Defense and Counter-Terrorism in Israel:  
The Misappropriation of Deterrence

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Abstract

This paper is an analysis of the research question “is the Israeli defence policy of deterrence effective in minimizing domestic-terrorism?” Through a two-part examination of deterrence and then reconciliation, it explains that Israel has adopted an anachronistic geo-political view of the issues in West Bank/Gaza that must be updated to one of domestic counter-terrorism. The author argues that a reconciliation process would be a more effective method of countering domestic terrorism in Israel as it, if done correctly, can address the deeply-entrenched grievances felt by the groups involved with the conflict.

**Keywords:** Counter-Terrorism, Deterrence, Integration, Israel, Reconciliation, Terrorism.
**Introduction**

The fighting between Palestinians and Israelis has been a bitter cycle of violence that has set deeply entrenched grievances on behalf of both groups. On September 6th, 1972, 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed in Munich by the pro-Palestinian liberation groups Fatah and Black September Movement (Binder 1972: 184). Two days later, on September 8th, the Israeli Air Force bombed ten Arab guerrilla camps in Syria and Lebanon (Smith 1972: 184). In 1974, as an act of revenge for the 24 Israelis killed in Maalot after the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) took hostages in the elementary school, Israel bombed the town of Nabatieh, Lebanon. A Palestinian woman driven out of Palestine and then out of a refugee camp near Saida, lamenting on the ruins of her newest destroyed village, was quoted as saying “Everywhere we go...[T]he Israelis are after us” (Roberts 1974: 193). These stories of the insurgency and the counter-terrorism methods utilised number in the hundreds. But these stories are not just relegated to the past. As reported in *Al-Jazeera* (2014), the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, bombed southern Israel with rockets and mortars while stating it was in reaction to the Israelis killing three of its members in an airstrike, breaching the brokered ceasefire. In the summer of 2014, after tensions were raised by the abduction and killing of a Palestinian boy and the retaliatory killings of three Israelis, Israel hammered down on Hamas to find rocket sites and had the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) enter Gaza, culminating in approximately 2100 deaths (Booth 2014).

Seeing this continued violence raises the question: Is the anti-terrorism policy utilised by Israel effective in minimizing terrorism? This is, and has been, a hotly debated topic by military elites and scholars for many years. Sloan (1986) advises a hard deterrent strategy, meeting any possible threat with reactive and pre-emptive punishments to destroy and disable the target. He outlines various methods for the use of military and para-military units that are specifically employed to search for and destroy any threat to the state. This can be viewed, however, with a realist perspective in the sense that it can be argued that he is promoting the use of the military to support state interests; in essence, anyone deemed a “threat” to the state and its interests can be hunted down by these units and eliminated to discourage anyone else from attempting such actions against the state. Other scholars argue for less harsh deterrence policies, and recommend methods that involve conciliation towards constituents who could possibly engage in terrorism in order to pacify them and to ensure that they do not feel the need to use such radical actions for political change (Chenoweth & Dugan 2012; Piazza & Walsh 2010; Sederberg, 1995). This is more or less a liberal perspective, as proponents of these strategies believe that through cooperation of sub-state actors, the situation can improve as the actors achieve what they want and finish more positively. Bar (2012) views the policies with a constructivist approach, discussing how the deterrence methods must evolve to the context of the individual leader of the terrorist organization whom the policies are meant to affect and influence, and that the place of the terrorist group in the social context dictates what the correct methods are to deal with them. Bar-Joseph (2007), via comparative analysis of how Israel applied different forms of deterrence to various incidents, found that the overall strategy of ‘cumulative’ deterrence (the overarching plan to put an end to the conflict with other states in the region over their existence) was effective.

Concerning reconciliation studies, Wolff (2002) discusses conflict management attempts by the British concerning Northern Ireland, primarily examining the conditions and interests of the
actors involved and how these led to various peace agreements. Spencer (2011) also examined Northern Ireland and discussed the methods of reconciliation used there. His article contains a constant reminder throughout that inter-party dialogue and truth-seeking is essential in a post-conflict state. Lambourne (2004) examines post-conflict reconciliation policies and highlights the importance justice has in ensuring effective resolution between competing parties. Machakanja (2010) similarly provides the same argument of the importance of justice, as well as public truth telling of historical issues, in the case of Zimbabwe. Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (2003) provide in-depth analyses of the process of reconciliation, examining the theory and various case studies that exemplify various specific aspects of the theory.

