IAPSS

Politikon

the IAPSS Journal of Political Science

ISSN 1583-3984

9 771583 398006

Volume 24: September 2014

Table of Contents

Editorial Note 4

Determinants of Political Behaviour of People of India
– Principles or Individual Interest:
An Experience from a Bengali Village
Harasankar Adhikari 5

Environmental Governance and Public Participation
Katerina Bozhinova 23

Ethnicity as Uncertainty Reducing Behavior:
Explaining Acquiescence to Ethnic Violence
Benjamin Claeson 46

The Distinction and Relationship between Ontology and Epistemology:
Does It Matter?
Sarita-Louise Kant 68

A Formula for the Measurement of Freedom
Mehran Mazinani 86

Ideal and Beyond:
Idealist International Relations Theory Contrast to Realist One
Hakan Mehmetcik 101

The Pattern of China's Global Activity:
Foreign Policy Instruments in Central Asia and Africa
Akbikesh Mukhtarova 110

America:
A Liberal Imperial Power
Lana Perić 127

Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism:
An application to post-1980 coup Turkey
Esra Simsek 141

Social Movements, Autonomy and the State in Latin America
Eric Sippert 165

Call for Papers for Politikon 196

Editorial Note

Dear Reader,

Even though the academia was in her major part enjoying her well-deserved vacation over the summer period, the Politikon Editorial Board received during the last five months more than two dozens of submissions. Ten of them were, after a careful review process, selected and edited into articles for the September issue of Politikon that you are now holding in your hands. The issues researched in these articles range from problems of political philosophy, through international organisations, relations and conflicts, to different agendas of public policy. We believe that among these articles, each and every one of our readers will find something exciting for his or her personal taste and helpful for his or her scholarly work; if not, you should take it not as a case for sending us a complaint letter, but rather as an opportunity to fill in the lacuna in our production by sending us a submission of your own.

And now, for a good measure of top quality academic entertainment, on the next page!

Your Editors

Determinants of Political Behaviour of People of India–Principles or Individual Interest:

An Experience from a Bengali Village

Harasankar Adhikari

Harasankar Adhikari is a Social Worker and Independent Scholar working on the issue of development and social welfare of downtrodden after his post-graduation in social work from Visva Bharati University. He has several publications in national and international journals.

Abstract

In a democratic system, elected political representatives of different political parties could form government and its opposition, and only electorate rights of the people determine the formation of the government. In the present study, the determinants of people's political behavior to support one particular political party were examined. Accordingly, 200 villagers aged 20–60 years from a village named Babalpur of Borgordar Godar Gram Panchayat under Nandakumar Block of East Midnapore district, West Bengal, India, were randomly selected through stratified sampling. Structured interview schedules and case studies were used to collect data on their views on political parties, causes of affiliation to a particular party, magnitude of participation, their attitude towards alternation of their affiliation, etc., besides their personal background. It was found that the majority of the subjects were not familiar with the principles of their affiliated political party. For the fulfillment of their individual interest in relation to their overwhelming needs in this consumer world, 76% of the subjects had altered their affiliation to political parties similar to the Theory of Vomiting. Furthermore, it was noted that broken inter and intrapersonal relationship among individuals and its consequences reflected through violence, which could never yield a better India. Thus, this is the crisis of democracy, which is speculated to become more severe.

Keywords: Political Parties; India; Behavior of Bengal's Villagers; Individual Interest; Violence.

Introduction

In general, political awareness and education have a reverse effect when it generates political interest group with a wide range of division, and brings separation among individuals. This can be explained based on an example of religious performance. In a village festival, the closing chapter of a religious festival is ritually addressed to the gathering of villagers through "kirtan" (religious songs by a choir) followed by the distribution of dry sweets, which is popularly known as "harir luth" (distribution of sweets in the name of Lord Krishna-Hari). In this case, the responsible priest may not be capable of distributing the sweets equally to everyone. As a result, the villagers gathered may shout towards the priest and quarrel with each other, finally, ending in chaos. This situation is almost similar to our political parties and their activities during its rule. Political parties facilitate an interest group to ensue captive votes, promote a polito-genous group, and cultivate a clear division in human relation. This is the fate and future of our so-called democracy (Ruud, 2009: 70-72).

Various studies had explored the political behavior of people in a democracy. According to Dalton (2000: 912-940), there are four areas of political behavior–the importance of political culture and recent evidence of cultural change, sophistication of mass publics, process of voting choice, and nature of citizen participation in politics. In advanced industrial democracies, the nature of citizen behavior had shifted during the latter half of the 20th century (Dalton, 2000: 912-940). In the new democracies of East Asia and other countries, a transformation in the political system and citizenry has been noted. A seminal study by Almond and Verba (1963: 123-145) noted Civic Culture, as the institutions and patterns of action in a political system were closely linked to the political culture of the nation. It has been stated that measurement of political culture is similar to "trying to nail jello WAS IT Jell-O IN ORIG? to the wall"(Kaase & Newton,1995: 23-47). It has been observed that political culture in virtually every feature of political life remains unexplained by other means. Some political culture studies based on public opinion survey of a single nation have indicated that it is difficult to isolate the role of culture in influencing national patterns of political behavior (Eckstein, 1992: 45-52). A previous study showed that cultural factors were more influential than economic differences, and that cultural patterns reflected the historical patterns of civic association (Putnam, 1995: 65-78). Further, it has been revealed that older generations are more likely to emphasize on traditional material, social goals such as economic well-being, social security, law and order, religious values, and strong national defense, while the young generations have shifting their attention to post-material goals of self-expression, personal freedom, social equality, self-fulfillment, and maintaining quality of life (Shin, 1999: 32-48). Furthermore, it is claimed that people are becoming more skeptical of politics, more disconnected from political parties, and more willing to use unconventional political methods (Barnes and Simons, 1998: 98-104). In summary, political culture might be illustrated in two ways: political culture and political support develop valuable concepts in exploring how citizens think about the polity and political community and the cultural pattern provides a valuable framework for examining the interaction between citizen value and political process. The variation in the structure of democratic politics and the implication of these differences (Lijphart, 1999: 32-35; Powell, 2000: 27-35) guide the need for a comparable understanding of how citizen's participation and realization could yield sustainable democratic culture for reduction of violence in relation to their political affiliation.

The human relation in a board frame is the capital of the existence of human society (Sur, 1974: 4-5). It determines the inter and intrapersonal relationship for the integration of advanced society, regardless of race, creed, and caste. The growing overwhelming consumerism and its effects are the prime cause of competition among people of different social and economic backgrounds. Every individual is trying to be richer than his/her fellow members. Currently, this trading attitude is almost everywhere, and provokes one to be violent, ultimately hampering the integrity and harmony at large. In fact, it creates a wide gap between rich and poor (Chandhoke & Priyadarshi, 2009: 23-67). Several crises such as poverty, ill health, and unemployment, etc. dominate the survival pattern of people. Unequal distribution of resources and malpractices causes greediness among people, directing them to wrong places. Thus, this evil impact obviously results in corruption (Chandhoke & Priyadarshi, 2009:23-67). A particular interest group emerges to fulfill its own needs and learn to disrespect other fellow members in their community.

In the Vedas, it has been postulated that a society will progress when its fellow members act for their own welfare as well as the welfare of others, and cherish through various relief by rich to poor in the name of transcend God (O'Flaherry, 2000:12-14). Rabindranath Tagore's rural reconstruction in Sriniketan was guided by three principles, self-power, co-operation, and development (Sinha, 2011: 34-76). Self-sufficiency of people is facilitated through human power and interpersonal relationships. The collaborative effort is integrated into them. Altogether, they design their need based on priority and plan of action for achievement based on their community's resources. They no longer depend on relief, and an emergency help gives birth to a particular interest group. Tagore practiced the best model of apolitical and people-centric self-reliant approach, which could regenerate people's power of sustainable development. Thereafter, they could bind together in a harmonious relationship. This could obviously strengthen one's own social structure and moral values, whereas violence and differences among people could destroy our society (Sinha, 2011: 66).

After centuries of long colonial rule, in 1947, India won her freedom and emerged as the largest democratic country of the world. The Indians could elect their government through their voting rights for the tenure of a maximum of 5 years and the elected government could rule the country for the sake of its citizens' interest. The Constitutional provision, 5-year plan, and other law and order authorities were set up to remove its darkness from illiteracy, ill health, and poverty, and formulated the policy of equality and justice for all (Sen, 2010: 8-12).

Different political parties emerges with their different principles and manifestos aimed at facilitating progressive and harmonious nation. They promised to strengthen the "unity in diversity" and people's interest (Ruud, 2009:67). Thus, these multi-colored political parties participated to rule the country forming government or take part as its opposition with particular focuses (Ruud, 2009: 72-78).

This has ultimately created a political competition to acquire the power of ruling through elections according to hierarchies from lower houses to upper houses. To ensure captive votes, political parties consciously facilitate the flourish of interest groups of supporters. They do not emphasize on teaching the people about their political principles, which would determine/influence the people to judge their preferences and choices to elect their representatives (Adhikari, 2013:32-36). In fact, people suffer from multifarious problems and are directionless. They move towards both tidal and un-tidal flows of rivers, which could destroy their inter and intrapersonal relationships when they are the members of the same community. These circumstances determine people's political behavior against an interest of rewards from their affiliated party, which is generally an advantage to a particular political party to gain their votes in the election.

Review of Literature

The trend of election studies in India has been influenced by the evolution of actual electoral politics. Studies on voting behavior, notably, the Columbia and Michigan studies (Sisson, 1972: 27-29) have had an impact on studies conducted in India to determine the important research questions. Party identification, issues, candidates, campaigns, socioeconomic status of the voters, and other areas are important realms for studies on voting behavior. However, some peculiar elements in Indian society, such as castes, play an important role in electoral politics (Jaffrelot, 2003: 36-67).

Politics during the Nehru era was stable (up to 1965) despite the occasional failure and turmoil. Kothari (1971: 99-112) explained the strength of "Congress system" until mid-1960s in terms of the capacity of the organization in networking dominant social groups through, for example, factions and linking them with the party structure. The "Congress system" was an effective channel for mobilizing popular support in the election (Kothari, 1971: 113-114).

The stability of the Congress-centric "one party dominance system" was shaken in 1967, when Congress party for the first time suffered a major setback. For the first time since India's independence, destabilization of the "Congress system" and the increasing possibility of changes in the ruling party through elections attracted the interest of many political scientists and journalists. The period between 1967 and 1971 was a period of increasing turbulence and fundamental transformation of Indian politics in accordance with deep-rooted socioeconomic changes in the Indian society (Sisson, 1972: 71-84). Hitherto, downtrodden people such as Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes(STs), and so-called Other Backward Classes(OBCs) began to assert themselves in a more dignified manner within the context of a weakening tie of feudalistic social relations and social modernization. Kohli (1991:23-56) has provided a good illustration of the turbulent process of transformation. The structural transformation of the party system and frequent changes in the ruling party/location through election was probably the major scholarly attractions. There are many cases of corrupt practice in the election process such as booth capturing, violence or intimidation against the weaker sections of the people, provocation of communal sentiment, distribution of money among the electorate, personation, misuse of official power, and machinery of the political party in power.

Many studies on Indian elections are journalistic and descriptive, which tend to be based on case studies or survey of individual voters looking into various aspects such as the selection of candidates, electoral campaign, and actual voting behavior of individual voters, including political perceptions and party preferences and socioeconomic status. For instance, Kini (1974: 13-21) noted that the voting behavior was influenced by important psychological processes, i.e. identification with leadership was significantly related to voter choice. He also found that socioeconomic status, such as gender, caste, religion, education, and income, were important in explaining political awareness, exposure to political propaganda, political involvement, caste identification, sense of personal effectiveness in politics, and exposure to modernization. He observed close relations between the set of variables of political perception, socioeconomic status, and party preference.

Furthermore, Dasgupta and Morris-Jones (1975: 23-56) showed that there was a meaningful correlation between socioeconomic status and electoral participation, while Blair (1990: 28 and 1993: 56-76), in his several studies on Bihar, one of the backward states of India, examined the ethnicity variable (i.e. caste, religion, and others) for the votes polled by the candidate and party, or turn out.

Dikshit's (1995: 24-36) studies on "electoral geography" provided an interesting analysis of turnout and votes for Congress in relation to the variables of social development, reservation, and linguistic and religion factors. The increased competitive nature of electoral politics and the decline in the Congress Party's electoral fortunes after 1967 were due to the decreasing loyalty of the Congress party's supporters that resulted from the generational change of people in the context of socioeconomic transformation (Chhibber, 1999: 112). Moreover, he showed that the increased competitiveness between the parties was not a result of turnout, but rather the increased vitality of second parties, which was emphasized by the importance of regional context (Chhibber, 1999: 183).

Kondo (2003: 48-56) examined the correlations between electoral participation, namely, voter turnout, etc., and socioeconomic variables such as literacy, agricultural development, and urbanization. The less faith in democracy among voters with higher level of education (basically those belonging to higher caste Brahmin) and those with lower education level was influenced by family (Sirisikar, 1970: 22-25). Furthermore, it has been reported that the influence of candidate, party loyalty, and caste loyalties, by and large, did not influence voting behavior (Sirisikar, 1973: 34-42).

Chandra (2004: 82-98) showed that in a patronage-based democracy such as India, voters expect the co-ethnic elites of the party to favor them in the distribution of benefits, elite information, and ethnic favoritism. This was a self-enforcing and reinforcing equilibrium. The author further insisted that if strategic SC voters were considered, then their party will win on the basis of "ethnic head counting."

In summary, we find that various factors influence voting behaviors in the electorate of India. These factors include socioeconomic status, value systems, and other important characteristics of voters, as well as issues in the election, ideological positions, and strategies of mobilization on the part of parties. Thus, the objectives of this study are to find out and explore the determinants of political behavior of people and the basis of their support towards a political party. Moreover, the study also aims to elucidate the causes of alternation of political affiliation and its effects on human relation in our society.

Methods

Babalpur, a village of Borgodar Goda Gram Panchayat under Nandakumar Community Development Block of East Midnapore district of West Bengal, India, was selected for this study. About 2500 homogenous Hindu population (Census Report, 2011) of different social and economic background inhabit this village. The literacy rate is almost cent percent, and the surname/clanframesthedifferent "para"(hamlet) of the village. Previously, every hamlet was familiar with some distinguished marks in terms of their occupation and educational background; however, now, it is vividly submerged. The village is well-connected by "pakka", road and electricity is available in every household. There is a primary school, post office, Gram Panchayat Karyalaya (office), and two anganwadi centers of Integrated Child Development Scheme in the village.

The data were collected from 200 villagers who were within the age bracket of 20–60 years. The subjected were divided into four groups based on their age (20–30, 31–40, 41–50, and 51–60 years), and from each group, 50 informants were selected at a male-female ratio of 4:1. An interview schedule consisting 25 dependent and independent variables was used to record the views of the informants on different political parties, causes of affiliation to a particular party, magnitude of participation, their attitude towards alternation of their affiliation, etc. Obviously, the first part of the interview schedule was set to collect information regarding informants' social and economic background. Nevertheless, the researcher arranged a group meeting to know their views more comprehensively. Case studies, including their interaction pattern, were conducted because the broken and violent relationship was due to their nature of affiliation to a particular political party. The overall data were synchronized to present through a discussion and table with an indication of an emerging trend of gaining personal benefit and having little knowledge on their political views among the interest group.

Results

Social, economic, and cultural background of the informants:

Tables 1–3 describe the social, educational, economic, and cultural backgrounds of the rural informants (n=200) who were Hindus and similar with respect to their age. From Table 1, it can be noted that 58% of the informants were from general category. Their gender representation was an average of 10.75% and 3.75% in case of males and females, respectively, according to their age group. Of these informants, 16.5% belonged to SC community, out of which male representation was thrice that of female representation. The rest of the informants (25.5%) were from OBCs, and among them, male representation was thrice that of female representation.

Table 1: Age-wise social background of the informants

Age group	Social background						Total
	General category		Scheduled Caste		Other Backward Classes		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
20-30 years	20(10%)	8(4%)	4(2%)	2(1%)	12(6%)	4(2%)	**50(25%)**
31-40 years	22(11%)	10(5%)	6(3%)	2(1%)	8(4%)	2(1%)	**50(25%)**
41-50 years	20(10%)	6(3%)	8(4%)	2(1%)	12(6%)	2(1%)	**50(25%)**
51-60 years	24(12%)	6(3%)	7(3.5%)	2(1%)	7(3.5%)	4(2%)	**50(25%)**
Total	**86(43%)**	**30(15%)**	**25(12.5%)**	**8(4%)**	**39(19.5%)**	**12(6%)**	**200(100%)**

Source: Field work by Adhikari (2013)

Table 2 shows that 44% of the informants had a primary education background and belonged to the age group of 31–60 years. The highest percentage (39%) of the informants was within the age bracket of 41–50 years (16%) and 51–60 years (23%), respectively. Furthermore, 34% of the informants had completed their secondary education and the highest percentage (13%) of them was within the age group of 20–30 years. Among these informants, 7% completed secondary and 4% were 20–30 years old. Furthermore, 17% reached their higher secondary education, out of which 5% were females. However, 8% of them belonged to the age group of 20–30 years and 5% were graduates and had higher education, with only 1% of them being female and most of them belonging to the age group of 20–30 years. These findings suggested that the educational status was updated among the younger generation in this village.

Table 2: Education background of the informants

Age group	Educational status (%)								Total
	Primary		Secondary		Higher Secondary(10+2)		Graduate and above		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
20-30	-	-	18(9)	8(4)	12(6)	4(2)	6(3)	2(1)	**50(25%)**
31-40	4(2)	6(3)	20(10)	2(1)	10(5)	6(3)	2(1)	-	**50(25%)**
41-50	24(12)	8(4)	14(7)	2(1)	2(1)	-	-	-	**50(25%)**
51-60	32(16)	14(7)	2(1)	2(1)	-	-	-	-	**50(25%)**
Total	**60(30)**	**28(14)**	**54(27)**	**14(7)**	**24(12)**	**10(5)**	**8(4)**	**2(1)**	**200(100)**

Source: Field work by Adhikari (2013)

Table 3 describes the occupational status of the informants according to their age. Only 4%, including 1% female, were students in the age group of 20–30 years. Among them, 7% were in services (public and private altogether), out of which 2% were females. Of these informants, 3% (including 1% female) were within the 20–30 years age group, and 1% of males and females were within the age bracket of 31–40 years and the rest of them (2%) were males within the age of 41–60 years. About half of the informants (52.5%) were engaged as agricultural labor and did allied jobs, and among them, 3% were females. In that case, the highest percent (15%; including 1% female) was within the 41–50 years age group and 14.5% (including 1% female) of them belonged to 31–40 years age group. Furthermore, 12% of the informants who were 51–60 years of age were engaged in agriculture and allied job as daily laborers, and all of them were males. The second highest percent (36.5%) was either housewife or those engaged in other jobs. Among them, 19% were females and the average representation of females was 4.75%.

