

ADV

A DIFFERENT VIEW

An IAPSS Monthly Online Journal


Volume 6: Issue 36

October 2010

New Editorial Board 2010-2011

-Editor : **Gabriela MARZONETTO**

-Editor : **Vasilis KILIARIS**



© 2010 International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS). All rights reserved. *A Different View* (ADV) is published monthly or bi-monthly by the IAPSS, Kardeljeva Ploščad 1, 1000, Ljubljana, Slovenia. ADV is published online at the IAPSS website [www.iapss.org] and may be freely distributed as long as no charges to the publication are made. The articles written in this section do not necessarily reflect IAPSS opinion. The content is freely posted by our contributors which are responsible for their words. The views expressed by the authors published in the ADV may not reflect the views of the IAPSS, its Executive Committee or the Editorial Board of the ADV.

CONTENTS

Editorial

**Quality of democracy in Latin American
and Eastern European Countries 3**

Vasilis Kiliaris and Gabriela Marzonetto

Opinion Articles

Voting right and minimum age limit 6

Maria-Iliana Pravita

Academic Articles

The Nation State, Migration and Liberty 10

Ines Katic-Vrdoljak

Democratization of the Western Balkans through EU Integration 16

Nemanja, Grgic

**Neo-liberalism, consequences on the prospect of democratization
in Latin America 28**

Alexandra Dobra

Call for Articles Guidelines 37

EDITORIAL

The IAPSS Online Journal "A Different View" new editor's team has the honor to welcome you to the first issue for this academic calendar year 2010-2011.

The topic of the ADV October Issue is:

Quality of democracy in Latin American and Eastern European Countries.

Regarding the achievement or not of the aforementioned democratic quality diagnose and indices for the countries in these regions, the editors of the ADV concluded that novel ideas such as the enlargement of the body politic and having the power of individual states reduced and more of their sovereignty surrendered, indeed reveal the different elements inherent in the construction of quality democracies. Furthermore, the analyses of the Eastern Balkans quest towards full democratization and their capabilities to join the EU, how neoliberalism in its economic and political forms has made citizenship from LA countries depoliticized, and how the democratic institutions were dismantled, successfully allows to the ADV readers to compare the achievements in the development of modern democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, in a world of constants changes.

Maria-Iliana Pravita in her opinion article examines the potential outcome on Democracy of the enlargement of the body politic by a further reducing of the age limit in political participation and voting. Examples are given and the political maturity of the youth is supported, e.g. by refreshing the body politic and being an institutional mechanism for violence prevention among younger people.

(Pravita, M.I., Voting right and age limit, 2010)

Ines Katic-Vrdoljak examines the balance between the sovereignty of the nation-state and the human liberty in the framework of the contemporary contentious issue of migration. Contemporary concepts such as the globalization, capitalism and neoliberalism along with case studies concerning the refugees in Palestine and in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on data abstracted by International Organizations are Ines arguments to defend her very interesting conclusion that

[W]hile it may be utopian to expect the world to move any time soon beyond the nation-state as the universal principle of political organisation towards a Kantian ideal of the world government that could supposedly eliminate some of the problems, world federalist forces may, if not abolish the system, at least help empower the existing supranational institutions and organizations, notably the United Nations (however with appropriate reforms), thus having the power of individual states reduced and more of their sovereignty surrendered. It is only then that we can possibly find ourselves on the path to a more just world, where individual liberty can be a reality and not just a notion.

(Vrdoljak, I.K., *The Nation State, Migration and Liberty*, 2010)

Democratization of the Western Balkans through EU Integration by Nemanja Grgic is an article about the challenges and issues in the process of democratization in countries like Kosovo or Serbia nowadays. These countries are working constantly hard in order to fulfill democratic standards, however their work is complicated and it can take a lot of time. In the last two decades Western Balkan countries have suffered political and economic reforms, that make it difficult to achieve the full democracy that they need in order to join the European Union. Nemanja focuses his attention on problems including issues of sovereignty, law enforcement and justice (areas in the “Justice and Home Affairs” portfolio of the EU institutions), as well as addressing past conflicts and human rights abuses (transitional justice). He also considers those are the main obstacles in the process of democratization of the countries in the region, and their eventual accession to the European Union. The main contribution of the article is to identify the key issues of the Balkan countries in order to figure out the true motives of the weak democracy in Eastern Europe and, on the other hand, the author gives us the possibility to focus our effort in the quest for Eastern Balkan countries full democratization and capabilities to join the EU.

(Grgic, N., *Democratization of the Western Balkans through EU Integration*, 2010)

Neo-liberalism, consequences on the prospect of democratization in Latin America, by Alexandra Dobra, is concentrating on two case-studies, Brazil and Chile. The author's analysis is done on a double level: In a first part she considers the consequences of neo-liberalism on the first dimension of the infra-State level, and in a second part it moves to the analysis of the society. Alexandra begins the article with two sharp questions for understanding the neoliberalism consequences in LA: are neo-liberalism and democratization compatible? How did neo-liberalism influence democratization? In the article, the author realizes a review of the history of the two last decades in Latin American Countries, but she focuses her work in Brazil and Chile. Alexandra shows that the neoliberal solution for public debt and democracy crisis did not bring positives responses for LA. Even "the neoliberal solutions" have sunk LA countries in poverty, clientelism, corruption, foreign capital dependency, coalitions between parties and with military groups, weak of the parliament and the appearances of charismatic leaders (that are not always democratic). This article aims to demonstrate how neoliberalism in its economic and political forms has made citizenship from LA countries depoliticized, and how the democratic institutions were dismantled. (Dobra, A., Neo-liberalism, consequences on the prospect of democratization in Latin America, 2010)

For further reading and scientific research here are some thoughts:

The opportunity for the advancement of the quality of Democracy in Latin America and Eastern European countries has solid foundations, the EU Lisbon Reform Treaty. Through the new EU Diplomatic Service (European External Action Service) new potentials emerge to become an active multilateral instrument for the enhancement of democracy from the EU to the MERCOSUR member states. Moreover another essential instrument for more democracy is the possibility given in the treaty for 1 million citizens of the EU, from a significant number of member states, can take the initiative to put a specific subject on the EU-Commission's agenda.

Enjoy reading!

Voting right and minimum age limit

Maria-Iliana Pravita

On the 7th of November 2010 local government authority's elections are going to be held in Greece. According to the recent provisions concerning the reorganization of local government and decentralized administration, the age limit for getting elected a local councilor has been reduced from the twenty first to the eighteen year of age. This provision aims to encourage younger people to take a more active part in the political life of the local community. Nevertheless, there has not been adopted a respective reduction of the age limit for participating in the electoral procedure; that is, the minimum age for exercising the voting right in local as well as in national elections is the eighteen years of age.

In this framework there could be argued that the eventual enlargement of the body politic with people of younger age (at sixteen, for example) would form a measure of practical and symbolic significance for enhancing participation and involvement in the political process. Participation of younger people in politics may rejuvenate the political life and invest it with a new spirit. Younger people's dynamism and creativity as well as their forward thinking can exert a positive influence in politics at large, so that traditional and modern perspectives are combined in tackling social and political problems. Even more so thanks to the demographic changes and the size of the ageing population in most contemporary advanced societies – imbalance between younger and older generations in favor of the latter.