This essay takes the liberal-constructivist approach, arguing that the current anti-terrorism policy in Israel is not practical at minimising terrorism in contemporary Gaza/West Bank. While effective in the past, this policy is rooted in an outdated geopolitical mindset of defence policy, and not one of domestic counter-terrorism. To resolve these issues, Israeli policy to Palestinians should begin to encourage a reconciliation process over the current deterrence strategy as a long-term counter-terrorism method.

This thesis and research question is important to many researchers, policy makers and civilians in the sense that, as it is so incredibly dynamic, terrorism and counter-terrorism is becoming an increasingly researched field. For policy makers, understanding policies that have worked or failed, and why, is of obvious importance to determine what policies are effective for their own state or institution. For civilians, it is important to understand the various aspects that concern terrorism, as these counter-terrorism policies have affected millions of lives and perspectives, especially after 9/11. Also, every year terrorist acts cost lives all around the world. To help to move towards world peace and stability, this issue must be researched and addressed.

To support this thesis, this essay will be constructed in two parts: Deterrence, then Reconciliation. Deterrence will be broken down into two sections: section one, titled Deterrence Theory, will examine the definition of terrorism and then move on to discuss deterrence theory. Section two, called Israeli Defence Policy, will discuss Israel’s use of deterrence theory, historically and today, and the effects it has had as an anti-terrorism policy. It will examine why the Israelis have utilised this strategy, and explain why it is not apt in the modern context.

Part two, Reconciliation, will be split into three sections: section one, titled Counter-Terrorism via Reconciliation, will examine the theory behind justice and reconciliation strategies and explain why it is appropriate as a counter-terrorism method. To support this, the second section, called Comparative Analyses, will briefly examine two cases: UK-Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe. It will specifically look at their conciliatory methods, and then discuss what worked, why, and vice-versa. Following this will be the third section, dubbed Deterrence in Defence Policy vs. Domestic Counter-Terrorism, which will examine the overarching reasons why the cases had success or not, and then apply the findings to Israel. All of this will be followed by policy recommendations and a conclusion.

To obtain a conclusion, a comparative analysis of cases that have utilised reconciliation as a method for long term peace will be used. The cases of UK-Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe have each been selected for several reasons. For one, each involved deep-seated grievances with
their respective actors, and enacted similar methods in attempts to achieve long-term peace. However, both are relatively unique in their situations: each case having different outcomes. Northern Ireland is an example of a more positive outcome occurring from its reconciliation process, whereas Zimbabwe is an example of a negative outcome. Through a comparative analysis, I will explain the similarities, what worked, what didn't, and why, to build a framework to apply to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a recommendation over deterrence to achieve a more effective strategy to minimize terrorism.

The advantage of utilising a comparative approach is the ability to find patterns that have been effective in an attempt to build a framework. As well, by examining various cases that are very distinct from one another, we may be able to find a commonality of what and what does not work. However, there are limitations. The process of reconciliation is but part of a broader effort of peacebuilding, and there are many aspects that affect scenario. It is difficult to analyse every single variable that affects the process, be it international, regional, national, local, and sub-local.

For the purposes of this essay, effectiveness will be defined as whether the process utilised achieved its goal, and by what cost. The method's goal is to minimise terrorism in Israel. A short-term solution will be defined as less effective than a method that does so for the long-term.

**Part One: Deterrence**

*Deterrence Theory*

To understand how to combat terrorism, one must understand exactly what it is and why it exists. The definition of terrorism is difficult to directly pin down, as it can be defined differently by various states. Even within the United States of America, the US State Department defines terrorism differently from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The State Department defines it as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (as cited in Gearson 2002: 9), whereas the FBI defines it as “the use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public in order to promote political, social or ideological objectives” (as cited in Gearson 2002: 9).

