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POLITIKON is the academic journal of the International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS). It is recognized as one of the leading academic journals publishing the work of students from across the fields of political science and international relations. Founded in 2001, the journal is published twice yearly and distributed in hard copy and online to more than 10,000 IAPSS members in more than 40 countries on every continent, as well as outside the IAPSS network. POLITIKON publishes the best in undergraduate and graduate student scholarship from around the world. The peer-review and refereeing process involves full Professors, leading academics and experts from across the world and abstracts from POLITIKON are included in the International Political Science Association's (IPSA) Annual International Political Science Abstracts.

POLITIKON: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science

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FOREWORD

Dear Reader,

There were plenty of misadventures publishing the current POLITIKON 15.2. Edition. This is why I would like to apologize for publishing it with delay. However, thanks to the devoted work of the Editorial Board, and also the time that professors consecrated helping us in editing it, POLITIKON 15.2. has became reality. The current Edition does not have a concrete theme or a topic, but the articles on the pages that you will read, have a very strong academic argumentation and speak about current political and humanitarian issues. Most of them have already inspired your critical mind of researcher. This Edition has only 4 articles instead of 5 because of the severe critics made by both Editorial and Advisory Board. We all hope that we finally selected the best to offer you.

While reviewing and making the last evaluation of the articles which have been previously approved for publication by both Editorial and Advisory Board, I found out that things finally went right: the first article called *"Reconsidering the Normative Power of European Human Security Agenda"* by Yulia Zabyelina and the book review by Nina Wilén, and also the second article called *"The Dynamics of (Personified) Party Identification in the Second Italian Republic"* by Diego Garzia and the fourth one called *" The Decline and Fall of the LDP in Japan: What happened?"* seem to compose two particular meaning units.

Nowadays, questions related to new human condition theories, human security, human rights studies, conflict management and prevention are arising more often than ever before. It should be wrong to think that states no longer play an important role. Perhaps, it is true that globalization has made states give up their sovereignty to other forms of political, institutional or military organizations, and thus questions are arising regarding not only the *"nation"* as a main notion to explore in Political Science field, but also related to *"communities, culture identification, religion, ethnics, irredentism"* etc. The new Political Structure is no longer bipolarized as we used to perceive it in the period between the end of the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. We are now living in a completely different world where new political, economical and cultural centers seem to emerge, and melting points are coming into

existence. We should all be aware of the consequences that such a world order could have in the future. This is why we should try to find the correct answers to our questions: (1) why is the world faced currently with new forms of terrorism; (2) why should the whole security paradigm be revised so that human rights play an essential and dominant role (because I am not sure that lessons from the past have been learnt). Furthermore, (3) why are conflicts getting more and more frequent in spite of all security programs aiming at restoring the peace, and last but not least, (4) why are main political and military institutions not effectively prevent emerging conflicts.

Let me stress on the fact that sometimes these institutions make *"conflict resolution"* more complicated and decision-making processes more difficult, or even impossible. Perhaps, what is sure is that European Union is the actual biggest policy maker, and Yuliya Zabyelina argues in her work that as such, EU has to prove that *"human security should not only be a simple "leitmotif"*. Indeed, I hope it will be the "*moving power of the mere changes"*. The author clearly identifies the problematic points being a major obstacle for correctly evaluating the achievements in the human security field, such as the lack of conceptual clarity, the clash between morality and effectiveness, the institutional and intervention dilemmas.

Then, is it just an illusion that human beings will no longer face conflicts and wars, and peace will be finally restored? Nina Wilén has correctly found out what Misra Amalendu is trying to prove in her book: ethnical and religious factors are getting more and more powerful by pouring into nationalist distortion, and thus giving rise to *violence*. Of course, new forms of violence: not only weapons or nuclear threats, as existed during the Cold War, are flattening against the wall through all kinds of ultimatums, or what is the worst, by genocide itself.

The metaphor of *"erotics of violence"* is perfectly chosen because it shows details from inside the horror of the committed *"crimes contre l'humanité"* in the Western Balkans, in Africa, in Tchetchenia, in Gaza Strip, in Darfur, or in Asia. Should politicians be aware of all consequences of positive conflict management? Yes, because they are supposed to know to what degree things are not put into the oblivion. Simply a treaty for restoring the peace or even the judgment of a court cannot properly solve a conflict, as certain researchers, politicians or sociologists are trying to convince us. What is then the price for the world tranquility? Let's consider

the situation in May 2009 in Iran, in which the truth will most likely never be unfolded, as it seems to be that *"truth has plenty of faces"***.** However, the process against the French woman in the Iranian prison from July 2009 could be considered a human rights violation or even the recent *"calvaire"* with Ingrid Betancourt in Colombia. What is true, for sure, is that there are still many states which have to prove they have adopted a democratic system.

However, the usage of *"democracy"* has recently become so common that it is merely impossible to go back to its origins. Everything related to politics, political order, political system or political endeavors, is explained thanks to the meaning of *"democracy"*. But it seems to me that there is a serious misuse of this fundamental notion, and these two articles show the right way of how political reality and party systems should be correctly treated. The articles called *"The Dynamics of (Personalized) Party Identification in the Second Italian Republic"* and *"The Decline and Fall of the LDP in Japan: What happened?*" throws a glance into the democratic political order in Italy and Japan, and represents an interesting overview of the party system of both countries. For sure, the best way for proving the main thesis is the *case study methodology* in combination with the *historical approach*. Moreover, Japan Party System studies are not so popular among undergraduate and graduate students, and I am more than happy to see this article published in this Edition. I will not go into details because I would like readers to have their own opinion and impressions, but perpetual topics such as political desperation, new hopes for changes, party and political corruption are still in the political agenda. I warmly recommend readers to read this article because they can follow easily the clear academic argumentation and the references to four different theories aiming at explaining why the party has stayed in power for such a long time.

When one party is in government for a long period of time, there is always a considerable possibility for this party to usurp the whole power. Moreover, personalization of politics in Western democracies has engendered several discussions. Diego Garzia tries to link the notion of *"personalization of politics"* and the other one of "*partisan dealignment"*. Readers can easily understand what has led to this specific phenomena in the political reality. It would be in vain to say other things about this article. I would recommend readers to read this article carefully. It is sure to give answers to some similar processes occurring in other countries because

parties do not play the same role they used to play in the 1960's or 1970's. Personal commitment and psychology based leadership approaches are the future of party survival in a new political reality.

The last article *"China, Japan and South East Asia Energy Geopolitics"* by John Henzel represents a well-structured and academically proven geopolitical analysis which reveals hidden aspects of making security strategy when talking about the energy resources of two of the biggest energy consumers in the world. I am sure that many of you do not know much about this specific topic and it will be a pleasure to read it. So,

Enjoy your reading!

Petar Ranguelov,

Editor-in-Chief

RECONSIDERING THE NORMATIVE POWER OF EUROPEAN HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA

Author: ***YULIYA ZABYELINA***

PhD Candidate in International Studies
University of Trento

E-mail: y.zabyelina@email.unitn.it

ABSTRACT:

Previously operationalized under the "soft" or "civilian", "normative" has become one of the most commonly used titles of the European Union actorness in the world. Optimistic arguments have celebrated the uniqueness of the EU normative power, while critical approaches, on the contrary, questioned the effectiveness and consistency of such an agenda. In the context of the changing global security landscape, this paper seeks to explore the EU-led value-added discourse on human security and its significance. First, it analyzes the concept of human security within the abundance of diverse interpretations. Second, it examines how and why human security agenda was incorporated into the European Security Strategy (ESS). Finally, it explores whether human security agenda plays an important role in the formation of the ESS or it is merely a good-sounding label for political rhetoric.

KEYWORDS: normative power, European Human Security Agenda, global security, European Security Strategy, on-going conflicts, human rights protection, Barcelona Human Security Doctrine.

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to Fukuyama's cheerful projections (1992), the end of the Cold War era has not diminished the threats to world peace and security, but has rather transformed them into new and more complex dangers. After the collapse of the communist regime, the international community has experienced violence and suffering in a stunning frequency and

variety. The on-going conflicts in the former Yugoslavia republics, Africa, and elsewhere are clear examples of the changing nature of aggression in today's world. Due to the emergence of a different kind of conflict, the conceptual variety of security has been extended beyond the strict focus on national security to the security of individuals, communities, and the humanity. Indeed, the conception of security has been shifted from traditionally military issues (horizontal extension), epitomized by nuclear security during the Cold War, to encompass issues of economic well-being, cultural identity, human rights, and environmental concerns. Moreover, within the contemporary interpretation of security the reference object of security has been expanded (vertical extension) from protecting the state (macro level) towards protecting the people, minorities, ethnic groups, individuals (micro level). This transformation in understanding security has had important theoretical and practical implications for the development of the European Security Strategy (ESS).

Since the adoption of the Barcelona Human Security Doctrine in 2004, EU policymakers have customarily placed overriding emphasis on international law, democracy, human rights, international institutions and multilateralism in its foreign policy. These priorities clearly indicate that the EU human security agenda is not just a policy. It is a manifestation of the normative power of the EU. In fact, the EU has been explicit, and formally announced these normative goals for its foreign policymaking in the A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003).

Regarding the contribution of this essay, I intend to complete three goals. First, I analyze the concept of human security within its historical background and recent interpretations, as well as explaining how this concept came to be dominant for most of modern states security agendas. Second, I examine how and why human security agenda is transformed into the ESS against the background of changing transnational norms surrounding aggression, conflict, peace and security in conjunction with expanding ethical mandates of the ESS. Third, the essay poses the question whether human security plays an important role in the execution of the ESS, or whether it is simply a good-sounding label for political rhetoric. This finally takes the reader to the hypothesis that the European Human Security Doctrine is a normative (or ethical) security policy and is, in such a formulation, hard, or even impossible, to be practically maintained in the nearest future.

Methodologically, this essay is a critical inquiry. The essay is not designed to provide the reader with statistical data on the different aspects of the ESS. What is going to be done is a systematic analysis of major policy documentation and theoretical literature related to human security and CFSP. Such analytical endeavor is expected to scrutinize the phenomenon of human security within the broad context of the EU foreign policy, where the

ultimate objective is to elucidate the limitations of the EU human security agenda, as well as suggest how the low effectiveness of this EU policy could be recovered.

HUMAN SECURITY: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT INTERPRETATION

The concept of human security has been extensively circulating among policymakers, researchers, NGO advocates, and the media, making this agenda an increasingly influential tool in "narrating the changing patterns of world order and prescribing action within them" (Larrinaga 2007, p. 2). The human security approach challenged the premises of traditional security, as well as the 'core scheme' of what was understood as security (Mesjasz 2004, p. 7).

The key concepts of security studies were extended in various directions by different combinations of the following attributes:

1. ***Reference object*** – state, region, alliance, society, various social groups, nations, minorities, ethnic groups, individuals, global system.
2. ***Threats*** – a wide range of existential disturbances are emerging – political, military, economic, ecological, and societal.
3. ***Discourse*** – methods of identification of threats and reference objects resulted from the discourse in policy making structures (norm-formation and norm-socialization).

Indeed, the discourse on human security coincided with the broader redefinition of traditional notions of national security that had begun in the 1970s and then intensified with the end of the Cold War. If the concept of security is ontologically deconstructed, the evolution of the different interpretations of what constitutes security can be conceived in the following categories indicated in Table.1. This schematic depiction of the ontological shifts in the perceptions of security indicates horizontal and vertical extensions from the 1970s up to the 1990s. It points out the transformation of the referent object from the state level to the level of an individual (horizontal extension: macro → micro deepening); and from the issues of military security to the issues of famine, disease, and economic crises, civil war, genocide, etc. (vertical extension: broadening).

Vertical extension (macro-micro direction: level deepening)	**Tradition and origin**	**Form of security**	**Specific emphases**			Horizontal extension (issue broadening)
			Focus: ***referent object***	What is at risk: ***threat***	Threats to security: ***securitization***	
	TRADITIONAL MEANING - security as an attribute of state, absence of military conflict	National	State	Sovereignty, territorial integrity	Other states	
	NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY AS A PUBLIC GOOD	Social	Societal groups, class and economic focus, political action committees	National unity, quality of life, wealth distribution	States, nations, migrants, alien culture	
	NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY IN A UNIVERSAL SENSE – HUMAN SECURITY	Human	Individuals, mankind, human rights, rule of law	Survival, human development, identity, and governance	State itself, globalizations, natural catastrophe and change	

Table.1. Shifting Perceptions of Security

Most classical definitions of security are based on state-centered perspective that highlights the priority of territorial integrity, political sovereignty, and the competence of a state to protect its citizens. These security theories are largely based on the realist assumption of security, according to which the referent object of security is the state. This traditional security approach is based on the anarchic balance of power, a military build-up of the US vs. the Soviet Union, and on the unconditional sovereignty of nation-states (Owen 2004). States are considered as rational entities with clearly defined national interests and policies driven by the aspiration of gaining absolute power. Therefore, the security of nation states is mainly

seen as national defense focused on protecting from an external threat, while internal attack is largely ignored. Bajpai specifies that these interpretations had reached the peak by 1980s in the bipolar international system, in which international stability relied on the premise that the maintenance of the security of the state would inevitably lead to the security of its citizens, soon lost its relevance as the USSR collapsed (Bajpai 2000). Therefore, as the military and ideological confrontation between the US and the USSR officially ended, crucial theoretical reallocation of emphases took place. Failing to explain the fiasco of the USSR, leading theorists in IR, political sciences, and security studies rushed to "rethink some of the basic categories of though concerning world politics and to delineate the contours of this new era" (Wyn 1999, p. 93).

Further shifts in security strategy stimulated by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s brought in the issues of societal security. Within the societal approach to security, it is interpreted as a public good that "provides benefits to all members of a community as soon as it is made available to any one person. Such a good is collectively consumed by everyone in a community, and it's impossible to charge for its use" (Mesjasz 2004, p. 5). This approach also argues that the more economic ties between states there are, the more secure they will be.

When in the 1990s the so-called Copenhagen School was founded (Buzan et al 1998; 2003), their security theory suggested a radical reallocation of traditional standpoints by emphasizing non-military issues that could be considered as crucial threats of security even if they are not threatening nation-states. The terrorist attack on September 11th 2001, the unsuccessful interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, or even Iraq only reinforced the non-traditional approach to security, having necessitated a vast amount of policymaking. Human dimensions of security, mainly human development and human rights protection, came to be put high on the international agenda.

Taking on the definition of human security, it should be said that this term has been given a variety of diverse definitions and characterizations. Therefore, there is a long way to go before there is any agreement on a precise definition. Most specialists in the field of human security attribute the launch of human security agenda to the United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) issued in 1994. This Report prioritizes human security as an essential policy that would protect people rather than states and territories, and prioritize human development rather than military power. Within such a developmental and people-centered position "the report seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation and a restructured system of global institutions" (Human

Development Report 1994, p. 2). Unfortunately, the Report fails to give a comprehensive definition of human security, referring to this concept as a general theme, an abstract idea identified by the following intrinsic features:

- "Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor";
- Since contemporary risks endanger all nations, "the components of human security are interdependent";
- "Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream";
- Human security is people-centered. "It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace" (Human Development Report 1994, pp. 22-23).

Altogether, HDR is significant as it was the first official documentation that refocused the traditional interpretation of security to four essential pillars: (a) universality; (b) interdependence, (c) prevention, and (d) people-centeredness.

