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# Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science

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# Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science



**Volume 13 Number 1 – April 2007**

## Contents

Foreword - Going Green: The Environment in Politics and Practice DYLAN KISSANE	5
Why Do Green Parties Emerge? The British and German Greens in Comparative Perspective MATHIEU PETITHOMME	7
The Development of a New Water Code in the Republic of Kazakhstan MARIYA GENINA	21
Expanding the UN's Collective Security System: Do the Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Conform to its Ideal Elements? ANDREA CHARRON	33
Support for European Membership in the new Candidate Countries SOLIDEA FORMICHELLI	53
International System: Unipolarity on the Brink CORINA MURFA	73



## Going Green

### The Environment in Politics and Practice

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In a year that has seen the release of the first part of the fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, the continued popularity of Al Gore's global warming film *An Inconvenient Truth* and counter-claims splashed across televisions in the shape of *The Great Global Warming Swindle*, it cannot be denied that the environment has taken a place at the forefront of political debates worldwide. Whether internationally – as in the series of concerts planned for July raising awareness of climate change – or domestically as an issue in national elections in Australia, France, Iceland and Ireland, the world has truly arrived at a time where the environment is no longer the backdrop to political affairs but rather a political object in its own right.

The environment, both within the literature and in the broader community, has become mainstream and the stereotype of the long haired, Birkenstock-wearing university drop-out is no longer the face of environmentalism, if it ever truly was. Today scientists, policy makers, lobby groups, non-governmental organisations and networked individuals are discussing, debating and establishing new practices in order to address a new reality where natural resources have become more than elements of national power and transnational environmental concerns are now writ large on the front pages of local newspapers. The international has become local and – with the power of a globalised media and online communities involving millions – the local has become stunningly international.

As claims and counter-claims are exchanged across classrooms, parliaments and even the floor of the United Nations General Assembly, a need for focussed political research on matters environmental has emerged. While the scientific journals will continue to reserve their editions for research in the physical sciences, social scientific journals like *Politikon* are opening their pages to the increasing weight of research focussing on the politics of the environment. While issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Whaling Commission and energy politics in the Middle East and Eurasia provoke a wide response, the literature is considerably more extensive and diverse than discussion of such high-profile matters alone. It is to highlight this diversity that in this issue of *Politikon* we present a pair of papers that exemplify the intersection of the environment and the political process in two very different contexts.

Mathieu Petithomme's article *Why Do Green Parties Emerge?* destroys the myth that all environmentalist political parties are the same. Using a comparative approach which contrasts the experience of the British Green Party and the German Die Grünen party, Petithomme is able to demonstrate the importance of institutional and strategic factors as opposed to the common notion of which privileges post-materialist factors as all decisive.

Petithomme's article offers a new perspective on a conventional wisdom, a common feature of papers at the forefront of the discipline and one which distinguishes his discussion considerably.

Mariya Genina's paper offers not an assessment of groups pursuing a change in policy but, instead, an assessment of a new environmental policy in Central Asia. In *The Development of a New Water Code in the Republic of Kazakhstan* Genina outlines not only the reasons for the implementation of the 2003 Water Code but also the success that the new code has had in alleviating the problems it was designed to solve. Genina's evaluation of the success of the new Water Code is not overwhelmingly positive and she identifies three areas in which the Water Code program could be improved. Genina remains positive about Water Code prospects but warns that, as with all environmental matters, the political will of the government must exist for changes to result.

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In addition to Petithomme and Genina's papers, this issue of *Politikon* also presents three other articles testament to the breadth of the discipline of political science.

Andrea Charron's *Expanding the UN's Collective Security System: Do the Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Conform to its Ideal Elements?* considers a key question in post-Cold War international politics. The seeming contradiction between the emerging norms of the 'Responsibility to Protect' and the 'Duty to Prevent' in interstate relations and the existing state obligations and rights under the UN Charter are explored by Charron who finds that only the employment of both emerging norms has implications not only for the UN but, potentially, for global peace and security.

Solidea Formichelli's *Support for European Membership in the new Candidate Countries*, meanwhile, offers a detailed assessment of support for two new European Union members (Romania and Bulgaria) and one candidate country (Turkey). Considering a range of data and tracking a number of variables, Formichelli is able to conclude that a person's support for membership in the EU can be tied to economic factors far more concretely than to factors related to national identity or cultural background. This paper, then, provides a basis for further research, particularly as the EU seeks to celebrate its common historical memory in 2007, the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

Finally, Corina Murafa's *The International System: Unipolarity on the Brink* presents a timely re-examination of a theory of international relations that has ignited the field since its presentation by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 work, *Theory of International Politics*. Murafa's consideration, critique and reconstruction of Waltz's neorealism as an 'amended neorealism' is imaginative. Further, though, it allows Murafa to argue convincingly that the period of post-Cold War unipolarity is finished and – in its place – a rather "imprecise multipolarity" has emerged, one that Murafa concludes will emerge as a classical multipolar system in short order.

## **Why Do Green Parties Emerge?**

### **The British and German Greens in Comparative Perspective**

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*The emergence of Green parties has long been explained by the development of post-materialist values in advanced democracies. This article takes a somewhat different perspective, by reassessing the importance of institutional and strategic variables. The comparison between the British and the German cases reinforces the notion that post-materialist values might be considered as characteristics of the Green electorate more than independent variables of the emergence of Green parties. The paper shows that party systems financial and electoral characteristics can strongly influence the emergence of new parties. Similarly, the institutional features of a given system can multiply or reduce the possibilities of entry and of coalition-building of a new party. In the end, from a strategic viewpoint, the internal organisation of a given Green party and its position toward the questions of intra-party democracy, institutionalisation, and incorporation into the parliamentary game are determinant. Therefore, important institutional factors and strategic choices can explain the weaknesses of the Green party as well as the emergence and the conversion of the German Greens to classical political liberalism.*

#### **Introduction**

The understanding of the root causes of the emergence of new parties in established democracies constitutes a core element in the comprehension of change in political competition structures. Indeed, the development of a new party implies a reorganisation of the electoral competition by limiting the votes of well-established parties. The emergence of a new party constitutes the result of a potential conflict within the political system between existing parties and the political group interested in constituting a new party. Before explaining more precisely the reasons for the emergence of Green parties in Germany and Great-Britain, it is necessary to shed some light on the theoretical debate within the literature on the emergence of new parties. In terms of perspective, the emergence of new parties has been analysed in relation to a given national context or following a comparative approach (Rosenstone et al. 1984; Hug 2001). This literature can also be classified following the type of emerging party considered, with research done on regionalist parties (De Winter & Türsan 1998), on Christian-democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996), on right-wing parties (Harmel & Sväsand 199: 501-23; Ignazi 1992: 3-34), or on left-wing libertarian/ecologist parties (Kitschelt 1998). In terms of explanatory factors, even if the empirical operationalisation of existing theories is sometimes partial, the emergence of new parties has been explained following (1) social, (2) institutional or (3) strategic variables.

- (1) The social approach argues that the emergence of new parties is intrinsically linked with the socio-economic mutations of a given society and the consequent transformation of individual values (Inglehart 1991: 11). The development of new social values would favour the electoral success of new parties promoting the politicisation of these new issues.
- (2) In opposition, the institutional approach emphasizes that the probability for the emergence of new parties depends on the characteristics of political institutions and the existence of a favourable structure of opportunities for new party entry (Hug 2001: 11). The decision to get involved within the electoral competition would be affected by the costs of entry, the perceived benefits of the access to public office and the probability of receiving electoral support (Tavits 2006: 100).
- (3) Finally, the theory of strategic entry highlights that the emergence of new parties might be related with elitist decisions to contest the existing electoral scene (Cox 1997). Following this paradigm inspired by rational-choice theory, political elites would enter within the process of electoral competition following three types of objectives: the desire to maximize their control on political positions, the willingness to influence the definition of public policies and the objective to maximize their electoral results, either for becoming a coalition partner of the government, or to access a blackmail position within the redefined political system (Storm & Müller 1999: 5-9; Sartori 2005 [1976: 149]). Following this third stream of explanatory variables, the emergence of new parties would be related to the strategy of interested political entrepreneurs.

### **Post-industrial Society, Post-materialist Values and the Emergence of Green Parties**

Since the 1970s, western European party systems have experienced processes of change and reconfiguration. For instance, the relative decline of the militant-party type, the weakening of partisan identification, the tendencies of a higher degree of electoral volatility, the progression of “emotional”, “affective” or “protest” voting and the increasing complexity of political competition resulting from the emergence of left-wing libertarian/ecologist or right-wing/authoritarian parties, have all contributed to party system change (Mair 1995: 40; Schmitt & Holmberg 1995: 96). However, these dynamics are not directly connected with a weakening of the traditional functions of parties to aggregate popular demands and make public decisions. Nevertheless, they support the analysis of a growing crisis of political representation. In this context, the emergence of Green parties within established political systems will be assessed, testing the classic hypothesis which states that the structural socio-economic mutations experienced by Western European democracies since the 1960s have favoured the development of new post-materialist values emphasizing political participation, power decentralization, individual self-realization, quality of life and environmental preoccupations (Inglehart 1991: 12). Theoretically, following this model, the progression of post-materialist values would represent an independent variable of the emergence of Green parties. In fact, following Inglehart’s indicator, many South European countries like Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Italy can still be considered as “materialist” with a low degree of social identification for post-materialist values.\* Green parties are also very weak or even inexistent

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\* The thesis of post-materialism developed by Ronald Inglehart defends that the growth of financial incomes and the relative absence of war leads to a shift in citizens attitudes, which become less

within these countries, which would confirm *a priori* the theory linking the emergence of Green parties with post-materialist values and socio-economic changes.

However, an important critique of this model argues that the socio-economic transformations which characterize the post-industrial society have facilitated the development of two and not only one set of new systems of values, post-materialism on the one hand and neo-conservatism on the other hand (Ignazi 1992: 5). Furthermore, even if we admit to the development of post-materialist values, a direct link with the emergence of Green parties does not seem to exist. Indeed, how can the theory explain that two countries like Germany and Great-Britain present similar levels of social identification towards post-materialist values (43% PM-55% M and 44% PM-53% M respectively), yet the emergence of Green parties is not constant between the two countries? Following Sartori's definition, *Die Grünen* can be considered as a significant party as it presents a "coalition potential", being involved in governmental decisions with the German SPD in 1998 for instance. *Die Grünen* has also "blackmail potential" within the German political system, because its positioning has forced other parties to realign themselves and ideologically renovate their programmes (Sartori 2005 [1976]: 148-49). However, the British Greens have never obtained significant electoral support and failed to apply sufficient social pressure to modify established parties tactics of competition and propose new themes to the political agenda. As a result, we will try to solve the puzzle of Green parties' emergence by looking at other explanatory variables in the German and British cases. The following argumentation reflects the analytical hypothesis which defends that the emergence of Green parties could be linked to institutional and strategic factors.

## **1. The Institutional Context**

The first institutional factor which can influence the emergence of Green parties might be the access to public finance within a given party system. Indeed, the rules which define political parties financing can constrain in a decisive manner the formation and the limits of political competition. Secondly, the legal environment and the rules of electoral ballot exercise restrictions or opportunities for the emergence of new parties, the political associations tending "to adapt the form of their activities to the formal structures of power" (Panebianco 1988: 12; Armingeon 2002: 104). Finally, the understanding of state-party relationships in Germany and Great-Britain foster a third explicatory factor for the emergence or non-emergence of Green parties.

### **1.1. The Financing of Political Parties and the Emergence of the Greens**

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preoccupied with material welfare than by individual subjective welfare. The degree of post-materialism is measured by the following question: «There is a lot of talk these days about what (OUR COUNTRY)'s goals should be for the next ten or fifteen years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people say should be given top priority. Would you please say which one of them you, yourself, consider to be most important in the long run?»: (1) Maintaining order in the country; (2) Giving people more say in important Government decisions; (3) Fighting rising prices ; (4) Protecting freedom of speech. Following Inglehart, people who choose the second and the fourth items are post-materialists and those who choose the first and the third items are materialists. Those who choose an item of each composed a mix group (Eurobarometer 64.2: 24).

### *The Green Party and the Financial Constraints of a Two-party System*

Important historical roots could explain that the British system of financing political parties has largely facilitated the stability of the two-party system and the alternation in power between the Labour and the Conservatives since the Second World War. Since its foundation, the Green Party has never been able to bypass the necessary percentage of electoral support for accessing public finance and parliamentary representation. As a result, the Green Party is over dependant on membership fees and individual donations. Legally, the Green Party is considered as a national confederation of local political associations, the House of Commons conditioning the access to public finance since 1975 to the share of two seats at the general elections or one seat and a minimum of 150,000 votes (Bogdanor 1984: 130). Political parties being not legally recognized by the law, the pluralist British system has the consequence to let third parties be highly dependent on their own resources, the necessity of self-financing becoming a major constrain of the political system in itself.

In fact, the access to public finance is restrained to parliamentary representation, limiting drastically the probability of the emergence of new parties, and establishing a clear differentiation between well-established and new parties. Moreover, the own independent ethic of the Green Party complicates its emergence, as its ideology is against donations from private enterprises and moral persons, in opposition to the Labour party which has always been linked with the Trade Unions and the Conservatives with business firms (Faucher 2003: 192). As a consequence, the scarce resources available reinforce a high cost of party formation for the British Greens, being regularly unable to present candidates in all the electoral circumscriptions on the one hand, and incapable of taking financial risks given the low probability of obtaining the reimbursement of electoral campaign expenditures afterwards (Bogdanor 1984: 134). Thus, the repertory of actions and the Greens electoral strategy become largely limited. Therefore, the political system favours the status quo between established parties (Webb & Fisher 1999: 16-17).

### *Die Grünen and the German Financing of Political Parties*

In Germany, the 1949 fundamental law limits constitutionally the public financing of political parties to the governmental process, that is to say, to the selection of political personnel (Poguntke 1994: 185). Only the electoral expenses can be reimbursed but not the general maintenance of a given political party. While the *Flick* scandal in the beginning of the 1980s has largely contributed to a fall in donations, the public funding of Bundestag parties has constantly progressed since the end of the Second World War. Public subventions already represented between 60 and 80% of the federal parties total incomes in the early 1990s (Poguntke & Boll 1992: 384). Since their first electoral victory in 1983 and their entry to the Bundestag, Die Grünen have benefited from this public financing, which has undeniably helped to consolidate the formation of the party (Poguntke 1994: 197).

Contrary to the British Greens who exclusively depend on their membership fees, in 1993, only 10% of Die Grünen total budget came from its members. In other words, the German system has played a permissive role in the progressive institutionalisation of the Greens. In the same way, after the Unification Treaty, the 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1991 *Law on Political Parties* has given a high proportion of public finance for political parties, legitimizing the electoral strategy of the new social movements and reducing the costs of the formation of new

political parties (Olivo 2001: 121). Finally, and in opposition with the British Greens, the Grünen have stimulated their own parliamentarians to redistribute a part of their incomes to some ecological funds in order to provide financial aid to the deepening of alternative projects (Poguntke 1993: 145). Benefiting of public subsidies at the federal level, this strategy of “politics from below” further reinforced the social anchorage of the party at the local level.

## **1.2. Ballot Electoral Rules and Political Institutions**

### *Great-Britain*

Parallel to the system of financing political parties, the British ballot electoral system might constitute one of the most constraining factors for the emergence of new parties. For general elections, the use of the uninominal one-round majority ballot, known as the electoral system of the “first-past-the-post”, has the direct consequence to favour the already well-established parties. The impossibility for a second decisive round between government parties and the very low probability of victory of an emerging party at the first round almost always leads to a “utility-vote” from the electorate, to the detriment of new parties. In addition, the ballot creates a high disproportion between the number of votes and the number of seats obtained, encouraging the over-representation of the most popular party (Crewe 1993: 83). On a regional basis, this deviation from the proportionality of the parliamentary representation seems even more important (Dunleavy et al. 1994: 181). Accordingly, this facilitates governmental stability by enabling the winner to count on an absolute majority at the Commons and forms a strong government with the support of only one third of the electorate. The British ballot therefore constitutes a key factor in the low probability of the emergence of the Greens as an important third national party. Thus, the “Westminster system”, intrinsically related with the British two-party system is a reflection of a conservative political culture, which favours bipolarisation, reinforces a dynamic of centripetal competition and sanctions extremism. Contrary to the Grüner, the political isolation created from an unfavourable ballot system may have contributed to the development of a peripheral culture within the British Greens and as a result, stimulated the triumph of the radical stream of the party (Douglas & Wildasky 1983 208).

### *Germany*

In Germany, important constitutional parameters have constrained political parties, such as the federal structure of government and the autonomy of political parties from their extra-parliamentary organizations. These institutional factors have fostered the fragmentation of German political parties in federations of organisations within a system of multi-level governance constituted by the federal, the Länd and the local level. Consequently, the German federal system may have augmented the possibility for strategic entry of the German Greens into the political system, thereby creating a favourable political opportunity structure for emergence. Additionally, the proportional ballot with compensation used in Germany presents a dual advantage: it enables a representation of proximity of the electorate (each one having a MP in its circumscription), and at the same time, equally represents political forces (Martin 2000: 41). This system with a proportional finality gives two votes to the electorate and mixes a uninominal ballot (with one round for the designation of half of the MPs) with a list ballot in order to determine “the global proportion of seats that each party bypassing 5% - or obtaining more than three MPs at the uninominal ballot – has the right to”

(Ibid. 2000: 41). The effects of majority created by the uninominal ballot are compensated by the election of half of the Bundestag MPs at the list ballot. The idea is to mix the supposed effects of the proportional and majority electoral system. Contrary to the British system the personality of the leader and the proximity with the electorate might play a more important role at the local level. Finally, the electoral ballot favours the development of a multiparty system, and reinforces the potential for new parties, like the German Greens, to emerge on the political scene.

### **1.3. State-Parties Relations**

#### *British Pluralism and the Emergence of the Greens*

Even if Great-Britain is considered to be pluralist in regards to interest groups studies, in practice, the access to public resources is still largely controlled by the two major parties. For instance, only government parties can decide the beneficiaries of “quangos” (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations) non-elective seats financed by the British state (Heywood 1994: 18). In spite of a historically pluralist character, British political power remains highly centralised, enabling governmental parties to benefit largely from their institutional connections even if the societal identification toward these mainstream parties declines. Within this “weak state with strong power”, the concentration of resources at the government level limits the potential influence of emerging parties on policy-making (Burgi 1992: 402-16). Great-Britain remains a country with a very low degree of federalism and corporatism all the while maintaining a high degree of budgetary centralism (Grossman & Saurugger 2006: 102-3).

Likewise, the limits of British pluralism can be illustrated by the access of parties to the Media. The British law prohibiting parties to buy a determined time-speech on the radio or on television, a mixed committee composed of the representatives of radio and television (*BBC and Independent Broadcasting Authority*), and of the representatives of the principal parties imposes informally the share of audiences for political parties campaigns. In the age of “the democracy of the public”, the access to the Media seems to become a fundamental precondition for a possible electoral success. Yet, in Britain, the political programmes on the radio and the television are *de facto* divided between the three main political forces, marginalizing the Greens from the public debate (Manin 1995: 279). In the end, the British “pluralist system with corporatist tendencies” does not deepen the opportunities of the Green Party. Thus, it enhances the strategy of “conflictualisation” of the party and the vicious circle of “political marginalisation – political radicalisation” (Coxall 2001: 20; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1995). The fact that the conventional relations between the British political institutions and the Green Party are not in favour of the latter reinforces the party strategy of external lobbying. Trying to mobilize the public through extra-parliamentary demonstrations and unconventional political means is the only way for the Greens to compensate the “institutional sclerosis” of the system, and be able to signal its political existence (Grossman & Saurugger 2006: 87).

#### *Germany and the Parität more than Corporatism*

In Germany as in Great-Britain, mainstream political parties traditionally decide internally the nomination for political offices, public firms and bureaucratic promotions within the state apparatus. However, the fundamental divergence between the British and the German model

is that in the German case, this repartition of offices does not only take place at the governmental level, but at all levels of the decision-making process (federal, Länd, local). Indeed, even if there is no consensus on the precise components in the German model, Germany would be an illustration of “organized pluralism”. The country tends to fit in Lijphart “consensual democratic” model that is characterised by a system of more or less permanent negotiations between political forces at all levels of decision making (Lijphart 1999). Accordingly, the term “cooperative federalism” has been developed to comprehend the *Parität*, the close cooperation formulated between political parties on the most important debates within the multi-level of governance federal system (Wachendorfer-Schmidt 2000: 81).

