Security, Violence and the Sacred

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Abstract

This paper argues that the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-foreigners violence in Europe in the last years, and their consequential labelling as a threat to the citizens' security, should be seen not only as effects of government practices. Rather, they should be seen as aspects of deeply embedded social phenomena, through which security and violence are generated and shaped from below, at the level of the society. Violence should be seen as a constitutive force of the community. This paper will then focus on the nexus between security, violence and the sacred. The sacred is able to situate the intrinsic violence of a community in a meaningful context, where its destructive force is converted into the generative force that reinforces the bonds between individuals. The work of Rene Girard on the 'scapegoat' will be used to interpret how violence and the sacred converge in the security demand of the population.

Introduction

The recent years have witnessed an increase in the cases of violence committed against foreigners, immigrants and Roma people across Europe. The perpetrators of these acts are not just the agents of the state, the police, the gendarmerie or the military. The sites of violence are not only asylum camps or prisons. More and more acts of violence against 'non-Europeans' are being caused by 'ordinary' people, in quotidian situations. Also, more and more 'hate-speech' is being vocalized towards foreigners in situations that are remote from the influence of the state apparatus. These are situations of extreme violence, such as street-level murders and fire bombings, usually performed by fascist young gangs, skinheads or para-military organizations (Macmaster, 2001: 190)

This observation would imply two different possible explanations. Either, on the one hand, the discourse of the extremist parties and of the government – politicians and technocrats together – has permeated the society so thoroughly that xenophobia has become embedded in the social imaginary of European citizens, and therefore the rise of

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violence can be attributed to a state-constructed discourse. On the other hand, another possible explanation looks at mechanisms that function at a more intimate level within a society. These mechanisms can be distinguished from the rhetoric of the state The first option would imply a focus on the practices of exclusion employed by the state, such as discourses of nationalism and the labelling of certain categories of persons as threats to the society. This would explain the emergence of violent acts as being generated and sustained at the institutional level by the state apparatus. The second explanation, however, would imply a more serious engagement with the dynamics of 'civil' society. It would require a more thorough understanding on the mechanisms of social action and collective movement, which would not focus only on the state rhetoric, but would look at the processes of the emergence of violence from the level of everyday social interactions.

This paper will follow the second direction, and it will provide an avenue? for interpreting the rise of violence against 'foreigners' in Europe as connected to an array of symbolic practices in which the sacred as a distinct category, plays a crucial part. Three forewarnings are in place, before the argument is developed. First, separating the state from the civil society is only an analytical move, and it serves to highlight two alternative processes of violence. Of course, this paper cannot sustain the argument that there is a sharp boundary between 'state' and 'society'. It also cannot be argued that there is a point after which the influence of the state discourse stops and the influence of the society's 'own' values and norms begins. The aim of operating this separation is merely to draw attention to the fact that in the discussion on the link between violence and security there has been too much emphasis on the role and influence of the state or state-sponsored actors. At the same time, the mechanisms through which the actions of the state find a fertile ground in the society have been largely ignored.

The second caveat is that this paper will not claim that the influence of the state and its agencies is not important, or that it is not able to account for the rise of violence against foreigners in Europe16. However, the argument is that even though focusing on the state and 'official' institutions might be a necessary endeavour, it is not a sufficient one, and it needs to be complemented with the second perspective. Third, this paper will not provide an exhaustive account of all the social mechanisms of social violence. There have been numerous studies and interpretation on the causes of violence, amounting to what is

[16] For an established analysis of the rise of the new extreme-right movements in Europe, see Kitschelt, 2007

already a considerable literature on this topic17. Rather, for reasons that will be spelled out later, the present paper focuses on the particular nexus of security, violence and sacred. The underlying assumption is that the analysis of contemporary security practices can be performed – theoretically and methodologically – by studying the sacred dimension of the mechanisms of collective violence.

Violence from below

The constant rise of xenophobia in Europe in the past decade is difficult to capture in numbers and data. However, there seems to be an acknowledged and official fact that, along with the high number of ultra-nationalist and extreme right political parties and movements that have risen to power in the last decade, there has also been a parallel inflation in a general xenophobic sentiment across the continent. In December 2007, the European Parliament issued a resolution[18] concerned with 'the rise of extremism in Europe', in which it expressed alarm for the 'resurgence in Europe of extremist movements and paramilitary groups and parties, some of which even have governmental responsibilities, which base their ideology, political discourse, practices and conduct on discrimination, including racism, intolerance, incitement to religious hatred, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, homophobia, misogyny and ultranationalism' (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). This kind of statements, however elusive and elliptic, point to a widespread phenomenon, which can be illustrated by some actual events that reflect its dimensions.

