Emerging Actors in International Development: the Case of Brazil and Portuguese Speaking Countries in Africa (2003-2014)

Iara Binta Lima Machado

Iara Binta Lima Machado, 25, has a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS – Brazil). She is currently pursuing a Master's degree in Political Science at the University of Montréal (UdeM – Canada). Her interests include international politics, Brazil-Africa relations and African politics.

Abstract

Under the leadership of former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011- ), Brazil has emerged as an important donor within the international development system. Within this context, Africa has stood out as a meaningful partner for Brazil’s development initiatives. This paper analyses the dynamics of Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI) with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (PALOP) between 2003 and 2014. It examines both the implementation of initiatives, pondering over the relative importance of the PALOP within Brazil's development assistance to Africa, as well as the dynamics of solidarity and interests that shape Brazilian cooperation with Africa. The analysis of discourse and practice suggests that the PALOP clearly stand out as prominent partners to COBRADI; beyond that, it suggests that self-interest and solidarity are not excluding dynamics in Brazil’s development cooperation.

Key Words:

Brazil-Africa development cooperation, Brazil-Africa relations, COBRADI, emerging donors, international development, PALOP.
Introduction

At the beginning of the century, emerging donors (e.g. China, India, Brazil) have come to occupy a more prominent place as providers of development assistance, whereas not long ago they stood out as aid recipients themselves (Cabrál and Weinstock 2010; Milani and Carvalho 2012; Fingermann 2014). This re-emergence of South-South Cooperation (SSC) has become the object of a growing interest on the part of researchers and the media, but its dynamics still merit further study, particularly as more data becomes available. This paper, which is part of on-going research on Brazilian development cooperation, seeks to address some of these knowledge gaps by focusing on Brazilian aid to Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (PALOP)\(^78\) between 2003 and 2014.

Under former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his successor, President Dilma Rousseff (2011- ), Brazil sought to diversify its international relations by strengthening partnerships with developing nations. In doing so, it prioritized Africa within its foreign policy strategy, albeit more markedly during Lula’s tenure. Since then, not only have diplomatic and economic ties with the continent intensified, but development cooperation has also become a major driver in Brazilian engagement and discourse towards the African continent (Amorim 2010; White 2010; Oliveira 2014).

This paper will thus examine Brazilian discourse and practice towards the PALOP. These five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa have become important partners to Brazil since the final moments of their struggle for independence in the 1970s. Since then, not only have bilateral exchanges intensified, but multilateral institutional arrangements have also emerged, such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), established in 1996 (Saraiva 1996; Pimentel 2000; Pinheiro 2007; Amorim 2010). As such, the paper seeks to understand how Brazil implements its development cooperation initiatives in these countries. Precisely, it ponders over their relative importance in Brazilian foreign aid towards Africa. Beyond that, it also examines how Brazil reconciles solidarity and national interest in the context of its development cooperation strategy in Africa and the PALOP. While important contributions have been made to the subject, they remain largely focused on specific issues (e.g. Chichava \textit{et al} 2013) and countries, leaving room for a broader approach. Furthermore, this paper aims to contribute to an expanding literature

\(^{78}\) These countries are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe.
on the relationship between self-interest and solidarity in cooperation for development, particularly with regards to Brazil (e.g. Pino and Leite 2010; Milani and Carvalho 2012). The study will be largely based on the analysis of official documents and secondary sources. After introducing the concept of South-South Development Cooperation, the paper presents the main features of Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI). It then analyses Brazilian initiatives in Lusophone Africa and, before its concluding remarks, presents a brief discussion on the dynamics of solidarity and self-interest shaping such cooperation.

**Conceptualizing South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC)**

As emerging donors have become an influential force on the international development architecture, there has been a greater need to conceptualize the phenomenon of SSDC. Even though a consensual definition is still lacking, with each country proposing its own general vision of the topic (Fingermann 2014), this process can largely be apprehended by the notion proposed by the UN, whereby SSDC can be understood as “(…) a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how (…) for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions” (UN 2012: 5).\(^79\)

SSDC stands out as a particular dimension of the broader phenomenon of South-South Cooperation as it has evolved since the 1950s. Broadly speaking, collaboration between developing countries can be traced back to the Bandung Conference and the subsequent establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In the following decades, efforts to enhance the development prospects and the negotiating capacity of developing nations continued through the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1964) (and within it of the G-77), with the approval of the Declaration on the New Economic International Order in the UN and a greater emphasis on technical cooperation with the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries.