In the *Millennium Report to the United Nations* (Annan, 2000), We the Peoples, Kofi Annan argues that "once synonymous with the defense of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence. The need for a more human-centered approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used" (Annan 2000a, pp. 43-44). In his opinion, only an extended understanding of security is likely to embrace peace above a mere absence of violence; prioritize human rights, good governance, access to education and health care; as well as ensure that each individual has an opportunity and a choice to fulfill his or her potential.

Academic definitions of human security vary to a larger extent. There is no common agreement on what are the constituent elements of this phenomenon. An overall analysis of academic publications on human security allows differentiating several mainstream approaches:

(a) ***Developmentalists***: human security as a guarantee of the maintenance of basic human needs as they are pointed out by the UNDP (economic, food, health, personal, environment, political security, etc.). Within this approach, human security is interpreted as the main provider of sustainable development essential for long-term prosperity.

(b) ***Interventionists:*** human security as a policy that protects citizens from intrastate aggression, "… contravenes principles of state sovereignty, advocates individual sovereignty, and creates criminal tribunals to establish connections between human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security" (Liotta 2002, p. 483).

(c) ***Transnationalists:*** human security as the most effective means to address 'non-traditional' threats. These are largely the phenomena that transcend the borders of nation-states, such as transnational organized crime, terrorism, anti-personnel landmines, and cyber crime.

CHANGING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE EU: THE BARCELONA REPORT (2004)

In the European context, the human security agenda was proposed by a group of experts from LSE who presented *The Human Security Doctrine* to Javier Solana in September 2004 at the Barcelona Forum. The project was adopted and very integrated with the ESS. The reasons which underpin Solana's adoption of this security strategy are twofold. Tadjbakhsh acknowledges that, on the one hand, human security is an "outward-looking strategy [that]…could reinforce the image of the EU as a successful example of peaceful development based on cooperation, and on core values: respect for diversity, the rule of law, human rights, democracy, and citizen participation" (Tadjbakhsh 2005, p. 16). On the other hand, human security is a defense strategy that contributes to global human security – "the most realistic security policy for Europe, given that where people lived in poverty, where violence and lawlessness reigned under dogmatic ideologies, there was fertile ground for human rights violations, for criminal networks and for terrorism with as consequence the importation of hard drugs and weapons into the European Union" (Tadjbakhsh 2005, p.16).

The Barcelona doctrine puts forward a set of clear principles, all of which stem from the human security approach:

1) **Human rights priority –** "The primacy of human rights is what distinguishes the human security approach from traditional state-based approaches. Although the principle seems obvious, there are deeply held and entrenched institutional and cultural obstacles that have to be overcome if this principle is to be realized in practice" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 10).
2) **Clear political authority** – "The central goal of a human security strategy has to be the establishment of legitimate political authority capable of upholding human security. The alternatives to authoritarianism are international, national and local governance based on consent, or state failure….The capacity to deploy civilian personnel is a crucial addition to these instruments. They represent the EU's commitment to help build and

sustain legitimate political authority in crisis situations" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 11).

3) **Multilateralism** – "means a commitment to work with international institutions, and through the procedures of international institutions. (…) First and foremost, working within the United Nations framework, but it also entails working with or sharing out tasks among other regional organizations. (…) Secondly, multilateralism entails a commitment to common ways of working including agreed rules and norms: creating common rules and norms, solving problems through rules and co-operation, and enforcing the rules. (…) Thirdly, multilateralism also has to include coordination, rather than duplication or rivalry" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 12).
4) **Bottom-up approach** – "the decision about the kind of policies to be adopted, whether or not to intervene and how, must take account of the most basic needs identified by the people who are affected by violence and insecurity. This is not just a moral issue; it is also a matter of effectiveness. It is people on the ground who know best what is needed and how best to do it" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 13).
5) **Regional focus** – "a regional focus is not only an issue for intelligence-gatherers or diplomats, it also has operational implications. The UN involvement in the Great Lakes region has been characterized by piecemeal interventions confined to one state, whilst refugees and combatants crossed borders back and forth" (Barcelona Report 2004: 15).
6) **Use of legal instruments** – "The use of law, and particularly international law, as an instrument does not just pertain to diplomatic for a and decisions concerning whether to intervene, they are at the core of how we envisage operations should be conducted" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 15);
7) **Appropriate use of force** – "Our approach does not suggest that the use of force is to be avoided under all circumstances. Nothing should undermine the inherent right of self-defense. If someone is threatening violence a soldier can respond appropriately, regardless of whether force has been authorized under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 16).

What should also be pointed out is that the Barcelona Report provides an elaborated list of reasons for choosing the human security agenda for the ESS. The first priority is given to the moral and ethical aspects of human security. The Barcelona Report suggests that "human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened. All human life is of equal worth, and it is not acceptable that human lives become cheap in desperate situations. There is nothing distinctively European about such moral norms. On the contrary, they are by their nature universal" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 5). Legal (human rights protection) aspects are only given secondary importance. From the legal perspective, "the European Union does,

therefore, recognize that it has obligations concerning the human security of people outside its borders" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 5). Moreover, although mentioned very superficially, the Barcelona Report talks about 'enlightened self-interest' that should explain why human security is important. It implies that in the age of ever increasing interdependency between states, "European cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity. In 'failing states' and conflict areas, the criminal economy expands and gets exported: the drug trade, human trafficking and the easy availability of small arms, and even the brutalization of society are not contained within the 'conflict zone' but felt beyond it, including in Europe" (Barcelona Report 2004, p. 5).

NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF EU HUMAN SECURITY DOCTRINE

From the analysis of the Barcelona report, it is obvious that the EU has sought to add a cognitively normative dimension to its security strategy. There is an apparent tendency in the ESS to develop the norms and values that would support human security policies, thereby cultivating a distinctive place and position in the contemporary international security architecture.

Sprung from the global interplay of such ethical concepts as *responsibility to protect, effective multilateralism*, and *human development*, human security indeed takes a meaningful part of the normative discourse in the European foreign policy. In 2003, Solana recommends that the EU should adopt a human security agenda to realize its ambitions to become a normative power reflecting its distinctive character as a multilateral polity committed to foundational ideas of peace, democracy and human rights rather than the classic nation-state defense of territory. In 2006, the study group under the aegis of the Finnish presidency further elaborates the human security approach by claiming that "human security is not simply a 'leitmotif' for EU security policies or an analytical label which categorizes the EU's international role in the way that concepts such as normative power or civilian power have done (Werthes et al 2006, p. 7). Enthusiastically promoting the Barcelona Human Security Doctrine, policymakers indeed projects the image of the EU associated with peace, stability, the absence of violence, or even more broadly, the absence of threat.

The incorporation of the human security agenda into the ESS brings about the conclusion that the ESS is at present a normative, ethical, and ideological issue. Moreover, although representing a qualitatively positive shift in understanding contemporary threats, the way how the ESS interprets human security makes this security strategy a fragile aspect of European foreign policy. Therefore, the ESS is widely criticized for *(1) presenting vague*

concepts; (b) failing to present concrete information about the agency that would implement the policy; (c) as well as for making the international intervention dilemma more complex.

a) Lacking conceptual clarity

To begin with, although the EU integrates the human security agenda into the ESS, this policy does not present an agreed definition of what this phenomenon implies. Human security has become an abstract wish list, on which everything that is politically good and acceptable is desirable. Such a conceptual defect "may be a handicap given that definitions do count when consensus is sought for cooperation. (…) Terminology consensus will be necessary if a comprehensive human security program is to be decided on and implemented" (Tadjbakhsh 2005, p. 24). The emerging European human security discourse obscures rather than clarifies the nature of European foreign policy. The European Security Strategy should not be a normative stand that exists as an abstract policy area.

b) Clash between morality and effectiveness

There is a clash between the effectiveness discourse and the normative agenda of the ESS. Shifting the policy emphasis to normative aspects of security, an area of decision-making driven by ethical principles makes it doubtful whether the EU as an international actor could be effective in the implementation of its human security agenda. "These two discourses can be better reconciled, or indeed any overlap between them exploited. If civilian power no longer quite fits, and normative power is indeed a paradox, if not a contradiction in terms, how can the EU resolve it? (…) The crucial consideration here is not the analytical problems surrounding the nature of the EU's external identity, but the operational implications of a lack of clarity and the disjuncture between different accounts of its personality" (Martin 2007, p. 7). There should be made a clear distinction between calling something 'human security' and actually doing 'human security', that is, between concepts and practicability.

c) Institutional dilemma

Regardless of the fact that human security strategy has been pronounced as a doctrine of the EU it seems to downplay the importance of state-centered security concerns. For quite clear pragmatic reasons, it is the state that has adopted human security as a foreign policy tool. Discussions around human security put very little emphasis on the empowerment aspects. Particularly, it is unclear what would be the responsible body that would ensure the maintenance of the human security agenda. "Human security as public good constitutes a responsibility for the state" (Tadjbakhsh 2005, p. 2).

d) Intervention dilemma

The intervention and peacekeeping dilemma is one of the most intricate aspects of the ESS. It creates "a kind of 'moral emergency' in which the *'...normal restraints of international law, political procedure and organizations...'* become unacceptable impediments" (McCormack 2005, p. 9). A foreign policy based on normative and ethical sentiments, removes such issues as international intervention, which very much should be debated, from the political realm. Such policymaking is, accordingly, likely to legitimize the actions of some states and delegitimize the actions of other states. "It legitimizes the actions of the states acting on behalf of the 'international community' or the EU that intervene against transgressor states. In practical reality however there is no international community, and the decision as to which states require external intervention is made by the world's most powerful states acting through the EU" (McCormack 2005, pp. 12-13). In this respect, the human security framework seems to be taking the international community back to unaccountable and hegemonic intervention on behalf of great powers.

CONCLUSION

This essay has sought to address the issue of human security in the context of the changing security architecture on the global level with making a particular emphasis on the development of the European human security agenda.

First of all, the implications of the transformation of the Cold War security architecture have been tremendous. What has been witnessed is a shift from national security, in which military forces may continue to play a preeminent role, to human security, where non-traditional security issues are prioritized. In the end of the 1990s, the conceptual transformation was more than just obvious as the issues of failing states, epidemiology (e.g. AIDS, HIV), environmental stress, resource scarcity and depletion, drugs, terrorism, inhumane weapons, cyber-war, and drug and human trafficking were highlighted by the UNDP. These non-traditional threats, be they closely associated with national security or not, will sooner or later exercise considerable influence on the development of strategic relationships and decision-making. The future will require policymakers in both the developing and the developed world to focus on the broad understandings security.

In the context of the European Security Strategy, this essay provides a few arguments proving that the EU foreign policy, particularly in its security aspects, has become fundamentally normative. First, instead of focusing on what constitutes politically sound and strategically meaningful policies, policymakers have engaged in a value-oriented debate about the actors and issues to be added on the lists of threats. Agreement on the definition of human security is a prerequisite, however, before this concept can be usefully employed in understanding the

phenomenon it is intended to capture. Without a clear idea what constitutes a human security and who should be protected from what threat and with which means, no policy could be effective and, more importantly, necessary. Altogether, the EU has developed the human security doctrine as a normative and value-added agenda that offers only partial insights into the nature of changing security architecture, and still requires further research. Moreover, the EU foreign policy discourse is currently fragmented in the political rhetoric due to the multiple policy labels it is attached.

Above all, this essay heavily criticizes the existing ESS that lacks a certain degree of precision to be successful not just in the world of norms and ethical sentiments, but also in the tricky realm of humanitarian intervention, peace operations, human development and poverty eradication. Furthermore, the normatively biased security considerations of the ESS lack indispensable implementation elements as well as the assessment standards to substantiate and evaluate the fulfilment of the human security goals. If the aspects of the EU human security agenda criticized in this essay are not reconsidered, the human security agenda might have negative effects externally and internally. Domestically, pre-emptive intervention in unstable states could possibly lead to greater instability as it would increase the dependence of the local elite on external assistance. Internationally, when sovereignty of weaker states could be 'legitimately' violated in the name of ethics and morality, i.e. human security, ironically might lead to international insecurity and fear.

Although by no means comprehensive in its conclusions, the essay highlights a number of key points that should be spelled out by the EU if it wishes to be a frontrunner of human security in the world. The essay also acknowledges the difficulties in defining human security as a workable policy framework, as well as specifies the limits of the implementation of such a policy.

Yet, human security is becoming an interesting element of the contemporary security, in which the participants are not limited to state actors, but also include individuals. Although human security is not a perfect policy, as any other policy focused on creating a stable global environment it should be researched in further academic endeavors.

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THE DYNAMICS OF (PERSONALIZED) PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN THE SECOND ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Author: ***DIEGO GARZIA***

Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP)
Università di Siena
E-mail: diegogarzia82@virgilio.it

Diego Garzia is PhD candidate in Comparative and European Politics at the University of Siena, Centre for the Study of Political Change (CIRCaP). Previously, he studied at the University of Rome (Sapienza) and Leiden University. His research interests include: political psychology, voting behavior, leadership, and the role of personality in political behavior.

ABSTRACT

Previous literature (e.g., McAllister 2007) has plainly assumed that the 'personalization of politics' in Western democracies is in large part due to the widespread 'partisan dealignment' going on in these societies. This paper provides an assessment of the causal relationship between these two phenomena in the Second Italian Republic, attempting to demonstrate that partisan dealignment is caused by – and not a cause of – the personalization of politics. Alternative explanations for the rapid weakening of partisan ties in the period 1994-2008 will be evaluated; then, it will be shown the prominence of leaders' image among the determinants of individual (de)alignment with political parties; finally, it will be revealed how a generalized decrease in the number of partisan is linked to the (equally generalized) deterioration of the overall image of political leaders.

KEYWORDS: Personalization of politics, institutional changes, party erosion, party dealignment, leadership, erosion of cleaveges, party system breakdown, elections.

1. CAUSES (OR CONSEQUENCES?) OF THE *PERSONALIZATION OF POLITICS*

Whether or not the dynamics of parliamentary elections have become more 'presidential' (Mughan 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005), it is hard to deny that democratic politics is now more 'candidate-centred' (Wattenberg 1991) than ever before. Third-millennium parties' profiles have become undoubtedly more personalized than they were three or four decades ago (Farrell and Webb 2000). The changing structure of mass communications has been crucial in emphasizing the role of political leaders at the expenses of parties, making the latter "more dependent in their communications with voters on the essentially visual and personality-based medium of television" (Mughan 2000: 129). Executives themselves are portrayed in a personalized fashion, being routinely labeled after the name of their leaders (Bean and Mughan 1989), and stronger correlation overtime between prime ministerial popularity and executive's public rating was revealed in several parliamentary democracies (Lanoue and Headrick 1994; McAllister 2003; Campus and Pasquino 2006). Correspondingly, party leaders have been found to matter more in individuals' voting behavior (Stokes 1966; Butler and Stokes 1974; Clarke et al. 1979; Graetz and McAllister 1987; Bean and Mughan 1989; Bean 1993; Crewe and King 1994; Sani 2002; but see King 2002).