The other issue with defining terrorism is the view that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. However, as Sloan (1986:1) states, “Whether they are terrorists or freedom fighters, their victims face a grim and often final reality…terrorism is the premeditated, calculated use of force to achieve certain objectives”. It is utilised as a psychological and political form of warfare to force a reaction from its target or attempt to enforce the groups’ goal. Also, the violent acts utilised by terrorist groups can appear irrational and random, but, again, each is planned to receive a certain reaction (Sloan 1986:1). This essay will adopt the definition found by Blackbourn, Davis, and Taylor (2012): “Terrorism is some form of purposive and planned violence that has a political, religious, or ideological motivation. It is intended to coerce or intimidate and is targeted at civilians or government” (23).
Now we will move on to understand the theory of deterrence. The core definition is “…the persuasion of one's opponent that the cost/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits” (as cited in Bar-Joseph 2007: 145). The main idea of the theory is to manipulate behaviour through “the application of threats” (Wilner & Wenger 2012: 5), known as deterrence by punishment; or to reduce the possible benefits that an enemy would obtain, which is known as deterrence by denial (Wilner & Wenger 2012: 5). To ensure that deterrence theory is used to maximum capacity, there are five theoretical requisites that Wilner and Wegner (2012: 5) discuss: commitment, communication, capability, credibility, and resolve. Failing to achieve all of those requisites diminishes the effectiveness of deterrence policy. To explain, commitment is the degree to which the actor, utilising deterrence, sticks to the policy, not wavering away from it; communication dictates that the actor must effectively ensure that its enemy is knowledgeable of the threat; capability refers to the degree in which the actor is able to raise the threat (e.g., from the threat of air strikes to a nuclear weapon); credibility describes the actor's ability to ensure that its threats are legitimate (i.e., not 'bluffing'); and finally, resolve is the actor's willingness to carry out the threat should it be ignored.

Theoretically, deterrence theory should work against any organisation or state that has the ability of rational thought. But that is also the part of the dilemma facing deterrence theory. As Ganor (2005: 64) points out, deterrence is designed for nations or terrorist groups with a hierarchy, not individuals or networks; as well, he points out that even if you punish part of a terrorist organisation, most of the time they are organised in such a way that if one sector of the group is attacked, the rest of the group remains unaffected for they are “by…nature, clandestine”. The next issue is the fact that defence policies that draw from deterrence theory must be very unique to the terrorist organisation in question. The group must be convinced that the threat of retribution is too high for their actions; however, many terrorist organisations usually have different values than their enemies (Ganor 2005: 64). As well, groups that measure success in terms of their ability to “sow fear, injure the populace, and humiliate the government, have very little to lose and it is therefore extremely difficult to deter them...[as well] those activists [who] are prepared to commit suicide for religious or other reasons” (Ganor 2005: 65).

To further analyse issues with deterrence theory, George and Simons (1994) explained four risks with the concept (or, as they described it, ‘coercive diplomacy’):

The enemy may reject the threat upon belief that it is a bluff, and carry on with the attack;

The enemy may reject the threat because he/she believes that accepting the threat would be humiliating, being too damaging politically or socially, and carry out the attack;

The enemy may take the threat seriously, but ignore it, for reasons stated earlier (suicidal, differing values, etc.), and carry out the attack;

The enemy may neither accept nor reject the threat, and may try to force the coercing power into settling for less. (276-277)

We will see some of these issues come up next as we delve into the defence policies that Israel uses, which draw from deterrence theory.
**Israeli Defence Policy**

Since its creation, Israel has had to fight against terrorism within its borders, the Occupied Territories, and inside itself (Catignani 2008: 47). Initially, in the 1950s, Israel hoped to utilise diplomatic means to reduce terrorism, and use force only within its own borders; but Palestinian and other Arab Fedayeen elements were committed to carry out small-scale raids in hopes to provoke the IDF into retaliating, which would in turn escalate tensions between Israel and other Arab states in hope of bringing about a war to eliminate Israel (Catignani 2008: 47). So, in 1953, Israel began using reprisal raids to deter other Arab states from aiding and hosting any terrorist groups whose goal was the destruction of Israel (Catignani 2008: 47). COS Lt. Gen. Moshe Dayan described in 1955 the policy that Israel would utilise, a policy that is still relatively unchanged today:

> We cannot guard every water pipeline from explosion and every tree from uprooting. We cannot prevent the murder of a worker in an orchard or a family in their beds. But it is in our power to set a high price on our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army or the Arab government to think worth paying. (as cited in Bar-Joseph 2007: 152)

The essential points of this quote are the deterrence aspect, and the words “Arab community”. This quote exemplifies how the conflict in West Bank/Gaza is framed in the minds of the Israeli elite. In a debate on Israeli borders in 1978, a young Benjamin Netanyahu (known as Ben Nitay at the time) outlined very clearly how the conflict is really a geopolitical conflict. When asked if self-determination is the root core of the conflict, he responds “[n]o, I don’t believe it is. The root core of the conflict is the unfortunate Arab refusal to accept the state of Israel” (“Young Benjamin Netanyahu (Debate on Israeli Borders) (Israel Live Com)”). He goes on to show that the PLO adopted its main objective in 1977 to destroy Israel, not to create the state of Palestine. From here, Netanyahu outlines the geopolitics of the region. He argues that as the Palestinians identify with the broader Arab community, they therefore share their ideology and hostility towards Israel. By the creation of their own state, they would become another state among the 21 other hostile Arab states (“Young Benjamin Netanyahu (Debate on Israeli Borders) (Israel Live Com)”). In the minds of Israeli elite, West Bank Gaza (WBG) is the stage of the broader geopolitical issue that threatens the existence of Israel. After fighting two wars, this threat was very real in 1978.

