Sustainable Development in Middle Powers’ Governance Arrangements: The Cases of IBSA and MIKTA

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Abstract

Considering middle powers’ potential to address new demands worldwide and their propensity to contribute to new forms of institution-building in global governance, arrangements between them consist of interesting opportunities to promote sustainable development. However, some have shown to be more effective than others in this regard. When observing two of these partnerships’ outcomes between 2015 and 2018, India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum has demonstrated more effectiveness than Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA) New Innovative Partnership. To understand why, this study analyses specialized literature, with special attention to Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) framework on global governance arrangements’ effectiveness. Arguing that middle power arrangements that address sustainable development are more effective when benefiting from greater functional specialization and that diversified power access also plays a role, this study raises awareness about middle powers’ relevance in addressing new global demands. The study points out the nascent research on these informal partnerships and the causal relations between these arrangements’ structures and effectiveness.

Keywords

Global Governance; IBSA; Middle Powers; MIKTA; Sustainable Development
Introduction

The end of the Second World War contributed to the creation of international organizations, which emerged legitimized by international law and mainly built on the most powerful nations’ interest like formal, standing institutions, s (Cooper 1997; Ikenberry 2001; Flemes 2007). However, from the 1990s onwards, the insufficient role of those latter states in carrying out new demands of an increasingly complex globalized system\(^\text{14}\) led to the emergence of informal institutions outside the scope of international law (Guerrero 2018). These governance arrangements arose as a response to new demands for the global agenda, which started to require appreciation and adaptation of novel themes in the international arena, beyond security and economy, such as human rights, gender, disarmament, and sustainable development (Reis et al 2008). In this context, a group of countries marginalized in the international order began to consider alternative forms of interaction in international relations. Despite remaining controversies in International Relations (IR), these nations are commonly designated as middle powers. Indeed, the global financial crisis of 2008 can be considered a watershed for these states in global governance as they increased their institutional representation (Cooper 2015). In the 21st century, they become important not only for their diplomatic practice, alternative to that of the great powers, but also for their prominence in the arrangement of informal institutions as instruments to address these countries’ demands (Cooper 2015; Haug 2017; Guerrero 2018).

Middle powers are influential diplomatic actors in areas where they do not collide with major powers’ interests. Such a role gains momentum nowadays, with the rising alignment of global governance arrangements between these nations. These partnerships can be considered precursors of institution-building by middle powers in global governance as these groupings become increasingly institutionalized to address the aforementioned “new themes”, thereby allowing these countries to gain more influence in the global system (Yoshihide 2012; Vigevani, Veiga and Mariano 1994). At the same time, since the beginning of this century, sustainable development has become a prevailing priority in the global agenda. Diverse international actors are increasingly conscious about this domain, consequently adapting the role of the institutions in which they participate to those novel priorities. The United Nations (UN), as the major global organization, has recently launched a series of initiatives related to sustainable development. The idea of development embracing political, social, economic, and environmental sustainability became a global compromise with the introduction of the 2030 Agenda, in 2015, which comprised the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Fukuda-Parr and Muchhala 2020).

\(^{14}\) Complex governance involves cross-border systems of rule that can assume diverse forms or involve multiple kinds of actors. It became an important concept that elucidates the way governors try to solve global challenges (Roger, 2019).
As the topic of sustainable development begins to play a role in influencing global governance, groups seeking to consolidate their influence in global governance are stimulated to invest in their development agenda and structural thrusts (UNDP 2017). Partnerships among India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) and among Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA) are current examples of middle powers moving towards new institution-building that prioritizes the SDGs. They use these partnerships as a means of reaching more representation in the global arena (Flemes 2007; Cooper 2015; Kim, Haug and Rimmer 2018; Lee 2018; Xavier and Fonseca 2018).

Based on the type of initiatives made, number of SDGs approached, and number of countries reached, IBSA demonstrated more effectiveness regarding results delivered in the period between 2015 and 2018. After all, the group worked on 23 projects approaching 8 SDGs in 18 countries outside the partnership (IBSA 2003; Indian Ministry of External Affairs 2018; RIS 2020). According to Xavier and Fonseca (2018), the group carries out actual projects that embrace specific SDGs (Annex 1). Within the same period, MIKTA developed joint projects for information exchange among the 5 members, with 14 initiatives addressing 4 SDGs (MIKTA 2020; South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). For Haug (2017) and Lee (2018) who also consider the abovementioned facts, MIKTA’s performance was inward and limited (Annex 2).

Considering the abovementioned findings, the specific objective of this paper is to comprehend why IBSA appears to be more effective in the promotion of global sustainable development than MIKTA, in order to understand the structural mechanisms of middle power arrangements that enable some to be more successful than others in this specific domain. After all, with the growing complexity of global governance, these reasons have been increasingly theorized (Hasenclever et al 2000).

This study uses Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) framework for assessing global governance arrangements, which focuses on three aspects: publicness, inclusiveness, and delegation, to examine effectiveness in middle power arrangements. This study hypothesizes that the difference in effectiveness in both middle power arrangements analyzed is due to the delegation of more specialized functions in an institution.

This paper contributes to the literature by studying minilateral institutions composed of middle powers whose participation grows in global governance, but whose effectiveness is under-researched. According to Guerrero (2018, 25), “little has been done to study the institutionalization processes of informal institutions initiated at the beginning of the century”. Moreover, the study helps to fill a gap in literature by exploring middle powers’ performance in global governance with regards to sustainable development. As noted by Lee (2018) as well as Xavier and Fonseca (2018),
this theme is key for the global agenda but remains underexplored from the perspective of middle powers agency.