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\(^{79}\) Operational definition proposed at the outset of the May 2012 meeting of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation.
Nevertheless, in the midst of the debt crisis, neoliberal adjustments, and democratic transitions that marked the following two decades, SSC lost its impetus. It is only recently that it has regained prominence in the international scene under the more active international stance adopted by emerging nations (Chatuverdi 2012; Leite 2012; Milani and Carvalho 2012; Ullrich and Carrion 2013).

In practical terms, SSDC differs from the official development aid (ODA) provided by the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC-OECD) with respect to its modalities and composition, thus standing as a broader concept (Lengyel and Malalcalza 2011). Perhaps more important though, and of particular interest here, are the principles which guide cooperation between developing nations, most notably the ideas of solidarity, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, reciprocity, and the absence of conditionalities (Milani and Carvalho 2012; Fingermann 2014; UNDP 2014). Beyond that, one must not forget the political implications of the rise of SSC Pursuant to Milani and Carvalho (2012), SSC in the 21st century stands out as

(...) an attempt to ensure a differentiated insertion on the part of some countries from the South in their dialogue with developed countries. Much of the institutional engineering that, since the early 2000, has supported SSC is based on the assumption that developing countries can and must cooperate with one another in order to ensure political reforms on global governance (IMF, WB, UN) and solve their own social and economic problems based on their shared identities (...), common efforts, interdependence, and reciprocity. This is the equivalent of saying that SSC presupposes geopolitical and geo-economic arrangements of the world

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80 According to Carlos Puente (2010), the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (1978), from which derived the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, was a milestone to technical cooperation within the global South. The document makes 38 recommendations to technical cooperation and focuses on 15 different areas of action.

81 Pursuant to the DAC, Official development assistance consists of “(...) those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)” (OECD 2015). The exclusion of export credits from the modalities of ODA is one of the differences between the DAC framework and South-South Cooperation in general (Cabral 2011).
that are not the sole expression of Western priorities (Milani and Carvalho 2012: 15).82

Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI) (2003-2014)

Under the leadership of President Lula, Brazilian foreign policy underwent significant adjustments, particularly in its affirmative stance towards the developing world. Such a stance has continued under President Rousseff, albeit with specific characteristics (Amorim 2010; Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro 2010; Milani and Carvalho 2012; Oliveira 2014). An important component of this new strategy has been Brazil’s efforts to extend its position as a provider of development cooperation through the expansion of its budgetary and project portfolio, particularly during Lula’s second term in office (Rizzi et al 2011; Inoue and Vaz 2012) (Figure 1).83

Figure 1–COBRADI (2005-2010) (in current US dollars)

![Figure 1](image)

Source: Author with data from IPEA (2011) and IPEA (2014).

Brazil defines its international cooperation for development as follows:

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82 Translated from the original text: (...) uma tentativa de garantir uma inserção internacional diferenciada de alguns países do Sul no diálogo com países desenvolvidos. Boa parte da engenharia institucional que, desde o começo dos anos 2000, tem sustentado a CSS fundamenta-se no pressuposto de que países em desenvolvimento podem e devem cooperar uns com os outros a fim de garantir reformas políticas da governança global (FMI, Banco Mundial, ONU) e resolver os seus próprios problemas econômicos e sociais com base em identidades compartilhadas, esforços comuns, interdependência e reciprocidade. Isso significa afirmar que a CSS pressupõe uma geopolítica e uma geoeconomia do mundo que não sejam exlusivamente a expressão das prioridades do Ocidente (Milani e Carvalho 2012: 15).

83 Aggregate data for the period 2011-2014 is currently unavailable.
The total funds invested by the Brazilian federal government, entirely as non-repayable grants, in governments of other countries, in nationals of others countries in Brazilian territory or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development, understood as the strengthening of the capacities of international organizations and groups or populations of other countries to improve their socioeconomic conditions (IPEA 2011: 17).

