Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism:

An application to post-1980 coup Turkey

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Abstract

This article provides an application of O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarianism theory in Turkish context though a survey of political unrest of 1970s and 1980 military coup. The theory is reappropriated through formal modelling in order to amend its previous weakness. Although BA theory is strong in explaining the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers, it lacks an actor level analysis. Thus, this paper takes political parties as active agents which instrumentalizes political violence and considers military as an institution bearing private interests. The formal design constitutes a break from traditional BA model and yields a "paralysis" equilibrium which is supported by historical account. Thus, the convergences and divergences between Turkish and Latin American context, reveals the need of recontextualization and reappropriation of BA theory, especially through inclusion of an agency-level analysis.

Keywords: Bureacratic-Authoritarianism; Coup d'état; Formal modelling; Turkish political economy

Introduction

Guillermo O'Donnell's "Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics", published in 1973, initiated a new phase in the debate over the relationship between social change and politics, in the context of Latin American Politics. He argued that social and economic modernization in the late developing countries tend to lead to authoritarianism instead of democracy. His focus was the emergence of military regimes in Argentina and Brazil in mid-1960s. These regimes were called "bureaucratic-authoritarian", as distinguished from oligarchical and populist forms of authoritarian rule. O'Donnell suggests that an "elective affinity" exists between modernization and the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in South America (12), as exemplified by the military takeovers of 1970s in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. This paper uses his framework of bureaucratic-authoritarianism to understand increasing political unrest in Turkey in 1970s, the subsequent military coup of 1980 and the following structuring of the state apparatus, as well as the radical change in economic policies toward liberalization. In the preceding period, Turkey adopted ISI regime in order to industrialize and reach substantive levels of economic growth. O'Donnell's BA theory is especially strong in explaining the economic-politic scene and the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers. In the light of the arguments of this book, this paper assesses whether if Turkey witnessed the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the aftermath of 1980 coup, given the economic policy change and the class alignments that also shaped the post-coup redistribution patterns.

Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Theory in Context of Turkey

In the literature, bureaucratic-authoritarianism (BA) model is applied into contexts of Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, Poland and various other countries. Nevertheless, there are limitations to O'Donnell's explanations of BA economic and politic structures. In each country, the development of institutions somewhat diverged from the "idealized" case presented by O'Donnell (Remmer and Merkx 1982, 4). This underlines the necessity of a revision of the theory in the specific context of each country, by inclusion of factors such as institutional autonomy of the state structure, the institutional and historical background and level of mobilization of popular sectors as well as the level of perceived threat. For instance, the institutional role and the alleged mission of armed forces in the decision-making process would be of particular interest in Turkish context. On the other hand, the ISI regime increased the level of social mobilization through the emergence of an urban working class in Turkey that is organized under the relatively liberal constitution of 1961. This in turn exacerbated the political

unrest. Moreover, the merits of Turkey's ISI economy is largely questioned towards the end of 1970s. For instance TUSIAD, a major businessmen association, blamed the import substitution strategy as the main culprit for rapid deterioration of the economy (Barkey 1984, 158). The January 24, 1980 decisions would be the major attempt of transforming economy (Amelung 1988, 98) although its strict implementation would only be possible after the 1980 military coup. In Turkish case, such pattern of military coup following the failure of deepening of ISI conforms to the O'Donnell's explanation of the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, this paper shows that the Turkey example requires a different theoretical framework to understand the implementation of liberal policies. O'Donnell's theory was developed based on the case study of 1966 Argentine military take-over. Thus, it has shortcomings in explaining the Turkish economic liberalization move, taking place almost two decades later, in an entirely different international context.

In the first section, an overview of O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarianism is provided along with the critics in the literature. The following second part contains a summary of the literature on coup d'états. The third section analyzes the political, social and economic context of 1970s leading to 1980 military coup. The political unrest and crisis of ISI would be essential for understanding of the reasons of military takeover. In the fourth and fifth section, a simple game is modelled to account for the political impasse of 1970s and it is played. In the last section, the newly emergent regime in Turkish context is analyzed with a particular emphasize on the liberalization attempts and the peculiar positioning of bureaucracy, as differentiated from Latin America examples. The paper concludes that the political crisis was not merely a reflection of an economic crisis or the tension created by modernization. Those had a considerable impact upon the internal dynamics, but the crisis itself cannot be understood without a careful consideration of political actors, their motives, interests, tools they employed. Moreover, in the aftermath of coup, instead of an amendment to bureaucratic-authoritarianism, a new framework must be developed to assess the rising authoritarianism and liberal economic transition.

An Overview of O'Donnell's Theory

O'Donnell argues that economic development is likely to generate greater political plurality that does not necessarily generate political democracy. Nevertheless, in South America "political authoritarianism – not political democracy – is the more likely concomitant of the highest levels of modernization" (O'Donnell 1974, 8). Thus, authoritarianism become a "byproduct" of development (Duggan 2001, 1). In order to operationalize the degree of modernization, he distinguishes between the centers, characterized by urbanization and unionization, and the

periphery that remained rural and underdeveloped. Through this distinction, his measures yield a controversial fact: democratic government arises when the level of modernization is found to be intermediate. High and low modernity engenders non-democratic systems. He introduces a binary characterization of political systems, which is either "excluding", where the government deprives the urban popular sector from reaching power, or it can be "incorporating", where the government incorporates and represents the demands of this sector. The excluding political systems lead to the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes that is exemplified by cases of Argentina and Brazil, argues O'Donnell.