Furthermore, the policy relevance of this paper is in clarifying what does and does not work for the effectiveness of middle power institutions in achieving global sustainable development, to which the SDGs are key. This is important in two ways: new institutions composed of these states improve their development agendas and organizational structures to address global sustainable development; in turn, these agenda proposals are better adapted to those new actors’ capabilities, consequently contributing to their end goal of becoming more influential in the global arena.

**Middle Powers and the Sustainable Development Goals**

**Middle Power Arrangements within Global Governance**

According to Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002, 7) definition, “governance arrangement” refers to “the interaction between various actors pursuing common goals […]. Thus, governance arrangements represent the link between the demand and the supply of global governance. However, as noticed by Kim, Haug and Rimmer (2018, 1), “traditional governmental organizations have become increasingly deadlock, prone and anachronistic” due to their inability to fulfil new demands in the global agenda. Considering that, an alternative group of countries has been becoming more influential in global governance. For Patrick (2015, 115), this “reflects the failure of formal international organizations to adapt to complex global challenges, dramatic power shifts, and growing normative divergences in world politics”. While engineered by newcomers, these informal institutions emerged apart from the formal context of prevailing structures of international organizations (Guerrero, 2018).

In line with Cooper’s (1997) “niche diplomacy”, Patrick (2015) as well as Kim, Haug and Rimmer (2018) identify the arrangements between few states with informal structures as “minilateralism”. They use this concept coined by Miles Kahler (1993) to explain the recent proliferation of such partnerships. One defining characteristic of today’s minilateral governance arrangements is that they are “informal, non-binding, purpose-built partnerships, and coalitions of the interested, willing, and capable set up to address challenges in specific issue areas” (Kim, Haug and Rimmer 2018, 478). Nevertheless, as pointed out by Patrick (2015, 127):

“[…] it seems dubious whether flexible minilateralism can resolve tough cooperation problems. No doubt, in the absence of standing institutions, informal frameworks may “facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty, improving communication, and providing focal points to coordinate policies. It is less clear [however] that they can be any more successful than other diplomatic forums in promoting mutual policy adjustment when states strongly disagree over policy preferences […].”
Aiming at expanding their participation in diplomatic decision-making and consequently changing the system from within – rather than trying to replace it, these nations tend to engage in global governance through mutual coalitions (Stephen and Zürn 2014). These countries became known as “middle powers”, a concept proposed by Giovanni Botero in the 16th century to refer to countries that were neither large powers nor small powers, in military terms, but positioned in-between. For Holbraad (1984), these states count on a certain degree of independent strength internationally, which leads to significant recognition and authority. Realist scholars believe that these states have intermediate material capabilities, due to their military and economic endowments. However, the approach has been moving increasingly away from this perspective. According to Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993, 19):

“Middle powers are defined primarily by their behavior: their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace compromise notions of good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy.”

Jordaan (2003) notices that these states sustain their role of legitimizing and stabilizing the global order, which is generally enabled via cooperative initiatives. The different kinds of interaction towards global partnerships differ among authors. This study adopts the concepts proposed by Castañer and Oliveira (2020, 972) who define coordination “as the attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes of joint determination of common goals, while cooperation refers to the attitude, behavior, and outcome of the implementation of those goals as agreed on”. They suggest that collaboration is a more formal institution, aimed at willingly supporting others in achieving these goals, while communication is a precondition for the three-abovementioned interactions.

At any rate, according to Yoshihide (2012), middle powers can be considered drivers in the process of institution-building in global governance, as these partnerships between them have been increasingly institutionalized to address new global issues and to achieve more representation in the global arena. These states’ investment in foreign policies on issues beyond security and economy – such as human rights, gender, environment, and disarmament – is what Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) label “middle power diplomacy” and Vigevani, Veiga and Mariano (1994) call “new themes”. Thus, middle powers have been currently achieving greater influence in the global system by confirming arrangements that are keener to address current demands, usually not prioritized by great powers.

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15 The idea of minilateralism was not yet commonly used by that time.
**Sustainable Development as a Key Agenda**

As recognized by Haug (2017) and Xavier and Fonseca (2018), sustainable development has been an increasingly important theme in the new global agenda, having become a means for middle powers to reach their end goal of increasing their influence in global governance. The most widely accepted conception of the term was coined during the World Commission on Environment and Development in the 1980s which gathered many important names in the field. Among them, there were Mahbub ul Haq and Samir Amin, who proposed that “humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987, 16). However, the emergence of sustainable development as a comprehensive international compromise, enabling the configuration of well-founded policy guidelines to put it into practice, only occurred with the creation of the SDGs, within the UN’s 2030 Agenda (Fukuda-Parr and Muchhala 2020). Based on the conception of the so-called Brundtland Commission, the SDGs aim at achieving socially and economically inclusive and environmentally friendly development (Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019).

The worldwide emergence of such theme and commitment to the SDGs influenced middle powers arrangements to approach them “given that, since their institution, they represent the highest priority on development” (Xavier and Fonseca 2018, 101). Despite the different impacts of the influence of these nations in each of the arrangements studied (IBSA and MIKTA), it became indispensable for both institutions to approach sustainable development in their agenda, hence contributing to the SDGs implementation (Xavier and Fonseca 2018; Lee 2018). Indeed, both partnerships mention sustainable development among their current priorities, as a pathway to grow their participation in the global agenda (IBSA 2020; MIKTA 2020). Notwithstanding, as observed in the initiatives developed by the institutions, each group has been advancing it at different degrees in practice, generating debate in IR literature around their effectiveness to address new global governance themes.