Even if this system tends to favour established parties, it does not prevent minor parties to access public responsibilities and offices at the local or Länd level, facilitating the institutionalisation of new parties through their contact with real-life conditions. For instance, the German Greens first entered the government of different Länders during the 1980s before becoming a real national party (Poguntke & Boll 1992: 330). In addition, the fact that the achievement of an absolute majority at the federal level has only been possible once since the Second World War (in part because the post-Nazi political system aimed to reduce the possibility of tyranny by a majority) has consequently fostered the process of coalition-building, and therefore, has extended the blackmail potential of minor parties. Thus, *Die Grünen* became a governmental party in the aftermath of the 1998 general elections, creating a coalition with the SPD while the Greens obtained only 6.7% of the vote share.

## **2. Questioning the Strategies of Green Political Actors**

For the ecologists, the choice to form a movement, and in some cases an autonomous political party has been motivated ambitions to create a new relation between civil society and political parties through the installation of participatory democracy (Icke 1990: 47). The Green theory argues that an active involvement of citizens in political life would balance the negative effects of “professionalisation” in political life. In that respect, following the inspiration of the new social movements, the Greens all over Europe would try to “do politics differently”. Nevertheless, Green parties have presented different political strategies and multiple positions toward the crucial questions of institutionalisation, electoral competition and ideological renovation so as to become institutionalized political parties. In the next part, we will see how these strategic choices in the British and the German context have constrained the emergence of the Greens.

### **2.1. The Green Party from Marginalisation to Radicalisation**

#### *Intra-Party Democracy, a Vector of Electoral Success...*

In terms of party institutionalisation, the Green Party has deliberately opted for a strategy of cultural revolution as an antecedent to an electoral revolution, by insisting on a necessary mutation of citizens’ political mentality and values, even if it should be associated with an impossibility to conquer political power in the short term. Thus, the Green Party has preserved statutes which permit the survival of a weakly-structured and egalitarian movement reticent toward party institutionalisation. The resulting dynamic result of the permanent opposition between the realists and the fundamentalists has led to the victory of

the latter, which are sceptical toward party hierarchies and social change through parliamentary means. As a result, intra-party decentralisation has been reinforced while the strategy of competition against other parties has become marginalised. For the Green Party, political renewal has to become a reality not only in reforming political institutions in the long term, but also through the realization of direct and intra-party democracy in the short term (Saward 1993: 71). In that sense, the centrifugal dynamic of competition of the Green Party has reduced the prospects for compromise and electoral coalitions with third parties. The Greens have been unable to transfer the ecological issue from the social to the political sphere.

Moreover, in order to avoid the control of political offices by an oligarchy of militants, the Green Party has institutionalised a system of rotation of the executive offices of the party every three years, prohibiting in the same way the accumulation of mandates. However, this also creates a regular shortage of experienced leaders. In terms of internal functions, the decision-making process is even more long and complicated now that the party tries to promote equal participation of all its members. Consequently, the willingness to promote intra-party democracy and to control the leadership has led the Greens to be incapable to react to external constrain and to develop a clear political message (Katz & Mair 1994: 611). The executive decisions of the party must always be accepted *a priori* and *a posteriori* by the militants, which led reformists Sara Parkin, Jonathan Porritt and Paul Ekins to leave the party in 1992 (Faucher 2003: 218). In the end, the promotion of “collective leadership” and the rejection of all hierarchies might have diminished the possibility to transform the movement into a political instrument.

#### *...Or an Internal Response to the Failure of a Parliamentary Strategy?*

Accordingly, the fact to permit deliberation without limits deepen the risk that internal debates focus on the details of a text more than on important political and strategic issues. In trying to institutionalize social pluralism, the Green party has not been able to limit the perverse effects of direct democracy. The sovereignty of its members on the activities and the programme of the party, the sanctification of deliberation, the egalitarian participation and the willingness of absolute transparency constitute not only the democratic exemplarity of the Green Party, but also reinforce the barrier towards party institutionalisation and entry into the electoral competition. In spite of a strategic choice at the beginning of their existence to enter into the political system, the readiness of the Greens to take consensual decisions without leadership and to decentralise internal political power has created “a weak movement and a quasi-disappearance of the national structures”, leading the Green Party to become a network of local groups more than a nationally coordinated political party (Faucher 2003: 206). In other words, its intransigent strategy has led the Green Party to occupy *de facto* the margins of the political system. The absence of decision-making responsibilities and political influence within the British political system has become a determinant influence on its internal ideological debate (Bennie et al. 1995: 236).

As a consequence, the Green Party decision to promote an extra-parliamentary strategy seems to be the result of the breakdown of its parliamentary strategy. Indeed, even if the Greens have focused on the elections and have tried to obtain seats since the beginning, their repeated electoral failures and the militants’ sentiment of impotency have favoured the

emergence of radical members within the party at the beginning of the 1990s. Then, the new political line of the party has become that of a politicisation of non-electoral activities, an enlargement of its political strategy to direct non-violent actions and the construction of networks of citizens and associations. The renewal of the party's repertory of action toward unconventional political means has been presented by the new militants as a multiplication of political opportunities allowing each citizen to get involved following his personal motivation (Rucht 1990: 159). It is true that more than 86.7% of the Green Party's members are also part of an association. This reinforces the idea of a multiple political engagement of British ecologists (Rüdig 1995: 238). Therefore, the debate for the Greens has been structured on the question of the strategic option of institutionalisation more than on the political positioning in relation to other political parties. Nevertheless, the rupture chosen in searching electoral coalitions to incarnate the confluence of social movements seems diametrically opposed with that of the German Greens, and does not appear to bring real success. In fact, the transition of the Greens toward unconventional forms of political participation shows its impotency in front of a multitude of factors, thereby reducing the probability of its emergence.

## **2.2. Die Grünen: From a Citizen Movement towards a Reformist Political Party**

### *The Institutionalization of Citizen Movements*

The paradigmatic process of institutionalisation of the German ecologist movement can be better illustrated by the ex-GDR citizen movement evolution. At the beginning of the 1980s, the GDR citizen movement had the objective to create a *Gegenöffentlichkeit*, a "counter-public sphere", promoting democratic reform and the defence of human rights in the former GDR. This ideological platform will constitute the basis for the future synthesis between citizen movement and party structure around the reunified Greens *Alliance 90/Die Grünen*. Since 1988, more than 325 groups such as the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" (IPHR) created by Wolfgang Templin in January 1986, the movement *Demokratie Jetzt*, "Democracy Now" (DN) created by Reinhard Lampe and the *Neues Forum*, the "New Forum" (NF), were insisting on the necessity to mobilize citizens for political change after decades of apathy and mass demobilization. Hence, this highly politicized political context might have favoured the dynamics of new party institutionalisation in response to renewed societal demands.

From the beginning, the citizen movements have tried to stimulate the creation of a public forum of deliberation, decentralised and promoting the *Basisdemokratie*, the democratisation of politics through the social basis (Olivo 2001: 92). Even if the strategy adopted was essentially extra-parliamentary, the citizen movements became progressively aware that party institutionalisation could permit them to play the role they wanted as a new intermediary between civil society and the state. Therefore, the initial electoral coalition Alliance 90 (IPHR, DN, NF) has also incorporated the social movements. In the aftermath of the 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1990 unification Treaty, the process of coalition-building was fostered by the fusion of the Greens of the West and of the East in one single political party, *Alliance 90/Die Grünen* in May 1992. On that point, the strategy used differs radically from that of the British Greens. The Green critique of *Parteiendemokratie*, the "democracy of party" became suddenly obsolete with the institutionalisation, and only the ideal of participatory democracy constituted the specific feature of the new party in relation with established ones. The same

trajectory as the British Greens has also existed in Germany, as the NF movement lead by Klaus Wolfram, Bärbel Bohlev and Ingrid Köppe has refused the incorporation in the parliamentary game and the creation of parliamentary coalitions, but in the German case, this strategy has been marginalised within the party (Markovits & Gorski 1993: 257). In the end, the new party has adopted a more transversal or “catch-all” political position, less radical than the British Greens.

### *The Progressive De-radicalisation of the German Political Ecology*

One could state that the force of the German Greens might have been the choice to operate a synthesis between a strategic entry within the electoral competition, and thus, a creation of classic party structure to make this strategy possible, and a preservation of the founding objectives of enhancing participatory politics and renewed political practices. Even if the strategy of power conquest requires a normalisation of party structures, the German Greens have tried to balance this effect by involving the social movements in their internal decision-making procedures, which are nevertheless subject to more hierarchical levels than in the British case. Trying to find an alternative to SPD’s trade unions traditional support and to the CDU/CSU support from business circles, the Greens have tried to attract all social movements, making them count within the internal structure of the party in an innovative manner. This social anchorage has certainly facilitated to legitimize the party and encouraged its influence on the German political agenda (Kitschelt 1989: 226). In opposition with the British Greens, it is the realists which have conquered the internal battles, leading the ecological movement to “renounce a part of its original radicalism in order to obtain concrete proofs of the ‘ecologisation’ of society” (Faucher 2003: 23). In that sense, the dynamics of electoral competition has constrained the Greens, the necessity to conquer a legislative majority then becoming a prior objective towards the establishment of a new model of society.

In general, the emergence of the German Greens seems essentially related with the ideological evolution of the party from its 1980 *Bundesprogramm* to the programmatic renovation promoted by the *Grundsatz* of April 2002. Indeed, Die Grünen has evolved from a radical eco-socialism towards a political position which could be assimilated to that of classical political liberalism. For sure, these developments have not been possible without debates and controversies but it seems that the German Green Party has become a classical third party trying to exercise its blackmail potential and searching to enter in governmental coalitions. From the “limits to growth” rhetoric and the willingness to incarnate the new social movements of the period in the late 1970s, the Greens have been progressively incorporated into the political game, entering the Bundestag in 1983 with 5,3% of the vote share and in 1987 with 8,3% (Papadakis 1984: 48). The German Greens have successfully transformed ecology into a political concept and instrumental tool for politicizing new social issues and renewing the political agenda of established parties, trying to promote nowadays a radical democratic politics in favour of minorities, social justice and multiculturalism. Moving from an anti-establishment position toward an active role in the politicisation of the public agenda might have constituted a key factor in the emergence of the German Greens, reinforcing a realignment of part of the SPD electorate to the benefit of the Greens. After its 7,3 % of the vote share in 1994, the Greens have become involved in a governmental coalition with the SPD in 1998, renouncing progressively to its founding objective to foster

the “politics from below” towards a motivation to “reinforce the constitutional liberalism” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 7). The German Greens have moved from the defence of collective rights to that of individual rights, “the democratisation of democracy, conceived previously in terms of politicisation of the social is now perceived in terms of institutional reform” (Talshir 2003: 174).

## **Conclusion**

Finally, why do Green parties emerge? As we have demonstrated, the post-materialist factor, once conceived as a decisive variable, might constitute a sociological characteristic of the Green electorate more than an explanatory variable of Green party emergence. Following our argumentation and the lights shed by the comparative perspective, we can defend that the emergence of Green parties is fundamentally related with institutional and strategic factors. In terms of financing, Die Grünen have largely benefited from public funds while the British Greens have been confined within an associative logic, being dependent on membership fees and consequently incapable to present candidates and develop a national political strategy. Moreover, the British electoral system has drastically restrained the possibilities of emergence of the Greens, while the German system has encouraged the development of a multi-party system and the equitable representation of political forces. The institutional stability of a “weak state with strong power” in Great-Britain has reinforced the centralisation of the decision-making process at the governmental level, creating an unfavourable structure of political opportunities for the Greens and stimulating in response its centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, the structure with multiple levels of governance and the “cooperative federalism” of the German system have tended to multiply the possibilities of entry for a new party, the party system in itself enabling the creation of party coalitions. In the end, from a strategic viewpoint, the British Greens “cultural revolution” has largely been a failure while Die Grünen’s willingness to incarnate an electoral alternative has been much more successful. Intransigent extra-parliamentary strategy, control of the leadership and internal democracy have been political decisions with a high costs for the British Greens, that of non-emergence. Nevertheless, these choices such as the radicalisation of the party after the victory of the fundamentalists can be better understood in the light of the constraints of the institutional system in itself. Die Grünen have been successful in institutionalizing a citizen movement into a reformist political party, enhancing a strategy of compromises and electoral coalition-building combined with a realist use of power in search of the median centre-left voter, converting gradually the German Greens to classical political liberalism.

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## **The Development of a New Water Code in the Republic of Kazakhstan**

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*The new Water Code (WC), adopted in the Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) in 2003, has not been sufficiently enforced. This has led to the water quality degradation and shortages. This paper identifies the factors leading up to the development of the WC and reasons for its weak enforcement. Using open-ended interviews and an analysis of archival information, this paper examines the reduction of financing and a weakening institutional capacity of the water organizations as main reasons for water quality degradation. These factors, plus unfamiliarity with the international terminology and inconsistency with other legislative acts are presented as key causes for the poor WC enforcement. The future of the water resources in Kazakhstan depends upon the effectiveness of future capacity building efforts.*

The new Water Code (WC) of the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted in 2003. Together with a series of regulatory acts, the WC provides a legislative basis for water related decision-making in the country. The main goal of the new WC was to achieve and maintain an environmentally safe and economical efficient level of water use, and to provide water resource protection that preserves and improves the living conditions of citizens and the status of the environment (Water Code, art. 3, 10 (as cited in Salman 2006)). Moreover, the new WC introduced international standards for equitable access to water and authorized the concept of integrated water resources management (IWRM) in Kazakhstan.

Some argue that the new WC was successful in terms of water management regulation and forwarding environmental interests, such as the protection of water quality and watershed management (Petrakov et al. 2006). However, many water policy experts assert that enforcing the WC faces huge obstacles, including institutional fragmentation, conflict with other laws and codes, and low capacity of executive water management institutions (Mitrofanskaya 1999; OECD 2000). The failure to implement the 2003 WC is one of the most significant reasons for current environmental problems such as severe pollution of water bodies, extensive desertification of agricultural lands, significant decreases in crop production, deteriorating water infrastructure, and low access for the population to safe drinking water and sanitation (UNDP Project 2005).

Despite current literature indicating that WC enforcement faces significant challenges (Mitrofanskaya 1999; OECD 2000), few analyses (Zimina 2002) exist on the reasons for these challenges and the initial process of Code's development. This research analyzes the history

and context of the WC development and examines factors influencing enforcement of the new Water Code.

Some policy analysts describe that in the period between the previous Water Code and the adoption of a new one, from 1993 to 2003, Kazakhstan experienced significant changes in its socio-economic, environmental and political situation, which necessitated the development of new water legislation. Despite various policy experts' awareness of the current situation, the driving factors and the initial process for WC creation and adoption remain unexamined. In this respect this paper addresses the following questions: Why was the new water law necessary in Kazakhstan? Which stakeholders were involved in the Code's development and adoption processes? Ultimately, do features of WC development process affect its present-day enforcement process?

### **Methodology**

The methods for this research consist of a review of published literature, mass media publications, reports from national and international organizations, and structured open-ended interviews with the main authors of the WC and local water policy experts. The water legislation reforms were assessed with a wide perspective, focusing on the influence of various stakeholders and the law-making process.

### **Historic overview of water resource management**

Water regulation and management is the most significant issue in Central Asia (Jalling 2003). Root causes for fragmented and inefficient water regulation lie both in the Soviet "environmentally disastrous policies and practices" (Jalling 2003), and a lack of attention to water resources after the fall of the Soviet Union. The consequences of these policy failures for the environment have been very destructive.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all Central Asian countries developed their own water legislation. The first Kazakhstan national Water Code was adopted in 1993. It reflected the Soviet water regulatory mechanisms that functioned for the previous 65 years and was characterized by highly centralized and stagnant mechanisms (Jalling 2003). Irrigation is one example. In the 1960s the Soviet government constructed huge irrigation systems in Central Asia covering hundreds of thousands of hectares. It was impossible to irrigate those huge fields uniformly, so excessive volumes of water had to be applied. This led in turn to soil erosion, rising groundwater levels, waterlogging, secondary salinisation, increased water use and lower crop yields. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states were left with huge interdependent irrigation systems and deteriorating water resources (Jalling 2003; Mickin 2000; UNDP 2004).

Soon after 1993, it became clear that the WC was inappropriate for the new independent environment. Because of the ineffectiveness and irrelevance of the old WC, and rapid economic, social and political changes in 1990s, a new WC was adopted in Kazakhstan in 2003 with the aim of improving the water resources regulation and status of the environment.

## **Water resources in Kazakhstan**

The Republic of Kazakhstan is situated in Central Asia, occupying 2.72 million km<sup>2</sup> of land, ranking as the ninth largest country in the world. Kazakhstan has an extremely diverse landscape, 58% is deserts and semi-deserts and around 10 percent is mountains. An important feature of Kazakhstan water resources is that the majority of the rivers originate in neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which makes an issue of water resource management and water quality very challenging (UNDP 2004).

The average water resources per year in Kazakhstan is estimated to be 100.5 km<sup>3</sup>. The distribution of water is 37,000 km<sup>3</sup> per km<sup>2</sup> and 6,000 m<sup>3</sup> per person per year. These indicators are the lowest in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). International standards indicate that annual supply of 8,000 m<sup>3</sup> per person is adequate. The water provision inside Kazakhstan varies significantly by region. For example, the basin of the Irtysh River (East Kazakhstan oblast) is considered a well-provided region; while the Ural-Caspian basin (Mangistau oblast), is a water deficit area (UNDP 2004). Although the natural factors, like the uneven distribution of surface waters and the annual and seasonal river flow fluctuations, contribute to Kazakhstan water resources shortage, the more important reasons for water problems are poorly regulated trans-boundary water relations with neighboring countries, and highly inefficient water use for irrigation (UNDP 2004). According to UNDP 2005, overall irrigation efficiency in Kazakhstan is less than 60%, resulting in that around 40% of water, devoted to irrigation is lost in the irrigation network and fields. Moreover, 70% of available surface water resources in the country, consumed for irrigation, contribute only 10% of the total economy of the country.


This inefficiency in irrigation of the country leads to water salinisation and severe levels of desertification (Jalling 2003; UNDP 2004). The water quality deterioration results in increasing number of water born diseases, ecosystem destruction and increasing potential for trans-boundary river conflicts. The most dramatic consequence of wasteful irrigation in the region is the near disappearance of the Aral Sea. Approximately 60% of the lake's surface has sunk by almost 80% for the period from 1960 to 1990s and now the Aral Sea currently consists of two parts, the North and the South Aral Seas (Jones 2003).

Not only does the irrigation inefficiency result in water losses and ecosystems degradation, it also results in considerable economic losses. Lost water can be translated into forgone crops. According to UNDP (2005), annual losses to Kazakhstan due to reduced crop yields alone are estimated at KZT 27 billion (\$US 200 million).

The present water management system in Kazakhstan is based on the basin principle. The territory of Kazakhstan is divided into 8 hydro-economic basins: Aral-Syrdarya basin, Balkhash-Alakol basin, Irtysh basin, Ural-Caspian basin, Ishim basin, Nura-Sarysu basin, Shu-Talas basin and Tobol-Turgai basin (see Figure 1, overleaf).

## **Factors in the development of Water Code**

The existing literature and interviews with WC developers agree on several factors that predetermined the development of the WC. The factors can be divided into five interdependent categories: financial, legal, social, political and institutional. The literature



**Figure 1:** Map of Main River Basins in Kazakhstan\*

emphasises a severe deterioration of water quality and water infrastructure across the country as a consequence of a sudden significant reduction in water sector financing (ADB 2005; Jalling 2003; Mickin 1991; OECD 2006; Petrakov et al. 2006; UNDP 2004). For example, the water infrastructure in Soviet times had been considered the most capital intensive sector. After the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, water infrastructure further deteriorated because of sharp decreases in public budgets and the continuing tradition of providing water virtually free of charge. An urgent increase in financing is needed to prevent collapse of water quality services and negative consequences for human health and economic activity (Petrakov et al. 2006; UNDP 2004).

Another serious reason for the deterioration of the water quality was that the 1993 WC lacked legal mechanisms and regulations. That Code neglected the environmental aspects of water management, such as water quality, watershed management, environmental flows and stakeholder involvement. The WC of 1993 was based on the Soviet water management system. The government of Kazakhstan intended to make the Water Code of 2003 as well the other laws more ‘Kazakh’ and less ‘Soviet’ (Hannan 2006; Mitrofanskaya 1999; Petrakov et al. 2006).

The period from 2000-2003 was marked by a large number of new environmental programs including “The Concept on Water Sector Development and Water Policy till 2010” (2002) which determined general Kazakhstan water policy directions, the “Drinking Water 2002-

\* Map courtesy of Water Resource Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

2010” program, and the law on “Water User Cooperatives” 2003 (ADB 2005). All of those legislative acts prepared a base and necessity for adoption of the new WC on July 9, 2003. In addition, according to ADB (2005), all of these programs and laws have significantly strengthened the water regulation basis in Republic of Kazakhstan (RK).