Initially, the ISI regime allows a broad coalition among urban and industrial sectors that benefits from protectionism and enjoys the "easy" stage of ISI. When a deeper industrialization cannot be realized, attempts of reform in economy provoke the conflicting interests in the coalition. Increasing mobilization in society results in, what Huntington (1968) "praetorianism", the political degeneration and collapse. Thus, new coalitions arise, especially technocrats grow more confident and coordinated, as emphasized by O'Donnell. With their attempt of coup, a radical restructuring of society would serve to enhance their domination, by means of excessive coercion and repression. The "exceptionally coercive nature" (Schamis 1991, 201) of bureaucratic authoritarian regime would lead to repression of political activity, abolishment of strike rights and restriction of union activity while placing market economics at the core of economic policies. A bureaucratic-authoritarian regime would target the "deepening" of "the productive structure" through private investments, "in particular the transnational corporations, as well as increasing the quantum and multiplier effects of public investment" (O'Donnell 1978, 11-12). Under bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, the state posts are filled with experienced technocrats and state apparatus expands not only to transform the society socially but also to assure the "consolidation of a new order" (O'Donnell 1977,59).

O'Donnell's theory was not without its critics. Przeworski (2000) is skeptical about O'Donnell's main case study, which is Argentine for being "a distant outlier" (101) and he demonstrates a significant relationship between democratic stability and higher GDP per capita. On the other hand, Londregan and Poole assert that "non-constitutional rule" constitutes a significant hindrance on economic growth (Londregan and Poole 1990, 163). O'Donnell questions the authoritarianism in linear terms through measurement of level of threat and subsequent level of coercion. This approach obstructs "qualitative" differences between countries and time intervals and reduces them to a "mere question of intensity". Moreover, it is difficult to operationalize and

measure the level of threat or coercion. That difficulty also arises in explaining the use of coercion even when the threat is no longer evident (Remmer and Merkx 1982, 19).

A Summary of Literature on Military Coup

Finer emphasizes the multifacetedness of military interventions whose likelihood of happening could be understood in terms of "military officers and institutions" interests. However, that would not exhaust all the possible ways of understanding such phenomenon, since the tendency of military take-over is "inversely related" to level of political culture (Finer 1962, 47). The structural reasons of military takeover can be enumerated as the weakness of civil society, the loss of legitimacy of rules and previous military coups of recent history (Belkin and Schoffer 2003). Thompson identifies four "non-mutually exclusive" dimension of a study on coups: the weakness of civilian regime, the endogenous structure of military, the external power struggles, and the "push-comes-to-shove grievances" that addresses the internal dynamics of society in pre-coup period (Thompson 1973, 5). According to Huntington, the coups are the result of the inadequacy of existing institutions to contain increasing political participation. Such political change occurs due to rapid economic change and the role of military changes from "reformer" to the "guardians of social order" (Huntington 1957). Luckham emphasizes three aspects: the power of civilian institutions, the organizational strength of army and the traditional role of army vis-à-vis the socio-political scene. He suggests that "as both the military and civilian institutions increase in strength, the capacity of the military for domestic coercion decreases" (Luckham 1971, 6). Thus, military take-over can be analyzed as a "political process". Also, Wyckoff argued that the politicization of military is "a symptom of a condition of political immaturity" (Wyckoff 1960, 752). Thus, prominent scholars such as Janowitz (1964), Pye (1966) and Johnson (1964) regarded military's role as an improving one, correcting the institutional weaknesses and deriving the socio-economic modernization. Thyne and Powell (2013) suggest that coups can lead to democratic transition if they are executed against an authoritarian regime that is unlikely to undergo democratic change otherwise. Nevertheless, such point is highly contested in literature: for instance Barber and Ronning (1966) pointed out the limits of military's role in modernization in Latin America (2), whereas Nordlinger demonstrated the under-investment trend and the decaying socio-economic welfare under military rule (1977, 3). Valenzuela (1985) criticizes the treatment of military takeover as "natural" development given the "vacuum left by civilian institutions". He rather underlines the necessity to treat "civilian side" as a complex institution as much as the military. Moreover, he indicates the "interpenetration" of military and civilian interests, while alluding to the political nature of army and its tendency to "operate" individually

or in harmony with other social actors. Lastly, Ibrahim suggests that coups are realized not because of internal cleavages and conflicts of interest in a country, but because of a "wider socioeconomic or political situation" that needs to be accounted for (Ibrahim 2009). In that aspect, Turkish military coup has to be embedded into socio-political context in order to account for the pressure generated by modernization and the subsequent rapid economic change resulting in a wave of immigration and political turmoil in urban areas.