Though IBSA has been subject of controversies since its formation in 2003, the assessment of IBSA’s commitment to sustainable development is positive. Critiques are mostly oriented to the fact that the theme of sustainable development has a great influence in the grouping, culminating in a too ambitious agenda a priori which does not manage to be materialized. For Husar (2016), this is especially true with respect to the orchestration of the group’s interests in global issues in multilateral forums. With the consolidation of IBSA’s Fund, literature has been more optimistic concerning the partnership’s performance regarding global sustainable development. The topic has a relevant influence in IBSA’s documents, such as mission and annual
reports. The SDGs have also been designated to all of IBSA Fund’s projects, since the Fund’s inception, in a very detailed manner.

Many scholars consider the group’s performance in the aid landscape impressive. Haug (2017) sees it as a noteworthy international cooperation instrument, highlighting IBSA’s Fund. Xavier and Fonseca (2018) share this view, underlining that the Fund has been delivering several projects oriented towards the SDGs. They note that the Fund approved 32 projects, which focus on critical areas to achieve the Goals, for 21 countries since its creation until 2018, (Xavier and Fonseca 2018, 188).

When it comes to MIKTA, the majority of scholars converge on the argument that, despite the role of sustainable development in the groups’ scope, the SDGs have been adapted and more generally summarized to suit MIKTA’s priorities. This is reflected by absence of goals assignment to each initiative, for example. The partnership is falling short of putting into practice the SDGs, although some recognize that achieving the SDGs may be a matter of time. Husar (2016) argues that MIKTA, like IBSA, lacks coordination in international summits. Cooper (2015, 95) goes beyond this to highlight the importance of MIKTA creating a summit of their own – which IBSA already has, “as a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained”. Still, the author points to the group’s early stage of development, relative to better consolidated partnerships like IBSA. Kim, Haug and Rimmer (2018, 486) acknowledge MIKTA’s precarious institutional situation, indicating uncertainty concerning its performance in global governance:

“Mechanisms that share MIKTA’s operational characteristics are likely to be short-lived and suffer from weak member commitment, resource constraints, forum-shopping risks, and a leadership vacuum. Some, however, may survive and become a new species of actor in a multiplex world”.

As noted by Haug (2017), MIKTA discussed the implementation of SDGs in its 2017 Development Seminar and had all its members present voluntary reviews between 2016 and 2018. He emphasized the potential of MIKTA’s alignment with South Korea in the implementation of global sustainable development programs, where South Korea’s performance has been outstanding since 2011. An example is the creation of the RoK-UNDP SDGs Trust Fund in 2016 (UNDP 2016). Nevertheless, Haug (2017, 61) states that:

“So far, MIKTA engagement with development-related issues has been mainly ‘inward-looking’, i.e., focusing on consultation and exchange among the five MIKTA countries themselves.
MIKTA’s ‘outward-bound’ engagement with global development – including cooperation with third countries and multilateral organizations – has just started to be discussed in more detail”.

The author emphasizes the members’ recognition of the partnership as a consultative body that improves mutual dialogue and common ties (Haug 2017). Indeed, it has developed joint projects until 2018 that, while limited to information exchange and strictly among the 5 members, embraced 4 SDGs (MIKTA 2020; South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). This also reinforces the fact that MIKTA does not perform actual international cooperation in terms of assisting entities and supported beneficiaries.

A Framework for Effectiveness in Global Governance Arrangements

Koenig-Archibugi’s Framework for Effectiveness in Global Governance Arrangements

This study compares IBSA to MIKTA regarding global governance arrangements’ effectiveness. The broader discussion on why some arrangements turn out to be more effective than others is not new in the literature with the increasing complexity of global governance since the 1980s (Hasenclever et al 2000). When analyzing international institution-building, scholars understand the effectiveness of international institutions in terms of the achievement of founding objectives. Perspectives vary based on different schools of thought in IR.

While some Realists believe that effective regimes are highly affected by the distribution of power resources among actors, others underline the influence of relative power in the effectiveness of international regimes (Stephen and Zürn 2014). In turn, neoliberalists like Keohane (1982) see effectiveness as the degree of compliance to certain rules within explicit regimes. However, when it comes to informal institutions such as the ones studied by this paper, measuring it becomes difficult, as they do not necessarily follow formal structures. For Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2000, 2), “a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules […] and […] that it achieves certain objectives or fulfils certain purposes. The most fundamental and most widely discussed of these purposes is the enhancement of the ability of these states to cooperate in the issue-area”. Yet, the authors have not defined any measurement tool in this regard.

Focusing on the capacity of governance arrangements to achieve their objectives, Miles et al. (2001) examine why some international environmental regimes succeed in comparison to others by analyzing which institutional designs lead to greater effectiveness. Based on that, Koenig-Archibugi (2002) proposes a conceptual framework for a comparison between global governance arrangements, analyzing the way in which actors pursuing the same objectives interact and organize.
Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) framework seems relatively well-suited to address the present research problem, because he identifies three factors that influence effectiveness in global governance arrangements in diverse cases. The author does not establish any causal relation between effectiveness and these structures — which would indeed be quite deterministic, as several other aspects may also play an important role (Koenig-Archibugi 2002). He rather proposes a framework to grasp the diversity of global governance arrangements, identifying three main aspects of institutional variations which influence the performance of these institutions.

i. Publicness

Publicness stands for the nature of the active participants in the institution, as Koenig-Archibugi (2002, 50) refers to them as “governance-givers rather than governance-takers”, or as suggested by Roger, “rule-makers, rather than rule-takers” (2019, 18). Koenig-Archibugi’s choice of calling it publicness seems to reflect a realistic approach – perhaps due to his research timeframe, since he considers the state as the main service provider to societies. Moreover, private actors are conceived not only as businesses, but also NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs), all part of a same entity. The first dimension of publicness refers to the differentiation between public and private members, with decreasing values from the former to the latter (i.e. national governments or international arrangements, business associations, or NGOs). This study opts for the same conceptualization as Koenig-Archibugi (2002). Thus, publicness is measured in terms of the presence of public members in the institution, where groups composed purely of these kinds of actors score the highest values and vice-versa. It is measured by the percentage of public actors in relation to all members in the arrangement.