In the social category for problems in WC development Petrakov et al. (2006) suggests that the rise in the level of public concern about environmental issues might have been one of the factors pushing for creation of the new WC. Jelling (2003) supports Petrakov’s suggestion by stating that the political opposition on environmental issues started in the 1980s, when President Gorbachov’s ‘*glasnost* policy’ opened the floor for criticism. The first outstanding example of environmental opposition in the Central Asian region was the ‘Nevada-Semipalatinsk’ movement, organized in 1989 by the famous Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov. Protesting against the nuclear tests in the Semipalatinsk region, the movement was successful, resulting in the official closure of the site in 1991. Public concern over the environment increased in the 1990s, resulting in the formation of two thousand independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Central Asian republics by the late nineties. However, these NGOs had various strengths and ranges of activities (Jelling 2003). Jelling (2003) criticizes some NGOs, especially those, supported by the United Nations and the World Bank, because their actions were considerably restricted by the governments and became additional channels for the governments’ treasuries financing.

Other important factors for the new WC adoption were political and included the influence of new international declarations and principles. Tim Hannan (2006), international water management consultant, reported that the WC was partly initiated by the World Bank, which indicates significant international influence on Kazakh policy. Since the WC was written with intensive participation of international consultants, it included a considerable amount of international standards and ideas. For instance, the principle of IWRM was authorized in the WC after the World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002. Creation of River Basin Councils (RBCs), representing the new representative democratic bodies in Kazakhstan, is a significant component of IWRM definition. RBCs were authorized in the new WC and justified specifically by Kazakhstan signature of Johannesburg international declaration (Salman 2006; Kazakhstan National Report 2004; Petrakov et al. 2006).

Trans-boundary water management is a relevant issue for all Central Asian countries. This is especially relevant for Kazakhstan, which gets approximately 44% of its total average annual water resources from rivers coming from China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia (UNDP 2004). Continuous political conflicts over water became an impetus for Kazakhstan to join appropriate international conventions and to improve domestic legislation on trans-boundary water issues. As a result, in January 2001 Kazakhstan ratified the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Zimina 2002). On the national level, the new Water Code included five articles in Chapter 11 on trans-boundary water regulation, substituting one article in the previous Code of 1993. The WC of 2003 provided a specific mechanism for dealing with trans-boundary water issues based on the principles of the ratified Helsinki Convention.

Institutional factors that influenced the development of the new WC include legacies from the USSR that have been difficult to change. The Committee for Water Resources (CWR) under the Ministry of Agriculture is the central water management body in Kazakhstan. From 1990-2006 the CWR was a part of two ministries, such as Ministry of Environmental Protection and Ministry of Agriculture. Since 2002, the CWR has been functioning under the Ministry of Agriculture, which has resulted in more attention devoted to irrigation (ADB 2005; Zimina 2002). Consequently, the water sector has not been managed comprehensively. In particular, the issues of drinking water and industrial water use have been overlooked. For instance, no central government body is responsible to manage urban drinking water: it is managed only on the local level (Petraikov 2006; Syundyukov 2006). Local water management encourages competition for scarce water resources and a central management agency can direct water more equitably and consistently across time and geography. Centralized agencies can anticipate demand with population growth and build in incentives to conserve water, limit development or shift from agricultural use to domestic use. In addition to one-sided responsibilities of the CWR, the attention to water issues from central government was minimal. For example, the CWR experienced a reduction of its permanent staff from 84 in 1993, to 34 people in 2003. These 34 employees were responsible for management of the entire water sector in Kazakhstan (ADB 2005). The efforts to attract support of international projects and to develop sound legislation are intended to improve the CWR capacity and to attract financing and attention to the water management sector of the country.

Despite the increasing efforts to attract attention to water issues, to date the government has financed solely infrastructure and technical weaknesses of the water sector (e.g. Drinking Water program of 2002 was aimed at building new water pipes and treatment stations); however, the programs have had little success, because of poor management and planning skills of local water managers. Therefore, staff and equipment supplies of CWR and RBOs should be increased in accordance with new functions assigned to them by the WC. Also, water managers need sufficient training in planning, water quality monitoring and other technical skills to be able to successfully enforce new water programs.

To sum up, introduction of the new WC in 2003 was preconditioned by interconnected external and internal factors. The factors such as the sharp reduction of water sector financing, conflicts with neighboring Central Asian countries, and high involvement of international organizations, were connected to the disintegration of the USSR and sudden independence of Kazakhstan in 1991. The other factors such as rapid economic development, rising public concern about environmental issues, intensive development of the legislative base, and weak institutional capacity of water management organizations, are related to the internal policies of the country during the period of 1991-2003. Consequently, the new WC had to account for all these factors and demands to be adopted and be feasible to implement.

### **Features of the Water Code of 2003**

The central goal of the WC was to achieve and maintain an environmentally safe and economically efficient level of water use and to protect water resources in order to preserve and improve the living conditions of citizens (Water Code 2003). First, the strengths and innovations of the WC will be discussed and then its major limitations will be examined.

There are six main goals of the Water Code of 2003: a) clarify and expand the competencies of governmental water management bodies; b) clarify and regulate water property issues; c) clarify the types of the allowable water use; d) prioritize environmental standards in water management; e) detail the issue of trans-boundary water use and regulation; and f) adopt the National IWRM Plan as the key WC enforcement mechanism.

In terms of its innovations, the WC integrated the international standards on equitable access to water resources and authorized the principles of IWRM in Kazakhstan. An essential component of IWRM is public participation. Therefore, the WC incorporated public participation by creating RBCs. According to Hannan, one reason for the working group's decision to introduce RBCs in Kazakhstan was the lack of public participation in the initial process of the WC development. Besides RBCs, several other important concepts of ownership and management of water infrastructure were introduced, such as hydro-ameliorative condominiums\* and water servitude† (Zimina 2002). The innovative policy allowed for private and shared ownership of the land and water infrastructure in contrast to pure governmental property ownership in Soviet times.

It is also important to mention that the WC is a much more detailed piece of legislation than the old WC. This indicates that stakeholders have realized the complexity of the issue and the continuing problem of inefficient and inadequate water management in the country. Water law evolves with experience, time and continued evaluation of successes and failures in implementation.

Although the new WC had significant advantages, it has received criticism on several fronts: 1) there is no clarity in the functions of Committee for Water Resources (CWR); 2) the role of NGOs and public organizations in decision-making process is not given enough attention; 3) the definition is unclear about the responsibility of drinking water suppliers in front of primary water users (Kazakhstan National Report 2004); 4) there is some inconsistency of the WC with other legislative acts.

The lack of clarity in the role of CWR is due to the fact that its deputy head and the heads of other departments are principal state inspectors for water consumption and preservation, as well as key executors of water policy (Zimina 2002). This lack of differentiation leads to conflict between central agency executives and the water organizations. Public participation, accounted for in the new WC by introducing the basin councils, was not enough. Participation was accounted for in the WC very insufficiently, formulated as “public organizations representatives may become members of basin council” (Water Code 2003). Moreover, councils were not given decision-making power; they only had a consultative role, thereby diminishing their role in encouraging public involvement. In addition, the WC did not provide any regulations in terms of responsibilities and rights in drinking water supply sector. In particular, there is no provision in the WC that would specify the responsibility of water

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\* Hydro-ameliorative condominiums are defined as “a special form of ownership whereby lands are in private ownership of natural and artificial persons, and water infrastructure belongs to them as a communal share property” (Water Code 2003)

† Water servitude is the right to limited exploitation of a water unit (Zimina 2002).

users to pay for the water supply services. This limitation of the new WC can be explained by the fact that CWR currently functions under the Ministry of Agriculture, which is not directly interested in drinking water issues. Such drawbacks in the regulation are important factors that result in the low level of drinking water supply – only 60% of Kazakhstan’ population has regular access to drinking water. Finally, the inconsistency with other legislative acts mainly lies in the fact that the principles of IWRM are not integrated into the relevant laws, including Civil Code, Law on Taxation, environmental protection laws and other appropriate laws (Hannan 2006).

### **Social process of the WC development**

Kazakhstan is a new independent state that emerged from the Soviet command-and-control regime. The government does not have much experience in stakeholder involvement. The concept of public participation is still in the stage of formulation and adaptation. The major stakeholders in the WC development were CWR, River Basin Organizations (RBOs) and representatives from all interested Ministries, such as Ministry for Environmental Protection, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning and others. In addition, since Water Code was being developed within the international project, funded by UK Department for International Development (DFID), there were not many of public organizations involved. To improve public involvement in the issue, the project organized several stakeholder workshops with some environmental NGOs and various press representatives, and “quite a few ‘local people’ that we practically dragged off the street” (Hannan 2006).

### **Status of the Water Code enforcement**

Based on the interview results with Petrakov and Hannan, the key developers of the WC, the Code is not being implemented. Petrakov considers the main challenges to the WC implementation to be: 1) a lack of awareness and understanding of the new legislation among public officials; 2) an inadequate institutional capacity to perform assigned functions; and, 3) a lack of appropriate financing in the water sector. Hannan, asserts, however, that the main reason for slow WC implementation is inconsistency of other legislative acts with water legislation. The other codes and laws contradict the WC, according to Hannan, because they do not yet integrate IWRM principles. The fact that during the period from 1999 to 2004 the parliament of Kazakhstan adopted 566 laws does not necessarily show the improvement of the quality of legislative system. Although Tuyakbai Zh., chairman of Mazhilis (lower chamber of Kazakhstan’ parliament), asserted in 2004 that this number of laws passed indicates the sustainable development of legislative system in the country, some policy experts argue that this overwhelming number of legislative documents has left significant contradictions among new and old laws (Kazakhstan Today 2004; OECD 2000).

The concept of River Basin Councils introduced as public involvement in water management process, was completely new for water managers in Kazakhstan. This unfamiliarity with the concept of public participation is related to Soviet expert-centered policy-making process, which excluded main stakeholders from participation (OECD 2000).

The limited capacity of water management authorities and the lack of sufficient financing leads to a general slowness and inactivity of the government to enforce the Water Code. Therefore, to assist the government of Kazakhstan, UNDP Project in coordination with CWR is

developing a National IWRM Plan, the adoption of which will become a significant step towards the WC implementation. National IWRM Plan is aimed at providing practical steps and actions towards ensuring effective and integrated water resource management at the national and river basin levels (UNDP 2005).

### **Conclusion and recommendations**

The creation of the new Water Code in 2003 was a significant improvement in Kazakhstan's water legislation. The development of the new WC was necessary because of financial, legal, social, political and institutional changes, which occurred after the separation from the Soviet rule. The key factor in the water degradation, which undermined all other spheres, was the reduction of financial support in the water sector of the country. The reduction of funds led to the deterioration of water quality and infrastructure, the weakening of water management body's capacity, increased potential for trans-boundary river conflicts and rising public concern about the status of water and environment in the country.

The WC development process was initiated in part by the World Bank and in part by CWR. The initial development was dominated by both international and local policy experts, while little participation was observed from environmental NGOs and the media. Because the WC was developed within the international project, several important points in the Code were formulated according to international standards and it was challenging for local officials to understand and appropriately implement those provisions.

There are three main recommendations to the government of Kazakhstan to improve water regulation. First, higher funding should be provided to the water sector and directed at strengthening the water management institutions in order to develop clear strategies and increase the commitment of implementing organizations (OECD 2000). Second, more consistency should be established among the legislative acts. In particular, principles of IWRM should be integrated into the relevant laws, including the Civil Code, the Law on Taxation, and environmental protection laws. The WC should be amended as well to clarify functions of central water management bodies and to strengthen the role of River Basin Councils. Finally, a better information network should be established among water management organizations to distribute more information on the new WC provisions and other water programs among key local executives. For example, more explanation about the role and meaning of River Basin Councils, as well as other new water ownership concepts is required to ensure their successful realization on the local level.

Looking into the near future, there are two likely scenarios in which the water resources sector could be developed. The first scenario assumes the continuing inactivity and delay on the side of the government. In this case, due to further deterioration of water quality and infrastructure there will be a quick increase in public concern and participation. Failure to implement WC provisions may cause increasing water conflicts with neighboring countries because of the lack of accurate water quality monitoring in Kazakhstan and poor negotiations skills. One of the channels for public involvement in decision-making may become the newly formed Basin Councils and a subsequent increasing influence of NGOs. Eventually, the government will have to improve the existing policy.

The second scenario is more optimistic and it assumes that CWR will gain higher status either within the agency or the ministry. The government will start undertaking active steps towards the WC enforcement and devote more attention and financial resources to water sector in the next two years. Also, more attention will be devoted in Kazakhstan to improving the institutional capacity of executive bodies, rather than ‘patching the holes’ in the old system. In this case there is the potential to improve management both of irrigation and of drinking water supply. The only thing that Kazakhstan needs is greater political will to improve the system of water management.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan needs to adopt and start implementing National IWRM plan, developed with the assistance of UNDP IWRM project, to make a necessary step towards the improvement of internal water resource management and to move closer towards the resolution of trans-boundary water issues. For instance, improving managerial and negotiation skills of RBOs together with strengthening their institutional and technical capacity would result in their greater ability to resolve conflicts and come to an agreement on the local level.

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## **Expanding the UN's Collective Security System** Do the Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Conform to its Ideal Elements?

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*The United Nations' 60th anniversary has prompted discussion and debate as to how best to improve this weakened organization. These discussions have included the adoption of two new doctrines to the existing collective security system. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Duty to Prevent, however, are not necessarily compatible with the ideals of the system as envisioned by the framers of the Charter. In striving to improve the legitimacy of the organization, the R2P and most certainly, the Duty to Prevent may undermine the very organization they seek to strengthen.*

### **Introduction**

It has been said the United Nations (UN) has two souls (Boulden 2006). The first soul works to ensure that international peace and security prevails through collective security and the second soul furthers the promotion of human rights, justice and social progress. To fulfil these mandates, each soul employs different strategies. While the second soul furthers the rights of mankind through consensus, treaties, committees and, occasionally economic and diplomatic pressure, the first soul must resort to coercive measures including military intervention in order to preserve the peace from time to time. This paper will explore the first soul and the use of armed intervention.

If one reads the Charter, one finds that the founders were not averse to using force in order to deter aggressors and preserve international peace and security. However, while the UN was formed to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," (*Charter* 1945) the list of scourges is growing. The real threats to international peace and security are no longer confined to violations of state sovereignty for which the UN collective security system was created. Rather, genocide, massive violations of human rights, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represent immediate, international security threats that are beyond the scope of any one state to solve.

A forum through which states can act in common to ensure that international peace is maintained seems even more relevant today than it was sixty years ago. But, the UN is floundering; the Oil-for-Food scandal, the war on Iraq and lack of action in Darfur are all used as exhibit "A" evidence for large-scale UN reform including its collective security system. The UN High Level Panel (HLP) has produced a report that "puts forward a new vision of collective security - one that addresses all of the major threats to international peace and security felt around the world." The HLP suggests collective security today should rest on three pillars or assumptions (*A More Secure World* 2004: 11). The first is the continued need for collective

responses at the global, regional and national levels. The second is the acceptance that certain threats pose serious security concerns to all states and the third, also known as the *Responsibility to Protect*, is the realization that some states cannot and will not protect their own people and will harm their neighbours. Based on these three pillars, the authors of the HLP argue that the UN's collective security system is still relevant and needed.

Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter believe a fourth "pillar" should be added. They have coined it a *Duty to Prevent*.<sup>\*</sup> This pillar focuses attention on the threat posed by WMDs, rogue states and terrorism and the need for collective military intervention. While the first two pillars are well-established principles of 1945-style collective security, these last two pillars would expand the scope and reach of the UN's collective security system. Some suggest there is a danger to adding these new principles to the UN's collective security system already plagued by "radical defects."<sup>†</sup> They ask: will these new pillars – *Responsibility to Protect (R2P)* and *Duty to Prevent* - result in international insecurity? Will these doctrines undermine the very organization they propose to strengthen?

This paper will explore collective security and these newly recommended "add ons" to collective security. It is acknowledged that diplomatic and economic sanctions could also be discussed but in order to make more meaningful comparisons, this paper will focus on the use of armed intervention - that is the use of deliberate military action by the UN against another state or states. In choosing to look only at the use of collective armed force, the scope of this paper is limited but, hopefully, the analysis will prove more meaningful. Rather than looking at a series of case studies, this paper will explore the ideal of collective security as envisioned by the authors of the UN Charter and the incorporation of R2P and Duty to Prevent into this framework. Of course the UN has had difficulty living up to the ideal of collective security, but if collective security is to include these new principles, it is important that we review the Charter with R2P and Duty to Prevent in mind to ensure there are no fundamental clashes of logic with the current collective security system and these new principles.

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<sup>\*</sup> The HLP also talks about the duty to prevent but they refer to this duty more in reference to the need to strengthen some two-type activities to eliminate or minimize the conditions that cause instability in the world. Examples include the need to reduce economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation as well as inter state and intrastate conflict. Force is only considered as a very last resort. Feinstein and Slaughter's duty to prevent targets only rogue/weak states with the potential of acquiring or having WMD and/or terrorists and that force is to be considered much earlier due to the immediacy of the threat posed by these rogue states and their WMD's.

<sup>†</sup> Stromberg, Roland. N., "The Idea of Collective Security", *Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy: Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace*, Joel Larus (ed), (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), 277. Ernst B. Haas is even more cynical stating "[c]ollective security, as an institutionalized organizational task, has shown no sign of producing any kind of cumulative patterns of satisfaction, acceptance or growth." See Ernest B. Haas, "Collective Security and the Future International System", *Monograph Series in World Affairs University of Denver*, Vol. 5. No. 1, (1967-1968): 55.

This paper will argue that although R2P requires a reinterpretation of what constitutes a threat within the UN's collective security framework, considerable international support and momentum to accept this change is growing. On the other hand, the Duty to Prevent is less compatible with the UN's collective security system and is best left to "coalitions of the willing" to pursue. Ultimately, the decision to adopt and apply these new pillars within the greater UN system of collective security must be made by member states but informed as to the fit of both of these new pillars within the current collective security framework.

### **Collective Security**

As first conceived by the founders of the UN, the collective security system was like a "vintage wine" (Claude 1971: 247). In the opinion of Inis Claude and Mumulla Naidu, the potential of collective security was never as great as it was post World War I because of the considerable diffusion of power across many states. Since then 'new wine' has been added in the form of state interests and political wrangling to dilute the potential of the collective security system. Overconfidence in collective security as a panacea for action by the international community gave it an aura it could never live up to (Claude 1971: 248). Today, ironically, under-confidence in the UN's collective security system (largely because it was designed with World War II in mind) has resulted in calls to broaden the scope of threats the system tackles with force (making the system more "elastic") (Martin 1952: 125) in order to maintain international peace and security. However, as many argue that member states invoke collective security inconsistently, is an expansion of the system a good idea? Critics suggest it will make the UN even more ineffective while proponents believe adoption of these new principles will render the world more secure.

Collective security is described by Inis Claude as the middle ground between two poles that are characterized at one extreme by anarchy and at the other by world government (1971: 245). Anarchy is described as "every nation for itself" (Stromberg 1965: 277) and world government is considered an unattainable ideal. If one applies a means/end analogy to a collective security system, "'collectively' is the means, 'security' is the end and the 'system' is the institution to make the means serve the ends" (Naidu 1975: 15). In other words the means are credible threats of collective measures ranging from diplomatic boycotts through economic pressures to overwhelming force, the ends are characterized by peace and stability in the international community and the institution is the UN. Collective security is security of all states by all states for all states, even non-members.

The distinction between unilateral and collective use of force is not one of numbers but of authority and purpose (Martin 2000: 294). Irrespective of the number of states involved, unilateral force is the result of a unilateral decision and is designed primarily to achieve goals personal to the acting states(s). Collective use of force, by contrast, is the result of the decision of a competent international organization and is taken on behalf of its representative community at large. For the purposes of this paper, we are not concerned with collective measures other than the application of physical violence (for example, economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure). Although it is acknowledged that these are important methods of collective action and are tools in the arsenal of collective security, this paper is concerned with the use of 'force' as described in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 'Force', in this paper, means military violence and does not include other types of injurious

conduct. Collective security action is taken to mean collective use of force carried out under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Dr. Claude cautions his readers lest they feel collective security be used as an enforcement mechanism for all violations of international law – such logic is what created the over confidence described in the early days of the UN’s history. States must not threaten “collective security” action for violations of all international norms; it must not be appropriated to apply to just any multilateral intervention and is not, as Allen Dulles believed, “a form of [state] insurance” (*Collective Security* 1965: 44) to be used as an enforcement mechanism for the whole body of international law (Claude 1971: 249). However, because collective security has always been described in ideal terms, “it has never been defined by treaty, nor by the supreme international tribunal which has been functioning at The Hague since 1922” (Martin 1952: 14). Collective security, therefore, is always in danger, according to Martin (p. 14), of being hijacked as a “cry for the moon.”