In November 2008, over 50 people were injured at a football match in Slovakia. Hooligans and neo-Nazi groups initiated the violent attacks, which were enmeshed in nationalistic rhetoric.[19] This episode is part of a wider trend of Eastern European xenophobic incidents related to race and nationality. In Romania, violence against Roma people is still a problem, after the beginning of the 1990's witnessed numerous cases of

[17] Among a myriad of titles, a useful reference that speaks to this paper's arguments as well, is Friedman, 2003

[18]'European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2007 on combating the rise of extremism in Europe' [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2007-0623&language=EN]

[19]The Slovakian-Hungarian Football War, December 5 2008, [http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2008/12/3/92953/2863]

ethic attacks.[20] In Germany, a recent study among young people revealed hostility towards foreigners and a growing rate of racist attitudes. At the same time, there is an increased affiliation with extreme-right movements among young people.[21] In the spring of 2011, far right paramilitary patrols harassed the Roma inhabitants of Hungarian villages with whips and dogs[22]; they also organized 'self-defence camps' with military training aimed explicitly at 'internal enemies'[23]; some representatives of these far right groups even talked about a 'civil war' between Hungarians and the Roma population of Hungary[24].

Italy has also seen the rise of street violence against Roma people, who are generally considered to be law-breakers and criminals. In February 2009 for example, 18 assaults were reported. These assaults are carried out by armed vigilante groups all across Italy. Aside from physical assaults with heavy objects, there were reported verbal aggressions and threats, as well as public instigations of extremist nature. A leaflet which appeared in Pesaro was captioned: 'Adolf Hitler taught us, it's not a crime to burn gypsies. 10, 100, 1000 patrols'.[25] In November 2011 in Torino, groups of vigilantes set fire to a Roma people's settlement.[26]

In the UK, the beginning of 2009 was also marked with violent xenophobic incidents. An Indian family reported how their house was attacked by a group of masked

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[20] Romanian Nationalism: Violence Toward the Roma (Gypsy) Minority, June 5 2008 [http://www.socyberty.com/History/Romanian-Nationalism-Violence-Toward-the-Roma-Gypsy-Minority.134119]

[21] Deutsche Welle - Xenophobia on the Rise Among German Youth, Study Says, March 17 2009 [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4106056,00.html]

[22] Athena Institute – Gyöngyöspata Assemblage, May 16 2011 [http://www.athenaintezet.eu/en/infocus/read/8]

[23] Huffington Post - Vedero, Hungary Far Right Group, Causes Roma Mass Evacuation With Training Camp , April 22 2011 [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/22/vedero-hungary-roma-_n_852491.html]

[24] The Contrarian Hungarian - Scandalous Jobbik "Civil War Tapes" (with transcript of Gyöngyöspata mayor's remarks), April 20 2012 [http://thecontrarianhungarian.wordpress.com/2012/04/20/scandalous-jobbik-civil-war-tapes-with-transcript-of-gyongyospata-mayors-remarks/] - JUST THE LINKS???? Please explain why you have chosen them, what is the subject.

[25] Italy, racism / violence against foreigners, February 28 2009 [http://de.indymedia.org/2009/02/242880.shtml]

[26]Torino, campo rom dato alle fiamme. Ecco il mostro della paura!, 11 December 2011 [http://www.osservatoriorepressione.org/2011/12/torino-campo-rom-dato-alle-fiamme-ecco.html]

youths. Racist graffiti was drawn on their door, and several windows were smashed.[27] In the context of the heated debates over immigrants in the UK, there is a general public concern that racial tensions will spill over into violence.[28] On top of all these events, let us not forget Norway's tragedy in 2011, when one single person, affiliated with the far-right, massacred more than 90 people.[29]

These examples, among many others, point to an emergent phenomenon of extremist violence against people of different race, nationality or ethnicity spreading across Europe. This is not a concerted form of violence, in that it does not manifest a coherent pattern of inception and propagation. Rather, it appears as a diffuse trend that can morph into various forms. It can be homophobic violence in Romania, anti-Roma patrols in Hungary, and anti-immigrant violence in Germany. It can be sparked by highly-mediatised events, like in Italy, or it can be the result of growing tensions and feelings of discontent, as in the UK. These events have in common the fact that there is always a clear boundary between the identity of the victim and that of the community[30] in whose name the violence is being perpetrated. The violence is always directed against individuals that are perceived to be 'alien' to the social group, and that are considered blameable for the group's misfortunes. In the Europe of the last decade, these victims have generally been immigrants, asylum seekers and Roma people.