Noteworthy are the principles that guide development cooperation, such as the ideas of solidarity and of mutual benefits and responsibilities, all of which bring Brazil closer to the discourse shaping SSC. Indeed, Brazil is reluctant to refer to its own initiatives as foreign aid, stating that “(…) in Brazil, when we talk about aid, we are talking about cooperation: South-South Cooperation (SSC)” (Farani 2011: 3). The Brazilian government thus opposes the notion of a donor-recipient relationship, opting for such terms as “exchange between equals”, “international cooperation”, “emerging donor” or “horizontal cooperation” (IPEA 2011; Inoue and Vaz 2012). According to Cristina Inoue and Alcides Vaz (2012), this characterization can be understood both in practical and philosophical terms. Indeed, although subject to change, Brazilian cooperation has not historically relied on loans and grants, which are commonly associated with ODA. Beyond that, Brazil’s bid can be seen as a move that reflects the country’s will to distance itself from images of paternalism, hierarchy and conditionality associated with traditional donors (Inoue and Vaz 2012).

Brazilian cooperation for development officially comprises the following modalities: (i) educational cooperation; (ii) contributions to international organizations; (iii) humanitarian assistance; (iv) technical cooperation; (v) scientific and technological cooperation and (vi) peacekeeping operations (IPEA 2011; 2014). Despite being excluded from the definition, debt relief will be accounted for in this paper. This move is justified by the significant evidence as to its usage and as an effort to increase the intelligibility of future comparisons84. Within these modalities, technical cooperation, which is coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), has come to occupy a noteworthy symbolic place in COBRADI, even being termed the “brand

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84 Independent references to scientific and technological cooperation, as well as peacekeeping operations appear only in IPEA 2014; the former being placed under technical cooperation for IPEA (2011). Carlos Milani and Tássia Carvalho (2012) point to the fact that Brazil’s current characterization of its development cooperation is still incomplete, excluding elements such as cooperation provided by federative units. Other issues concern the inclusion of financial and economic cooperation into Brazil’s official aid modalities (Cabral 2011).
image of Brazilian cooperation” (Cabral 2011: 12; Albuquerque 2013). Officially, this type of cooperation is said to be free of conditionalities and commercial purposes while also serving as an instrument to consolidate Brazil’s external relations (IPEA 2011). Finally, all throughout the period under study, trilateral or triangular cooperation has increasingly become a mechanism to foster development projects, through the establishment of partnerships with developed countries and international organizations. Moreover, since 2008, Brazil has sought to promote structuring or groundwork projects, claiming that they have a greater positive impact on the field (IPEA 2011; ABC 2012c; Inoue and Vaz 2012; Fingermann 2014).

**Brazil-PALOP development cooperation (2003-2014): practices, modalities and initiatives**

The present section analyses Brazil’s development cooperation with the PALOP. Particularly, it will assess the relative importance of these five countries as development partners in the African continent. It begins with a brief description of the general aspects of Brazilian development initiatives in Africa before focusing on Lusophone Africa in particular.

**Brazilian cooperation for development in Africa: general aspects**

Upon taking office in 2003, President Lula pledged to make a contribution to the development of Africa’s full potential (Silva 2003), a commitment that was followed by a series of initiatives. Indeed, until 2006, Brazil had relieved more than US$ 931.8 million of African debt – notably 74.25% of all debt relief initiatives up to that year –, in a move consistent with the Millenium Development Goals and the Paris Club prerogatives. Debt relief measures continued under President Rousseff, benefiting countries like Gabon, Sudan, and Senegal (Presidência 2007; Moura 2013).