So far, I have described what collective security is not. It is not a panacea, it is not insurance against all threats and it is neither anarchy nor world government. But what is collective security and how do states benefit from participating in the system? To answer these questions, let us turn to Inis Claude, Mumulla Naidu and others who have studied, in detail, the ideal typology of collective security. As their research represents the hallmark of this field, we will use their criteria.

The ultimate objective of collective security is to frustrate any attempts by states to change the status quo with overwhelming force (Martin 1952: 14). A change in the status quo meant a change to the world order of independent, sovereign states. The mechanism for change was assumed to be acts of aggression or violence by one or more states that would or could lead to war. To counter this aggression (and after exhausting non-violent methods of coercion), overpowering, collective force would be threatened and then applied to end the aggression and deter other would-be aggressors. Of course the experience of World War II was instrumental to these assumptions about what constituted a “threat,” who could project this threat and what was the appropriate response.

Naidu and Claude posit that the ideal form of collective security is constructed with seven necessary elements (Naidu 1975: 17-20). These seven elements are really a reflection of the UN lessons learned from the League of Nations. However, with these (new) elements in place, global action, through “preponderant physical power [would] deter or defect actual or potential [breaches] of peace and security anywhere in the world” (Naidu 1975: 17) thus rendering the world more stable and individual states more secure. The seven elements are listed below in what is assumed to represent a descending order of importance. We shall review the elements and then see how they are manifested in the Charter.

### **The Seven Ideal Elements of a Collective Security System**

- 1) **Prohibition of force:** Whether one has a Kantian or Hobbesian outlook on mankind’s nature, history has proven that man can and will resort to armed force. Therefore, by prohibiting armed force, wars can be eliminated. However, as history has shown that not all states will refrain from the use of force in spite of its prohibition, it is better

that all states are armed to counter attacks and preserve the peace through a collective security system. The argument is circular. Really, this first element advocates the prohibition of *arbitrary, unilateral* force. It is generally accepted that all states recognize and accept the fundamental importance of the primary ban on the resort to force – it is said to have reached the status of *jus cogens* but states also accept that there are cases, including self-defence (unilateral or collective), that are acceptable exceptions to the primacy of this *jus cogens* principle.

- 2) **Collective Guarantee of Security:** The guarantee of security necessitates that all states render assistance to the victim state. No state can claim neutrality and it is presumed no state would dare to support the aggressor. Thus, this element may require states to use armed force against former allies in order to achieve collective security. This is the three-musketeer element: “all for one and one for all” as described by Finklestein and Finkelstein (1966: 1). This is also the compensation aspect of the equation. While many are too polite (or perhaps strategic) to mention this factor, it certainly applies to any state that is not a superpower. Ideally, states will not arm beyond a basic level so that, if they are attacked, they won’t be alone in their response.
- 3) **Collective Force as Deterrence/Sanction:** If the first two elements are in place, then deterrence should be achieved in theory. However, should an aggressor dare to use force then the combined forces of all the other states should so overwhelm the aggressor that hostilities would cease, and furthermore, any other would-be aggressor should be deterred. Naidu refers to the latter lesson learned as “sanction.”
- 4) **Automatism in Collective Action:** Collective guarantees of action must be absolute and automatic. As Woodrow Wilson stated, there can be no ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’ – violation of the prohibition of force must be regarded *ipso facto* as an “act of war” (Claude 1971: 262). Collective security must be a mechanism that, like a mousetrap, springs automatically when tested. The response must be immediate and impartial. Naidu and Claude are rather circumspect on the issue of nuclear weapons. Presumably, automatism would be unaffected by these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because element #3 would ensure they are never used in the first place. I am not convinced. I suspect Naidu has fused the concept of deterrence with disarmament and/or had not anticipated that WMD technology would be transferred to non-super power states so readily.
- 5) **Anonymity of Aggressor and Victim:** The collective security system must be above alliances and history; it cannot harbour eternal friends or everlasting foes (Naidu 1975: 48). As a result, regardless of who are the aggressors or the victims, the system must be unbiased and concentrate solely on the act of aggression. Collective security, therefore, is different from a collective defence system like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which will only attack external enemies but never members within the alliance (Lipson 1997: 113)

- 6) **Assignability of Guilt:** This element assumes that all states accept a universal definition of “aggression” and can recognize such acts of aggression instantly. Moreover, this necessitates procedures for the determination of aggression and an impartial institution entrusted by all to make the final (but largely forgone) determination.
- 7) **Permanency and Generality of the System:** The system must be “permanent, abstract and general [as opposed to] ad hoc, expedient or particularistic” (Naidu 1975: 20). A collective security system “must be institutionalized for international security against all dangers” (Naidu 1975: 20). This element is closely related to *Automatism in Collective Action* and *Anonymity of Aggressor and Victim*. In other words, the system cannot be whimsical or hesitant.

These elements must be considered as a nexus; if any element is missing, the system as a whole vitiates.

The failure of the League of Nations to invoke collective security to prevent World War II was fore in the minds of the authors of the Charter. If the UN were to succeed where the League had failed, then a collective security system would be essential. However, in order for states to adopt an ideal system, they must be prepared to sacrifice a degree of sovereignty. As outlined in the Charter, a state could no longer solely make the decision to use force – this was to be a collective decision. States, however, were not prepared to accept this compromise and one sees this tension throughout the Charter. For every article that ensures that the ideal elements are in place, there is a countering article that frustrates the ideal. We shall return to the seven elements with the Charter in hand to highlight this tension.

## **The Charter and the Seven Ideal Elements**

**1) Prohibition of the Use of Force:** As a cardinal principle, the Charter enshrined the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4). This was an improvement on the League’s Covenant, which did not ban war - war was only a “concern” (Covenant of the League of Nations 1924, Art. 11). This article, in principle, satisfies element #1. However, by introducing self-defence as a right of all states, a contradiction regarding use of force was also enshrined in Article 51. A system of collective security cannot tolerate states “going it alone” rather than submitting to the system. Realistically though, few states feel secure enough to rely solely on a collective system of security. “Collective security [cannot] do for the international society what police actions [do] for the domestic community” (Thompson 1953: 755) and therefore, self-defence and other military alliances help to bolster the security of individual states but detract from the ‘collectivity’ of collective security. The circular argument is present in the Charter as well to a certain extent though somewhat cushioned by the fact that Article 51 demands the states invoking self-defence inform the Security Council immediately and do not impinge on the Security Council’s primary role to maintain international peace and security.

**2) Collective Guarantee of Security:** The preamble of the Charter invokes element #2 (“to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”) as do Articles 1, 39, 41 and

42. These articles constitute the “core” articles of the UN’s collective security system. Not only do states confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for determining and acting on breaches to peace and security but the Council members may authorize “all necessary means” meaning the use of violent force to restore peace and security. Of course, because of the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, collective approaches are contingent on their approval or at least their abstention. This, according to Naidu, “reintroduces decentralization [of decision-making] and thereby neutralizes the collectivist approach...” (Naidu 1975: 37). The veto represents one of the profound challenges of the Charter and a potential qualifying sub-element for collective security in the UN. Indeed, the veto is a challenge for all seven of the elements.

Returning to the compensation aspect of this element, the collective guarantee could also be called the “easy rider” (Sokolsky 2006) approach to security spending. As a hedge against member parties coming to their aid, states forge bilateral relations with the superpower(s) to ensure added security. Furthermore, states may even decrease their defence spending according to the strength of the bilateral relationship, which undermines the collective security system. Canada is the quintessential example.

**3) Collective Force as Deterrence/Sanction:** Collective force is meant to be far superior to a balance of power because the philosophy underlying the former is the overall diffusion of power rather than shifts in the concentration of power to “balance” the power of other states. Collective security, therefore, is thought to be more stable in the sense that instability was believed to lead to war. This presumption, however, was complicated by the existence of superpowers during the Cold War. Superpowers can impede the operation of collective security simply by being potentially stronger than the collective (Claude 1971: 272). Should one of the superpowers be the aggressor, the deterrence capacity of the system vitiates significantly. The only solution for dealing with superpowers (or in today’s case, a hegemon) according to Naidu, is universal disarmament (preferably) or armament control (more practically). Unfortunately, the Charter only mentions disarmament in Article 47(1) (in reference to the duties of the never-used Military Staff Committee), Article 11(1) (in reference to possible topics of discussion for the General Assembly) and Article 26 (in reference to the Security Council’s responsibility to armament regulations in consultation with the Military Staff Committee). The first article only refers to “possible disarmament” and the second refers to “the regulation of armaments”. Article 26, though, refers only to the regulation of armaments and not universal disarmament (Naidu 1975, pp 41-46). Of course it must be remembered that the Charter was drafted during the Second World War and it would have been unrealistic to expect states to become members of an institution that advocated the renouncement of armaments and military capability for the sake of the collective good. Rather, the authors of the Charter expected to use force against aggressors defensively and not offensively. Nevertheless, the paradoxical outcome was an arms’ race to theoretical levels of destruction never presumed imaginable.

Ernest Haas, on the other hand, suggests that discussions about disarmaments are side conversations at best because the permanent five members “were expected – and expected themselves – to settle their differences privately outside the UN” (Haas 1967-68: 36).

Therefore, whether these states were disarmed or not was largely irrelevant to discussion about collective security that really was meant to benefit “quarrelling smaller nations” (Haas 1967-68: 36).

**4) Automatism in Collective Action:** Article 39 stipulates that the Security Council “shall” determine the existence of breaches to international peace but does not guarantee either the extent or speed of the response. These facts in conjunction with the veto are what undermine automaticity. In the case of Iraq’s refusal to comply with a number of UN Security Council Resolutions in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, twelve years elapsed before the US decided to make good the threat that the “Council [had] repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” (S/Res/1441 2002, para.13). Unfortunately, the Coalition of the Willing took action without the blessing of the Security Council. The Security Council is not a mousetrap that springs automatically and, as a result, element #4 is on shaky ground.

**5) Anonymity of Aggressor and Victim,** or element #5, is closely related to element #4, Automatism of Response. Remembering Naidu’s diktat that “a collective security system... cannot permit eternal friends or everlasting foes,” then the UN Security Council should have no compunction acting against any state on behalf of any state. Of course, in reality, this is decidedly not the case. It is highly unlikely that the Council would have reacted with force had South Korea invaded North Korea in 1950 nor does it suggest all states declare war on the instigator if Eritrea invades Ethiopia (or vice versa). Most assuredly, anonymity of aggressor and victims is conspicuous if one of the permanent members is involved. In other words, the mousetrap is very particular about and sensitive to which mice trigger the trap.

**6) Assignability of Guilt** is another assumption of the collective security system and constitutes element #6. The difficulty for the Security Council has been the fact that “aggression” was not defined nor were “breaches to peace and security” when the Charter was drafted. This was deliberate so as not to constrain the Security Council as the Council had been under the League of Nations. Since then, the General Assembly has defined aggression to be “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of another State...” (UN GA Resolution 3314 1974, XXIX). Breaches to the peace are still left to the determination of the Security Council on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, there is often considerable debate before a breach to the peace is determined. Furthermore, while the ‘act’ may be identified, naming the guilty party is another, separate issue that the Security Council is neither mandated nor inclined to determine. For example, Security Council Resolutions pertaining to the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq mention only state names and not the responsible individuals (S/RES/660 1990). This has much to do with political precedent (Naidu 1975: 50) but also the fact that the Security Council had no mechanisms for prosecuting individuals. This has now changed with the establishment of the International Criminal Court for some member states.

**7) The final element, Permanency and Generality of the System,** is the element that has been realized through the UN. What distinguishes the UN from an alliance system is the fact that it is neither an ad hoc nor an expedient arrangement. Rather, it is a permanent and nearly universal institution with one hundred and ninety-two member states. Unfortunately,

due to the veto power of the permanent five members, the “generality” of the system must be called into question as some breaches of the peace are not subject to the collective security system principally because they involve/concern one of the permanent members.

### **Responsibility to Protect**

The greatest advocate of the need to expand the UN’s collective security system to include armed humanitarian intervention is the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Deeply disturbed by the international community’s limited response to the Rwandan genocide, Srebrenica, Darfur and other intra-state conflicts that resulted in “gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity,” (Responsibility to Protect 2000: vii) he believes it is time to equate and translate these gross violations into threats to international peace and security. As we shall see, there is resistance to this concept.

First, the idea of intervening collectively with force in a state that is abusing its own people is not new – many argue it predates the Charter and is supported by early “just war” theory. This theory expounded the permissibility of war if the attacking states believed that their war was waged against an immoral enemy. This was considered ‘just cause.’ But, just war theory is now considered antiquated customary law that has since been supplanted by the Covenant of the League, various treaties such as the Kellogg–Briand Pact and, of course, the Charter (Dixon 2000: 294-295). These legal bodies outlaw traditional war to varying degrees. Reinterpreting these bodies of law to promote armed intervention for the purpose of ending human rights abuses requires counter-restrictionist (i.e. more liberal) interpretations of these international bodies of law that some states are hesitant to support.

Furthermore, states have not used the protection of innocent civilians as a reason to use military force consistently.\* Rather, the Security Council has preferred to decide each case on an individual basis and has shunned doctrinal constraints that force their collective hand. The problem for proponents of Responsibility to Protect is that numbers are simply not in their favour – a majority of states still believe that the principle of sovereignty, as enshrined in the Charter, protects states from interference in their domestic affairs – even if those states are engaged in the large-scale extermination of their own people. As well, adopting Responsibility to Protect as another pillar of the UN’s collective security system means that the Security Council now has a “responsibility” to act. There would be greater impetus on the Council to respond to massive human rights violations because Responsibility to Protect articulates when armed intervention is needed.

There have been many books and articles written on this new “responsibility” including Simon Chesterman’s “Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law” (2001) and Nicholas Wheeler’s “Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society” (2000) which are core texts. However, while they debate the legality of the “responsibility”, what is missing are the arguments that concretely transfer “gross

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\* Even though cases such as Vietnam’s war with Cambodia and Tanzania’s war against Uganda are used as early examples of “armed humanitarian intervention”, neither Vietnam nor Tanzania used the humanitarian imperative as their just cause. Rather, the reasons for war given by Vietnam and Tanzania were self-defence for breaches to the territorial integrity of the state.

violations” from Soul 2’s ‘respect for human rights UN in-basket’ to Soul 1’s ‘threats to peace and security in-basket’ that necessitates collective armed force. The HLP has revived this debate.

The *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS) and HLP both agree that regardless of whether a legal norm has developed or not, there is a growing international consensus that, under certain circumstances characterized by massive human rights abuses, a legitimate case for armed intervention is emerging. So long as states can make the fundamental shift in thinking from “sovereignty as authority” meaning “sovereignty as an unrivalled control over a delimited territory and the population residing within it” (Welsh 2002: 511) to “sovereignty as responsibility” meaning “sovereignty as conditional on a state demonstrating respect for a minimum standard of human rights” (Welsh 2002: 512) then a norm of responsibility to protect will emerge. If this shift can be made, then armed force can be employed legitimately.

Similar to the conclusion of Martha Finnemore (2003: 52-84), the HLP has concluded that norms and practices regarding armed interventions have and are in the process of changing. But is the UN’s current collective security system predicated on inter-state wars robust enough to accommodate a new pillar – the Responsibility to Protect? As we shall see, it is an awkward fit. Let us turn to the seven ideal elements once again.

### **The Seven Ideal Elements and the Responsibility to Protect**

1. The **prohibition to use force** is considered *jus cogens* (Dixon 2000: 38). Its exceptions, self-defence and/or to combat acts of aggression that threaten peace and security, are well-established customary rules of law (ibid: 28-38) that took years to develop. Humanitarian intervention as a collective practice has yet to be established. The great danger to expanding collective use of force for collective security to this new responsibility to protect is that it may weaken the entire system – the weakest link argument in other words. Restrictionists are still not convinced that states should meddle in the domestic affairs of another state. Using force to end massive human rights abuses may serve only as a guise for other purposes. In the eyes of some, it is better to restrict uses of collective force to very specific and well-established legal precedents than to run the risk of slippery-slope use of force for any and all purposes.
2. Adding a responsibility to protect does not change the second element, the **collective guarantee of security**. The same dilemmas are faced by this new principle as was discussed for collective security in general. The unknown is whether or not the Security Council is more or less likely to sanction the use of force for massive human rights abuses than for acts of aggression. New studies by the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden suggest that before the 1980s, UN peacekeepers were more likely to be sent for interstate rather than for intrastate conflicts. However, the number of intrastate conflicts (that are characterized by massive human rights abuses) has been on the rise and the international promotion of intrastate peace has only recently become more common than the promotion of inter-state peace (Heldt and Wallenstein 2004). This shows that the UN does equate intrastate conflict with threats to peace and security. Furthermore, another study by Gilligan and Stedman

suggest there is a positive relationship between, on the one hand, civil war duration and number of casualties and, on the other hand, the probability of a UN operation (Gilligan and Stedman 2003: 48; 50; 53). This suggests that “need” rather than great power interests may “condition UN decisions” (Heldt and Wallensteen 2004: 15). So, as long as the UN can be convinced that there is a need to intervene to protect civilians from massive human rights violations, there is a reasonable chance that the collective system will be invoked. While one can be accused of comparing apples and oranges (not all UN peacekeeping missions are collective security missions) and, of course, my analysis is cursory at this point, these statistics can be designated as points toward a win for responsibility to protect to be included in the greater collective security system.

3. **Collective Force as Deterrence/Sanction:** Unless states believe they will be threatened with armed force for not respecting the rights of their citizens, then deterrence in these cases cannot be achieved. This harkens back to the early discussion on the leap of legal faith to intervene thus contravening a state’s “domestic jurisdiction.” As well, the state that is accused of doing the abusing matters. Gilligan and Stedman have concluded that the UN is “significantly less likely to intervene in civil wars with large government armies” (Gilligan and Stedman 2003: 48). Power, therefore, must matter. Of course power also matters when discussing collective security – the system will not engage ‘superpowers’ or great power states because there is little chance of success. It would seem that the same chance of success is an important determinant for the responsibility to protect as well. Perhaps if the Janjaweed were not as strong, the UN would act? What is important to note is that military power discussions, thought to be “academic” now that the US is the sole superpower, still matter.
4. The fourth element, **automatism in collective security**, is a perennial problem for Responsibility to Protect. Why intervene in Somalia and not Rwanda, why Haiti and not Darfur? The third element raised a discussion regarding size of the state army, but an element of political will must also be considered as an impediment to the R2P. If Responsibility to Protect were adopted formally as a pillar of the collective security system, then a debate about using force to end the atrocities should, in theory, only focus on whether it is or is not the best means for ending the human rights violations and not whether it is or is not permissible. But would this mean that collective force would be used to stop human rights abuses? Political realities (who is the abuser, what is the state, where is the state etc.) are still factors that could “overrule” the Responsibility to Protect despite the legal green light.
5. **Anonymity of Aggressor and Victim** is the fifth element. The difficulty is that who or what constitutes the aggressor and the victim are radically different under Responsibility to Protect than under ideal collective security. The international community must consider individuals and non-state actors as potential aggressors and victims rather than just seeing states as the aggrieved and victimized. The UN is extremely reluctant to denounce the actions of individuals. Furthermore, the dilemma for the UN then becomes weighing the sacrifice of “blood and treasure” of

member states' armed forces against the lives of "strangers" (Wheeler 2000). The media has compounded such decisions by amassing public opinion to "do something".

6. **Assignability of Guilt:** Since the UN lacks its own intelligence forces (Sutterlin 2003: 19-21), it depends on member states and the Secretary General to bring situations of concern to the attention of the Security Council. It is not an obligation for states to report information that they might have regarding a certain situation. One may run into the perverse situation where potential aggressors are also members of the Security Council when an item that pertains to them is discussed. This limits the objectivity of other members of the Council to counter assertions that the situation is "under control". Which states are members of the Security Council does impact the assignability of guilt and the call for armed intervention.
7. **Permanency and Generality of the System** is the final element to consider. The UN Charter binds states only to refrain from the "threat or use of force" in "their international relations" and explicitly protects their "domestic jurisdiction" from outside interference. As a result, the 1990s were replete with examples of internal conflicts - civil wars, ethnic bloodletting and resurgent nationalism – against which the UN's collective security system chooses not to counter. At the same time, however, there were examples of cases when the Security Council did choose to intervene (e.g. Kurdish refugees flooding into Europe – especially France and Turkey - were one of the arguments for intervening and establishing no-fly zones in northern Iraq in 1991) (S/Res/688 1991). Over time, restrictionist thinking (i.e. conservative interpretations of the Charter) has held less weight in discussions in the Security Council. Slowly, the UN has adopted a new interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security representing an evolution in thinking.