The Social, Economic and Political Background of Turkey

The ISI period of Turkey was initiated by military regime in the aftermath of 1960 coup. With the pressure from Republican People's Party elite and Istanbul bourgeoisie, the elections were held in October 1961 where RPP gained a marginal victory and entered parliament alongside with the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), claiming to be successors of closed Democrat Party. Between 1961 and 1965, four coalitions were established, the first three headed by the RPP and the fourth by the JP. Due to the political uncertainty of the era, all investment was interrupted until the planned economy came to be seen as the cure. The State Planning Organization (SPO) prepared the first Five Year Development Plan for 1963-1967, adopting an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy accompanied by temporary import restrictions (Dodd 1986, 514). In 1965, IP gained 52.9 percent of votes after "stressing its belief in anticommunism and Islam associating the RPP with communism" and provided the country with much needed political stability, albeit temporarily (Amelung 1988, 21). The private sector in Turkey enjoyed the ISI model where highly profitable durable consumer goods were sold in the protected internal market. The increasing demand for foreign exchange lead to skyrocketing of foreign indebtedness. In the aftermath of 1969 elections, Justice Party led by Demirel was the major political party in the parliament, but the decline in industrial growth resulted in the decay of the support base. The March 1971 ultimatum paved the way for military control indirectly by a threat of coup in case of inability to form a coalition; and directly by establishment of a cabinet including "policy planners, technocrats and managers under Professor Erim". The government declared martial law in order to confront the urban guerilla movements and union strikes. In 1972, a new cabinet was formed, excluding RPP, nevertheless no reform could be implemented because of the discontent of business and landed classes, represented in parliament. In 1973, RPP-National Salvation Party (NSP) coalition introduced minimum prices for agricultural products as well as various social benefits such as unemployment payments. Ramazanoglu points that "the domestic market has developed as far as possible under the conditions of closed economy" (1985, 70) and the only way out of the bottleneck was to opening of the economy.

RPP firmly advocating the interest of working class against the industrialists, could not maintain the coalition with NSP and resigned. Ersan (1981) claims that the breakdown of democracy in 1980 as provoked by the political parties that could not ensure stability in the parliament. Instead of implementation of outward looking policies, the economy took a turn toward the "secondary import substitution" where heavy industries promotion was undertaken by state, leaving the profitable sector to private hands. The initial stage of ISI ended with a slow-down in growth, conflicting interests between various business groups and a certain inward orientation of economy. The fact that, during the implementation of the Second Plan (1968-1972) the import quotas were decreased even further and the third plan (1973-1978) advocated for infant industry protection reveals the protectionist tendencies and shed light on the lack of motivation on the part of business elites for increasing competition.

The increasing exports due to 1970 devaluation and remittances from German workers enabled ISI "to persist politically as well as economically" (Amelung 1988, 25) and survive the first oil shock. The failure to deepen the ISI was accompanied with political unrest and a subsequent declaration of martial law in 1978. In 1974, after Ecevit resignation Demirel's second National Front coalition could not obtain a vote of confidence vote, leading to formation of a minority government headed by Ecevit. During the political turmoil, the economic policy was neglected and was restricted to limiting the imports and indebting in order to close the foreign exchange gap. The real production deteriorated and inflation skyrocketed while the industrial unemployment increased. Daily strikes and lock-outs hindered production and the excessive fiscal spending due to the subsidization of peasants and industrialists lead to increasing budget deficits. Suffering from the impact of second oil shock, the government was compelled to negotiate with IMF and World Bank. The resulting January 24, 1980 decisions introduced devaluation, price increases, elimination of red-tape and subsidies to export industries, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies and the elimination of controls on interest rate. Following the failure to implement these policies due to political unrest and inability to elect a president in parliament, on September 12, 1980 military led by Evren took state power. The National Security Council banned all political parties, imprisoned unionists while the January 24 decisions announced to be still effective. The coup was regarded as an improvement by industrialists, as one of the leading businessmen, Koc admitted that elimination of the "obligation to pass decisions in parliament...[helped] saving of time" (Cumhuriyet, 1982). The deputy prime minister Ozal, commissioned by military, nailed the coffin of ISI leading the liberalization move. He was "a man for all seasons", being politically conservative, economically "middle-of-the-road" liberal and he adopted the populist social policies of he left. He blamed the

violence of 1970s on the "socio-economic dislocations of the 1950s and 1960s" and he prioritized economy and cutback in national bureaucracy before any security measure (McFadden 1985, 78). Subsequently, the inflation was reduced to 33.2 percent in 1982 from three-digits, the domestic markets were liberalized thus preventing shortages in basic commodities and relative prices were readjusted. The burden of reforms fell upon the working class due to "drastic regression in labor incomes" (Korkut and Yeldan 2006, 4). There was a gradual move toward liberalization of trade (1984) and capital account (1989).

A General Outline of the Game

This section provides a simple formal model that draws upon the strategic interaction among players in Turkey, that are political parties inside and outside the parliament during 1970s.