With regards to official cooperation modalities, Brazil’s programs and expenses between 2005 and 2010 targeted the African continent and African nationals in the form of humanitarian assistance, contributions to international organizations and banks, and refugee protection (IPEA 2011; 2014). Under the guise of the India, Brazil and South

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85 According to Inoue and Vaz (2012), Brazil has also began pursuing South-South South trilateral cooperation arrangements.
Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund), functional since 2006, projects in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, among other nations, have been financed (IBSA 2011). On the field of educational cooperation, the Exchange Program for Undergraduate Students (PEC-G) and the Exchange Program for Graduate Students (PEC-PG) stand out as two of Brazil’s most prominent educational programs by allowing foreigners to graduate from Brazilian universities. Between 2003 and 2013, Africans from 17 countries benefitted from PEC-G, representing almost 81% of all students enrolled in the program (5149 out of 6377 students); as to the PEC-PG, African participation was considerably lower, slightly over 20% (IPEA 2014; MRE 2014a; 2014b).

Following demands by President Lula, the MRE sought to increment Brazil’s network of technical cooperation. In this context, Africa, and particularly the PALOP countries, became a regional priority (Farani 2009; ABC 2014). Indeed, during Lula’s tenure, 238 technical cooperation agreements were signed between Brazil and African nations, as opposed to the 33 established by the previous government (1995-2002). Some of these agreements established new partnerships, thus enlarging the geographical scope of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa, an increase of over 318% compared to 2002 (from 11 to 35 countries) (Mendonça 2013). The increase in the number of partners was accompanied by growing expenditure between 2004 and 2010 (from under US$ 2 million to more than USS$ 22 million), with the exception of 2007; in 2010, the continent accounted for 57% of all budgetary execution on technical cooperation. Despite a large array of themes, most projects focused on agriculture, education and health (52%), but fields such as social protection and biofuels also received great attention, not least on Brazilian discourse towards African development. Over the following two years, budget execution underwent a considerable reduction, as shown below (Figure 2) (ABC 2011; 2013; Cabral 2011; Stolte 2012).
That notwithstanding, under President Rousseff, Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa continued to foster some of the innovations devised under Lula. By building on the expertise of public institutions such as the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the impetus to develop groundwork projects and foster trilateral cooperation was reinforced by the advancement of projects such as the Capacity Improvement Project on Research and Technology Transfer for Development of Agriculture in the Nacala Corridor (ProSavana) and the production of anti-retroviral drugs, both in Mozambique (Chichava et al. 2013; Russo et al. 2014).

**Brazilian development cooperation with the PALOP: strengthening partnerships**

Brazilian development cooperation with the PALOP covers the full range of official modalities of COBRADI, as well as initiatives in debt relief. Given the greater availability of data regarding technical cooperation and its centrality as the “brand image of Brazilian cooperation”, analysis will focus mostly on this particular modality. After a broad overview, attention will be directed towards specific themes in technical cooperation, precisely the fields of education, agriculture and social protection, as well as technical cooperation in health.
Brazilian technical cooperation with Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Guinea-Bissau dates back to the end of the 1970s, when Brazilian foreign policy started advocating for the strengthening of ties with these former Portuguese colonies. By the mid-1980s, all five countries had signed a Basic Technical Cooperation agreement with Brazil; even more so, the late 1990s brought about the allocation of specific resources to finance projects in the PALOP amidst the incremental expansion of efforts to foster Brazilian technical cooperation. Throughout this trajectory, Portuguese-speaking countries remained the main recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation. In fact, only taking into account the period between 1995 and 2005, for which data are available, one finds that they accounted for 94% and 68.9% of projects and actions in Africa, respectively (Puente 2010; Inoue and Vaz 2012; ABC 2012a; 2012b; 2012d; 2012c; 2012f; 2012g).

Despite the geographical expansion of technical cooperation agreements and projects during Lula’s tenure, the PALOP have continued to account for the bulk of initiatives in Africa, a reality that is consistent with ABC’s stated priorities. According to the agency itself, these countries responded for 55% of resources allocated for projects in Africa (ABC 2010). This trend is even more impressive when one considers that, between 2005 and 2009, as much as 27% of all resources made available for technical cooperation were disbursed in Portuguese-speaking countries. In this same period, Guinea-Bissau alone responded for 6% of expenditures; being closely followed by Angola and Mozambique, each with 4%. In 2010, Lusophone countries accounted for 24% of all budgetary expenses within this modality (IPEA 2011; 2014). The establishment of a complementary agreement on technical cooperation was even a part of the Strategic Partnership established between Brazil and Angola in 2010; the said agreement was signed in 2012 and it envisages action in the fields of energy, health, education, and the justice system (Cruz 2012; ABC 2012a). An assessment of technical cooperation in particular fields allows one to further grasp the importance of the PALOP in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Taking advantage of the shared Portuguese language, technical cooperation in education has seen some interesting initiatives in professional education, which responded for 61.96% of all technical cooperation projects in education between 2000 and 2012 with