Security and Violence

One body of literature that has tried to analyse and explain these processes is the literature on the securitization of immigrants[31]. This literature is useful because the general discourse

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[27]NewTown Abbey Times – Family Speaks out over Racism Terror, March 23 2009 [http://www.newtownabbeytoday.co.uk/news/FAMILY-SPEAK-OUT-OVER-RACISM.5105083.jp]

[28] BBC News - Britons fear race violence – poll, April 17 2008 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7352125.stm]

29 CBS News - Norway massacre's links to right-wing extremism, July 23 2011 [http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20082587-503543.html] -see previous remarks on links

30 Throughout this paper, a very minimal definition of community will be used, which is that of a social group held together by a perceived common identity. According to this definition, the common identity of the group becomes the highest stake for its existence. It is usually when this identity is perceived to be threatened that the existence of the community as such becomes perceived as endangered. See more detailed explanations in the next section.

[31] The process of 'securitization' implies a process through which a referent object begins to be considered as threatened and needs to be 'secured'. This securitization means that the 'threat' is identified and dealt with. In the general literature on securitization (Buzan et. al., 2008), the process of securitization involves a discursive move through which the threat is labelled as having an existential urgency. In other words, if it is not dealt with properly, the threat will end up destroying the referent object (the state, the identity of a social

presents immigrants and Roma groups as 'threats' to the identity of the population. In order for this identity to be 'saved', violent groups legitimize their attacks as a form of self-defence, as a way to ensure the security of the groups they claim to represent (Mireanu, 2012).

To begin with, Huysmans points to the fact that immigrants and refugees are being framed by the state as 'disturbing normal ways of life' within a society (Huysmans, 2006a: 45). Because of their perceived 'otherness', immigrants are seen as alien elements of the community – be it the neighbourhood, the nation, or even 'Europe' as a common identity, with the potential to disrupt its unity and well functioning. As such, their presence induces a climate of general 'unease', of fear and discomfort among the population (Bigo, 2002). In consequence, the immigrants are being perceived as a threat to the existential security of the community. Immigration becomes securitized, which means that it becomes the object of measures that are intended to articulate it as a coherent threat, and subsequently to address this threat with coercive means (Buzan et. al., 1998). Securitization processes articulates practices of exclusion and violence against the perceived threat (Shapiro, 2007). Moreover, the securitization of immigrants in particular serves to create a 'political community of the established'; therefore, the provision of security by the state is founded upon the creation of a climate of insecurity, in a process of mutual constitution of supply and demand (Huysmans, 2006a: 47). Violence against migrants is seen as a response to the 'unease' that is generated by their framing as a threat (Huysmans, 2006a: 58). In consequence, constructing unease and fear is a pre-condition to the manifestation of violence.

But how is this climate of unease produced? Two interwoven processes are put forward in order to explain this phenomenon: the politicians' search for legitimacy, and the *habitus* of the security professionals (Bigo, 2002). The first process is connected to the so called 'professionals of politics', which are agents situated in positions of political power, members of government, and individuals with high political authority and credibility. This is obvious from the explanation that is given for how this first process operates. Hence, Bigo is concerned with the political spectacle, that is, with the need of politicians to create situations as problematic, in order to manage them. In this way, the politicians justify their

group, the environment etc.) Dealing properly with the threat involves taking exceptional measures – actions that would normally not be allowed. More often than not, these actions lead to extreme violence such as war (Neumann, 1998).

own authority and legitimacy (Bigo, 2002: 68-69). At the same time, the political spectacle infuses a sense of self-conscience in the politicians, who begin to see themselves as fundamentally necessary for the preservation of the state's functionality. This necessity is captured by the 'politics of protection', which is the politically generated need of security in the face of daily dangers and risks (Huysmans, 2006b: 2). In this respect, the blame for the emerging xenophobia in Europe is explicitly placed on the discourse of political actors in search of legitimacy (Bigo et al, 2007: 21).