A related aspect of the problem has to do with the diminished concern of participation in elections both of younger and elder people. That has been observed in a number of countries. In that regard reducing the age limit of voting right may enhance the participation of younger people who would then be attracted and perhaps persuaded to get involved in politics instead of voicing their anger in more inordinate ways. As a result the legitimacy of the political regime is likely to be augmented.

Comparative analysis of respective trends and practices in various countries could provide data and experiences in the effort to improve the quality of democracy in our turbulent times. Thus it would be seen that reducing the age limit for the exercise of the voting right either in local or/and national elections presents an initiative that has already been considered and tested in a number of countries around the world.

According to available data the minimum age limit for participation in electoral procedures has been reduced from eighteen to sixteen years of age in various States in USA. As far as the European Union is concerned, this right has been recognized for the local elections in certain Länder in Germany. In Norway as well a number of counties will allow the participation of young voters at sixteen in the local elections of 2011, in acceptance of a relative proposal of the Ombudsman for Children. In Austria youngsters at sixteen took part for the first time in the national elections of 2008 with positive results. According to a respective research of the Austrian Institute of Social Research and Analysis, no significant trend of the electorate towards the extreme left or right wing was observed among the youngsters, whilst the great majority of them continued attending political matters even after the elections.

The likelihood of extending the voting right is on the agenda in an increasing number of states, including Great Britain, other Scandinavian countries, the Czech Republic, but also Australia, New Zealand and Canada. In that regard it is important that a proposal was tabled in May 2009 at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for reducing the age limit for the voting right from eighteen to sixteen in the member states of the Council.

As far as Greece is concerned, in spite of the fact that the minimum age for exercising the voting right continues to be the eighteen years of age, the constitutional provisions make reference to the universal application of the voting right, so that possible reduction of that is not only compatible with the spirit of the Constitution, but may also widen political participation.

Are the youngsters mature enough?

Young people of eighteen do already possess a basic knowledge about the function of the political system and are capable of reaching decisions regarding matters of public interest. Obligatory education gets completed by the age of sixteen and people may then engage in social and economic relations, crime and delinquency included. Recognizing the voting right to the younger part of the electorate, which will eventually assume the responsibility for the future, justifies their claim to express their opinion about the problems that concern them. The decisive criterion for inclusion in any democratic procedure is not whether the people of younger or elder age do already hold an expert opinion on all issues that emerge in the political agenda, but whether the majority of them are capable of receiving information and reaching sound judgment on them.

In the age of information and the knowledge society of our times it is more likely that younger people have much wider access to information than past generations.

A rather persuasive evidence to that regard forms the initiative for establishing the Parliament of Youth in Greece a few years ago. The maturity of deliberations in the above setting has impressed politicians and the public at large. Moreover, Youth Local Councils invite people to participate from the age of fifteen onwards and have indeed contributed to the improvement of the quality of the political life in local communes. What is also of particular significance, as already mentioned, is that the minimum age for getting elected a local councilor has been recently reduced.

Opening up participation

Enlarging the voting right forms a bold measure for refreshing the body politic and an evidence of the attention being paid to the opinion and the views of younger people in electing political leadership and reaching decisions on matters of political concern. Furthermore, it may also provide an institutional mechanism for violence prevention among younger people, who might be falsely lured to it, since they would then realize that their voice is being listened to and matters in the ordinary political process.

A short presentation of the author:

Maria-Iliana Pravita, 32, studied Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Athens (1996-2001). She followed graduate studies at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration (2001-2002) receiving a Master's Degree on "State and Public Policy". In 2008, she obtained her Doctoral Degree (Ph.D) from the University of Athens. She has written her Doctoral Thesis on the access of EU citizens to the public service and its restrictions. She currently teaches at a Technological Educational Institute. Her interests include public administration and public policy.

The Nation-State, Migration and Liberty

Ines Katic-Vrdoljak

In this time and age we are witnessing the movement of goods, services, capital, information, ideas and people on a global scale at an unprecedented pace. However, the latter is not always voluntary, but is instead often forced and as such can be seen as a product of (but also a threat to) the nation-states. The nation-state does not only cause but it also prevents human migration thus calling in question the very concept of human liberty. That is because the individual's liberty, rights and indeed identity are conditioned upon his citizenship that is confined to the nation-state. Globalisation, neoliberal capitalism and economic insecurity that this form of capitalism brings about only exacerbate the situation further.

The world is divided into nation-states envisaged ideally as homogenous cultural communities with a common language, history, beliefs, customs and norms, in other words culture, that provide their presumably equal citizens with a collective identity and protection in return for control over the territory that their citizens occupy and for monopoly over organised violence (Turton, 2002, p. 20). However, the notions of protection and equality (along with that of liberty) can be contested. While migration can result from natural disasters or demand for cheaper labour force, for the most part it is induced by the state itself whether through state-sanctioned development schemes and consequent internal resettlement of its population; as a result of inter-state or civil wars, political persecution by the regime, or simply of the state's poor policy and performance, thus preventing people from pursuing their interests and managing their lives as they wish by turning them into refugees, asylum seekers, hostages or even stateless people. It is ironic, though, that it is the very migration that changes the principle of sedentariness on which the nation-state rests, where the resulting diversity that increasingly makes modern states multinational actually challenges the idea of the nation-state as a culturally homogenous community.

Patterns of resettlement within a state due to development schemes such as building dams, highways, ports or expanding cities indicate that resettlers have no freedom to decide on matters concerning their livelihoods and often have little or no influence on decisions made by the state as a principal agency of development, especially as they often belong to ethnic or indigenous minorities living in poorer and marginal areas used for the construction of dams, electric power plants and industrialisation. According to evidence collected by the World Bank, there are a number of consequences common to almost any instance of forced resettlement: loss of land, employment and housing, economic and social marginalisation, food insecurity, higher incidence of disease and death, and dismantled social networks (Turton, 2002, p.52). The construction of the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River where it forms the natural border between Zambia and Zimbabwe that started in 1956 caused the resettlement of over 57,000 Gwembe Tonga people (twice the number originally estimated) that inhabited both banks of the middle Zambezi. While only very modest compensations in cash, food and poll tax exemption were provided for a while, most of the land in which they settled was of poor quality and ironically, most of resettled people had no electricity for over twenty years.. The morbidity and mortality rates significantly increased; with the social security nets destroyed, they found themselves in a double bind. So, on the one hand, the state pursues development programmes on behalf of and for its citizens, but on the other, only certain groups benefit. Obligated to protect its citizens' rights, the state often not only fails to do so for all its citizens, but moreover violates their rights by forcefully resettling them.

