatively soft. The EC made a declaration on the day after military took the power in Turkey and stated that the EC was following developments (**Dağı**, 1997, p.126). These declarations were reflecting *wait and see* policy of the EC. On the other hand, military government in those

days committed that it would be bound with NATO obligations and maintained a democratic political order. However, 15 months after the coup the EC began to raise its voice, the EP suspended its relations with Turkey and the EC also did not release financial aids. The EP demanded from the Council of Ministers to initiate a monitoring mechanism against Turkey and it entitled the Commission of Political Affairs to follow developments in Turkey (**Oran**, 2002, pp.188–201). These efforts tried to put HR violations in Turkey into center of international agenda. With this way the EC and the EP began to frame HR problems of Turkey to put Turkey into shameful position. Increasing opportunities to get news from Turkey also opened additional ways for NGOs and IGOs to frame violations in Turkey. They also published reports and increased attention of international community against Turkey.

After these, in 1983 progressive developments began to occur with general elections. The restoration of order, the withdrawal of the military and the creation of political parties brought a new wave of democratization in Turkey (**Aybet**, 1999, p.53). However, emergence of PKK terrorist attacks on Turkish security forces and establishment of National Security Courts (NSC), namely (DGM), crumbled positive developments. Approximately for following 15 years especially armed attacks hindered HR progress and Kurdish issue has found a considerable place in different reports of international organizations proposed Turkey.

In those years, the EC understood that continuous pressure over Turkey made improvements possible in ameliorating HR performance of Turkey (**Dağı**, 1997, p.136). However, this approach was regarded by some circles as an intervention to internal affairs of Turkey and they denied validity of accusations about HR that can be explained within the context of norm socialization model. Increasing armed attacks forced Turkey to take additional measures such as introduction of state of emergency and enactment of the Law of Fight Terrorism (**Galletti**, 1999, p. 67). However, measurements taken by Turkish authorities negatively affected bilateral relations of Turkey and the EC.

In 1987 the EU's effect showed itself in occurrence of progressive developments. Turkey at that year moved to the next step namely prescriptive status. Turkish authorities in order to pacificize criticisms made some changes such as granting to Turkish citizens the right of individual petitions before ECtHR and creation of Parliamentary Committee to supervise developments in HR field. In 1987 Turkey after these developments applied for full membership. Turkey also in November 1988 ratified the European Convention for

the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the United Nations Convention against Torture. 200 verdicts of capital punishment were not approved and exercised. These efforts were seen as positive developments by the EC, but did not suffice the EC and international HR organizations. In 1989 the Council of Europe (CoE) denied Turkey's application on economic reasons and indicated completion of Customs Union Agreement. The EC also mentioned that Turkey still fell short of minimal standards the EC sought. Despite their claims about HR, international organizations and European countries did not considerably force Turkey to change. This situation prevented Turkey from crucial damages.

After application's denial Turkish state initiated HR reformation process, permitted HR organizations and created ministry dealing with HR issues. At the beginning of the 1990s efforts were directing to Customs Union membership. The EP also declared it would vote against Turkey on the grounds of HR violations in Turkey in 1995. In order to influence decision of the EP, in July 1995 a constitutional reform was introduced. As a result students allowed to become members of political parties, public employees were granted the right for collective bargaining and voting age lowered. In addition in Anti-Terror Law the maximum sentences lowered to 3 years.

Due to armed attacks of PKK, until 1999 Turkey's HR record had not improved especially in areas ruled under a state of emergency. These developments in those years were preventing general appearance and substantial HR progress. In 1997 Turkey's application was rejected in Luxembourg Summit. The council explained that the strengthening of EU-Turkey relations would depend on Turkey's political and economic reforms, alignment of his HR standards with those of the EU, and protection of minorities (**Uğur**, 1999, p.235). However, Turkey, due to reactions of elites and the United States' initiative and to foster the democratization efforts, was accepted as the 13th candidate country at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. This development forced Turkey into series of amendments namely reformation packages in terms of its legislation.