Mardin (1975) argued that the "center-periphery" cleavage is the underlying axiom Turkish politics. The political system consists of a body of "nationalist, laicist, etatist, educated, urban, elite" which embodies the "center" whereas the "periphery" consists of "more traditional, conservative, religious, rural and anti-etatist" masses. Kıbrıs argues that the center-periphery cleavage "coincides" with the left-right cleavage where the right-oriented parties appropriated and represented the periphery, while the left-oriented parties appealed to the laicist, etatist center. Kalaycıoğlu (1994) claims that the center-periphery divide remains as a significant determinant of electorate's decisions, while operationalizing this cleavage based on religiosity. Esmer (1995) affirms that religiosity level and left or right identification of oneself constitutes the major elements in deciding on a party choice. Akarca and Tansel (2006) demonstrate that voters also consider government's economic performance as a determinant, although only the one-year period before the election has a significant impact on voting decision.

In the next section, a game is modelled based on the initial game sketched by O'Donnell's "Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics" In this section, it would be sufficient to enumerate the assumptions of the game.

1. Initial Conditions

- Players: Each political party is a player.
- Players' positions: In the start of the game, they are divided along the ideological lines of right-left wing.
- Players' assets:

-Political power: If emerged victorious of elections, the political parties could form the government. The minor parties such as "the Workers' Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, the Workingman's Party, the Socialist Revolution Party, and the "Maoist" Peasants' and Workers' Party and the National Unity Party" (Feroz 1981, 17) that lacked electoral strength or National Order Party that was banned in 1971 would not aspire to obtain such asset.

-Voting strength: Estimated share of the total vote to be cast for each party in elections.8

The Approximate voting strengths are:

Republican People's Party (Left)

Justice Party (Right)

National Movement Party (Right)

National Salvation Party (Right)

Democrat Party

Republican Trust Party

Independents

Turkey Unity Party

Nation Party

30-40 percent

4-6 percent

10-12 percent

each 2-4 percent

each 2-4 percent

Definition I: A "winning party" is a party that has not formed a coalition and has plurality over other parties.

Definition II: A "winning coalition" is a combination between two or more parties that having agreed how to allocate pay-offs, has a first plurality in election.

Definition III: A "prospective winning coalition" is a combination made by two or more parties prior to an election according to vote strength and likelihood of being elected. Thus,

- If no coalition is established, either RPP or JP would have won the election, only
 one those two major parties could secure the formation of a single-party
 government.
- 2. If a grand coalition of leftist wing is formed, the right wing loses; or vise-versa.
- 3. A coalition of Left or Right wing with one or more other parties is a prospective winning coalition. If (RPP+NSP or NAP) or (JP+NSP or NAP), it is a

⁸ See Appendix for results of general elections in 1969, 1973 and 1977.

prospective winning coalition, if the all the other minor parties do not form a grand coalition.

Table 1: The Ideological Spectrum of Political Parties in 1970s' Turkey

Right	<u>Left</u>
Justice Party	Republican People's Party
National Movement Party	Turkey Workers' Party
Nation Party	Trust Party
	New Turkey Party
	Unity Party

Source: Author

Stakes of the game: Parties try to obtain important offices through election victories.
 Important offices are those in the cabinet, as well as the ability reshuffle bureaucratic positions and fill the administrative cadres with your own clientele. Such payoffs are indivisible. When coalitions are formed, the biggest party in government allocate some side payment to its allies in the parliament, such as ministries.

2. On the motivation of players

- Voters are rational and they vote for the most preferred one. When the choice is between
 the disliked and strongly disliked, they vote for the former, in order to decrease the
 likelihood of the second to be elected. When they strongly dislike the alternatives, they
 abstain.
- Parties are rational in the sense that they try to maximize their vote to be elected and
 once elected, they seek to satisfy the demand of the electorate. Also, they try to remain in
 power once elected.

3. Rules

- Bargaining to form coalitions is allowed, but once the coalition is formed, it needs to be announced.
- Minor parties are not allowed to win elections.
- Major parties will have to share the total votes, thus none of them would be able to
 establish the coalition by themselves. Major parties will not establish a coalition with each
 other either. They would have to seek alliance with minor parties.

• No party is allowed to change the rules.

Playing the Game

When the game is played, the outcome would be weak coalitions, surging political unrest and in the end, the only feasible outcome would appear to be military take over. The main underlying reason is the political party's strategies that undermine democratic values. The dominant strategy of RPP or JP is to form a coalition with minor parties or being able to form a coalition of single party. In order to obtain such result, they would grant concessions to minor parties, but such coalitions, as it would be clear in the next section, happen to be short-lived and weak. Thus, as an alternative strategy, major parties would resort to aggressive rhetoric and they would focus on the ongoing street violence in their political discourse. The extreme polarization of political scene causes the volatility in elections; the result of elections could not be easily anticipated. The electorate of relatively small parties had a great potential of swinging their votes, thus instead of building any coalition before the elections, all parties sought to employ an aggressive rhetoric, to blame each other for the violence.

