The approach of moderate constructivism towards international regimes¹

Vladrin Grainca
valdrin_gr@hotmail.com

This article adapts a theoretical approach toward explanations of international regimes. The main point is to see how moderate constructivism can contribute to the study of the international regimes. Since liberal institutionalism is the leading perspective on international regimes, this article defies its main theoretical foundations rather ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Market Failure’. After viewing these explanations as not convincing we turn to the moderate constructivism by arguing that this perspective can provide better explanations by focusing on identity theory. By focusing on identity theory this article argues that the strength of international regimes depends on the identity of states. The behaviour of the great powers will take place as illustrations.

Introduction

From 1970s emerged theories focusing on interdependence and study of international politics (Little 2005, p.370-371). These theories focused on international regimes in order to explain cooperation and institutions of international politics. The interactions between states attracted attention of the scholars within the area of international regimes. One important aspect was the role of hegemonic power and its role on facilitating international regimes. This raises a question about other great powers and international regimes: if the hegemonic power established regimes for its interests then how do other great powers view international regimes? The aim of this article is to provide a critical examination of ‘Prisoners Dilemma’ and ‘Market Failure’ dealing with the concept of international regimes. During the past many wars between powerful states occurred as a consequence of power quest of rising powers (revisionist identity). Beside existence of international regimes, these great powers made war as a normal tool towards the peak of international politics. France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan etc., were using war as a means of progress in international affairs. International regimes that were created during this period had incorporated norms and principles to justify the gains of wars (Puchala & Hopkins 1982, p.257). After the Second World War (WWII), the emergence of regimes became a fashion and, at the same time, there was no war between great powers. Proliferation of international regimes continued while great powers such as China and Russia joined World Trade Organization (WTO) or

¹ This article contains some parts of the master thesis “Great Powers’ Behavior towards International Regimes: introducing moderate constructivism”.

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International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the Cold War. These organizations and regime that they promoted were biased because they served the interests of the United States of America (U.S.) (Puchala & Hopkins 1982, 260). Nevertheless, China and Russia joined these regimes advocated by abovementioned organizations. How this could happen? China and Russia made a step that leads to assumptions of compliance with the established rules, thus, making their power quest as a non-violent behavior. In sum, behavior of powerful states in search for power has changed, shifting from war to international regimes as a means of power projection. In this aspect, even though international regimes existed before WWII they didn’t reduce uncertainty, as they didn’t maximize benefits of concerned parties. This gap emerges by ignoring the contextual aspect of great powers their identity, indeed. The concept of international regimes is changing effectively as a result of states’ identity. By adapting a theoretical approach we intend to understand this change of behavior and a great help will be moderate constructivism of Alexander Wendt.

**The concept of international regimes**

Toward the concept of international regimes Susan Strange brings a profound criticism. Her criticism is based on Marxist structuralism and economic aspect where she made some points. Strange (1982, p. 484-485) asserts (as Arthur Stein does) that the concept of international regimes is so broad that when used by international scholars it means different things and is used to analyze different aspects of international politics, thus, being “woolly”. Moreover, the concept of international regimes attempts to obscure the fragility of international politics where disagreements are more usual than agreements (p. 491). Her critique is elaborated further by accusing regime scholars to be tending to assert that regimes are reducing uncertainty and bringing order, meanwhile many regimes brings disorder than order (p. 480-489).

States’ behavior, power and interests are important parts of the explanation of international regimes. In this respect, liberal institutionalism gave profound insights on international regimes. On the other hand, constructivism – divided in two groups – gave insights, too, but it substituted regimes for institutions. In this way, Wendt (1999, p. 96) views institutions “made of norms and rules, which are ideational phenomena”. Rationalists, too, substitute regimes for institutions only that there are different thoughts to what an institution or regimes are. Therefore, there is a need for a proper concept of international regimes that would have two elements: first, it would have elements of moderate constructivism or it wouldn’t be in contradiction with this perspective and it would limit the concept of international regimes to certain institutions that are within regimes, thus, avoiding criticism of Strange.