The other dimension of publicness relates to the diversity in the nature of the interaction between actors of different degrees of publicness. Here arrangements have either homogeneous or hybrid participation in terms of access to non-state actors. The more an institution counts on public actors in a homogeneous interaction, the higher the values for this dimension. The continuum goes from “state-centered arrangements with no access for private actors, state-centered arrangements with private actor access […] private-public partnerships (PPPs), private governance with public supervision, and purely private regimes” (2002, 7-8). According to the adaptation proposed by this study, this dimension is measured by the level of participation of public actors in comparison to private ones and is indicated by the continuum that goes from state-centered with no access for private actors, state-centered with access for those agents, PPPs, private governance with public supervision, to completely private regimes. The ones that limit their membership to state actors score the highest values; the ones exclusively composed of private agents, the lowest.
ii. Delegation

Delegation refers to the functions’ assignment bodies, i.e. departments within the arrangements created to perform specific functions. According to Koenig-Archibugi (2002), one dimension concerns what the arrangement can do in terms of its scope of functions, alluding to the separation of powers that can be delegated to the departments that compose arrangements. This study also understands delegation as referring to functions’ assignment bodies within the arrangement and, regarding the institution scope, it is also measured by the presence of specialized functions within and indicated by the presence of functions differentiation in the organization chart. However, these functions do not allude to the separation of powers here, considering that informal arrangements do not have conventional, formal procedures of elaborating, applying, and enforcing laws. Instead, informal arrangements focus on agreement on recommendations and implementation of cooperation initiatives. Thus, this study makes an adaptation and measures this dimension by the presence of relatively independent bodies created to address specific purposes in the group. The more specialized functions arrangements have, the higher their values in the measure of delegation.

The other dimension of delegation is independence, referring to how much autonomy the actors embraced by an institution have within its area of competence. This relates to the agent’s autonomy in relation to the principal,\textsuperscript{16} or inter-governmentalism versus supra-nationalism. According to Koenig-Archibugi (2002, 8), “when the implementation of policies is left to national administrations, delegation is lower than when this task is performed by independent agencies”. Thus, values increase from arrangements where all policies are decided via negotiation and implemented by the members themselves, like the G20, to the ones where autonomous agencies perform relevant legislative, executive, or judicial functions, like the European Union. This paper follows Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) logic for this variable, measuring the existence of policies negotiation and implementation mechanisms by the institution itself which signifies indirect management by agents. This is indicated by the presence of bodies led by agents that are not the direct representatives of the participating members, such as committees, assemblies, or summits, through which these actors perform their roles. This dimension assumes higher values when autonomous agencies perform relevant legislative, executive, or judicial functions and lower values when principals directly assume this role.

\textsuperscript{16} In International Organizations, the principal-agent theory refers to agents’ empowerment in detriment to state members themselves (Nielsen and Tierney 2003).
iii. *Inclusiveness*

For Koenig-Archibugi (2002), inclusiveness refers to power distribution in an arrangement’s decision-making. The first aspect is access, related to the active influence of the actors constrained by the rules, policies, or decisions made by the arrangement. Values grow as shares of their participating power increase. In this study, power access is measured by the degree of active participation of the actors to whom the initiative was made, the ones achieved by their settlings – which may or may not be the same entity. However, no formal decision-making process takes place in informal institutions. Thus, power distribution is indicated by the existence of any procedure that allows the participation of internal and external actors affected by the arrangement’s settings, with values increasing with higher numbers of these actors.

The other aspect or inclusiveness is weight, which refers to the equality of influence of the active members within an arrangement. The continuum of this aspect of the measure of inclusiveness goes from unilateral, to minilateral, and finally the multilateral power distribution level, in ascending order. Examples are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Group of the 7 (G-7). In turn, according to the present analysis, weight stands for the equality of power distribution within the arrangement, measured by the degree of hierarchy between members and indicated by the classification of the arrangements as unilateral, minilateral, or multilateral. Equality rates increase from the first to the latter ideal type.

*Limitations of the Theoretical Framework*

A generalist conception of private actors is used as both groups analyzed in this study are only comprised of state actors. There would be no reason to go deeper into this differentiation here. The adaptation of Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) state-centered approach in this study is not meant to perform any value judgement with regards to state and non-state actors as agents in current global governance.

It should also be clear that theoretical frameworks, such as the one presented above, are simplifications of reality, so the existence of other features that influence institutional effectiveness should also be considered. Consequently, instead of establishing causality between these features and institutional effectiveness, this framework is used to simply establish the relation between features of global governance arrangements and their effectiveness.