These are the viewpoints of the Israeli elite today. They do not view the conflict in West Bank/Gaza as domestic, but one that is geopolitical to the region. And so, Israel has not adopted a domestic counter-terrorism policy in WBG, but a foreign defence initiative.

The deterrence policy that Israel has utilised is comprised of two main parts: preventative and proactive strategies (Bar 2012: 209); or, as Brym and Anderson (2011: 484) describe it, use of threat (deterrence) and the use of disproportionate military force (compellence), both being part of cumulative deterrence.

According to Bar (2012: 209), preventative strategies surround measures that include “impeding terrorist movement and communication”, such as closing roads to Gaza and other passage restrictions to Palestinians. These measures frustrate terrorist abilities to convene and plan, as well as create an environment where it is difficult to carry out a successful attack on a target.
Other tactics are more controversial: the demolition of a terrorist’s home and forced expulsion from West Bank to Gaza (and vice versa), as well as economic and political pressures applied to the populace, like curfews and increased road blocks to close off access to territories (Bar 2012: 209). These were meant to force the population into submission, and turn against the ones who brought upon this misery, being the terrorists, and ease violence in the area to lift Israeli sanctions (Bar 2012: 209).

Proactive strategies, however, entail offensive and defensive tactics. These include the targeted assassinations of key planners and leaders in Palestinian territories and abroad; the “arrests inside Palestinian population centers; wide-scale military operations, like Operation Defensive Wall…[and] the ‘siege’ of Yasser Arafat’s compound in Ramallah” (Bar 2012: 210).

These policies of deterrence (preventative and proactive) ensure that Israel sets its threat very high and follows through with its disproportionate retaliation. It shows us that Israel is committed to the principles of: deterrence by threat, as Israel makes the threat known and when prompted applies that threat; and of deterrence by denial, as its disproportionate reaction would enforce the idea that no matter what one does against Israel, they will lose more. We can see the theory of deterrence used as a base from which Israel has drafted its defence policies, as it plays into rational-choice theory.

In the past, these strategies have proven to be very effective at minimizing, and at times, destroying terrorist threat. For example, after Munich in 1972, where 11 Israelis were murdered by Black September/Al Fatah terrorists, Israel responded with the targeted killings of every terrorist involved with the operation with Operation Spring of Youth. It showcased every aspect of Israel’s deterrence policy, and as a result, Fatah ceased international terrorist operations for years, and Black September ceased to exist; it also helped to push the PLO into formalizing the decision to refrain from international terrorism in 1974 (Bar 2012: 210). Furthermore, by initiating such disproportionate punishments to threats, Israel has ensured that surrounding hostile Arab states are kept in check, and that they sometimes learned to refuse to host terrorist groups (as in the case of Israel bombing the PLO headquarters Tunisia, which put pressure on the Tunisian government to impose sanctions on terrorist organisations (Bar 2012: 211)).

However, these targeted killings also had a variety of side effects. Rid (2012) explains that the policy of revenge attack has become predictable by terrorist groups, and suggests that these groups have even used the attacks to their advantage. For example, Hamas and other radical groups may have utilised the anticipated Israeli counter-reaction to show the populace ‘who the real enemy is’, and to validate their violence in stifling street protests in 2011 (Rid 2012: 140).

Dugan and Chenoweth (2012: 600) also point out that there is a possible backlash to indiscriminate and discriminate deterrence. The idea is that the punisher legitimises the actions of the punished, and can motivate others to join with the terrorist groups as they feel persecuted; as an example, when Israel focused home demolition of suicide bombers families, Palestinian suicide attacks decreased, whereas when Israel pre-emptively demolished the homes of ‘possible’ threats, suicide attacks jumped (Dugan & Chenoweth 2012: 600). By such abuses of power, it validates terrorist propaganda and gains support and sympathy for the group as they stand up against the perceived ‘aggressor’ (Walsh & Piazza 2010: 572).
Another effect is that targeted killings fed a “cycle of violence” (Bar 2012: 211), as many attacks in Israel by terrorists were seen by the perpetrators as acts of revenge, to which Israel would react (in revenge) against the terrorists. This action would be seen by the Palestinian populace as repressive, motivating further revenge attacks; simply feeding the cycle (Bar 2012: 211; Brym & Anderson 2011: 485; Dugan & Chenoweth 2012: 600-601).