Table 3: Occupation of the participants according to their age

Age group	Occupation								Total
	Students		Service		Agricultural labour & allied jobs		Housewife and others		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	female	
21-30 years	6(3%)	2(1%)	4(2%)	2(1%)	20(10%)	2(1%)	6(3%)	8(4%)	**50(25%)**
31-40 years	-	-	2(1%)	2(1%)	27(13.5%)	2(1%)	7(3.5%)	10(5%)	**50(25%)**
41-50 years	-	-	2(1%)	-	28(14%)	2(1%)	10(5%)	8(4%)	**50(25%)**
51-60 years	-	-	2(1%)	-	24(12%)	-	12(6%)	12(6%)	**50(25%)**
Total	**6(3%)**	**2(1%)**	**10(5%)**	**4(2%)**	**99(49.5%)**	**6(3%)**	**35(17.5%)**	**38(19%)**	**200(100%)**

Source: Field work by Adhikari (2013)

Dynamics of political opinion and affiliation of the informants

In the present study, the researcher interacted with the informants during individual and group meetings, and it was found that the informants were affiliated with the political parties named Community Party of India (Marxist) (CP(I)M), Communist Party of India(CPI), Forward Block (a left party), Congress (I), and Trinamul Congress(TMC). Table 4 shows that the majority of the informants (47%) were affiliated to the TMC, out of which 10% were females. Furthermore, most of these informants belonged to the age group of 31–40 years (14%). The second largest party was the Congress (I) to which 22.5% of the informants were affiliated. The female population affiliated with Congress (I) was 6.5% with the dominant age group being the 31–40 years age group (7%). Conversely, 14.5% of the informants were affiliated to the CPI(M), out of which 4.5% were females. The dominant age groups in this case were 41–50 and 51–60 years age groups (9%). Moreover, 10% of the informants supported CPI and 7% supported Forward Block, with the dominant age group being 51–60 years age group (CPI, 3%; Forward Block, 3%).

Table 5 shows that there was a trend to alter the political affiliation among the informants. However, only 24% of the informants belonging to the age groups of 41–50 years and 51–60 years did not think of altering their affiliation. The rest them had altered their affiliation. Among them, 38.5% (including 12% females) altered their affiliation once, 24.5% (including 5% females) altered their affiliation twice, and 13% (including 2% females) altered their affiliation thrice and more. The alternation of political affiliation was a higher in the age groups of 20–30years(25%) and 31–40 years (20%), while it was equal (14%) in the age groups of 41–50 years and 51–60 years.

Table 4: Distribution of the informants according their political affiliation

Age group	Political parties (%)										Total
	CPI(M)		CPI		Forward Block		Congress(I)		TMC		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
21-30	4(2)	2(1)	2(1)	2(1)	2(1)	2(1)	8(4)	6(3)	18(9)	2(1)	**50(25)**
31-40	2(1)	2(1)	2(1)	2(1)	1(0.5)	1(0.5)	11(5.5)	3(1.5)	20(10)	8(4)	**50(25)**
41-50	8(4)	2(1)	3(1.5)	2(1)	1(0.5)	1(0.5)	8(4)	2(1)	20(10)	5(2.5)	**50(25)**
51-60	6(3)	3(1.5)	4(2)	2(1)	4(2)	2(1)	6(3)	2(1)	16(8)	5(2.5)	**50(25)**
Total	**20(10)**	**9(4.5)**	**12(6)**	**8(4)**	**8(4)**	**6(3)**	**31(16.5)**	**13(6.5)**	**74(37)**	**20(10)**	**200(100)**

Source: Field work by Adhikari (2013)

Table 5: Frequency of alteration of political affiliation

Age group	Frequency of alteration								Total
	Once		Twice		Thrice and more		Never		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
20-30	20(10%)	8(4%)	10(5%)	4(2%)	6(3%)	2(1%)	-	-	**50(25%)**
31-40	11(5.5%)	6(3%)	15(7.5%)	2(1%)	4(2%)	2(1%)	6(3%)	4(2%)	**50(25%)**
41-50	10(5%)	6(3%)	6(3%)	2(1%)	6(3%)	-	18(9%)	2(1%)	**50(25%)**
51-60	12(6%)	4(2%)	8(4%)	2(1%)	6(3%)	-	12(6%)	6(3%)	**50(25%)**
Total	**53(26.5%)**	**24(12%)**	**39(19.5%)**	**10(5%)**	**22(11%)**	**4(2%)**	**36(18%)**	**12(6%)**	**200(100%)**

Source: Field work by Adhikari (2013)

From Table 6, it is clear that 24% of the informants, most of them belonging to the age group of 41–50 years (10%), followed by those belonging to the 51–60 years age group (9%), believed in the principles and values of their political affiliated party. Hence, they had not changed their affiliation. The rest of the informants exhibited a trend to change their affiliation due to some reasons related to their personal interest and others. Among them, 33.5% had altered their affiliation due to the desire of some benefits, 16%had altered because of torture and harassment, 14.5% had altered to protect their properties from unauthorized acquisition, and 14% had altered to gain power and authority.

Table 6: Causes of alteration of affiliation or no alteration

Causes of alteration	**Age groups**								**Total**
	20-30 years		**31-40 years**		**41-50 years**		**51-60 years**		
	Male	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	**Male**	**Female**	
Attraction to principles and values of the affiliated political parties	-	-	6(3%)	4(2%)	18(9%)	2(1%)	12(6%)	6(3%)	**48(24%)**
Accessing and availing benefits either for self or for the members of the family (service and others)	26(13%)	8(4%)	10(5%)	2(1%)	7(3.5%)	-	12(6%)	2(1%)	**67(33.5%)**
Escaping from torture and harassment	4(2%)	3(1.5%)	8(4%)	4(2%)	4(2%)	3(1.5%)	4(2%)	2(1%)	**32(16%)**
Protecting properties from unauthorized handling	2(1%)	2(1%)	10(5%)	3(1.5%)	4(2%)	4(2%)	2(1%)	2(1%)	**29(14.5%)**
Securing power and authority and its benefits	2(1%)	1(0.5%)	8(4%)	1(0.5%)	7(3.5%)	1(0.5)	8(4%)	-	**28(14%)**
Total	**34(17%)**	**14(7%)**	**42(21%)**	**14(7%)**	**40(20%)**	**10(5%)**	**38(19%)**	**12(6%)**	**200(100%)**

Source: Field work by Adhikari (2013)

Discussion

Opportunities and individual interest towards political affiliation:

The Constitution of India was enacted to ensure equal opportunities for all, considering individual education, skills, and experiences. The social background of the individual gets special consideration as far as the reservation is concerned. Factual selection and judgment of individual personal background (education, skills, and experiences) is a biased/critical task that needs to be performed correctly. This inculcates a system of backdoors or corruption, and it is a scope for the ruling political party to take advantages by ensuring an individual's support in exchange for the opportunity. Moreover, this is the prime cause of less principle oriented political education, rather than fulfillment of individual interest through some benefits. Hoping to enjoy benefits, people turn their affiliation from one party to another, with some of them altering their affiliation expecting more benefits than his/her existing affiliation.

Determinants of interpersonal relationship within family and outside family:

We found that there was always a competition among individuals in the family and community to avail more comforts as well as benefits from less labor (physical, emotional, or intellectual). Thus, individuals adopt a system to fulfill it from political parties, and attend the functions and activities of their particular affiliated political party and propagate the agenda, influenced by others. However, when one showed his/her unwillingness to join, it yielded disturbances among members of a family as well as community. This separated the selection of daily newspaper, new channels in electronic media, and so forth. It was noted that individuals buy their daily domestic needs from separate vendors who are the supporters of the same party, and avail separate tea and snack stall in their local market. The distribution of movable and immovable assets in the family, which is a family issue, was resolved through the interference of the party.

Developmental tasks determined by political affiliation:

Various rural development schemes implemented by the local self-government (Panchayat) were enforced according to the choice and will of the dominating party or ruling party. Planning at Gram Sansad level, selection of beneficiaries under MGNREGA, and distribution of development work were finalized according to the will of the dominating party. This trend was the prime cause of violence in integration and co-ordination of inter- and intrapersonal relationships. This cultivated a system of social boycott, hooliganism, and other indulgences.

Case 1: Mr. G. Ghorai (62) who died due to torture by his opponent's political party supporters in connection to protecting his land property. He was a long-time supporter of left parties, for which he was socially boycotted by his siblings and kin in his community, because they were the supporters of the right parties. They did not include him and his family members on any occasion of their community. When the left parties' rules were under threat by the right parties, the right parties unethically occupied his land, and on opposing his, Ghorai and his son and daughters were physically assaulted and Ghorai was beaten. After that, he was admitted to hospital with severe head injuries and died. No one came to rescue him because his co-supporters were also threatened.

Case 2: Ms. Aruna (28) was a girl child of a weaver's family in this village. She belonged to a poor family (BPL) and completed her Bachelor's degree as a first-generation learner. However, she did not get any job due to the absence of any channel. Her family was a supporter of left parties. By that time, a chance for a job in the village came. It was an opportunity to work as ananganwadi worker under Integrated Child Development Service Scheme (ICDS), and was advertised that a girl with a qualification of Madhyamik and belonging to a BPL family would be recruited. Hence, Aruna applied for that and she was the only candidate as per the advertisement. However, finally, she did not get the job because her competitor was a member of the ruling party and was also from an economically and educationally rich background.

Theoretical perspective of political affiliation according to the fulfillment of personal benefit/individual interest:

Love-making is an emotional trait in every individual in almost every society, and age and gender are not the determining factors. The emotional bondage is a biological need. Similarly, limerence is a state of being in love, and love and sex may co-exist without limerence. It may begin when one person feels an interest in a particular person; however, if nurtured by appropriate conditions, it can grow to enormous intensity. In most cases, it also declines, eventually to zero or to a low level. At this low level, limerence is either transformed through reciprocation or transferred to another person who then becomes the object of new limerent passion (Tannov, 1999:20-70). Further, the limerence can be explained with the help of Treisman's Theory of Vomiting. This theory states that vomiting and malaise are a part of an early defense and warning system inappropriate in the case of motion, but lifesaving in the case of toxin ingestion. Thus, motion sickness is an accidental byproduct of the organism's response to certain head and eye moments that occur in the case of food poisoning. Unfortunately, this may also occur in the case of certain types of theorizing and is assumed to be associated with the "survival value" (Treisman, 1977:493-495). In context of the present study, political parties are the limerent objects to the people or voters from whom some people desire individual benefits, which the parties use to ensure their vote at the time of election. People alter their limerent objects (political party) easily when their desired benefits are unfulfilled by one party, and this is a chain system. The behavior of people is similar to the theory of vomiting because they feel the pain only during suffering. However, when they overcome it, they generally forget the danger of food poisoning.

Thus, the overall system of electoral politics cultivates an interest of an individual. It consciously or unconsciously promotes a self-centered society because it does not facilitate the collective goal of election to government. When human beings were hunter-gatherers, they were collective belonging to a group; however, the group leader's interest broke their group, and gradually it invited the slavery system and feudalism. At present, based on the fulfillment of personal consumers' life, an individual is prone to meet his/her own interest, which breaks the societal norms and yields corruption and violence.

Case 3: Sudipta (32) was a postgraduate in geography. He was the eldest son of a public servant father. He was affiliated with the left parties during his student life and his family also had full faith on left parties. They participated in various political functions for 18 years and more. Sudipta tried a government job after passing his degrees and his expectation was stronger that his affiliated party would help him to get a job. However, he failed to reach the target. Thus, one day he altered his political affiliation to another party. He involved himself in the newly affiliated party. Although his target was to get a job, his political interference did not help to reach his target and they only assured to help him. Nevertheless, this was not successful. As a result, his participation turned into a passive one, and he stated that he might join another party if they assured his job.

Case 4: Goutam (53) was a daily laborer in the transport industry. He belonged to a socially and economically higher class in his community because his two sons were also employed in jewelry industries in Mumbai. He constructed a two-storied building. He needed a tube-well nearby his house. He channelized his need to his affiliated party, which ruled the Panchayat for more than three terms (one term=5 years). They assured to install it, but in practice, they installed it 100feet away from his house. As a result, he withdrew his affiliation and joined another party who assured to re-install it besides his house. Eventually, there was no step taken, according to him, and hence, he stated that he would think about what he would do in near future.

Conclusion

Indian democracy is the largest democracy in the world and each and every Indian elects their government that would rule the country. It is undoubtedly a great philosophy, and the political parties are the key actors of parliamentary democracy. These political parties have their own philosophy and principles with manifestations. Their target is to lead a progressive nation and protect the interest of citizens collectively within the state and within other countries of the world.

In the present study, we observed the political behavior of villagers. In the studied village, the people were homogenously Hindu and were in a far better position than any other backward village. They showed their clear political opinion regarding their reasons for affiliation to a particular political party and why they had altered their affiliation or not. About half of the subjects were affiliated with the TMC, which was the ruling party of West Bengal, and 76% of them had altered their affiliation, even more than thrice. The age of the informants was a factor for alternation. However, most of them had altered due to their own interest. These interests were varied according to their situation for a self-centered peaceful survival. Some of them had altered their affiliation to gain some benefits for their better future in terms of living conditions. Furthermore, some of them altered their affiliation to escape from the torture and harassment by a ruling party, while a portion of them altered their affiliation to protect their properties and so forth. Much older population was habituated to change their affiliation to hold power and authority.

The study also revealed that the informants had no or little knowledge about the principles of their affiliated parties, and were older than those who altered their affiliation. The overall scenario reminded us that the political parties had failed to orient/teach the people about the values and norms of their parties to build a progressive nation. Affiliation to a party to gain some benefit is noted to facilitate violence and damage the inter- and intrapersonal relationship, resulting in national disintegration. So, the political parties mislead the followers through assurance for personal gain because their policy is to hold the authority anyway.

In general, people who used to sell their vote purposefully belong to a state of limerence. If one limerent object fails to fulfill an individual's dream, then the individual can turn to another. This is also the state of an individual who vomits because of food poisoning. Once the individual heals, he/she forgets about food poisoning and takes the same types of food again.

Finally, people and political parties should rethink about human civilization and the importance of integrated India. There should not be any party to fulfill one's personal interest, and parties should avoid abuse of power and authority for particular supporters. Besides these, the parties should maintain equilibrium in the distribution of resources according to the quality of human resources; otherwise, democracy "must die."

Bibliography

Adhikari, H. (2013). Emerging Political Caste in West Bengal: Rethinking Society & Human Relations, *Journal of Politics & Governance*, (1&2), 32-36.

Almond, G. and Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture*, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barnes, S. and Simons, J. (eds.) (1998). *The Postcommunist Citizen*, Budapest, Hungary: Erasmus Foundation.

Blair, H.W. (1990). 'Electoral Support and Party Institutionalization in Bihar: Congress and the Opposition 1977-85' in Sisson, R. and Roy, R. (eds.) *Diversity and Dominance in Indian Politics*, Vol-I, Changing Bases of Congress Support, New Delhi: Sage.

Blair, H.W. (1993). 'Local Support Bases and the Ninth General Election in Bihar and Maharastra' in Gould H.A. and Ganguly, S. (eds.) *India Voters-Alliance Politics and Minority Governments in the Ninth and tenth General Election*, Boulder: Westview.

Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Chandhoke, N and Priyadarshi, P. (eds.) (2009). *Contemporary India: Economy, Society, Politics*, New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley India

Chhibber, P.K. (1999*). Democracy Without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Dalton, R.J. (2000). Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior, *Comparative Political Studies*, 33(6/7): 912-940.

Dasgupta, B. and Morris-Jones, W.H. (1975). *Pattern and Trends in Indian Politics- An Ecological Analysis of Aggregate Data on Society and Elections*, New Delhi: Allied Publishers.

Dikshit, R.D. (1995). *Geography of Elections: The Indian Context*, New Delhi: Rawat.

Eckstein, H. (1992). *Regarding politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jaffrelot, C. (2003). *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics*, New Delhi: Permanent Black.

Kaase, M.and Newton, K. (eds.) (1995). *Beliefs in government*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Kini, N.S. (1974). *The City Voter in India- A Study of 1967 General Elections In Nagpur*, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications.

Kohli, A. (1991). *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kondo, N. (2003). *Indian Parliament Elections after Electoral Participation*, Chiba-Japan: Institute of Developing Economics (JETRO).

Kothari, R. (1971). 'Politics and Social Mobility', *India Contributions to Indian Sociology*, 5:99-114.

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of democracy*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

O'Flaherry, W.D. (2000). *The Rig Veda*, New Delhi: Penguin.

Powell, G.B. (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone. *Journal of Democracy*, 6, 65-78.

Ruud, A.E. (2009). Talking Dirty about Politics: A View From a Bengali Village, in *the Everyday State and Society in Modern India*, Fuller, C.J. and Benei, V. (eds.), New Delhi: Social Science Press.

Sen, S. (2010). *The Constitution of India: Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Transformations*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Shin, D.C. (1999). *Mass politics and culture in democratizing Korea*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sinha, D. (2011). *Rabindranather Pallypunargathan Prayas* (Rabindranath's effort for rural reconstruction and foundation of Sriniketan), Kolkata: Pachimbanga Bangla Academy.

Sirisikar, V.M.(1970). *The Rural Elite in a Developing Society-A Study in Political Sociology*, New Delhi: Orient Longmans.

Sirisikar, V.M.(1973). *Sovereigns without Crowns- A Behavioural Analysis of the Indian Electoral Process*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Sisson, R (1972). *The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Political Integration and Institution Building in an Indian State*, New Delhi: University of California Press.

Sur, A. (1974). *Bharater Bibaher Itihas*, Kolkata: Ananda Publishers.

Tannov, D. (1999). *Love and Limerence: the experience of being love*, USA: Scarborough House

The Census Report of India, (2011), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi

Treisman, M. (1977). Motion Sickness: An Evolutionary Hypothesis, *Science*, 197, 493-495.

Environmental Governance and Public Participation

Katerina Bozhinova

Katerina Bozhinova, 23, is a graduate who received her Bachelor degree in "Political Science and International Relations" with honors at the American University in Bulgaria in 2014. She completed her Bachelor Thesis on Environmental Governance and Public Participation in 2014. Her interests include local environmental governance, policy-making, and comparative politics. This research was conducted as part of the final dissertation at the American University in Bulgaria. This author is grateful for the university support in accessing academic resources and would like to thank Dr. Cosmina Tanasoiu for her constant feedback, supervision and support during this process.

Abstract

Environmental sustainability is a complex term, characterized by dynamic interactions between human and natural dimensions. Policy-makers in the developed world face the challenge of balancing economic growth with citizen concerns for curbing human impact leading to environmental degradation. This thesis contributes to the investigation of environmental governance on local scale by assessing the quality of environmental decisions. It examines and compares how the involvement of interest groups and citizens into local decision-making structures promotes efficient environmental policies. By applying the crispy sets qualitative comparative analysis (cs/QCA), this study aims to indentify the conditions necessary and sufficient for formulating participatory environmental decisions. The results suggest that successful policy formulation is dependent upon the presence of governmental agenda-setting and multilevel governance. The findings outline good practices, which reveal how governments can organize and facilitate participatory decision-making to ensure legitimate representation of interests and, thus, reach consensus-based decisions, which then translate easily into policy formulation.