Table 3: The possible outcomes of various strategies

		Major Party Choices	
		Coalition with Major or	Adopt Agressive Rhetoric
		Minor Party	
	Coalition	Each benefits; although	Major party resorts to violent
	with a	minor party could secure	rhetoric; if it secures single-part win,
	Major Party	more benefits if encourages	no coalition. If it cannot, coalition
		street violence.	with minor, minor party loses for not
			promoting street violence.
Choices	Promote	Major party seeks a	Both party promote violence; political
	Street	coalition with minor; minor	system is worse-off and more
ty (Violence	party is more powerful due	polarized. Minor party is better-off;
Par		to street mobilization,	major party is forced to be offensive
or]		secures more concessions.	in its rhetoric. Coalition is possible
Min			but more unstable.
Minor Party Choices		secures more concessions.	1

Source: Author

Minor Parties

Coal. Agression

Coalition

Solution

Agression

Agression

-5 -5 -2

Table 2: The formal Game illustrating pay-offs for respective strategies

Source: Author

The tablo above attributes representative numeric values to various payy-offs generated by two strategies available for two players. For Major Parties (RPP or JP) the dominant strategy is to engage in "coalition" in the case where Minor Parties (NSP, NAP, DP, RTP etc.) agree to coalition. However, the coalition in either case is only the weak strategy for minor parties. Even though the final goal for the minor party is to be in coalition with a major party, the minor parties in 1970s are ideologically extremists and very well-organized in street level. Thus, mobilizing this street-level violence brings greater power to minor parties, thus increasing their vote share or more frequently enabling to make themselves heard more clearly. The pressure generated by street violence does not always translate itself into success at ballots; nevertheless, it leads major parties to be more willing to engage in coalition with a particular minor party and thus, secures greater concessions from major party in favor of minor party. This clearly demonstrates why the agression is the dominant strategy for minor parties. In the case where minor parties dominantly prefer to engage in agression, the coalion strategy pays off poorly for major parties. If the minor party mobilizes the street violence, the above matrix reveals the major party gets (-5) for coalition behaviour and (-2) for agressive rhetoric. Thus, rational major parties are obliged to adopt a more agressive rhetoric. The simple Nash equilibrium is unique and it is "Agression, Agression", resulting in (-2, 15) pay-off values. Thus, the formal game illustrates that although at the initial stage the major parties were cooperative, due to the polarization and pervasive violence across the political spectrum, they opt for offensive political discourse.

The minor parties' dominant strategy is to seek alliance with major parties. Alternatively, they can prefer to remain in opposition, but due to the concessions they obtain for joining the major party's coalition, minor parties tend to pursue the dominant strategy. Once the result of election

is announced, smaller parties could get side payments from big parties in exchange of coalition partnership with them. Thus, small parties benefitted from adopting "RRP or JP mode" after the election is done. The ideological orientation (being right or left oriented) mattered only moderately, as exemplified by the center-left RRP and religious right NSP coalition on 1974. Due to election threshold, small parties worried little about competition. In order to establish a coalition, major parties would need one or two minor parties depending on their vote share. Thus, once in the parliament, minor parties could bargain with a stronger hand and without fearing of major parties seeking coalition with other parties. Moreover, Rostow indicates that the number of seats occupied by small parties (NSP and NAP) between 1973 and 1980 could swing the balance between RRP and JP, thus small parties could extract greater favors. Nevertheless, in order to guarantee a larger share of total votes to remain as an attractive minor party, the NAP employs a second complementary strategy: despite the formal appearance, arguably NAP had ties with neo-fascist groups that undermined the democratic values. It had close ties with right wing terrorists and such organized mobilization opportunity contributed to enlargement of its impact. NAP without a doubt benefitted from the "accomplishments" of its activist branch. This complementary strategy arguably had a positive impact on NAP's votes which follow an increasing trend in 1970s. The "rightist terror" fueled by political instability and mobilized by grass-root organization of right wing parties, undermined the political power of RPP that had majority of seats in parliament, through an "organized campaign of violence". Ecevit replied by convincing Turk-Is and DISK, two major unions, to work together against "the rising tide of fascism", thus mobilizing the left that lacked "political leadership" due to fragmentation in left politics (Feroz 1981, 15). Thus the left-wing groups replied the right terror in kind. This shows that given the complementary strategy of NAP, the RPP and other left oriented parties adopt a tit-for-tat strategy: a complementary violent strategy is adopted across the political spectrum.

Given that players' stick to their dominant and complementary strategies, it became more difficult for ruling party to stay in power and rule the country. The violence came to be an ordinary feature of daily politics. Moreover, the government had to manage the economy, a challenging mission in the 1970s international economic scene: the liquidity abundance and economic expansion of post-war era was behind, 1970s witnessed two major oil shocks, that proved detrimental for Turkish economics. The following part sheds light on the steps that lead the ruler party into an economic and political impasse during 1970s.

• There is a need of economic management; although first oil shock in 1973 is alleviated through remittances, the fragilities were inherent to the economy. Despite an output

growth, the ISI regime of Turkey was not an altogether success and it had seeds of crisis. The unemployment was high, the growth was dependent on consumer demand, and the industry was highly dependent on imports, thus fragile. The oligopolistic structure was encouraged, so the economy lacked competitive drive, and structurally the inflation has been high and TL overvalued (Barkey 1990).