Additionally, this study has found no study in IR literature applying this or any similar framework to the specific cases of middle power arrangements – perhaps, due to their relatively recent emergence in global governance. To mitigate these limitations, a rather inductive approach is proposed, with the revision of assumptions – also referred to as probabilities, or expectations.
**Expected Results of the Study**

While transposing Koenig-Archipugi’s framework to the cases of IBSA and MIKTA and considering Kirton’s (1999) remarks regarding thematic domain and timeframe definitions, the notion of institutional effectiveness here consists of the capacity of states to cooperate in the achievement of the goals proposed by the institution in which they participate. As proposed by Castañer and Oliveira (2020), cooperation means the communication between partners oriented to achieve common goals through coordination. Yet, in addressing the question of why some arrangements manage to be more effective than others in addressing their objectives, this analysis focuses on the case of middle powers.

This study examines the area of sustainable development between 2015 and 2018, considering the salience of this issue in global governance nowadays (Fukuda-Parr and Muchhala 2020; Lee 2018; Xavier and Fonseca 2018). The study expects that more specialized arrangements i.e. the ones that score higher levels in terms of delegation, tend to be more effective in this domain. After all, this seems to enable a better administration of multiple functions.

**Investigative Technique**

**The Cases of IBSA and MIKTA**

With regards to sustainable development, IBSA and MIKTA are chosen as cases for this study as they are partnerships composed of middle powers in the current global governance context. Moreover, both have sustainable development as their priorities. After all, as previously pointed out by several authors, the conception of development as involving social, economic, and environmental sustainability only became a global consensus with the launching of the SDGs.

Nevertheless, the two groups produced different outcomes in terms of the initiatives delivered when approaching the SDGs, as IBSA demonstrated to be more effective than MIKTA in this regard. Thus, these cases are also selected as they seem appropriate to understand which characteristics of new global governance arrangements lead to greater effectiveness in addressing sustainable development. The timeframe of this study starts in 2015, when the SDGs were casted, and ends in 2018, when both have the same official data available.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

The study relies on data from primary and secondary bibliographical sources, including official documents — statements and reports from their websites — from IBSA, MIKTA, and the UN, as well as core scholarly literature on global governance, middle powers, and sustainable development. The data collection considers the topicality of the materials. Moreover, it pays attention to the diversity of authors’ nationalities to express the points of view of scholars from
member countries of these groups, as these nations have been seeking more influence not only in
global governance, but also in scholarly literature.

In this context, the research begins with an analysis of the progress of both groups in their
approach towards the SDGs, in terms of the nature of initiatives held, the number of goals
approached, and the number of countries assisted by the initiatives of both arrangements. Table 1
contrasts the cases by depicting how publicness, inclusiveness, and delegation may have led them
to different levels of effectiveness in approaching the SDGs.

**Empirical Discussion**

This section aims at analyzing effectiveness in IBSA and MIKTA in terms of the three
abovementioned structures of global governance arrangements. Analyzing both groups’ degrees
of publicness, inclusiveness, and delegation reveals whether the delegation of more specialized
functions in an institution explains the difference in effectiveness between these arrangements.

**IBSA: Trilateral Dialogue Forum**

Many believe that IBSA originates from BRICS, an acronym coined by O’Neill in 2001 that
represents Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The latter represented great perspectives
at the beginning of the millennium, as agreements between members were signed in several fields.
However, China and Russia have not shown interest in systemic changes\(^\text{17}\) over time and have
diverged in their interests advocated within the group given their more advanced conditions and
positions in some domains of the global agenda, such as military and economic power (Reis et al.
2016; Nye 2009).\(^\text{18}\) In this context, IBSA Dialogue Forum was created to contribute to a new
international architecture, gathering the three countries’ voices on global issues and intensifying
their ties in various domains (IBSA 2003; IBSA 2020). The group is also known as Group of the
3 or G-3, alluding to the several configurations of country groupings (Reis 2015).

IBSA’s mission states that “the strength of IBSA is the shared vision of the three countries
that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and key to sustainable peace and
stability” (IBSA 2020). The latest declaration emphasized that, by “recalling the commitments and
the means of implementation for the development agenda, IBSA stresses the centrality of the
SDGs” (South Africa 2018, 1). Thus, the priority areas of IBSA are agriculture, culture, defense,
education, energy, environment, health, human settlements, transport, infrastructure, public

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\(^{17}\) For Gilpin (1981), there are three types of international system change. The most fundamental, although rare, is
called system change: altering the nature of the system itself. In turn, a systemic change involves a modification in the
form of governance of the international system. Finally, the interaction change concerns the transformation of rules,
rights, and processes among actors in the system.

\(^{18}\) Nye (2009) differentiates between traditional hard power, which would consist of material resources of power,
easily measurable, as they are more concrete, and soft power, which would be the forms of power that are, in his
view, more subtle, but also determinants of the capabilities of states.
administration, revenue administration, science, technology, social development, trade and investment and tourism (IBSA 2020).

In this context, the group developed 23 projects in 18 developing countries located in Asia, Africa, and Latin America between 2015 and 2018. Annex 1 details what these initiatives are, where they are targeted, and why they are significant. As illustrated in Figure 1, they approach 8 SDGs: 1 – End poverty in all its forms everywhere; 2 – Zero hunger; 3 – Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; 5 – Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; 6 – Ensure access to water and sanitation for all; 7 – Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy; 8 – Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all; and 12 – Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (UN 2020).

Figure 1: SDGs in IBSA

Moreover, IBSA Visiting Fellowship Program, an annual academic exchange program, was launched in 2016. IBSA Visiting Fellowship Program was supported by India’s government, with the objective of enhancing cooperation in the social sciences and economics between the three members. It focuses on institutional coordination to “support and enable sustainable development globally; joint research for cooperation and exchange of information in the fields of macro-economy, trade and development” (RIS 2020).