The *personalization of politics* should be seen as a process in which "the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines" (Rahat and Sheafer 2007: 65). Three intertwined causes have been advanced for such process of personalization (McAllister 2007). One originates from the *institutional setting* of the country. The electoral reforms of the 1990s in countries such as Israel, Italy, and Japan (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001), and the spread of primary elections around Europe (Hazan 2006) are good examples of institutional changes promoting personalization. However, a recent comparative study has found substantive evidence of "a shift in intra-executive power to the benefit of the head of government" (Poguntke and Webb 2005: 337) also in countries where no significant institutional change took place. The second (yet more visible) cause of personalization of politics is *the growth of electronic media* – and that of television in particular. Because of its power to present images, it is easier for television to communicate political information through physical objects such as leaders (rather than through abstract entities like parties, manifestos or ideologies). Personalization has been defined as "the more general, pervasive, and fundamental element in the process of change of electoral campaigns" (Swanson and Mancini 1996). Finally, the personalization of politics is thought to be caused by the widespread *erosion of party loyalties* encountered in almost every advanced industrial democracy (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). In times of partisan dealignment, it is reasonable

to hypothesize that "voters will rely more heavily on the appeal of the personalities of the leaders" (McAllister 2007: 582).

The Italian case is probably one of the best examples of personalization among Western European democracies. The origins of this process has been traced to the early-1980s, when the customary division of power between party leadership and the prime minister's office was challenged by figures such as Giovanni Spadolini and Bettino Craxi, which have been the first to hold both the leadership of their parties (PRI and PSI respectively) and the presidency of the Ministers' Council. However, it is only with the transition to the so-called *Second Republic* that Italy becomes under many respects the ideal-typical 'personalized polity' (Calise 2004). The collapse of the old *partitocrazia* – weakened by an erosion of the stable social cleavages on which it was based (Parisi and Pasquino 1977) and further discredited by *Mani Pulite* scandals (Gilbert 1995) – produced the most appropriate conditions for popular figures to '*enter the field*'. Moreover, the majoritarian reform of the electoral systems for both local (Fabbrini 2000) and national elections (Katz 2003) "strongly reinforced the view that people would henceforward directly decide on political outcomes" (Calise 2005: 90). With respect to political communication, it is true that television coverage was already shifting towards the candidates during the 1980s. Yet the entrance of Silvio Berlusconi (then owner of three out of six national TV-channels) in Italian politics resulted, according to many, in an unprecedented acceleration of such trend (Campus and Pasquino 2006). Thanks to the success of his 'media party' Forza Italia (Perrucci and Villa 2004), he made the others' increasingly dependent from television, for it immediately "seemed clear that no party could remain in the contest without heavy use of mass communication channels" (Mazzoleni 1996: 200). The extent to which Italian electoral campaigns have become more personalized is evident from the adoption of televised election debates *all'Americana*, which were held in 1994, 1996 and 2006[1]. Furthermore, the resilience of Silvio Berlusconi (uncontested leader of the centre-right coalition) and Romano Prodi (Prime Minister twice: in 1996-8 and 2006-8) on the political scene contributed in making the past decade "something of a duel between two leaders" (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007: 64).

While both institutional change and television had a plain role in the personalization of the Second Italian Republic, the causal role of partisan dealignment is much less clear. It is true that the erosion of partisan ties was among the main determinants of party system breakdown (Morlino 1996); and in fact the election of 1994 was held at the nadir of party identification in the country (Bellucci 2007). However, it must be noted that only two years

[1] Not in 2001 though, when in order to challenge Berlusconi on his major strength (e.g. personal appeal) the centre-left coalition nominated the young, good-looking and relatively inexperienced Francesco Rutelli as its prime ministerial candidate, instead of incumbent prime minister Giuliano Amato (Calise 2005).

later the Italian electorate was almost completely realigned, with three voters out of four reporting a feeling of identification with a party (ITANES 1996). The aim of this paper is to uncover the determinants of partisan dealignment in the Second Italian Republic[2]. As we will try to show, this is to be found in the public's assessment of party leaders: in absence of widespread information about the new parties (as it was the case with the 'old' parties), voters developed a sense of party identification based on the only feature they could manifestly evaluate: the parties' leaders. Given the already high degree of personalization in the political system, the subsequent fall in the number of partisans (minus twenty-five percent in the decade 1996-2006) can hardly be conceived as a cause of personalization.

Rather, this paper is aimed to verify whether the causal relationship between partisan dealignment and the personalization of politics in the Second Italian Republic operates the other way around. In other words, my hypothesis is that in our case *partisan dealignment is caused by – and not a cause of – the personalization of politics*. There are several grounds to base this expectation. The 'indistinguishable identity' between the leader and the party (Poli 2001) that always denoted Forza Italia, paralleled by an increasing number of 'personal parties' (Calise 2000) support the contention that in post-1994 Italy political leaders have become important in their own right "by personifying the policy platforms of their respective parties" (McAllister 2007, 574). This claim is further reinforced by the consideration that every political leader of the Second Republic has been in politics longer than his own party[3]. The predominant position of Italian leaders *vis à vis* their parties emerges clearly with a quick glance to the ballot paper, where the great majority of party symbols feature the name of the respective leaders as big as it fits[4].

Our hypothesis will be verified in the following way: first, alternative explanations for the rapid weakening of partisan ties in the past fifteen years will be evaluated; secondly, the properties of party identification as an analytical construct will be assessed in order to ascertain that the concept 'traveled well' into the Second Republic; at third, it will be demonstrated the prominence of leaders' image among the determinants of individual (de)alignment with political parties; if partisanship is caused mostly by the image of the leaders, then we might expect that a generalized decrease in the number of partisan is linked to an equally generalized deterioration of the overall image of political leaders – this proposition will be tested in the final section of the analysis.

[2] For the purposes of this study, we will consider post-1994 Italy as an intrinsically different political system from the one that preceded it – that is, the First Italian Republic. Hence, our explanation of partisan dealignment in the Second Republic does not (and cannot) account for a similar process (e.g., partisan dealignment) in a different setting (e.g., pre-1994 Italy).
[3] Of course, this assertion holds only as long as we take a *nominalist* approach to parties.
[4] Some observers considered this as an unprecedented step in parliamentary regimes that declares the penetration of the presidential criteria even in the electoral device (Calise 2004: 32).

2. PATTERNS OF PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT IN THE SECOND ITALIAN REPUBLIC

Figure 1 presents the percentage of party identifiers in the period 1996-2008[5]. As said, the electorate was significantly realigned after only two years from the fall of the old party system (e.g., 1994). However, the decline in the period 1996-2001 is somehow impressive, with the percentage of survey respondents declaring a sense of identification with a political party falling steadily from seventy-seven percentage points to fifty-five (minus 22 percent). The decrease is even more striking among 'strong partisans', that go down from 18,4 to 11,2 percentage points (that is, some forty percent less). Between 2001 and 2008 the tendency towards further dealignment slows down considerably, yet the proportion of partisans keeps going down (53 percent in 2006, 51,5 percent in 2008) along with that of strong partisans (10,7 percent in 2006, 7,8 percent in 2008).

FIGURE 1 – Party Identifiers (%) 1996-2008



SOURCE: ITANES 1996, 2001-2006 (Panel), 2008

To be sure, partisan dealignment is not an Italian peculiarity. The widespread decline of partisan attachments occurred across all Western democracies in the past several decades has been described as the most profound change in voting behavior since the 1920s (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Dalton (1984) interpreted it as a consequence of the process of modernization going on in every advanced industrial democracy. Building on the 'functional model' of party identification – that implies the need for partisan ties to be a function of

[5] Unfortunately, ITANES (Italian National Election Study) investigators did not pose the question in 1994.

voters' political skills and information (Shively 1979) – he showed that the dramatic spread of education along with a generalized information explosion in these countries significantly improved the average citizen's political and cognitive resources. This *cognitive mobilization* entails that "citizens possess the skills and resources necessary to become politically engaged with little dependence on external cues" (Dalton 1984: 267). It follows that a pattern of partisan dealignment should be accentuated among the better educated and those more exposed to the information flow of the media (that is, the young). Such pattern has been observed in almost every advanced industrial society, including the First Italian Republic (Dalton 2000).

As shown above, the Second Italian Republic saw a steady and unambiguous process of partisan detachment, and we know this finding to be in line with modernization theory. Yet, "even if the development of the level of party identification is consistent with what the theory of modernization predicts, this does not necessarily prove that this development is caused by the mechanisms supposed in functional theory" (Berglund *et al.* 2005: 108). We can assess the ability of cognitive mobilization theory in explaining the dealignment occurred between 1996 and 2008 through ITANES data. The first two columns of Table 1 present the mean age of partisans and apartisans respectively in each election year (also, the table includes a measurement relative to 2004, when the second wave of a panel study started in 2001 was conducted). The third and the fourth columns report the mean score of partisans and apartisan in each time-point on a simple 'education level index' (respondents are coded: 1-primary education; 2-secondary education; 3-high school; 4-college education).

TABLE 1 – Mean Score for Partisans/Apartisans on Alternative Measures of Partisan Dealignment, 1996-2008

	AGE		EDUCATION		POLARIZATION		PARTY TRUST	
	Partisan	***Apartisan***	***Partisan***	***Apartisan***	***Partisan***	***Apartisan***	***Partisan***	***Apartisan***
1996	44,1	42,4	2,17	2,08	-	-	-	-
2001	46,7	46,7	2,35	2,15	5,18	4,92	1,13	0,74
2004	50,9	49,2	2,38	2,15	5,15	4,77	1,13	0,71
2006	50,2	49,8	2,53	2,31	5,04	4,36	1,12	0,79
2008	49,4	49,9	2,46	2,29	4,16	3,51	1,10	0,75
1996-2008	**+ 5,3**	**+ 7,5**	**+ 0,29**	**+ 0,21**	-	-	-	-
2001-2008	(+ 2,7)	(+ 3,2)	(+ 0,11)	(+ 0,14)	**- 1,02**	**- 1,41**	**- 0,03**	**+ 0,01**

SOURCE: ITANES 1996, 2001-2006 (Panel), 2008

If we are to believe that the weakening of partisan ties is a function of social modernization, then we expect the 'average apartisan' to be(come) younger and more educated than the 'average partisan' through the years. However, the data hardly support this contention. With respect to age, partisans are in average almost two years older than apartisans in 1996, as old as apartisans in 2001 and some half year younger than the latter in 2008 (the fact that both groups are getting older through the years is easily explained by the demographical structure of a country where one citizen in five is a pensioner). Regarding education, the trend is even clearer: both partisans and apartisans are getting (in average) more educated, and they are doing so in almost equal proportions. In the light of our data, it seems hazardous to conclude that the process of modernization (that is undoubtedly occurring in Italy as in every advanced industrial democracy) is a causal determinant of partisan dealignment. With this we do not intend to point out that the role of macro sociological explanations of the sort is irrelevant. On the contrary, they exert in all likelihood a role as driving forces behind the long(er)-term trend (Holmberg 1994). However, if we are looking for a more satisfactory account of the phenomenon in the short time span of this study (e.g., twelve years), we might want to turn to political explanations.

One of the hypotheses advanced by Berglund et al. (2005) in a recent assessment of party identification in six European democracies maintains that "people's degree of party identification is related to the extent that they *perceive* ideological differences between relevant political parties" (117). Their findings indicate that perceived polarization is positively (albeit weakly) correlated with people's strength of partisan attachment in each of the countries under analysis. In order to test this hypothesis on our case at hand, we have calculated for each respondent the perceived distance on the left-right spectrum between the main two Italian parties (1994-2006: Forza Italia and Democratici di Sinistra; 2008: Popolo della Libertà and Partito Democratico). In the fifth and sixth column of Table 1 is presented the mean score for both partisans and apartisans on this 'polarization' variable in each time point (except 1996, for in that year respondents were not asked by ITANES investigators to position parties on the classical ten-points scale). On the one hand, it appears clearly that partisans perceive the two main parties to be more distant than do the apartisans – and this is true in each year investigated. On the other hand, it also must be noted that both groups show to perceive an increasing depolarization between the two parties. The figures move downwards very slowly between 2001 and 2006 though, while the major decrease is found between 2006 and 2008[6]. Overall, we find weak support for the 'depolarization hypothesis' within the context of the Second Italian Republic. It is true that partisans perceive a higher

[6] This is hardly surprising, given that the process culminated in the foundation of PD and PdL was based on the implicit – and unrealized – expectation that the two would have been the only actors of the bi-party system to come (hence, both aimed at the exploitation of the centre).

degree of polarization among the main parties as compared with apartisans, but it is also evident that both groups increasingly perceive a depolarization in the party system. To be sure, the multivariate analysis presented in the forthcoming section will show that among panel respondents, the perception of a lower degree of polarization at t_2 (as compared with t_1) is a statistically insignifcant predictor of partisan instability/dealignment.

As a final test, we will verify whether partisan ties' decline is indeed a sign of growing disenchantment with political parties as agents of representative democracy (Dalton 2004; Dalton and Weldon 2004). The entries presented in the last two columns of Table 1 represent the mean score of partisans and apartisans respectively on a 'party trust index' (coding: 0-not [trust] at all; 1-little; 2-somewhat; 3-very much). Once again, there is no supporting evidence in our data. Apartisans do not generally trust political parties (in average, they trust political parties less than 'a little') but they do not show to trust parties less with time (the mean score on the index being almost equal in both 2001 and 2008). Partisans do not have a much better image of parties though (the score indicating an average level of trust slightly higher than 'a little'), and like apartisans their score does not differ significantly during the decade under analysis (also this hypothesis will be tested in the forthcoming section, so as to assure us that decreasing trust in political parties at the individual level bear no causal impact on partisan detachments).

This section has demonstrated that the steady erosion of partisan ties among voters of the Second Italian Republic cannot be satisfactorily explained with theories such as cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984), depolarization (Holmberg 1994) or declining trust (Dalton and Weldon 2004). Once freed from competing explanations of partisan dealignment, we are now left with the task of demonstrating that the main cause of the process is to be found in the *personas* of the party leaders. Before doing so, however, we will first verify the applicability (and the characteristics) of party identification as an analytical concept in the Second Italian Republic.

3. PARTY IDENTIFICATION *ITALIAN STYLE*

Since the 1950s the concept of party identification has been central to the evolution of electoral behavior studies on both sides of the Atlantic. In its original formulation, it is conceived as a "psychological identification, which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support" (Campbell *et al.* 1960: 121), while its analytical usefulness lies in its "relative stability and priority in time" (*ibid.* 135) as compared with vote choice. Hence, party identification is (i) *distinguishable,* (ii) *causally antecedent* and (iii) *more stable* than vote choice. The "most enduring of political attitudes" (Miller and Shanks 1996: 117) has nevertheless been widely

criticized on several grounds. Under the push of rational choice models inspired by Downs, some American scholars questioned the stability of party identification demonstrating that it could be moved even in the short run (Markus & Converse 1979; Fiorina 1981). Even stronger critiques emerged from the implementation of the concept in the analysis of Europeans' voting behavior. Since the very first attempts it became clear that in countries featuring a tight fit between political parties and social structure, the primary identification is that with the social group. In other words, the stability of partisan identifications should reflect the stability of party-society links (Campbell and Valen 1966). In a comparative assessment of party identification in Europe (Budge *et al.* 1976), it was demonstrated that the concept *'did not travel well'* to the Old Continent (Crewe 1976; Kaase 1976). Thomassen's (1976) analysis of the Dutch case showed that party identification in the Netherlands did not share any of the three 'core properties' as featured in the U.S. Against this view, Holmberg (1994) found in a comparative analysis of Britain, Canada, Sweden, the U.S. and the Netherlands, that in all but the latter party identification was more stable than the vote and – at least in Sweden – distinguishable from vote choice.