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86 Timor Leste is included in this calculation.
Africa, for when data is available (Ullrich and Carrion 2013). According to Ullrich and Carrion (2013), the impetus to foster professional education in these countries stems from the lack of specialized main d’oeuvre. Central to this strategy has been the implementation of vocational training centers by the Brazilian Service for National Apprenticeship (SENAI), which began even prior to Lula’s administration. In Angola, for example, where a center has been active since 2000, courses are offered in the fields of mechanics, masonry, and sewing, among others. Its administration was transferred to the Angolan government in 2005. Beyond that, other units exist in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and implementation is under way in Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique. Concerning the latter, this process included the offering of courses to the center’s future trainers (ABC 2010; 2012c; Modelo 2011). Furthermore, since 2007, SENAI began to work in association with private Brazilian companies in Africa. The outset of such partnerships came with the establishment of the Odebrecht Center for Technical Education in Angola. In 2013, SENAI and Odebrecht signed a new contract to ensure the training of 770 Angolans from Biocom, a company that operates in the bioenergy and sugar-alcohol sectors. Vale, Brazil’s giant mining corporation, has also engaged in educational arrangements with SENAI. Indeed, in 2009, both came to an agreement regarding the qualification of workers for the Moatize mine, a project that has sparked controversy over its social effects87 (IPEA and WB 2011; Pires 2013).

From the support for horticulture in Cape Verde, through the strengthening of cashew production in Guinea-Bissau, to the broader collaboration to the development of agriculture in Sao Tome and Principe, Brazil has fostered a series of projects and actions in agriculture and social protection in Portuguese-speaking nations in Africa (ABC 2010; ABC 2014a). Brazilian cooperation in agriculture and social protection with the PALOP also provides a good illustration of the patterns that characterize Brazil’s more general approach, such as reliance on the country’s own expertise and experience, and the usage of long-established public institutes to provide cooperation (e.g. EMBRAPA). Furthermore, it allows one to probe into the more recent trends of mixed-modality arrangements, groundwork projects and trilateral cooperation, the Mozambican portfolio being a great example (Chichava et al 2013). In 2011, Mozambique was one of the five countries which have adhered to the More Food Africa program, a mixed-modality family farming program

that couples technical cooperation with concessional loans for Africans to buy Brazilian equipment and machinery (Chichava et al. 2013; Moçambique 2014). Mozambique is also one of the beneficiaries of a program launched in 2012 combining the efforts of the Brazilian government and Britain’s DFID, with the support of the World Food Program and the FAO. The Purchase from Africans for Africa program (PAA África) stems from an idea put forward by the Brazilian government during the High-Level Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fighting Hunger and Rural Development (2010) and builds upon the Zero Hunger national initiative. The program seeks to enhance access to institutional markets for small-scale farmers while at the same time ensuring food assistance to school children. Phase I, which ended in December 2013, saw 497 farmers and 74,520 children assisted by the program in Mozambique (PAA Africa 2014).

EMBRAPA has been a major supporter in the development and implementation of structuring projects in the PALOP by means of trilateral cooperation. In Mozambique, two programs are noteworthy, the ProSavana and ProAlimentos. According to Chichava et al. (2013: 11-2), “ProSavana is perhaps the most ambitious and high profile initiative in the recent history of Brazil’s international cooperation for development in Africa”. The project was born from a partnership between the Brazilian and Japanese governments back in 2009 and seeks to build upon Brazil’s experience with turning its Cerrado region into a productive agricultural zone. Its ultimate goal is to increase food security in Mozambique, a partner sought due to the similar conditions between its Savana region and the Cerrado, through investments in research and extension. The initiative, under implementation since 2011, will be concluded in 2016 (Chichava et al. 2013; EMBRAPA [2014b]).