Keywords: Developed World; Environmental Governance; Policy-Making; Public Participation; Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

Introduction

Since the 1970s governments in developed countries reconsidered their approaches to managing environmental problems. Ruling elites increasingly promoted ideas of collaborative and participatory governance in search for more sustainable and effective policies. This shift in environmental policy resulted in the aftermath of the year United Nations Stockholm Conference and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The Rio Declaration set out to protect the Earth's ecosystem, and committed developed countries to acknowledge their responsibility for pursuing sustainable development on a global scale (Vonkeman 2000). Sustainable development, developed by the United Nations, as a way of organizing human activity on our finite planet emerged as a political concept. Since there are no absolute criteria to optimize economic development while preserving the environment, sustainable development reflects human values and judgments, which requires opening environmental decision-making processes to wider groups, rather than governments and experts.

This thesis investigates how local environmental governance and participatory decision-making influence governance effectiveness in selected cases across the developed world. More particularly, it is examined how citizens and interest groups participate in environmental governance and evaluate their contribution to good governance practices. This study also considers contextual factors (i.e. economic, social, and political) and their role in influencing different actors' demands, decision-making processes, and environmental outcomes. The crispy sets qualitative comparative analysis (cs/QCA) is applied for sixteen cases, to identify conditions necessary and sufficient that characterize a good practice. This is a comparative study following the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), selecting cases that share characteristics such as similar structural characteristics, citizen involvement and generated outcomes of decision-making from both North America and Western Europe. This dataset relies upon secondary data collected from an on-going research project called ECOPAG (Environmental Consequences of Participatory Governance).

Literature Review

Environmental problems are complex and affect multiple agencies and actors. Their solutions increasingly incorporate public participation, representing a diversity of knowledge and values. Widespread acceptance of participation has partly resulted from increasing knowledge and interest in environmental issues, as well as policy trends that promote sustainable development and collaborative problem-solving. Claims in favor of participation, however, have rarely been tested, and no consensus on public participation as panacea to environmental sustainability exists.

Environmental Governance and Public Participation

Environmental governance is a multifaceted term, which includes social, institutional, and environmental elements. Governance is broadly defined as "the structures and processes by which people in societies make decisions and share power" and "creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action or institutions of social coordination," to discuss how they apply for environmental problems (Folke et al. 205: 444). The normative dimension of environmental governance relates to promoting sustainable development (Hempel 1996; Gibson et al. 2005). A narrower approach focused on the management of fisheries, sees environmental governance as "the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities" (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005: 17). Kooiman and Bavinck (17) view governance as an inclusive term, which borrows from the literature on environmental policymaking and management both theoretical and practically-oriented mechanisms. More specific definitions emphasize on the institutional aspect of environmental governance as a "set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations," which deal with environmental conflicts (Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 298; Paavola 2007: 97).

Literature on the theoretical aspects of environmental governance offers conceptualizations of different models of governance and examines how they shift over time. The three ideal types are hierarchical (or top-down) governance, self-governance - without intervention from governments, and co-governance, which is at the focus of this study, as it defines the interactions between governments and societal actors (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005: 21-22). Glasbergen suggests five different models of governance: market regulation, civil society, co-operative, contextual control, and self-regulation (1998: 3-4). In practice, a degree of hybridization exists, as these types of governance are not mutually exclusive and often operate together (Meadowcroft 1998). The major determining factors of governance hybridization and shifts across time are the number of the actors involved and the extent to which environmental issues affects them (Driessen et al. 2012: 145).

Collaborative types of governance, using participatory approaches such as meetings with stakeholders and engaging citizens in workshops, have become increasingly popular (Folke et al. 2005). Co-governance is based on public participation, which is defined as "any type of inclusion of non-state actors, as members of the public or as organised stakeholders, in any stage of governmental policy making, including implementation" (Wesselink et al. 2011: 2). Usually, governmental agencies initiate this mode of governance by developing agendas for meetings and natural scientists analyze environmental problems and develop solutions. This mode incorporates the public into an already established framework, which limits the discourse with them and simplifies social dynamics (Folke 2005: 462). Public participation, however, is not always limited to governmental and expert frames, which is evident in the first typology, crafted by Arnstein, which she called the "ladder of participation" (1969). The ladder begins from the lowest level of participation - passive dissemination of information for the purposes of education (also called "manipulation"), followed by other types of increasing involvement, the highest level of which means citizens obtaining the majority of the decision-making seats or the full power to decide, labeled "citizen control" (Arnstein 1969: 217). Other typologies distinguish between normative and pragmatic participation. Normative participation guarantees the democratic right of citizens to participate in environmental decision-making, while pragmatic participation is concerned with achieving high-quality decisions (Reed 2008). The distinction between the two types is framed as "public acceptance" versus "decision quality" or "political" versus "technical" participation (Beierle 2002: 3).

The benefits of public participation in environmental governance are approached from both normative and pragmatic perspectives. The normative argument for participation, grounded in democratic logic (enhancing representativity and legitimacy), claims that stakeholder involvement reduces the marginalization of society units. If participatory processes are perceived as fair and taking into account conflicting views, then they may increase public trust in decisions (Reed 2008: 2421). Participation promotes transformation of adversarial relationships by appreciation of other's views through social learning (Reed 2008: 2421). Pragmatic arguments focus on the quality and durability of co-governance decisions (see for example: Beierle 2002; Reed 2008). Co-governance may enhance the rate of adoption of a decision and meet the local needs (Rydin and Pennington 2010: 155). By taking into account local concerns and interests, a project design may be enriched with locally specific information, unavailable to professional agencies. For example, environmental planning can benefit from detailed knowledge of the local environment and its use by local communities (Rydin and Pennington 2010: 155). Participatory processes can lead to high-quality decisions, as they are based on more complete information and negative scenarios can be analyzed and ameliorated before they occur (Reed 2008: 2421). Participation is also advocated to reduce conflict during policy-making and implementation. Engaging citizens at an early stage of policy processes can prevent from disagreement later on and guarantee greater legitimacy (Rydin and Pennington 2010: 155).

The benefits of co-governance are counterbalanced by claims of potential dangers and dysfunctionalities. Cooke and Kothari warn about the dangers of groupthink, manipulation, self-censorship, and coercive persuasion in participatory processes (2001: 11). Consultation fatigue may develop, as citizens are often asked to participate in environmental decision-making, in which they perceive little reward or capacity to influence, leading to a decrease in the quality of the participatory input (Reed 2008: 2421). Fatigue can be observed when participants' empowerment is restricted, which occurs most frequently when decisions are overruled by authorities. The reliability of participation is also questioned, as publics do not have sufficient expertise to deliver meaningful contribution, especially in technical debates (Fisher and Young 2007).

Research on citizens' contribution to high-quality environmental decisions is limited, especially regarding generalizations about the effectiveness of their input. To evaluate the output of participatory governance, Beierle (2002) coded information for 239 case studies on environmental decision-making. He found that stakeholder involvement resulted in higher decision quality for the majority of these cases, particularly when consensus among the participants was sought. Sultana and Abeyasekera (2007) analyzed 36 cases of community fisheries management in Bangladesh, some of which did not include public participation during the planning processes. They found participatory cases of governance to be more effective in terms of yielding more conservation measures and reducing conflicts between stakeholders. Newig and Fritsch (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 47 cases of participatory decision-making in Western democracies to evaluate potential determinants of governance effectiveness. They found that environmental preferences of the actors, face-to-face and two-way communication, and multi-leveled governance systems influence environmental outputs. Similarly, Koontz (2005) conducted a multiple-case study, showing that high concerns for the environment, shared by already formed social networks, enhance the participatory contribution to policy-making.

Methodology

This thesis is a comparative study applying cs/QCA to a medium range size pool. The aim is to evaluate co-governance through establishing conditions, necessary and sufficient, for environmental policy to occur.

Case Selection

Newig and Fritsch conducted a preliminary study through a meta-analysis of 47 case studies on environmental decision-making in developed countries to evaluate citizens' performance in governance. They argue that their regression models did not provide enough insights on the public contribution to governance effectiveness and started a new project called ECOPAG (Environmental Consequences of Participatory Governance – see bibliographical reference), collecting larger amount of case studies. This study defers to their on-going research project to select 16 case studies from their pool of 110 cases. The cases on environmental participatory decision-making, from North America, and Western Europe, generally share similar structural and process characteristics (i.e. local environmental problems, governance, though not exclusively, on local level, description of the problems and attempts for their solution, etc.), as well as degrees of public participation. The study compares developed countries , as the democratic tradition of participatory governance developed there since 1960s, together with a shift towards post-material values, such as environmentalism (Mason 1999).

A moderate number of cases (16) are selected to facilitate QCA (Ragin 2008). Case selection is based upon participatory element, while also showing representativity in terms of scope of the projects (natural resource management, participatory planning, and sustainable community programs) and geographical spread (i.e. Canada, USA, Germany, Switzerland). Around half of the 110 cases report citizen involvement from North America, due to longer tradition of collaborative and inclusive eco-politics in the USA, compared to Europe (Newig and Fritsch 2008). Similarly, 6 out of the 16 selected cases concern US environmental management issues to ensure representativity from the pool, as well as to cover earlier participatory processes, as most of the American cases date back to the 20th century. The sample does not account for all types of participatory processes in the case study countries. However, it covers a broad spectrum of political and social issues, scales, types of participation, and governance arrangements.

The main criterion for selection is participation of non-state actors, based on Arnstein's "ladder of participation," which distinguishes between eight types of participation, grouped in two broader categories called "participation" and "non-participation." She argues that the latter category does not lead to citizen contribution to decision-making, as powerholders (governments and business) use it to claim representation of interests on behalf of the community (Arnstein 1969). Non-participation occurs when powerholders include citizens for the sake of inclusion or education, without consulting with them or giving them decision-making power, which constitutes the two lowest levels of the ladder. Only case studies, where participation exists at least in the form of consultation, some of which include negotiation and voting power, delegated to citizens, were selected.

Furthermore, case selection was based on information availability, provided in the case reports, with preference given to cases which contain primary data. Cases using secondary data sources, which do not describe the participatory events in detail, but rather focus on the environmental problem and its technical aspects, were excluded. Research techniques such as surveys and interviews of the participants in environmental governance, and observations of meetings enable comparison of the selected cases. They share similar characteristics such as background of the problem, timeline of participation events, analysis through surveys and/or interviews, and discussion and evaluation of participatory processes.

Table 1. List of case studies analyzed

Case	Country	Environmental Issue	Reference
Aargau Landfill Siting	Switzerland	waste incineration	Renn et al., 1998
Belmont Open Space Controversy	USA	spatial planning	Layzer, 2002
Ede High-Speed Railway	The Netherlands	railway construction	Enserink and Monnikhoff, 2003
Great Bear Rainforest	Canada	land and resource use plan	Cullen, 2006
Homestake	USA	uranuim mine development	Watson and Danielson, 1983
Kromme Rijn	The Netherlands	water management	Lamers et al., 2010
Minnesota Water Qulity Citizen Panel	USA	agricultural impacts on water quality	Crosby et al., 1986
Monfalcone Regasification Terminal	Italy	construction of a regasification terminal	Del Furia and Wallace-Jones, 1998
Neuss Mediation	Germany	solid waste management	Fietkau and Weidner 1995
San Juan Archipelago	USA	marine ecosystem management	Evans and Klinger, 2008
Scotland Wind Power	UK	wind power	Aitken, 2008
Spey River	UK	river basin management plan	Blackstock and Richards, 2007
Sugarbush	USA	dam construction for snowmaking	Fitzhugh and Dozier, 1996
Vancouver Island Generation Project	Canada	hydroelectric power plant construction	Cruikshank, 2006
West Hawai Marine Protected Areas	USA	marine area protection	Capitini et al., 2004
Wuskwatim Generation Project	Canada	hydroelectric dam construction	Cruikshank, 2006

Method

Literature on participatory environmental decision-making either follows a case study approach (Neidzialkowski et. al. 2012; Fietkau and Weidner 1995; Blackstock and Richards 2007) or performs large cross-case quantitative analysis (Newig and Fritsch 2009; Beierle 2009; Sultana and Abeyasekera 2007). By applying QCA, this study will conduct a cross-case analysis with the goal to identify conditions, necessary and sufficient, for a successful outcome to occur. Boolean algebra not fuzzy sets was applied due to lack of uniformly collected quantitative data, which would otherwise allow for accurate calibration of fuzzy sets variables. Calibration is conducted according to objective criteria, such as the presence or absence of four different variables, which can be traced in the case materials. The interpretation of the findings will draw upon extensive empirical evidence collected through archive research.

Construction and Calibration of Variables

The common outcome of environmental governance for the sixteen case studies is policy formulation. Since participating stakeholders, by adding new information and ideas, improve the quality of the decisions in most cases, any policy formulation with the absence of deadlock will be considered a success (Beierle 2002; Sultana and Abeyasekera 2007). Failure of environmental governance is considered to occur when consultation with stakeholders did not result in a policy formulation or a plan, submitted by a project developer (usually a company) was not approved by legislature. To determine the conditions necessary and sufficient for effective governance, four variables related to public participatory processes are constructed: multilevel governance, public participation in the decision-making process, presence of non-local actors (i.e. experts, business representatives, or members of an organization from a different region/city), and governmental agenda-setting. Newig and Fritsch (2009) find that multilevel governance leads to higher environmental outputs than polycentric governance. Multilevel governance is present in cases where more than one territorial tier is involved in policy-making or determines the legislative framework around the environmental problem, and absent when only one tier regulates and decides on the issue. Ensuring non-state actors' participation in the decision-making processes is widely advised as a best practice in environmental governance (Fiorino 1990; Laird 1993; Chase et al. 2004; Tippett et al. 2007, in Reed 2008). Presence of this variable is established when the public (or at least one participant from the public) has voting power or when governmental actors retreat from the decision-making process and the developer of a project and the public settle the dispute. Absence is when only governmental actors have voting and/or decision-making power. Presence of non-local actors on meetings includes at least one participant, who does not live or work in the region where an environmental problem originates (neutral observers of the processes are excluded), and absence means that only local actors are involved. This variable is related to a hypothesis that local citizens are mainly concerned with economic exploitation of natural resources, while non-local citizens favor conservation (Newig and Fritsch 2009). Agenda-setting by governmental actors influences not only the process of decision-making, but also the quality of its outcomes by maximizing information outputs (Newig and Fritsch 2012). Governmental agenda-setting is considered present when local governmental actors craft agenda for at least one meeting with stakeholders and absent when meetings are not initiated by authorities

Findings

The crispy set analysis provided one set of necessary and sufficient conditions leading to successful policy formulation:

govtagnd*multigovern

Governmental agenda-setting, combined with multilevel governance (coverage: 0.6364)

While this combination is not consistent enough to ensure a path of success for policy formulation, it provides guidelines for case clustering and understanding the mechanisms through which these variables affected the outcome.

The other two variables - public participation in the decision-making process and presence of non-local actors, did not produce any significant results in terms of policy formulation.

Citizen voting power or delegated power to make decisions, which will not require subsequent approval from the government, actually led to policy formulation, which emerged out of voting results, consensus, or compromise in Great Bear, Aargau, Spey River, and Wuskwatim Generation Project. For the remaining 5 cases , where the outcome was present but public participation in decisions was absent, policy was formulated as a result of strong citizen involvement in discussions and crafting projects. Although governments had the final decision-making power, their efforts for communication and coordination with non-governmental actors promoted consensual ideas of environmental policies.

Presence of non-local actors did not have significance for policy formulation, mostly because non-local actors were a small part of all participants and did not exercise much influence in discussions and decisions in none of these cases. The assumption that non-local citizens are more concerned with environmental outcomes, rather than economic issues, is not relevant for these cases. Instead, the findings support the value of local participation as a result of better understanding and knowledge of the problem.

Findings Part I: Solution Analysis

The solution covers six case studies with presence of the outcome and one case , which did not result in policy formulation. The elements which lead to success in the six cases are complexly intertwined and harder to identify, compared to those cases where failure to formulate policy was often due to concrete factors or circumstances (e.g. lack of cooperation between government officials and citizens, economic risks of a project, strong opposition, etc.). In those with successful outcomes, policy formulation was due primarily, but not exclusively, to the combination of multilevel governance and agenda setting by governments. The benefits, derived from this combination, can be inferred from archive research and secondary data, including observations of meetings and surveys and interviews of participants, collected by researchers and observers.

I. Multilevel Governance

The presence of multilevel governance facilitated policy formulation in two ways. Coordination between the different tiers of government eliminated a possible preponderance of the interests of one tier and ensured the provision of technical information and constant government support, when needed by participants. Legal provisions on national or supranational level, stipulating environmental protection and public participation in decisions, were applied to initiate the participatory processes and reach both consensual and more environmentally sustainable decisions.

Coordination between different tiers of government proved beneficial both for arranging efficient incorporation of the public in projects and success in policy formulation. For example, in Minnesota, to ensure effectiveness of the participatory process, the regional government chose as sponsors those state agencies that have the ability to influence events in the areas of water quality management. The coordination between the regional and national levels of government ensured the implementation of some of the recommendations, which were incorporated in a national bill (Crosby et al. 1986: 177). In Great Bear Rainforest, the provincial government was supported by an interagency planning team, made up of local and federal agencies, which provided technical analysis for the tables (Cullen 2006: 74). Similarly, in Neuss the district authorities cooperated with municipalities in launching a project, but with the aim to assign citizens to smaller groups and this cooperation ensured representative selection of different stakeholders (Fietkau and Weidner 1995). In Aargau, municipalities did not have enough resources to organize the process, so they benefitted from the help of a higher governing body and asked the Canton to assume responsibility for the project design and decision-making (Renn et al. 1998).

In some case studies, the coordination between different tiers, complemented by cooperation between governments and citizens, ensured that high-quality decisions were taken. In Minnesota, state agencies sponsored the work of citizens, who first took part in several regional panels, until they elaborated a set of recommendations and joined into one statewide panel to present their decisions. The government representatives allowed the regional panels more freedom to craft their recommendations, while the state panel was more strictly guided by the interested state agencies, thus helping reach a decision. The researchers who evaluated the participation arrangements concluded that the two-tiered approach showed how having good ties with local communities and requesting their input can become a way to influence statewide legislation (Crosby et al. 176). In Great Bear Rainforest, the native communities (First Nations) were encouraged to participate, based on their constitutional right to the land, requiring the government to consult with them and accommodate their interests (Cullen 63). The provincial government outreached their minimum legal duty to these communities by forming a partnership with First Nations representatives, aimed at negotiating a decision on land use. Participating citizens evaluated the recognition of First Nations as a distinct stakeholder as a positive aspect of the provincial government plan by citizens (Cullen 126). In Spey River, five national and regional authorities worked in close cooperation with stakeholders and were part of the citizen working groups, which led to adoption of the recommendations by all five organizations (Blacktock and Richards 2007: 500).

In several Europe based cases the legal provisions and implementation of EU directives led to public involvement in environmental problems and provided frameworks for more sustainable and consensual decisions. In Spey River, the European Water Framework Directive was implemented and citizens were invited to participate in crafting a River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) under Article 14, which calls for "active involvement of interested parties" in RBMPs (Blackstock and Richards 494). The participatory process was overseen by five regional and national authorities, who have statutory responsibilities under the European Habitats Directive (Blackstock and Richards 500). In Kromme Rijn, participation in water management planning was also a policy requirement from the European Water Framework Directive, stipulating integration of different interests related to water and "good ecological status for the water system" (Lamers et al. 2010). The implementation of the directive led to expansion of the functions of the regional water boards and effective process design and implementation, according to the majority of participants (citizens and authorities) and the researchers who evaluated the process. In a non-European case study - Great Bear Rainforest, the provincial government released a Protected Areas Strategy, which provided guidance to planning processes, crafting recommendations for protected areas (Cullen 53).