Compared to the ideal system of collective security, the new principle of Responsibility to Protect, in its ultimate form as armed intervention for the purposes of protecting individuals, has an uncertain future. But, so did collective security during the Cold War. The key will be to what extent the UN is able to establish and impose the two other responsibilities that make up the responsibility to protect. These include the responsibility to prevent (addressing root causes), and the responsibility to rebuild (recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation so as not to slip back into a state of conflict); these Soul 2-type mandates are always preferred to armed conflict. If after a concerted effort to stop the conflict, Soul 2 scenarios fail, the Security Council must entertain the use of force as well as the possibility of a regime change. There is no point stopping a Pol Pot from killing his people only to leave him in-charge once the troops have left. And here represents the most difficult dilemma for R2P. Implicit in the doctrine is the need for regime change. Collective security, based on WWII thinking, is all about stopping the unilateral use of force and not promoting regime change and democratization. It is this expansion of the collective security system that will prove most difficult for the UN system.

The principle of responsibility to protect (really the responsibility to react according to the ICISS report) would, of course, be strengthened if each of these pre-requisites were met.

Certainly faith in the impartiality of the system (or the fifth subjective prerequisite) has been badly damaged by events in the 1990s including Somalia, Rwandan and Bosnia and continues to be damaged by the dithering surrounding Darfur. One cannot help but to conclude that black Africans are not worth as much as white Europeans – as unfair as this sounds (in fact and in analysis), the Sudan is a current example. While R2P does not undermine collective security elements *per se*, it would require that the Security Council define threats to peace and security to include massive human rights abuses. The Council may adopt such a new definition – all signs point to this. But, no one should be surprised when the Security Council chooses not to intervene despite a new definition. Let us next turn to an analysis of Feinstein and Slaughter's *Duty to Prevent*.

### **Duty to Prevent**

There is a lot of confusion about “duty to prevent” because two different “versions” have been promoted. The first, which this paper shall investigate, is the *Duty to Prevent* as collective military force directed at rogue states to eradicate the immediate threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists and/or the governing elite of these failed states. The second “challenge of prevention,” (*A More Secure World* 2004: 35; 40; 45; 50) outlined in the HLP, also applies to the elimination or control of WMD and terrorism but the focus is on collective actions short of force. For example, the HLP would be most pleased that the General Assembly, on April 13, 2005, adopted by consensus the text of the *International Treaty for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*, which makes it a crime for terrorists to possess or threaten to use nuclear weapons. This second duty to prevent is about strengthening the second soul of the UN and only advocates employing collective force in very particular circumstances once specific criteria of legitimacy are met and all non-violent forms of coercion have been exhausted.\* However, once collective force is used, it is no longer “prevention” according to the HLP. Feinstein and Slaughter are suggesting that the international community should not wait for the issue to be debated and transferred from the second soul prevention “in-basket” to the first soul action “in-basket”. In their opinion, WMD in the hands of rogue states and/or terrorists necessarily constitutes an immediate international threat and the use of force may be the only sensible solution to ensure peace and security. These authors have been influenced heavily by the current US President's doctrine of pre-emption and its use in the current Iraq war. While the Bush doctrine promotes unilateral action, Feinstein and Slaughter believe a collective armed response is the preferred preventative course of action because collective action is more “legitimate”.

According to Feinstein and Slaughter, current non-proliferation regimes have been ineffective. The result is the “unprecedented threat” posed by terrorists and rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction. Their suggestion is that a doctrine of armed anticipatory self-defence, conducted collectively rather than unilaterally, is a necessary new corollary to be added to the UN's collective security system. They argue that the threat posed by rogue states and closed societies headed by autocratic rulers pose immediate threats to

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\* The criteria as outlined in the HLP include: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences. These criteria, however, are not new. They represent the criteria of *jus ad bellum* which should apply to any inter-state (and now many say intra-state) armed conflicts. One would hope the Security Council has adopted these criteria already.

international peace and security because they are more likely to pursue possession of WMD, menace their own citizens and their neighbours (2004: 137). As a result, the threat to international peace and security is a direct link and does not require debate – it is all about disarming rogue states of potentially catastrophic weapons. They may have a point. However, is a “duty to prevent” as they envision amenable to the UN’s current collective security system? Again, the seven elements of an ideal collective security system will be applied to Feinsein and Slaughter’s new corollary.

### **The Seven Ideal Elements and the Duty to Prevent**

- 1) **Prohibition of use of force:** To be fair, Feinsein and Slaughter do not propose declaring war on rogue states immediately. Rather, they suggest states engage the usual diplomatic processes including diplomatic and economic sanctions first. However, given the track record of certain states – especially North Korea, Iran and Iraq, prohibition of force is not respected by these types of states and therefore, pre-emptive force should be used, according to the authors, to stem the spread of WMD to terrorists and other rogue states. Of course use of WMD is also a major concern and demands preventative force. For the authors, the time delay between measures short of force and force should be minimal. They make no comments about the need for a corresponding regime change. Rather, Feinsein and Slaughter argue that the Duty to Prevent concerns the eradication of WMD.
- 2) **Collective Guarantee of Security:** If the eleven-nation Proliferation Security Initiative is a measure of “collectiveness,” guaranteed collective security is highly unlikely. This “global” effort to stop the shipment of WMD, their delivery systems and related material at sea by air or on land is led by the Americans (Feinsein and Slaughter 2004: 146). The member nations include Australia, Japan, Poland, and Western European countries (including Canada). If only eleven countries are interested in stopping the spread of WMD, how many countries would be willing to send their soldiers to attack a rogue state in possession or suspected possession of WMD? The probable answer is very few; the method being the issue not so much the desire to stop the proliferation of WMD. Limited “coalitions of the willing” are likely the only bet in my opinion. Feinsein and Slaughter would likely disagree. They point to the EU’s “strategy against proliferation” announcement in June 2003 that identified “coercive measures, including as a last resort the use of force in accordance with the UN Charter” as a key element (Feinsein and Slaughter 2004: 148). The G-8 group has agreed that WMD and the spread of international terrorism are “the pre-eminent threat to international society” and that force was not out of the question (ibid: 148). Still, the EU and the G-8 states, though important, do not the UN make.
- 3) **Collective Force as Deterrence/Sanction:** Feinsein and Slaughter believe “keeping force on the table is often a critical ingredient in making diplomacy work” (2004: 47). Furthermore, in the opinion of Feinsein and Slaughter, the unmatched legitimacy of the UN Security Council to order force against rogue states makes it “...harder for targeted governments to evade [the Security Council] by playing political games.” The more likely scenario is that Security Council members are more likely to engage in

political games and delay any decisions to enforce “all necessary means”. Furthermore, states like North Korea are well aware of the international community’s reticence to engage them militarily. One must ask: who is in control? The UN or rogue states?

- 4) **Automatism of Collective Security:** It is one thing to threaten force against a small state. It is another to threaten the use of force on a small state, potentially armed with WMD and headed by a highly unpredictable ruler. One of the reasons why I believe North Korea has not been threatened with force is that there is no guarantee that Kim Jong Il will not launch nuclear weapons indiscriminately. Having proven he is not averse to killing his own people, why would he feel any compunction toward neighbouring enemies and potential adversaries? No one wants another war in Korea so states are extremely reticent to go so far as to wage war. Of course, North Korea is just one example but the authors see it as the archetypical example for application of this new corollary. I am not convinced that automatism of armed force is assured, however.
- 5) **Anonymity of Aggressor and Victim:** The Duty to Prevent represents the antithesis of this element. The duty to prevent is directed at closed, weak or rogue states with WMD that lack “internal checks.” The list is small but includes North Korea and Iran (Iraq having been “dealt” with already). Furthermore, the authors suggest that it would be folly to direct attention to China (and one would presume India, Pakistan, Israel, the US, France or the UK) because there is little chance of success in disarming these states. So much for anonymity. But the point of collective security is not to rid the world of WMDs, but to what extent states with WMDs have sufficient and robust internal checks (read democracy). Collective security is about minimizing the use of force. India, Israel, the US, France and the UK have sufficient internal checks; Pakistan and China arguably do not have sufficient checks. The danger with a Duty to Prevent becomes the possibility of moving beyond the management of WMDs to the establishment of acceptable state governance models, which is beyond the scope of collective security.

As for the victim, the duty to prevent is not particularly concerned with the citizens of these rogue states (although Feinstein and Slaughter readily accept that rogue states usually abuse their citizens terribly). The victims in this case are what Buzan would refer to as “strong states” (1991: 96-107). This new pillar is about saving and securing states. From this perspective, this does correspond to the goals of collective security.

- 6) **Assignability of Guilt:** This may be the only element that has a chance of success. When it comes to rogue states like North Korea and Iran, most states can agree who they are. However, not all states are willing to make the jump that these states represent threats to *international* peace and security and not just a local security concern for surrounding states. Rather, some suggest that by just leaving them alone, the world order status quo can remain rather happily. I refer to this as the “laissez-faire” theory. However, as more and more states reveal they have the technology and appetite for WMD, is laissez-faire a wise, international strategy? Buzan would

argue that it is preferable for the world order for every state to have nuclear weapons than for just a few to possess them. Politically, however, this is not a popular mantra to adopt.

- 7) **Permanency and Generality of System:** There is a fear that if the UN pursues the doctrine of duty to prevent as envisioned by Feinsein and Slaughter, states may chose to leave the UN rather than pursue this new corollary. Perhaps this is why the HLP tread rather more gingerly than Feinsein and Slaughter and presented a less force-driven version of “duty to prevent” with respect to failing/rogue states and terrorism.

Rather than a defensive, reactive response of force to an established collective threat, a Duty to Prevent would require an offensive, preventative response of force to a potential collective threat. This would require a significant change of thinking on the part of states if the current UN collective security system were to be used. Not only does it require states to act before a traditional act of aggression takes place, but the threat may never be realized. In which case, states would be engaging in war against another state without the necessary threat to peace and security. Furthermore, the use of force is switched from a defensive posture to an offensive one. To be fair, a right of anticipatory self-defence has been evident in international law for some time, made famous by the *Caroline Case*. The *Caroline* was an American ship that had been used by Canadian rebels to harass the authorities in Canada in the 1840s. While it was moored in an American port close to the Canada/US border, it was attacked by the British and destroyed. The legality of the action was raised when Great Britain sought the release of one of the men involved in the attack. The US’s representative, Mr. Webster, wrote a letter to his British counterpart, Mr. Fox. Webster’s formulation in this letter is regarded as the *locus classicus* of anticipatory self-defence (Dixon and McCorquodale 1991: 561-562). A right of self-defence would be recognized by the Americans if the British could prove that the threat posed by the *Caroline* was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation” (Dixon and McCorquodale 1991: 562).

It would seem prudent for Feinsein and Slaughter to include these four criteria, outlined by Mr. Webster, in their duty to prevent. My assumption, however, is that the authors would promote a use of force before this moment of brinkmanship because of the destructive nature of WMD – presumably, they would argue that WMD pose a much greater and wide-spread threat than a ship of rebels armed with swords and pistols.

Turning to a review of the prerequisites, we find that several large changes must be made in order for a duty to prevent to be accommodated by the UN’s current collective security system. The first (rationality/goodness of man) and fifth (impartiality of the system) prerequisites would require re-thinking for a duty to prevent since states are specifically targeted because they are weak and/or the government/governing elite is/are incapable or unwilling to maintain law and order. The implicit assumption of duty to prevent is that certain individuals are barbarous and untrustworthy. As well, the ninth prerequisite (legality of the concepts and procedures) requires a particular note of discussion. A Duty to Prevent, as conceived by Feinsein and Slaughter, is really a form of collective (offensive) self-defence and, as such, is different from collective security. Collective self-defence (as is practiced by

NATO) is meant to be an emergency response to an emergency situation, but, according to Dixon, “[self defence] also implies that the ‘defender[s]’ is entitled to use force for so long as it is threatened” (Dixon 2000: 317). Collective security, on the other hand, is concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. The right of self-defence is superseded by collective action under Chapter VII once the Security Council is “seized” of the matter. However, collective security does not guarantee that peace and security will be restored or that the *status quo ante* will be achieved. Returning once again to the warning of Inis Claude, states must be willing to give up a significant portion of their sovereignty to participate in a collective security system. The portion of the sovereignty they forgo is the independence of decision-making to use or not to use force to protect the state. However, as it has proven inconsistent, no state would put all their eggs in collective security system basket and would likely support the option of acting more quickly with a “coalition of the willing” even if it is at the expense of the UN’s credibility.

Furthermore, the main threat to be challenged is a weapon, terrorist group or weak government. It is not a state as is the normal aggressor under a collective security system. As we have seen analysing the Responsibility to Protect principle, changing the ‘type’ of aggressor from state to individual(s) is not a transition that is easily made. Reviewing the “fit” of the Duty to Prevent with the seven, ideal elements, it is not at all certain that it can or should be adopted as a fourth pillar to the UN’s current collective security system.

## **Conclusion**

This paper examined the UN’s collective security system. In the early days of the Charter, threats assumed to be limited to states bent on war. The appropriate action was a collective response of a threat of violent force to counter the aggressor and deter future aggressors. So long as power is diffused amongst the states and states are willing to cede sovereignty to the collectivity, then collective security would ensure the safety and security of the world order. This, however, is an ideal position and rarely is it a realistic one.

Since the number of intrastate conflicts has increased and because of the events of 9/11, many are suggesting that what constitutes a threat to international peace and security be re-examined. War is no longer the main preoccupation of states. Rather, poverty, infectious diseases, bloody civil war, weapons of mass destruction and terrorist cells are “the gravest threats to the [world’s] survival and well-being [of individuals]” (*A More Secure World* 2004: 12). In response to these cries for changes, the Secretary General configured a high level panel that would refashion and renew the UN to better meet these threats.

The High Level Panel authored a report that recommended the expansion of the UN’s collective security system to be broader and more comprehensive. The authors recommended that an additional pillar be added called the Responsibility to Protect. Lee Feinstein and Anne Marie Slaughter have also suggested another pillar be added called the Duty to Prevent. With these two additional pillars, presumably, all of these new threats would be covered and the threat of deadly force authorized by the UN would ensure peace, stability and the world order status quo.

What we have concluded from the analysis, however, is that it is not simply a question of adding new pillars to the old UN security system. Firstly, the system was designed to counter very different threats. Secondly, the ideal elements of collective security were never fully realized by the UN's system. Thirdly, states have not demonstrated a level of willingness to accept these new pillars as has been witnessed by the dithering in Darfur (a test case for Responsibility to Protect – to date, a disaster) and the latest war in Iraq (a test case for the Duty to Prevent - in some ways successful if adopted by a "Coalition of the Willing). Perhaps the fault lies not with the new pillars but with the will of the member states of the Security Council to act. The Security Council is not limited by the Charter as to what constitutes "a threat to peace and security" (*Charter 1945, Art.39*) But, in practice, military force under Chapter VII is used carefully and advisedly. While the number of armed UN interventions has increased, some critics would say the Security Council has been too "mean" in their assessments as to what constitutes a threat that requires force.

While the UN has now adopted a Responsibility to Protect framework one must remember the urging of Claude, Naidu and others not to employ collective security for the enforcement of just any international norms. If collective security is to be employed, especially armed intervention, then it must be to preserve and protect "international peace and security." Therefore, advocates of the *Responsibility to Protect* and *Duty to Prevent* doctrines must present their cases to all states as hitherto new mechanisms to counter the new threats to international peace and security. Furthermore, it must be proven that the UN's collective security system, as opposed to some other alliance system, is best placed to preserve the peace. While the Responsibility to Protect converges (albeit awkwardly) with the seven, ideal elements of collective security, the Duty to Prevent represents a radical departure from many of the elements. It is therefore recommended that while the Responsibility to Protect may be adopted in theory, the Duty to Prevent is likely to clash within the current confines of the UN system. Ultimately, states must ask: can these new pillars strengthen international peace and security? Only they can answer this question legitimately.

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## **Support for European Membership in the New Candidate Countries**

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*Is European Membership supported in candidate countries? Up until now a lot has been written on support for European integration and explanations for it within European Union Member States. Considering three candidate countries – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – and focusing on the economic calculus of costs and benefits and national-European identity theories, this paper analyses public opinion support for European Membership. The main results, obtained using the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4 dataset, and applying a logistic regression model, shown that the economic model better explains the support for European integration than does the identity model. National identity does not affect the support at all; it is not significant in any of the models elaborated.*

### **Introduction**

The interest in investigating public opinion feelings regards European Community<sup>\*</sup>, is evident since early 1970s. Notwithstanding, pioneer explanations for this support have been elaborated only starting from 1990s, when researchers become confidential with the idea that, previously, the role of public opinion was underestimated in spite of the development of European Union as political actor (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998). Generally, these researches focus on the member states of the Community, while the principal aim of this paper is to analyze the support in three candidate countries before an eventual accession: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

The support for European Integration, since 1990s, is one of the most important fields of research in European Union studies focusing on the trend of support and on reasons behind some changes. In this work I focus on the support for integration in the pre-accession phase starting from the rejection of the idea that citizens merely provide a “Permissive consensus” that enabled elites to pursue the European ideal unconstrained by pressure from the public. In this way, to study public support among Candidate Counties can be useful not only “to show us to what extent the public is aware of European Politics and to what extent it accepts the European Community’s power” (Janssen 1991: 443), but also to look at the future of the Community and its expansion (Anderson 1998).

The years of reference are the so-called “years of Europeanization” a period similar to the 1950s and 1960s for Western countries (*cf.* Ammendola and Isernia 2005), and the idea is to see if, in these countries, the reasons to support E.U. are the same moving the member states

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\* Questions regards the European Community were asked only in the early period of European integration, starting from the 60s, European Community is substituted by European Union.

or not.

Using a Eurobarometer survey on candidate countries in 2003<sup>\*</sup>, the principal aim is to give an answer to the following questions: *Is the European Membership perceived as a good think in these countries? And if yes, can we apply the same models elaborated in overall Europe to explain this support?*

In order to do so, the paper is divided into two main parts: the first one, theoretical, in which I will determine the hypotheses, and the second one, empirical, in which I elaborate and explain the model of analysis in those countries. What emerges from the analysis is that the economic expectations and the identification with Europe affect the support with a similar extent, while, the national identity does not affect the support for Europe in the hypothesized negative way.

## **1. Framework of analysis**

Several explanations on the support for the European Integration, among member states, have been elaborated, but economic explanations have been the most developed.

The utilitarian explanations build on trade theory, conceptualize a calculus of economic costs and benefits, assuming that “individual support for European Integration is determined by expectations of economic gain associated with membership” (Ehin 2001: 34).

Another explanation, the so-called “affective one” (*cf.* Domm 2004), draws on cultural influences, individual values and belief system. This explanation, based on psychology of group membership, focuses on “how social identities including, above all, national identity, constrain support for European Integration” (Hooghe and Marks 2005: 2).

Focusing on these two theories, I analyze the impact of these two sets of explanations on public support for European Integration in candidate countries and which of the two theories can explain better it.

### **1.1 Utilitarian Explanation of support**

The economic or utilitarian model appears in early 1990s, when Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), following the traditional economic voting hypothesis<sup>†</sup>, argued that Europeans assess their EC membership based on evaluations of their personal and national economic situations. Afterward, the model was developed (*cf.* Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998a,b,c), focusing “on two sources of support for Integration: economic conditions and economic benefits associated with membership in European Union” (Anderson 1998: 572). The main assumption of the model is that support is the consequence of an evaluation of costs and benefits associated with integration and explained in terms of advantages and sacrifices implied by it.

In this sense, it is argued that the European mass public associates national economic performance with the integration process. So, as well as in a business cycle, national levels of support are higher when domestic economic conditions are favorable (Eichenberg and Dalton

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<sup>\*</sup> In the following pages quoted as CCEB 2003.4.

<sup>†</sup> The economic voting theory was elaborated in the field of electoral behaviour but adopted also elsewhere. The main idea is that vote (and in this case support for investigation) is a function of economic variable (inflation, unemployment, GDP growth) (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

1993) and individuals who assess economic performance favorably are more inclined to be supportive of integration (Gabel and Whitten 1997).