The last effect is the result of the decentralisation and destruction of leaders in terrorist organisations. In the Second Intifada, Palestinian and Arab political leaders believed they were immune to the assassination policy Israel utilised. However, as the Intifada intensified, Israel began to target high level and low level leaders, from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to Hamas, as well has Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Bar 2012: 211). Even heads of organisations were not immune: the siege of Arafat’s compound, the leader of the PLO, and the killings of Hamas leaders Salah Shehadeh, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, and Abd al-Aziz Rantisi (Bar 2012: 211). Two results came of this: one was the paralysation of various terrorist groups, the loss of know-how and the forcing of terrorist organisation leaders to go underground; the other, more negative result, was the decentralisation of power in various terrorist organisations to external leadership outside WBG, resulting in complicating and weakening their ability to effectively deter or compel terrorist groups (Bar 2012: 211).

And so we can see several issues with Israel’s domestic use of deterrence: it has become less and less effective over time, and it is being used against Israel as forces like Hamas know that they will carry out the threat, and use the disproportionate violence as legitimization of their cause. This only furthers the grievances and politicization of the Palestinian identity. Then, when they retaliate, they only further the grievances and politicization of the Israeli identity, making a vicious circle.

The understanding that the Israeli elite had of WBG as a geopolitical arena is inappropriate to dealing with domestic terrorism, and so they must adopt a strategy that is more conducive to domestic counter-terrorism. As Bar-Joseph (2007) found, the cumulative strategy of deterrence was effective in achieving its goal, with Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian National Council (PNC) accepting Israel’s existence (the PNC even changed its Palestinian Covenant, removing the sections that called for the destruction of Israel that Netanyahu spoke of in 1978) (178). And so we see the misappropriation of deterrence.

**Part Two: Reconciliation**

*Counter Terrorism via Reconciliation*

Reconciliation as a method of counter-terrorism works as a long-term solution due to its ability to resolve the roots of the issue that terrorism is a symptom of: grievance. By identifying the grievances of a group and adopting a reconciliation process, the issue that inspires violence between groups can be resolved.

The idea of reconciliation can be very confusing and is often mistaken as a goal. In reality, reconciliation is a long-term process with many components to achieve a goal; the goal being peace. Bloomfield (2003: 14) identifies the common misperception of truth and justice as being
reconciliation, yet they are but two important aspects of the reconciliation process overall. Bloomfield provides a definition of the concept:

Reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies - not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately (2003: 12)

Bloomfield also outlines the primary processes of reconciliation:

Finding a way to live that permits a vision of the future;

The (re)building of relationships;

Coming to terms with past acts and enemies;

A society-wide, long-term process of deep change;

A process of acknowledging, remembering, and learning from the past; and

Voluntary and cannot be imposed (2003: 14)

These processes also closely resemble Lambourne’s model of reconciliation (2004: 23-24).

The process of reconciliation is meant to penetrate deep into both the individual actors and the communities involved with the process, to address the historical grievances of each side in a manner to move forward. There are three stages to reconciliation that are meant to achieve this, that are not necessarily linear in application: 1. Replacing fear with non-violent co-existence, 2. Developing trust between the parties involved, and 3. Building empathy between the parties of the grievances experienced by the other (Huyse 2003: 19-21). To achieve each of these stages, there are four mechanisms that Huyse also identifies that must be mobilized:

Healing methods of survivors (i.e. support groups, compensations, symbolic forms of healing);

Retributive or restorative justice (based upon a cost-benefit analyses of the specific case);

Truth/story telling of historical events;

Reparation of material and psychological damage to victims of either side (2003: 23)

These mechanisms overlap each other in many ways, and work together to support each other and the overall process of reconciliation. They are also not alone, for other mechanisms such as education are also important for long-term assurance of peace.

Identifying that justice is a key aspect of reconciliation, it must be noted that the rule of law is absolutely key to insure the support of the four mechanisms. In a keynote speech at the Hague Institute for Global Justice by Dr. Hans Corell (2013), he discusses the importance of the rule of law in the peacebuilding process. He mentions as well the United Nations (S/2004/616) and the World Justice Program (“What is the Rule of Law?”) as supporters of the idea. The World Justice Program outlines the four main pillars of the rule of law:
The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable under the law.