The aim of this section is to evaluate applicability and properties of party identification in the Second Italian Republic. Before 1994 Italian politics was characterized by a substantial overlap of political parties and social subcultures. However, that year's election resulted in the extinction of the old class-mass parties that ensured the stability of party-society links. Furthermore, the parallel erosion of social cleavages made it hard – or useless, as one prefers – for new parties to appeal to (only) one of the country's subcultures. In the light of this situation, it is not unreasonable to expect that Italian voters (freed from past group loyalties) could develop an 'orthodox' sense of identification with one of the actors of the Second Republic politics. The data to assess the properties of party identification in post-1994 Italy come from ITANES post-electoral panel survey conducted in three waves (2001, 2004, 2006)[7]. Since we intend to test the stability of a long-term attitude, the relatively wide time-span of the survey makes it perfectly suitable for our analytical purposes. Furthermore, the election of 2001 was the third held in the Second Republic. As we know from the literature, "there is much less malleability [in individuals' party identification] after the third election" (Miller and Shanks 1996: 131). Hence, we are assured that we are studying a period where partisan identities were already shaped in individuals' mind.

i. Consistency of Party Identification and Vote Choice. In 2001 the percentage of identifiers voting consistently with their party identification varied between 87 percent (strong partisans) and 77 percent (leaners). Five years later the figures were slightly higher,

[7] Nationwide panel survey conducted through face-to-face interviews/CAPI [n(2001)=3209; n(2004)=1882; n(2006)=1048]

with 89 percent of strong partisans voting consistently with their party ID (figure lowered to 85 percent among leaners). In line with both American (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996) and European findings (Thomassen 1976; Holmberg 1994; Thomassen and Rosema 2009), the stronger the partisan ties, the higher the probabilities of vote for the party one identifies with. More importantly, the percentage of consistent partisan voters stands at a level that did not appear 'too close for comfort' in other European countries such as Sweden (Holmberg 1994: 97). Hence, we can assert that party identification in the Second Italian Republic (at least during the years under scrutiny) *is distinguishable from vote choice*.

ii. Causal antecedence of party identification. If we compare the percentage of Italian respondents whose party identification in 2001 coincided to their vote in 2006 with those whose vote choice at the beginning of the panel matched with their party identification five years later, we can appreciate that the former group is more numerous than the latter (66 percent against 59 percent). In other words, previous identifications had a stronger causal effect on future vote choices than did previous vote choices on one's future party identification. That is, party identification is *causally antecedent to vote choice.*

iii. Stability of party identification over time. The third feature of the concept in its original Michigan connotation is, as we have seen, the higher stability when compared to vote choice stability. However, the data in Table 2 hints us that this is not the case in the Italian context. Vote choice has been stable in two respondents out of three (time points: 2001 and 2006), while only one in two declared to be identified with same party after five years from the first interview. The cross tabulation of the two variables shows that, similarly to the Netherlands (Thomassen and Rosema 2009: 50) – and contrary to the 'orthodox' assumption – the number of people with unstable party identification and stable vote choice outnumbers on a 4:1 ratio the amount of respondents with stable identification and unstable vote preference.

TABLE 2 – Party ID and Vote Choice Stability across Two Elections, 2001-2006

		VOTE CHOICE		
		STABLE	UNSTABLE	TOTAL
PID	STABLE	**44**	**6**	50
	UNSTABLE	**23**	**27**	50
	TOTAL	67	33	100%

SOURCE: ITANES 2001-2006 (Panel)

Figure 2 sketches in more details the dynamics of party identification through a period of five years. The use of panel data allows us to trace the record of alignment(s) for same individuals across time. The two groups on the left side of the figure represent partisans and apartisans as categorized in 2001 (55 and 45 percent respectively). Each group is then analyzed according to its respondents' partisan status is 2004 and 2006 (by 'unstable partisans' we mean not only those who changed the party they identify with, but also those who reported to not identify anymore with any party). Three points seem worth noting: a) *stable partisans* are the most likely to remain partisan across time (i.e., 77 percent of stable partisans in 2004 remain partisan in 2006, while among the unstable partisans the percentage of identifiers in the successive time point is only 58 percent); b) the majority of *unstable partisans* is always made of former partisans who do not identify anymore with any of the parties ('quitters' in the figure: between 57 and 65 percent); c) being *apartisan* means a high likelihood to not become partisan (only one apartisan in three turn to a party in both 2001-4 and 2004-6). Notwithstanding the high instability of partisanship among our sample (and even among stable partisans), it seems clear that unstable partisans are more likely to 'quit' partisanship with time than do stable partisans. The main concern regarding this process lies in the fact that those who turned to apartisanship are also the most likely to not become partisans again. In other words, *unstable partisanship is in the long run conductive to dealignment*.

FIGURE 2 – The Dynamics of Party Identification, 2001-2004-2006



SOURCE: ITANES 2001-2006 (Panel)

4. THE DETERMINANTS OF PARTISAN (DE)ALIGNMENT IN THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 2001-2004

In this section we will assess in turn the determinants of party identification (*static model*) and partisanship instability (*dynamic model*) in the period 2001-4 (that is, the years when the first two waves of ITANES panel were conducted[8]).

4.1. The Determinants of Party Identification, 2001 (Static Model)

By means of binary logistic regression we can appraise the relative strength of the explanatory variables usually considered to be cause of one's identification with a political party. Two in particular will be at the core of our analysis. We will call them respectively the 'personal component' and the 'political component'. We operationalized the former with the respondent's evaluation (on a 1-to-10 scale) of the party leader, and the latter through the left-right distance between the self and the party[9] (that is, self-placement's score on the L/R scale minus the score assigned to the party on the same scale, in absolute value). The model includes also standard sociodemographic variables (e.g., age, gender, education level, social class, trade union membership, religious attendance and TV exposure). The 'static model' is designed in the following way. Five different regression analyses were performed, one for each of the main parties then in Parliament. In every instance, the dependent variable is a dummy coding **1** the respondents identified with that party, and **0** apartisans as well as identifiers with parties other than the one under scrutiny. With regard to the predictors, the 'personal component' variable is the respondent's evaluation of the leader of *that* party, while the 'political component' measures the respondent's distance on the left-right scale with the party for which the regression analysis is being performed. Table 3 presents the standardized regression coefficients (B) of our analyses (entries in italic are not significant at the .05 level).

[8] An analysis of the period 1996-2001 would have been preferred, for it was in those years that the major decrease in partisanship took place. However there is no panel data for that period. Hence, I decided to move the analytical focus five years ahead, in order to take advantage of a unique dataset that allows us to assess the determinants of both partisan alignment and partisanship (in)stability across the same individuals (something that could not be done with standard post-election surveys, given the dynamic nature of the analysis).

[9] According to Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), "the classic view of the left-right dimension sees it as a super-issue which summarizes the [political] programmes of opposing groups" (244).

TABLE 3 – The Determinants of Party Identification in 2001 (Logistic Regression Estimates)

	Alleanza Nazionale	Democratici di Sinistra	Forza Italia	Lega Nord	Rifondazione Comunista
Age	**- .01**	-	*.01*	*.01*	**- .03**
Gender	**- .56**	*- .15*	*.20*	*- .40*	*- .42*
Education	**.36**	*- .02*	*- .09*	*.31*	*- .37*
Social Class	**.19**	*- .07*	*.05*	*- .23*	*- .12*
Union Member	*.13*	**.61**	*- .32*	*- .35*	*.12*
Religious Attendance	*- .10*	**- ,17**	*.03*	*- .16*	*- .12*
TV Exposure	*.05*	*. 01*	*- .06*	*- .02*	*- .17*
Political Component	**- 1.01**	**- .98**	**- .61**	**- .89**	**- 1.03**
Personal Component	**.66**	**.44**	**.67**	**.91**	**.42**
Nagelkerke R Square	**.54**	**.50**	**.49**	**.47**	**.48**
% Cases Correctly Predicted	91,3	87,3	85,8	98,6	95,8
(n)	(2178)	(2035)	(2231)	(1997)	(2116)

The predictive power of the five models is overall satisfactory (Nagelkerke R Square ranging between .47 and .54; cases correctly predicted between 85,8 and 98,6). We can appreciate the fact that both 'personal' and 'political' components are statistically significant predictors of party identification for every party under analysis. The 'personal component' is the dominant predictor of partisanship in two cases, and not by chance the two most 'personal' parties of the maze: *Forza Italia* and Umberto Bossi's *Lega Nord*. In the other three instances, it is indeed the 'political component' the best predictor of alignment with party (e.g., *Alleanza Nazionale*, *Democratici di Sinistra* and *Rifondazione Comunista*). This is hardly surprising, given the more 'political' nature of these parties – all of them were in fact legitimate heirs of mass parties of the previous century (contrary to F.I. and L.N.). Nevertheless, even among these parties the 'personal component' of party identification is a strong determinant of partisanship (the second stronger except for D.S., where it is union membership the most powerful predictor of party identification after the 'political component'). Overall, we can assert that *evaluation of the party leader is a very strong (and at times the strongest) determinant of party identification*[10].

[10] Some might advance that partisans can be biased in the judgment of their own party's leader, hence inflating the explanatory power of the 'personal component' on identification. However, our analysis has focused on five parties whose leaders in 2001 have been so since the foundation of those parties. Hence we are assured that the 'indistinguishable identity' between the leader and the party has not been disentangled yet (Poli 2001).

4.2. The Determinants of Partisanship Instability, 2001-2004 (Dynamic Model)

Making use once again of binary logistic regression, we now move to the assessment of the determinants of partisanship instability. As described above, we consider as '*unstable partisans'* the voters who changed party they identify with across the two time-points, as well as those who reported a sense of identification in 2001 but not anymore in 2004. The 'dynamicity' of the analysis resides in the fact that we will use *differentials* as independent variables. That is, the *'personal component'* of partisanship instability will be operationalized as the difference between leader evaluation at t_2 and (same) leader evaluation at t_1, while the *'partisan component'* will be the difference between the self and the (same) party on a left-right scale across the two time-points. The *'dynamic model'* features also the individual differential in perceived polarization of the party system (left-right distance between the main two parties) and party trust (score on the three point scale) between t_1 and t_2, and of course the group of control variables already employed (e.g., age, gender, education level, social class, trade union membership, religious attendance and TV exposure). This model differs from the *'static'* one in the choice of the cases under analysis. While the previous analyzed every respondent of the survey, this one will indeed concentrate on the respondents who declared to be partisans in 2001 but that also took part in the second wave of the panel. Three different regression analyses were performed, this time including only identifiers with the three parties (one regression per each group of partisans) featuring a sufficient number of respondents who was both partisan in 2001 and re-interviewed in 2004 (e.g., Alleanza Nazionale, Democratici di Sinistra, Forza Italia). The dependent variable is a dummy coding **1** those who remained stable partisans between 2001 and 2004, and **0** unstable partisans. Table 4 presents the standardized regression coefficients (B) of our analyses (entries in italic are not significant at the .05 level).

TABLE 4 – The Determinants of Partisanship Instability, 2001-2004 (Logistic Regression Estimates)

	Alleanza Nazionale	Democratici di Sinistra	Forza Italia
Age	*- .02*	**- .04**	**.02**
Gender	*.09*	*- .51*	*.09*
Education	*.23*	*.32*	*.23*
Social Class	*.23*	*- .18*	*- .07*
Union Member	*-1.10*	*.50*	*.40*
Religious Attendance	*- .29*	*- .16*	*- .08*
TV Exposure	**.53**	*.04*	*.11*
Polarization (Diff.)	*- .19*	*.03*	*- .02*
Trust in Parties (Diff.)	*.14*	*- .04*	*.09*
Political Component (Diff.)	**- .59**	*- .28*	**- .31**
Personal Component (Diff.)	**.77**	**.25**	**.42**
Nagelkerke R Square	**.56**	**.31**	**.38**
% Cases Correctly Predicted	81,2	71,2	73,7
(n)	(133)	(170)	(190)

The estimates of our analysis marshal strong support to our research hypothesis. In every group of partisans under scrutiny it is the *'personal component'* the strongest determinant of partisanship instability, and indeed the only predictor which remains statistically significant across groups (the *'political component'* looks stronger in the case of D.S., but the coefficient is not significant). That is, a worsened evaluation of the leader bears a stronger effect as compared with a perceived increase between one's left-right placement and that of the party. Also, we can appreciate the fact that none of the *usual suspects* of partisan dealignment (e.g., age, education, depolarization and party trust) bear a visible impact on partisanship instability.

Our findings thus demonstrate that partisan dealignment in the Second Italian Republic is better explained as a process where the (changing) image of party leaders is central in provoking partisanship instability, which is in turn conductive to apartisanship (as showed above). As partisan alignment is mainly a function of one's evaluation of the party leader, by the same token dealignment is caused, first and foremost, by a deteriorated perception of him. That is, *partisan (de)alignments are caused for the most part by the voters' evaluation of party leaders.*

5. PARTISAN DEALIGNMENT AND THE 'OVERALL IMAGE OF LEADERS'

In the previous section, the prominence of leaders' image among the determinants of individual (de)alignment with political parties has been revealed. In a context in which partisanship is mainly a function of the image of the leaders (as perceived by the voters), we might hypothesize that a generalized erosion of partisan ties at the aggregate level is in relationship with a parallel deterioration of the overall image of party leaders. The high instability of partisan ties among Italian voters (hand in hand with the key role exerted by party leaders' image in determining both party identification and partisanship instability) implies that *'unstable partisans'* are still available in considering new parties to identify with, but only as long as they see other party leaders in a sufficiently favorable way. In the light of this, it follows that a worsened evaluation of party leaders as a whole strongly reduces the likelihood for such *'unstable partisans'* to find a spot to realign. Table 5 presents the mean score assigned by survey respondents to party leaders of the bigger eight parties in each election year (plus 2004, where the parties considered are the same of 2001). What concerns us the most here are the entries in the last row of the table, that represent the mean score of party leaders as a whole in each time-point (that is, *the 'overall image of leaders'*). Despite the fact that in no case party leaders as a whole are evaluated sufficiently (mean scores all below the score of six), there is nonetheless a substantive variance throughout the period 1994-2008. The *"overall image of leaders"* rises of a half-point between 1994 and 1996 (when it hits the highest peak of the period). Then, a steady decline in the period 1996-2004 (lowest dip of the series) is followed by a nearly equivalent increase between 2004 and 2008 (when the overall score of leaders backs close to 1996 levels).