The picture gets complicated with the second process. The emergence of the field of the security professionals is strictly connected to the development of security technologies, the privatization of security, and the globalised neo-liberal discourse of technocratic governance (Bigo, 2002). These factors converge to establish a network of 'professionals of (in) security', which operates with its own systems of meaning, and with practices that display productive powers (C.A.S.E Collective, 2006: 458). These professionals have the legitimate and socially accepted level of expertise that allows them to decide whether something is a risk or not, and therefore, whether it can be labelled as a threat (Bigo, 2002: 74). In other words, security professionals provide the technical justification for securitization. Yet their contribution goes further, as the nature of their expertise is translated in the nature of the threat. With the evolution and growing sophistication of security devices, threats can be identified not only in the military capabilities of nation states, but also in isolated individuals. At the same time, the same technical evolution encourages the need to use advanced methods of control and surveillance (Bigo, 2008).

These factors produce a special type of technique, which Bigo calls the '*banopticon*' (Bigo, 2007). The banopticon is a technique of governing through which the entire population is under constant surveillance, but only certain groups are being coerced and excluded (Bigo, 2007: 16). Furthermore, the banopticon is a zone of indistinction, situated in-between inside and outside, at the margins of the rule of law, and as such a zone of exceptionality (Bigo, 2007: 5). However, within this zone of exceptionality the mechanisms of governing operate based on routines, and daily practices and norms (Huysmans, 2011). As such, the exception becomes the rule. The banopticon is an ensemble of practices and discourses of security which serves to survey and discipline the population. It is a '*dispositif*' of institutions, architectural structures, laws and administrative measures, that uses power at a micro level in order to control the transnational movement of people (Bigo, 2008: 32).

This technique is explicitly designed to address the problem of immigrants and 'foreign bodies' within a social group. As such, it operates not only on the widest territorial level – through surveillance and control – but also on the most intimate biological level, by introducing, for example, biometric identifiers.

In this way, the population is rendered passive, and its role diminished. Not only is there any place for resistance in this picture, but the passivity of the subjected populations appears to deny any trace of responsibility on behalf of individual actors. This is possible because the basic rationality of the banopticon is that of protection. However, protection here is seen less as opening the possibility of agency (or, in the words of Bigo, it is not '*pro-tegere*'), but as tutoring, as speaking in the name of the protected. Therefore, the voice of the protected is muted, and its agency is considerably reduced: "The agency of the protected […] is here turned to a passive voice, reducing the political life of the protected to a biological one" (Bigo, 2006: 92).

It is thus consistent with the theory of the securitization of immigrants to argue that this 'top-down' approach places great emphasis on the practices of the government and those of the security professionals, and in this way leaves out the possibility of independent collective action at the grass-root level. Ordinary forms of racism and xenophobia become in this way subsumed, and even determined by the banopticon and its practices (Bigo, 2007: 28). These practices, continuously developed and reinforced by politicians and security experts, have the overwhelming power of deciding on the nature of the threat, its incarnations in different types of individuals, as well as on the means to address this threat. The violence of security[32] therefore becomes truly monopolized by the State[33].

The argument of this paper, to reiterate, is not that such a picture is theoretically incoherent, nor that it depicts aspects that are far from reality. Rather, the argument is that

[32] On this issue, we have to stress the argument that violence and security are closely interrelated; from exceptional measures outside the realm of normal politics, to practices of surveillance, control and the ban, and finally to war itself, violence is the main modality of security (Neumann, 1998). Whether it is outright display of force, or a more subtle practice of domination through consent, security actions are predominantly violent.