The laws are clear, publicized, stable and just, are applied evenly, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.

The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient.

Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals that are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve. (“What is the Rule of Law?”)

By creating a legitimate institution that brings justice fairly and without discrimination in a non-violent way, people will have an outlet to bring their injustices without feeling like violence is the only method to voice their anger and concerns. However, it must be noted that failure to commit to the rule of law can have severe consequences upon the reconciliation process by reinforcing the mistrust between the parties involved and breaking the second stage (trust building) identified.

Now that the basic theory has been examined, let us now move on to examining the reconciliation strategies used in several cases.

**Comparative Analysis**

**UK-Northern Ireland**

The protracted conflict in Northern Ireland was one that exacerbated deep divisions within its society. From the 1960s to the late 1990s, more than 3,000 people were killed between the Unionists and Loyalists. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) led a series of increasingly sophisticated bombings in Northern Ireland and Britain, as Loyalist paramilitaries attacked unionists and south into the Republic of Ireland (White 2003: 89).

In 1974, the Glencree Centre was set up as an NGO with a peacebuilding mandate. After the 1998 peace agreement, the centre formed a new dialogue programme focused on grassroots reconciliation, Let’s Involve the Victims’ Experience (LIVE) (White 2003:89). Their mission is “…helping the transformation and building of relationships...through facilitated inclusive dialogue and capacity building of stakeholders” (Glencree 2014).

This mission statement was put into action via LIVE (as well as through many other programs). LIVE was designed to create relationships between survivors/victims. To do this, LIVE used a three step program on 10 three day workshops held over a year which involved three components:

Structured opportunities for discussion and the telling of participants’ stories;

Inputs from professionals and therapists on issues directly related to managing post-traumatic stress; and

Social activities aimed at allowing participants the chance to build relationships and share experiences in a less formal environment (White 2003: 91-92).
The program was expanded later on to involve a parallel program specifically for combatants. The success of these programs was inherent on their ability to allow non-judgmental dialogue between those who volunteered. The volunteering aspect is crucial, as one cannot force reconciliation.

By involving groups to interact and tell stories, Glencree was able to humanize “the Other” (as cited in Aiken 2010: 185). This is exceptionally important because it allowed the process of the slow removal of negative perceptions and connotations for the opposing group to begin.

Programs like Glencree can be viewed as successful in achieving its aforementioned mission. Aiken outlines one of the ways it was effective in this mission:

Evidence suggests that the experience of positive intercommunity relations may be responsible, in part, for a growing trend of individuals identifying with group identities that are less oppositional than traditional nationalist/unionist or Protestant/Catholic ones, including an increase in identification with a more inclusive ‘Northern Irish’ identity (as cited in Aiken 2010:185).

This building of mutual understanding, trust, and a collective deeper understanding of the past, programs like LIVE helped with the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland to ensure a long-term peace. While there is a long way to go, this case shows us that even within a society split along such deeply entrenched politicized lines, effective reconciliation policies aimed at the depoliticisation of hostile identities can contribute positively.

Zimbabwe

The case of Zimbabwe is one where the state, once hailed as a model of ethnic reconciliation of historical grievances, became an example of failed reconciliation policies. After the liberation war of the 1970s, Robert Mugabe (who was the first elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe) attempted to begin the “politics of reconciliation” in the 1980s after the Lancaster dialogue between each of the conflicting parties and the agreement to end the war in 1979 (Huyse 2003: 34 ; Machakanja 2010: 10). Mugabe attempted to bring white settlers a chance for reconciliation “in exchange for positive peace and the promise of external foreign aid to rebuild the war-ravaged country” (Machakanja 2010: 10). However, over time, the seemingly pragmatic choices made in the name of reconciliation would become the undoing of the process and ultimately its failure in Zimbabwe.

The failure of the reconciliation process in Zimbabwe came from the inability to adhere to the four primary mechanisms of reconciliation discussed earlier. First to be examined is what Huyse calls “Amnesia” (2003: 36). This was a scenario where the state failed to institute methods of open communication between the various victims and perpetrators of the conflict. Instead, the state opted a “forgive and forget” strategy, through various amnesty orders (1988, 1995, 2000) that shut the door on the human rights abuses and crimes committed by political parties, the Rhodesian police, the secret service, and the army, and abuses inflicted on civilians by the liberation movements (Huyse 2003: 36; Machakanja 2010: 10).
This policy brought no retributive or restorative justice, and failed to open any constructive
dialogue between the actors involved. This allowed any grievances experienced or perceived to
remain under a veil, without bringing them into an environment where they can be recognized
and remedied. As the white population were given assurances on their land, they were able to
remain with their previous privileges, the previous destructive status-quo of social and economic
inequality remained; they even did not need to acknowledge any historical guilt, allowing the
grievances of other groups to remain unrecognized (Huyse, 2003: 37).