II. Arranging Participatory Processes

Multilevel governance arrangements, combined with governmental agenda, allowed for initiating and improving participatory processes. Agenda-setting is part of a larger strategy of governments, aiming at structuring participatory processes to achieve representation of different stakeholder groups and their values, open discussions, transparency of the processes, and, most importantly, to promote consensual decisions so that the resulting policies will not be challenged.

i. Funding

Since governments initiated participatory processes , in some case studies they also provided funding for implementation, including education, hiring external specialists, and implementation of the projects. Unlike private sponsorship, governmental funding aims at transparent selection of participants and decision-making processes and guaranteeing that policy will not favor business interests. For example, in Great Bear Rainforest, the provincial government, as well as the federal government provided the majority of funding to create an independent information body, which assisted the planning tables with information provision, recommendation of decision frameworks, and support for implementation (Cullen 81). In Neuss, funding to carry out mediation was provided by the Science Centre Berlin for Social Research center, which implemented the participation process together with the district government. The center drew funding from the German Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology (Fietkau and Weidner 5). While in most cases funding extended to hiring independent facilitators and covering costs for organization of participation, in Minnessotta government officials paid the participating panelists $75 a day to compensate for the intensive and time-consuming sessions (Crosby et al. 175). In contrast to funding from companies (in Scotland Wind Power and Vancouvre Island Generation Project), in these cases citizens perceived government funding positively and raised no significant suspicions of conflicts of interest.

ii. Selection of Participants

Participant selection influences the decision-making processes by assigning roles, such as information providers, influencers and decision-makers. Therefore, to achieve a thorough understanding about environmental problems, which can then be used for policy-making, selection should include variety of concerns and interests, chosen in a fair and transparent manner (Reed 2008). Furthermore, to ensure the effectiveness of the decision-making process, governments should tailor analysis strategies, which incorporate the participation of the most interested stakeholders, while informing those who are tangentially interested (Reed 2008).

To align with best practices, governments analyzed relevant stakeholders and ensured that selection was fair and equally representative of the different interests involved (Reed 2008: 2424). In Minnessotta, participants in the panels were selected from a pool of citizens who attended information meetings. However, in these meetings there was a predomination of concerns from only two groups - farmers and environmentalists. To ensure broader representation of interests, the regional government distributed surveys and then explained the selection process on the outset of each panel, which decreased suspicion about biased selection (Crosby et al., 175).

Selecting the relevant stakeholders and balancing representation of interests by either including or excluding certain groups guaranteed the legitimacy of the decision-making process in Neuss. Similarly to Minnessotta, in Neuss, numerous groups who had concrete and potential interest in solid waste management (e.g. environmental and economic organizations, citizens' initiatives, churches) were approached and informed about the reasons for mediation. Those representatives who had shown interest in the procedure were then invited to a public meeting, where they were given the right to select three representatives to participate in the mediation (Fietkau and Weidner 9). The mediator and the district staff, however, did not include disposal companies in the mediation to prevent business-related conflicts, as no company was selected to build the waste disposal facilities.

Stakeholder analysis as a tool to achieve systematic representation of all interests was used in Kromme Rijn to include a two tier involvement, where the stakeholders were given the role of decision-makers, while the less interested were kept informed. Unlike Neuss, in Kromme Rijn the regional government did not allow stakeholders to choose their representatives and took care of their selection, using a technique, called bull's eye approach, which categorizes stakeholders in an environmental issue from central to peripheral (Lamers et al. 2010). The regional government identified four groups, based on the degree of their involvement. The first two groups, made up of government officials, agricultural and environmental organizations, and recreation groups were directly involved in the project, while the second two groups - stakeholders with lower degree of interest and the general public, were only informed about the progress and occasionally consulted.

The common features of selection for all cases consisted in fair representation of citizens and making the distinction between stakeholders, who participated directly in crafting or improving the projects, and the general public, who were informed on the progress of the project, educated on the environmental problem, and allowed to raise concerns. The identification of stakeholders with central interests allowed governments to organize efficient participatory processes, in which small but carefully selected groups of citizens focused on problem-solving, avoiding pressure from publics while they presented the product of their efforts.

iii. Benefits of Small Groups

Working in small groups was one of the conditions for reaching consensual decisions, which then translated into policy formulation. Small groups allow all individuals to share their knowledge and opinion and, thus, prevent the potential loss of substantial information, which occurs in larger groups, when some members avoid participating (Blackstock and Richards 2007).

This element of participatory design, arranged by government staff, and its contribution to both consensus and stakeholder representation was best illustrated in Spey River. Regional and national authorities broke down the multitude of participants by designating five working groups, each responsible for different environmental aspects of river basin management (i.e. water quality, agriculture and forestry, fisheries management, etc.). They decided to include representatives of interest groups and statutory bodies for their expertise and local knowledge. Then they developed a plan, involving five stages to make sure that the river basin management plan is prepared by the working groups and then approved by the citizens, who attended the final consultation meeting. Interviews show that three-quarters of the stakeholders praised the discursive process, initiated by government officials, for encouraging potential solutions to be assessed from a number of perspectives (Blackstock and Richards 502). Furthermore, deliberation within the working groups, encouraged by government staff, aided consensus, for example through preparing a guide on control of river waters, which eliminated disagreements over handling engineering works in the river basin (Blackstock and Richards 503).

The main benefits of working in small groups in Aargau and Kromme Rijn included open discussions with greater variety of views than larger meetings usually permit. In Kromme Rijn the involved stakeholders appreciated their exclusiveness from the general public, stating that working in small groups gave them a sense of safety and enabled them to discuss directly and openly (Lamers et al. 2010). In Aargau, the small working groups also promoted communication, as they incorporated the input of participants who did not usually speak in larger meetings (Renn at al. 1998). In Great Bear Rainforest and Neuss, one of the main aims of government officials was to ensure representation of interests and consensus. The district government in Neuss organized nine mediation large sessions, complemented by smaller meetings with deliberately fewer stakeholders, attempting to fulfill both goals (Fietkau and Weidner 6). In Great Bear Rainforest, government officials promoted consensus by first dividing the region into north and south planning areas during the first planning table and then addressing the whole region during the following planning table, so that local participants can consider their own sub region, at the same time having a say on the whole plan (Cullen 87).

iv. Procedural Rules

Small group discussions were facilitated by creating procedural rules and appointing independent specialists, most commonly, mediators. The development of ground rules enables discussions, which will not be disrupted by procedural disagreements. Basic and rudimentary rules are preferred to detailed and long procedural ones, as the latter can stifle participants' creativity (Weidner and Fietkau 31).

In Aargau, for instance, government officials discussed the rules of discourse and the desired procedure for making final decisions. All participants adopted these rules unanimously and requested each session to be facilitated by an independent moderator, which subsequently guaranteed a fair consensual procedure (Renn et al. 1998). In Neuss the same combination, complemented by officials' willingness to make a compromise, which partially incorporated the demands of a particular group of stakeholders, led to successful policy formulation. The mediator proposed rules to the participants, weeks before the mediation began, to prevent procedural conflicts. Although the process did not end with a consensus, as environmental pressure groups and the Green party did not agree that waste should be incinerated, the district officials managed to partly alleviate Greens' concerns by reducing incineration by 78%, compared to previous years. Therefore, the officials' aim to ensure mediation was successful and resulted in partial compromise in favor of ecological demands, since consensus was impossible. Even though the outcome of the mediation received mixed responses by the participants, none of them agreed that a more transparent and satisfactory decision could have been taken without mediation (Fietkau and Weidner 43). Similarly, in Great Bear Rainforest 86% of the participants stated that the presence of an independent mediator improved the effectiveness of the planning process. (Cullen 114-115).

v. Agenda-setting

Meetings and workshops in small required agendas either set by one or more government level or in cooperation with mediators or stakeholders. Agendas facilitated the interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors, thus allowing participative decisions to translate into policies. Usually, agendas were fixed at the first stages of the participatory arrangements to ensure sufficient information and discussion of a wide range of problems. As the process advanced, they were subsequently adjusted in accordance with the decision makers' needs. In Minnesota, agendas were crafted with the help of the participating citizens and constantly adjusted to match their changing needs for flexibility to articulate their preferences, on one hand, and for structured environment, when they faced difficulties in problem definition and decision-making, on the other. At the beginning of the organization stage, government officials faced the challenge of problem definition, pertaining to agricultural impacts on water quality. State agencies, which were sponsors of the project, demanded to narrow down of the scope of the problem, but they did not reach consensus on which aspects should be left for discussion. Government officials then solved this agenda-setting problem presenting the whole range of environmental impacts and, thus, allowed the participating citizens to articulate their values and concentrate on which environmental aspects they considered important. To ensure that staff presentations were accurate and bias-free, officials held a dry-run in front of all stakeholders. Additionally, they allowed their preliminary agenda to be examined by all participants. The panelists made new suggestions and, subsequently, the content of the agenda was modified. After the panelists were educated, the regional government set the agenda by selecting the state agencies, deemed to have expertise, to present alternative solutions. The panelists chose the solutions according to their preferences and directed the staff in crafting agenda for the following days. When the final decision had to be taken, panelists found it difficult to reach conclusions on specific set on recommendations. The staff prepared several frameworks the panelists could use in formulating the final decision. Panelists approved the frameworks and based their final report on them (Crosby et al. 174-175).

Crafting a flexible agenda together with citizens was outlined as good practice in Minnesota, as it guaranteed transparent decision-making, which served for passing a national bill. Another way of improving transparency and avoiding potential conflicts is through seeking approval of the rules and agendas from participating citizens, as in Neuss and Kromme Rijn. In both cases regional officials crafted agendas, together with independent facilitators, specifying the aims of each workshop, meeting and presentation, and decided which groups took part in them. Their efforts proved beneficial to the centrally involved participants, because they needed guidance. Generally, citizens in Kromme Rijn responded in interviews that they were very satisfied with the openness of the process, the extent to which they had influence, and how government reduced conflicts of interests (Lamers et al. 2010). Participants in Neuss mediation were also satisfied by the transparency of processes and specifically pointed out the mediator's contribution to fair decision-making (Fietkau and Weidner 35).

Mediators also aided with agenda-setting in Great Bear Rainforest and, together with a governmental interagency team, ensured that citizens' recommendations on land use of all planning tables were incorporated in the final planning document. Participants were not consulted on the agenda, which did not have a negative impact on the final decision in this case. The province promoted fairness in educating participants by developing analysis guidelines to ensure that all planning tables had access to the same information. To reach consensus the provincial staff applied a variety of techniques, such as negotiation, consultation, fact-finding, and mediation (Cullen 56). The majority of the participants who were interviewed stated that governmental agenda setting proved beneficial by providing clear rules (71%) and sufficient training (79%), and 93% agreed that the staff lead the process in a "neutral and unbiased manner" (Cullen 114-115). Overall, 93% of the participants, including government officials, stated that the process was a positive experience and 85% perceived it as a success (Cullen 119-126).

III. Combination of Conditions

The combination of multilevel governance and governmental agenda-setting allowed for initiating and improving participatory processes. Specifically, the established communication and coordination between officials from different tiers of government or a specific regulatory framework led to obtaining funding for participatory processes and policy implementation. Once participation was arranged, officials crafted agendas, occasionally with the help of independent facilitators or participating stakeholders, containing procedural rules and aiming to incorporate all concerns and information about a particular environmental problem. Agenda-setting facilitated decision-making by structuring and directing discussions, while coordination between different tiers of government, as well as between them and participating citizens, enabled the results of these discussions to gain wider acceptance by both governmental and non-governmental actors, and then translate into policies.

IV. Monfalcone – a special case

Monfalcone stands out as the only case study, in which the combination of multilevel governance and governmental agenda was present and, yet, policy was not formulated. Unlike in the other cases of energy-related environmental issues , not a private project developer, but the municipality of Monfalcone organized and led the participatory process. Investigating the cause for the lack of success reveals that the project (construction of a regasification terminal) gained the consensus of the citizens, immediately involved in its evaluation, but was abandoned due to the negative results of a referendum. Therefore, the process of decision-making, prior to consultation through the referendum, was not problematic and the combination of multilevel governance and governmental agenda aided consensus within the working groups. Del Furia and Wallace-Jones (1998) identified multiple benefits from the involvement of the municipal government. For example, government officials arranged information campaigns to address citizen concerns, attempted to reach wider public by entering discussions with citizens in favor and against the project, and encouraged small meetings so that participants will express their values and interests. Their efforts were complemented by the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) – a decision-supporting procedure, based on Directive 85/337/EEC, which was enforced by the Italian government in 1990 (Del Furia and Wallace-Jones 2). EIA foresees that information, assessing the potential impacts of a project on the environment, is used to support decisions. In Monfalcone, government officials sought feedback about the quality of EIA from citizens and their input determined the final decision. By following EIA recommendations and, thus, devolving more power to the public than usually in such procedures in Italy, the government ensured transparent two-way communication and significant changes to the project design, which arose from consensus (Del Furia and Jones 26). However, these efforts did not translate in a specific policy, because the majority of citizens voted against the project, which could have been prevented, if the Italian government would have announced the judgment on environmental compatibility prior to the referendum.

Conclusion

This thesis assesses the contribution of citizen participation within environmental governance arrangements. Applying cs/QCA as a new method for analyzing case studies of local environmental problems, this research aims at identifying conditions necessary and sufficient for local and regional decision-making structures to reach successful policy formulation. The findings suggest that environmental policy formulation is dependent upon governmental agenda-setting and multilevel governance. Depending on the case studies, fixed or flexible agendas, combined with legal provisions, implementation of EU directives, and coordination on different government levels, create frameworks for taking environmental decisions, which enable not only inclusion, but also contribution of citizens. These findings are useful for identifying elements of good practices within these cases, which promote the incorporation of different interests and values into consensual decisions.

Environmental problems have a complex nature, as they involve a multiplicity of actors and interests as well as intricate interlinkages of technological, societal, and environmental factors. Therefore, no single way of evaluating the effectiveness of environmental decisions exists. This thesis assesses the quality of environmental governance by focusing on the dynamics of decision-making and procedural legitimacy, based on inclusion and legitimate representation. The main assumption behind this method of evaluation suggests that local participation enhances decision-making processes, because factual knowledge about local conditions is integrated in their solutions, presuming that those who are closest to the problem have developed thorough understanding about it.

The thesis calls for further investigation of environmental governance in terms of the effectiveness of policy implementation. The field of environmental governance can benefit from establishing links between how environmental policies are effectively interpreted and applied to solve complex environmental issues. To make further evaluations of public participation, research can focus on case studies, in which coordination efforts between governmental actors and citizens extend beyond policy formulation to involve citizens in the implementation of the solutions.

Bibliography

Aitken, Mhairi. 2008. "Power and Windpower: Exploring Experiences of Renewable Energy Planning Processes in Scotland." PhD thesis, Robert Gordon University.

Arnstein, Sherry. 1969. "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 26: 216-233.

Beierle, Thomas. 2002. "The Quality of Stakeholder-Based Decisions: Lessons from the Case Study Record." *Risk Analysis* 22: 739-749.

Betsill, Michele, et al. 2006. *International Environmental Politics*. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Blackstock, Kirsty, and Caspian Richards. "Evaluating Stakeholder Involvement in River Basin Planning: A Scottish Case Study." *Water Policy 9* (2007): 493-512.

Bressers, Hans, and Walter Rosenbaum, eds. 2003. *Achieving Sustainable Development. The Challenge of Governance Across Social Scale*. Westport: Praeger.

Capitini et al. 2004. "Competing Perspectives in Resource Protection: The Case of Marine Protected Areas in West Hawai'i." *Society and Natural Resources* 17: 763-778.

Cooke, Bill, and Uma Kothari, eds. 2001. *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books.

Crosby et al. 1986. "Citizen Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Participation." *Public Administration Review* 46(2): 170-178.

Cruikshank, Aaron. 2006. "Assessing Public Participation in Canadian Public Electric Utilities." Master of Public Policy. Simon Fraser University.

Cullen, Andrea. 2006. "The Central Coast Land and Resource Management Plan: An Evaluation of Collaborative Planning in British Columbia." Master of Resource Management Thesis, School of Resource and Environmental Management, Simon Fraser University.

Del Furia, Luca, and Jane Wallace-Jones. 1998. "The Effectivenes of Provisions and Quality of Practices Concerning Public Participation in EIA Procedures in Italy and the UK."

Driessen, Peter, et al. 2012. "Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Shifts in Modes of Environmental Governance – Experience from the Netherlands." *Environmental Policy & Governance* 22(3): 143-160.

Enserink, Bert, and René Monnnikhof. 2003. "Information Management for Public Participation in Co-design Processes: Evaluation of a Dutch Example." *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management* 46(3): 315-344.

Evans, Kristen, and Terry Klinger. 2008. "Obstacles to Bottom-Up Implementation of Marine Ecosystem Management." *Conservation Biology* 22(5): 1135-1143.

Farrington, John. 1998. "Organisatonal Roles in Framer Participatory Research and Extension: Lessons from the Last Decade." *Natural Resource Perspectives* 27.

Fietkau, Hans-Joachim, and Helmut Weidner. 1995. "Environmental Mediation: The Mediation Procedure on the Waste Management Plan in the District of Neuss, North-Rhine Westphalia – Initial Results of the Companion Social Science Research." *Schriften zu Mediationsverfahren im Umweltschutz* 10: 1-70.

Fischer, Anke, and Juliette Young. 2007. "Understanding Mental Constructs of Biodiversity: Implications for Biodiversity Management and Conservation." *Biological Conservation* 136: 271-282.

Fitzhugh, John, and Daniel Dozier. 1996. "Finding the Common Good. Sugarbush Water Withdrawal."

Folke, Carl, et al. 2005. "Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 30: 441-473. EBSCO.

Glasbergen, Peiter, ed. 1998. *Co-operative environmental governance: public-private agreements as a policy strategy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Hempel, Lamont. 1996. *Environmental governance: the global challenge*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Kooiman, Jan, et al, eds. 2005. "The governance perspective." Fish for life: interactive governance for fisheries. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Koontz, Tomas. 2001. "What Do We Know and Need to Know about the Environmental Outcomes of Collaborative Management?" *Public Administration Review* 66: 139-152.

Lamers et al. 2001. "Beyond Dry Feet? Experiences from a Participatory Water-Management Planning Case in The Netherlands." *Ecology and Society* 15(1): 1-14.

Layzer, Judith. 2002. "Citizen Participation and Government Choice in Local Environmental Controversies." *Policy Studies Journal* 30(2): 193-207.

Lemos, Maria, and Arun Agrawal 2006. "Environmental governance." *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* 31: 297-325. EBSCO.

Mason, Michael. 1999. *Environmental Democracy*. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.

Meadowcroft , James. 1999. "Cooperative Management Regimes: Collaborative Problem Solving to Implement Sustainable Development." *International Negotiation* 4: 225-254. EBSCO.

Newig, Jens, and Oliver Fritsch. 2009. "Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi-level and Effective?" *Environmental Policy & Governance* 19(3): 197-214. EBSCO.

Newig, Jens, and Oliver Fritsch. 2012. "More Input – Better Output: Does Citizen Involvement Improve Environmental Governance?" *Environmental Governance: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness*. Eds. Karl Hogl, Eva Kvarda, , Ralph Nordbeck, and Michael Pregernig. Chetelham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Newig, Jens, et al. 2012. "Environmental Consequences of Participatory Governance – A Comparative Meta-Analysis of Case Studies in Environmental Decision-Making."