Alexander Wendt reduced regimes to institutions and this represents the problem underlined by Strange and Stein that the concept of regimes became “woolly”. But Wendt distinguishes these institutions in terms of incorporation of them within the society as norms and principles thus using them also in international arena where these institutions became as shared ideas. In this
way, we intend to combine the definition of Wendt and Stein. Arthur Stein (1982, p. 301) emphasized the most important element in regime formation by asserting that the facilitation of regimes takes place when behavior of states is constrained by joint decision/action. Thus, conventions and agreements are the basis to identify elements of a regime but not the only one. To translate this in constructivist language and combine it with Wends understanding, regimes represents shared ideas incorporated within joint decisions of states, thus, constraining and establishing a certain behavior of states.

**Liberal institutionalism**

Another tradition of thought is liberal institutionalism (or neoliberalism). The neoliberalist point of view accentuates that institutions exert a significant influence on international relations enabling states, as rational actors, to solve cooperation problems and realize what autonomy and self-help cannot provide (Reus-Smit 1997, p. 560). Neoliberals propose to analyze regimes as a “strictly interest-based phenomena the creation, maintenance, and demise of which can and must be accounted for from the perspective of strategically rational but otherwise mutually indifferent actors” (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1996, p. 26). A leading thinker is Keohane who “relying heavily on modern economic theories of institutions”, proposes a contractualist approach of international regimes (p. 27). The main function of regimes is described by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the role of regimes is to serve as a means of cooperation, and market failure that gives a functional attribute to regimes (1996, p. 27). Moreover, actors’ interests or values are not changed by international regimes, these regimes alter the incentives for action, thus changing “the calculations of advantage that governments make” where, as Keohane points out, regimes are the “cause” while cooperation is the “effect” (Keohane in Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1996, p. 32).

International regimes have an advantage because states are provided with an environment where they can cooperate through agreements (Keohane in Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, p. 37). But, what about the role of shared ideas? Do regimes serve as a place where states can share ideas on interests and power? Moreover, do these ideas have any role at all in states interactions? These are cognitivist questions that will bring insights on the role of the state and international regimes meanwhile stressing the limits of liberal institutionalism.

Robert Keohane as a leading thinker of liberal institutionalism, from the beginning of 1990s turns to the study of the role of ideas in foreign policy. Keohane, in this respect, introduced new insights in the role of ideas between states and within international regimes. In his book, a co-editor with Judith Goldstein, he asserts that ideas, which are “defined as beliefs held by individuals”, help to explain outcomes particularly those related to the foreign policy” (eds Keohane and Goldstein 1993, p.3). Nevertheless, since politics is a realm where states are faced with continuous uncertainties, ideas can serve as roadmaps in maximizing interests of the actors (p. 16). Accordingly, ideas guide the behavior by “stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical
or moral motivations for action” (p. 16). The role of ideas as roadmaps is very profound but nevertheless, ideas are not limited only to the causal factor. As it will be mentioned below, Wendt pointed out that interests, beside their materialistic part, are constituted by ideas.

Later, Keohane (2002, p.1) asserted “the principal motor of action in this view is self-interest, guided by rationality, which translates structural and institutional conditions into payoffs and probabilities, and therefore incentives”. How can states share ideas within a certain regime when they are self-interested entities? The generated behavior that derives from the “self” is very limited, since the state would be interested to realize its own goals. Liberal institutionalism shares rationalist framework of studying international regimes. Liberalists ignore identity issues of states and as a consequence they cannot explain why regimes serve as means of advancing interests in present-day and didn’t provide same opportunities before the WWII. This is the reason why in this thesis liberal institutionalism is considered as a non-comprehensive perspective.

**Market failure**

In his explanation of market failure, Keohane (1984), takes the explanation ‘market lemons’ provided by George Akerlof where institutions are needed to reduce uncertainty. Arrow, examining this market failure, asserted that the problem here is not the buyers (actors) but the problem is at the products (Arrow in Keohane 1984, p. 96-97). Translated into the international politics, this means that, as Arrow notices, actors are not the problem because they are ‘rational utility-maximizers’ but the problem is the structure of international system (which is anarchic) and the absence of institutional arrangements that would determine the ‘price of lemons’ (Arrow in Keohane 1984, 97). Therefore, the key element is the uncertainty that we face in international politics. In this way, states do not have same opinions during their interactions. And this results to the market failure. To escape the market failure, international system needs international regimes (institutional arrangements) to reduce uncertainty and to have coordination in order to maximize interests.