1999 was an important turning-point in terms of HR and democratization. Especially the capture of PKK leader decreased the level of HR abuses. On November 1999 amendments to Articles 243 and 245 of the Penal Code increased the length of custodial sentences for those found guilty of torture. Also, 1913 Civil Servants Law amended and ways opened for responsibility of security forces in involvement in HR violations. In 2000 Turkey also signed the United Nations Charter of Individual and

Political Rights and the Charter of Economic and Social Rights. After ratification of Accession Partnership Document and acceptance of National Programme involving short-medium and long term priorities, Turkey with increasing pace, began to change regulations that were created by 1980 military government.

In 2001 another reformation package was introduced. It removed the prohibitions on broadcasting and publishing in Kurdish. Status of women improved, the period of detention before trial was reduced to four days (**Gorvett**, 2002, p.28). The first package was introduced on February 2002 that was named as *mini democracy package*. Articles 159 and 312 of Turkish Penal Code and 7th and 8th articles of Anti-Terror Law amended and period of custody was decreased. Also additional guarantees were brought about privacy of private life and freedom of correspondence. With the second package on April 2002 Law of Foundations were amended and banned language passage was eliminated from Press Law. Four months after the third package introduced on August 2002. In that package death penalty abolished, legal guarantees introduced for freedom of expression and freedom of associations and obstacles were lifted to learn languages other than Turkish. Also on November 2002 the state of emergency removed.

After establishment of new government other packages introduced measurements involving the prevention of torture and ill treatment, changes in the Political Parties and Elections, simplification of procedures on non-Muslim community foundations and retrial arrangements on the basis of judgments rendered by ECtHR. Broadcasting and teaching in different languages and dialectics were allowed, opening of places of worship rendered possible, regulations about composition of National Security Council and relevant law were among other changes that were made in 2003 in following other four packages. Despite influential changes in these 7 packages, different progress reports have always emphasized deficiencies and necessary legal regulations. These progress reports have played precursor roles for necessary amendments. In the last two packages, namely 8th and 9th packages, opened decisions of High Military Council to judicial review, entitlements of president were limited; National Security Courts were completely abrogated.

With these two last packages in 2003 and 2004 Turkey generally completed first homework on the way to the EU membership. Firstly, the Committee Prevention of Torture (CPT) in 2003 confirmed the existence of positive HR developments in Turkey. All these developments showed their positive consequences in 2004 progress report of the EC. In addition to these in 2004 Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE lifted monitoring

mechanism that was formed for Turkey in 1996 about HR. At the end in December 2004 the EC decided that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria to a satisfactory extent and accession negotiations could begin. On the 3rd of October the Negotiating Framework was issued by the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council. Finally the EU Council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.

VI. Conclusion

As mentioned above the EU set strict normative framework or structure up for the candidate member countries. Rules regarding HR are found in the acquis communautaire and the legislation of the EU. HR has important place in community legislation that was confirmed with 1993 Copenhagen Criteria. Therefore, the Union requires the future member to have a good record of HR. In order to be able to gain accession chance candidate countries have no choice and try to meet the HR criteria set by the Union. In other words, the Union, with its normative structure and rules in accession process has influential and transformative effect over agents namely candidate countries. The Union in this process uses conditionality principle as a primary tool. On the other hand states by passing from different stages internalize and institutionalize international HR agreements and make them parts of domestic practice.

States at the beginning of this process generally pursue instrumental interests; however in time this point of view changes and agents accept validity of those international HR norms. All these changes occur within the context of Human Rights Norm Socialization process stemming from constructivism. This model accepts activities of international organizations as important variables and defines them as teachers working in international relations. It is assumed that at the end of this process norm violating states reach to rule-consistent behavior level and are regarded as legitimate member of international society and the Union.

At the end of this work by looking developments it can be asserted that the democratization and HR amendments were initiated, motivated, triggered and monitored by the Union. In Turkish case point of departure is the idea of membership to the EU that was realized with 1999 Helsinki Summit. The Union, in this process with its advices, inspiration and pressure ignite the fire of change in the absence of domestic forces.

HR and democratization have been considered by the EU as effective tools to force Turkey to comply with the set of requirements formulated at the Copenhagen

Summit in 1993. In this context, Turkey after 1999 faced with a list of 'what has to be done?' that promises different rewards. At the beginning of this process, due to accusations about HR, Turkey was forced to defense position against Western World and chose the way of denial. But, since 2001 with constitutional amendments, domestic environment and tendency towards the comprehensive change changed and became stronger than previous periods.