Newig, Jens, et al. 2008. "The Role of Formalisation, Participation and Context in the Success of Public Involvement Mechanisms in Resource Management." *Systemic Practice and Action Research*. 21: 423–441.

Niedzialkowski, Krzysztof, et al. 2012. "Participation and Protected Areas Governance: the Impact of Changing Influence of Local Authorities on the Conservation of the Bialowieza Primeval Forest, Poland." *Ecology and Society* 17(1). EBSCO.

Paavola, Jouni. 2007. "Institutions and environmental governance: a reconceptualization." *Ecological Economics* 63(1): 93-103.

Plummer, Ryan, et al. 2013. "Adaptive comanagement and its relationship to environmental governance." *Ecology and Society* 18(1): 1-21.

Ragin, Charles. 1989. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Qunatitative Strategies*. California: University of California Press.

Ragin, Charles. 2008. *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Reed, Mark. 2008. "Stakeholder Participation for Environmental Management: A Literature Review." *Biological Conservation* 141: 2417-2431.

Renn at al. 1996. "Procedural and Substantive Fairness in Landfill Siting: A Swiss Case Study."

Rydin, Yvonne, and Mark Pennington. 2000. "Public Participation and Local Environmental Planning: The Collective Action Problem and the Potential of Social Capital." *Local Environment* 5(2): 153-169.

Sultana, Parvin, and Savitri Abeyaskera. 2007. "Effectiveness of Participatory Planning for Community Management of Fisheries in Bangladesh." *Journal of Environmental Management* 86: 201-213.

The World Bank Group. Beyond Economic Growth. Glossary.

Toikka, Archo. 2010. "Exploring the Composition of Communication Networks of Governance - a Case Study on Local Environmental Policy in Helsinki, Finland." *Environmental Policy and Governance* 20: 135-145. EBSCO.

Vonkeman, Gerrit, ed. 2000. *Sustainable Development of European Cities and Regions*. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Print.

Watson, John, and Luke Danielson. 1983. "Environmental Mediation." *Natural resources Lawyer* 15(4): 687-723. JSTOR.

Wesselink Anna, et al. 2011. "Rationales for public participation in environmental policy and governance: practitioners' perspectives." *Environment and Planning* A 43(11): 2688 – 2704.

Appendix

Truth Table

1	caseid	dcmaking	multigove	nonloc	govtagnd	poliform
2	neuss	0	1	1	1	1
3	great	1	1	0	1	1
4	vancouvre	0	1	1	0	0
5	aargau	1	1	1	1	1
6	monfalcone	1	1	0	1	1
7	scotland	0	0	1	0	0
8	minnessotta	0	1	0	1	1
9	kromme	0	1	0	1	1
10	sugarbush	1	1	0	0	1
11	belmont	1	0	0	0	0
12	westhawaii	0	1	0	0	1
13	homestake	0	0	0	0	1
14	spey	1	1	1	1	1
15	ede	0	1	1	0	0
16	wuskwatim	1	0	1	0	1
17	sanjuan	0	1	0	0	1

Cs/QCA Software Output

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
	----------	----------	----------
govtagnd*multigovern	0.636364	0.636364	1.000000
~govtagnd*~nonloc*~dcmaking	0.272727	0.272727	1.000000
~govtagnd*nonloc*~multigovern*dcmaking	0.090909	0.090909	1.000000

solution coverage: 1.000000

solution consistency: 1.000000

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term govtagnd*multigovern: neuss (1,1),

great (1,1), aargau (1,1), monfalcone (1,1),

minnessotta (1,1), kromme (1,1), spey (1,1)

Ethnicity as Uncertainty Reducing Behavior:

Explaining Acquiescence to Ethnic Violence

Benjamin Claeson

Benjamin Claeson is twenty-one years old and attends Bates College. He will attain a Bachelor of Arts with a major in Political Science. He will write his bachelor's thesis examining power-sharing institutions as solutions to ethnic civil wars. After graduation he is applying to masters programs in international affairs. His interests include peacebuilding, human rights, identity politics, and democratic transition.

Abstract

Scholars of ethnic violence have moved beyond the traditional primordialist constructivist debate into a much more thorough discussion exploring why mobilizations to violence along ethnic divisions are successful. This debate has sparked insight into many components that help to explain varied motivations for participation in ethnic violence. However, as of yet there has not been a systematic theory that can explain the prevalence of ethnic violence as opposed to violence based upon other categorizations. This paper argues that ethnic mobilization to violence is successful because ethnic identity offers a means of uncertainty reduction in times of chaos that allows people to create more effective risk assessments in their daily interactions. However, ethnic violence will only occur under conditions where more effective risk assessment tools are sufficiently weakened.

Keywords: Bosnia; Balkans; Civil War; Constructivism; Ethnicity; Instrumentalism; Northern Ireland; United Kingdom; Uncertainty Reduction; Yugoslavia.

Introduction

Prior to the Yugoslavian conflict, the region of Prijedor represented an exemplar of intercultural tolerance and interaction within Bosnia. When the Muslim political party, the SDA, won the elections in 1991, they refrained from taking all leading positions in the government, despite their mandate, because they believed that hoarding power threatened the stability of the government (Oberschall 2000, 985). One Muslim refugee described the situation prior to the conflict:

> In Prijedor there were no conflicts between nationalities. We didn't make the distinctions. My colleague at work was an Orthodox Serb, we worked together. When we were children we went to the Orthodox church or the mosque together… I don't understand. Before there were never any problems between us. We lived together. My sister is married to a Serb, and a brother of my wife is married to a Croat (Oberschall 2000, 986).

On April 29, 1992, a Serb militia of two thousand local Serbs overthrew the government. Muslim political leaders were detained or executed. Muslims who were detained were tortured, starved, and killed, and their houses were looted and burned (Oberschall 2000, 986).

What explains turning against your neighbor in such a brutal fashion? Why are mobilizations to violence along ethnic lines able to overturn years of peaceful coexistence? Until recently, societies in which this violence occurs were denigrated as primitive, and eternally scripted into paths of ancient hatred. However, this theory has been thoroughly debunked. In its place ethnicity scholarship has stoked a lively debate seeking to explain the motivations for engaging in, or tacitly supporting, ethnic violence. This paper will argue that ethnic mobilization to violence is successful because ethnic identity offers a means of uncertainty reduction in times of chaos that allows people to create more effective risk assessments in their daily interactions.[1] However, ethnic violence will only occur under conditions where more effective risk assessment tools are sufficiently weakened.

This paper first examines the three major groups of scholarship that explain why ethnic mobilization is successful. It then explains why the theory of ethnicity as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty holds the most explanatory power. Next, it offers evidence from the conflicts in Bosnia and Northern Ireland to support that claim. It concludes by examining areas for future research.

[1] Risk assessment refers to the process by which people attribute certain levels of risk to their interactions with community members and strangers.

Literature Review

There are three major groups of theories that seek to explain under what conditions ethnicity can be mobilized towards violence. This paper, like Henry Hale's work, will abandon the traditional primordial constructivist theoretical split for two reasons. First, there are very few true primordialists left. Second, constructivism as a blanket term limits the nuance necessary to advance a complete theory of ethnicity. The first group defends an instrumentalist theory. It will be called epiphenomenal individual-action theory. The second and third groups are constructivist theories. The second group is institutionalist theory. The third group is ethnicity as relational theory.

David Laitin and James Fearon argue that there are three standards by which we should adjudicate the explanatory power of an ethnic conflict theory. First, it must explain why inter-ethnic relations are characterized by tension and mistrust while these characteristics are relatively absent from intra-ethnic relations. Second, it must explain why despite greater tensions, peaceful and cooperative relations are more likely in inter-ethnic relations. Finally, it must explain why "in some cases inter-ethnic tensions are occasionally punctuated by spirals of violence, while in other cases tensions exist, but interethnic disputes are more often "cauterized short of war" (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 715). This paper will use these standards to evaluate theories of ethnicity.

Epiphenomenal Individual-Action Theories

Epiphenomenal individual-action theorists argue that there is not an inherent quality to ethnicity that explains why it is mobilized. These scholars hold that ethnicity is just a category used to shroud other motivations. Within this group there is a split between scholars who advocate that these mobilizations occur as result of elite interests and those who argue they occur as a result of localized individual interests.

Elite-based epiphenomenalists argue that 'ethnic entrepreneurs' invoke ethnicity to obscure the motivations behind their violence. Grievance based upon what is considered as an immutable characteristic is used to justify certain actions that may have separate motivations. Paul Brass argues that identities are shaped by elites who are competing with other elites for economic and political power. This competition arises when elites face either internal or external threats to their power bases (Brass 1996, 87-90). Lee Ann Fujii, examining the Rwandan case, argues that the conflict can be explained at least in part by elite competition within the Hutu community. For Fujii, these ethnic divisions are not real: rather, ethnicity only becomes salient when elites mobilize the population around it. For example, Fuji argues that attempts at reconciliation were hampered by radical actors faking Tutsi attacks to encourage identity homogenization (Fujii 2009, 127). Kanchan Chandra contends that the reason why these ethnicities are mobilized is that they are highly visible and relatively unchangeable, which allows elites to exclude certain communities from the spoils, and assists them in preventing cooperation between rival political factions (Hale 2008, 29). However, this argument fails to explain why mobilizations can occur when ethnic differences are not visibly distinguishable.

V.P Gagnon argues that elites have incentives to mobilize along ethnic lines when they face challenges from reformist leaders. They use ethnicity to distract attention from economic or political failures that reformists are calling attention to (Gagnon 2005, 132). For example, in Serbia during the late eighties, poor economic performances gave rise to reformist politicians. In response Milosevic began painting Serbs in Kosovo as threatened by Albanian nationalism (Gagnon 2005, 132). Gagnon claims that there has to be some past political participation along ethnic lines that gives legitimacy to ethnic rhetoric (Gagnon 2005, 132). However, that argument and these scholars are limited in their explanations of why publics participate in this elite rhetoric. A precondition of past political participation along ethnic lines is not enough to explain why it is successful in the present.

Gagnon makes some attempt to identify why people might opt in. He suggests it is helpful to have control over information. Milosevic, for example, had an iron grip on the press in Serbia and used it to assimilate all Croatians with the fascist and terrorist Ustashi organization. However, more analysis would be needed about the level of information control necessary to lead to this acquiescence. Moreover, it is unclear why people participated in this rhetoric after years of peaceful coexistence. Gagnon answers this question by arguing that elites use thugs to create cycles of tit-for tat-violence and generate a fear among their domestic base, which forces that base to support hardline elites who can protect them (Gagnon 2005, 132). However, he fails to explain under what conditions that fear becomes operational for elites seeking to mobilize along ethnic divisions. It is unreasonable to suggest that if a gang war were to begin in Sweden, the broad majority of the public would immediately run to one gang or the other for protection. As a result it seems that there is something about ethnicity that causes people to participate in mobilizations to violence. Gagnon's theory denies this and is, as a result, insufficient.

Local actor epiphenomenalists argue that individual motivations can explain why publics opt into elite mobilizations. Stathis Kalyvas argues that most violence is localized (Kalyvas 2005, 475-6). Using a broad anthology of violence during civil wars, he argues that local citizens use the guise of war to carry out personal vendettas or to gain 'booty'. Kalyvas argues that the concept of group violence implies the interchangeability of individual persons within those groups. He argues that this limits individual agency that is most often the salient explanatory factor in their decision to participate in violence. For example, he cites the Liberal Conservative clash in Colombia, stating that more often than not, the split between liberals and conservatives came out of deep seeded family feuds rather than an ingrained allegiance (Kalyvas 2005, 480-2). These back stage feuds are then played out on the front stage of ethnic conflict.

Kalyvas' analysis is problematic in a few areas. First, he provides no identification of which conditions lead people to be violent, simply suggesting that opportunity and greed are enough. This may explain some portions of thug violence, but to suggest that broad populations are susceptible to this tract needs more justification. His selected stories are not enough to prove that claim. They therefore hit the same block that Gagnon hits, about explaining why the fear caused by initial violent thugs causes people to opt into a system of ethnic violence. Second, assuming that not all violence is local, he does not explain why people who do not participate in ethnic violence still opt into hardline ethnic rhetoric. Kalyvas is correct to point out that not all violence is centered around a master cleavage of ethnicity and that there are local variations of violence. However, it is possible that this local violence hardens identities that allows for group-based violence to occur. He, like other epiphenomenal scholars, is unable to explain this outcome.

Institutionalists

Institutional theorists advocate that ethnic violence can be explained by the breakdown of institutions, or weak institutions. Cindy Crawford and Daniel Posner both advocate that institutions create the conditions whereby people begin to opt into ethnic identities. Crawford identifies colonial discourses that incentivized the choice of ethnic identities by attaching resource allocation to those identities (Crawford 1998, 18). In this way, people believe that opting into those identities increases their life chances. Conversely, this causes feelings of discrimination due to membership in an ascribed identity. For Crawford a history of this institutionalized identity formation is a necessary precondition for violence to occur along ethnic lines (Crawford 1998, 18). Crawford argues that where institutions are weak there are incentives and opportunities for elites to exploit those cleavages for their own benefit. This exploitation takes the form of patronage being doled out along those ethnic divisions (Crawford 1998, 25). Neil DeVotta argues that when those systems of preferential treatment occur the institutions decay through a process of ethnic outbidding. Institutional decay refers to the process whereby the rules of the game become unfair as they are modified in order to play the ethnic outbidding game. Ethnic outbidding defines the situation where elites now have incentives to maintain the hard line with regards to their relations to the other ethnic community, because if they do not then a competing party will outbid them by portraying them as abandoning their own ethnic community. This becomes salient because the institutional decay has instilled an expectation in each community that resources will be doled out along ethnic lines. So, for example, in Sri Lanka the SLFP and UNP, the two Sinhalese parties, both portrayed the other as betraying the Sinhalese community when they advocated reconciliation with the Tamils (DeVotta 2005, 140-3). As a result of this process, the minority community has no meaningful expectation that the current system gives them a chance of victory and they are likely to mobilize (DeVotta 2005, 140-3). What these theories do not explain is why these identities are not abandoned on the brink of violence, particularly by the dominant party. It is reasonable to suggest that people might opt into ethnic identities to ensure increased life chances, but when those mobilizations threaten their lives one would expect them to abandon those identities. As Fujii notes at the outset of her book, people are better of under conditions of peace than violence (Fujii 2009, 3). This premise will not be true for everyone as there are wartime gains to be made by 'war entrepreneurs'. However, for the general populace you would expect general conditions of life to decline in times of war. Given this premise, institutionalist theories fail to explain mobilizations to violence along ethnic lines.

Crawford begins to answer this through her concept of bandwagoning. She argues that elites use vivid acts of public violence to increase emotions and fear (Crawford 2005, 29). At the point where a few people opt into ethnic violence because of that fear, three things occur. First there are reduced social costs to joining these movements. This means that people who want to opt into this violence to assuage local vendettas feel more comfortable doing so. Second, there are more social costs to not joining as there is now an increased expectation that you should join to 'protect your community'. Finally, the presence of ethnic violence from one community reduces the costs and raises the incentives for excluded ethnic communities to also mobilize as that becomes a rational choice to increase life chances (Crawford 2005, 25, 28). Critically, the reason why ethnic mobilization creates bandwagoning but class mobilization does not is that ethnicity is exclusive. As a result of this exclusivity she argues that people feel compelled to opt into these categories because there is no way to enter the other community (Crawford 2005, 29).

While this theory is compelling in explaining the group dynamics that can lead to violence escalating it suffers from two deficiencies. First, as Posner points out, there are many cases where ethnic identities are highly fluid and, thus, not exclusive (Posner 2005, 17). However, particularly in times of conflict they may seem exclusive. Second, and more importantly, this theory does not explain why the dominant group opts into this rhetoric beyond a material benefit to itself. A Sinhalese person is likely to do fairly well in elections without excluding the Tamils. When that exclusion begins to increase violence, one's life chances would be better served by abandoning those policies and not risking one's physical safety. Why then do dominant groups still participate in this violence? Crawford's theory is reliant upon a critical mass of that community participating for her logic to take effect. Henry Hale begins to answer this dilemma in his ethnicity as relational theory.

Ethnicity as relational

Relational scholars advocate that ethnicity is about reducing uncertainty in our social interactions. These scholars argue that two basic conditions cause people to utilize ethnicity. First, the world is unknowable and consists of infinitely complex possibilities of social arrangements. Second, the brain is imperfect at processing this complexity. As a result, using psychological studies, Hale argues that that ethnicity is a way of grouping highly complex social arrangements to make sense of the world. George Meade argues that we define ourselves based upon our relation to our community (Meade 1934, 200-2). Michael Hogg and Barry Mullins concur:

> People have a fundamental need to feel certain about the world and their place within it--subjective certainty renders existence meaningful and thus gives one confidence about how to behave, and what to expect from the physical and social environment within which one finds oneself (Hogg and Mullins 1999, 253-5).

When we feel uncertainty we feel that we no longer have control over our lives. As a result uncertainty reduction becomes a prerequisite to facilitate purposeful interaction. Hogg and Mullins reproduced Henri Tajfel's 1982 experiment and found that contrary to popular interpretations, people do not opt into groups on the basis of relative self-esteem but rather on the basis of uncertainty reduction. Indeed, self-esteem only came into play as it related to uncertainty reduction (Hogg and Mullins 1999, 251). As a result ethnicity becomes a simplifier, a tool to reduce this complexity by creating rough predictions about the interactions we have with other individuals and groups (Hale 2008, 34-5). It contains basic information that allows people to fill in blanks of knowledge in regards to strangers they interact with. The question becomes, why does ethnicity as a grouping mechanism hold more informational content capable of reducing uncertainty than other types of groups?

Hale argues that there are three metrics by which groups can be evaluated to determine their 'thickness', or relevance and meaning to people. The first metric is intrinsic importance, or when life chances are directly affected by the grouping distinction. For example, having a common language significantly reduces transaction costs. The second metric is imposed importance. This importance becomes salient when a particular grouping distinction is tied to material allocation of resources (Hale 2008, 34-7). For example, as Posner argues, the British colonial administration in Zambia provided resources to certain tribal chiefdoms that allowed them to dole out patronage in a way that gave imposed importance to those identities (Posner 2005, 34). The final metric is usefulness as a rule of thumb. This becomes important when an easily perceptible social category frequently coincides with less perceptible points of reference that are independently important (Hale 2008, 37). For example the accent of a Northern Irishman can allow you to reasonably infer the class of the person and which neighborhoods within a city they are likely to live in. The more of these metrics a grouping distinction meets, the more information is available to create rough predictions.

For relational theorists the activation of a rule of thumb is dependent on the accessibility of the category and how it fits with observed social reality. The grouping mechanism is 'thickest' when it is both chronically and situationally accessible. An identity is chronically accessible if people can access it in their memories. So, for example, a Croat who has been told their entire life that a Croatian is different from a Serb is more likely to view their interactions along this distinction. An identity is situationally accessible if it is immediately available through environmental cues. For example, Putin flooding the media with images portraying Ukrainians as fascists, and distinct from Russians, makes it more likely that Russians will view interactions between Russians and Ukrainians along this distinction. However, as has been discussed above, while these may be preconditions, they are not sufficient to explain the rule of thumb being activated. The group must also be evaluated on its ability to fit. The category has to make sense of the situation by at least representing distinctions between people somewhat accurately. However, Hale notes that people frequently use categories that are far from perfectly accurate (Hale 2008, 39).