Considering that, the structures suggested by Koenig-Achibugi (2002) are next analyzed as per the adapted framework proposed by this study: publicness, delegation, and inclusiveness. Starting with member’s nature, IBSA has a state-centered nature as it is a mechanism of communication, coordination, and cooperation composed solely by public actors. In the words of the institution:
The establishment of IBSA was formalized by the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003, which mentions India, Brazil and South Africa’s democratic credentials, their condition as developing nations and their capacity of acting on a global scale as the main reasons for the three countries to come together. Their status as middle powers, their common need to address social inequalities within their borders and the existence of consolidated industrial areas in the three countries are often mentioned as additional elements that bring convergence among the members of the Forum” (IBSA 2020).

IBSA has no headquarters or permanent executive secretariat. It is an informal arrangement with no separation of powers or legally binding procedures Nevertheless, by adapting Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) framework to this kind of institutions, IBSA seems to present function differentiation, meaning that it has relatively independent functions created to address specific purposes in the group. IBSA counts on a trilateral forum that used to rely on formal summits up to the last decade, headed by member states’ presidents or prime ministers. Since 2012, IBSA only organizes ministerial level meetings which take place biannually (IBSA 2020). In this case, institutional autonomy delegation seems to have undergone a shift from principals to agents, notably concentrated in the latter actors during the timeframe examined by this paper.

However, the functions within the group seem to be significantly diversified for an informal arrangement. IBSA is supported by 14 sectorial working groups that focus on several SDGs, a people-to-people forum with non-state actors like the civil society, and a Trust Fund for financing international cooperation projects. This latter mechanism was established in 2004 and began operations in 2006. It is dedicated to the accomplishment of the SDGs, in particular poverty, hunger, and partnerships for development, and invests in actual cooperation projects on a demand-driven basis for developing countries by working together with local governments, national institutions and implementing partners via the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Each member sponsors projects according to the proportion of their contribution to the Fund (IBSA 2020). Until 2018, it had received over $35 million in its budget (UNOSSC 2020b). The Fund’s management is delegated to the UNDP’s Office for South-South Cooperation, following IBSA guidelines as well as UN standards (UNOSSC 2020a):

“Governments requesting support by this Fund initiate discussions with focal points appointed among IBSA countries’ officers around the world. These focal points submit proposals to the IBSA Board of Directors for review. If a proposal receives favorable review, UNDP’s UNOSSC, which acts as the fund manager and board of directors’ secretariat, initiates contact with a potential executing agency to advance a project formulation, and to facilitate the project’s implementation.
[...] The IBSA Fund Board of Directors comprises the Ambassadors, Permanent Representatives and Deputy Permanent Representatives, of India, Brazil and South Africa to the United Nations in New York. The Board approves summary proposals and detailed projects and continuously provides strategic direction to IBSA projects to ensure their successful implementation.

Several official soft law documents define the scope of IBSA’s summits, ministerial meetings, and fund board. Between 2015 and 2018, the group produced declarations, agreements, memorandums of understanding, joint communiqués, and joint statements. Nevertheless, no evidence was found in the period researched concerning the beneficiaries of countries’ participation in these gatherings oriented to set up IBSA’s priorities and operation (IBSA 2020). Yet, considering the adaptation of Koenig-Archipugi’s (2002) framework to informal institutions with no actual decision-making process, IBSA’s demand-driven projects consist of a means of including beneficiaries’ interests in the arrangement’s agreements. Moreover, the openness of some lower-level meetings (academy, business, or communication-related) to civil society also aggregates in this regard. Finally, all participating states assume equal positions in terms of their share of power, characterizing minilateralism.

**MIKTA: New Innovative Partnership**

The power fragmentation in a multipolar international system, together with the geopolitical uncertainty entailed by the global economic crisis in the late 2000’s, led to the creation of MIKTA within the UN General Assembly in 2013. Previously, in 2005, O’Neil indeed popularized the grouping of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey under the name of MIST, based on predictions from the Bank Goldman Sachs that these states would “occupy an increasingly imperative place in the global economy towards 2050” (Cooper 2006; Gok and Gok 2016). Due to their relatively major role in the G20 after the global economic crisis, the group was created together with Australia, having the vision statement signed in 2015 (Kim, Haug and Rimmer 2018). MIKTA represents an alliance of countries with rapidly growing economies (MIKTA 2020). As an alliance comprised of only middle powers, the partnership is a consultative platform that offers space for its member countries to engage in dialogue independently of the big powers. The raison d’être of the group is defined below:

“Today, the international community is faced with various challenges […] but these cannot be easily resolved by the efforts of only a few countries. Also, reforming the global governance has emerged as a new challenge due to changes in the international environment. At times like these,

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19 “Soft law” is here is seen as norms that consist of recommendations, the content of which, unlike “hard law”, leads to conduct that do not incur sanctions for non-compliance. (Shelton, 2000).
the roles of countries that take the lead in tackling global issues with as much commitment to advancing the public good as their own interests are becoming more important. MIKTA was launched to advance discussions on various global agendas and to seek practical and creative solutions to global and regional challenges” (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018, 10).