Refugees, also a product of and a threat to the international state system, are deprived of freedom of choice too. An example is the 1992-1995 armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), one of the six former federal Yugoslav republics, where differing aspirations regarding the future of the country between particular national (or rather nationalist) groups, namely Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks (Muslim), resulted in almost two million people fleeing their homes, with one half estimated to have fled to other countries (including the former Yugoslav republics) and the other half being internally displaced (Migration Citizenship Education website, <http://www.migrationeducation.org>). While almost half of the refugees had returned to their homes by the end of 2004, the rate of returns has been

declining steadily over the past eight years. As a result, there are still over a hundred thousand internally displaced: indeed, according to Human Rights Watch, as of June 2009 there were more than 117,451 Bosnians registered by UNHCR as such (<http://www.hrw.org>), and over half a million believed to have permanently settled in other countries, whether voluntarily or due to there being no homes and jobs to which to return (UNHCR website, www.unhcr.org). The Palestinians found themselves in an even worse position: after the British mandate in 1948 many of them found themselves outside what was then the other half of the Palestine Mandate and now Jordan (the only state to grant them its citizenship) thus remaining refugees to the third generation and becoming stateless aliens (Lewis, 1999, p.104-105). Therefore, it can be argued that refugees and stateless people are put in the position that they are in by the very nation-state system that characterises the current political world order and by the inherent institution of citizenship: fleeing from their own state might not be so distressful and painful were there a 'neutral' territory where emigrants could seek shelter and exercise their human rights. Instead, they can only go to another state and come to be subject to another set of laws and immigration policies.

While measures have indeed been taken to reconcile these contradictions and to manage refugee flows, such as the International Refugee Regime established as a set of laws to include the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; norms such as the right to claim asylum and the right of voluntary return; and structures in the form of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), it seems that, as Turton claims, these steps were not taken so much to protect refugees but to help the international nation-state system itself (2002, p. 28). Indeed, as the number of refugees rose over years to reach millions (8.4 mil by the end of 2005 and as high as 16 mil in June 2009 (UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org>)) the alarmed developed states had the Regime move over the years from a policy of asylum and resettlement to prevention and containment of refugee flows. The EU also sealed their borders through a range of conventions and treaties such as the 1990 Dublin Convention, the 1990 Schengen Convention, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, thus introducing restrictive asylum practices to control and contain flows of refugees on

the pretext of the governments being obliged to protect the interests of their own citizens.

However, the blame cannot be laid on Western countries only. It is also states with poor governance, democracy deficit, political instability, terrorism threat, poor economic performance and human rights abuse records that should be held responsible: by consequently becoming subject to stringent visa regimes they actually keep their own citizens as hostages. Especially trapped may feel those who do not even conform to the political values, ideas and policies of the government of the day: not only are most of them faced with difficulty to settle in another country freely (notably in developed countries due to the stringent immigration criteria) but they may have trouble obtaining visas even just to visit other countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is an ample example again. Widespread nationalism, differing political views of the composition and the authority of the Bosnian state hinder any political and therefore economic reforms. A corrupt society deeply divided along ethnic lines with democracy only claimed to exist, minority rights gravely violated on a daily basis, political instability, underdeveloped civil society and the absence of dissent only help the corrupt nationalist politicians to be certain of victory at every election. This, coupled with the faltering economy still dependant on foreign aid and the lack of foreign investments, prevents the country from meeting the conditions placed upon her by the international community for accession to NATO and the EU. As a result, BiH citizens spend hours in long queues waiting outside Western countries' embassies, and the very thought of moving to these countries borders with the impossible. Thus, affected are (and perhaps quite rightfully) not only those who repeatedly voted for the ruling elites, but also those who do not conform to their rule, whether because they do not identify with either of the ethnic groups or simply cherish different values and beliefs. They must feel as hostages of their country, unjustly trapped and undeservedly deprived of freedom of choice.

Untamed globalization and accompanying neoliberal capitalism with the market deregulation philosophy not only proved unsustainable but also make things worse: as the latest financial market's crisis showed, ever more people with relative job security were left unemployed and impoverished world-wide. In addition, as the 1999 United Nations Development Programme indicates, inequality between developed and developing countries has been rising steadily: the ratio of the income

of the 20% of the world's people in the richest countries to that of the poorest 20% rose from 30:1 in 1960 to 74:1 in 1977, with the trend continuing (Thompson, 2004, pp. 379-400). So, with or without visas, people from developing or transition countries may find it increasingly difficult to afford to travel and generally to pursue their lives and interests freely.

Finally, it can be argued that human liberty is curbed by the international system of nation-states as we know it. By their very existence, refugees and resettlers do highlight contradictions in the nature of the nation-state and challenge the political principle of the organisation of the world. Also, the International Refugee Regime may have become less state-centred, state borders less relevant and state sovereignty reduced (notably in the EU), and human rights advocacy organisations proliferated. However, nation-states as political entities - and more importantly as voluntary members of international and supranational institutions and organisations - still have much power. While it may be utopian to expect the world to move any time soon beyond the nation-state as the universal principle of political organisation towards a Kantian ideal of the world government that could supposedly eliminate some of the problems, world federalist forces may, if not abolish the system, at least help empower the existing supranational institutions and organisations, notably the United Nations (however with appropriate reforms), thus having the power of individual states reduced and more of their sovereignty surrendered. It is only then that we can possibly find ourselves on the path to a more just world, where individual liberty can be a reality and not just a notion.

A short presentation of the author:

Ines Katic-Vrdoljak, 45, holds a Bachelor of Science (Honours) in International Studies from The Open University, UK. Having obtained a Postgraduate Certificate in Conflict and Development from the same university, she is continuing her studies towards a Master of Science in Development Management. She currently works at NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Her interests include democracy, human rights, development, conflict resolution and security.

References:

Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009): *Events of 2009* [online] Available from <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87501> (Accessed 22 July 2010)

Lewis, B. (1999) *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, London, Phoenix in association with Orion Books Ltd

Migration Citizenship Education website (2006) *Forced Migration and Ethnic Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, [online] Available from <http://www.migrationeducation.org/20.0.html> (Accessed 23 July 2010)

Thompson G. (2004) 'Chapter 11: Global inequality, economic globalization and technological change' in Brown W., Bromley S., Athreye, S. (eds) *Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation*, London, Pluto Press and The Open University

Turton, D. (2002) 'Displacement in the nation-state model of political organization' in Robinson, J. (ed) *Development and Displacement*, Oxford, The Alden Group in association with The Open University

UNHCR, The Refugee Agency (2004) *Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomes over 1 million returnees* [online] Available from <http://www.unhcr.org/print/414fffba4.html> (Accessed 24 July 2010)

UNHCR, *2010 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Bosnia and Herzegovina* [online] Available from <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d766> (Accessed 20 July 2010)

UNHCR, The Refugee Agency (2009) *World Refugee Day: 42 million uprooted people waiting to go home* [online] Available from <http://www.unhcr.org/4a3b98706.html> (Accessed 20 July 2010)

UNHCR, The Refugee Agency (2010) *2009 Global Report* [online] <http://www.unhcr.org/4c08f2ee9.pdf> (Accessed 20 July 2010)

Democratization of the Western Balkans through EU Integration

Nemanja Grgic

This paper will discuss three major issues which are commonly seen as the key political problems of the Western Balkans countries in becoming fully-democratic societies. These problems include issues of sovereignty, law enforcement and justice (areas in the “Justice and Home Affairs” portfolio of the EU institutions), as well as addressing past conflicts and human rights abuses (transitional justice). These are considered to be the main obstacle in the process of democratization of the countries in the region, and their eventual accession to the European Union.