- As the government made attempts to apply necessary economic tools, it became further
 dependent on the coalition of organized sectors bureaucracy, unions and right-wing
 groups. The latter two can be mobilized through ideological discourse, although such
 mobilization leads to further polarization.
- The bureaucrats and business groups measure the level of success of government based on economic-social indicators. These indicators would include the GDP growth, level of inflation, the budget deficit and low level of social unrest (strikes etc.). If these indicators show a significant improvement compared to previous government, the incumbent government would be considered to be successful and unsuccessful if such improvement cannot be observed.
- The current government cannot depend on the support of unorganized sectors. The business group would be divided along regional and importer-industrial lines, thus represent a heterogeneous group that heavily depends on state policies. The same situation is observable to a large extent for the landed interest (Amelung 1988, 98). Subsequently, the bureaucracy, the trade unions and the organized right groups that cultivate street violence have a greater say in politics.
- The achievement of substantive economic performance requires disregard of social pressures, a "negative redistribution of income, neglect of popular consumption demands, and elimination of inefficient producers" (O'Donnell 1975, 103). Thus, government should be able to employ a coercive mechanism.
- If government is able to exert coercion, the business groups and bureaucracy would acknowledge the economic improvement but the deprived sectors would be alienated. The exertion of coercion would lead to further isolation of government that has to rely on a narrow coalition of bureaucracy and some sections in business group. In order to remedy the social cost of coercion, there is a need for an actor outside the ruling coalition, but such mobilization is impossible due to successful implementation of coercion in the first place.
- There would be an increasing discrepancy in the perceived reality of the two parts in the society; those who exert coercion and those who are deprived. If the deprivation level

prevents further improvement in the economic signs the process could stop, but by then the regime would have changed the social context in which it was installed, thus leading to a new game (O'Donnell 1975, 104).

- Considering the opposite scenario where the coercion could not be applied successfully, different results would follow where the government policies would be impeded by popular sector mobilization.
- The social sector increasingly resort to strikes etc. Thus, the government has to negotiate with the most organized actors. The attempt to perform economic policies is further endangered when the government's failure to exert coercion became apparent. This situation would divide the ruling coalition among those who blame the coalition for not taking the reforms seriously and those who seek outside support to coalition, thus opening game to new actors (105).
- In the external front, the search for outside support is likely to remain infertile due to previous attempt of exclusion of various sectors. In domestic front, there are highly mobilized sectors in the society such as unions and right-wing violence-prone groups. Thus government is unable to apply problem solving strategies resort to clientelistic relations and rely on patronage. The state cadres reshuffled every time the ruling party changed, further eroding the confidence into political system. The patronage relations were not a feasible alternative to economic-social policies and they kept RRP or JP in government, they could not remedy for social vulnerabilities and subsequent unrest.

The Historical Outcome of the Game: The Era of Weak Coalitions

The history shows that in the beginning of 1970s, the ruling coalition was formed under Ecevit's RPP with religious NSP. In 1974, the coalition was disbanded to be replaced "National Front" government under prime ministry of Demirel's JP with the NSP and the NAP. Between 1973 and 1980, eight governments were formed and collapsed, out of which five were majority governments, while the remaining three were respectively an all-party cabinet, formed to supervise the 1973 election, a "technocratic government", constituted of diplomats and professors, in order to parliamentary deadlock in 1974 and the last one was a a minority government under Ecevit, who failed to obtain a vote of confidence after 1977 elections. 1977 election witnesses an expansion of the vote share for two major parties, at the expense of minor ones, whereas in its aftermath, another weak Nationalist Front was established under Demirel, consisting of JP, NSP and NAP. This marked the beginning of the end, so to speak, where National Front government was disbanded after resignation of JP deputies, who later joined

RPP, that rewarded them with ministerial positions and could form a new government. The new government survived barely 22 months, only to lose power in 1979 after the victory of JP in partial Senate elections that signaled the loss of popular support in RPP. Demirel formed a new government with NAP and NSP, which would last until military coup of 1980. Evren, the general that led the coup, would argue that the coup was the result of the political violence (around 5000 dead by the time) that political parties failed to prevent. After the electoral defeat of Turkish Labor Party in 1969, left-wing movement started to consider terrorism as a legitimate tool to reach their goals. Cayan, one of the leaders of left movement, stated that there was no alternative beside armed struggle in order to transform the system. Although the numbers of members were around thousands, they managed to terrorize the society and faced the challenge of extremist right. The same conflict had a reflection in political arena, where center-right parties (JP, NAP, MSP) accused center-left RPP of encouraging terrorist actions. The governmental dead-end disgraced the democracy, further pushing activists to engage in street violence. THKO and THKO-C were the leading left groups which resorted to terrorism: on the right wing, there were Idealist Clubs Association (Ulku Ocaklari Dernegi), the Idealist Path Organization (Ulku Yolu Birligi), and the Idealist Youth Organization (Ulku Genc Dernegi), collectively, known as the Grey Wolves (Sayari 2008, 412). They were mobilized under the leadership of a former military officer Alparslan Turkes who was the founder of NAP. There could not be found a parliamentarian solution for violence since each party had a different agenda: JP accused Marxist-Leninist groups' "indoctrination of the university students" and their ideology that aimed at replacing democracy with a socialist regime. On the other hand, RPP located the problem in governments' inability to account for social and economic problems, thus pushing people into despair and violence.