This strong tendency has followed a non-linear development pattern in Turkey. So far, in membership process the EU has been performing successful teacher role with its regular reports and normative framework. But, on the other hand Turkey as a student has not fully completed all necessary requirements. However, when it is generally evaluated, all changes made in Turkish legislation have been regarded as important steps towards the EU membership target. At the final stage, it can be said that, Turkey, in order to eliminate its HR problem from its agenda, must focus its attention on domestic practice, adoptation of acquis communautaire and internalization of relevant normative framework.

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"Taoisigh & Prime Ministers' policies towards extremists in Northern Ireland 1985-1996: A Learning Process?"

Dawn Walsh[38]

Abstract

Several different explanations of policy change based on notions of learning have emerged in policy literature. These explanations can largely be divided into those that deal with policy learning and those relating to policy adaptation. Policy learning is a fundamental process that involves re-thinking primary values, altering the goals of policy and constructing complex cause and effect chains as the result of processing new knowledge in the policy area provided by epistemic communities. Policy adaptation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc process of change where fundamental values remain constant and only the means of achieving goals change not the goals themselves. This paper applies these possible explanations to the case of the policy change effected by the British and Irish governments in relation to negotiating with extremists in Northern Ireland 1985-1996; a policy change that has been cited as being pivotal to the success of that peace process. (150 words)

Introduction

'We will not negotiate with terrorists' is a refrain that is commonly heard flowing from the mouths of various statesmen across the globe in relation to a multitude of different groups involved in politically motivated acts of violence. It is a refrain Prime Minister John Major vehemently endorsed in numerous speeches to the British House of Commons in relation to the various paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. To enter into talks with such people would 'turn [his] stomach' (Dixon, 2001, pp361). In reality, however, conflict resolution is not so black and white.

By the time the Good Friday Agreement was signed at Belfast in 1998 political parties with connections to paramilitaries on both sides had been included in the negotiations. Notwithstanding the conditional nature of their public inclusion in talks, there had clearly been a departure from the policy being pursued by both governments at the time of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. At that time the Taoiseach and Prime Minister were attempting to end the conflict by reaching an agreement that empowered the

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moderate parties and removed support from those pursuing violent means. By 1996 they had visibly altered this policy to one that sought to co-opt the fringes into mainstream politics.

This change in how governments felt extremists must be treated in order to end the conflict is extremely significant. It shows a recent case where governments attempted to end a small war not by military or security means but by entering into talks with those previously excluded. The focus of this paper is to ascertain whether this change was as a result of policy learning by the Taoisigh and Prime Ministers or if it was the result of an ad hoc process of alteration in response to particular events (policy adaptation).

Policy adaptation and policy learning

In *When Knowledge Means Power* (1990) Ernst Haas offers a clear dichotomy which addresses the significant differences between policy learning and policy adaptation Haas explains the differences between policy learning and adaptation by asking who learns, what is learned and to what end does the learning occur?

In relation to who learns Haas argues that in the case of policy learning epistemic communities are central. They provide policy makers with consensual knowledge from which new purposes can be derived. In the case of policy adaptation there is no central role for an epistemic community. The actors involved in policy-making simply change their policies on an incremental basis due to the ambiguous lessons of history.

In policy learning 'what is learned' is a whole new nested problem set. The consensual knowledge provided by the epistemic communities allows not just for more efficient methods of achieving existing goals but for new interconnected understanding of issues to be constructed. In policy adaptation the role of new consensual knowledge is not central; what is learned is much more restricted. More efficient means of achieving existing goals may be ascertained. There is not a broad reassessment of the nature of the problem.

To what end does learning take place? In policy learning the end of learning is a fundamental reassessment of values that underpin policy aims. Values are deeply held over long periods of time and to propose that they would be re-examined with change in mind shows how policy learning is transformative of fundamental beliefs. Policy adaptation does not involve such fundamental examination of values. Consequently, although policy adaptation may involve achieving more aims through new routes it does not operate to the same fundamental end as policy learning.