Introduction

This paper will discuss three major issues which are commonly seen as the key political problems of the Western Balkans countries in becoming fully-democratic societies. These problems include issues of sovereignty, law enforcement and justice (areas in the “Justice and Home Affairs” portfolio of the EU institutions), as well as addressing past conflicts and human rights abuses (transitional justice). These are considered to be the main obstacles in the process of democratization of the countries in the region, and their eventual accession to the European Union. The issues stated above are also specific for this region only. Thus, they require a different kind of involvement by the EU. The paper will analyze these matters using examples from the following Western Balkan countries: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia including Kosovo, and FYROM.

The paper will therefore discuss the widely assumed thesis that the integration of the region in the EU will lead to the full democratization of these societies, after they fulfill the criteria that are set for them by the EU. The paper will analyze the main political and legal reforms that the countries of the Western Balkans are conducting. The conclusions from this paper will attempt to answer the following questions: How does the EU influence democratization in the Western Balkans? How much more democratic these societies become? Are they, as a consequence, more globalized?

EU Integration and Globalization

After long and devastating conflicts, the region of Western Balkans has entered a period of relative stability. Most of the citizens of these countries seem to agree that the EU is the solution to their countries' problems, since large majorities of the public polled wish to see their country join the EU - 88% in Albania, 66% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 62% in FYROM, 67% in Montenegro, and 69% in Serbia including around 90% in Kosovo, according to the Balkan Gallup Report 2009¹. (2009 Summary of Findings, 2009) Rarely, if ever, has the region had such a clear vision of its future, and rarely was it ready to commit to so much change in order to achieve a certain political and economic gain. That is why it is very important to look into the process of EU integration and question to what extent is this process truly encouraging to the democratization of the societies of the Western Balkans, as well as how genuine and how durable is this change. It is widely believed that once these countries bring European standards in resolving sovereignty issues, criminal persecution, or facing the troubled past, they will become fully democratic societies. This presumes that the process of EU integration actually facilitates the solving of the aforementioned problems.

The countries of the Western Balkans are required to make a series of steps in terms of reforming their political and judicial systems (next to the already implied financial and market reforms). Many of the reforms are encompassed by the official accession criteria to the EU (the so-called Copenhagen criteria) devised in 1993 and 1995 ("Europa Glossary"), but also to another set of criteria which are specific to the region – for example, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These are defined through the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), by the decisions of the EU institutions from 1999 onwards, including the Zagreb and Thessaloniki Summits in 2000 and 2003 ("European Commission – Enlargement").

¹ The only exception to this optimism is Croatia, the wealthiest country of the region and the most advanced in the EU accession process. In the light of the recent political instability and cases of corruption in high political instances the public showed mistrust in all political institutions as well as the EU – only 39% supports accession.

The addition of new criteria reflects the changing international circumstances, the internal EU anxieties and balances, and the regional and country-specific contexts. Next to the Copenhagen principles and universal Western criteria, the EU adopted an additional cluster of criteria especially for the Western Balkans addressing the post-conflict regional challenges of reconstruction, stabilization and reform.

(Anastasakis, 2008, 367-8)

Through these criteria of accession the EU requires a country to have: “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union; and the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.” (“Europa Press Releases RAPID”)

It is important to bring in the concept of globalization in this context, and to note that the EU is usually considered to be the “success story” of this process, including the political aspects of globalization. The integration of the Western Balkans countries in the EU is also a clear example of conditionality towards political reform for the purpose of achieving certain economic benefits. All the countries are allowed to profit from the pre-accession EU funds, and they are promised even more economic assistance and general progress after becoming full members of the EU. Yet they are required to accept a set of reforms (noted in the previous paragraph) which goes well beyond the adoption of common market rules. This example supports the theoretical approach to the relationship between globalization and the promotion of democracy: the expansion of the economic markets is the force that drives political reform and enables greater political globalization. (Steger 34) This claim would probably best explain the policies and goals of the EU in the Western Balkans. Yet there are other scholars, most notably Richard Falk, who highlight the difference between the “popular-democratic globalization-from-below” and the “market-driven, corporate globalization-from-above”. (Steger, 2002, 35) Falk’s views are important because he emphasizes the role of international institutions and regimes, and thus questions “(...) the capacities of political actors to challenge the prevailing dominance of neo-liberal globalization (...)”. (Steger, 2002, 35) In the context of the Western

Balkans, Falk therefore rightfully questions the relationship of states and the supranational organizations, and asks “whether the state will function in the future mainly as an instrument useful for the promotion and protection of global trade and investment” or will it primarily keep in focus the well-being of its citizens. (Steger, 2002, 35)

Specific problems that only the countries in the region have in joining the EU (such as sovereignty issues, law enforcement, and transitional justice) need to be analyzed in order to assess the character and the degree of political globalization in the Western Balkans.

State Sovereignty

The issues of EU involvement, processes of democratization, and eventual globalization of the countries in the region regarding state sovereignty will be discussed through cases of Kosovo’s final status and the Ohrid Agreement addressing the ethnic division in FYR of Macedonia.

The unresolved status of Kosovo dramatically hurts the political stability of the region. The problems include not only the legal position of the new state in international relations, but also internal stability of Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the relations among countries in the Western Balkans. As Yannis states in the article “The Politics and Geopolitics of the Status of Kosovo: The Circle is Never Round”:

The real option is always between a new vicious circle or a virtuous one: between renewed stagnation and instability for Kosovo, Serbia, and the region, or moving forward to the European Union with eventual membership as the catalyst.

The involvement of the European Union in the Kosovo crisis can be traced back to the middle of the 1990s. The EU undertook diplomatic action but also committed its military power together with other NATO members to stop the ethnic conflict, find a solution that satisfies Albanian aspirations towards independence and respects the territorial sovereignty of Serbia, and at the same time promote integration of the region in the EU, and its full democratization. The activities of the EU institutions and diplomatic entities at times seemed to be vague and inconclusive. The most prominent example of this sort of uncertainty was the declaration of independence of Kosovo in

2008, when EU member states were unable to reach a common position on the matter.² (Cocozzelli, 2009, 192) The EU nevertheless remained actively involved by granting large amounts of economic assistance to Kosovo - €426.4 million were given in the period 2006-2010 according to the data of the EU Commission. (“European Commission Enlargement”) It has been present on the ground with the EULEX force, the EU civilian mission deployed under the Common Security and Defense Policy, whose main task is to assist the Kosovo authorities and institutions, specifically the police, judiciary, and customs.³

Despite the heavy presence of EU institutions on the ground and its diplomatic activity, Kosovo’s status remains to be a problem for the democratization of the region, and an obstacle for Serbia and Kosovo in their EU integration. The unconsolidated position of all EU member states regarding the final status, as well as the complicated structure of the Union’s institutions, make the whole process more difficult. Serbia used the unclear situation and employed “a series of stalling tactics that demonstrated the structural inability for Belgrade to move forward in a way that would prove acceptable to the international community.” (Cocozzelli, 2009, 206)

In the neighboring FYROM there has also been a conflict caused by ethnic divisions which threatened to split the country apart. After a brief but extremely intense conflict, and assertive EU diplomatic action, in August 2001 The Ohrid Agreement was signed with the purpose of reducing the inter-ethnic tensions and improving minority rights (most importantly for the Albanian minority).⁴ “The EU assumed a leading role in international diplomatic efforts to promote peace in Macedonia.” (Daskalovski, 2006, 107) The EU’s involvement did not include necessarily the commitment of troops and weapons, as an Albanian political leader noted at the time, but the commitment to start the political negotiations, keeping prospects of joining the EU open, and granting financial assistance:

² Independence has not been recognized by Greece, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus. (“EurActive Network”)

³ EULEX was established by the Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on February 8th 2008: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:042:0092:0098:EN:PDF>.