Post-1980 Era in Turkey: A Critique of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model

It is evident from the historical picture that the government increasingly lost its ruling capacities, thus paving way for a military takeover. But, what precisely can we conclude regarding the Turkish political context about the BA model? How the analysis on 1970s and the political unrest helps us to understand the new regime that is established after 1980 coup? What can be said about the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of that regime?

In order to outline the specificities of the new regime established after 1980 coup, it would be essential to underline the commonalities and differences of Turkish regime with the BA model. According to literature, BA regimes were effective "at fragmenting, atomizing and inhibiting potential oppositional collectivities" (Stepan 2001, 317), thus generating a balance where the state

grew at the expense of society's power. Indeed, Latin American countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina in 1960s and 1970s, witnessed periods of industrialization, emergence of a more authoritarian rule where the bourgeoisie maintained the "social base" for authoritarian rulers who, at the first instance, used the repressive state apparatus to dismantle working class movement. The attempt to "restructure capitalism" was common, although the means differed. Thus, the comparaison between the Turkish context and BA model coalesce around three points: the growing authoritarian capacity, the technocratic level in regime and the economic restructuring, encompassing a major industrialization move.

Considering the growing authoritarian capacity, Turkey can be considered as a case of "zero-sum" game, where the state expanded at the expense of decline in social capacity for mobilization. The members of allegedly terrorist political organizations, were imprisoned and tortured. The unions were disbanded and once allowed in the aftermath of 1983 elections, they were rendered powerless through legal framework with new constitution. The labor movement was weakened through limited membership opportunities and bans on activities. This manifested itself most radically in labor's real income decreases through 1980s. In 1970s, there were approximately 800 unions out of which, few had nationwide influence. Following the 1980 coup, only Türk-Is was spared from closings that other unions faced. Subsequently, the government allowed the other union groups to resume their activities. Eventually, they were allowed to resume their activities albeit under severe legal restrictions. ⁹ The following political regime was reluctant to change legal framework since the economic liberalization required weaker labor movements. Thus, there was a certain authoritarian tendency at the expense of social movement capabilities.

Secondly, the technocratic tendencies should be contested. O'Donnell's model anticipates high level of military and technocrat involvement in establishment of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime, whereas in Turkey and in Middle East, as an historical trend, army's involvement in politics, although heavily present, remained behind the scene. Its essential involvement was structured to maintain "a particular regime in power", that characterizes a "moderator" tendency in Nordlingerian terms (1977). Nordlinger develops a typology of military strategies; first, there are "moderators" that uses "veto power" and "displacement coup" in order to assign more favorable civilian groups to power and maintain their position. Thus, they enforce "political and constitutional ground rules", in Turkish context Kemalist doctrine and oversees political stability.

⁹ See for data: http://countrystudies.us/turkey/54.htm

A second type would be "guardian" army, which corrects previous regime's negligence through displacement of civilians and taking control of government. The last would be the ruler type that openly and actively involves into politics in order to rule the constituency by first hand. From that categorization, I would suggest Turkish military forces remained relatively outside the politics and by adopting such policy, it managed to protect its "good image" as the defender of country against state's enemies. Thus, through acting as a "moderator", Turkish military kept its influence intact, although it was not involved with the institutional and economic restructuring of state in the aftermath of coup. Certainly 1982 constitutions granted new, ample powers to army, but the fact that army preserved the 24 January decisions, reveals its economic compliance with previous regimes. Moreover, in 1983 elections, Özal's victory-induced discontent was prevalent in army, however no action was taken. The army was content of its role as "moderator" and it was inclined to leave the restructuring of economic scene to political authorities, as long as the ideological orientation of political power conformed to the needs and interests of military. This constitutes a break from BA model where the military-bureaucrat apparatus is actively involved in political-economic restructuring. Another point that is worthmentioning would be the reshuffling of bureaucratic cadres. The Turkish politics have a long tradition of clientelistic distribution of bureaucratic posts, thus it was not surprising the existing bureaucracy was replaced by a small group of western (especially US) trained technocrats summoned by Özal, once he became the prime minister. Thus, contrary to Latin American examples where the old bureaucracy consolidated its grasp, in Turkish context the old bureaucracy was eliminated. However, there is a similarity in the sense that the new bureaucracy in Turkey undertook major economic restructuring. The bureaucracy was strictly subordinated to political authority, but it had also an autonomous sphere because of the major responsibilities and technical expertise requirements.

The last comparison line concerns the economic restructuring that should encompass a major industrialization move. Hirschman (1979) questions the "industrialist nature" of bureaucratic authoritarian governments that succeeded military coups in Argentina and Brazil, as well as "deindustrializing" characters of 1970s global economy. Although in the "deepening" stage of ISI, Argentina witnesses a 52.5 percent increase in industrial output between 1966 and 1973, the bureaucratic authoritarian framework is not able to incorporate different phases of development, closely tied to global economy, thus the model cannot explain the slowdown in Argentinian industrialization in second half of 1970s. The late developers such as Argentina and Brazil, benefitted from an expanding world economy in 1960s, an absent phenomenon in 1970s. Contrary to BA model, a deepening of industrialization was reversed and surrendered against the