Ethnicity has four factors that account for its particular prevalence as a grouping mechanism that can reduce uncertainty. First, it has connotations of a common fate and origin. Ethnic symbols that are tied to myths of common origin make ethnicity an accessible grouping. Ethnic symbols like flags and myth-bearing rhetoric that are documented in historical tradition make it both situationally and chronically accessible. These appeals to common origin strengthen appeals to common future fates. However, as discussed earlier, this clearly is not a sufficient condition to explain ethnicity being so prevalent (Hale 2008, 39).

Second, ethnicity as a grouping can limit barriers to communication. This can occur on the basic level of language, or on a more abstract cultural level. As a result, ethnicity simplifies social interactions, making it a useful tool to reduce uncertainty. Laitin and Fearon build on this particular facet of ethnicity. They argue that ethnicities are usually marked by highly developed systems of social interaction. This allows information to be transmitted rapidly and cheaply. This feature means that not only does the ethnicity itself allow for a crude expectation of behavior from another individual, but it also allows people from within that ethnicity to rapidly assess each other based upon quickly attainable histories of that person's behavior. That information is not available from the other ethnic group, leading to more trust and less uncertainty within the particular ethnicity (Laitin and Fearon, 1996, 718-19).

Third, ethnicity is often tied to physical differences that are both easily identifiable and hard to change. For example, it would be very difficult for a Hispanic gang member to pass as a Black gang member. However, Hale argues that it is often used even in highly imperfect situations where ethnicity is not physically distinguishable (Hale 2008, 41-3).

Finally ethnicity often fits, or makes sense to people, because of its overlap with other salient identities. So for example, because it tends to be territorially based it can often coincide with relative economic differences. Or more simply, its territory-based nature ties the ethnicity to feelings of home (Hale 2008, 42-5). These factors create expectations that allow people to predict the behavior of others within their group, and outsiders towards them. Ethnicity is the simplifier that conveys this information in a way that is both easy to understand and quickly accessible. Other categorizations contain these characteristics, but ethnicity is unique in the depth that it holds.

Hale argues that the initial individual choice of an ethnic group occurs on the subconscious pre-rational level which then allows the material and security benefit-based choices to occur on the ethnic group level (Hale 2008, 53-4). He argues we have ingrained mental mechanisms that convert uncertainty into risk by creating social categories that "imply probabilities as to how the actions of others are likely to affect" us. Hale seems to suggest that choice made on the subconscious level is still made based upon a rational-choice process given the human need to reduce uncertainty (Hale 2008, 48). Moreover, once people are grouped into these ethnic communities, Hale, like Posner, advocates that ethnic politics are about material and other interests (Hale 2008, 33). Hales' theory should increase its potency under conditions of violence, where uncertainty becomes magnified. Moreover, under these conditions, both Crawford and Gagnon's theories' explanatory power is also more convincing, lending support to the analysis of social pressures that powers their arguments. For Crawford's bandwagoning theory, this uncertainty reducing behavior would explain initial acceptance of violence. Uncertainty reducing behavior both limits the barriers to entering violence and increases the harms to standing against it. This allows the critical mass of people participating in violence to accumulate. This behavior also explains the fear that, as Gagnon demonstrates, leads people to opt into ethnic hardline groups.

Uncertainty as a Driver of Violence

Violence increases uncertainty in social interactions, thereby increasing the likelihood that people will opt into a hardline ethnic identity. The inability to predict people's behaviors becomes much more important when that unpredictability is tied to physical safety. This is particularly true when violence is exerted by elites along communal lines and individual actions do not affect the likelihood of being targeted by violence. So, for example, Protestants in Northern Ireland were often targeted indiscriminately on the basis of their religious identity rather than any action they took against the Irish Republican Army. As a result, all of the factors outlined by Hale, that push people towards ethnicity, become magnified.

That same impetus to opt into ethnic identities in times of chaos makes it much more likely that moderate leaders will lose to hardliners. DeVotta begins to outline this process through his argument of ethnic outbidding. He argues that when institutions fail to discourage politicians who appeal exclusively to their ethnic community, those politicians have incentives to compete with their rival parties on the basis of serving their ethnic community. This patronage-based system creates an expectation and, in turn, comes to define the rules of the game (DeVotta 2005, 141). As a result, moderate parties who seek to reconcile with parties from the other ethnic community are targeted with campaigns that question their loyalty to the ethnic community. Due to the expectations that the patronage-based system has created, moderating parties tend to lose out. This is not because people feel that their ethnicity is being targeted, but rather because they think they will lose ground materially (DeVotta 2005, 142). However, given that DeVotta agrees that institutions are not determinative of behavior, there needs to be more analysis explaining the informal conditions that create incentives for formal institutions to violently marginalize a group.

The desire to reduce uncertainty makes it difficult for moderate reconciliatory actors to achieve success. In cases where ethnic conflict exists, the policies of moderate actors are likely to increase uncertainty. These policies indeed encourage reconciliation with, and relative trust of, the other group. Moderate policies that increase interaction without protective security forces, and place members from the other groups in positions of power increase the uncertainty people feel in their daily lives. As a result, people are much less likely to support these policies.

This does not mean that uncertainty reduction is a trump card that will always win out and determine the outcome. First, there are ways to decrease expected uncertainties in the aftermath of conflict with reconciliatory policies (e.g neutral occupancy forces). Second, if the conflict creates a certainty of violence in the immediate surrounding, individuals are more likely to risk uncertainty. However, as Hale notes, uncertainty reduction is often a prerequisite for achieving other goals (Hale 2008, 465). Increased feelings of uncertainty are likely to prevent trust in a peace process even if the current conflict poses a certain threat to their physical safety.

This logic empowers elite-based analyses as it explains acquiescence to the grotesque public acts of violence that Gagnon describes. These acts, which encourage tit-for-tat violence, increase uncertainties involved in reconciliation, as there is an increased fear of violence from the other group (Gagnon 2005, 135). That means that those acts serve to increase the impetus towards uncertainty reducing behavior.

However, in order for this theory to be operational, we need to differentiate how it interacts with people operating with different motivations. Fujii is correct to note that there are a variety of different actors that represent varied motivations and actions. For the purposes of this paper we will examine the perpetrators and the joiners. First, as both Fujii and Kalyvas argue, there are those actors who use the central elites' ethnic cleavage as a script that legitimizes their local vendettas or greed-based violence. We will call these perpetrators (Kalyvas 2005, 481; Fujii 2009, 116). Critically, that script is only legitimate because people opt into those master scripts as an uncertainty reducing behavior. If people did not at least tacitly accept the increased risks associated with interacting with the other ethnic community then the actions of these opportunistic perpetrators would be subject to the same scrutiny they would otherwise face. Under these conditions, the first part of Crawford's bandwagoning argument becomes salient. As populations see their community members participating in the violence they feel more comfortable acting out their own vendettas.

However, as Straus notes, in many instances the vast majority of people do not act out this violence. For example, in a one-hundred-person militia in Rwanda, only five people actually committed the violence (Straus 2006, 74). Uncertainty reduction also explains why these joiners choose to acquiesce to violent actions. This decision occurs on two levels. First, for all the reasons discussed above, it is easier to tacitly accept the communally antagonizing rhetoric and limit your interactions with the other community. As a result, the violent members of your community are a safer bet than increasing interactions with the other community. Second, once you have begun participating in that rhetoric it becomes harder to stand against it. Fujii highlights examples where Hutus targeted other Hutus as evidence of ethnicity having no importance. There are two problems with this. First, while ethnicity may not motivate violence it does motivate acceptance of violence. Second, and relatedly, that violence is often used as a tool by elites to increase the risk of opting out of a hardline ethnic identity. Speaking out against the violent leaders of the community increases the risk of facing retribution. It is then unlikely this retaliation would be met with rebuke from other community members. First it would require challenging the entire uncertainty-reducing paradigm that people are clinging to. Second, the would-be rebuker increases the risk to their own safety. Ethnicity as a means of uncertainty reduction only works if there is a meaningful expectation of safe interactions within one's own ethnic community. Standing out against thugs within one's community changes that and limits the ability to use ethnicity to create effective risk assessments. Intra-ethnic policing should not be considered sufficient to explain why joiners acquiesce, however in conjunction with a base desire to reduce uncertainty it holds much more explanatory power.

Finally, we then must address Laitin and Fearon's standards by explaining why "in some cases inter-ethnic tensions are occasionally punctuated by spirals of violence, while in other cases tensions exist, but interethnic disputes are more often "cauterized" short of war" (Laitn and Fearon 1996, 715). If institutions that cross ethnic divisions can offer a meaningful expectation of safety, then they can stand in for ethnicity as an uncertainty reducing mechanism. Ethnicity is not a perfect mechanism for reducing uncertainty, and it has to compete against other mechanisms like adhering to norms of law. When those norms create better risk assessments people will drop ethnicity. This should explain why ethnic violence is a relatively unlikely scenario globally.

Epiphenomalist scholars, conversely, argue that ethnicity is much more fluid. Fujii cites examples where a man changed from Hutu to Tutsi upon acquiring more cows, or when Tutsis were able to buy Hutu's identification cards during the conflict. This fluidity would seem to undermine uncertainty-reducing arguments because it creates confusions in social interactions thereby increasing uncertainty. However, Fujii also argues that these transitions are contingent upon communal acceptance of the identity change. As a result, during periods of conflict, communal acceptance of identity change, and consequential fluidity, could decrease (Fujii 2009, 115-17).

During initial periods of violence fluidity is likely to decrease. The uncertainty reducing behavior discussed above is likely to occur most prominently in that period during the immediate onset of violence, where some action (e.g the assassination of President Habyarimana in Rwanda in 1994) has created a political opportunity due to chaos. In these periods, even if publics do not believe in communally antagonizing rhetoric, that rhetoric still creates social pressures not to accept someone from the other group. This is because in the aftermath of this initial chaos people grasp for explanations for that violence and, therefore, are more likely to accept these explanations than in other conditions. Moreover, under conditions where elites have control over information and can portray a serious threat to the community, a moratorium on identity changes can reduce uncertainty and allow individuals to create better risk calculations. Given that people are risk averse in these situations it is likely that the level of information control does not need to be that high. It is easier to superficially accept elite rhetoric just in case the member of the opposite community will target you. So, for example, throughout the Croatian conflict, Serb leaders like Ratko Mladic constantly referenced the encroaching threat of the Ustashi Croats. Even if the average Serb did not believe that his neighbors are committing acts of violence, it is still a risk to increase interactions with that community given the presence of some hardline Croats who may escalate violence.

Finally, even in cases where there is fluidity, ethnicity may still be utilized as an imperfect tool. Cases of transition are likely to occur on the margins; as a result ethnicity still contains value as a simplifying tool. People can recognize the imperfection of using it in every case and still participate in ethnic identification in order to create more effective risk assessment writ large.

Evidence

There are a few indicators that help demonstrating that the uncertainty reduction argument explains why violent mobilizations along ethnic divisions are successful. First, whether people respond to stress and chaos by opting into uncertainty reducing behaviors. Second, there should at least be a perception that violence is being exerted along communal lines. Alternatively, if violence targets individual cross-cutting attributes, then resorting to group identities would not be effective in calculating risk. Third, we should see communities homogenizing because violence increases uncertainties in contexts of mixed interactions. If uncertainty reduction explains why people acquiesce to ethnic violence, then we would expect that same impetus to also lead to efforts to reduce those uncertainties in their daily lives. Finally, we should see repression of moderate actors during cycles of tit-for-tat violence. Tit-for-tat communal violence should dramatically increase the uncertainties that people feel during conflict. As a result moderate actors should lose out to hardliners, because their policies are more likely to increase those uncertainties.

There are two disclaimers to note. First, this paper will draw examples from two varied conflicts. While this methodology has its flaws, it is both necessary due to limited evidence sources and has distinctive benefits since it provides a level of generalizability. The cases selected, Northern Ireland and Bosnia, each provide valuable insights into this question. Bosnia represents an interesting case in which high levels of communal interaction disintegrated into communal violence. Northern Ireland represents a notable case where there are significant amounts of data to test this hypothesis. Second, while this is by no means conclusive and a more thorough case-study-based analysis would be useful, this evidence is still suggestive of uncertainty reduction theory. In order to prove this theory one would need to conduct a psychoanalytic assessment of actors within a conflict. This paper will provide corroboration of that argument by analyzing the indicators that are available.

Responding to Stress through Uncertainty Reduction

Erikson argues that we respond to situations of stress by trying to reduce uncertainties thereby limiting the lack of control we have over our lives. In order to do this we create these identities as social radars to traverse uncertain conditions. Under that assumption, identities are situational, and tend to thicken under conditions of stress (Erikson 1968, 22-4). That drive to reduce uncertainty comes out of an evolutionary drive to preserve life (Van der Dennen 1986, 47). Hogg and Mullin concur and argue that under conditions of massive upheaval, like violence, people revert to identity as a means of uncertainty reduction to create better risk calculations. During these episodes the normal metrics by which we judge those around us become useless and we are forced to create new, or rely more heavily upon old, generalizing metrics. These studies suggest that under conditions of violence people revert to stricter identities (Hogg and Mullins 1999, 266-7). This is because violence increases the basic reason why people opt into and participate in identities in the first place: uncertainty.

Perceptions of Communal Violence

In order for the logic of people opting into ethnicities as an uncertainty reducing behavior to hold relevance, the violence within those communities must be perceptually targeted along communal divisions. Moreover, it should consequently result in increase homogenization of ethnic communities. If violence were targeted on the basis of individual actions then people would not need ethnicity to create better risk assessments as they could judge their relations on the basis of their individualized actions. However, it is critical to note that not all of the violence has to be targeted along communal lines. Frank Wright, in his theory of representative violence, advocates that the effect is the same even if a very small portion of the violence is 'representative'. When "[e]veryone might be a target for reprisal for something done in their name and without their approval", a generalized danger is created and an increase in uncertainty arises, because even if there are only a few perpetrators targeting violence along communal lines, their violence could be targeted at anyone (Wright 1988, 11).

Throughout the Northern Irish conflict there are a number periods in the conflict in which the conflict followed a communal tit for tat pattern. Dillon and Lehane highlight one period in particular, September to October 1972, where Protestants killed two Catholics for every Protestant killed (Dillon and Lehane 1973, 118-139). Republicans were less retaliatory towards Protestants, but followed the same model, particularly in the period surrounding the 1972 truce. Dillon and Lehane note that the retaliatory targets were chosen at random and represented useful symbolic reprisals (Dillon and Lehane 1973, 75-90). Hayes and McAllister echo this by observing that the Provisional IRA's campaign in the early to mid-seventies was largely based upon indiscriminate bombing campaigns (Hayes and McAllister 2002, 903). This does not mean that the motivation behind this violence was ethnically based. The violence was often highly strategic. Rather, it suggests that the perception was that it was being targeted along religious lines.

Hayes and McAllister analysis of the Northern Irish violence provides further compelling evidence to suggest that there was a perception that at least some of this violence was targeted along communal rather than individual lines. By 1998, one in seven people had been a direct victim of a violent incident. During that same time frame one in five had a member of their family injured or killed. Strikingly, over half of the polled citizens had personally known at least one person who had been killed in the conflict. Moreover, by 1998 a quarter had been caught in an explosion and a quarter had been caught in a riot. Only two percent of republican violence was targeted against loyalists and only four percent of loyalist violence was targeted against nationalists (Hayes and McAllister 2002, 906-7). This widespread and relatively indiscriminate violence suggests that it was not targeted on the basis of individual attributes.

The conflict in Bosnia followed a similar pattern. Ivana Maček conducted an ethnographic analysis of the conflict within Sarajevo. One woman described the inability to affect your fate: " Everything is out of your hands, you are completely helpless, someone else decides over your life and death" (Maček 2009, 58). This sentiment is echoed in numerous interviews in which people describe the targeting of their communities along ethnic lines and even the creation of strong communal identities where they had not been before (Maček 2009, 256). Moreover, blame was attributed to Serbs or Muslims as a whole rather than individuals (Maček 2009, 221-3). This is suggestive of violence targeting indiscriminately along communal lines rather than based upon individual attributes. Importantly, this argument does not mean that the conflict is ethnically motivated but rather there is at least the perception that it is targeted along those divisions. This violence should lead to increased communal homogeneity as violence creates an increased uncertainty in social interactions.

Communal Segregation

Uncertainties between communities in Northern Ireland have led to communal segregation, along residential and personal lines. Prior to the start of the conflict, 69 % of Protestants and 56 % of Catholics lived in streets where their community was the majority. By 1972 those proportions had increased to 99 % of Protestants and 75 % of Catholics (Wright 1988, 205). This segregation of course diffuses to other areas of social interaction, including which shops you patronize and which football clubs you support. This pattern is typified by the Protestant Shankill community and the Catholic Falls Road community in Belfast, where there is very little interaction with the other (Abrams, Hogg, and Marques 2004, 269). This pattern also exists within personal interactions, approximately 75 % of Catholics stated that all or most of their personal interactions occurred within their community. Moreover when, for example, a Protestant married a Catholic, they were forced to cut all ties with their Protestant community (Abrams, Hogg, and Marques 2004, 270). These patterns indicate a process whereby the inability to predict behavior from the opposite community increased due to onsets violence and led to people opting into stronger ethnic identities.

The process of nationalism within Bosnia is particularly interesting given its history of cross-cutting cleavages. However, as violence along communal lines increased, people began to opt into nationalist identities. An interview with a Sarajevo refugee in Sweden suggests that these episodes of violence began to shift identities towards communal definitions. She explains that her neighbors in Dobrijna began to classify her based upon her communal identity, and classified her as the enemy due to her Serb heritage (Maček 2009, 108). This effect was also seen amongst familial relationships. After a fatwa issued by the head of the Muslim community in Sarajevo, mixed marriages were described as unnatural and their children as rotten eggs. Therefore, mixed marriages became perceived as anomalies rather than common practice. Moreover many preexisting mixed marriages fell apart as social pressures to homogenize communities increased. As one Muslim from Sarajevo stated, "A mixed marriage in this place can now exist only if one absolutely does not care [about his/her nationality]. This is very hard to find nowadays, but that is understandable, as so many people have been killed" (Maček 2009, 115-17). One Muslim family had four of their friends and family killed by Croats and refused to let their daughter date a Croat, because they feared the same thing would happen again (Maček 2009, 118).

Sarajevo is known for its intercultural tolerance even during the war: however, even that tolerance began to disintegrate. Some older neighborhoods with mixed nationalities maintained their bonds throughout the war (Maček 2009, 123). However, Tone Bringa's documentary, *We Are All Neighbors*, highlights how strong friendships started to disintegrate as violence escalated (Bringa 1993). Even in Sarajevo, as rumors of neighbors killing neighbors in other areas of Bosnia increased, suspicion of neighbors from other nationalities also increased:

> In an atmosphere where the media were almost exclusively pounding into peoples heads the message of betrayal between neighbors on national grounds, and where people themselves started to repeat this in order to somehow make sense of what was going on around them, it was hard to remember and behave in accordance with the knowledge that many neighbors helped each other and saved each other's lives in similar situations (Maček 2009, 133).