Market failure is the concept that, provided by liberal institutionalism, explains the reason why international regimes exist and are beneficial. According to Richard Little (2005, p. 80), the decline of state authority expressed the need for regime formation in the international arena. In this way, international regimes emerge as a consequence of states’ self-interests because these regimes provide cooperation and beneficial agreements that may maximize their gains (Keohane 1984, p. 27). As a result, great powers enter regimes because these regimes provide cooperation amongst them and may advance their interests. Here after, we cannot argue why regimes did not have this role before WWII. During that time, international regimes existed but nevertheless they were not seen as the means to maximize interests. In sum, we cannot be certain that by establishing a regime the uncertainty of the anarchic world will be reduced.
Robert Keohane (1984, p. 96) pointed out that interactions are with sub-optimal outcomes and these interactions are mediated by market thus giving “the utility functions of actors and the resources at their disposal”. In the same section, Keohane asserted the asymmetry of relations where not all states benefit equally from agreements. Therefore, the probabilities of the great powers’ to benefit are greater than the other states. Moreover, stressing the role of hegemony, liberal institutionalism claims, “...actors being investigated are rational and that the institutions and the social practices to be explained were designed to fulfil anticipated functions” (p. 95). As an illustration he provides the formation of International Energy Agency, where the interests of United States was to promote its ambitions on the field of energy.

But viewing actors as egoistic, how cooperation can prevail? To this question Keohane (1984, p. 97) answers by explaining how egoistic actors do cooperate. He asserts that egoistic actors are always interested in each other’s behaviour and how this behaviour would influence the interests of the egoistic actor. So, for their own sake, these actors cooperate by adjusting or modifying behaviour in order to cooperate since these actors are self-interested and rational. As we can infer if great powers do not comply with this schema then market failure would emerge and actors wouldn’t be rational. Therefore, regimes/institutions provide great powers with cooperation and uncertainty reduction. In this way, if there is a market failure it is because of the lack of the institutions that facilitate coordination. Once again, we have problems to put these explanations in the historical context. Anterior WWII, there were regimes and institutional arrangements but these states didn’t see these arrangements as lucrative because they didn’t maximize interests by these regimes. For instance, after First World War (WWI) Germany and Japan sought to maximize their gains by war and not international regimes (cooperation). In this way, this situation can be explained by revisionist identity theory. More argument and illustration will be provided in the section of revisionist states and international regimes where the analogy of ‘market failure’ has limited explanations.

**Prisoner’s dilemma**

‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ represents a situation where two prisoners are caught and they cooperate in strategic way. This game theory explains how actors can maximize their gains. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, individuals are foreseen to be rational where by cooperating they achieve a maximum outcome. What we see here is that parties are not interested in maximum gains (that would be if one of the actors confess thus not being prosecuted at all), because the best outcome would be neither of prisoners to confess and be detained only for thirty days. As a result, Keohane asserts that Prisoner’s Dilemma helps to explain strategic interaction between actors and it explains why cooperation brings collective goods. As we explored above, institutional arrangements helps actors to carry out this cooperation and strategic interaction. Nevertheless, relying on Hardin and Taylor, Keohane (1984, p. 83) asserted that in multi-case Prisoners’ Dilemma concept of practice, or better to say repeating (not learning) takes place where actors conclude better calculations. Thus, Keohane refuses the role of the learning ability. Referring to Haas’ concept of learning, Keohane
(1984, p. 83) asserted that this concept is not possible in a political context, since there are structural constraints, thus, actors have to stay close to the boundaries of political action within international regimes. Therefore, here are obvious limits of institutional liberalism when it comes to the change of interests.