Another important aspect of the economic model is the distinction between subjective and objective evaluation of economic condition meaning the different impact of national economic condition and the personal one, in fact, as demonstrated by Gabel and Whitten “regardless of how beneficial European Union policy is for its citizens, support will vary with perceptions of the economy” (1997: 92). Hence, notwithstanding the different point of view of these analysis focused on the economic impact on Support for European Union, surely, it is possible to admit that the economic model affects support for integration in a strong way.

The idea to test the economic model in Candidate countries, which economic condition clearly cannot be affected by European Union, is based on Ehin’s suggestion that “individual support for European integration is determined by expectations on economic gain associated with membership” (2001: 34), for this reason, in this work will be considered expectations regards national and personal economic conditions. This is because, on one hand, in the general framework of economic voting there are assumed some differences between sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of economic conditions (*cfr.* Gabel and Whitten 1997). While, on the other hand, there is a controversy regards the operationalisation of this variable with one or both these aspects of the same phenomenon (Carey and Lobo 2000). Hence, assuming that the national economic perception has an impact higher than the personal economic one on support for E.U. membership (Gabel and Whitten (1997) the hypotheses tested in the next pages are the following:

*H1: the better the expectation of the national economic condition the greater the support for integration will be;*

*H2: the better the expectation of the personal financial situation the greater the support for integration will be.*

## **1.2 National identity**

Another important body of research focuses on the impact of national identity. Generally, some accusations pointed at European Union are that citizens of European member states have rarely had any direct involvement in the major decisions made in their name, and mostly there is a lack of accountability of its institutions. Therefore, the existence of this democratic deficit is a serious problem for the legitimacy of European Union; hence, the presence (absence) of a European Identity can increase (decrease) support for European Integration (Deflem and Pampel 1996).

In fact, on one hand, the persistence of the nation-states coincides with a persistence of national identity, conceived as the subjective representation of allegiance toward one’s country (*Ibidem*). So, if national identity persists, citizens of industrialized countries of Europe today will favor or disfavor political regimes, national and supranational, on the basis of perceived worth they have for their own countries (Gabel and Palmer 1995). While, on the other hand, the emergence of a cosmopolitan or collective political identity within the European Community would reinforce this general trend toward post-national identity.

Therefore, who has a national identity is less supportive of European Integration than who has a post-national, European or cosmopolitan identity (Deflem and Pampel 1996).

Usually, surveys of European public opinion reveal very little evidence of any European identity showing how Europeans still appear to be attached to their national identity rather than to Europe. Also in my sample, in fact, the percentage of who feels attached to Europe is 67%, while the percentage of who feels him/herself attached to his/her own country is about 94%, as we will see.

Looking at the theories elaborated in this field, one of the earlier formulations of the national identity theory was McLaren's model (2002). Assuming that utilitarian and cost/benefits models miss a large part of the core nature of hostility toward the idea of European Integration, he argues that antipathy toward European Union reflects fear of or hostility toward other cultures, and it can be considered as a powerful explanation of support for European integration. In this sense, not only the economy matters, but, thinking about issue of European Integration, people are concerned also with problems related to the degradation of nation-states. The idea is that people see their nation-state as the appropriate reference point for identity, and the terminal community (Deutch 1966; Petus and Hunals 1999 in Carey 2002), and it is possible that they perceive European Union as undermining their nation-states integrity. In other words, although the utilitarian approach is relevant in predicting attitudes toward European Union, also a high threat perception produces equally strong, but negative effects on support for European Union.

Concluding, also in this field there is a general consensus regarding the fact that National identity affects the support for European Integration in a negative fashion while European Identity affects the support in a positive way. Therefore, it is important to test also these two hypotheses, as they have been accounted for in the literature:

*H3: the greater the feeling of national identity, the lower the support for European integration will be;*

*H4: the greater the feeling of European identity, the greater the support for European Integration will be.*

However, I expect to find a different pattern, because of the sample of countries selected. In other words, we cannot forget that the European history in the last years has been characterized by important changes; and the most important one is the last integration phase that changes European Union from a community of 15 member states to a community of 25 members with more differences.

Hence, remembering that the Eurobarometer selected is the last one just before this enlargement and that the countries selected are candidates, it is a little bit hard to assume that in these countries European Union is perceived as a threat for their nation as it was for Western States in the 1950s or 1960s. In other words, it is important to consider that in a period of continuous enlargements, particularly considering candidate countries, national identity may not exercise an impact as it was in the past in other countries.

### 1.3 More explanatory factors

Apart from the two most important theories, anyway, by the time scholars have proposed other alternative models considering mostly the political cues such as the domestic politics, the support for government and so on, as factors of influence on support. One of those “alternative studies” is Anderson’s research (1998) on domestic attitudes toward European Union and citizens’ lack of information. Starting from the assumption that European mass publics are not particularly well-informed about or aware of the integration process, but more informed and with more crystallized opinions about domestic politics, Anderson develops a model of public opinion that portrays citizens as using the context of domestic politics to form opinions about European Integration process.

The basic line of argument is that, since only “few citizens possess the kinds of cognitive structures required for the level of information that many economic models presume” (Anderson 1998: 574), usually, people fill their knowledge gaps by using proxies when responding to questions about the integration process. In other words, Anderson argues that generally not very well informed citizens view the integration process through the lens of how they feel about their own political system, political parties and, to a lesser extent, their government (system support hypothesis).

For this reason, in my model it will be considered not only the level of education but also some factors regarding the evaluation of the domestic politics, definable as political cues to evaluate and support the process of integration.

Finally, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) has demonstrated that the system support hypothesis has not captured the right sign of the relationship because it did not control for supranational variables. According to the scholar, it is important to consider the benefits coming from Europe. In other words, since European Union produces some benefits that are not available at the domestic level, for instance peace, economic well-being, political stability and so on, “the greater the benefits associated with European Union, the greater the support for the integration process” (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000: 151). In this sense:

...all other things being equal, the better the opinion citizens’ have of the European institutions, the stronger their support for integration. And the better their opinion of their national institutions, the less the support for integration (*Ibidem*: 152)

Therefore, to conclude and complete the analysis, I am going to introduce in a second step some supranational variables that directly account for the evaluation and feelings of Europe, to see if and in which way they are able to change the relationship between domestic politics and support for Europe.

In this kind of analysis, generally, scholars expect higher support for integration in those countries that have little to lose from transferring national sovereignty to European Union level, such as those countries with problems like corruption, poor performance of the state, low responsiveness of political parties. Countries with low corruption, an efficient democracy,

a highly developed welfare state, instead, might be more reticent with respect to the integration project.

Hence, contrary to Anderson (1998), which demonstrates that domestic variables such as satisfaction with democracy have a positive impact on the support for European integration, Sánchez-Cuenca shows that this findings are not real because he has not controlled for supranational factors. In fact, in his view, controlling for these supranational variables, the sign of the relationship will be inverted, it means that a better opinion of national government produces a decrease in support for integration.

In order to control for all these factors, I am going to consider the following variables: the knowledge of Europe and the level of education in order to see if the level of education and consequently the level of knowledge of Europe affect the support, so I expect that:

*H5: the higher the level of education and the higher the knowledge of Europe, the greater the support for European integration will be.*

Secondly, to see if really a lack of knowledge is substituted by the evaluation of the institutions' performance I will use the satisfaction with the way democracy works in the own country hypothesizing that:

*H6: The higher the satisfaction with democracy in country the higher the support for European integration will be.*

Finally, considering Sánchez-Cuenca's argumentation of supranational control, I will introduce in a second step, more variables regarding the level of information on European matters, the level of confidence in Europe and the satisfaction with the way democracy works in Europe, to see if and how the founded relationship varies.

## **2. The empirical model**

### **2.1 Data, Research Design and Case Selection**

Following the current literature elaborated for member countries, the idea is to elaborate a model for the new candidate countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. To do this, I use the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4 (October-November 2003) dataset, which includes both economic indicators and national/European identity variables. The choice to consider these three candidate countries is justified by the fact that looking at the pre-accession stage of 5 new candidate countries<sup>\*</sup>, in 2003, the Commission states that Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have made significant progress towards meeting the accession criteria<sup>†</sup>. In fact, as stated by the official documents, accession negotiations are well advanced with

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<sup>\*</sup> Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Turkey ([http://europa.eu.int/abc/governments/index\\_en.htm#candidate](http://europa.eu.int/abc/governments/index_en.htm#candidate)).

<sup>†</sup> Continuing enlargement: Strategy paper and Report of the European Commission on progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (COM (2003) 676 final - Not published in the Official Journal).

Bulgaria and Romania, and will continue on the basis of the same principles that guided the negotiations with the ten countries\* that joined Europe in 2004. For this reason, European Union supports Bulgaria and Romania's ambition to become members in 2007<sup>†</sup>, while for Turkey is established to make further progress in compliance with the accession criteria.

Looking at the political criteria, it is important to underline that in 2003, both Bulgaria and Romania have continued to comply with the accession criteria even if corruption remains a problem in both countries and some problems regards the living conditions of disadvantaged people still persist in Bulgaria, while in Romania, main problems were related to huge administrative procedures, lack of transparency and inadequate capacity to apply policies (Com. (2003) - 676 final). Turkey, on the other hand, has accelerated legislative reform to comply with the political criteria. However, also in this country further efforts are needed to close the gap between legislation and practice, and in particular, as stated by the European Commission, to solve the Cyprus problem that otherwise, could be a serious obstacle to Turkey joining Europe<sup>‡</sup>.

For all these reasons, at the beginning of 2004 the European Commission has presented a three-year financial framework for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, and financial assistance to Turkey of € 1.050 million for the period 2004-2006.

This is the reason why I will consider all these countries even if the accession has been arranged for Bulgaria and Romania and not yet decided for Turkey.

## 2.2 Dependent Variable

Generally, the question, in the Eurobarometer survey used as an indicator of the support for the integration process is the following:

*“Generally speaking, do you think (our country’s) membership is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?”*

Usually, scholars adopted also other measures of the support for integration, and they are:

- *Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of European Union?*
- *In general, does European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?*

In this case, since the countries under study are candidates, the questions were posed in a different but similar way:

- *Generally speaking, do you think that (Country)’s membership of European*

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\* Estonia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

<sup>†</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press\\_corner/newsletter/index\\_en.htm#a4](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/newsletter/index_en.htm#a4).

<sup>‡</sup> As we can see also in the political agenda of the European Commission in those days:

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press\\_corner/newsletter/index\\_en.htm#a1](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/newsletter/index_en.htm#a1)

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press\\_corner/newsletter/index\\_en.htm#a2](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/newsletter/index_en.htm#a2).

- Union would be...? (a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad)*
- *Do you think that becoming a member of European Union would bring (country)...? (many more advantages, more advantages, as many advantages as disadvantages, more disadvantages, much more disadvantages)*
  - *And, in general, do you have a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image of European Union?*

Looking at the correlation (Table 1) between the dependent variable and the other two variables emerges that they are strongly correlated, overall the countries and in each of the three countries. This means that surely the variable selected is a good indicator of the concept I want to analyze. Other scholars, analyzing different data with different techniques, found same correlations and results (*cf.* Deflem and Pampel 1996; Gabel 1998b). So, I use E.U. membership question as dependent variable.

The dependent variable consists of ordered categorical responses<sup>\*</sup>, with an overall distribution of support equals to: 78% in favor, 16% indifferent and only 6% contrary (Tab. 2). Hence, surely there is a difference between these three candidate countries and the members of the Community, in fact within the 10 countries that become members in 2004<sup>†</sup>, the percentages of who thinks that E.U. membership is a good thing falls to a level of 56%, and in the 15 previous European Union members it falls to 51%<sup>‡</sup>. However, if it is consider the pre-accession or early accession period of Western European countries, it is possible to see how these percentages are quite similar, in fact in the 1970s the average of support in Europe was 82% (*cf.* Ammendola and Isernia 2005).

According to these elements, hence, I can surely admit that in 2003 the level of support for European Integration is much higher in these three candidate countries than in the members and candidates which membership was arranged for the following year.

Looking instead at the differences between countries, the country whit more supporters of European Integration is Romania, where 87% of respondents are in favor of E.U. membership, while the lower level of support is reached in Turkey (70%), but in any case higher than in member states.

Since I want to know how to explain the probability to support European integration, in order to elaborate my model<sup>§</sup> I have recoded it as a dummy one considering on one hand, the answer *“European Union is a good thing”* and on the other hand the other two possible answers together (*a bad thing and neither good nor bad*).

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<sup>\*</sup> 1 = a bad thing ; 2 = neither good nor bad ; 3 = a good think; Details on the variables used in this analysis will be given under request at formichelli@unisi.it

<sup>†</sup> Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latria, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

<sup>‡</sup> Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Finland EB60.1 (2003.4).

<sup>§</sup> The model will be a logistic regression.

### 2.3 Independent Variables

Looking at the independent variables it is possible to see how they differ among these countries. Regarding the economic explanation of public support for European Union, I am going to consider both the national economic perception and the personal financial situation, remembering the distinction between sociotropic and egocentric evaluation of economy (*cf.* Gabel and Whitten 1997). Since for these countries European Union has established a financial assistance since 2004, I am going to consider the expectation for the following year as explanatory factors. The questions are:

*What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2004 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to:*

- *the economic situation in (country)*
- *the financial situation of your household*

The only country with a positive feeling regarding economy is Turkey. Only in this case, the percentages of who thinks that the general economic condition and his financial situation will be better (respectively 43.1 and 40.4 Tab.3.), is greater than the percentages of who thinks that they will be the same or worse (respectively 39,2 and 20,4 for the economic condition and 28,9 and 28 for the personal financial situation). In Bulgaria the majority thinks that the economic condition (49,8%) and the personal financial situation (54,5%) will be the same, and in Romania 35,8% of the respondents think that the economic condition will be worse while 42,3% think that the personal financial situation will be the same.

To see if, and in which way, these variables have an impact on the general level of support I firstly make a bi-variate analysis, differentiating it by country. What emerges is that in all the countries, increasing the feeling of an improvement of the economic condition of the own country, the percentages of who thinks that the membership in the European Community is a good thing increases. The percentage of who thinks that European Union is a good thing increases in average of about 18 percentage points moving from who thinks that the economic situation will be worse to who has a more positive view (Tab. 4a.b.c). This suggests that there is a relationship between the two variables, and this is confirmed by the Chi-square tests significant at the 0.001 level in each country. Therefore, this preliminary analysis confirms the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the expectation of the national economic condition and the support for the European membership.

Looking at the personal economic condition, it emerges that there is a similar pattern while, as hypothesized, the difference in percentage points is lower than before. The difference between who thinks that European Union is a good thing decreases in average of about 4 percentage points moving from who expects a worse financial situation to who expect a better one for 2004 (Tab.5a.b.c.). Hence, even if also the personal financial situation influences the support for the European integration, the perception of the national economic situation has a greater impact. Also in this case the findings are corroborated by the chi-square tests, all significant at the 0.001 level.

Looking, instead, at the two variables regarding the identity, both National and European, the variables chosen are:

*People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to European Union. Please tell me how attached you feel...*

- to (our country)?
- To Europe

After recoding them<sup>\*</sup>, first, the level of attachment with the own country is much more grater than the level of attachment with Europe. In fact, considering all the countries together, there is a difference of about 31 percentage points (Tab.6a.b.), but the percentage of who feels attached to Europe is anyway high. In average 66.9% of the overall population feels attached to Europe, even if still candidates and not member countries.

Looking at the differences between countries, while the level of attachment to the own country is similar and higher than 93% in all the countries, the level of attachment to Europe varies much more in fact, Turkey is the less attached (40.7%), and Romania is the most attached one (88.5%), with a percentage almost double than in Turkey. A phenomenon that is quite understandable if we simple think at the state of accession in the three countries considered.

Analyzing, finally, the relationship between identity and E.U. support, in a bi-variate way, contrary to our opinion, it seems that there is no relationship between the attachment to the country and the support for European integration, as suggested by the non-significance of the chi-square (Tab.7a.b.c.). Notwithstanding, moving from who is not attached to who is attached to his own country, the probability to think European Union as a good thing increases of about 9 percentage point. Maybe other factors influence this relationship.

In the second case – that hypothesizes a positive relationship between E.U. membership and the attachment to Europe - the relation is significant and it is, as expected, positive. Among who feels him/herself attached to Europe, in fact, the probability to think that E.U. membership is a good think is 26 percentage points greater than among who does not feel attached to Europe. Also in this case the higher level of chi-square and its significance at the 0,001 level allows as to surely admit that there is a relationship (Tab.8a.b.c.), in all the countries analyzed.

## **2.4 Analysis and results**

Now, a logistic model will be elaborated in order to investigate which factors among those presented earlier, will increase the probability that people support the E.U. membership.

The model will be estimated three times. In the first model our predicting variables are the evaluation of the economic situation, both personal and national, the attachment to the own country and to Europe, and as control variables, the level of education and the democratic satisfaction in the country. In the second one, I will introduce a supranational control, which concerns variables regarding the satisfaction with democracy in Europe, felling of confidence

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\* Considering together “not attached at all” and “not very attached” on one hand and on the other hand “fairly attached” and “very attached”, cause of the low percentages of the responses.

in Europe and the knowledge and attention to European news. Finally, in the third model, I will add the countries as a final control.

Looking at the overall model, the first thing to see is the goodness of fit ( $R^2$ ) that tells how well the model predicts the results. Since, as said, the model is a logistic one we have not the  $R^2$  as in a linear regression, but we have several different measures of pseudo  $R^2$ . Considering McFadden's\*  $R^2$ , in our case, the first model explains about the 13% of the variation, while adding new variables, firstly the supranational control and secondly the countries, the model explains better the variation which percentage explicated is about 30%. This means that not only the national variables have little explicative power but also that controlling for variables directly linked with Europe, its knowledge and satisfaction, as suggested by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000), the explicative power of the model (Tab. 9), is more than doubled. But, as we know, the pseudo- $R^2$  simple considers the value supposed to be the  $R^2$  in a linear regression, for this reasons many doubts persists on its validity, so another important measure of goodness of the model, is the probability of cases correctly predicted (CountR). This means how much better is this model despite the no-model (the probability of that event without predicting variables)<sup>†</sup>.

Considering, hence, the percentage of cases correctly predicted, the 1<sup>st</sup> model correctly predicts 80% of cases, while the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> improve this percentage of 5 percentage points. This result, actually, does not surprise us because, since the dependent variable is a dichotomous one, it is difficult to improve the percentage of cases correctly predicted when it is high also in the first model. More interestingly is to consider the reduction of error by the model, that is, how much our model can reduce the error of the no-model. In this case I have that from a reduction of error of 7% in the first model (Adj, Count  $R^2$ , tab.9), in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and in the 3<sup>rd</sup> models this percentages increases to a level of about 20%. This means that overall the introduction of the supranational control improves the goodness of fit, in the sense that it explains better the support for European integration.

Looking at the coefficients, not all of them are significant as it was in the by-variate analysis. Considering both the *z value*<sup>‡</sup> and the *Wald test*<sup>§</sup>, in fact, the results shown how the economic expectation has an influence as hypothesized, while the financial expectation has not significance at all<sup>\*\*</sup>, as well as the attachment to the country.

On the other hand, attachment to Europe, satisfaction with democracy in the own country, and the level of education have all the hypothesized effect on the support. This means that

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\* McFadden's  $R^2$  is the likelihood ratio index that compares a model with just the intercept to a model with all parameters so:  $R^2_{McF} = 1 - (\ln\hat{L}(M_{Full}) / \ln\hat{L}(M_{intercept}))$ . Since this measure of  $R^2$  is the most analogous to the sum of squares for linear regression analysis, it's not sensitive to the base rate and unlike the unadjusted measures of pseudo  $R^2$ , it varies between 0 and 1, I will use this measure of fit as the most appropriate for logistic regression (cfr. Menard 2001 p.27).

<sup>†</sup> For more details on the selection of the Pseudo  $R^2$ <sup>see</sup> Menard (2001), Long *et al.* (2003).

<sup>‡</sup> for each value of the variable, Tab.9.

<sup>§</sup> for the variable as a whole, when it has two or more dummies, Tab.10.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Except for one isolated case in Romania, according to which who thinks his/her personal economic situation will be worse is less supportive of who thinks it will be the same.

the more a person thinks that the economic condition will be better, the more (s)he supports the European membership. Similarly, the more (s)he is attached to Europe, the more (s)he supports the membership of his/her country in Europe. The attachment to the own country, instead, has not the negative hypothesized impact on the support. Hence, differently from member states, these countries do not identify their national government as a cue to evaluate Europe, probably due to their status of “candidates” and so there is not the kind of link between the European government and the national one, evident, instead in the member states.