This pattern also manifested itself in much more subtle actions. For example, people began to seek out resources from organizations tied to their national identity (Maček 2009, 153). Such episodes are suggestive of a trend towards limiting interactions with people from different communities due to uncertainty of how they would interact with you. One woman described this process of identity change, "There, I never knew I was a Muslim, but now I know that I am something different [from the Serbs] because somebody is slaughtering me" (Maček 2009, 256). Strict identities thus became a useful tool for people to use in order to calculate risks associated with interacting with another person.

This same pattern also was reflected in formal institutions. The homogenization of military units is particularly useful as an example of this. As communal distrust increased, military groups tended to separate into exclusive nationalist units (Maček 2009, 203). One man, Emir, switched into a exclusively Serb unit in order to defend himself, "if you had a Serb with you, you knew for sure who they were" (Maček 2009, 264). Indeed, people began to opt into ethnic communities as a way of reducing uncertainty created by communally targeted violence. However, in order for this pattern to be consistent with uncertainty reduction theory, we should see that these periods of uncertainty-increasing violence would experience a corresponding acquiescence to hardliners and a decrease in support for moderates.

Failure of Moderation

If this theory is correct, both decreased support for moderate actors and increased support for hardline actors during periods where uncertainty increases should be observable. While this is not an indicator unique to the uncertainty reduction theory, it is, in conjunction with the abovementioned evidence, suggestive of that end.

Patterns of public support within Northern Ireland demonstrate that increased uncertainty led to increased support for hardline groups. Compiling data from the Loyalty Survey (1968), the Irish Social Mobility Survey (1973), and the Social Attitudes Survey (1978), Hayes and McAllister found interesting trends in public support for the use of violence. It is of course difficult to measure support for violence, given its sensitive nature. However, these surveys were conducted using relatively neutral language. In 1968, just prior to the onslaught of what has been labeled The Troubles, roughly half of the Protestant community agreed with the use of violence for political goals. At that time only 13 % of Catholics felt the same way. However, in 1973, 25 % of Catholics believed violence was a legitimate way to achieve goals. Only 16 % of Protestants felt the same way. This is highly significant given the dynamics of violence during the early years of The Troubles. Catholics were two and a half times more likely to experience intimidation, twice as likely to be a victim of a violent incident, and one and a half time more likely to know someone who had been killed or injured (Hayes and Mcallister 2002, 11-12). These events included, notably, Bloody Sunday and the practice of internment. During periods where uncertainties were high, hardline groups thus received increased support.

Within Bosnia, the uncertainties discussed above made it difficult for moderate parties to achieve electoral success. Beginning in the early 1990s, the Muslim nationalist party, the SDA, began to dominate elections (Maček 2009, 160). They capitalized on those uncertainties by institutionalizing preferential treatment for members of their own national community. Muslim soldiers killed in battle got a distinct classification as Sehit (martyr), which ensured them special commemoration (Maček 2009, 170-1). Moreover, the SDA began changing street names from Serb and Croat names to Muslim names. These symbolic preferences are indicative of a political climate in which nationalism was prioritized over cross-communal interaction. That sentiment was codified in new language and education policies where 'Bosnian' was Islamized and Islam was taught in public schools (Maček 2009,171-3, 176). Hardline parties were able to capitalize on uncertainties in communal interaction by offering policies that solidified their national communities.

Serb groups within Bosnia followed a similar policy. The head of the SDS, Karadzic, justified the radicalization of the SDS as necessary to avoid being outflanked by other parties who could appeal to the increasing nationalism within Serbian Bosnians. Under that ethos the SDS pressured the Serb people into boycotting the Bosnian independence election (Caspersen 2010, 88). Critically this does not mean that this radicalization was present within the Serb community; rather it suggests that it was difficult to advocate for moderate policies given the rhetoric of appeals to increased uncertainty under those policies. The SDS consistently justified their policies through the uncertainty of conditions under a Bosnian dominated government: "the Serb nation does not want to live in an independent state where they will be outvoted" (Caspersen 2010, 90). That rhetoric was given increased salience due to the stories of Serbs being killed by Bosnians and Croats throughout the country. This suggests that Serb leaders were appealing to the fear of uncertainty under a Bosnian government.

These examples are illustrative of a trend towards uncertainty reducing behaviors during conflicts. Nationalist groups were able to beat out non-ethnic groups by offering a community and policies that would affirm that community, in which people could feel secure in their interactions. Within the context of violent episodes of thug-based violence, in which people felt as if they had no control over their lives, these hardline communities allowed them some ability to increase control by creating more efficient risk calculations. They believe they are less likely to be targeted by someone who is so closely tied to them, as a result they support policies which encourage the stability of those communities.

Conclusion

In Prijedor it is unlikely that the local Serbs who acquiesced to violence preferred the leaders and local actors who perpetuated them. But it is equally important not to treat this acquiescence as a result of being duped by elites or motivated solely by material self-interest. Rather, this paper has suggested that people acquiesce to hardline leaders in an effort to reduce the uncertainty in their everyday lives. However, it is important to conduct a more rigorous investigation into the claims made above. The evidence presented, while circumstantially compelling, is by no means conclusive. Ethnographies should be conducted which specifically target the veracity of the arguments presented here. There is good work being done by psychologists in post-conflict Croatia and Bosnia. A joint study with these groups would be fruitful in understanding why we choose ethnicity. If, as Hale argues, this decision occurs at the pre-rational level, then a joint psychological study will be imperative. Critically, in order to prove that uncertainty reduction is a substantial motivator for people opting into ethnic violence, we do not have to prove that all people opt into it for that reason. Kalyvas provides compelling evidence that some people opt into it on the basis of benefit or vendetta. However, in order to create a more complete understanding of why those actors are able to pursue their vendettas, it is important for us to understand the pre-rational mechanisms that create social atmospheres conducive to those actions.

The implications of this argument are important in so far as they can guide conflict resolution efforts. If ethnicity is an imperfect means to reduce uncertainty, then it may be possible to change the grouping mechanism that people chose. Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides conducted an experiment in which people were showed arguments between different people. They were then asked to identify who said what. In the initial stage of the experiment, people used race as a grouping mechanism, evident by the fact that when they made mistakes, the person they incorrectly identified was always the same race as the person who actually said the particular sentence. This racial identification occurred even though the arguments were not racially based. However, when Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides introduced different colored shirts to identify different sides of the argument, people reverted to this grouping mechanism and dropped race (Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001, 387-92). If it is true that people opt into these violent mobilizations to reduce uncertainties, rather than out of fear or interest, then policies aimed at reconciling conflict ought to be targeted towards reducing those uncertainties or providing a better uncertainty-reducing group. This targeting could come for example in the former of neutral occupancy troops, as we saw with UN peace keepers in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Or it could come in the form of power sharing agreements that reduce the uncertainties associated with trusting opposite ethnic communities. More research should be conducted into the links between this argument and those polices.

Bibliography

Abrams, Dominic, Michael A. Hogg, and José M. Marques, eds. 2005. *Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion*. New York: Psychology Press. Accessed September 17, 2014. http://trinity.etailer.dpsl.net/home/html/moreinfo.asp?isbn=0203496175&whichpage=1&pagename=category.asp.

Brass, Paul. 1996. "Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Identity Formation." In Ethnicity, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. *Oxford Readers*, 85-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bringa, Tonne. 1993. *We Are All Neighbors. VHS. Debbie Christie*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Caspersen, Nina. Ethnopolitics. 2010. *Vol. 6, Contested Nationalism: Serb Elite Rivalry in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Crawford, Beverly. 1998. "The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach." *International and Area Research Studies* 98.

Devotta, Neil. 2005. "From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict." *Nations and Nationalism* 11(1).

Dillon, Martin, and Denis Lehane. 1973. *Political Murder in Northern Ireland*. A Penguin Special. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Erikson, Erik H. 1994[1968]. *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *The American Political Science Review* 90(4).

Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2000. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." *International Organization* 54(4).

Fujii, Lee Ann. 2009. *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gagnon, V.P. Jr. 2005. "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia." *International Security* 18(3).

Hayes, Bernadette, and Ian Mcallister. 2001. "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland." *Political Studies* 49(5).

Hale, Henry E. 2008. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hogg, Michael A., and Barry Mullins. 1999. "Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and Group Identification." In *Social Identity and Social Cognition*, edited by Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, 1. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Kalyvas, Stathis Jr. 2005. "The Ontology of Political Violence." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(1).

Kurzban, Robert, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides. 2001. "Can Race Be Erased? Colational Computation and Social Categorization." *Proceedings of the National academy of Sciences* 98(26).

Maček, Ivana. 2009. *Sarajevo under Siege: Anthropology in Wartime. The Ethnography of Political Violence*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mead, George Herbert. 1934. *Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Edited by Charles W. Morris. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Oberschall, Anthony. 2000. "The Manipulation of Ethnicity from Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(6).

Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions*. Cambridge ;: Cambridge University Press.

Straus, Scott. 2006. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Van der Dennen, J. M. G. 1987. "Ethnocentrism and in-group/out-group differentiation." In *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism*, edited by Vernon Reynolds, V S E. Falger, and Ian Vine, 1. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Wright, Frank. 1988. *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble.

The Distinction and Relationship between Ontology and Epistemology:

Does It Matter?

Sarita-Louise Kant

Sarita-Louise Kant of Pretoria received her Bachelor of Arts degree in the Humanities (Politics) at the University of South Africa in 1979. In 1989, she obtained a Master of Arts degree at the University of South Africa. The dissertation was entitled 'Ayn Rand's contribution to political thought. An evaluation'. The dissertation was passed 'cum laude'. She obtained her doctorate (D Litt et Phil) in 2010 at the University of South Africa. The thesis was entitled 'A critical and systematic analysis of the democratic values of freedom and equality'. Fields of interest include issues in the philosophy of science and political philosophy.

Abstract

In the social sciences, a distinction is generally drawn between ontology and epistemology, usually accompanied by the assumption that some relationship exists between ontology and epistemology. In this regard several issues arise. Whereas there seems to be general agreement on the meaning of the concepts 'ontology' and 'epistemology', there seems to be no agreement on what can be classified as ontological or epistemological. The distinction and particularly the relationship between ontology and epistemology is furthermore regarded by some scholars as problematic and contested. The aim is to examine the distinction and the presumed nature of this relationship in order to establish why it is contested. It is extremely important to take cognisance of the possibility of fallacious reasoning concerning the distinction and the relationship between ontology and epistemology, as the failure to do so may have serious consequences for the integrity and validity of research projects in the social sciences. Lastly, it is also relevant to determine whether the distinction and the presumed relationship between ontology and epistemology are important for the scientific enterprise.

Keywords: Epistemology; Category Mistake; Fallacy; Ontology; Solipsism.

Introduction

In postmodern times in the social sciences , it is common practice to misuse and abuse concepts like 'ontology' and 'epistemology' and their meanings by using them interchangeably or by collapsing the distinction between them, and to overlook and sometimes ignore the rules of language and logic, thereby enhancing the possibility of fallacious reasoning. This practice has serious consequences for the validity and soundness of research projects in the social sciences. Validity does not seem to be a concern of postmodern discourse and its presumed concomitant epistemology, which differs radically from, for example, a realist as well as a positivist epistemology.

Consequently, after having clarified the meaning of the concepts of ontology and epistemology, and determined their scope, the presumed relationship between ontology and epistemology will be examined. Some of the arguments concerning the relationship and the distinction between ontology and epistemology will be analysed to examine the possibility of whether fallacious thinking is involved. Lastly, an attempt will be made to establish whether the distinction and the relationship between ontology and epistemology are important for research in the social sciences. The approach followed here is critical with regard to the points of view provided by various scholars.

The Meaning of Ontology and Epistemology and the Distinction between Them

Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185) affirm that there is general agreement on the meaning of ontology and epistemology. The general agreement is also evident from the ensuing views expressed by scholars.

Ontology is a branch of metaphysics. Metaphysics has various different meanings. It can refer to the study of reality or existence as a whole, or particular aspects of reality, for instance, monism (reality consists of one substance) or monadology (reality consists of many substances). Metaphysics also explores the world beyond experience in order to establish first principles as the foundation of knowledge. It also examines the kinds of things that ultimately exist (Flew 1984: 229-230). However, in this context metaphysics refers to the study of reality as a whole. Ontology then is concerned with the nature of reality or existence, which is "apart from the nature of any existent object" (Flew 1984: 255; see Blaikie 2007: 13). It addresses the question of "what is out there to know about" (Grix 2002: 1). In the social sciences ontologies concern the question: "'What is the nature of social reality?'" (Blaikie 2007:13). The forgoing implies the existence of a reality independent of human beings' knowledge of it, which will be analysed further on.

Epistemology studies theories of knowledge, how knowledge is derived (for instance, by reason or experience, which may both take various forms), and the reliability and validity of knowledge claims (Flew 1984: 109; see Grix 2002: 177).

Ontological questions focus on the nature of reality. Put differently, the key issue is "whether there is a '"real"' world '"out there"' that is … independent of our knowledge of it" (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185). If this view is upheld, the basic epistemological question concerns "the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known" (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185).

Marsh and Stoker (2002: 11) follow a similar view and depict ontology and epistemology as follows: "'ontology is concerned with what we can know about the world and epistemology is concerned with how we can know it'". Although Marsh and Stoker clearly distinguish between ontology and epistemology, Bates and Jenkins (2007: 58) find their description problematic and incorrect as in their view what exists is an ontological issue which is not the same as the epistemological issue of what we can know.

Nevertheless, Grix (2002: 175) concurs with Marsh and Stoker (2002: 11) when he asserts that ontology means "what is out there to know about" and epistemology refers to "what and how can we know about it". Here a clear distinction is again drawn between ontology and epistemology. Furthermore, Hay (2002: 63 in Grix 2002: 177) states that a researcher's ontological position is reflected in the answer to the question of "'what is the nature of the social and political reality to be investigated?'". This question must be answered before one can consider what one can know about this social and political reality (Grix 2002: 177). What one can know about reality is an epistemological question.

Moses and Knutsen (2007: 5) is similarly of the view that ontology refers "to the study of being – the study of the basic building blocks of existence". Epistemology accordingly denotes the study of knowledge. The basic question is "'[w]hat is knowledge'" (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 5).

Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185) follow a realist perspective to demonstrate the link between ontology and epistemology. Accordingly, epistemology concerns two main questions. The first one relates to the issue whether an observer or researcher can identify objective or real relations between social phenomena. The first question entails a return to ontology, that is, whether reality exists independent of the observer or researcher.

The second question concerns how the researcher can identify real relations between social phenomena, if the first question in answered affirmatively. Negating the existence of an independent reality means that no researcher can be objective as the social world or reality is socially constructed (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185). The second question, furthermore, raises an important and related issue of whether a researcher can establish real relations between phenomena by means of direct or indirect observation. The answers to all these questions influence a researcher's epistemological position (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 186).

Scholars who follow variants of realism draw a clear distinction between ontology and epistemology. The distinction and link between ontology and epistemology, as expounded, for example, by Furlong and Marsh is regarded as contentious, particularly by researchers favouring a constructivist perspective for conducting research in the social sciences. Constructivists are apt to reject the distinction between ontology and epistemology. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the commonsensical distinction between ontology and epistemology is one matter, and whether this distinction is accepted or rejected by scholars is another.

Classification of Ontological and Epistemological Positions

Whereas there is general agreement on the meaning of the terms ontology and epistemology, there is "much less agreement about either the ontological and epistemological positions that researchers adopt or the relationship between ontology and epistemology" (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185).

Blaikie (2007: 13) distinguishes between idealist and realist ontological assumptions. Idealism assumes that "the external world is just appearances and has no independent existence apart from our thoughts" and realism holds that "both natural and social phenomena are assumed to have an existence that is independent of the activities of the human observer" (Blaikie 2007: 13). More recently though a distinction is drawn between realist and relativist ontologies, both of which have many variations (Blaikie 2007: 13). The variations of realism, for example, which include scientific realism and critical realism, despite their differences, subscribe to the existence of a mind independent reality.

As far as epistemological positions are concerned, two alternatives were traditionally regarded as "the foundations of knowledge", namely, rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism takes reason as a source of knowledge, "to distinguish between what is true and false" (Blaikie 2007: 18). Empiricism in contrast bases knowledge of reality on sensory experience (Blaikie 2007: 18).

In order to further clarify the distinction between ontology and epistemology, Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185) demonstrate the complexity of ontological positions by identifying two main ontological ones, namely, "foundationalism/objectivism/realism" which supports an external world, independent of people's knowledge of it, and "anti-foundationalism/constructivism/relativism" which views the world as a socially constructed entity. These two streams, however, have different variations and the distinctions between them may be obfuscated (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 189).

The use of the terms "'foundationalism'" and "'anti-foundationalism'" as ontological terms are regarded by Bates and Jenkins (2007: 58) as a "conflation of ontological and epistemological concerns". These terms are not ontological but rather epistemological (Bates and Jenkins 2007: 59).

Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185), however, clearly distinguish between a researcher's ontological and epistemological positions, which is also indicative of the interrelationship between ontology and epistemology: "If an ontological position reflects the researcher's view about the nature of the world, his or her epistemological position reflects his/her view of what we can know about the world…". Furthermore, the main epistemological question concerns "the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known…" (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010:185).

Grix (2002: 177-178) refers to Bryman's (2001: 12-13, 16-18) examples of "'objectivism'" and "'constructivism'" as ontological positions, and "'positivism'" and "'interpretivism'" as epistemological positions. Objectivism as an ontological stance states that social entities and their meanings exist independently of human beings. Constructivism holds that social phenomena are socially constructed and subject to revision by observers or researchers. Positivism, as an epistemological position, applies the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences. Interpretivism again distinguishes between the methods of the natural sciences and those methods applicable to the social sciences. The methods of the social sciences are regarded as subjective in nature. Similarly, Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185) identify interpretivism as an epistemological position.

Jackson (2008: 132-133) again identifies dualism and monism as ontological positions. Dualism makes a strict distinction "between the world and knowledge of the world, whether that knowledge is held by the researcher or by the people under investigation" (Jackson 2008: 132). Knowledge is regarded as a representation of the world. Knowledge is derived from and refers to "a world of objects that exist and have their character outside of any knowledge" (Jackson 2008: 132; see Flew 1984: 97). Monism, on the other hand, "maintains a fundamental continuity of knowledge with the world, and therefore does not give rise to an account of knowledge practices that aims at accurately reflecting the world's essential dispositional character" (Jackson 2008: 133; see Flew 1984: 237).

Whereas idealism entails a world constructed by the researcher's thoughts, monism "avoids the thing/thought dichotomy altogether" and focuses on practical activities that lead to both objects and thoughts, which may be called "discursive practices, fields of action, figurations" and so forth (Jackson 2008: 133). Monists deny that human beings can obtain knowledge of the world as it exists. It is clear that adhering to either monist or dualist ontological assumptions leads to practicing different kinds of social science (Jackson 2008: 133).

It is evident that there is less agreement among scholars on ontological and epistemological positions and classifications, and the positions that researchers support (see Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 185).

The Distinction and Relationship between Ontology and Epistemology

Whereas the meaning of ontology and epistemology is generally accepted, the distinction and the relationship between ontology and epistemology, particularly in postmodern times, are contentious and contested, especially by interpretivists, constructivists and scholars of hermeneutics (see further on).