[33] 'State' here is not seen as an institution, but in the Gramscian way, as a social relation - a 'historical bloc' with a hegemonic discourse (i.e. articulation of threats, risks and dangers, among others, and therefore, the definition of 'security') (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992). This historical bloc is comprised of politicians, security experts, administrative staff, the mass media, the police and the military, and to some extent, parts of the population that accepts (and sometimes benefits from) the hegemony of the State's practices.

such a picture inevitably omits an important part of the story. This other part consists of the actions and the discourses that occur and emerge at the population's level. It can hardly be the case that this population merely adopts certain discourses, as they are 'passed down' by the State. Rather, what is needed is an account of how the population is an active part of the discourses of security and violence. It would require an explanation of how this discourse is generated within the society as well. The above examples illustrate precisely these points. They showed instances of violence that occurred distinct from, or parallel to the State action; they reflect diffuse attitudes and silent processes that take place outside state policies. The level which will be under scrutiny in the next section is distinct from the policy sphere in which the State operates. It is the symbolic level, where the stakes of collective action are not necessarily connected to the day to day parameters of the state's action. Rather, the motivations in the symbolic level are related to the unconscious strata of a community's imaginary, they are related to concerns that transcend the horizons of time and space as captured by the political. This is not to say that the political is excluded, or that it does not have any influence over this realm. However, in order to fully grasp its significance on social action, the symbolic sphere has to be disentangled from the political one.

Violence and the Sacred

This section will provide an insight on how the stakes of the symbolic order operate at the society level. The argument here is that the violence inherent in some exclusionary practices against immigrants, such as xenophobia and racism, is a manifestation of the sacred. The sacred is viewed as a system of meanings that situates the subjectivity of individuals in a coherent set of values, practices and institutions. These values and practices, in turn, give the individual a sense of true being, in short, a consciousness (Rennie, 2006). The sacred does not belong to the 'real' (here, in the phenomenological sense), even though it is manifested in and through it (Saliba, 2006). It belongs to the symbolic realm, and as such, it is distinct – although central – to the political (Agamben, 1998).

The centrality and significance of the sacred in social practices has been underlined by historians of religion, such as Eliade, who argued that the rhythm of modern culture is permeated by moments of rupture, in which the normal course of things is interrupted by a symbolic event or action. This interruption is the *hierophany*, the manifestation of the sacred within the profane order, which is embodied in practices such as ceremonies,

celebrations, rites and rituals of all sorts. These moments of dis-order have specific functions in modern society, and as such they constitute an integral part of social ontology (Eliade, 2006: 18-20).

Taking this argument one step further, the sacred can be seen at the very root of a social group, in the sense that it constitutes the primordial essence of inter-individual relations. Rene Girard has shown how this is possible, by unearthing and analyzing the role of violence as a manifestation of the sacred. At the very heart of a community lies an initial act of violence, which generates social bonds and constitutes the order (Girard, 1993). This act of violence is the symbolic murder of the '*scapegoat'*. Girard uses examples from ancient mythology, especially Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* to illustrate what he calls the 'sacrificial crisis'. This is the moment when a society over-accumulates violence that cannot be neutralized by normal means (rites of purification, animal sacrifices). Therefore, this violence spills over in the group, endangering its very fabric.

In the course of this generalization of violence, differences between individuals are suppressed, since the guilt of the violent acts becomes symmetrical, and the violence evolves in ascending spirals. Thus, violence becomes the common denominator for everyone, and at the same time the community as such becomes disintegrated through inner conflict. In order to resolve this crisis, the myths show, and Girard interprets, one member of the community has to be sacrificed, to take all the guilt onto him/herself and serve as the scapegoat. Crucially, since violence erases difference, this scapegoat can be any member of the community (Girard, 2004); at the moment that s/he is designated, however, the scapegoat becomes the complete *alter*, the 'other' towards which the identity of the social group is re-established in a symmetrical way (Girard, 1992). The killing of the scapegoat is not homicide, but (contra Agamben's understanding of the *Homo sacer*) a sacrifice. The sacred dimension is thus revealed in the ultimate and creative act of violence[34] – the sacrifice of the scapegoat.