"reemergence of laissez-faire" (Schamis 1991, 209). The economic restructuring scheme, following the military takeover, tended to create a new economic class and a new form of accumulation: in Turkish case, that would be the exporters. The exporter class was encouraged to grow through various subsidies and support mechanisms, among which liberalization emerged as an important component, not only economically but politically. The state was no longer ideologically tolerated for its interventionist tendencies and the bureaucracy, as well as unions, were to take their share of burden under liberalization. The liberalization period of 1980s in Turkey is a peculiar one: the lower rates of unionization was guaranteed through a series of bans on union and strike rights, in compliance with liberal agenda, but SEEs remained largely untouched and continued employing large numbers of workers until 2000s where a true wave of privatization would be witnessed. Thus, the major industrialization move never occurred for Turkey, neither before or after 1980 coup. Beside the structural shortcomings of Turkey, the international economic scene was oriented toward economic liberalization and financialization. Thus, it can be argued that, bureaucratic-authoritarian model tends to exclude the international economic dimension and underestimate "the specific connection" between a specific economy and the international system into which the former is embedded (Schamis 1991, 211). The economic contraction of 1970s disfavored models anticipating an increase in manufacture production. Thus, the BA model was "virtually impossible" (213) to replicate itself through different time spans. Instead, Ozal's big project was to promote exports, thus he hoped, to eliminate the inward-looking tendencies of old ISI elite. However, such competitive edge escaped the ISI elite until the Customs Unions agreement with European Union in 1995. Moreover, the Turkish economy took a turn toward financialization: the banks played an increasingly important role and had close ties with business conglomerates. Turkey increasingly integrated with global market, although strict reliance on short term foreign capital inflows would constitute a major weakness of Turkish economy.

Having established the three points of comparison, this paper demonstrates there are significant divergences from classical BA model in Turkish context. In order to explain the divergence this paper attempted to construct a formal game and draw upon the institutionalist methodology. Such inquiry elucidates that the bureaucratic-authoritarian model does not provide an in-depth analysis of social actors and crisis dynamics leading to the emergence of either civil or military authoritarian regimes. This paper outlines the instrumentalization of violence and patronage relations in consolidation of electorate base. Thus, the political crisis was not merely a reflection of an economic crisis or the tension created by modernization. Those had a considerable impact upon the internal dynamics, but the crisis itself cannot be understood without a careful

consideration of political actors, their motives, interests, tools they employed. There is an essential point that needs to be underlined regarding the societal dynamics in 1970s. The previously outlined social cleavage approach, borrowed from Mardin, cannot account for some important aspects of elections, such as "heterogeneity" of the voter base, the absence of class politics, importance of clientelistic relations and volatility of voters' preferences. Contrary to Western Europe where political parties emerged as a result of "bottom-up" movements and thus represented fixed cleavages in society, Turkish political party system is heavily influenced and controlled by authoritarian state elites, thus enabling the dissolution of strict voting patterns frequently and disallowing persistence of societal cleavages (Sayari 2008). The patronage relation played a major role in securing greater vote share in a highly volatile environment. The ISI coalition in Turkey, that was constituted of big industrialists, bureaucracy and unionized labor, was numerically unable to engender winning major parties in 1970s; thus they were "narrow policy coalitions" (Öniş and Şenses 2007). However, the center-right parties successfully broadened their vote base through patronage politics although such coalition proved to be "unsustainable" (Öniş 2010). Beside the patronage relations, the political violence was instrumental in that aspect in order to consolidate the cleavage in the society, thus expanding the extremist parties' electorate base. Political parties can also assume a "society-shaping" role where they not only capitalize upon the already existing conflict of interests, but they can actively redefine "economic and cultural bonds" to utilize them to gather support. Through such "political articulation" process, political parties naturalize the "ethno-religious, racial or class" cleavages as basis of socio-political identities (De Leon, Desai and Tugal 2009). Thus, political unrest was instrumental not only in consolidating but creating the cleavages. The BA model undermines such important institutional aspect due to the failure of not treating political parties and social organizations as institutions per se.

Conclusion

When applying O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime model in Turkish context, this paper sketches a formal model relying on the strategic actions between the political parties in 1970s. Having established the three points of comparison, this paper demonstrates there are significant divergences from classical BA model in Turkish context and argues that this difference can be accounted for through an actor level analysis. This enables BA theory to be reappopriated in each individual context.

The BA theory is strong in explaining the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers, but it has a major weakness, that is the lack of actor level analysis. For instance, this paper found

that there were striking differences in terms of the technocratic level in regime in newly established Turkish regime vis-à-vis the BA model. However, the following economic restructuring era revealed the inadequacy of BA to account for changes if replicated in different contexts. Thus, the comparison of convergences and divergences between Turkish and Latin American context, revealed the need of recontextualization and reappropriation of BA model, especially through inclusion of an agency-level institutional analysis and incorporation of the concern for international economic setting. This paper argued and demonstrated that political parties are active agents that use patronage policies and political violence as efficient tools to consolidate their electorate base. Through such instrumentalization of violence, they contribute to polarization of politics and push the country on the edge of chaos, while actively constructing the cleavages that would benefit them. Thus, it is argued that inclusion of actor-level analysis and institutional methodology permits the BA theory to be improved beyond amendment; it is transformed into a powerful and new methodological tool.

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