TABLE 5 – Mean Evaluation of Eight Party Leaders and 'Overall Image of Leaders', 1994-2008

	1994	1996	2001	2004	2006	2008	MEAN
Prodi	-	6,2	-	-	-	-	6,2
D'Alema	-	6,2	-	-	-	-	6,2
Fini	5,5	5,9	5,9	5,5	5,5	5,8	5,7
Veltroni	-	-	5,2	-	-	5,9	5,5
Berlusconi	6,9	5,3	5,9	4,0	4,5	5,6	5,4
Dini	-	5,3	-	-	-	-	5,3
Casini	-	4,8	4,9	4,9	5,3	5,3	5,0
Rutelli	-	-	5,3	4,4	5,0	-	4,9
Fassino	-	-	-	4,6	5,0	-	4,8
Bertinotti	4,3	5,7	4,6	4,6	4,9	4,5	4,8
Segni	4,7	-	-	-	-	-	4,7
Di Pietro	-	-	4,4	3,8	-	5,4	4,5
Pannella	4,4	-	-	-	-	-	4,4
Martinazzoli	4,3	-	-	-	-	-	4,3
Occhetto	4,3	-	-	-	-	-	4,3
Pecoraro Scanio	-	-	-	-	4,2	-	4,2
Santanchè	-	-	-	-	-	4,2	4,2
Bossi	3,6	3,4	3,0	2,9	3,2	4,6	3,4
OVERALL LEADER IMAGE	**4,8**	**5,3**	**4,9**	**4,3**	**4,7**	**5,2**	

SOURCE: ITANES 1994, 1996, 2001-2006 (Panel), 2006, 2008

The data presented in the table does not speak of a uniform decrease in the overall image of party leaders, as found out with regard to the percentage of party identifiers. Yet, one cannot overlook the fact that this time we have included two additional time points (1994 and 2004). And we did so on purpose: given the nature of the macro level analysis that will soon follow, it seemed appropriate to increase our *n* as much as possible. Figure 3 presents the trends of both *'aggregate partisanship'* and *'overall leader image'* in six different time-points (e.g., 1994, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008). The data on aggregate partisanship for 1994 and 2004 comes, respectively, from Eurobarometer 41 and the second wave of ITANES panel 2001-2006.

FIGURE 3 – Aggregate Partisanship and 'Overall Image of Leaders', 1994-2008



SOURCE: Eurobarometer 41; ITANES 1994, 1996, 2001-2006 (Panel), 2006, 2008

At this point, also partisan dealignment appears less uniform in its development. Yet, we could expect party identifiers in 1994 to be less than in 1996 – this being in line with the 'orthodox' assumption that feelings of attachment with a political group develop with time (Converse *et al.* 1960). And while the period between 2001 and 2006 previously appeared as a downwards trend between two time-points, we see now that in 2004 the number of partisans was slightly lower than in 2006 – yet, *not so lower* (roughly one percentage point) to disturb the general trend. But what matters the most, the trend-lines for the period 1994-2006 are now entirely compatible. Every time the *'overall image of leaders'* goes up (or down), so do the percentage of party identifiers. The correlation coefficient (Pearson's *r*) between the two trends in the period is .81 (n = 5). However, the correlation gets strongly depressed if we include the measurements relative to 2008 in the analysis (*r* = .55), and this for a clearly visible reason: between 2006 and 2008 the 'overall image of the leaders' increased sensibly, but the percentage of partisans did not augment by any means. At a first glance, this would seem a definite disconfirmation of our hypothesis. Yet I contend that it is indeed the strongest proof marshaled in support of our theory. In 2006, roughly 80 percent of partisans were identified with a party that two years after would not have existed anymore. Since we know partisan attachments to develop with time, we could have expected a much sharper decrease in party identifiers than the *one-point-something* percent actually found. According to our findings the image of party leaders is among the strongest determinants of alignment (along with self/party left-right distance, but in aggregate it is mathematically impossible to reduce such distance lessening the number of parties). Hence, if aggregate

partisanship in 2008 was substantially resilient notwithstanding a wholly renewed political offer, we can assert with a certain degree of confidence that this would have not been the case without a significant increase in the public's perception of party leaders. In other words, in 2008 *it was the improved image of the leaders to prevent a major fall in aggregate partisanship* (as we would have expected otherwise).

6. CONCLUSIONS

Recall the definition of *personalization of politics* provided above: *"a process in which the political weight of the individual actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., political party) declines"* (Rahat and Sheafer 2007: 65). The findings of our analysis carry strong support for the *'personalization hypothesis'* in the context of the Second Italian Republic, and in particular with respect to the increasingly *'personalized'* dynamics of party identification. We found that the weight of party leaders as a determinant of party identification equals substantially that of ideological proximity. What is more, party leaders' image is even a stronger (indeed, the strongest) determinant of partisanship instability – which is in turn conductive to partisan dealignment. These results demonstrate that party leaders bear a stronger role in shaping (rather than being shaped by) political attitudes than is often supposed (e.g., Barisione 2006; Barisione and Castellani 2008). In the final section we further advanced an explanation for the decline of aggregate partisanship in the period 1996-2008, based on the changing perception of leaders as a whole (*'overall image of leaders'*): a fairly strong correlation between the two is emerged. But most of all, we could ascribe to the improved image of party leaders the fact that in 2008 aggregate partisanship *'held'* notwithstanding a sweeping change in the political scene. If we are to advance a reason for the ameliorated image of the leaders in that year, it is probably to be found in the way the political battle has been fought. Walter Veltroni's strategy to *'keep it calm'* (Legnante and Sani 2008: 29) had undoubtedly a role in promoting a competition freed from the so-called '*demonization of the enemy'*, which consisted in a minor number of personal attacks – and in turn resulted in a less generalized erosion of *'image capital'*.

One final point seems in order. The personalized dynamics of party identification as outlined in this paper shed a not so assuring light on the spread of open primaries among Italian coalitions (i.e., *Unione*) and parties (i.e., *Partito Democratico*). So far, primary elections of the left has been mainly a way to provide leaders *in pectore* with a piece of *'popular legitimacy'* (in both 2006 and 2008 Romano Prodi and Walter Veltroni faced no serious challengers for the leadership of Unione and PD respectively). However, these leaders were already chosen by their respective coalition/party as the *less divisive* figure around (in this respect, Prodi's leadership is the most telling example). The higher it will get the competitiveness of such contests, the less they will be likely to result in the election of a

unifying figure. We showed in this paper the high instability of partisan ties in the Second Italian Republic, as well as the strong impact of party leader evaluation on such process. Also, we know from the last fifteen years of Italian politics what the *'divisive leader'* implies: some will love him, some others will hate him. The risk for internally democratic parties is obvious: the more divisive its popularly elected leader will be, the higher the chances to lose partisans are[11].

[11] In this respect, the last primary election held in October 2009 by the *Partito Democratico* is quite telling, with the election of Pierluigi Bersani almost instantly resulting in the depart by one of the party's founding fathers, Francesco Rutelli, in open disagreement with the leftish direction the party is supposed to take under such leadership.

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THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE LDP IN JAPAN: WHAT HAPPENED?

Author: **Hrannar Baldvinsson**

Research student at the
Department of Political Science
at Waseda University,
Tokyo, Japan.

E-mail: Hrannar@fuji.waseda.jp

ABSTRACT

This article explores the reason why the LDP has stayed so long in power and why it ultimately fell out. It begins by giving an overview of the political situation in Japan in the past decades. It then proceeds to explain the main theories on why the LDP stayed so long in power and maintains that the main contributing factor has been a weak opposition. Finally it discusses how the new party has distinguished itself from former opposition parties and how and why the LDP had failed to meet that challenge.

Keywords: Liberal Democratic Party, Democratic Party of Japan, Elections, New Komeito, Japan Communist Party, Japan socialist Party, Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, Taro Aso.

INTRODUCTION

Echoing what Voltaire said of the Holy Roman Empire the leftists in Japan have for a long time said that the Liberal Democratic Party is neither liberal, nor democratic and not really a party. Democratic or not it is nevertheless a fact that it has managed to retain its grip on power almost uninterruptedly since 1955, a situation unheard of in any other "real" democracy. All this just changed in August this year when the party dramatically lost 155 seats in the lower house elections and thus its majority. The party had already lost its majority to the opposition in the upper house back in 2007 but now, finally some might add

the era of almost uninterrupted LDP domination seems to be at an end. The question that the LDP party members are probably asking themselves is how on earth did this happen? This paper will try to answer that question but before proceeding to do that it is important to understand the workings of Japanese politics and how the party, despite its unpopularity and despite its corruption, managed to maintain its grip on power for so long.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE LDP HOLD ON POWER

The Liberal Democratic Party came into existence in 1955 when the country's two main conservative parties; the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party merged into one. The left wing parties had been openly discussing for some time a merger and the conservatives feared that they might lose power against a united left. Most of the centre-left parties soon merged as well to form the Japan Socialist Party. The JSP was orthodox Marxist, vehemently anti-American, opposed to the U.S. military presence in Japan, and opposed to the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. The conservative wing thus had good reasons to merge. Until August 2009, the party had been in power non-stop since 1955 with the exception of 1993 when a breakaway faction from it formed a multi-party coalition that only lasted for 11 months. The situation made some political commenter dub Japan *de facto* one party system while others would call it the first party system. One would think that in a democratic state, a party with such a long track record of staying in power must have been very popular, but far from it, the LDP is and has for a long time been both unpopular and inherently corrupt. Its support base had been steadily declining thus it resolved to form coalition governments with the small Buddhist party New-Komeito. In the year 1990 a poll conducted showed that only 19% of participants supported the single party system while over 50% wanted some other alternative[12], a poll conducted in August this year showed that 20% of participants were going to vote for the LDP against 34.6% who said they were going to vote for the main opposition party; the Democratic party of Japan.[13] Furthermore the LDP does not have and has never had any well defined ideology; rather it has strived to maintain the system. In the absence of countering evidence the LDP had for decades been able to maintain that it is the only party capable of running the economy and if the left-wing parties ever came to power nationalization and economic stagnation would surely follow. Tight campaigning regulations (laid out in 1925) also surely favor the incumbent candidate. As Hrebenar points out: "Almost every type of campaign activity that would evolve the voter in any but the most superficial way as prohibited. In particular, door-to-door campaigning, signature drives, polling, providing food and drink, mass meetings, parades, unscheduled speeches, multiple

[12] Hrebenar, 2000, page 11.
[13] "Japans opposition leads ruling LDP,Tokyo Shinbun Poll says."

campaign vehicles, and candidate produced literature are illegal in contemporary Japanese campaigns."[14]

Furthermore strict laws apply to size and form of advertisements. The guidebook of do's and don'ts in election campaigns is 478 pages long! Internet commercials are furthermore banned, the reason being that since the book (published in 1928) did not mention the internet it is considered illegal. Hrebenar does though acknowledge that regulations are regularly flouted but nonetheless the background role that campaigning posters and commercials seem to play in Japan is striking to outsiders. Yet another aspect of Japanese politics is the tremendous power that the bureaucrats hold. The bureaucrats, along with politicians have worked to protect the interests of lobbyers. The ministries also have their own budget which they can distribute more or less without consulting elected politicians. Still today a large number of bureaucrats are graduates from the elite Tokyo University and as such, they often consider themselves above the politicians in rank. When interviewing former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, Chris Hogg of the BBC recounted with almost a pity how the stiff, uncompromising bureaucrats surrounding him seemed to dictate everything he said and did.[15] It is not an exaggeration to say that the office of Prime minister in Japan is among the weakest in any democratic state.

Despite rampant corruption, scandals and only minimal success in reviving the economy after the post war economic *"miracle"* came to a halt in early 1990s the LDP succeeded in maintaining its grip on power almost uninterruptedly for over 50 years, a fact that has made the Japanese people in general apolitical and cynical towards politicians. A common saying in Japan is that the country has a first class economy but third class politics, a poll conducted in 1980 even showed that considerably higher percentage of participants had faith in fortune tellers than politicians![16] Recent polls also demonstrate that the faith in the democratic system seems to be at an all time low.[17] The popularity of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi demonstrated the willingness of voters to support whomever they thought likely to bring about change. The maverick prime minister promised change both in the economic sphere and in the way politics are conducted and had an approval rating approaching 90% in his first months in office![18] It was sometimes said jokingly that Koizumi was popular because he promised to destroy his own party. After his disappearance from office things soon returned to business as usual though.

[14] Hrebnar, 2000, page 50.
[15] "Japans political revolving door."
[16] Hrebnar, 2000, page 21.
[17] McCreedy, 2002, page 3.
[18] "Japanese PMs party wins Tokyo election."

THE FIRST TWO THEORIES: THE ELECTION SYSTEM AND CULTURE

It has now been established that the LDP is corrupt and unpopular, the bureaucracy pervasively powerful and that the public seems to be ready to vote for whomever they believe will bring about change in the way politics are done in Japan. Election campaign regulations are also notoriously tight which has not helped to the opposition, however that does little to explain the LDP hold on power, these regulations are after all circumvented on regular basis. To explain why the same party has stayed in power for so academics have proposed four different theories.

The first explanation is that the **Single non-transferable vote** (SNTV) electoral system prior to 1996 favored LDP dominance.[19] In a SNTV system a voter casts a vote for only one candidate in his or her constituency; the candidate with the most votes gets the first seat and so on. The downside of this system is that it is perfectly possible for the most popular party to get the votes concentrated on one or two candidates, while a less popular party gets its votes spread more even and thus win more candidates although the party might get far less total votes. Although the electoral system probably plays its part it is hardly decisive, it was abolished in 1996 and the LDP managed to hold its grip on power for an additional 13 years. Moreover, according to Ichiro Miyaje the system basically introduced in 1925[20], 30 years before the one party dominance of today. Although civilian control of the government was effectively abolished in war-time Japan there were years prior to 1955 with SNTV without a single party dominance and there have been years after 1996 without SNTV with one-party dominance. The first theory is therefore not adequate to explain the phenomena.

The second theory is the so-called Political culture theory.[21] This theory maintains that the Japanese people are simply submissive to authority and are therefore unlikely to try to oust the incumbent government out of power. Although this theory might sound romantic to the western orientlist wanting to construct a framework the differences of Japanese culture to his or her own, it is far too simple to be valid. To begin with, the LDP stronghold is in the countryside and it is a well know fact that people in the countryside are more likely than urbanites to be conservative and/or nationalists. This applies to Japan as well as to the U.S. and Iran as demonstrated recently. Furthermore polls in 1990 showed that 80% of voters in the countryside voted as opposed to only 60% of city dwellers.[22] Recent polls have also shown that a great majority of the population does not think that politics should be left to the politicians alone and the percentage of independent voters who do not vote for the LDP has

[19] For details see Kohno,1997.
[20] Tanaka, 2007. page 2.
[21] For details see Richardson, 1974.
[22] Hrebenar, 2000, page 18.

been increasing steadily in the last decades.[23] The culture of a country is certainly reflected in its politics, after all the politicians are members of their countries culture like everybody else, but culture does not explain the one party dominance in Japan any more than culture explains why the U.K. has a two party dominance out of three main parties.

INSTITUTIONALIZED CORRUPTION AND THE FAILURE OF THE OPPOSITION

The third theory holds that the LDP, controlling budget allocation, subsidies and policy making brought back "pork" to the constituencies in exchange for votes. Pork is of course meant here as all sorts of benefits. Since the party controlled the government budget it was able to allocate resources to supporters, especially in the countryside which is overrepresented in the diet. Those in power in the countryside knew that bridges, tunnels, roads and all kinds of constructions would be built as long as the LDP holds power. The LDP therefore constructed a highly organized voting machine (the LDP has the most organized voting apparatus of any party save for perhaps the New Komeito) to maintain themselves in power. These organized voters have always been the backbone of LDP support. This theory is furthermore supported by statistics mentioned earlier that show that voting participation is far higher in the countryside than in the large cities or 80% as opposed to 60%. Furthermore the percentage of voters who are unorganized and thus less likely to vote for the LDP is considerably higher in the cities. Some scholars believed that the SNTV electoral system with multi member districts had in fact fostered this kind of pork barrel politics but Ethan Scheiner, the main proponent of the theory rejects this pointing out that the LDP did not change its strategy after the electoral reform of 1996 (The single member district system with proportional representation).