Demanding Security

[34] David Apter reminds us that violence creates not only a discourse, but also "(...)a form of capital, a monopolistic capital of truths and virtues, of logocentric closure. It produces a conveyance, people giving over a piece of their minds to the collective, enabling them to draw more power than they give up". (Apter, 1997: 13)

How is this relevant to the analysis of the securitization of immigrants? An analysis of the hierophany of violence points to the fact that labelling the migrant as a threat does not just serve the interests of politicians and of security experts. Rather, the immigrant serves the more subtle and symbolic function of the *scapegoat*. The violence directed towards migrants is not just the daily practices of the banopticon, a *dispositif* of constant surveillance and invisible coercion. Acting in ways that eventually lead to violence towards migrants seems to be an inherent logic of many societies. This logic is not motivated solely by a perceived existential threat, but also by the need to direct the violence that would otherwise destroy the very fabric of the society. Therefore, violence against the migrant is a symbolic act of social purification and reconsolidation. By driving the internal violence away from its members and towards the 'other', the community saves itself from destruction and reconfirms its own identity. This violence cannot always be expressed in an intense manner, partly because of the state's monopoly on coercive instruments.[35] Therefore, the society directs it as a *demand for security* to policy makers, and also to other social actors.[36] Repressed violence leads to the perception that the immigrant is a threat, and protection measures are demanded from the state. This is the nexus between security, violence and the sacred. And it is in this manner that security issues emerge initially outside the official state discourse and action, and then eventually get picked up by the state and re-directed back to the population.

35 This is to say that social groups do not always have the capabilities (time, strength, resources) to engage in open conflict with those that they consider to be scapegoats. The violence then gets dispersed and submerged, and is expressed in everyday acts. The examples of extremist violence that we have seen in the introduction to this paper can therefore be thought of as just the tip of an iceberg that has very deep roots within the core of the social imaginary.

36 This mechanism does not reflect a mere disposition of the society to become united in moments of crisis. Security may as well divide the people, not just bring them together. Rather, we can argue that this mechanism of security and common identity reflects something deeper, something related to profoundly rooted social fears and panics. Humans need security, as much as they need the feeling that they belong to a bigger collective. The two elements – security and identity – go together hand in hand. We would argue that there is a certain demand for security, articulated or not, but definitely felt by individuals.

The demand for security happens autonomously from the threat articulations of the state. Of course there can be no real separation between what the state says and what the society thinks, there is always an influence from the state towards society, if only for the fact that the state controls most of the information related to security and threats. But we can safely argue that the social demand for security can be distinct from the state's activity: it can posit different threats than the state does, or it can claim that some threats are more important than the state claims, or it can even claim the state itself as a threat. Moreover, these social processes can lead to deeply rooted perceptions of threat that can function independently of the state's policy. These rooted perceptions form imaginaries of threats that are highly conservative, stereotypical and taken for granted. This is why, when certain actors from the society claim to speak on behalf of it, they attempt to use these imaginaries in order to gain as much credibility as possible.

This is not to deny the importance of the interplay between the political and the technocratic in labelling the migrant as a threat. Yet, in parallel to these factors, the wide adhesion of the society to violent acts against migrants – ranging from surveillance to expulsion – has to be seen also in conjuncture to the symbolic function of the migrant as a scapegoat. The migrant is blamed for all the deficiencies of the society – unemployment, poverty, disorder, crime, amorality and so on. As such, any violence towards the migrant is legitimate, as it is part of the purifying ritual of social redemption. Symbolically sacrificing the migrant achieves two goals. On the one hand it re-directs the violence of the group away from its members and towards the victim. On the other hand, by removing this destructive force and the potentiality of conflict, it re-establishes social harmony.

Conclusion

This paper presented, of course, a highly stylized account of what is a complex phenomenon. However, at their very root, the social motivations behind tolerating and augmenting violence towards migrants in Europe are also based on such symbolic mechanisms. The rise of more and more xenophobic and new racist movements across Europe – all of which see migrants as the main problem – is an illustration of these processes of symbolic scapegoating, as a manifestation of the sacred and its functions. Yet, if their occurrence is continuously seen as a product of state rhetoric, and their most intimate rationales are not uncovered, their intrinsic violence will remain enigmatic.

Even more, analysing security as instrumental tactics of agents in pursuit for any kinds of capital and power, as revealing as they might be, ultimately remain trapped in an infertile pessimism. Reflecting upon the constructive side of security practices can shed light on the puzzle of their continuous and growing public support, which occurs in spite of numerous attempts to de-demonize the immigrants. Also, seeing the demand for security and violence not as a pathological trait or a side effect of state interference, but as an active and conscious move on behalf of a society that genuinely feels threatened, might point to better and victimless ways of managing unease. Conflict is an essential part of the political, and thus any polity will be faced with violence. However, understanding the mechanisms of this violence can help us manage it in ways that do not lead to social exclusion and bloodshed.

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