⁴ According to the official text of the agreement, retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp.

On 5 April, the Union granted Macedonia the most favored nation status, and days later the country became the first in Southeast Europe to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), though at the time it was assumed that the country was not ready for this step. The EU saw the agreement signing as a diplomatic gesture aimed at forcing the Macedonian political leaders to end hostilities and introduce political reforms.

(Daskalovski, 2006, 108)

Yet the Ohrid agreement did not completely solve the ethnic divisions in FYROM, nor did it remove some of the structural problems that this country, same as others in the region, have on their way to becoming a member of the European Union. In 2004, for a period of two weeks, hostilities outside of Skopje were renewed. The local elections in 2005 enabled many of the “local bosses”, also alleged to have ties with the criminal world, to come to power in their communities. “Western observers” had doubts about the capabilities of the local judiciary to put war crimes from 2001 on trial, but also that sending the accused to the ICTY would undermine peace established by the Ohrid agreement. (Pond, 2006, 183-6) Despite the efforts for equal ethnic representation “the judicial system [remained] unreformed and dysfunctional”, according to a report by the International Crisis Group, and it would be easily influenced by corruption and the executive branch of state power. “Macedonia is still an immature democracy, vulnerable to spoilers seeking to hijack or exploit an imperfect reform process.” (Pond, 2006, 186)

Law Enforcement

One of the other important structural problems in the region is the development of organized crime. In this section of the paper the issues of police response to organized crime as well as countries’ cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will be discussed, again through the perspective of EU involvement and EU’s democratization efforts.

Organized crime has been identified as the “major threat to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and social and economic progress in Europe” by the CARDS Regional Police Project (CARPO) in 2005, which is, according to Pond, the most comprehensive public report (sponsored by the EU Commission and the Council of Europe) on crime in the Balkans. (Pond, 2006, 251) According to this report, in

many countries in transition organized crime has been “constantly evolving”, and it has entered “most structures of public life, including law enforcement and criminal justice systems”. (European Commission and Council of Europe, 2005, 52) The CARPO report therefore states: “The EU accession prospects for the region are closely linked with countries’ efforts against organized crime and steady improvement of the rule of law, as it is mentioned in the EU Road Map and the Stabilization and Association Agreements.” (50) The EU’s response to this situation was to agree to the already existing requests by the local professionals in the countries of the Western Balkans, as Pond notes: they would get training and advising by the Europol, OSCE, and various other EU institutions. (253) Also, at the meeting of Balkan interior ministers in Croatia in 2005, there was another set of measures proposed to fight organized crime: the establishment of new legal frameworks and institutions, development of criminal intelligence, protection of witnesses and justice collaborators, and an increase in funding for the law enforcement institutions. (Pond, 2006, 253) All of these efforts signify the importance of fighting regional organized crime for the EU institutions. European officials have asserted that “it would be easier to fight crime if Southeast Europe becomes part of European Union’s law enforcement space. (Pond, 2006, 253) This also ties into the wider thesis of Trauner, who emphasizes that “the key to understanding the Europeanization of the Western Balkans is to take policy-related conditionality into account, in addition to membership conditionality”. (Trauner, 2009, 71)

Other efforts of the law enforcement institutions in the region relate to the cooperation of the Western Balkan countries with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In that respect there is a clear EU conditionality element for these countries on their road to the EU membership, stated in the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA): a country must fully cooperate with the ICTY, which includes documentation access and the arrest of war criminals. (“EU-Western Balkans Relations”)

There have been several examples where the EU has slowed down or even completely stopped a country’s accession process because of the lack of progress in this area. Croatia “almost” did not get to start accession negotiations in 2005, after a negative report by the chief prosecutor in the ICTY. After the political support and diplomatic actions by Croatia’s ally Austria (and the threat of vetoing Turkey’s

accession), the EU allowed Croatia to move on, since their cooperation with the Tribunal was “the best of all of other countries in the region.” (Pond, 2006, 137) This action was later justified by the arrest of Ante Gotovina, an indicted war criminal, who was considered the main hurdle on Croatia’s road to EU membership. The same sort of EU conditionality was exercised with Serbia in 2006, when the EU suspended further talks on SAA due to the insufficient cooperation with the ICTY. The SAA was then signed in April 2008 in support of the pro-European political parties in Serbia ahead of national elections, which led to the arrest of Radovan Karadzic in July of the same year, the most wanted war criminal by the ICTY. (“EU-Western Balkans Relations”) Cooperation with the ICTY remains to be a problem for Serbia, as it is stated in the 2009 EU country-progress report, since “ICTY inductees Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic are still at large.” (“Europa Press Releases RAPID”)

Transitional Justice

The cooperation with the ICTY is not the only thing that countries in the region have to do in order to promote peace and reconciliation in this post-conflict region. Democracy, promotion of human rights, good neighborly relations, etc., are all concepts that are indirectly required by the EU for the countries of the Western Balkans to join. These goals can partially be achieved by the concept of transitional justice, which has been one of the focuses of EU institutions and their funding. Transitional justice is the societal response to gross violations of human rights. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice:

“Transitional justice seeks recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse.

(“International Center for Transitional Justice”)

Most of the work in this area is done by the governments or the civil society in the region of the Western Balkans. The EU is involved less directly. According to the Balkan Civil Society Network, around €1 billion of EU funding was available just in 2007 for NGO projects in the region. (“Balkan Civil Society Development Network”)

According to the reports of the International Center for Transnational Justice and the Humanitarian Law Center (a Serbian NGO) there are four main elements of transitional justice significant for the Western Balkans: war crime trials, “truth-seeking”, institutional reforms, and restitution. The war crime trials conducted by the local courts attracted the most public attention, and they were mostly supported by the national governments. (“Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries” 5) The number of trials in 2007 increased by a third compared to 2006: in Croatia 35, in Bosnia 29, and in Serbia 6. (“Humanitarian Law Center” 5) There was less success in “truth-seeking”, as none of the governments organized truth commissions, and the only one that was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006 failed “due to disagreements on its mandate among the Commission members.” (“Humanitarian Law Center” 6) In terms of institutional reform, there were no significant lustration processes. The only judicial reform of relative success was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the periods 1999-2002 and 2002-2004. The Serbian Law on Responsibility for Human rights Violations remained a “dead letter”, and similar legal attempts have not even been made in Montenegro and Croatia. (“Humanitarian Law Center” 7) Regarding reparations, there is a number of compensation and restitution cases of governments paying to citizens for destroyed property in the conflicts. Also, “memorials are put up almost exclusively in memory of victims – members of the majority community”, according to the Humanitarian Law Center Report. (“Humanitarian Law Center” 7)