Extremists, exclusion and spoilers

The change in the British policy in relation to negotiating with extremists has been highlighted as being one of the most important developments that made ending the conflict in Northern Ireland possible. Small wars are often fought against states by groups who hold extreme aims or grievances and are determined to see their goals achieved or the grievances dealt with. In turn states often refuse to recognise these groups as being in any way legitimate in their aims or methods and thus adopt certain policies to end the war by dealing with them but rule out negotiations. It is often argued that permitting them to enter into negotiations would legitimise their tactics or even appease them (Spector, 2003, pp2).

A number of the most widely used strategies for managing the issue of extremists reflect this idea. Elimination, for example, is a popular policy adopted by leaders when faced with extremists. It seeks to use intelligence information, the law and physical force to identify, locate and apprehend extremists or key leaders of extremist groups. This may also entail the seizing of funds from such groups and efforts to ensure international funding networks are dismantled.

'Expanding the middle' is another tactic that is often employed. It seeks to establish conditions that grow the more moderate segments, thus attracting more moderate members of extremist groups toward a position of tolerance and away from a commitment to the destruction of the other (Bartoli & Coleman, 2003, pp4).

Such security related policies towards the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in particular can be seen in Thatcher's policies towards Northern Ireland (Thatcher, 1993, pp379-415). The idea of 'expanding the middle' by supporting the SDLP (Social Democratic Labour Party) is also a policy clearly pursued by both Thatcher and Fitzgerald. Such policies that seek to sideline extremists may not be the most effective way end small wars or conflicts.

Some peace processes result in lasting peace, others break down and the war resumes. The emergence of extremists who want to 'spoil' the peace process greatly accounts for this variation. Spoilers often originate from extremist groups. They pose a great risk to those seeking to make peace. Minimising and overcoming this risk is one of the greatest challenges facing those engaged in seeking to end wars, big, small old or new (Stedman, 2003, pp104-105).

Zahar makes an important distinction between inside and outside spoilers. This terminology relates to the position of the group in negotiations. Those who have been

involved in the negotiations are insiders. If they are to consider spoiling they need to take into account not only the costs associated directly with returning to violence but those associated with losing the 'peace dividends' (Zahar, 2003, pp119). The 'peace dividends' may take many forms such as of positions of power promised to the group or aid promised to their supporters. They also have to take into consideration the damage that will be done to their international reputation if they are seen to renege on promises they have signed up to.

'Outside' spoilers are those who have been excluded from negotiations. These groups are more likely to view peace as a threat. The exclusion of a group from negotiations that result in a particular peace agreement means that the agreement's success can be seen as evidence of the irrelevance of the group and can thus undermine their political significance and threaten their continued survival. Financially, outside groups that benefit from the war economy have no interest in peace. Their exclusion means that they have not had an opportunity to negotiate side deals that allow them to benefit from the peace. It is in the interest of such groups to continue the violent conflict so that they can continue to reap the monetary rewards (Zahar, 2003, pp118).

In short, actors included in negotiations have a vested interest in the success of the agreement. Any gains they have made are dependent on its survival. In contrast groups left out of the negotiations have no stake in peace and they may even have extensive stakes associated with the continuation of the violence. This logically indicates that a management strategy for extremists that seeks to exclude them from a peace process makes it more likely that they will seek to destroy that process.

Operationalising the model

The hypothesis of the research on which this paper based is that: the Taoisigh and Prime Ministers' policy change to negotiate with extremists in Northern Ireland was caused by policy learning not policy adaptation. In order to make this hypothesis testable the differences between policy learning and policy adaptation were compiled into a four-fold typology that clearly allows for the observation of theoretical concepts. The presence of the four main observable implications will be investigated:

- original values examined;
- purposes redefined;
- new nested problem sets constructed;

- new purposes derived on the basis of knowledge provided by epistemic communities.

The presence of these observable implications will be considered in direct contrast with the four central observable implications of policy adaptation:

- behaviour changes as actors add new activities without examining the implicit theories underlying their actions – values are not questioned;
- emphasis is on altering means of action not ends – not the ultimate purpose;
- new purposes are added to old ones without worrying about their coherence;
- change is incremental (Tannam, 2001, pp496).