It might also be added that big companies have almost all supported the LDP, and many of them financially. Up until the 1990s there was no limit on how much money a private corporation could donate to political parties and as a result, corporations donated huge sums of money in exchange for lax laws, and a voice in the law making process. This was revised and fixed to a certain maximum amount, but that did however not have the desired effect (if desired at all) to curb money from companies. Instead parties and party-factions organized thinly disguised money making machines under the pretext of being interest groups or think tanks working to promote various policies. The main goal of the group is however, simply to make money. All this gives an image of a massive corruption but as Ramseyer and Rosenbluth point out; it is an institutionally driven corruption.[24] Although this did cost the party some popular support it could use the money it gains by this to buy back support in the manner described above.

[23] Tanaka, Martin. 2003. page 30.
[24] Ramseyer, Rosenbluth, 1993, Page 9.

The fourth and the last theory also maintained by Ethan Scheiner and in a little different form by Aiji Takana[25] maintains that the large vote share gained by the LDP did not necessarily translate as a support for the LDP as such but rather as a support for the political system in general. In other words; voters simply had no other reliable alternative to the LDP. If we examine the other major parties in post-war Japan this theory seems to hold ground. The party that was for the longest the largest opposition party; the Japan Socialist Party advocated mass change in the social structure of Japan and was, at least in rhetoric, Marx-Leninist until 1986.[26] Furthermore, internal squabbling and constant factional wars between the radicals on one hand who believed that the party should be a class party and the more moderates who wanted it to be a mass party inhibited it from offering a reliable alternative. Hrebenar describes popular perception of the party as having been: "poorly organized, indifferently led, narrowly based, doctrinaire and irresponsible in policy, lacking in autonomy, poor in human talent, and overly prone to ideological and factional division."[27] This was obviously not a party that voters could trust. Another major party was the Japanese Communist party which was even further to the left, advocating a complete overhaul of society, though in a democratic way. The JCP is one of the largest Communist parties in the world not in power, it is highly organized and has a relatively high budget for its size but such radical parties however are not likely to catch a majority of votes in any industrialized country barring an economic catastrophe. The last party worth mentioning is the New Komeito party which is generally perceived to be the political arm of the Buddhist organization Soka Gakkai (although both are nominally independent of each other). The Soka Gakkai is, depending on one's point of view a highly organized religious group or a highly organized cult. It bases itself on the teachings of the 12th century Buddhist monk Nichiren, and one of its underlying principles is intolerance of all "heresy" and other religious teachings. The organization furthermore owns assembly halls, companies and even universities in Japan. The Soka Gakkai evokes a high level of feelings in most Japanese ranging from intense praise to the far more usual; intense dislike. Originally founded to push forward the "gospel" of Nichiren, the party has repeatedly tried to reassure the nation that it has no intention of pushing Nichiren Buddhism upon a nation unwilling to accept it but with little luck so far. The percentage of votes cast for the New-Komeito party changes little from one election to the other, indicating that its voters are committed Nichiren Buddhists. It is therefore not very surprising that a political party based on the principles of the Soka Gakkai cannot hope to become a major opposition party, and in fact, the party has formed a coalition with the LDP for the past few years, not helping its popularity among those who want the latter out of power.

[25] For more information see Scheiner,2007. and Tanaka, 2007.
[26] Kono, 1997, page 118.
[27] Hrebenar, 2000, page 210.

Many other small parties have come and gone but the parties mentioned before have been the main opposition parties in Japanese politics. Neither the New-Komeito nor the Communist party could ever hope to become a mass organization to challenge the LDP. The failure of the opposition is therefore mainly the failure of the JSP. The continuing success of the LDP despite its corruption and rampant nepotism does therefore not symbolize support for the party but rather says that there are other parties. It is also event in the fact that with the exception of the Koizumi years, support for the LDP has been steadily declining since four small opposition parties merged in 1998 to form the Democratic Party of Japan. The party has been steadily gaining seats since its formation, going from holding 38 seats in the upper house to the now 109 of 242, and 93 members in the lower house to the now 308 of 480 making it by far the largest party. Ideologically speaking, the DPJ is a centre right party; although it calls itself revolutionary, and although the LDP calls it "*extremist*"[28] compared to the older opposition parties it hardly lives up to that label. The main changes on its agenda are overthrowing the *"ancient regime"*, end corruption in the bureaucracy and increase in welfare. The increased welfare consist mostly of introducing child allowance, raising unemployment benefits, cutting taxes on small businesses, and reforming the pension system of the aging country. The party also intends to save 9 trillion yen by putting a stop to wasteful public work and other spending the LDP has used to keep itself in power as mentioned earlier. The most important promise of the DPJ is however to put an end to the rule of bureaucrats. The party was from 2006 led by Ichiro Ozawa a former chief secretary of the LDP, who had a reputation for regularly changing parties. Ozawa was forced to resign in May 2009 due to a fund scandal, but this does not appear to have diminished the popularity of the DPJ.

As mentioned earlier, the decline in the popularity of the LDP was reversed for a time from 2001 to 2006 by the ascent of Prime Minister Koizumi. In an attempt to revive the party's fortunes, the charismatic leader reconstructured the economy along neo-liberal economic ideals, privatized the postal system and tried to revive the economy with some success. His strongman approach to the powerful and conservative bureaucracy and his attempts to break down the factions within his own party gained him much popular support and for the first time the party was more popular in the cities than in the countryside. Ironically, however, his market reforms resulted in social disparities which seriously hurt the party's traditional base of support: the rural areas.[29] When Koizumi left the scene the party really had nothing left that appealed to voters. His handpicked successor Shinzo Abe was expected to continue his policies but had neither the charisma nor the forceful character of Koizumi, his popularity soon plunged and he lost control of his party, resulting in party members actively working

[28] "The opposition peers ahead."
[29] "Editorial: recreating the LDP"

against him; a strange report circulated in the media claiming that his cabinet members did not even bother to stand up when he entered the room.[30] The party then suffered great losses in the upper house elections of 2007, one major contributing factor to this dramatic loss was the so called pension scandal. It was reveled in 2007 that the government had lost 50 million pension records, up to this date only a small fraction has been correctly identified and authorities were forced to admit that up to 10 million records would probably never be correctly identified. Many political analysts labeled this the last straw for the unpopular party.[31] Abe resigned soon afterwards and his successor, Yasuo Fukuda signaled in many ways victory for the bureaucracy and the old style factions within the party over the reforms of Koizumi, Fukuda being an old style politician not likely to be the initiator of great changes. Fukuda abruptly resigned in September 2008, citing the difficulties he faced negotiating with the DPJ controlled Upper house. His successor Taro Aso, was yet another old style politician who seemed clueless how to revive the nations faltering economy. He soon saw his popularity plummet both within his own party and in the polls. The party resolved to attack advertising but to no avail and it would have needed a miracle to win the elections, polls 2 weeks before the election date showed the DPJ lead by almost 15%[32], after being in power almost as long as the Chinese communist party, both Japanese voters and the LDP needed a break from each other.

CONCLUSION

This short overview gave a very brief background description of the Japanese political situation and went over the main theories how the LDP was able to maintain power for so many decades. Although the first two theories (namely that the voting system had impeded change and the hierarchical political culture has made the voters unlikely to *"rock the boat"* may offer some insight it is save to dismiss them as main factors. Rather, the third theory; that the decades that LDP had been in power had made it able to control the budget and literally *"bribe"* constituencies into voting for them and the complete failure of the opposition to offer a reliable alternative seem more realistic. Of those two, the latter one appears to be decisive; the LDP still had control over the budget and still *"bribed"* the constituencies last August but that did not save them from a crushing defeat in the elections. In the last years, the party has performed badly in most elections and that fact has been one of the decisive factors in forcing prime ministers out of office from Shinzo Abe to Yasuo Fukuda and now, Aso. Polls also indicate that the party has been steadily losing support since back in the late 1990s; when the current biggest opposition party the DPJ was formed. Koizumi tried to change this trend and for a while he was successful but this was the result of his persona and

[30] "The good son falters"
[31] "Scandal over lost pensions may be the last straw for the ruling party"
[32] "Japans opposition leads ruling LDP Tokyo Shinbun poll says"

his promise of change in the way politics are conducted in the country. Ironically his changes undermined the party's rural support which the party had always counted on. After he left the scene it was back to business as usual and the party's new found popularity in the metropolitan areas plummeted. Shinzo Abe, his successor lacked both his charisma and forceful character. The last straw was the pension scandal which the party never recovered from. The reason why people are turning to the opposition now is that it has promised; like Koizumi to fight the corruption and the power of the bureaucrats while (unlike previous opposition parties) keeping the economic and social system more or less intact. The Japanese electorate finally has a realistic alternative to the "ancient regime."

From all this we can gather that the state of Japanese politics in the last few decades has been somewhat dismal. Owing to bad opposition, the Japanese electorate has been left with no reliable option to voting for the same party elections after elections. Some have equated this to saying that Japan was a *de facto* one party state. This is probably an exaggeration since the government places no real legal restrictions on opposition parties comparable to countries like Singapore, for an example. Nonetheless the "first party" system was hardly healthy for a democracy, not even for the ruling party itself since it has caused both mass corruption and has contributed to the general disbelief in politics in Japan. Whether the DPJ can change this or not is an entirely another matter, the powerful unelected bureaucrats are not likely to be very enthusiastic about changes and will do whatever they can to preserve the cozy situation they have been accustomed to, the LDP will help them.

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CHINA, JAPAN, AND ASEAN ENERGY POLITICS: DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Author: *John Henzel*

E-mail : henzelj10@mail.wlu.edu

John Henzel is an undergraduate senior at Washington and Lee University. He is majoring in International Politics and additionally a concentration in East Asian Studies. After graduating he plans on obtaining a PhD in Political Science and International Security programs with a continued East Asian and Japanese language focus.

ABSTRACT:

Because China's demand for hydrocarbons is rapidly increasing and Japan remains dependent upon foreign sources, energy resources in the East Asia play a pivotal role in security policies of two of the largest energy consumers on the planet. While both nations are attempting to secure a steady supply of resources through cooperative "soft power" efforts, violent clashes in the South China Sea indicate that China's security policy may be more military focused than Beijing indicates.

KEYWORDS: China, Japan, ASEAN, South China Sea, Energy Security, Hydrocarbons.

INTRODUCTION

With China's increasing hydrocarbon demand and Japan's dependency upon foreign sources, ASEAN hydrocarbon production in the South China Sea and the rest of South East Asia has a dramatic effect upon the geopolitical stratagems of both nations as well as global powers such as the United States. The maritime disputes in East Asia are centered on control of the flow of trade and the production of energy resources and are a significant indicator of both Chinese foreign policy and Japanese foreign policy regarding securing energy for the future of both nations. The South China Sea specifically gives clear examples of China's foreign policy intentions, which can be clouded by diplomatic rhetoric and a nontransparent security policy.

HISTORY

In order to understand the situation in East Asia currently, the history and growth of the region should first be considered. Beginning with Western entry to the region during the colonial era, resources have played a key role in the development of all nations in the East Asian theater. Development and subsequent industrialization of East Asian nations have spawned from geographic and historical circumstances unique to each nation's experience engaging with the industrially superior international core that has created distinctive patterns of trade, diplomatic relations, and energy usage and needs. When the West came to the region it was opened up to a world of trade and competition over resources. First seeking out luxury goods such as spices and silk, Asia was a natural place to begin trade for the West. Colonies and ports to expedite Western demand were eventually created in islands such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia, and official trade relations were opened up throughout the Asian Pacific.

Japan for a time took an isolationist path to dealing with foreign colonialism, expelling everyone except for a few select approved traders from China and the Netherlands from the island. This kept Japanese entanglement in Western affairs low during a time that many Western powers attempted ardently to dominate the periphery for trade purposes to ensure a constant flow of goods. Eventually in 1853, late to the game, America decided that it was necessary to force competition in the Asian markets so that America's increasing demand for Asian goods would not be dominated by the British or the rest of Europe and sent an expedition to Japan. With the arrival of Commodore Perry in Edo bay, a fundamental shift in Japanese ideology took place and rapid political changes hit Japan and eventually Asia through Japan's actions.

Troubled by the inability to rebuff foreign pressures, Japan took a surprising Western route and industrialized at a ferocious rate while espousing borrowed Western ideas of "modern" militarism and imperialism. Coinciding with Japan's industrialization, so too hit the rapid change in the global market, the discovery of the industrial uses and refinement of oil. These two occurrences mark the beginning of the prolonged conflict over energy resources in Asia that have continued to this day.

China at that time also went through an industrializing process, but enjoyed less dramatic results than Japan. Because China was not urbanized to the level of Japan but contained many as of yet untapped resources, the stage was set for resource poor Imperial Japan to pursue its borrowed colonial philosophy attempt to establish control in mainland China to fuel Japan's continued industrialization. This, and other attempts to colonize Asian nations, sparked a series of conflicts in East Asia that culminated in the Pacific front of World War II,

where Japan attempted to seize American and British interests in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore to control the textile and petroleum products produced and traded in there.

Following WWII, security in East Asia changed dramatically from the paradigm seen before. Because Japan was defeated at sea and then bombed with nuclear weapons not only once, but twice, it surrendered completely to SCAP (Supreme Command of Allied Commanders) occupation. SCAP occupation ultimately resulted in a fundamentally altered Japanese perception of government, warfare, and international norms, the highlight of which is the Japanese constitution forbidding any form of aggressive warfare - a radical shift from the previous policy. In conjunction with the occupation of Japan, the United States' military presence lingered as the only significant Western power in the region outside of Russia. Also during this time, China emerged from the world war as a communist state and set about recovering from the war and joining the industrialized global marketplace. This set the stage for the current tug-of-war over resources, needed more than ever before, where "soft power" techniques are favored over the pre-war military and colonial based foreign policies espoused by both the players in Asia and the West.

For the next two decades colonialism receded in Asia, being replaced by an American military presence focused more on ideological concerns than colonial resource control, as well as a tempered resurgence of influence of Japan and the immergence of China. Following the Korean War and the Vietnam War, American presence reached a higher level than ever before to combat communist advancements in Asia, a concern fueled by the Cold War. Meanwhile, China underwent a monumental growth of population and development of industrial and military capabilities under the umbrella of the Soviet Union. Japan's resurgence however took the form of economic affluence instead of a military presence because of their newfound aversion to warfare and militaristic solutions to security issues.

In 1967, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines to foster economic cooperation in the region and to champion South East Asian issues to the UN and the world. In the years that immediately follow, it expanded upon its original economic charter and made advances in promoting both political cooperation and security cooperation, while focusing on the association's underlying purpose of regional security in the face of the Cold War and communist insurgency (Chee 1986, p. 111, Narine 2002 p. 67). Chan Heng Chee states that, "the creation of ASEAN was equally a response to external stimuli. With the departure of the colonial powers from Southeast Asia, increased fears of a dominant China and an increased sense of vulnerability to communist subversion served as the impetus" (1986, p. 113). During the formation of ASEAN, that aided each nation's unique interests with a variety of security, geopolitical, and economic issues, ASEAN succeeded because it focused publically on the economic aspect of subregional cooperation, instead of the more divisive issues of security,

thus illustrating the importance and potential of soft power in the region. Chee further notes that "economic cooperation was also inspired by the prevailing view of the day- that economic cooperation [...] was an essential precondition for durable political and cultural cooperation" (p. 114), reflecting the common sentiment regarding peace in East Asia following one of the most bloody and discordant eras of Asian history.