Conclusion

When discussing these three major areas, which are commonly seen as the key political problems of the Western Balkans countries in becoming fully-democratic societies, it is difficult to come up with clear, straight-forward conclusions. Since in all areas there is some sort of an advancement in promoting democracy, the rule of law, and protection of human rights, it is safe to say that the Western Balkans is becoming a more democratic region. Yet, how much is this a result of EU involvement remains unclear because the assertiveness of the EU varies from issue to issue. The criteria that the EU has set up for countries to join the EU have been changing and additional measures have been introduced specifically for the Western Balkans. Also, it is difficult to assess if these societies are becoming more globalized. Although there has been increased cooperation among the countries in the region, as

well as their interaction with the EU, not all the measures and rules suggested by the EU have been adopted “whole-heartedly”. Also, some of the promoted solutions (such as the Ohrid Agreement provisions), still await final assessment.

When it comes to issues of state sovereignty, there has been a significant involvement by the EU, its institutions on the ground, as well as heavy diplomatic action by individual member states. Yet it appears that these efforts have not resulted in long-lasting democratic development for the Western Balkans countries, at last not in the way they were intended to. Kosovo remains to be one of the most troubled societies in Europe, and FYROM still has many problems along the lines of ethnic division. In terms of law enforcement, the EU has been less directly involved in the region, restricting its activities to advising, training, and funding the local institutions. These efforts resulted in more or less complacent positions of the national governments in the region. Seemingly, they simply tried to fulfill what was asked from them in order not to slow down on the road to becoming a full member of the EU. This is apparent in both cases of fighting organized crime and state cooperation with the ICTY. Finally, the EU has been very indirectly involved in issues of transitional justice, where only partial results are visible. These achievements can be attributed to randomly (and rarely) efficient government institutions and the efforts of the civil society, and need a longer amount of time to pass in order to be noticeable.

A short presentation of the author:

Nemanja Grgic, 25, is a college graduate who received his Bachelor in "International Relations and Diplomacy" at Anatolia/American College of Thessaloniki, in Greece (2010). Currently, he is a student at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Bologna, Italy, majoring in International Relations and International Economics. His interests include Comparative Politics, Conflict Management and post-Conflict processes, and American Foreign Policy.

Bibliography

2009 Summary of Findings. (2009). *The Balkan Gallup Monitor*. Retrieved April 23, 2010, from <http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-2009_Summary_of_Findings.pdf>

Anastasakis, Othon. (2008). The eu's political conditionality in the western balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, (8.4), 365-377.

Balkan Civil Society Development Network. *Guide to EU funding for NGOs*. Retrieved from <<http://www.balkancsd.net/?ItemID=DCA5E646C395F4469A56ACD2FC41A3A5>>

Cocozzelli, Fred. (2009). Critical junctures and local agency: how Kosovo became independent. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, (9.1-2), 191-208.

Daskalovski, Zidas. (2006). *Walking on the edge: consolidating multiethnic Macedonia 1989-2004*. Chapel Hill, NC: Globic Press.

EurActive Network. *EU-Western Balkans Relations*. Retrieved from <<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations/article-129607>>

Europa Glossary. (n.d.). *Accession criteria*. Retrieved from <http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen_en.htm>

Europa Press Releases RAPID. *European Council in Copenhagen*. Retrieved from <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/93/3&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>>

Europa Press Releases RAPID. *Key findings of the progress reports on Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Kosovo*. Retrieved from <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/450&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>>

- European Commission and Council of Europe, (2005). *Situation report on organized and economic crime in south-eastern europe - CARPO Regional project* Strasbourg: Retrieved from <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/organisedcrime/projects/CARPO/Pctc_2005_9%20Eng1%20Situation%20Report.pdf>
- European Commission Enlargement. *Kosovo Under UNSCR 1244 – Financial Assistance*. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/kosovo/financial-assistance/index_en.htm>
- European Commission – Enlargement. *The Western Balkan countries on the road to the European Union*. Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/history_en.htm>
- Humanitarian Law Center. *Transitional Justice in Post-Yugoslav Countries*. Retrieved from <http://www.hlc-rdc.org/uploads/editor/file/Izvestaji/Tranziciona-pravda-2007/izvestaj_tran_eng.pdf>
- International Center for Transitional Justice. *Transitional Justice Approaches*. Retrieved from <<http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/>>
- Pond, Elizabeth. (2006). *Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style*. Brookings.
- Steger, Manfred B. (2002). *Globalism: The New Market Ideology*. Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Trauner, Florian. (2009). Deconstructing the EU's Routes of Influence in Justice and Home Affairs in the Western Balkans. *European Integration*. (31.1). 65-82.
- Yannis, Alexandros. (2009). The politics and geopolitics of the status of Kosovo: the circle is never round. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, (9.1-2), 161-70.

Neo-liberalism, consequences on the prospect of democratization in Latin America

Alexandra Dobra

Abstract. The present paper aims to analyze the consequences of neo-liberalism on the prospect of democratization in Latin America, by concentrating on two case-studies, Brazil and Chile. The analysis is done on a double level. In a first part it considers the consequences of neo-liberalism on the first dimension of the infra-State level, the State itself and the government. In a second part it moves to the analysis of the second dimension of the infra-State level, the society. This double level of evaluation highlights the deficiency of an efficacious political democratization at the level of the State and the lack of the application of civil rights at the level of society. The neo-liberal context has accentuated democratic lacunas, because it has been ineffective in providing monitoring capacities in the field of democratic norms and institutional implementation.

Keywords: *Neo-liberalism; Latin America; Democratization; Democratic deconsolidation; Depolitization; Public sphere.*

Introduction

“Reality is determined not by what scientists or anyone else says or believes but by what the evidence reveals to us” (Hale, 1987)

In 2009, poverty reached 9,7 points in Brazil. Furthermore, Brazil did not adopt a political resolution for managing distributive conflicts. A main corollary follows, social and civil democratization is still relatively absent from the Brazilian landscape.

The implementation of neoliberal reforms in Latin America, in respectively the 80s and 90s, has been the result of economic crisis and the absence of democratic regimes. In the context of States facing irrecoverable debt amounts, neo-liberal reforms - cut governmental spending and subsidies, institution of market economy – seemed the most appropriate way to resolve the crisis. However, to what extend are neo-liberalism and democratization compatible ? How did neo-liberalism influence democratization ? Optimists argue that free-market economy ensures a durable democracy by restraining State power, improving resources allocation and securing the survival and sustainability of democracy (Weyland 2004, Hayek 1982). Hence, democratic norms, institutions and practices are disseminated. However, this scenario is more a semantic construction than a concrete reality. Neo-liberalism provoked side effects. This paper argues that where the shoe pinches resides in the fact that neo-liberalism has accentuated democratic lacunas, because it did not provide monitoring capacities in the field of democratic norms and institutional implementation. Therefore democratic quality has been weakened and limited (Weyland, 2004). Neo-liberalism did not consolidate the Marshallian sequence of democracy – civil, political, social rights – and on this basis it occasioned a democratic deconsolidation. In other words, there is a “democratic promise unfulfilled” in Bresnahan’s terminology, reverberated via the gap between the image and the reality.