With the mission of promoting development in specific target areas, enhancing global governance and fostering regionalism, MIKTA develops projects in conformity with the SGDs. The founding priorities of the group as of 2016 are: “reform of international energy governance and the promotion of energy access; counter-terrorism and security; peacekeeping; trade and the economy; gender equality; good governance, human rights and democracy; and sustainable development” – in the pure sense of climate (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020, p. 212). MIKTA’s Agenda 2030 emphasizes the goals of improving tax and fiscal systems; ensuring gender equality and empowerment of women and girls, improving the effectiveness of development cooperation; enhancing data capacity, scaling up development cooperation with middle income countries, and establishing an evaluation mechanism.

MIKTA’s initiatives include workshops, lectures, and experts’ meetings, many as part of wider multilateral fora, like the UN. In addition, the group realized 10 initiatives of this kind between 2015 and 2018. Moreover, MIKTA promoted 4 professional exchange programs in the same period, some oriented to young people, other to diplomats. All initiatives are intended to strengthen relations among members (MIKTA 2020). Annex 2 shows what these initiatives are, where they are targeted, and what the relevant SDGs approached are. Though these following goals are not explicitly attributed to specific activities. MIKTA’s internal agenda defined in 2016 and priorities ranked in 2018 target the following goals, as shown in Figure 2: 5 – Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; 7 - Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; 9 – Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; and 16 – Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies (MIKTA 2020).

In this context, the analysis of MIKTA’s structures according to Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) adapted framework is essential to verifying the argument of this study about the lower effectiveness of this arrangement in addressing the SDGs, as compared to IBSA. In terms of the nature of the group’s membership, since its foundation till now, it is composed of state-actors. Accordingly, MIKTA has a state-centered membership nature.
Regarding the group’s organization, it is a flexible platform, with no headquarters or secretariat and with a rotating executive management. MIKTA is chaired by foreign ministers of each member state. This means that there has always been full delegation of institutional autonomy to agents. They rotate yearly, according to voluntary candidacies and consensus among all members. Between 2015 and 2018, the chair countries were South Korea, Australia, Turkey, and Indonesia, respectively (South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The group has never counted on summits, which are considered more high-level meetings, since these are generally led by heads of state/government, which lead to stronger agreements (Cooper 2015). Instead, the group holds annual meetings that involve foreign ministers, senior officials, and spokesmen. It also hosts one of G20 Sherpa’s meeting (MIKTA 2020). However, the present analysis identifies a lower delegation of functions within the institution, as the group seems not to go beyond a consultation platform, with no specific roles transferred to a separate management body.

These meetings only led to the creation of joint statements and joint communiqués which are less enforcing than declarations or agreements in international law (MIKTA 2020; ECCHR 2020). During the timeframe analyzed, they only counted on the participation of MIKTA’s members, which means for this study that the group leaves no power access to other countries that may be potentially affected by its agreements. In turn, as there is no hierarchy between the participants within the arrangement in that same sense, this indicates that it relies on a minilateral power distribution.

**IBSA and MIKTA Effectiveness in Contrast**

As evidenced, both middle power arrangements score the highest values for the nature of membership, with 100% of participation coming from the public sector, being entirely composed of state-actors. IBSA and MIKTA also have the same highest values for the interaction within the arrangement since they are only composed by the same kind of members. They both also score 100% due to a homogeneous interaction among public members. Thus, both are similar in terms of publicness.
Nevertheless, IBSA and MIKTA differ in their delegation of functions. At first glance, both groups have open and flexible structures with no headquarters or a permanent executive secretariat. However, IBSA presents a more complex functions assignment, especially considering that the group’s Fund, very oriented towards the SDGs, had been reinforcing its role in international cooperation for development during the period analyzed. Conversely, MIKTA does not have specialized functions and differentiated managerial bodies. Its initiatives also do not reach the status of cooperation, only communication. Thus, whereas IBSA scores more in terms of functions delegation, MIKTA scores lower. Yet, both equally achieve the same results in terms of the autonomy delegated to agents in charge; after all, during the period studied, they have been led by indirect representatives of their member states.

Concerning inclusiveness, IBSA scores the highest values for giving a certain power access to its member countries’ civil societies and the less developed nations embraced by the projects to influence their settings. On the other hand, while MIKTA has a less active participation of beneficiaries from its actions however, minilateralism characterizes the power relation among the participating states in both arrangements. It puts the two groupings in the midway when referring to the power weight, since all members have the same intermediate level of hierarchy between members within both institutions. However, while IBSA involves cooperation, MIKTA remains a communication platform. Moreover, seeing both organizations’ approach to the SDGs, this study understands that this kind of partnerships can, like formal, standing institutions, have a significant role in sustainable development despite the uncertainty raised by some of the abovementioned scholars.

Table 1 summarizes the discussion above. Considering the relations between global arrangements structures and their levels of effectiveness, higher delegation of functions and higher inclusiveness in power access seem to have been relevant aspects that led to more effectiveness in a middle power arrangement’s performance towards addressing the SDGs. Therefore, it is probable that, as proposed by this study, that enhanced effectiveness in these institutions is influenced by the delegation of more specialized functions within them. However, it also likely that IBSA has presented higher numbers of projects, SDGs approached, and countries reached during its operation between 2015 and 2018 due to different levels of inclusiveness. Still, it should be emphasized that this is not sufficient to draw a causal relation between features of middle power arrangements and their effectiveness with regards to sustainable development. After all, other features of global governance arrangements not considered here may also have an influence in this regard as well.
Table 1: IBSA and MIKTA structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLICNESS</td>
<td></td>
<td>PUBLIC (+)</td>
<td>% of public members/All members presence</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRIVATE (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION NATURE</td>
<td></td>
<td>HOMOGENEOUS PUBLIC (+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HYBRID</td>
<td>Level of public members/private members presence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HOMOGENEOUS PRIVATE (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>FUNCTIONS DELEGATED</td>
<td>SPECIALIZATION (+)</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>LESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO SPECIALIZATION (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY DELEGATED</td>
<td></td>
<td>AGENTS IN CHARGE (+)</td>
<td>Presence of leadership by indirect representatives</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>More</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRINCIPAL IN CHARGE (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLUSIVENESS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ACTIVE BENEFICIARIES'</td>
<td>Existence of procedures for participation in settlings</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>LESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PARTICIPATION (+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WEAK BENEFICIARIES'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PARTICIPATION (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POWER WEIGHT</td>
<td></td>
<td>MEMBERS EQUALITY (+)</td>
<td>Level of hierarchy between members in settlings</td>
<td>Minilateral</td>
<td>Minilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MEMBERS INEQUALITY (-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, based on Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) framework and the empirical findings of this study.
Conclusion