During the 1970s, economic and political instability caused Japan's growth to falter due to uncertainty surrounding the "Nixon Shocks" and the oil crisis of 1973. Whereas Japan's economic strategy had been founded upon "four cornerstones" of access to cheap raw materials, secure currency exchange rates, access to foreign markets, and high global demand[33] until this point, the increased cost of oil, at a time when Japan imported more than 80% of oil from the Middle East[34], crippled Japanese growth and caused economic panic on the island. During the same timeframe, China and the United States normalized economic relations, vastly improving China's position in Asia economically and geopolitically. While Japan searched around for a way to react to the new situation of the global and regional market, China under Deng Xiaoping began to enact the "four modernizations" in 1978 in the areas of agriculture, industry, technology, and defense to make China into a great power by the 21st century, adopting simultaneous soft power and hard power tactics to ensure its security.

However, Japan found its way forward in the region in the "Fukuda Doctrine" announced in Manila, named after the Japanese Prime Minister of the same name.[35] This doctrine contained three major points. The first was that Japan would not seek to become a military power, the second that "Japan will seek 'a heart-to-heart' understanding' with the ASEAN nations", and thirdly that Japan would give importance to the ASEAN nations of the time, yet simultaneously seeking cooperative dealings with the Indochina region.[36] Nishihara notes that there was awareness not only in Japan, but also across Asia, of a new "comprehensive approach to national security, recognizing that security depended not just on military security, but also on economic and energy security."[37] By presenting peace and diplomacy as a guarantee, not just a temporary trend, Japan hoped to gain some trust with nations that had previously feared the island nation during the Second World War, as well as change the fundamental norm of relations in the region towards cooperative methods.

In 1980, Japan's Foreign Minister Okita Saburo stated that "we are moving into a new phase of heightening awareness of Japan in the international political context and increasing

[33] Gary Allinson, *Japan's Postwar History,* 126.
[34] Hisane Masaki, *Oil-Hungry Japan Looks to Other Sources,* Asia Times, 21 February 2007.
[35] Masashi Nishihara, "Japan: Regional Stability", *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region,* 65.
[36] Ibid, 81.
[37] Ibid, 73.

willingness to act in accordance with that awareness."[38] To back up the Fukuda Doctrine, Tokyo provided $350 million in assistance to Indochinese refugees, and approximately $1 billion for industrial development to ASEAN.[39] This represented a fundamental shift towards proactive methods in Japanese foreign policy in the region from prior passive relations that defined the era immediately following WWII. The Fukuda Doctrine has laid the basis for the relationship between ASEAN and Japan ever since, as well as the beginnings of Japanese soft power in the region.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation in East Asia was shaped by a rapidly growing China, an economic powerhouse in Japan, and a heavily involved United States. In 1995, Chinese growth and consumption peaked past its level of hydrocarbon production and the nation became a net importer of petroleum instead of a net exporter to feed its seemingly unstoppable growth. Japan suffered economic downturns in response to political and social turmoil, but remained a significant economic consumer.

During this time, and forward to the present, both nations maintained modern developed armed forces, albeit with very different ideologies backing them. The flexibility of Japan's Self Defense Forces at the time were, and are to this day, restricted by Article 9 of the postwar Japanese constitution, while China's military maintained growth despite the end of the Cold War. While Japan maintains a close security relationship with the United States who both enjoy military technological superiority over China, especially on the seas, to assist where Japan cannot project power, China's actions are ultimately more autonomous and Beijing has the freedom to pursue its interests in whatever fashion it deems best, regardless of domestic concerns. This restriction upon Japan's course of action is the primary reason why the Fukuda Doctrine's soft power effects with Japan's neighbors is so crucial to successfully achieving foreign policy objectives such as ensuring resource flow for the small island nation. However, because Beijing faces no such constraints, the costs associated with more aggressive strategies for ensuring resource streams are lower, and there are far fewer assurances that the Chinese foreign policy will necessarily remain aligned with international norms of peace and cooperation.

The modern situation in East Asia has now transitioned out of the Cold War ideological conflict and back into primarily concerns of resource flows, especially of hydrocarbons. With China's level of urbanization and industrialization greater than ever before, the state is desperately in need of additional energy resources. Over 53 percent of China's oil is now imported, and consumption is expected to rise to near 60 percent by 2015.[40] In response to

[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid, 81.
[40] Walter Pincus, *Pentagon Report Plays Down Chinese Military Threat*, Washington Post, March 2008.

the increased demand that they face, Beijing is looking out in all directions in an attempt to diversify its supply of petroleum and natural gas, exploring sources in Africa[41], Central Asia[42], Russia[43], and South East Asia.[44][45]

In Southeast Asia, the South China Sea borders many nations that all claim various parts of the sea as their Exclusive Economic Zones, or EEZ, which extend 200 nautical miles from sovereign soil. The root cause of the problem in the area is two-fold. First, the claims by the various bordering nations overlap and the disputes have not yet been resolved even to this day. Parts of the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea are disputed by the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia. The nations lay claim to the islands because it would increase their sovereign territory under international law, and allow them a greater exclusive access to the resources in and under the sea through an expanded EEZ. The second part of the problem is that the resources under the water, the oil and gas, often run between economic borders and nations are often using up the same source of oil, despite respecting the borders of the Exclusive Economic Zones.[46]

To date, there have been numerous armed conflicts over the area. The Energy Information Agency reports 13 conflicts, 9 involving China, in the years 1988-99.[47] More recently, in July of 2007, China clashed with Vietnamese fishing boats killing one and injuring more, a time when oil was priced near $100 a barrel, raising concerns that cooperation is being strained by the economic times.[48] David Koh said that "both sides probably now realize that sovereignty feeds no mouths and saves no souls."[49] Others note with concern that "China has expressed its desire to recapture the Malampaya and Camago natural gas fields from the Phiippines, among other islands that offer strategic importance and/or natural resources to quench China's thirst for energy."[50]

Last month, March of 2009, there was an incident between China and the United States where Chinese ships forced the American naval ship, the Impeccable, to leave an area just south of Hainan, where they were reportedly engaging in "illegal activities in Chinese waters."[51] While the United States admitted that the vessel was tasked with intelligence activities, Washington was angered by the interference in what it considers to be a legitimate

[41] Robert Rotberg ed., *China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*.
[42] Mengdi Gu, *China wants more pipelines for improved oil import security*, Oil & Gas Journal, January 2005.
[43] BBC News, *Russia signs gas deal with China,* March 2006.
[44] Eric Ng, *China Oilfield in deepwater push*, South China Morning Post, April 2008.
[45] Barry Wain, *All at Sea Over Resources in East Asia,* Korea Times, August 2007.
[46] Michael Klare, *Resource Wars,* 109.
[47] Michael Klare, *Resource Wars*, 124.
[48] Roger Milton, *Vietnam, China Clash Again over Spratlys*, The Straits Times, July 2007.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Malou Innocent, *Outlook on China: Peaceful Partner or Warmonger?,* Christian Science Monitor, February 2009.
[51] BBC News, *Russian army newspaper views possibility of US-China strategic partnership,* March 2009.

activity in international waters.[52] This conflict raises fears of military posturing between the two states, or worse, if shots were ever fired between a Chinese and American vessel.

Put into context, the South China Sea borders the Straits of Malacca, a trade route vital to both Chinese and Japanese interests. Most all of China and Japan's oil imports currently come through the straits of Malacca. 80 percent of China's imports flow through the straits, concerning Beijing that the United States could easily take punitive action against in the event of a future disagreement between the nations and control China's energy supply through superior naval forces.[53] Control of this trade route is vital to the control of East Asian energy supply.

ENERGY PROFILES

Chinese consumption of oil has vastly outstripped its production in the past decade. In 1998, the nation consumed 4,106 thousand barrels a day and produced 3,302 thousand barrels a day. In 2008, consumption grew to 7,954 thousand bbl/d with a production of 3,973 thousand bbl/d, a consumption increase of 94 percent in 10 years, with only a 20 percent increase in production. While natural gas consumption has increased even quicker than oil consumption, from 724.7 Billion Cubic Feet (Bcf) in 2008 to 2,490 Bcf in 2007, a 244 percent increase, natural gas production has kept pace better than oil, rising from 821.6 Bcf in 1998 to 2,446.2 Bcf, a 198 percent increase just shy of demand. China's current oil reserves have been held at 16 billion bbl since 2007, a reduction from 24 bbl of reserves held in 1998. However, China's natural gas reserves have nearly doubled to from 1998's levels, leaving a reserve of 80 trillion cubic feet.[54]

With long term projections of Chinese energy needs placed to increase 91 percent by 2025[55], to meet the massive demand China is pursuing sources in sources in Africa[56], Central Asia[57], Russia[58], and South East Asia.[59][60] China's six largest oil partners are Angola, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Oman, and Yemen, respectively.[61]

Japanese consumption of oil on the other hand has never been matched by production, and the island is entirely reliant upon imports. In 1998, the nation consumed 5,515 thousand bbl/d and produced 104.4 thousand bbl/d. In 2008, consumption surprisingly shrank to

[52] Ibid.
[53] Mengdi Gu, *China wants more pipelines for improved oil import security*, Oil & Gas Journal, January 2005.
[54] Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Statistics*, 2009.
[55] Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Outlook 2009*.
[56] Robert Rotberg ed., *China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*.
[57] Mengdi Gu, *China wants more pipelines for improved oil import security*, Oil & Gas Journal, January 2005.
[58] BBC News, *Russia signs gas deal with China,* March 2006.
[59] Eric Ng, *China Oilfield in deepwater push*, South China Morning Post, April 2008.
[60] Barry Wain, *All at Sea Over Resources in East Asia,* Korea Times, August 2007.
[61] Energy Information Administration, *China Country Analysis*, 2006.

4,712 thousand bbl/d while production rose nominally to 132.8 thousand bbl/d, leaving a gap of 4,609.4 thousand bbl/d that must be imported. For Japan, compared to China's 198 percent increase, production of natural gas dropped 33 percent between 1998 and 2007, from 197.9 Bcf to 131.7 Bcf, while consumption rose 32 percent from 2,675 Bcf to 3,542 Bcf. Japan's oil reserves are nominal at best, with approximately 44 million bbl since 2007, less than half a percent of China's reserves. Japan's natural gas reserves have nearly halved from 2000's levels, leaving a reserve of 0.73 trillion cubic feet, slightly less than 1% of China's proven reserve. However, while China is dramatically outpacing Japan in production and consumption of energy, it is indicative of China's future demand to note that Japan consumes more than three times as much energy per capita than China; 178.8 Million Btu and 56.17 Million Btu respectively.[62]

As for Asia as a whole, Klare notes that "energy consumption in East Asia's ten leading economic enters (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) grew by a rate of 5.5 percent per year - approximately ten times the rate of the rest of the world", and Asia is expected to use 34 percent of the world's energy by 2020, as opposed to 24 percent in North America.[63]

Interpretation

James Morley summarizes the security situation in East Asia stating that:

> All states in this vast Asia Pacific region are drawn not only into various local and subregional theaters, but also into a single Asia-Pacific-wide regional theater, in which the security of each state is vitally affected by the balance among all. ... Although the security map of the Asia Pacific region may seem more complex than that of most other regions of the world ..., what distinguishes the Asia Pacific region in this regard is the multiplicity of its theaters and the diversity of emphasis given them by participating states.[64]

Because the concept of balance of power evolved from the actions of European nations, some argue that the term is not applicable to Asian security, but this is far from the case. Morley states that despite that argument, "differences in geography, history, and culture have not made the states in the Asia Pacific region immune to its [balance of power's] imperatives. Its explanatory power is as great there as anywhere else."[65] Kang argues against the idea that

[62] Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Statistics*, 2009.
[63] Michael Klare, *Resource Wars,* 110.
[64] James Morley, *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region,* 13.
[65] James Morley, *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region,* 7.

long term stability will arise from balance of power forces between the existing regional great powers in Asia because there is instead a historic orientation towards hierarchic relations instead of balanced relations.[66]

In Kang's argument, East Asian states are more likely to prefer alignment strategies in the case of Chinese growing preeminence because it creates regional stability under a single regional leader.[67] While that may be reflected in the pre-colonial era, its applicability is doubtful in the modern era where East Asian nations have been content with power decentralization throughout the post-WWII era. Also even if Kang's argument were applicable in the modern era, the idea that certain East Asian powers might prefer an external hegemon, such as the United States, instead assuming preference would go to a neighboring power is not addressed. When viewed in terms of global trade and energy supply, Kang's argument seems even weaker, because China is not necessarily the strongest candidate to ensure peace and the continued flow of energy to Japanese, Korean, or ASEAN shores.

Energy in the modern globalized context is raw political, economic, and military power refined down to a simple and versatile form. Steady access to hydrocarbons greases the gears of industry and provides for a robust economy. However, it also plays a significant role in projecting military or "hard" power. In order to influence regions beyond your borders, especially in East Asia, naval and air supremacy is required, and both are extremely expensive. Both forms of combat require large amounts of fuel, and access and control of areas with the infrastructure capable to supply the refined product. The only power in the region that has full access to the resources and refueling spots necessary to project power to the entirety of East Asia is the United States. Beijing is attempting to develop that capacity currently, but Japan does not show any interest in using resources for anything but domestic consumption and benign leveraging of soft power abroad.

Soft power in the politics of energy is of crucial importance because by using soft power to influence neighbors, who are potential sources or even competitors for energy supplies, nations avoid costly military expenditures and promote trade boosting economic growth in both states. By exporting a state's most innate resources, its culture and core values, to other states it becomes much easier for those states to empathize with the policies and understand the institutions of the first nation. That is extremely valuable to any nation wishing to import significant amounts of hydrocarbons because it provides a more secure haven for the large investments that will be required to develop the supply of oil or gas. However, soft power is limited and cannot ensure complete national security or guarantee that energy will always

[66] David Kang, *China Rising*, 66.
[67] Ibid.

flow, especially if there is doubt in the international community about the true intentions of the state using soft power. During times of duress, such as demand rising far beyond a nation's capacity to acquire hydrocarbon sources or stressors on the global economy which drive the price of hydrocarbons higher, some states may feel the need to circumvent the cooperative "soft power" method and secure resources through force.

Asking if a nation is a status quo power or a revisionist power is pivotal to understanding the future of balance of power in East Asia. The current balance in East Asia is presently defined by a large urbanized industrial China, an economically affluent Japan, a growing ASEAN, and a militarily dominant and resource rich United States. Arranged as such, Asia's balance is simply arranged into a system constituted of a single global power, the United States, that can act equally across the whole system, and has unassailable resources at its disposal, and three regional poles of power, China, Japan, and ASEAN, each with individual strengths and resources. China is poised to move beyond the status of regional power in the immediate future should it not get bogged down in a regional conflict with ASEAN or Japan, should it wish to advance towards the international core and out of the semi-periphery.