A wide range of data was examined with the explicit and sole intention of ascertaining whether or not policy learning is more evident than policy adaptation.

Original values examined

Key original values were examined over the period 1985-1996. Firstly, the potential to exclude the extremist groups, namely, Sinn Féin, from the political framework was reassessed. In the post-hunger strike years, Sinn Féin enjoyed increased electoral support. This worried the leaders and Fitzgerald[39] in particular feared that Sinn Féin could become the main party of Northern nationalism as well as increasing their representation south of the border. This fear motivated a policy that sought to exclude Sinn Féin from the political structures. It was believed that an agreement that supported the SDLP's role as representatives of the Nationalist minority could deprive Sinn Féin of its constituency and political legitimacy and thus make them irrelevant. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement was such an agreement and in the years that followed the belief that Sinn Féin should and could be sidelined continued.

By 1996 there was an acceptance by Major and Reynolds that no matter how problematic it was to include Sinn Féin and their loyalist counterparts in the process, it was necessary for a settlement to be successful. A commitment to the Mitchell Principles was a necessary condition for the inclusion of any party and different parties were excluded at different points. There was, however, no longer a belief that such parties could be sidelined or an agreement reached without them. Their exclusion was temporary and used as a pressure tactic to punish and prevent violence by their armed colleagues. The belief

[39] Haughey was also concerned about the electoral threat of Sinn Féin but this was during his early period as Taoiseach and while in opposition. By the time his final period in office, which is the subject of this analysis, began this threat had decreased.

that they could be marginalised to the point of political extinction or a meaningful agreement reached in their absence was re-examined. The practicality and effectiveness of this belief was re-evaluated and a policy of cautious engagement through a 'carrot and stick' approach replaced it.

_____Secondly, and more fundamentally, the legitimacy of the extremists as a political voice was examined. The view of them as simply representing a grave security threat was replaced by a more nuanced view of their role. Through the exchange of various position papers on issues such as self-determination and consent the leaders demonstrated a de facto acknowledgement that the extremists had political and constitutional concerns that were worthy of addressing. This represents a fundamental re-evaluation of values because it shows that the leaders did not enter into narrow contacts with the extremists seeking simply to put an end to immediate violence. The inclusion of constitutional elements in the discussions is indicative of leaders that fully recognised the necessity of taking into consideration the views of the extremists on constitutional matters. Together these new positions represent the adoption of values that recognise the importance of bringing extremists into the process both for the practical reason of ending the current violence *and* for the theoretical reason that the more inclusive the process the more likely it is to succeed.

Purposes redefined

_____Values inform purposes and as a result it is only logical that if there was a real change in values this would be observed in the goals the Prime Minister and Taoiseach set themselves in relation to the extremists in Northern Ireland. As I've just mentioned, both redefined their purpose in relation to the extremists. By the early 1990s the aim of isolating and defeating Sinn Féin and the IRA, and the loyalist paramilitaries, had been replaced by an aim of finding a way forward in which Sinn Féin could be included. The rhetoric of defeating the IRA was replaced by a dialogue that recognised the significance that the Republican leadership could play in negotiating a broad political settlement. The aim became the construction of an environment in which the extremists could be brought into the political mainstream.

_____This new goal involved the employment of a new set of instruments. Moves such as the lifting of the broadcast ban on members of Sinn Féin, the issuing of visas for the US

to Adams and Cahill, and the statement by Brooke that the British had 'no selfish interest' in Northern Ireland all sought to create an environment where an IRA ceasefire could be achieved. Securing an IRA ceasefire was a top priority of the leaders, not simply as an alternative to military force in ending the violence and suffering but in order to create a situation where extremists could be brought into negotiations with the governments and constitutional parties.

_____There is an important issue to be highlighted here. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach were not always in agreement as to how far the policy of coaxing an IRA ceasefire should go. Downing Street strongly opposed the granting of the US visa to Gerry Adams, a position that they made clear to both Dublin and Washington. They felt that such privileges should be held back as examples of what could happen after a ceasefire, not used as enticements before the ending of violence.