Secondly, it emerges that they do not perceive European Union as a threat for their nation-state, as it was for the other states in the early years of the community. While, the satisfaction with the way democracy works in the own country exercises the expected impact on the probability to support the European integration. Finally, the level of education exercises an important effect on the support, in fact, both those who has a high (university) and a medium (secondary school) level of education are more supportive of who has a low level of education, as hypothesized. In other words, the probability to support E.U. membership increases increasing the level of education.

Considering the coefficients of the second model elaborated, the only variable that loses its power of explanation despite the first model is the level of education, while all the new variables considered have a significant impact. This suggest us that the previous influence considered is spurious because they are the variables related to Europe that affects the support rather than the education even if it is possible to consider the education as an antecedent variable, in the sense that the education affects the attention and the knowledge of Europe\* that than affects the support.

More aspects emerge considering the supranational variables and they are:

- confidence in Europe, as expected, exercises a greater impact on the support as well as the satisfaction with democracy in European Union, meaning that the probability to support European Union is greater among who confidence in Europe.
- the satisfaction with democracy in Europe, quite surprisingly, has an impact different from the one hypothesized, in fact it emerges that the more unsatisfied the people is with democracy in Europe the more they support Europe.

Therefore, our first conclusion is that in these candidate countries, if considered together, the evaluation of Europe rather than the perceived economic condition or the so-called domestic cues affects the support for the process of integration. Finally, in the third model, I introduced the country variables. The empirical results confirm that it really applies in all the countries considered<sup>†</sup>. Now, to conclude, I consider the effect of single variables in some particular conditions, since, as we know, our model - based on probability- changes according to the different situation we are looking at.

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\* The  $\chi^2$  in both cases has significance and from an high value of Kendall's Tau b, it emerges that increasing the level of education increases also the attention or the knowledge of Europe.

<sup>†</sup> The z score of the dummies regarding Bulgaria and Romania and regards the constant (where there is Turkey) have all significance at the 0.05 level.

Regards the economic condition, all the other things being equal\*, the probability to support European Union increases of about 9 percentages point (Tab.11) passing from who thinks the economy will be worse to who thinks it will be better. This result confirms that the national economic perception in the model still exercises an impact on E.U. support even if it is not intense as in the first model (13 percentage points of difference). Also the attachment to Europe exercises an impact of about 10 percentage points, while in the first model its influence was of about 26 points, capturing, probably, the effects of the other European variables not considered in that model.

The satisfaction with democracy, as already pointed out, has a positive impact, if it is an evaluation of the democracy in country (+ 8 percentage points) while it has a negative impact if the evaluation regards Europe (- 7 percentage points). Finally, among the variables regards Europe, the less influent is the knowledge of Europe, which increases the probability to support the Europe of only 4 percentage points and which is significant only at the 0.1 level, while the attention to Europe exercises an influence equal to 13 percentage points of variation between who is interested in European news and who is not. In the end it is not surprisingly, in candidate countries confidence in Europe exercises the most important impact equals to more than 40 percentage points of variation.

Concluding, our findings shown how in these countries the economic model works better than the national identity one (*cfr.* 1<sup>st</sup> model), but, not surprisingly, introducing some consideration regarding Europe and its institution, the democracy and so on, the economic model lost some of its significance, suggesting how in these countries feelings and confidence in Europe are the most influential factors on the support (*cfr.* 3<sup>rd</sup> Model).

## **Conclusions**

The aim of this paper was to test two of the most popular theories of explanation of public support for European integration: the utilitarian explanation and the identity model, in three Candidate countries - Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. The economic expectation and the European identity have, as expected, a positive impact on the support while the national identity seemed to have no impact on the support. Controlling both these relationship for some domestic and supranational variables, three regression analyses have been made.

The first one includes social and domestic politics controls (level of education and satisfaction with democracy in the own country). It showed how both of them can be considered as cues of explanation, since they have both statistical significance, in fact the satisfaction with the way democracy works in country significantly affects the support as well as the level of education, both in a positive way, meaning that increasing the satisfaction or the level of education the support will increase. In the second model, following the idea that some supranational factors can affect the relationship founded, I have controlled for the level of satisfaction with democracy in Europe, confidence in Europe, knowledge of European matters and the level of attention paid for news regards Europe. This second model explains better the variation in the probability to support European Union. It shows also how, controlling for

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\* At a medium level.

variables directly related to Europe, the economic model lost some of its power of explanation, and how notwithstanding the level of education, is the attention on news regards Europe and the general knowledge about it that influence the support. Finally, in the third model, considering the countries as dummy variables to see if the model applies in all of them or not, the significance of their *z score* suggest that the model is true for all the three countries considered.

To conclude, what emerges from this analysis is that in these candidate countries – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – in 2003, the support for European Integration is affected mostly by confidence and attention to Europe, but, interestingly enough the national identity does not affect the support for Europe in the hypothesized negative way. Finally, the economic expectations and the identification with Europe affect the support with a similar extent.

## Tables

**Table 1: Correlation<sup>§</sup> between possible dependent variables**

	Bulgaria	Romania	Turkey	All
	<i>EU membership good/bad</i>			
<i>EU membership country benefit</i>	0,630**	0,390**	0,626**	0,554**
(N)	(914)	(904)	(894)	(2712)
<i>European Union image Positive/negative</i>	0,558**	0,387**	0,557**	0,519**
(N)	(915)	(931)	(935)	(2781)

<sup>§</sup>Correlation shows the Spearman's-rho.

\*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 2: Evaluation of the European Membership by Country, 2003**

	(%) A good thing	Neither good nor bad	A bad thing	Total (N)
European Union 15	51	29,1	14,8	100,0 (16082)
10 Later members	55,9	31,9	12,2	100,0 (8586)
The three candidates	78,6	15,6	5,9	100,0 (2870)
<i>Bulgaria</i>	<b>78,2</b>	18,6	3,2	100,0 (939)
<i>Romania</i>	<b>87,9</b>	10,6	2,5	100,0 (975)
<i>Turkey</i>	<b>70,4</b>	17,7	11,9	100,0 (956)

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4, EB60.1

**Table 3: Expectations for the Year to come:**

	a. The economic situation in...				b. The financial situation of your household			
	(%)				(%)			
	Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)	Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)
Bulgaria	30,5	49,8	19,7	100,0 (885)	29,1	54,5	16,4	100,0 (949)
Romania	35,8	31,6	32,6	100,0 (919)	26,7	42,3	31	100,0 (960)
Turkey	28	28,9	<b>43,1</b>	100,0 (952)	20,4	39,2	<b>40,4</b>	100,0 (962)
Total (N)	31,4	36,5	32,1	100,0 (2756)	25,4	45,3	29,4	100,0 (2871)

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 4: E.U. Membership and Economic condition within Country**

		a. Bulgaria				b. Romania				c. Turkey			
		Economic condition				Economic condition				Economic condition			
(%)		Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)	Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)	Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)
European Membership	A bad thing	5,9	0,7	1,8	2,5 (21)	4,9	2,2	0	2,4 (21)	20,9	13,1	6	12,1 (111)
	Neither good nor bad	23,9	18,7	10,6	18,6 (159)	17,2	11	3,5	10,7 (93)	19	21,2	14,4	17,6 (161)
	A good thing	70,2	80,6	87,6	78,9 (673)	77,9	86,8	96,5	86,9 (755)	60,1	65,8	79,6	70,3 (643)
	Total (N)	100,0 (428)	100,0 (255)	100,0 (170)	100,0 (853)	100,0 (308)	100,0 (273)	100,0 (288)	100,0 (869)	100,0 (253)	100,0 (260)	100,0 (402)	100,0 (915)
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.) (P.)		31,829 (4) (0,000)				46,885 (4) (0,000)				42,891(4) (0,000)			

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 5: E.U. Membership and Financial Situation within Country**

		a. Bulgaria				b. Romania				c. Turkey			
		Personal Financial Situation				Personal Financial Situation				Personal Financial Situation			
(%)		Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)	Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)	Worse	Same	Better	Total (N)
European Membership	A bad thing	6,1	1,6	0,7	2,8 (25)	3,8	2,1	1,4	2,3 (21)	21,3	11,9	7,1	11,8 (109)
	Neither good nor bad	21,1	19,8	12,4	18,9 (170)	17,4	8,3	7,3	10,4 (94)	18	20,7	14,6	17,7 (163)
	A good thing	72,8	78,6	86,9	78,3 (705)	78,7	89,6	91,3	87,3 (791)	60,7	67,4	78,3	70,5 (651)
	Total (N)	100,0 (261)	100,0 (486)	100,0 (153)	100,0 (900)	100,0 (235)	100,0 (384)	100,0 (287)	100,0 (906)	100,0 (183)	100,0 (362)	100,0 (378)	100,0 (923)
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.) (P.)		21,997 (4) (0,000)				21,655 (4) (0,000)				31,238 (4) (0,000)			

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 6 : Level of attachment to Country and Europe by Country**

	a. Attachment to Country (%)			b. Attachment to Europe (%)		
	<i>Very + fairly</i>	<i>Not very + not at all</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>Very + fairly</i>	<i>Not very + not at all</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>
<i>Bulgaria</i>	3,84	0,29	100,0 (982)	2,96	1,17	100,0 (904)
<i>Romania</i>	3,92	0,21	100,0 (1.033)	3,67	0,46	100,0 (1.002)
<i>Turkey</i>	3,88	0,25	100,0 (997)	1,67	2,46	100,0 (980)
Total (N)	3,88	0,25	100,0 (3.012)	2,76	1,38	100,0 (2.886)

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 7: National Identity and E.U. Membership within Country**

		a. Bulgaria			b. Romania			c. Turkey		
		Attachment to Country			Attachment to Country			Attachment to Country		
		Not at all + not very (%)	Fairly + Very	Total (N)	Not at all + not very	Fairly + Very	Total (N)	Not at all + not very	Fairly + Very	Total (N)
European Membership	A bad thing	4.8	3.1	3,2 (30)	3.6	2.4	2.5 (24)	12.9	11.9	12.5 (114)
	Neither good nor bad	27.4	18.0	18,6 (173)	18.2	10.2	10.6 (103)	24.2	17.1	17.5 (167)
	A good thing	67.7	78.9	78,1 (725)	78.2	87.4	86.9 (843)	62.9	71.0	70.5 (672)
	Total (N)	100,0 (62)	100,0 (866)	100,0 (928)	100,0 (55)	100,0 (915)	100,0 (970)	100,0 (62)	100,0 (891)	100,0 (953)
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.) (P.)		4,192 (2) (0,123)			3,970 (2) (0,137)			2,277 (2) (0,320)		

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 8: European Identity and E.U. Membership within Country**

		a. Bulgaria			b. Romania			c. Turkey		
		Attachment to Europe			Attachment to Europe			Attachment to Europe		
		Not at all + not very (%)	Fairly + Very	Total (N)	Not at all + not very	Fairly + Very	Total (N)	Not at all + not very	Fairly + Very	Total (N)
European Membership	A bad thing	8,1	1,3	3,1 (27)	11,3	1,3	2,4 (23)	17,1	4,7	11,9 (112)
	Neither good nor bad	32,2	12,6	18,0 (156)	26,4	8,5	10,5 (99)	22,8	9,7	17,4 (163)
	A good thing	59,7	88,9	78,9 (686)	62,3	90,2	87,1 (824)	60,1	85,6	70,7 (664)
	Total (N)	100,0 (236)	100,0 (633)	100,0 (869)	100,0 (106)	100,0 (840)	100,0 (946)	100,0 (549)	100,0 (390)	100,0 (939)
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.) (P.)		77,266 (2) (0,000)			76,276 (2) (0,000)			73,207 (2) (0,000)		

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 9: Logistic Regression**

		1 <sup>st</sup> Model		2 <sup>nd</sup> Model		3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	
		B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
National economic condition (same = 0)	Better	.634***	.169	.628***	.229	.669***	.233
	Worse	-.320**	.137	-.275	.198	-.292	.200
Personal financial Situation (same = 0)	Better	-.039	.158	-.209	.212	-.195	.215
	Worse	-.198	.143	-.173	.207	-.191	.207
Attachment to country (not attached = 0)	Very	-.118	.197	-.170	.273	-.103	.271
Attachment to Europe (not attached = 0)	Very	1.534***	.110	1.117***	.162	.936***	.173
Satisfaction with Democracy in Country (not satis = 0)	Not very	.526***	.123	.712***	.182	.721***	.182
	Very	.556***	.144	.591***	.205	.639***	.209
Level of education (primary school = 0)	University	.414***	.140	-.187	.204	-.258	.206
	Secondary	.341***	.127	-.010	.194	-.258	.212
Satisfaction with Democracy in European Union (not satis = 0)	Not very			-.596*	.303	-.548*	.296
	Very			-.764***	.294	-.836***	.289
Trust European Union (dummy)				1.925***	.158	1.849***	.162
Attention to European news (not attention=0)	Low			.675***	.216	.703***	.217
	High			1.016***	.237	1.111***	.241
Knowledge about Europe (not at all = 0)	Low			-.362**	.168	-.373**	.168
	High			-.102	.276	-.121	.276
Bulgaria						.424**	.228
Romania						.701***	.240
Constant		-.067		-2.329***		-2.385***	
N		2447		1696		1696	
Chi <sup>2</sup> (d.f.) (P)		338.29 (10) (0.000)		474.38 (17) (0.000)		483.11(19)(0.000)	
McFadden's R <sup>2</sup>		0.129		0.290		0.295	
Count R <sup>2</sup> (adj.)		0.802 (0.076)		0.853 (0.214)		0.848 (0.192)	

\*\*\*p?0.01; \*\*p?0.05; \*p?0.1

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 10: Wald Test**

Wald Test	1 <sup>st</sup> Model		2 <sup>nd</sup> Model		3 <sup>rd</sup> Model	
	X <sup>2</sup>	Prob.	X <sup>2</sup>	Prob.	X <sup>2</sup>	Prob.
National economic condition	29.11	0.0000	14.88	0.0006	16.49	0.0003
Personal financial situation	1.96	0.3745				
Democracy satisfaction in Country	22.60	0.0000	16.36	0.0003	16.93	0.0002
Level of Education	10.80	0.0045	1.12	0.5700		
Democracy satisfaction in Europe			6.94	0.0312	9.33	0.0094
Attention paid to European Union news			18.28	0.0001	21.29	0.0000
Knowledge of Europe			4.69	0.0959	4.94	0.0846

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

**Table 11: Variation in support when only one variable changes  
(dependent variable: EU support)**

All other variables set at their mean		Probability to support European Integration		
		1 <sup>st</sup> Model	2 <sup>nd</sup> Model	3 <sup>rd</sup> Model
National Economic Expectations	Worse	0.75	0.84	0.83
	The same	0.80	0.87	0.87
	Better	0.88	0.93	0.93
Attachment to Europe	Not attached at all + not very attached	0.62	0.78	0.81
	Very + Fairly attached	0.88	0.92	0.91
Satisfaction in Country	Not satisfied at all	0.76	0.82	0.82
	Fairly satisfied	0.84	0.90	0.91
	Very satisfied	0.85	0.89	0.90
Level of Education	Primary	0.78		
	Secondary	0.83		
	University	0.84		
Satisfaction in Europe	Not satisfied at all		0.93	0.94
	Fairly satisfied		0.89	0.90
	Very satisfied		0.87	0.87
Trust European Union	Don't trust		0.22	0.24
	Trust		0.65	0.67
Attention to news European Union	Not attention		0.78	0.78
	Low attention		0.87	0.87
	High attention		0.91	0.91
Knowledge regards European Union	Low knowledge		0.86	0.86
	Medium knowledge		0.90	0.90
	High knowledge		0.89	0.89
Bulgaria				0.89
Romania				0.92
Turkey				0.85

Source: Elaboration on CCEB 2003.4

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# **The International System**

## **Unipolarity on the Brink**

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*The article claims that the international system is emerging out of an interlude of unipolarity – characterized by US dominance –, and entering an age of so-called “diffuse multipolarity”, i.e. a situation in which less clear-cut regional entities challenge the pre-eminence enjoyed by the US. Neorealism – with Kenneth N. Waltz’s theories about self-help and balancing – represents the main theoretical frame that supports my conjecture. This theory is enriched on the one hand by a broader view on systemic approach to the international system, and on the other hand by relevant information extracted out of international society theory (Conway W. Henderson) and out of declinism (Paul Kennedy). Together, they support data collected out of recent UN studies and publications such as The Economist.*

### **Justification**

This examination of the international system is not the fruit of a presupposed flamboyant attempt at explaining the way the world today shapes its every nook and cranny. The author of this article does not have monumental intellectual ambitions in mind. However, it should be stated from the very moment that this article aims at shedding some light in the rather intricate landscape of world politics. The attempt is thus closer to a clarification – by matching together existing theories of international relations with existing facts that belong to the same field of discussion – of existing stands, than to an endeavour of offering a new stand on world politics.

As a matter of fact, it was the desire at clarification that triggered the very idea behind this article. Quite recently, I explored with great interest a most useful instrument for students in international relations, i.e. a textbook of international relations. The work of professors Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen is beyond any doubt an instrument that I myself used in my attempt of understanding international relations (Jackson & Sørensen 2003). However, it was one classification the two aforementioned authors presented in their work that drew my attention and acted as the incentive for writing this article. States could be defined, authors claim, either by their judicial statehood – the property of a region of being recognized as a state by both national and international official documents, or – more satisfactory apparently – by their empirical statehood. The empirical statehood is “the extent to which states have developed efficient political institutions, a solid economic basis, and a substantial degree of national unity” (Jackson & Sørensen 2003: 15). If one takes this criterion into account, than the global state system has five categories, the authors state: five great powers (USA, Russia, China, Great Britain, France), thirty highly substantial states (Europe, North America, Japan), seventy five moderately substantial states (Asia, Latin America), ninety insubstantial quasi-

states (Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Pacific), and numerous unrecognized territorial political systems submerged in existing states.

I reject this depiction out of two reasons. Firstly, it is a reductionist one. It ought to be mentioned that I view reductionism (as a theoretical approach to international relations) largely in the manner Kenneth N. Waltz presents it (Waltz 1979); the classification advanced by Jackson and Sørensen focuses only on the individual – or national – level (Jackson & Sørensen 2003). I hold by the opinion that reductionism as such may be useful for didactical purposes, but it certainly cannot account for a broader perspective on the international order. Secondly, by presenting world states in such a manner, useful individual nuances are ignored; for instance, it might be said that China does indeed have a solid economic basis (as a component of the empirical statehood criterion), but only in terms of gross national product (GNP), not in terms of GNP/ capita – viewed oftentimes as a better indicator of economic stability. Fortunately, the comprehensiveness of the entire book out of which I extracted this classification compensates for the shortcomings of this classification per se. Irrespective of its rights or wrongs, the classification did enable me to pursue a more in-depth view on the matter of the global state system, in a comparative and systemic manner, as it will be unfolded in the next sections of this article.

## Structure

After synthetically presenting the main conjecture of this article, the structure of my argumentation will follow a deductive approach. I will firstly present one main theory in international relations that forms the theoretical kernel of my explorations regarding the issue of the nature of the international system nowadays. I will eliminate its limitations as far as the subject under present scrutiny is concerned by adjusting some of its assumptions with the help of two other theories in international relations. Secondly, I will try to demonstrate by using recent statistical data, as well as opinions advanced in renowned publications – be them not peer-reviewed academic journals –, such as *Times* or *The Economist*<sup>\*</sup> – the manner in which the empirical facts match the theoretical framework I chose in order to have the international system clarified in a more appropriate manner. Apart from drafting a conventional conclusion, I will draw the readers' attention to a recent event that will turn out adequate in either supporting or rejecting my thesis.

## Conjecture

The author of this article believes that the international system is nowadays relatively rapidly shifting from unipolarity (US dominance) to diffused multipolarity<sup>†</sup>. Amended neorealism as main framework, and international society theory, as well as declinism, as secondary supporting theories, will hopefully demonstrate this conjecture.

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<sup>\*</sup> My opting for popular publications, apart from the academic journals employed as references, as a source of illustrating my conjecture, is not simply a convenient approach, as some might argue. It is my belief that such renowned international publications are of paramount importance in shaping public opinion on a subject which goes far beyond academic interest, i.e. the way the international system is nowadays structured.

<sup>†</sup> Terms such as “unipolarity” or “diffused multipolarity” will be clarified later in this article – because they belong to a specific conceptual framework –, in spite of a possible objection that clarifying such apparently crystal clear concepts is redundant.