In this way, we understand that great powers by joining or forming international regimes, seek to reduce uncertainty and cooperate to make beneficial outcomes. And here the concept of actors as egoistic and maximizers of gains, is not convincing since the Prisoner’s Dilemma is about actors who ‘care’ for others. This ‘care’ is manifested by the action not to get released immediately, but by willing to take thirty days in prison and granting the other actor with the same benefits. As we mentioned above, Keohane (1984) fills this gap – the ‘care’ for others –by asserting that the concept of ‘self-interest’ is very broad and doesn’t exclude the ‘other’ in order to achieve better results for parties. Nevertheless, it is not convincing, since a rational-egoistic actor would choose to maximize its own gains. This means that prisoners are interested on maximizing gains for their Self. This dilemma can be fulfilled by moderate constructivism where it introduces the collectivist identity of states. In this identity great powers care for each other since they have learned each other’s interests during interactions. The decision of China to buy Boeing airplanes, in order to reduce its own benefits of trade with the USA, shows how the great powers are not maximizers of interests.

**Moving towards reflexivism**

Later, by the beginning of 1990s, liberal institutionalism moved towards reflexivism. They turned to the role of ideas and how these serve to institutions. Nevertheless, the meaning that liberals gave to ideas is far from the constructivist thought. Keohane and Goldstein asserted that ideas have only causal impacts (eds Keohane & Goldstein 1993, p. 13-14). This means that ideas serve as a tool or means to reach better outcomes, in this way serving as strategies that are incorporated into institutions. Liberalists claim, that war is an obsolete means and that trade is the tool of maximizing interests, it is not new. As the classical liberalist Norman Angell (in Nye 2005, p. 43) asserted a century ago, war became too expensive therefore trade makes states merely to be determined for trade rather than conduct wars. Nevertheless, two world wars occurred. As it will be argued below, trade always enables major powers to advance their interests but the exclusion of war as a tool of advancing interests happens only when states abandon revisionist identity. Before the Second World War, nothing stopped Germany or Japan to advance their interests by existing institutions. Here it is obvious that liberal institutionalism makes the assumptions as the realist tradition concerning the origins of interests. Conceiving ideas and interests as exogenous, liberals see international politics as material and not social, thus, giving to institutions a material purpose and not conceiving them as shared beliefs that “constitute power and interest” of the great powers (Wendt 1999, p. 34). Therefore, the main dilemma is that liberal institutionalism cannot provide an answer for the
role of international regimes in historical context.

**Moderate constructivism**

As a grand theory, constructivism is a very broad approach. Within this broad approach is moderate constructivism endorsed by Alexander Wendt in his book “Social Theory of International Politics”. Having in mind Wendt’s approach toward international regimes, he is considered as a strong constructivist (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger 1996, p. 167). Accordingly, Wendt doesn’t view regimes as a sufficient external element in constraining the behavior of other states unless there is not internalization of norms/institutions by states (Wendt 1999, p. 359). As a result, it allows focusing in the internalization of norms and regime robustness. A hypothetical claim would suggest that the lack of internalization of norms by states caused the weakness of international regimes before the end of WWII, while the internalization of these norms (such as the norm/institution of sovereignty) after WWII led to the robustness of regimes. This is what Wendt argued in his above-mentioned book only that he viewed the internalization of institutions in different periods of time than the one we tend to have in our study and he spoke in terms of peace and not regimes.