The reconciliation as imposed from above allowed for no societal involvement with the process.
As victims were not consulted, they had no avenue available to speak out against perpetrators
going unpunished and even given high ranking positions in the government and military
(Machakanja 2010: 6). Because of this, the “forgive and forget” policy attempted by Mugabe
failed to appeal to the general population as their grievances were too entrenched to simply
sweep away, and their political identities too politicized to begin identifying with their former
enemies as compatriots.

Because of the unresolved grievances, Mugabe’s “economic revolution”, where he took the land
he promised to the white settlers, was very popular to a large portion of the population (Huyse
2003: 37). This led to a plethora of issues from the white settlers, and shows us that
unrecognized grievances and imposed reconciliation can beget further problems.

**Deterrence in Defence Policy vs. Domestic Counter-Terrorism**

Examining Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, we can see one strong common theme: the
necessity to address the grievances, both real and perceived, held by the participating groups.
This necessitates a de-politicisation of opposing identities to change the mindsets of groups from
“us and them” into “we”. By using the proper tools such as retributive or restorative justice and
a broad truth-telling strategy that permeates the various levels of society, grievances have a
chance to become somewhat satisfied to a level where peaceful co-existence and social progress
can begin in time.55

There are several important factors that can be extrapolated from comparing how Israel,
Northern Ireland, and Zimbabwe dealt with their issues. Starting with Northern Ireland, there
was no geopolitical threat posed to the British or Northern Ireland. The methods that the British
used after the peace treaties were signed utilised light deterrence for security, and reconciliation.
These were part of their overall domestic counter-terrorism plan. The view was domestic, and so
it was dealt as such.

Looking at Zimbabwe, we see that the government was not deterring anything, but failed to
address the root causes of the conflict. This resulted in the issues festering and rising again later
on.

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55 For other cases concerning the reconciliation process, I recommend: Rettig (2008), concerning the importance of
the rule of law in the Rwanda Gacaca courts. He argues that they have furthered ethnic divisions; Bockers, Stammel
& Knaevelsrud (2011), which examines post-conflict Cambodia and the methods of reconciliation enacted; Reyna
(2013), who examines Sri Lanka, and more specifically how the reconciliation process there affected women; and
Moon (2008), who dissects the discourse and events of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
and looks at its effects.
Finally, Israel lies in an area where it needs to achieve a balance. Right now, the view of the conflict as geopolitical is wrong. It may have been that way in 1978, but the context has changed (examine, for example, the modern cooperation between Israel and Egypt), making deterrence in WBG today anachronistic. The issue today requires a domestic counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy must involve reconciliation to attack the core root of terrorism (grievances), with deterrence as a complimentary method to maintain security.

Policy Proposals

To resolve some of the issues Israel faces with its current policy, Israel should reform the policy in a way to raise the benefits of abstaining from terrorism while still punishing those who operate in terrorist groups. As seen in the case analyses, case specific reconciliation policies can give a populace a reason to abstain from terrorism. As Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) state:

Without additional reconciliation, the only value offered to terrorists and their constituencies for disengaging from terrorism is the absence of punishment - which is really just the status-quo. Had the status-quo been sufficient to avert terrorism, no terrorism would occur in the first place. (618)

In the context of Israel, using the lessons learned from Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, the reconciliation process would be to be conceptualised as an inclusive, multi-dimensional process aimed at different levels of the society (political to social). Some examples of reconciliatory methods specific to Israel include the removal of a curfew, investigating abuse, admitting a mistake, negotiations, public positive announcements of cooperation with Palestinians, and meeting to discuss matters of importance (Dugan & Chenoweth 2012: 609).