Neo-liberalism's consequences on the first dimension of the infra-State sphere: anemic, inefficient and discriminatory State

“State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies, too; and this lie crawls out of its mouth: ‘I, the state, am the people.’” (Nietzsche, 1985)

Neo-liberalism implemented under the Washington Consensus reduced the State role because of the belief that the solution against economic crisis in Latin America relied on the confidence in the market. This confidence was made to the detriment of the enforcement of the State's infrastructural powers (Mann, 1986). The process of market reform created a model of State action according to which personal enriching and prerogatives excel on the defense of the public good. The freeing of markets has withdrawn the government from many of its adjudicatory functions in the economy, thereby simultaneously removing conflicts from the political arena. This has inherently increased the autonomy of political actors from the State (Dominguez, 1997). The implementation of neo-liberal reforms has also brought with it a principle of neo-conservative governability of societies (Huntington, 1975), aiming the contention of the State's power and the consequent “reversal of politics”. Thereby, politics is reduced to the defense and promotion of private property and initiative. Hence, the instituted liberal democracy is contracted to the domain of procedure and democratization has been limited by the liberalization of the political regime. The subsequent incapacity of political parties and parliamentary mechanisms to articulate social demands encouraged free-riding behaviors and ascended corporate interests, making them become “a hegemonic business class stronger than the State itself” (Nef, 2003). Capitalists, leaders, etc... attempted to shift the costs of stabilization and structural adjustment onto one another, onto unorganized groups, or onto the State itself (Smith, 1992). Furthermore, the strategic conflict among collective actors strengthened the private capital and weakened the State's capacity to regulate and to mediate class and sectoral conflicts. One example of this strengthening of private capital is the *Ambito Financiero* of Buenos Aires in Venezuela. It corresponds to a market coup, a new mode of political destabilization leading to changes in the government's economic team, thereby forcing major policy shifts.

Neo-liberalism did not operate to a *tabula rasa* of the traditional political features and therefore has indirectly nurtured the traditional political endemic features. The persistence of perverse institution and non-transparent practices did not disappear under neo-liberal reforms. The *Concertation* coalition in Chile and its instituted representative democracy, continued to be conditioned by politico-institutional arrangements granting the military significant prerogatives and tutelary powers over the civilian authority (Loveman, 1991). Similarly, Brazil's political culture and constitutive institutional features - corporatist and clientelistic practices - have been fuelled by neo-liberal reforms. For instance, vote buying - particularized form of clientelism involving the exchange of goods for votes at the individual level (Stokes 2007) - has been high in the 90s. Thus, democratization faced limits coming from the state of statuses and privileges inscribed within the political power structure at the level of its "central instances of nomination" in the Bourdieusian terminology, indirectly sustained by neo-liberalism. In Brazil, one major obstacle for economic and political change resided in the peculiar electoral system, encouraging alliances of transitory electoral convenience and minimizing responsibility of representatives (Schneider, 1991). Lastly, the prerogatives-preservation concern of governmental elites hindered the democratization process. Governmental institutions charged with macroeconomic reforms have been reluctant to cede decisional authority to business and labor representatives. For example in the late 80s, Argentina's president Raul Alfonsin, and Brazil's president Jose Sarney, efforts of achieving macroeconomic policy concertation failed.

Due to the weakness of social actors, often charismatic leaders (instead of elected assemblies, e.g.: Pinochet in Chile) assumed economic reform by imposing policies in a technocratic and authoritarian manner. This contributed to the rise of clientelism - hindering efforts to professionalize the public bureaucracy - and the absence of the realization of social representation, meant to be incompatible with neo-liberal reforms. For instance, Menem in Argentina, Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Fujimori in Peru adapted populism to the severe economic constraints they, used political populism to impose economic liberalism, and used this latter to strengthen their populist leadership (Smith, 1991). This adoption of a development model turned towards the external side axed on the market was made via a "revolution from the top" and reinforced the traditional weakness of the public sphere. The low level of

political institutionalization, the party systems and the parliamentary mechanisms of interest articulation and aggregation led to institutional failures. In addition, the adoption of economic measures and the subsequent social and political effects contributed to problems of democratic governability (Smith, 1990). Under the impetus of the U.S. government and international creditors Perez's government in Venezuela adopted a series of neo-liberal reforms. Although the restoration of rapid economic growth (9,2% in 1991), these reforms also contributed to the widespread corruption and the deepening of social cleavages. To conclude, the *ut supra* arguments converge towards the idea of a democratic deconsolidation – absence of real renovation of leadership, absence of real accountability, presence of perverse institutions (tutelary powers).

Neo-liberalism's consequences on the second dimension of the infra-State sphere: fragmentation, embryonic public sphere and depoliticization

“A vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it.” (Diamond, 1994)

Under neoliberal conditions there is mainly a failure of representation born of atomization and a consequent inability to articulate interests. In most Latin American countries an increase in economic dualism and social exclusion has been noted. In the 90s, 45,5% of the population in Latin America was employed in the informal sector and 19% of the population employed in the formal sector had no social security coverage (ILO, 2004). Moreover, the Gini coefficient highlights the endemic character of inequalities in this region. In 1990, the Gini coefficient was 0,625 in Brazil (which signifies an increase in inequalities) and was 0,550 in Chile (ECLAC, 2004). The persistently high levels of inequality in the distribution of income and assets make social contrasts more dramatic and produce greater vertical fragmentation. The “new economic model” imposed by neo-liberalism did not reduce poverty but increased inequalities (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). The exercise of civil and political rights, required in a democratic regime, seems incompatible on the long-term with the chronic presence of social inequalities and the stagnation of employment levels, provoked by the politics of structural adjustment. In the case of an absence of access to minimum of resources, the agent's capacity to make autonomous choices is

hindered and his degree of conversion capacity of formal rights into capabilities is very low.

The subordination of social issues to the market in order to eliminate conflicts of interests rests on Hayek's idea that politics are too expensive and constitute a factor of destabilization (Hayek, 1981). As such, in Chile the privatization process included the traditional boundaries of productive enterprises and the welfare privatization: pensions and health. Strategies for ensuring the governability of the system consisted in depoliticizing social problems and in transferring them to the market. This was translated in a limitation of the liberal democracy and a limited action power of citizens via political participation. However, neo-liberal reforms conserved intact the institutions and the traditional political relations, reinforcing political power concentration and depoliticizing society by disarticulating forces. Hence, the space of participation has been abridged and the nature of political decisions emerged as technified. Chile illustrates very well the concept of citizenship of low intensity and the instrumental nature of group relation. In 2000, 84,3% of the youth considered that parties do not represent their interests and 88,7% of the population stressed not to be interested in participating in a political party (Sylva, 2004). In another way, Brazil's failure of the economic plans Collor I and Collor II by eroding the government's initial popularity and the subsequent pervasive "civic fatigue" (Power, 1991), provides also an example of apathy and democratic deconsolidation.