Moderate constructivism, as Wendt (1999, p. 47) claims, is a via media approach. He applies a constructivist ontology and epistemology of ‘scientific realism’, thus representing his methodology of moderate constructivism. Guzzini and Leander (2001, p. 324) called this a ‘dualist ontology’ since it implies holist and individualist elements. But actually we can call it as dualist only the origin of this ontology because Wendt integrated individualism and holism in a unique form. In our study, this ontology will inform about constrains and possibilities of states behavior and regimes. For instance, this ontological position would suggest that shared ideas contain the concerns for the self and the other. In this way, if there is empirical ground, we could argue that states quest for power concerns the first element (the self) while multidimensionality of power would argue that power is not for the egocentric state only, but also about later concerns (the other). As it will be argued below, both modalities of concerns are embedded in international regimes. In sum, Wendt (1999, p. 372) represented an ontology of ideas that has two elements: social and constructionist. The former one represents ideas since these serve as a ‘bridge’ between states and the later constitutes the identity of states. This discerns the identities of states and the concept of international regimes by studying the ideas that states have in their ‘pockets’. As Joseph Nye (2005, p. 6) pointed out, for constructivists ideas and culture shape international politics, in this constructing identities where states converge. The overall picture of Wendt’s theory relies on culture that is constituted by structural facts and states identities. In this ambient, power and interests have different meanings from assumptions of rationalism and (strong) constructivism. As scholars have asserted, when studying regimes is mandatory to explain interests and power of states in the context of international politics (Krasner 1982, p. 193). In this way, to understand international regimes we have to explain what does moderate constructivism means by power and interests.
Power

Wendt (1999, p. 97) asserts that not only realists write for power and use it as a concept to explain international politics. Nevertheless, there is a difference between theories by asking “how power is constituted” (Wendt 1999, p. 97). Writing for power doesn’t make you a realist because it depends from the explanation of power that a scholar is using. In order to explain power Wendt (p. 109) refers to interests since “[t]he explanatory significance of the distribution of power depends on historically contingent distributions of state interests”, thus, power has a meaning taken from interests. The highest concern of states is – even when they calculate their goals – the survival. Wendt agrees with this concept if we are talking for revisionist states. Wendt (p. 262) explains that “[s]ince the enemy's revisionist intentions are "known," the state can use the enemy's capabilities to predict his behavior, on the assumption that he will attack as soon as he can win” and it is this moment that power takes a determining role in the survival. Wendt explains power politics in terms of Weberian concept of social by referring to the Self and Other. Viewing the power also as social phenomenon, interactions can succeed since “actors bring their beliefs enough into line that they can play the same game, each side tries to get the other to see things its way” (Wendt 1999, p. 331). Concerning international regimes, the conception of power provided by Wendt is important since it allows distinguishing the role of these states and how regimes can be affected.

In sum, it matters how power is constituted and what explains. In this way, power is dependent from the context whether we have to deal with revisionist, status-quo, or collectivist identity of the great powers. Wendt’s assumption relies on the functionality of power in the meaning that what constitutes that power material interests or social interests? Therefore, to understand via media conception of power we have to understand the interests of actors since – as mentioned above – power depends from the states interests. Are these interests constituted by motivation of survival or other factors too? Wendt’s theoretical claims bring also insights on constitution of interests.

Interests

Interests, like power, depend from the context, too. Concerning interests, Wendt (p. 123-124) assumed that “states have desires”. Nevertheless, it depends for which states we are talking about. Are we considering desires of status quo, revisionist, or collectivist states? According to Wendt, status quo states – in contradiction with revisionist one – do not have interests in “conquering other states, redrawing boundaries, or changing the rules of the international system”, thus “these beliefs are not merely about an external world: they also constitute a certain identity and its relationship to that world, which in turn motivates action in certain directions” (123-124). Different from status quo states, revisionist states are interested in conquering and changing rules of the interactions. Third category of states is collectivist one, “collectivist states have the desire to help those they identify with even when their own security is not directly threatened” (123-124). Thus, here we have to do with
identities of states and socialization of states. Before the WWII we had many revisionist states such as Germany and Japan, and this is their identity where interests were materialistic in the meaning that these states had some materialistic needs while in the same time they had an idea (war) of maximizing their interests. We have to bear in mind that these materialistic needs are not given exogenously but are determined by human nature so it is different from realist conceptualization. Therefore, a conclusion is the formula of “desire plus belief plus reason equals action” (125-126). Portraying power and interests in this way it is important for our understanding of great powers behavior toward international regimes in different contexts.