Food security is also at the core of the Technical Support to Nutrition Programs and Food Security in Mozambique (ProAlimentos), a trilateral initiative between Brazil, Mozambique and USAID established in 2010. The project focuses on subsistence agriculture and family farming and operates under the Global Initiative to Fight Hunger and Food Security (GHFSI). Its implementation phase began in 2011 with completion scheduled for December 2014 (Fingermann 2014; EMBRAPA [2014a]). Starting in 2014, a groundwork project is under development in Angola in partnership with the FAO under the Brazil-FAO South-South Triangular Cooperation Program. It seeks to enhance the country’s agricultural innovation and research prospects (EMBRAPA [2014c]).
Brazilian technical cooperation in health with the PALOP targets a range of issues, such as projects against malaria, the strengthening of national health institutions, and HIV/AIDS. With 31 active projects in these five countries in 2011, the PALOP were the main recipients of Brazil’s projects in health (Russo et al. 2013). Similar to agriculture and social protection, structuring projects have been launched in recent years, with some remarkable examples being implemented by FIOCRUZ (WB and IPEA 2011; FIOCRUZ 2014). Noteworthy is the establishment of an anti-retroviral pharmaceutical plant in Mozambique, a project born back in 2003 from a request made by the Mozambican government. Despite delays due to procedural and financial matters, the factory was finally inaugurated in 2012. In the following year, production of five different drugs began and, interesting enough, the Mozambican government intends to move production beyond the initial focus on HIV/AIDS medication. As it stands, it is the sole publicly owned drug plant in Sub-Saharan Africa; Brazilian support is currently scheduled to end in 2017 (Stolte 2012; Roa and Silva 2013; Russo et al. 2014).

Other groundwork initiatives include actions to strengthen the public health institutions of the PALOP countries, such as the support for technical health schools in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the development of national health schools in Mozambique and Angola. Cooperation in health between FIOCRUZ and the PALOP benefits largely from the framework provided by the CPLP. Here, one notes the initiative to establish human milk banks in CPLP countries (2008), with a unit opening in Cape Verde in 2011 (Fonseca 2013; Roa and Silva 2013).

In regard to the other modalities of Brazilian development cooperation, the pattern of expenditures allows one to probe into the importance of the PALOP in Brazil’s foreign aid. Even though the African continent only accounted for 7.26% of disbursements in humanitarian assistance, the members of the CPLP combined – thus including Timor-Leste – represent 8% of total expenditure between 2005 and 2009. In particular, Guinea-Bissau received 3.48% of total spending in the period (IPEA 2011). The PALOP were by far the main beneficiaries of PEC-G between 2003 and 2013. Together, they represented almost 84% of all African students awarded scholarships to Brazilian universities; and close to 68% of all students welcomed in the same period. In PEC-PG, they accounted for more
than 92% of African students (MRE [2014a]; [2014b]). In 2010, for when data is available, the Portuguese-speaking countries were the five main recipients of Brazilian development assistance to Africa, receiving almost 77% of all spending (IPEA 2014).

Debt relief measures were also extended to the PALOP. In 2003, President Lula ratified a debt forgiveness agreement relieving Mozambique of 95% of its debt with Brazil (US$ 331 million), concluding negotiations under way since 2000. With Cape Verde, debt restructuring resulted in the elimination of US$ 1.2 million out of the US$3.9 million in interests owed by that country. During Rousseff’s first term in office, Sao Tome and Principe was one of the countries whose debt, which amounted to a little more than US$ 4.3 million, was restructured amidst measures to renegotiate almost US$ 900 million of the debts from twelve African nations. The formal announcement, made during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the African Union, also includes Guinea-Bissau (Perdão 2004; Em Cabo Verde 2010; AFP 2013; Senado Federal 2013).