The implementation process of reconciliation is crucial to its effectiveness. The reconciliation policy cannot benefit a terrorist group in anyway; instead, it must benefit the populace, pushing them away from engaging in terrorism. The policy must be indiscriminate to a part of the populace that is innocent, to encourage cooperation; while, at the same time, the policy will maintain the deterrence method by punishing those who are proven to engage in terrorism (Dugan & Chenoweth 2012: 619; Sederberg 1995: 309). This will remedy a few of the issues brought upon by the current deterrence policy; by encouraging cooperation and aiding innocent Palestinians, this disarms terrorist propaganda and disincentives the innocent populace from engaging in acts that would bring about punishment. Moreover, it will create a scenario where the ‘cycle of violence’ begins to slow down as the ‘recruiting grounds’ for terrorist organisations begin to dry up as the populace see that it is in their own interest to co-operate with Israel rather than join terrorist groups. As another effect of this, hopefully over time the innocent populace will cast out those who are involved with terrorism, seeing them as a threat to their current beneficial situation.

Other methods to engage with the Palestinian populace involve civil rights policies. Many Palestinians, when involved in talks and negotiations, even in joint activities with Israelis, wish to see Israel admit fault, and feel that the occupation of Palestine is a crime and that the only way they will be satisfied is the creation of a Palestinian state (Dajani & Baskin 2006: 89). Furthermore, many want Israelis to know of the suffering Palestinians face at their hands, and want an apology for these perceived sufferings (Dajani & Baskin 2006: 89). Thus, one way to
deal with this is for Israel to accept the right of existence for these peoples, as well as their own. According to Dichter & Abu-Asba (2006: 188), they can introduce several policies which could address the issues Palestinians face, such as full civic equality and collective rights between Israelis and Palestinians in the state; ensuring solid personal and group social relations; proper representation in state institutions and market sectors; and the legitimacy and inclusion of Palestinians in Israel. Another method could be a truth commission much like the one used in South Africa or such as the Glencree Centre, which could begin to recognize the historical grievances of either side to allow for healing. Without recognizing these grievances, the way forward is far more difficult.

With the example of Zimbabwe in mind, it is of the utmost importance that if these policies were to become instituted as a strategy, both sides must be volitional and committed. Bloomfield outlines four key points to remember:

Begin early, when attitudes are most receptive to change and challenge;

Stick to the commitment, and deal with the hard issues: they will only get harder with time;

Give it sufficient time: it cannot be rushed;

Be transparent about the goals, the difficulties, the time span and the resources (2003: 17).

The importance of the voluntary aspect involved with the process is perhaps one of the most difficult aspects when attempting to apply this method to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, if it can occur in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and other areas where deep divisions existed between the groups involved, then there is still hope.

Conclusion

The situation Israel faces concerning terrorism is an incredibly difficult, multi-faceted problem. The responsibility of Israel to protect its citizens is the number one priority, and it is expected to do so. However, although its current policy of deterrence has worked in the past to reduce the terror threat and keep hostile Arab states at bay, it must change this policy concerning WBG. The idea that the issue in WBG is geopolitical may have been the case in the past, but today the issue is a misappropriation of deterrence to deal with the problem of terrorism. By changing the policy towards reconciliation as a counter-terrorism policy, it begins to give a reason to not engage in terrorism; benefits of cooperation that are physical and mental, as the grievances a group has are recognized and can heal. As for the civic rights policies and the proper institution of the rule of law, these can further address the issues and demands that Palestinians make; possibly further destroying the view that violence is the only method of political change.

The first part of this essay shows us the viewpoints that the Israeli elite have concerning WBG, and explains why deterrence is not appropriate in the modern context, because of its failure as a domestic counter-terrorism strategy.

The second part of the essay has shown us that reconciliation policies can make an impact when used correctly and with the right timing in environments involving factions with historical grievances. It also provided a warning of the dangers should the policies be applied incorrectly.
With the application of a custom reconciliation framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is possible that reconciliation is better as a long-term anti-terrorism strategy than deterrence.

For further research, the author would like to delve deeper into other state responses to terrorism and why they were effective/ineffective (for example, Canada and its response to the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ), or Germany and their response to the Red Army Faction). The author would also like to build upon the case by case analyses of reconciliatory strategies, and also look further into identity politics and grievances, the effects of power-sharing agreements, and bottom-up peacebuilding.

This information can also be used by those interested peacebuilding, as lessons learned through this specific case can be cross-examined with others, and vice-versa.

To try and understand terrorism and to attack its roots is incredibly important for our contemporary world. One of the main lessons is to understand what you are fighting. The other, once you understand why the terrorist group has reached a level of radicalisation, is that a possible remedy may be to cut them away from a potential audience by giving the populace an idea they want to live for, not an idea they will engage in terrorism and die for.
References