**Identity theory**

Identity theory, which is represented by Wendt, will be as a distinguishing factor of interests during contexts. To summarize, identity theory represents the state itself with ideas about the world where this identity is constituted by interactions (Wendt 1999, p.224). In this way we will be able to notice the identity of great powers and to reveal reasons how a certain state such as Japan behaves in different ways in historical contexts. One determining element of the certain identity is interest. Here we can assume the nature of interests of states thus serving as a roadmap to study empirical findings and interpret them in relation to international regimes.

Maja Zehfuss (2001), by taking the example of Germany, suggested that using identity to describe world politics is a dangerous liaison. This liaison undermines Wendt’s constructivism because we are not able to calculate whether a certain state is bounded with a certain kind of identity. As an argument he takes the commitment of Germany to the basement of foreign policy ‘never again in war’. The author explains that as a consequence of history, Germany used this phrase to abolish the use of force in foreign policy. Nevertheless, during the Kosovo War and other conflicts, Germany abandoned that phrase and used the war (violence) as a means of foreign policy. In this context, we cannot distinguish between the identity of the Third Reich and nowadays Germany. But Zehfuss’s argument is not representative. The German use of war as a means of foreign policy is not the same as it was during the Third Reich. As the Wendian identity theory is developed, it is obvious that within identity theory it’s important to know the purpose and means of war. If it is used for territorial purposes or it is a regular (normal) means of realizing shared beliefs (humanitarian intervention). If the first one takes place, then we have to do with a revisionist identity. Otherwise, if that war is meant to be for collective purposes (such as the intervention in Kosovo) where a particular state (for instance Germany) doesn’t benefit solely, then we cannot identify revisionist ideas. In sum, we have to attach the ideas of a particular state that it has in a certain action. Moreover, in this article we concentrate on identity of great powers and relations between these great powers. However, Zehfuss argument is valid, to some extent, when it comes to describe a certain great power as a collectivist or a status quo. Since there are no strict and ad hoc shifts from one identity to another one, as nowadays identity of the great powers is mixed between status-quo and collective one. This is the reason why we asserted that
in this study after Second World War, world politics contains great powers with status quo and collectivist one. But, when it comes to revisionist identity, the difference is obvious.

In his book *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt analyzed three types of state identities: revisionist identity, status-quo, and collectivist one. These types of identities are the one that bounded international politics. This identity theory is important for international regimes because it asserts what kind of interests Great Powers have. What follows is a summary of these identity theories that Wendt represented in his book.

**Revisionist states**

The concept of international regimes before the Second World War can be analysed in terms of the great powers’ behaviour. To analyse this behaviour we will concentrate in a particular form of the identity theory. This form is revisionist states. According to this theory, “states will try to conquer each other, territorial property rights will not be recognized, and weak states will have a high death rate” (Wendt 1999, p. 105). In this way, interests and shared beliefs are not embedded within the international regimes but they will "bandwagon" with other great powers to “change the system” (p. 105). Here we can put states such as Germany and Japan, but also empires of XIX century. This identity theory is compatible with constructivism since here interests and shared beliefs, defined as in moderate constructivist framework, will be helpful in determining the role of international regimes.

According to Wendt (p. 269), revisionist states are encircled by norms that are similar with Hobbesian culture where “...interest of these states is in conquering each other, at the limit in creating a world empire, and as such they are not better off cooperating”. Interests of these states are from human nature and not in the meaning of shared ideas (p. 286-287). Moreover, here shared ideas have different connotation representing the “commonly known", for instance, "...the institution of sovereignty is not shared in the sense of "accepted" by revisionist states” (p.286-287). In this way, regimes had an informal role since they were constituted only through practices of the great powers and not by frameworks of deliberation where regime creation would take place and different agreements would serve long term interests. In general, beliefs and interests of revisionist states can be explained under the anarchic culture of Hobbes (p. 124). Wendt (p. 124) asserts that under this culture, these states have desires of conquering and changing the rules of the game. These desires and beliefs are a ‘culturally constituted cognitions’ and to explain these aspect Wendt (p. 124) turns to the socio-psychological aspects of states like the belief of being a “victim” or the passions for ‘glory’.