Under structural economic adjustments, Latin America's corporatism has been replaced by neo-pluralism, a form of diminished democracy (Oxhorn, 1998). This latter is characterized by weak civil society, poor political representation, presidentialism (e.g.: Brazil) and delegative democracy - premise that whoever wins elections to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees it" (O'Donnell, 1994). Liberal policies have had a transformative effect on society and social organization which raised significant barriers to collective political action and thus induced a decline in the organizational capacity of civil society. In Chile the industrial decentralization enfeebled powerful and militant trade union movements and compressed the labor movement reverberated via the decline in manufacturing (in 1996 only 18,9% of GDP). Reforms alongside did also reduce the scope of political decision making, decreasing incentives for individuals to engage in political activity. The labor reform of 1979 in Chile was designed to depoliticize workers. Reforms can

also exert depoliticizing influence in the social sphere by transferring what were highly consequential policy decisions to the private sphere hence political decisions become less materially consequential for most citizens. Business associations and syndicates do not constitute an effective united front representing a collective interest class (Weyland, 2004), because of the atomized nature of labor markets and society by neo-liberal reforms. In Chile, trade-unions attitudes remained unchanged since 1970s (Haagh, 2002) because of the concern with bread-and-butter issues. To conclude, the democratic quality has been lowered by limiting popular sovereignty and by countermining the public sphere, both crucial for stimulating popular participation and holding the government accountable.

Conclusion

This paper has constructed an argument highlighting the double scale negative impact of neo-liberalism on the prospect of democratization in Latin America. Post 1990, Latin America has been characterized by a State crisis, reverberated via the diminishing of the State's global action capacity and the reinforcement of democratic lacunas. On the State level, the unilateral conception of political economy by technocratic elites bound to executive power provoked prestige lost and weakened the fundamental democratic institutions. While on the societal level neo-liberalism contributed to depoliticized the public sphere thereby weakening the organizational infrastructure of democracy.

In the frame of a future perspective for implementing durably and effectively democracy, a central role must be played by the social integration which is at the heart of the concept of citizenship (Weffort, 1992). An effective democracy cannot be instituted without a historical rupture from the exclusionary and inegalitarian dynamic. As such, there are two urgent targets for Latin American States to achieve for avoiding procyclical patterns. First they must operate to a social and political inclusion of marginalized segments of population and second, the network of State institutions must implement a new *agora*, for the operational representation of the *vox populi*.

A short presentation of the author:

Alexandra Dobra is reading a Bachelor in Politics and International Relations at the University of York, UK. She is the author of several articles in international peer-reviewed academic journals. She is an editor for the academic journal Politikon (IAPSS) and redactor for the academic journal ResPublica nova (ENS), as well as chapter chairman and founder for the academic journal The Transatlantic (LSE, SIPA Columbia).

References

Bulmer-Thomas, V., (1996). *The New Economic Model in Latin America and its Impact on Income Distribution and Poverty*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.

Diamond, L., (1994). Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation. *Journal of Democracy* 5.

Dominguez, J., I. (1997). Technopols : freeing politics and markets in Latin America. *Journal of Democracy* 9 (4)

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribean, (2004). Social panorama of Latin America.

International Labour Organization, (2004). Panorama Laborae 2004: America Latina y el Caribe.

Haagh, L., (2002). *Citizenship, labour markets and democratization: Chile and the modern sequence*. London: Palgrave.

Hayek, F. (1982). Los principios del orden social liberal, *Revista Estudios Públicos* 6 (1).

Huntington, S., P.; Crozier, M.; Watanuki, J. (1975). *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: New York University Press.

Loveman, B., (1991). Mision cumplida ? Civil-military relations and the Chilean political transition. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33 (3).

Mann, M., (1986). *The sources of social power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nef, G., (2003). The Chilean Model: Fact and Fiction. *Latin American Perspectives* 30 (5).

Nietzsche, F., (1985). *Ainsi parlait Zarathustra*. Paris: Gallimard, Folio.

O'Donnell, G., (1994). Delegative Democracy, *Journal of Democracy*.

Oxhorn, P., D. (1998). What kind of democracy? What kind of market? Latin America in the age of neoliberalism. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Power, T., J., (1991). Politicized democracy, competition, institutions, and 'civic fatigue' in Brazil. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33 (3).

Schneider, D. J. (1991). Social cognition. *Annual Review of Psychology* 42.

Smith, W., C. (1990). Democracy, distributional conflicts and macroeconomic policymaking in Argentina, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 32 (2).

Smith, W., C. (1991). State, market and neoliberalism in post-transition Argentina. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33 (4).

Stokes, C., (2007). *Political Clientelism. Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sylva, P. (2004). Doing politics in a depoliticized society: social change and political deactivation in Chile. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23 (1).

Weffort, F., C., (1992). *New Democracies, Which Democracies ?*, Washington, Woodrow

Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Latin American Program, 198.

Weyland, K., (2004). Democracy and the new market model in Latin America. *Latin American Politics & Society* 46 (1).

Call for articles

A Different View

IAPSS's monthly Online Journal *A Different View* reaches a wide audience of students and university teachers around the world and is looking for articles. Contributors to *A Different View* may live on different continents, hold different beliefs and political opinions but share in one task: delivering high quality, student-authored news, opinion pieces and academic articles every month!

If you have something to say about economic, political or legal developments around the world, if you feel there is an issue that other people should be aware of then submit your paper to the following e-mail address: adv.iapss@gmail.com.

What topics are published by A Different View (ADV)?

A Different View publishes articles, which deal with specific topics and should refer to:

- Political Science
- International developments
- National events which impact on the international community

Technical specifications for articles:

The deadline for articles shall be the 20th of each month.

I. Opinion articles should be:

- on a current political, economic or legal issue
- written in standard English
- between 1000 and 2000 words
- no in-text reference

II. Academic articles should show:

- academic style and tone
- excellent English
- between 1000 and 4000 words
- in-text references (APA-Style): Name of author, year of publication, page (e.g. Klausmann, 2007, p.23)
- a bibliography at the end

III. Dialogue articles:

- two authors take different sides on an issue and oppose their arguments in two columns (no bullet points)
- excellent English
- between 2000 and 4000 words (altogether)

With your articles please include a **short presentation of yourself** (approx. 100 words) in the following style (3rd person singular): Name, age, (hometown), university, degree, focus of your studies/Master or Bachelor Thesis, current employment or study interests, e.g.:

" Françoise Deutsch, 32, is a college graduate who received his/her Bachelor in "European Studies" at the University of Shire in 2008. In 2009, s/he obtained an LL.M/M.Sc./MA in International Relations at the University of Stadt. S/he has written his/her Master Thesis on ???, and currently interns/works/studies at the WWW. His/her interests include security studies, human rights, democratic transition, development studies, political philosophy, conflict resolution etc."

Contact Us: Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us at adv.iapss@gmail.com.

Previous ADV issues are available for viewing on the IAPSS website www.iapss.org.