**Solidarity and national interest in Brazil-Africa development cooperation: insights from the PALOP**

The growing role of emerging nations as providers of development cooperation has sparked interest over the motivations guiding their actions. In the Brazilian case, recent studies have sought to engage in this discussion (e.g. Pino and Leite 2010; Inoue and Vaz 2012), with some focusing on relations with the African continent (e.g. Milani and Carvalho 2012). This section seeks to probe into how Brazil reconciles its geopolitical and economic interests with the logic of solidarity attached to SSDC by looking at examples from the PALOP.

As mentioned before, solidarity is a prominent concept in Brazil’s discourse on development cooperation. This conception is reflected on official addresses specific to the African continent. Indeed, during his speech at the opening ceremony to the 13th General Assembly of the African Union, in 2009, President Lula stated that:

> Brazil is not coming to Africa to expiate the guilt of a colonial past. We also do not see Africa as an extensive reserve of natural resources to be exploited. Brazil wishes
to be a partner in development projects. We want to share experiences and lessons, consolidate efforts and unite capabilities (Silva 2009: 2).

Even more so, in the African context, solidarity is coupled with an ethical component whereby development cooperation is associated with reparations for slavery (Puente 2010). That notwithstanding, does the notion of solidarity thus exclude the importance of national interests can play in Brazil’s development cooperation with the PALOP in particular, and with Africa in general? According to Milani and Carvalho (2012), historical, regional and cultural contexts provide the basis for solidarity in South-South Cooperation, though this particular element cannot be dissociated from other interests (i.e. political, social, cultural, economic), and that on the side of both providers and recipients of this said development cooperation. Indeed, Brazil is kin on stating that its development cooperation serves as a foreign policy instrument where its mechanisms can help strengthen Brazil’s relations with other developing nations. This is made explicit in regards to technical cooperation (IPEA 2011),

In the Brazilian case, South-South cooperation [technical cooperation] is inspired by the concept of “Diplomacy” whereby Brazil makes available to other developing countries the experiences and the knowledge of specialized national institutions, without the imposition of any conditionalities and detached from commercial interests or lucrative intentions (...) This modality of international exchange represents, moreover, an important instrument to promote Brazil’s image and potential abroad. In South-South cooperation, one transfers not only what is best, in terms of competencies and services, but one also disseminates the country’s position as an active actor on the international scene, in favor of development and solidarity, materializing a traditional point in Brazilian foreign policy (Farani 2009: 21).

88 Translated from the original text: O Brasil não vem à África para expiar a culpa de um passado colonial. Tampouco vemos a África como extensa reserva de riquezas naturais a ser explorada. O Brasil deseja ser parceiro em projetos de desenvolvimento. Queremos com partilhar experiências e lições, somar esforços e unir capacidades (Silva 2009: 2).

89 Translated from the original text: No caso brasileiro, a Cooperação Sul-Sul é inspirada no conceito de “Diplomacia” na qual o Brasil coloca à disposição de outros países em desenvolvimento as experiências e conhecimentos de instituições especializadas nacionais, sem a imposição de condicionalidades e desvinculada de interesses comerciais ou fins lucrativos (...). Essa modalidade de intercâmbio internacional representa, outrossim, um importante instrumento de divulgação da imagem do Brasil e de suas potencialidades no exterior. Na Cooperação Sul-Sul, transfere-se ao exterior não apenas o que há de melhor no País, em termos de competências e serviços, como, também se difunde a postura do País como ator ativo no cenário internacional, em favor do desenvolvimento e da solidariedade, materializando assim um dos pontos tradicionais da política externa brasileira (Farani 2009: 21).
The “Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development”, held in Brasília in 2010, provides an illustration of the political impetus attached to Brazil’s development cooperation with Africa (Albuquerque 2013). Pursuant to the final document, Africa and Brazil must engage in joint efforts to secure better access to markets, technology and financial resources, as well as the lifting of barriers in international trade in favor of developing countries (MRE 2010). Perhaps more symbolic is the election of José Graziano da Silva to serve as FAO’s director in 2011. Pursuant to a Mozambican official interviewed by Chichava et al. (2013: 22), “For his election, Brazil negotiated with Guebuza the support of Mozambique for his candidacy. Brazil pressured the PALOPs to support Graziano by committing to a South-South Cooperation policy”90.