Richard Rosecrance (in Nye 2005, p. 5) identified two ways of increasing power. First, power can be increased by territorial conquest (revisionist states), as an illustrative example is Japan and Germany. Second is by peaceful means (status quo and collectivist states), where major powers can gain power without waging wars. Here as examples are Japan and Germany again, where the
former became the second largest economy in the world. As it is mentioned in the power/interests section, revisionist states are not attached to joint institutions to advance their interests. This is because they are interested in territorial gains, since powers and interests are mainly based on human nature (Wendt 1999, p. 105). This human nature makes great powers to view power and interests only for the materialistic “Self” and here the concept of ‘self’ and ‘other’, as it is in status-quo and collectivist identity, it is not present. Therefore, the great powers were not interested in advancing their interests by international regimes. Instead, they viewed regimes only as joint impacts to halt their ambitions. The assertion of realism that powerful states use regimes as means of power projection in this context, fails. Beside the existence of these regimes, as we notice in illustrations, great powers didn’t use regimes as power projection. The revisionist beliefs are the reasons why Japan and Germany didn’t advance their interests primary by international regimes. As Wendt asserted (see above), in revisionist identity ideas among countries (read great powers) are not shared as accepted but as commonly known. In this way, these ideas in an easy fashion can be rejected. To illustrate these theoretical explanations of moderate constructivism, we described three samples of regimes anterior WWII, where the role of revisionist great powers toward international regimes is discerned.

**Status quo and collectivist states**

From the end of WWII, no war between major powers has occurred. In this sense, new theories of international relations emerged to explain this situation. While liberal institutionalism offered interdependence, Alexander Wendt focused on identity theories. As we mentioned above, revisionist theory of state is intended to explain the occurrences of politics before the end of WWII since this period was identified with many great wars. But the period after WWII is much complicated and it has no clear boundaries in states behavior. Therefore, here are represented two identity theories of state: status-quo and collectivism one.

According to Alexander Wendt’s thought (p. 105) represented in *Social Theory of International Politics*, the status-quo states are the one who doesn’t fight and they get along with each other with the formula “Live and let live”. In an anarchic situation they possess a culture that is called the Lockean one. An attribute of this theory is the fact that states may get into security dilemmas and arm races (Herz and Jervis in Wendt 1999, p. 105) but interests of this culture are of that kind that no war occurs. According to Wendt, these states are interested in material force, capabilities, therefore engagement in power politics is obvious but their behavior doesn’t degenerate in armed conflict since shared ideas of these states (such as accepted institution of sovereignty) do limit the behavior (Wendt 1999, p.269). Keohane (1984) represented international regimes as a way of reducing uncertainty but this thought ignores the fact represented by Wendt (1999, p. 108) that history exists and states have knowledge about each other’s interests and intended behavior by creating an idea on the identity of a state whether it is a revisionist or status-quo.
This Lockean culture suggests that status quo states have self-help elements but in the same time other-help because here states are not seen as enemies but as rivals (p. 296). This type of identity theory allows us to explain the concept of international regimes. In this way we claim that international regimes became more important since great powers are advancing their interests through peaceful manner. In this respect, theory of status quo states will enable to see the attributes of great powers where these states are interested on their own gains but not being warlike. But this theory alone will not be helpful to explain ongoing politics. Thus, another state identity theory will bring complementary insights.

Collective identity asserts that Self and Other are identified with each other by accepted shared ideas (Turner in Wendt 1999, p. 229). Here states, through homogeneity, are identified as a group (Wendt 1999, p. 352). States create a group identity where self-restraint helps in creating common goals between Self and the Other (p. 344). With other words, the Other is not a threat or risk of Self. In this way states see themselves as encircled not by enemies (revisionist) or rivals (status-quo) but by friendly states. As an example of this identity, Wendt (p. 359) describes pluralistic security communities such as NATO. By referring to individuals, Wendt (p. 163) asserts that states have commitment to their group as individuals have commitment to the group they belong to since there is a collective memory that generates patterns of behavior.