Since the Second World War, alternative forms of institutions have emerged as alternatives to address global issues within the recent global governance environment (Kim, Haug and Rimmer 2018). Middle powers became key actors in this context and are thus considered by this study as influential agents in areas of global governance where they do not compete with major powers. With the aim of rebuilding existing power structures, they build partnerships as tools for power redistribution and recognition (Jordaan 2003).

In parallel, with the beginning of the 20th century, states became aware of the importance of sustainable development which gained momentum with the launch of the SDGs by the UN in 2015 (Fukuda-Parr and Muchhala 2020). States became aware of the importance of the inclusion of SDGs as a priority in their national and foreign policies, influencing the performance of global governance arrangements in which they participate. Considering the tendency and importance of middle powers in addressing new demands, as potential drivers in global governance institution-building (Yoshihide 2012), sustainable development became an interesting opportunity for groups like IBSA and MIKTA. The approach to this key global demand stimulates middle powers to invest in their development agenda and organizational thrusts, as a means to reach greater representation in global governance.

To understand the structural characteristics of middle power arrangements that enable some of them to be more effective than others in the sustainable development domain, Koenig-Archipugi’s (2002) model was adapted to the cases of IBSA and MIKTA between 2015 and 2018. Based on the observation that the former has shown to be more effective than the latter in this sense, an inductive analysis on empirical data was conducted to verify the expectation that enhanced effectiveness in middle power arrangements addressing sustainable development is influenced by the delegation of more specialized functions within the institution.

IBSA and MIKTA have similarities regarding publicness but differ in terms of delegation and inclusiveness, so the expectation proposed by this research seems to hold: IBSA presented higher functional specialization relative to MIKTA. The former group’s more diversified power access is another aspect to be considered as well. In any case, it is possible to affirm that these middle power arrangements have been contributing to institution-building and sustainable development promotion, each one at its own pace.

Further study is necessary to enhance academic knowledge on global governance arrangements and to elucidate causal relations between institutional characteristics and effectiveness. Moreover, no study applying a framework similar to the one used by this paper to the case of middle powers was found. Therefore, it is important to expand this analytical
perspective to these arrangements, given the importance of the emergence of these new powers for achieving the SDGs (Cooper 2015; Guerrero 2018; Haug 2017; Husar 2016).

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### Annex 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector IDOG</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Partners</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction through Livestock Development 21</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>SAINT LUCIA</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Promote the Socioeconomic Integration of Vulnerable Children and Youth 19</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>HAITI</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conservation Agriculture, Permaculture and Sustainable Fisheries Management 25</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>TIMOR-LESTE</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Enhancing Agricultural Capacity 14</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>COMOROS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Enhancing Inclusive Sustainable Economic Development through Coconut-sector Development</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>KIRIBATI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Leveraging Zambia’s Agri-industry Potential in Rural Areas through Enhanced Soy Bean Production and Processing</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Support to Integrated Irrigated Agriculture in Two Districts in Bolikhayamay 51</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>LAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>An Innovative e-Learning Approach for Health</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>VIET NAM</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Construction and Equipping of a Centre for Persons with Severe Intellectual Disabilities 56</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>PALESTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Health Insurance Scheme Support Project 31</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>GRENADA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reconstruction of Atta Habbit Medical Centre in Gizo City 60</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>PALESTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of the Cultural and Hospital Centre (Phases I and II) 58</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>PALESTINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Empowering Rural Women</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>FIJI</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Increased Access to Water, Improved Livestock Production and Post-drought Food Security 30</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>BOLIVIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Creation of Job Opportunities for Youth in Sudan Through Labour-intensive Work Opportunities 23</td>
<td>Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction among Youth</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>CAMBODIA</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Solid Waste Management Improvement Project 17</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>GUAYANA</td>
</tr>
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Source: Author, based on IBSA (2018).
## Annex 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector (SDG)</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Target Country</th>
<th>Partners</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Measures taken on eliminating violence against women</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gas Security in the MIKTA Countries</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>United States, Poland, Slovakia, International Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Removing barriers and promoting public-private cooperation in disaster risk reduction</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Workshop on Electronic Commerce</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development, World Trade Organization, World Economic Forum, Consumer Unity &amp; Trust Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Workshop on Trade and Investment</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development, World Trade Organization, World Economic Forum, Consumer Unity &amp; Trust Society, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>MIKTA in Malaysia</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Prevention of Narcotic Drug Abuse in MIKTA Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agenda 2030</td>
<td>Exchange Program of Journalists</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Korea Institute for National Unification</td>
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<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey</td>
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<td>MIKTA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, Korea Foundation</td>
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Source: Author, based on MIKTA (2020) and South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018).