New nested problem sets constructed

_____In 1985, the understanding on which the Anglo-Irish Agreement operated defined the problem as being one that could be solved by creating new institutions with the moderates. This approach failed to realise that the conflict could not be ended without fully taking into consideration the role of the extremists.

_____The extremists were not simply violent criminals to be dealt with through security measures. They also held positions on principled issues regarding the broad political position of Northern Ireland. These positions were supported by significant numbers within their communities. Thus the new understanding of the conflict realised that these positions had be addressed.

_____There was an appreciation that securing a ceasefire was not an end to the conflict. It was one very important goal but was interconnected with goals that sought to moderate the extremists' positions on political issues. It is this understanding that allowed Reynolds to defend his support for the issuing of Adams' and Cahill's visas for the US. While such a move may have seemed unwise while violence continued, it represented a reasoned expansion of goals to a position where securing a ceasefire and inviting the Republicans into constitutional politics were both being pursued due to their indivisibility.

_____Furthermore the casual relationships between the aims of different groups were taken into consideration. When redrafting the Hume-Adams' document that eventually comprised a large part of the Downing Street Declaration Major and Reynolds recognised

that the Nationalist/Republican origins of the document would be a problem for the Unionists. To this end they went to great lengths to ensure it was viewed as a neutral document written by the governments.

New purposes derived on the basis of consensual knowledge provided by epistemic communities

_____It has been said that success has many fathers (John F. Kennedy, 1961). This is undoubtedly true in the case of the Northern Irish peace process. The role of actors such as Dr. Martin Mansergh, John Hume, Fr. Alex Reid and Archbishop Robin Eames has been the subject of many papers and books, and in relation to this paper these actors take on a particular significance. The role of these actors in providing consensual knowledge to the governments over the period in question is a strong indication of policy learning. Knowledge and those who provide it are central in Haas' distinction between learning and adaptation.

The 'muddle through' incremental style of policy change that Haas terms 'adaptation' does not utilise outside knowledge to a great effect. This contrasts with learning (and the previous three indicators of such) which is not possible without the dissemination of new knowledge. The examination of values, alteration of aims and reconstruction of cause-effect chains is only possible because of the existence of previously unavailable knowledge.

_____The arguments put forward by Fr. Reid are an example of this new knowledge. While his role as facilitator of the contact between the Taoiseach of the time and Sinn Féin is often praised, the most important element of Fr. Reid's involvement in relation to the hypothesis being tested in this paper is the consensual knowledge he provided that persuaded Charles Haughey to begin a process of contacts that ultimately led to a fundamental policy shift by the Irish leaders. Similarly, the role of John Hume in promoting dialogue, both between the leaders and with extremists in order to secure a lasting peace, has been highlighted as being extremely important (O'Leary, 2003, pp81). While the massive role played by John Hume in the peace process is far beyond the scope of this paper, his involvement is illustrative of policy learning in the way in which it served as the provision of knowledge to leaders.

Such new knowledge does not immediately become embedded in policy. The change in policy towards the extremists in Northern Ireland took over a decade to become fully embedded but this gradual nature of change should not be confused with

incrementalism that Haas associates with adaptation. While the process of change was gradual it was not ad hoc, in the way adaptation is, because of the involvement of the epistemic communities. They provided the knowledge that seeped into policy making over time to inspire an examination of fundamental values – the very process by which policy learning occurs. The presence and consideration of such knowledge is sufficient to support the hypothesis being examined in this paper.

Conclusion

Having established the presence of policy learning this paper is an important first step in analysing the process through which an important policy change occurred. The British and Irish governments' approaches to ending the conflict in Northern Ireland underwent a fundamental change. This highlights how governments engaged in small wars may end them by engaging with groups previously only target for elimination.

Policy learning highlights the importance of the provision of new knowledge from epistemic communities in facilitating such policy changes. This is a key area in which further research would be useful. The author encourages others to investigate how epistemic communities provide such knowledge. In relation to this conflict suggestions for individuals and institutions that could be included in such research include: the US government, John Hume and the SDLP and some Church leaders, civil servants and political advisors. Alternatively additional research which examines whether governments have undertaken policy learning in relation to how they end various small wars in which they are engaged would also be useful.

(3,195 words)

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