The matter of economic interests attached to Brazilian cooperation for African development is harder to evaluate at this stage, although some points of contention are worth highlighting. For instance, the experience with mixed-modality arrangements, particularly the More Food Program, leaves one to ponder over the relationship between Brazil’s technical cooperation and commercial interests. According to Cabral and Shankland (2013), the issue became a point of bureaucratic contention between ministries from economic portfolios, keen on partnering with commercially relevant countries, and the MRE, which rejected the conditionality approach. In the end, demands from African nations emerged as the criteria for selecting partners and terms for concessional loans for machinery were agreed upon. Private sector engagement also plays a role in ProSavana, though not in the official project itself. Besides visits from Brazilian farmers, business events were held to lure private entrepreneurs and farmers into Mozambique, such as the ‘Agribusiness in Mozambique: International Cooperation Brazil-Japan and the Investment Opportunities’ in 2011. Another initiative concerns the establishment of the Nacala Fund, which seeks to mobilize private capital to help develop agribusiness in the Nacala region (Chichava et al. 2013). Though not an official modality in Brazilian development assistance,

90 Following Miguel Lengyel and Bernabé Malacalza’s (2011), one could apprehend such behaviour through the concept of political conditionalities. Pursuant to them, “(…) the empirical evidence allows us to state that Southern relations also apply political conditionality of the donor (not necessarily exposed to the public) that comes from the use of SSC as an instrument of foreign policy. It is therefore a tacit conditionality related to the donor’s foreign policy; in many cases, it may take the form of an appeal for international support of a particular case, the support to a peacekeeping mission or simply a fulfillment of a particular diplomatic issue by the host/recipient country (Lengyel and Malacalza 2011: 15-6). This is not to say that there is a contradiction with the Brazilian discourse since the country does not impose policy and procedural conditionalities, commonly associated with cooperation by traditional donors.
debt relief measures can also be related to Brazilian economic interests, since poverty relief and the prospects for financing new investments are both envisaged by the Brazilian government (MRE 2013; Brasil 2013; Renegociação 2014). To what extent all these elements pose a challenge to Brazil’s conceptual framework and discourse in favor of development cooperation remains to be seen.

**Conclusion**

Following President Lula’s initial commitment in 2003, Brazil-Africa cooperation for development underwent a significant renewal, as seen by the increase in the number of partners and in expenditures until 2010 (the year 2007 constitutes an exception to this trend). Even though the Rousseff years have seen a decrease in expenditures in technical cooperation with Africa, the “brand image of COBRADI”, important projects have continued to be implemented, some of them through means of trilateral cooperation. Through it all, the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa have remained prominent partners to Brazil’s international development efforts. Their centrality to Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa can be apprehended both through quantitative means, as well as qualitative aspects. In 2010, in particular, they responded for 77% of all disbursements made to initiatives in African nations (IPEA 2014). With regards to education cooperation, for instance, the PALOP account for the majority of all Africans enrolled in the PEC-G and PEC-PG initiatives. Technical cooperation provides an even clearer picture of the importance of the PALOP, with these countries being singled-out by the Brazilian government as priorities to development projects. Moreover, they have also been the scenario for the implementation of ambitious initiatives, combining several recent innovations in Brazil’s approach to development cooperation. The ProSavana project is but one example of such trends.

To what extent does Brazil engage with Africa and the PALOP in order to express solidarity or in pursuit of self-interest? As the analysis has shown, with illustrations from the PALOP, national interest does play a role in Brazil’s stance towards development cooperation, though a clear and coherent vision seems to still be under discussion. Regarding economic interests specifically and exemplified by the internal dispute over the More Food program, different sectors within the Brazilian government disagree over the criteria to be applied when engaging in development projects, a situation that will need to
be addressed as COBRADI expands. This, of course, is not meant to offset the logic of solidarity that underlies discourse and the will to contribute to African development under the guise of South-South Development Cooperation. Even more so, as noted by Pino and Leite (2010), the association between self-interest and development cooperation should not undermine the fact that COBRADI has had positive outcomes through a commitment to international development in regional, interregional and multilateral settings, the passing on of good practices, and the engagement of multiple actors.
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