## Theory

### *i. Amended Neorealism*

As the main theoretical framework that would account for the declining unipolarity – accompanied with a shift towards multipolarity – in today’s international system, I opted for neorealism, as it is conceptualized by Kenneth N. Waltz (Waltz 1979). A brief presentation of the main ideas of neorealism, which will later on be correlated with empirical data, is thus necessary. Nonetheless, it should firstly be stated that neorealism is the international relations theory that *par excellence* treats international politics in terms of the international power structure. Concepts such as “power structure”, “power transition”, “poles of power” (and its corollary “polarity”) belong to the realist lexicon in international relations, and, by virtue of extension, to the neorealist one. Kenneth N. Waltz elaborates his theory of neorealism as a systemic approach to international politics. This is tantamount to saying that international politics is mostly shaped by the set of interacting units (states, organizations, etc.) taken as a whole, and less by the individual units, studied in their relative simplicity. (Waltz 1979)

As neorealist scholars of international relations all agree, the first and foremost assumption of neorealism is that the international system is an anarchic, self-help system. Waltz equates this to saying that “every unit spends a portion of its effort in providing the means of protecting itself against others”. Simply put, “the international imperative is take care of yourself!” (Waltz 1979: 107). The second assumption entertained by the neorealist school is that the international system is composed out of ready-made units, i.e. the states – all having to perform the same tasks. However, they differ in one way, namely in their relative capabilities. (Jackson & Sørensen 2003) These relative capabilities are determined by simultaneously measuring the size of a unit’s population and territory, its resource endowment, its economic capability, its military strength, as well as its political stability and competence. (Waltz 1979)

According to balance of power theories – supported by neorealists – states are unitary actors who at a minimum strive to ensure their survival, and at a maximum drive for universal domination. Neorealists believe that the international system is structurally bound to balancing: state balance against one another. More clearly put, “in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it”. (Waltz cited in Christopher 1993: 32)

The amendment to realism I chose to take into account in the theoretical framework of my essay is mainly an attack on the unilateral approach of Waltz. Explaining the international system, Stuart J. Kaufman points out (Stuart 1997), should not be based solely on the single variable (the systemic ordering principle – anarchy – and polarity) advanced by Kenneth N. Waltz. Instead, it should take into account other key causes to systems change: economic interdependence, principles of unit legitimacy (the social principles according to which states are organized), and administrative technology (how a state is administered – bureaucratically or non-bureaucratically). In addition to this, international systems should be viewed on a

broader continuum. Kaufman believes that “systems vary not just from multi- to bi- or perhaps unipolar but from extreme consolidation (imperial hegemony), through balance-of-power systems (with varying number of <poles>), to extreme fragmentation (splintering into many units with no poles at all) with many possible gradations in between” (Kaufman 1997: 174).

Out of all these theoretical pieces of criticism of the classical, Waltzian, neorealist approach, the following ideas should be extracted in order to support my conjecture. Firstly, systems allow for many possible gradations and secondly, one should lay emphasis on issues such as economic interdependence or socio-political *Dasein* of states, apart from their self-interests. Having accepted that a whole series of gradations is to be found between classical “unipolarity” and classical “multipolarity”, I should now define the terms employed in the conjecture of this essay. I view the situation of world affairs immediately after the end of the Cold War as a case of “unipolarity” – understood as hegemony of a single state, namely United States, but not absolute, imperial-like hegemony. This initial unipolarity is ever more elusive, as it is moving towards what I coined as “diffuse multipolarity”. The term “diffuse” suggests that no-clear cut opposing unit has yet defined itself as an opponent of the single hegemon; instead, there are several larger, not clearly defined units that are challenging the status-quo. More on this shall be presented in the second part of this article, when I will attempt to link the theoretical references with the factual situation as it appears at the beginning of year 2006.

## ii. *International Society Theory*

Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, when commenting upon the classification I have taken as a starting point for this article, assert that international society theorists lay more emphasis on moderately substantial states and on insubstantial quasi-states, rather than on great powers or substantial states by and large. This is due to the fact that international society theorists believe that the international state system raises issues not only of international order, but also of international freedom and justice (Jackson & Sørensen 2003). Other assumption of international society theory can be extracted from works which present international relations explicitly out of an international society perspective. First and foremost, one should clarify the concept of “international society”. It seems that international society designates the international system in which multiple actors cooperate to solve problems they cannot handle on their own (environmental issues, human trafficking, international crime and terrorism, etc.) (Henderson 1998). Advocates of this view believe that the world has moved from international anarchy (the traditional neorealist depiction of the international system) to the aforementioned international society. Conway W. Henderson speaks of “the nascent international society forming and eclipsing anarchy” or of the “Grotian order of states able to recognize common interests and abide by many of the same rules” – a hybrid between the Hobbesian war of all against all and Kant’s eternal peace. (Henderson 1998: 123)

In spite the fact that this article largely abides by the neorealist paradigm (amended as shown in the previous section), there are several ideas that belong to the international society school in international relations which are valuable theoretical assets that support the

standpoint of this article. Thus, it is my belief that the de-emphasis on military force (hard power) and replacement with leadership based on soft power (usually translated in economic influence) – advocated by international society theorists – are indeed to be found in the present international system. Furthermore, I also view as valid the statement according to which “a conflict-oriented, bipolar structure has given way to a world of diversified kinds of power” (Henderson 1998: 123). Still, despite the fact that there is indeed unprecedented agreement among major states, the very fact that major global problems such as terrorism proliferate, testifies to the idea that a consistent pattern of cooperation – at least vaguely similar to the “universal society” purported by its defenders – is still lacking. All in all, it would seem that the famous “power politics” coined by Hans J. Morgenthau hasn’t eroded itself as much as international society advocates claim, despite the fact that wider consensus between major powers indeed exists – which is not to say that a balance-of-power international system has disappeared.

### *iii. Declinism*

Normally, a power of a state can be measured through various indicators. The method of measuring relative capabilities pioneered by Waltz was further refined and turned into a relatively stable scientific method. For instance, Ray S. Cline developed the so-called “power index”, a mathematical formula for establishing the perceived power of a state. The Cline power index is to be calculated according to the following formula:

$$P_p = (C + E + M) * (S + W)$$

Perceived power = (Population & Territory {Critical Mass} + Economic Capability + Military Capability) \* (Coherent Planning & National Strategy & Will)

As accurate as the Cline formula for power calculus might seem, one could point out its relative subjectivity. For instance, how can one measure coherent planning? Or how can one measure national will?

Theorists thus tried to advance a simplified method of determining the relative capability of a country. Currently, the GNP is considered to be the most reliable single power index. The reason for the ease with which scholars rely solely on economic considerations when determining the power status of a state is represented by the fungibility of power. Power, usually economic power, is convertible in other sorts of power, most often military power.\* Some go even further and try to explain the twists and turns of the international system with the help of economic factors. The declinist school is renowned for this perspective. For instance, Paul Kennedy’s main thesis is that economic ascendancy leads to the rise of a great military power (a hegemon in the international system), and vice versa: economic decline is the inevitable root cause for the fall of a great power (Kennedy 1987). The explanation for this assumption goes along the following lines: a strong national economy means economic

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\* Both neorealists and international society theorists, such as Henderson, agree on the idea that power is convertible.

resources for persuasive diplomacy (soft power), a high level of technical endowment (including what Kaufman coined “administrative technology”), as well as the fungibility of power necessary to convert economic resources into military ones. Paul Kennedy elaborates his theory further. He invokes historical evidence when claiming that economic decline of great powers preceded their military fall. It is emphasized that economic stress becomes more severe when a state spends too much of its national revenues on military capability, especially when this overstretching of resources is due to excessive global commitments (the so-called “imperial overstretch”) (Henderson 1998).

## **Factual Data**

### *i. Amended Neorealism at Work*

The second section of this article is an endeavour to back up the aforementioned theoretical constructions with factual data. Where available and needed, figures and conclusions which are part and parcel of international studies and evaluations will be brought forth. Supporting commentaries from both reference literature and articles in popular, yet universally accepted as reference, publications will also constitute evidence supporting our attempt of bringing together theory and practice.

During the Cold War, bipolarity was the main feature of the international system. Universal consensus supports this claim. Stuart J. Kaufman uses the term “dual hegemony”, most probably in order to suggest that both the Soviet Union and the United States acted as hegemons in their spheres of influence (the hegemons, operating from the apex of the power hierarchy were by definition able to provide peace and stability by regulating the international system to a significant degree) (Henderson 1998).

Towards the end of the Cold War and especially after the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, USA began to assert itself as world power. American analysts claim that the basis of this pre-eminence (asserted, according to some, from the very 60s) was three-fold: nuclear superiority, control of the world’s energy industry, strength of the dollar in international trade and finance (Toma & Gorman, 1990). Neorealists seemed to agree: “However one measures, the US is the leading country” (Waltz 1979).

Since neorealists lay great emphasis on relative capability, let us examine, in a comparative manner, how the world system nowadays looks like. Peter A. Toma and Robert F. Gorman were drawing attention, from the beginning of 1990 that all the three aforementioned factors that fuelled the American supremacy have seriously eroded. Thus, the nuclear superiority was challenged ever since the Cold War. In addition to this, US no longer control the world’s energy resources. On the contrary, it is controlling, claim the authors, less and less of the world’s gross product. The authors lay the blame on the United States’ complacency (“it was accustomed to being number one”, say Toma and Gorman), for it stood by while other countries (especially the Asian tigers) were advancing (mostly educationally and technologically). Statistics point out that the effect of this passivity was that American industry had to spend \$ 20 billion to educate and retrain its workers. From the 70s to the 90s the US share of world market in automobiles decreased from 76% to 24%, in machine tools

from 100% to 35%, in turntables from 90% to 1% and in colour TVs from 90% to 10% (Toma & Gorman, 1990). A more recent look into the decline of the US economy is presented in the *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2005*, published by the United Nations. Global external imbalances are largely due to the twin trade deficit of the US (\$ 650 billion), which amounts to over 5% of the national GDP. The American dollar is on a steady decline, reaching a new low in August 2004. United Nations recommend the correction of the US fiscal deficit and improvement in private savings as key fiscal policies to be undertaken for a redress of the American economy. UN experts warn about the “growing constraints” US is facing such as the unwinding of previous policy stimuli, higher oil prices, weak employment growth, mounting debt in the household sector and the twin deficits (United Nations Report *World Economic Situation and Prospects*, 2005). The report further states: “The United States continues to be one of the main drivers of global economic growth. [...] Consumer spending remains strong, business investment and productivity are increasing and inflation is low. Nevertheless, with interest rates moving up, fiscal stimuli waning, oil prices remaining at their increased levels and employment showing a hesitant recovery, growth in 2005 is expected to decelerate to 3%” (United Nations Report *World Economic Situation and Prospects* 2005: 9). From a military point of view, the United States remains by far the greatest military power on Earth. However, it seems that this is no longer enough to ensure unipolarity. Kenneth N. Waltz was warning ever since 1979 that military power no longer brings political control, on the one hand due to the generalized military stalemate, on the other because of the ever increasing prevalence of non-military factors in international politics (Waltz 1979). The 2003 invasion in Iraq revealed the limits of the American military power. “The 2003 invasion will go down in the textbooks for the brilliance of its execution. But despite spending \$5 billion a month, and 140,000 troops on the ground, the United States cannot ensure stability or security in Iraq”, American journalists believe (Cornwell 2006).

Despite ever more fervent domestic discontent, president George Bush Jr. announced, in the presentation of the 2007 budget, that 141 social programmes will receive lower funding or no funding at all (including Medicare and Medicaid). Conversely, the Defense Department will receive \$ 439 billion, which means a 4.8% increase when compared to the 2005 disbursement. Consequently, I hold by the opinion that the economic decline of US is likely to worsen.

In order to abide by the neorealist paradigm, we should also examine the capabilities of other states, at least from an economic and a military point of view. We restrict our approach to the two aforementioned factors, since quantifying other variables such as unit legitimacy, administrative technology (apud Kaufman) or political competence (apud Waltz) would require extensive resources – notions such as political culture, the exigencies of and criticism against multiculturalism, the clash of civilizations, and so on and so forth would have to be brought into discussion. For the sake of a multi-faceted argumentation, I will briefly point some non-economic factors that testify to the shift from unipolarity to diffuse multipolarity. First and foremost, it is suggestive that US is no longer regarded by official bodies such as the UN as the main pillar for economic growth. The *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2005* regards US in relation to China. The report designates US and China as being “the principle engines for the global economy at present”. (United Nations Report *World Economic Prospects* 2005: 11) Furthermore, it is clear now that China is well ahead of US in several

sectors, in which the latter is underperforming. One of the possible poles to challenge the US-dominated unipolarity, so as to create what I coined as “diffuse multipolarity” could be Eastern Asia. The UN report bring evidence in favour of this supposition: “Eastern Asia continued to be the most rapidly growing developing region in 2004, largely driven by China’s 9.2 per cent and the consequent expansion of intraregional trade” (United Nations Report *World Economic Prospects 2005*: 11). What’s interesting though is that Asian countries provide large part of the financing of the American twin deficit by purchasing United States government securities. The increasingly interdependent economic relations between the US and China prove that a fragmentation of the international system is gradually taking place. At the moment, the problem is that US and China are not developing a common strategy, and hence the macroeconomic imbalance, says *Time Magazine* (Time Magazine, February 2006). Diffuse multipolarity is but obvious when one looks at the economic interdependence between the two actors: “The combination of big-spending US consumers and a booming China that feeds the Western appetite for low-priced products resulted in a second consecutive year of world-wide growth, estimated at more than 4%” (Time Magazine, February 2006: 26).

Nonetheless, at least from an economic point of view, the situation isn’t heading to a reversal to bipolarity, but rather to multipolarity. The emergence of new economic world powers is now clear. The 2006 Economic Forum at Davos discussed mainly the economic boom China and India have been experiencing for some time now. “The sheer ubiquity of the Indian presence” was matched by a clear message: “India is in. And less explicitly: it’s time for the world decision makers to stop obsessing about China and take a closer look at the other emerging Asian economic heavyweight” (Time Magazine, February 2006: 26). Prospects are everything but optimistic for the US economy. Jim O’Neill, head of global economic research for Goldman Sachs, states – in an interview for *Time Magazine* – that China’s economy will be the world’s largest by 2050 (far ahead of second place USA). In the long run, China is expected to improve its GDP/ capita, too.

Europe is no longer a collection of motley states. The neorealist logic of self-help is nonetheless still in action, at least up to a certain point. For instance, the recent discussion of the EU budget can be interpreted in this manner. “In short, this budget was a characteristic exercise in national self-interest and splitting differences. For many years, the salient features of the EU have included an obsession with detail, a preference for incremental change, an inability to do things until the last minute, habit-forming dependency on France and Germany, and a commitment (sometimes wobbly) to enlargement” (The Economist, January 2006). Despite political problems of its own, the European Union, as all frames that end up by generating structures, is an organism that entails new principles of unit legitimacy or political consolidation, if one is to interpret, in a neorealist manner, the evolution of EU in the context of the international system. Kenneth N. Waltz was anticipating, ever since 1979, that challenges to unipolarity are more likely to come from supranational structures. “Only by merging and losing their political identities can middle states become superpowers”, stated Waltz (Waltz 1979: 182).

The idea of “diffuse multipolarity” can be equated with what Stuart J. Kaufman views as regionalization of the international system. Eastern Asia, the EU, not to mention the Middle

East seem to constitute power blocks that go beyond state identities. Regional subsystems increasingly autonomous from global forces are most likely to develop, thus creating a serious threat to the already declining US hegemony (Kaufman 1997: 207).

All these are of course complementary to the neorealist assumption that states necessarily balance one another. Christopher Layne presents an explicit neorealist approach to contemporary international politics. His main conjecture is that the unipolar moment is just an interlude that will give way to multipolarity in 2000 – 2010. It is argued that history proves, on the one hand, that “unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon’s unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers”, and that the entry of new power erodes the hegemon’s ascendancy, and ultimately pre-eminence (Layne 1993). From a structural point of view, the neorealist approach reveals that differential growth rates (from an economic, military or technological point of view countries never grow in the same rhythm) lead to the emergence of other great powers, apart from the hegemon – which proves that unipolarity is most likely to be short-lived. Christopher Layne examines how eligible states gain relative power, and consequently advance their standing in the international system. He then adds that rising power is an incentive for rising ambition and hence for a more assertive involvement in the international community. Japan – an economic giant – is a very adequate example that supports this structural claim. As it grew from an economic point of view and reached the top hierarchy of world powers, it began taking steps to acquire a better defined political profile. It offered the world’s largest economic aid program, it sent unarmed troops in the UN mission in Cambodia, it paid billions of US dollars to help with the Persian Gulf War, and is now powerfully lobbying for a permanent seat in the Security Council.

All in all, it has become quite clear how neorealist premises – amended by a broader view on systems theory in general and international systems in particular – fit the present international political landscape as a territory moving from a temporary unipolar interlude to a diffuse multipolarity.

## *ii. International Society Theory at Work*

International society theory was laying great emphasis on international freedom and justice – as was clarified in the theoretical section of this article, putting questions of power politics in the brackets. It should be stated from the very beginning that the classical neorealist assumption that the demand of placing international interests above national ones is meaningless in an anarchic context still stands, for power politics and self-help still stand. For instance, an examination into the participation of states in the peacekeeping and peace-maintaining missions of the UN – meant to assess if the states’ national interests prevail over idealistic commitments to the international community – demonstrated that it is the realist predominance of self-interest that determines states’ humanitarian actions (Neack 1995).

Nonetheless, questions of international freedom and justice are nowadays part of international law. That means for instance that states which are party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment are bound by law to respect its provisions. The international community can sanction breaches of

international conventions, protocols, or covenants. International courts of justice exist and can punish individual states. Moreover, members of the international community theoretically seek the same universal aims (peace, human rights, etc.) all the more since it is now their legal obligation to do so. This means that “hard power” is most likely to be replaced by “soft power”. The previous section of this article demonstrated that, from an economic perspective (soft power), unipolarity is eroding at an escalating pace. From this standpoint, the international society theory supports the main conjecture of this essay. Should we assume that power politics is not totally by-gone, we can infer that multipolarity will gain a more precise limitation in the future; we could thus witness a reversal of the pre-1945 situation, but traditional international actors (states) are gradually replaced either by supranational entities (the EU) or by regions. Conway W. Henderson, a representative of the international society school in international relations, supports this view: “Recently, a few observers have claimed that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States again leads the world as a hegemon. This hegemony, if real, is probably a <unipolar moment> that is shifting to a multipolar structure” (Henderson 1998: 117).

### *iii. Declinism at Work*

As the section in which I examine the practical implications of what I referred to as “amendment realist” probably made clear, the US appears to be the latest case of a declining hegemon, suffering from “imperial overstretching”. Its budget and trade deficits, its national debt, money diverted to the global strategic military system, domestic problems – such as poverty, unemployment, deteriorating infrastructure of highways and cities – they all testify to a case of declinism, as Paul Kennedy clarifies this theory. Conway W. Henderson entertains similar beliefs: “If we choose to call the US the <lone superpower> it is a diminished superpower” (Henderson 1998: 119).

### **Conclusion**

A thorough examination of the international system demonstrates that unipolarity is gradually making room for a rather imprecise multipolarity, imprecise insofar as there are several regional actors which act as balancers to the US – up to now considered pre-eminent world power. An extended neorealist theoretical framework, aided by some considerations that belong to declinism or to international society theory, provides the theoretical structure of my assessment of the world system.

Some events that are to take place in the near future are likely to further consolidate – or, on the contrary, contradict – my conjecture. The crisis in Iran and the recent deferral of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Security Council of the United Nations could demonstrate tensions between the head of the unipolar world – US – and the rest of the world powers; Iraq reloaded holds prospects both for a humanitarian disaster and for a definite failure of the US army, at least in terms of peace-building, if not in terms of the military confrontation *per se*. At the same time, the unfolding of the crisis is likely to deepen tensions between two rival world regions – the West and the Muslim world – which, in term of relative capabilities are worthy of a closer analysis (let us not forget that assessing relative capabilities also means assessing national loyalty, political legitimacy, etc.). All in all, the international system is apparently well on its way to multipolarity.

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In a crowded academic publication market *Politikon* has carved out a niche, becoming one of the longest standing and most highly regarded journals of political science and international relations for students in the world.

Articles submitted to the journal should meet the following standards:

- English language
- 4000 – 7000 words, including footnotes
- Microsoft Word or RTF file format
- Fully referenced in Harvard style (see <http://tinyurl.com/nsfcg>)
- An abstract of no more than 125 words
- Biographical information of the author (no more than 50 words)
- Be concerned with political science, international relations, international law, political economy, public policy or a related field. For this issue the Editorial Board is particularly interested in articles which consider minority, identity and Roma issues.

Submissions should be emailed directly to [politikonjournal@iapss.org](mailto:politikonjournal@iapss.org). A reply confirming receipt will be sent within 48 hours. All submissions should be received no later than 30<sup>th</sup> June 2007.

<http://www.iapss.org/politikon/home.html>