So which nations are status quo powers, and which are revisionist? If American alignment is the current situation, then Japan is the most "status quo" of the three Asian regional powers. Heavily aligned with the United States, Japan has a vested interest in keeping American forces close because of its own limitations on military force and foreign actions. The American security umbrella currently protects Japan from North Korea and other foreign threats. Japan has proven its value and devotion to the United States by assisting economically and with peacekeeping troops in the Iraq war. [68] Furthermore, Japan has an ideological problem with "revisionism", because of the close association between revisionist policies and imperial intentions, which Tokyo and the Japanese people have been avoiding with fervor from the postwar period onwards.

The foreign policies of China and ASEAN however pose a larger challenge. While ASEAN is assuredly not distinctly revisionist in nature, it is not as attached to the status quo of American hegemony. Kang says that the Southeast Asian nations are improving Chinese relations, while detangling from American relations, seeking to balance the two so that they can "benefit from rising Chinese economic power but also continue to maintain good relations with the United States."[69] Ultimately, because ASEAN is an institution designed to govern regional stability and promote economic development and trade, not to balance militarily against an outside foe, the South East Asian nations will try to draw the line down the middle. With the advent of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, the two economies are moving together to cooperate on resources and industrialization. John Wong notes that

[68] Yasuo Takao, *Is Japan Really Remilitarizing? The Politics of Norm Formation and Change*. 3-5.
[69] David Kang, *China Rising,* 126.

because of the China-ASEAN FTA, "some Chinese enterprises like the oil and chemical firm Sinopec are actively exploring overseas opportunities and investing in resource-rich states like Indonesia and Malaysia", which has direct impacts on both ASEAN alignments and it further diversifies China's energy supply routes.[70]

This does affect the balance of Asia, because it provides greater assured access of ASEAN based oil to China. While it by no means closes out the United States, it does bolster the position of its primary geopolitical adversary in the region, putting the United States on track for a decline of influence and control of resources in the region which theoretically could eventually marginalize American power in the region. Contrary to what many in the West might think, the citizens of East Asian nations are not concerned with the rise of China, but instead view it in a positive light, indicating how important "soft power" forces such as economics can be.[71]

Despite China's increased technological and political advances, debate still lingers as to the path that Beijing's policies are leading China. The first argument is that China is a revisionist state seeking to overthrow the regional status quo and impose a new system that favors Beijing's interests in the region and assures supply of energy to feed domestic urbanization. This unfortunately is the most common perception among many in the West and even Washington itself and is potentially harmful due to its self-fulfilling nature. If one state begins balancing, the other must necessarily respond, fueling the classical "security dilemma" wherein both states ends up less secure than when they began posturing.

The assumption among theorists is that states naturally wish to develop spheres of influence specifically to dominate and oppose the interests and influence of other states, and therefore balancing would logically derive from a "rising power" status. Zhao notes that while China is rising in influence, potentially even to the level of superpower status, there is not a "one up and one down" affect, and while the United States may lose elements of its current total dominance, America's influence will not be replaced by China in any foreseeable future.[72]

The second theory revolving Beijing's foreign policy is that the nation is merely a bourgeoning economic power that favors economic cooperation both regionally and globally so that it can meet its growing domestic demands. This assumes instead that China is sufficiently tied into the international system as a whole, and has more to lose than to gain from challenging the world order. While Beijing may watch the United States with a wary eye, ultimately it is only out of caution instead of any hegemonic ambition. Status quo Beijing would pursue a course contingent upon the status quo of the international system, relying more upon international norms, economic interdependence, and being a bilateral partner

[70] John Wong and Sarah Chan, *China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement*, Asian Survey, 526.
[71] David Kang, *China Rising,* 67.
[72] Quansheng Zhao, *Managed Great Power Relations: Do We See 'One-Up and One-Down'?,* 634

within global cooperative endeavors in order to protect its assets and increase its supply of oil. Given China's unique position to use soft power to attract support from the East Asian states as well as build economic interests in Africa and Central Asia, Beijing would be acting rationally to not engage itself in military acts which could harm its precarious international image.

I find Johnson's argument that China is a status quo power only while it benefits from that status and could change to military posturing if it feels threatened or pressured by the international community to be preferable to a strict status quo or revisionist view of China. Johnson says that "status quo states, particularly those caught in security dilemmas, can be quite willing to use military force to defend their territory, their spheres of influence, and their client states."[73] With this perspective in mind, China is merely balancing costs and benefits and will pursue whichever course of action provides for its needs most adequately.
There are similarly diverging views on the route that Tokyo will follow to deal with the changing situation in Asia, despite American affluence. Of all of the nations dealing with China on economic and security fronts, Japan poses the most perplexing case to classical realists. Japan currently boasts one of the most robust economies in the world, pervasive technology advances unparalleled even by many Western nations, and the nation is distinctly aligned with the United States on the issue of security. However, the nation has never fully remilitarized in the wake of WWII except for a "Self Defense Force", which is constitutionally limited against preemptive attacks and nuclear weapons, despite China's rising affluence in the region. This limitation precludes Japan from ever projecting power into the East Asian theater outside of Japanese territorial waters, meaning that the nation cannot actively balance against China or seek a hegemonic role in the region to establish a flow of resources without the assistance of the United States. Furthermore, despite material capacity for a technologically advanced and regionally influential military, Japan continues to show no interest in revisiting the constitutional limitation on martial forces.

Some argue that Japan is on its way back to being a "normal nation" with a normal army and an ambitious foreign policy typical of a great power. This view comes from either the idea that nations always attempt to maximize their power or that nations maximize to the level of perceived threat. Both of these theories fail to see the fallacies inherent in applying them to the current Japanese state. The first is empirically false, because in modernity nations minimize the proliferation of force when it is not necessary. While the latter, falling more into the guise of structural realism, has more redeeming qualities, it cannot naturally assume that Japan deems China a threat. In fact, Japanese citizens consistently rank North Korea as more

[73] Alastair Johnson, "Is China a Status Quo Power?", *International Security*, 56.

dangerous to Japanese interests than the rise of an affluent China.[74] For that very reason, Taewoo Kim makes note that both are wrong because "Japan's foreign policy choices are determined not by international variables but by domestic normative context."[75]

SOUTH CHINA SEA

The South China Sea, disputed by several ASEAN states and China, located on the Asian side of the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's largest trade routes, is a potential flashpoint for Chinese military expansionism. While Beijing may have mastered speech of diplomacy and cooperation, the South China Sea reveals the true intentions of the nation. Because China's security policies are not transparent in the least, the nation's credibility depends on if their stated policies actually line up to the events over the past decade.

The conflicts in the South China Sea began exclusively as conflicts with Vietnam, but eventually with the Mischief Island events, it became obvious that the nation was being duplicitous in its dealings in the South China Sea. In 2007 alone, China had two violent conflicts over the region of the Spratly Islands[76], warned BP and ConocoPhillips over a $2 billion dollar project with PetroVietnam in the region[77], and became embroiled in an argument with Vietnam over construction in the area meant ostensibly to house Chinese tourism in the Paracel Islands despite the project going online in a disputed territory.[78] Despite the fact that China has indicated a desire for increased cooperation in the disputed zones[79], the middle kingdom has been evasive of real solutions such as deescalating the arms race in the region.

China skirmished with more than just Vietnam and other competitors for resources in South East Asia however. Highlighting the delicacy of military cooperation in the pacific, in March of 2009, there was a confrontation between Chinese and American naval vessels where the Chinese ships forced the American vessel to vacate the area, accusing the ship of engaging in "illegal activities in Chinese waters."[80] China's military intentions in the South China Sea appear suspicious at best.

Even China's own whitepaper on defense states that "security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting",[81][82] placing

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[74] Daniel Kliman, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan,* 55.
[75] Taewoo Kim, "Japanese Ambitions, U.S. Constraints, and South Korea's Nuclear Future", *Japan's Nuclear Future: the Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security,* 89.
[76] Robert Milton, *Vietnam, China clash again over Spratlys*, The Straits Times, July 2007.
[77] The Canberra Times, *Territorial conflicts ignite as demand for fuel grows*, August 2008.
[78] Roger Milton, *Vietnam Blasts China's plans for Paracels*, The Straits Times, August 2007.
[79] The Canberra Times, *Territorial conflicts ignite as demand for fuel grows*, August 2008.
[80] BBC News, *Russian army newspaper views possibility of US-China strategic partnership,* March 2009.
[81] BBC News, *Chinese agency carries "full text" of 2006 defence white paper*, December 2006.
[82] Walter Pincus, *Pentagon Report Plays Down Chinese Military Threat*, Washington Post, March 2008.

stress on the precarious situation in the disputed, resource heavy, shipping lanes of the South China Sea. China reported an increase of 18 percent in the official military budget for 2007, creating calls for transparency in Beijing's security policies.[83] Simultaneously, in what appears to be a move to challenge American hegemony on the waves, China is spending vast quantities of money building a blue water navy, in what the China Post admits could be a shift in strategy towards projecting power "deep into the Pacific", but more importantly to protect sources of overseas oil, by deploying to the South China Sea, Malacca Strait, and Indian ocean to protect the flow of oil from Middle Eastern and African sources such as Gwadar.[84]

While Beijing may wish to market Chinese involvement in South East Asia as economics, leverage over the flow of resources is closer to the truth shown by Chinese actions. Because Beijing is concerned about both securing a steady stream of hydrocarbons to meet future demand, but also to ensure the supply against international obstructions such as periods of high energy costs and interference from powers like the United States, China wants to create a position in the South China Sea to not only increase supply from a few ASEAN and China sponsored South China Sea sources, but to dominate the flow of hydrocarbons from other regions throughout East Asia in the future.

China is attempting to keep its options open instead of dedicating itself to either hard or soft power entirely, but the conflict in this disputed area shows that at least part of Beijing's power structure advocates more proactive methods with its more vulnerable neighbors. If China does manage to match American and Japanese technological prowess on the seas, it is possible that the same actions evident in the South China Sea could threaten East Asian stability as a whole in the event of an incident between Chinese and American or Japanese forces in either the South China Sea or the East China Sea which houses an underwater natural gas field which runs across disputed EEZ lines.

CONCLUSION

Because of China's mounting hydrocarbon demand and Japan's dependence upon overseas sources, South East Asia plays a pivotal role in the strategies of both nations. Because Japan's security ideology is controlled by unique domestic norms that dictate pacifism, Japan does not attempt to project power over the region to ensure its supply of energy, despite the significant gap between domestic production and consumption. Tokyo instead relies upon the security umbrella of the United States to keep the status quo, allowing Tokyo to cooperate freely with energy supplying nations as its primary strategy to maintain energy flows.

[83] The Boston Globe, *The Real China Threat*, March 2007.
[84] China Post, *Pacific Power Play China's Naval Growth*, March 2007.

While China may or may not be a "status quo" power, their actions indicate that they are making every preparation required to challenge US power and control one of the most significant trade routes in the world. The maritime disputes in the South China Sea are centered on control of the flow of trade and the production of energy resources and signify the two discordant strategies being enacted by Beijing, with talks of alignment and mutually beneficial cooperation on one side, and forceful military tactics on the other. If Beijing wishes its soft power policies to succeed in the long run with the ASEAN nations, it will have to be careful of how its actions on the seas are perceived abroad. Even if hydrocarbon costs skyrocket, China will have to be aware that any seemingly small actions to ensure energy supply could permanently damage the image built through soft power policies. Additionally, they will have to be wary of the United States' view of their actions, or else competition over resource streams could become a full-fledged security dilemma polarizing the entire region.

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BOOK REVIEW

Misra Amalendu,

Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention and Resolution,



Routledge, London and New York, 2008.

Nina Wilén

Researcher in Political Science
Université Libre de Bruxelles,

E-mail: Nina.Wilen@ulb.ac.be

Amalendu Misra has written one of few single-volume works about the different aspects of civil wars. The book covers the different phases of civil wars, by following the 'cycle' of conflict, starting with causes, then conduct and finally the end of the wars. While the first part examines the start and the conduct of civil wars, the second part gives room for the analysis of intervention and conflict resolution. The list of contents follows the structure of the author's own approach to how civil wars should be treated; "capable of going through the cycle of development, decay and eventual demise" (p.1).

In his first chapter Misra guides the readers through the theories of civil wars, investigating the main actors, such as the state, the rebel and the individual, but also some of the causes,

including grievance and greed. Additional factors like identity, ethnicity and religion are thereafter added to the analysis after Misra had finally established that the causes of civil wars are limitless.

The author takes on an in-depth perspective on the aspect of nationalism in the second chapter, by claiming that the level of nationalism determines the level of violence and conflict in a given state. Nationalism is according to Misra's main argument; both able to unite and divide. It is also through this facet that he borders the issue of globalisation, emphasizing the radically different standpoints that might be taken in this regard from a nationalistic point of view.

In the chapter with the intriguing title; "Erotics of violence", an analysis of violence in civil wars is structured along themes such as logic, genocidal (genocide) and psychology of violence. It is also in this section that the author connects to the introduction, discussing the difference between new and old wars and making a rather bold statement that present-day civil wars lack both legitimacy and politics (p.59). Although Misra does defend this argument by some examples, the lack of an exhaustive analysis of the actual causes behind this change, which for the author seems so obvious, leaves the reader without a strong conviction. Though a plausible explanation leans towards a change in the mentality of the population, this aspect is never investigated.

The second part of the book examines the different features of intervention and conflict resolution. It is in these chapters that the author's own experience of working in conflict affected areas comes most to its right, as the empirical examples enriches the analyses with their clarity and pertinence. It is also in these parts that the author's own voice is heard through the many references and Misra's contribution to the study of civil wars becomes evident.

In the chapter discussing intervention the reader is led through the many obstacles and motivations behind the decision to intervene, touching upon the principle of sovereignty and the never-ending debate about selective interventions and self-interest. While highlighting many risks with intervention, in particular preventive intervention, the author adopts the standpoint that the risk of spill-over effect is one of the strongest arguments for intervention.

Misra goes on to portray the difficulties associated with rebuilding a nation or a state, or both, as he sees them as intrinsically linked; differing between the soft (nation building) and the hard (state institutions) aspects of state construction. He then compares two actors' records in state-building; the US and the UN and concludes that even though the US has had

two success stories in Germany and Japan, the conditions for state-building are no longer the same and the UN stands as the more successful of the two. A more inclusive examination of exactly where the UN has succeeded would have been suitable here for a more balanced comparison.

In his last chapters, the author depicts the difficulties with both reconciliation and resolution of civil wars. After having explored different strategies such as pardon, punishment and amnesia for reconciliation and resolution approaches, the general conclusion is that there is no such thing as one overarching answer to all civil wars; each conflict needs a tailor-made solution.

Overall, Amalendu Misra delivers an excellent introduction to the study of civil wars. It offers both a wide overview of the different aspects and phases of the conflicts as well as thorough analyses of certain well-chosen issues. In particular, the many different case studies make the work easy to read while also lifting the quality of the book above that of a typical textbook. The complexity of the work is however also one of its weaknesses. The broad perspective occasionally leads to the author's own contribution getting lost in the many references. Rather all-inclusive conclusions are also somewhat disappointing as few alternatives are rejected or clearly embraced.

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International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS)

Kardeljeva ploscad 1, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

Tel: +386 1 580 53 88; Fax: +386 1 580 53 78