Combining collective and status quo identity, we can represent a better illustration of states behavior and why they act in a different way in comparison with revisionist states. Also, when we introduce the analogy it will be noticed a process of socialization. In turn, this makes great powers to be more cautious with each other’s needs. For example, China decided to spend billions of dollars to buy few Boeing planes in order to reduce the gap of trade imbalance with the USA. Therefore, this form of identity will supplement status-quo identity since there are some phenomena in international regimes that rivalry cannot explain.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, we argued that to understand the approach of moderate constructivism towards international regimes, we have to give a primary concern to identity theory. Liberal institutionalism is constrained by their ontological and epistemological assertions, thus not giving a proper concern to the role of ideas and identities that states may have during the history. To overcome these gaps, moderate constructivism offered explanations that are able to identify these ideas in different contexts. Analogies provided by liberal institutionalism have ignored contextual aspects of states and their identities. Great powers with revisionist identity were not interested in advancing their interests by international regimes. Instead, they preferred war and revolutionary change. This ended in the great wars and the meaningless of regimes. And since history exists, these great powers have been able to learn from the past and changing their behaviour towards international regimes, they also began to socialize with the rules of regimes while constantly trying to change prospects. These great powers, such as China, joined the trade regime
that is evolving from WTO because interests and power, as are defined by moderate constructivism, exclude the narrow egoistic behaviour of the great powers. Therefore, there is always possibility for change.

Trying to escape from this pessimistic view, liberal institutionalism asserted a more adequate approach towards international regimes. With market failure, “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and later incorporating a causal function of ideas liberal institutionalism, stressed the ability of the great powers to cooperate. As Nye has mentioned, liberals tend to write about trade regimes and they neglect other regimes. And this is true because all analogies derive from economic theories and these analogies tend to explain reasons of why egoistic states cooperate to maximize interests. Nevertheless, liberalism does not answer our questions such as why the existing regimes before Second World War failed to perform their functions as uncertainty reducer. Moreover, introduced analogies ignore contextual factors, learning, and the identities of the great powers. As we mentioned, from classical liberalism to liberal institutionalism, trade and emergence of regimes is seen as a way of avoiding war. But WWI and WWII argued that even though regimes may exist, they do not prevent the occurrence of war. Another argument against liberal institutionalism is the maximization of interests. As Wendt mentioned, when states are in interaction they cannot maximize interests. The only way of maximization of interests is war where a state may impose to the defeated states unconditional requests. This is the reason why the word ‘advance’ suits better in analyzing the great powers’ interests. A valuable critique is the concept of ‘trade and’ issue. Dunnoff (1999) argued that liberal institutionalism cannot explain more than trade issues. Nowadays, many trade issues are related to other issues, such as environment and in this context we can not speak for pure trade issues only. In sum, by ignoring contextual factors, ideas and the concept of learning, liberal institutionalism fails to see the difference between regimes before and after the end of Second World War and identities of the Great Powers.

Finally, we offered an explanation of moderate constructivism. Constructivism ignores the study of regimes respectively, transfers the study of international regimes to social institutions. Nevertheless, conceptualizing in this way, constructivists cannot escape from the profound criticism of Susan Strange on international regimes. In this way, assertions of moderate constructivism had to be accommodated in a proper way in order to make comprehensive theoretical framework of regime analysis. This accommodation is enabled by Arthur Steins’ concept of regimes and Alexander Wendt’s writings on the identity theory.

The concept of international regimes was designated to explain the cooperation of states. Nevertheless, Susan Strange (1982) criticized this concept calling it as ‘woolly’. Arthur Stein (1982) made the same criticism where the concept of international regimes meant to explain all of international politics. Stein formulated some principles when certain cooperation can be seen as a regime. Also, Wendt, as other constructivists, views international regimes in terms of institutions. Nevertheless, when he introduces the identity theory, he is writing about specific institutions that are embedded in the identity of a state depending on whether it is a revisionist, status quo, or a collectivist identity.
From combining Wendt’s assertions with Stein’s conceptualization of regimes emerges a comprehensive conceptualization of regimes. In this way, we argued that from moderate constructivism perspective we can explain the concept of international regimes.

REFERENCES