The relationship has several disputed facets: the directionality of the relationship between ontology and epistemology; the distinction between ontology and epistemology, (albeit its denial); conflating or collapsing the distinction between ontology and epistemology, which tends to reduce the former to the latter; and the ontological issue of the existence of an external, mind independent reality, whether social or political, which can be studied by observers or researchers. These points will be briefly examined.

There are views for and against indicating the directional relationship between ontology and epistemology.

Grix (2002) asserts that ontology logically precedes epistemology and that both are logically closely related. The nature of the relationship is logical. Hay (2007: 116-117) concurs and supports the "primacy of ontology over epistemology". Ontological claims about the social and political world logically precede epistemological claims concerning what can be known about that social and political world. Hence, epistemology is dependent on ontology. This position, however, is a matter of logic and not of metatheory. Hay (2007: 118) further contends that "ontological assumptions inform epistemological assumptions" and that "both inform methodological choices".

Some scholars in the social sciences again hold that epistemology precedes ontology, but the grounds for this and the defence of this position are not clear in the literature. Scholars and researchers who do not present some argument for their positions cast some doubt on the validity of their views. It must be noted that a valid defence first and foremost requires "a clear statement of the strongest arguments of your opponent as a preliminary to their refutation" (Lunn 1950: vii). This requirement is fundamental to research in the social sciences as well as arguments in philosophy.

Bates and Jenkins (2007: 56) are against what they regard as "a tendency to present, indeed prescribe, a particular directional relationship between ontology and epistemology as a given…". Prescribing a directional relationship undermines "reflexive learning and the development of critical analysis…" (Bates and Jenkins 2007: 56).

However, Bates and Jenkins (2007: 60) do not argue that directionality is incorrect, but stress that this perspective is contested (see Marsh and Stoker 2010: 186). Some views perceive the relationship between ontology and epistemology differently. For instance, neither ontology nor epistemology can be seen as prior to the other. Another perspective bases ontology on epistemology. Yet another view collapses the distinction between ontology and epistemology. For Grix (2007: 179) this means that ontology is simply seen as a part of epistemology.

Hay (2007: 117) acknowledges that some scholars confuse and conflate ontology and epistemology. Bates and Jenkins (2007: 60) affirm that some post-structuralists conflate ontology and epistemology. According to Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 189) post-structuralist scholars deny the possibility or usefulness of a distinction between ontology and epistemology.

Some scholars writing within the ambit of hermeneutics are also inclined to confuse ontology and epistemology. Understanding society, which is different from nature, requires "an interpretive understanding of society where we try and grasp other's thoughts with our thoughts" (Spencer 2000: 2). This tends to reduce the study of society to the understanding of thoughts on the issue (see point 5.1 further on).

Hermeneutics and structuralism emphasise the importance of language and oppose "attempts at explaining human society in terms of human nature" (Trigg 1985: 188-189). This kind of structuralism, furthermore, rejects the notion of human beings as subjects thinking about an independent, external world and formulating a language to describe that world. This means that human beings are neither the source of language, nor of culture (Trigg 1985: 189-190). Language then has some independent status. In other words, language is reified. Reification means regarding "human products as if they were entities independent of man" (Trigg 1985: 211). It is not clear how language can have an independent status as it is the product of a conscious mind or intellect. Language, moreover, is a means of communication and an instrument of knowledge. The social sciences (and natural science) as well as scientific practice depend on the quality of terms and concepts. As Sartori (1984:22) puts it:

> Clear thinking requires clear language. In turn, a clear language requires that its terms be explicitly defined.

The existence of an independent natural, social and political world was implicit in much of the forgoing discussion. Realism supports the notion of an independent reality which exists apart from the subject, knower or researcher. However, in postmodern times "it is usual to either deny that reality exists apart from our knowledge (usually understood as our linguistic representations) of it or to deny that our knowledge in any way 'reflects' the world as it exists in and of itself" (Spencer 2000: 1).

Some of the issues concerning the distinction and relationship between ontology and epistemology will be further examined to establish whether or not fallacious thinking is entailed in some of the views expounded above.

The Issue of Fallacious Reasoning

Two issues concerning ontology and epistemology are particularly important here. The first concerns collapsing the distinction between ontology and epistemology and treating the former as an aspect of the latter. The second issue pertains to the ontological assumption of the existence of an independent social and political reality.

The distinction between ontology and epistemology

Does collapsing, conflating or confusing the distinction between ontology and epistemology possibly entail a category mistake? According to Ryle (1988: 17; see Flew 1984: 58) a category mistake is made when a concept or term belonging to "one logical type or category" is placed in another category to which it does not belong. A category mistake depends on some theory of categories. In an Aristotelian sense it refers to "a sort of equivocation" (Flew 1984: 58).

One of several examples given by Ryle (1988: 17-18) to illustrate a category mistake involves a foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge University for the first time. The foreigner is shown several colleges, libraries, museums, scientific departments, administrative offices and playing fields. The visitor afterwards asks where the university is. He has seen various institutions, but not the university. The visitor made the mistake of thinking that the university was yet another building instead of the university being the way in which all the buildings and playing fields are organised (Ryle 1988: 18; see Baggini and Fosl 2003: 73-74). The various institutions, buildings and playing fields (observable reality) comprise the whole, the university (an abstraction). These are clearly different categories.

Ryle (1988: 19) states that theoretically the most interesting category mistakes are made by those who are "perfectly competent" to apply terms and concepts in the cases "with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong".

As an example of an interesting category mistake, Ryle (1988: 19) tells the story of a student of politics, who has learned the main differences between the French, British and American constitutions, as well as the differences and connections between Parliament, the Cabinet, the Judiciary, the various ministries and the Church of England. When asked questions about the connections between the Church of England, the British constitution and the Home Office, the student still became embarrassed. The Church and the Home Office are institutions, but the British constitution is not just another institution in the same sense as the noun 'institution'. Hence, the relations between institutions which may be claimed or denied to exist between the Church and the Home Office cannot be stated or denied to hold between either of the two institutions and the British constitution. The latter term 'constitution' is not of the same logical type as the Church and the Home Office.

From the above it is clear that concepts and terms belonging to a particular logical category must not be placed in a category to which it does not belong. This means that the distinction between ontology and epistemology must not be collapsed. Historically and philosophically the concepts of ontology and epistemology refer to different things. They are not the same and the one must also not be confused with or reduced to the other. Spencer (2000: 1) cites Roy Bashker's notion of an epistemic fallacy which reduces issues of ontology to epistemology. "Hence, the epistemic fallacy would assume that for any question of whether or not such and such exists, we should substitute the question of how we know that such and such exists" (Spencer 2000: 1). What can be observed must not be confused with what is real. Reality consists of more than what can be observed. The two must not be conflated (Chernoff 2007: 121; see Bhasker 1997: 36-38). In this view, the distinction between ontology and epistemology must thus be upheld to avoid the committing of a category mistake.

If ontology and epistemology are conflated, the study of society is then reduced to the understanding of ideas. However, it is correct to see society as a unique entity, as "ideas can be causes" (Spencer 2000: 2). Society is complex and the causes of behaviour, political, social and economic relations and events in society cannot merely be regarded as ideas, or caused by people's ideas. Society cannot logically be reduced to ideas and the study of society cannot logically be reduced to issues of epistemology (Spencer 2000: 2).

Finally, Spencer (2000: 4) emphasises that "[t]he confusion between ontology and epistemology … is the confusion between the study of thought and the study of the world as it exists independently of thought… ".

An independent reality

In contrast with idealism, which supports the notion that an external reality is not completely independent of mind, (or that the mind somehow creates reality, or that reality is dependent on the observer's beliefs about it, or in the Hegelian sense that material things is a form of one (absolute) mind) (see Flew 1984: 160-161), the existence of an external mind independent reality has philosophically been accepted since the earliest times. Rand (1961: 22) affirms that Aristotle "defined the basic principles of a rational view of existence and of 'human' consciousness: that there is only *one* reality, the one which man perceives – that it exists as an *objective* absolute (which means: independently of consciousness, the wishes or the feelings of any perceiver) – that the task of man's consciousness is to *perceive*, not to create reality … ".

If the axiom of the "primacy of existence" and the axiom that consciousness perceives reality are rejected then the primacy of consciousness is the alternative or represents a reversal, namely "the notion that the universe has no independent existence, that it is the product of consciousness (either human or divine or both)" (Rand 1982: 29). This entails the inability to understand the difference between the outer world and a person's inner state, or between the perceiver and the perceived. Rand (1982: 30) calls this the "fallacy of failing to discriminate crucial differences". This fallacy collapses the distinction between reality, the perceived, and consciousness, the perceiver. Here again, the possibility of a category mistake arises.

Hallowell (1954: 25), who supports the common sense principles of classical realism, also asserts that the existence of reality "does not depend upon our knowledge of it" and that "[k]nowledge does not involve the making or constructing of anything, but rather the discovery of what already exists".

Scholars and views of science that contend that reality is mind dependent, or deny the existence of an independent reality, also run the risk of committing the well-known fallacy of solipsism, which denies the existence of an external reality. The fallacy of solipsism is described by Flew (1984: 330) as follows:

> I must hold that I alone exist independently, and that what I ordinarily call the outside world exists only as an object or content of my consciousness.

On a metaphysical level solipsism holds that 'I alone exist', and in an epistemological sense one can only know oneself and nothing else. Mounce (1977: 11) elaborates on this dilemma:

> I cannot say that I alone exist, as against the world, for without the world I cannot distinguish my own existence. Consequently what is true in solipsism cannot be expressed without recognizing the truth in realism. I cannot say that the world appears to *me*, without recognizing the reality of the *world* which so appears.

For Stove (1991: 65) even asking the question of whether an external world exists demonstrates that there is something seriously wrong regardless of how the question is answered. Stove (1991: 71) remarks that:

> 'An external world exists' follows from 'At least one human being exists', just as it follows from, say, 'At least one cabbage exists.' Now, necessarily, no human being could ask, even inwardly, whether an external world exists, unless at least one human being exists. And necessarily, if at least one human being exists then an external world exists. Therefore, necessarily, no human being could ask whether an external world exists, unless an external world does exist.

The statement concerning the existence of an external world, in other words, follows from any observation statement (Stove 1991: 72). A statement that denies the existence of an external world seems to at least implicitly accept its existence in an attempt to deny it.

Furthermore, something, for example, realism, is not contingent as it has no contingent contrary. The statement on the existence of an external world does not seem to have a "contingent contrary". This means that "there seems to be no alternative to it which is possible" (Stove 1991: 72). A statement, however, is "a *necessary* truth, if there is no possible alternative to it" (Stove 1991: 73). Hence, the existence of an external world is self-evident. Rand (1982: 33) concurs that "[t]he metaphysically given cannot be true or false, it simply *is* …".

The question must also be asked "whether solipsism is logically possible" (Stove 1991: 73). Those who assert that it is logically possible, either interpret solipsism incorrectly, which means that it does not amount to solipsism, or their interpretations are "necessarily false" (Stove 1991: 73).

Furthermore, the question arises whether solipsism can be refuted, and if so, on which grounds? Is solipsism irrefutable? It seems clear though that if objects are mind dependent, one cannot validly argue that an external world exists (see Flew 1984: 330).

It seems evident that in order to avoid the fallacy of solipsism or the making of a category mistake, the existence of an independent reality must be implicitly or explicitly upheld, and the distinction between ontology and epistemology must be maintained as they clearly refer to different things. Contesting or challenging the forgoing might well entail fallacious reasoning. Trigg (1980: 95) cautions that whenever the distinction between a "knowing subject and what is known" is blurred, the "status of knowledge itself is in jeopardy". Furthermore, "[w]ithout objective reality, we can say nothing true, and without the possibility of truth and error, there can be no possibility of rational judgement. Without rationality men can have no freedom of choice" (Trigg 1980: 197). Granted that human reason and rationality are limited by nature, human beings to a greater or lesser extent are arguably capable of distinguishing between truth and error.

The Importance of the Relationship between Ontology and Epistemology

Upholding the distinction between ontology and epistemology, and the relationship between them clearly seems important for avoiding fallacious reasoning. The distinction demonstrates the difference between things, and the relationship indicates the connection or link between things.

Furthermore, ontology and epistemology are closely related and the distinction between them should be upheld as all research commences with a researcher's conception of the world, which itself is influenced by the experience a researcher contributes to the research process (Grix 2002: 179). Research strategies are based on ontological assumptions. Such strategies implicitly or explicitly make various claims about the kinds of things that can or do exist, the relations between them and the conditions of their existence (Blaikie 2007: 13). The relationship between ontology and epistemology is arguably important for various other reasons.

The meaning of ontology and epistemology, and the directional and logical relationship between them must be understood to enhance criticism and constructive dialogue among students and scholars (Grix 2002: 175). Bates and Jenkins (2007: 56), as stated previously, do not agree with this view and argue that prescribing a directional relationship between ontology and epistemology undermines "reflexive learning and the development of critical analysis …". The relationship between ontology and epistemology, however, is logical in nature and it is dubious whether indicating a logical relationship has the influence or power to inhibit critical thought.

It is apparent that logically social and political reality cannot control human thought. It can influence, motivate, shape and inspire human thought and ideas, but it is doubtful whether reality can determine human thought and ideas in any strong causal sense. However, traumatic experiences like surviving a holocaust or war can profoundly affect or shape a person's outlook on life. Reality consists of human made phenomena (for example, inventions, institutions, structures and policies) – the products of human thought, creativity and productivity. These are in principle subject to change by human beings, unlike the metaphysically or ontologically given. Hence, a relationship exists between that which exists (ontology) and what human beings can know (epistemology). Knowledge, a product, then entails a relationship between the world and human beings. This implies that the relationship between the observer or the researcher and the social and political world is reciprocal. Interaction takes place between the researcher and reality, as knowledge is neither acquired nor exists in a vacuum. The nature of the interaction arguably may be active or passive to a greater or lesser degree.

Researchers, moreover, must have a theory of ontology, whether it is explicitly acknowledged or implicitly held, as a presupposition of the researcher's theory of epistemology (Spencer 2000: 2). Furlong and Marsh (Marsh and Stoker 2010: 184) support a similar view and state that a researcher or social scientist's notion of ontology and epistemology, whether acknowledged or not, "shape the approach to theory and the methods" which they use. A researcher's ontological and epistemological orientation then influences the methodology adopted and a researcher must acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological assumptions (Furlong and Marsh in Marsh and Stoker 2010: 210).

Blaikie (2007: 14) concurs that ontological assumptions, although they may not be explicitly stated, implicitly guide research and the methods adopted. It is furthermore important to be aware of the ontological assumptions that inform scientific research and their consequences "for research practice and outcomes" (Blaikie 2007: 25). These assumptions are embedded in the research paradigms and research strategies employed by researchers, and "they can also influence the choice of research methods" (Blaikie 2007: 25). This common sense view is also supported by Hay (2007: 118) who asserts that "ontological assumptions inform epistemological assumptions" and "both inform methodological choices".

Ontological and epistemological assumptions then inform and impact on the research process. They are fundamental to all research, hence the importance of understanding them (Grix 2002: 176). Grix (2002: 177) further emphasises that "[o]ntology is the starting point of all research, after which one's epistemological and methodological positions logically follow". Once researchers and students understand that research is based on ontological and epistemological assumptions, and the logical connection between ontology, epistemology and methodology, they can grasp "the impact one's ontological position can have on what and how we decide to study" (Grix 2002: 179). Ontological and epistemological assumptions then influence the questions a researcher asks, how they are formulated and how they are answered (Grix 2002: 179).

Ontological and epistemological assumptions, methodology, methods and data sources, moreover, are directionally logically interrelated. Although a directional relationship exists between ontology, epistemology, methodology, methods and data sources, this does not mean that one element determines another. It does not mean, for example, that a positivist ontological position will automatically lead to the adoption of a positivist epistemological position. It is important to note that methods themselves are not coloured by ontological and epistemological assumptions and that the choice of methods depends on the research questions (Grix 2002: 180-181).

It is, however, not possible to establish by means of empirical enquiry which ontological and epistemological assumptions are the most appropriate for a particular research question. Researchers adopt ontological and epistemological assumptions "partly as an act of faith in a particular view of the world" (Blaikie 2007: 25). However, their strengths and weaknesses are subject to debate (Blaikie 2007: 25). Ontological and epistemological assumptions, which are regarded as necessary conditions for knowledge, are also beyond empirical proof or verification and empirical refutation (see Grix 2002: 177; Monteiro and Ruby 2009: 7). They are accepted as self evident.

Conclusion

The meaning of ontology and epistemology is relatively unproblematic. The same does not apply to what can be classified as ontological and epistemological. The relationship between ontology and epistemology is contested by various scholars and views of science. There is disagreement among scholars on the directionality of the relationship. Even if it is argued that ontology logically precedes epistemology, epistemology is required to gain knowledge of ontology. Hence, the relationship between the observer, who may be a researcher or a scientist, or a philosopher, and the observed which encompasses the social and political world is reciprocal in the sense that knowledge neither exists nor is acquired in a vacuum. Interaction takes place between the observer and the observed, but the extent and nature of such interaction is subject to debate.

Nevertheless, ontological and epistemological assumptions arguably play a role in scientific research. To the extent that they do, the distinction and relationship between ontology and epistemology should be upheld to eliminate the possibility of fallacious reasoning. Issues of ontology and epistemology and epistemology must not be obscured, conflated or confused. Furthermore, the one is arguably not reducible to the other. Ontology and epistemology then concern different things and the distinction between them should be upheld to avoid confusion and fallacious reasoning, particularly the committing of a category mistake. Moreover, the denial of an independent reality raises the issue of the fallacy of solipsism. The existence of an independent reality, however, is an assumption which can neither be proved nor refuted. Care should be taken not to commit logical errors and fallacies, and not to misuse and abuse language when engaging in scientific research. The related practice of obfuscating arguments by using different terms and concepts, but giving them similar meanings tend to create uncertainty and confusion as to their meanings. This outcome is counterproductive and does not lead to an understanding of scientific debate and the research process. Clear thinking requires the clear and precise use of scientific terminology. Key terms and concepts must be defined and the meaning attributed to them by the definition must be clear, precise and unambiguous. The meaning must also be used consistently in the research project (see Sartori 1984). The implication of not giving due attention to the correct use of terms and concepts, upon which research in the social sciences depend seems clear. The research process, findings, and the integrity, validity and soundness of the scientific enterprise might be compromised. Furthermore, definitional clarity is not likely to be served by logical errors and fallacies, but these only serve to create confusion. The misuse and abuse of language is unlikely to enhance the quality of research in the social sciences.

Lastly, it is likely that the distinction and relationship between ontology and epistemology will continue to be a subject of debate in the social sciences. The debate is contentious and cannot merely be accepted at face value. If the views and positions of scholars and researchers are challenged, it is incumbent upon them to be able to substantiate or provide a justification of their chosen stance.

Bibliography

Baggini, J. and Fosl, P.S. 2003. The philosopher's toolkit. A compendium of philosophical concepts and methods. Malden, MA (USA): Blackwell Publishing.

Bates, S.R. and Jenkins, L. 2007. 'Teaching and learning ontology and epistemology in political science.' Politics. 2007. Vol 27 (1). 55-63.

Bhasker, R. 1997. A realist theory of science. (2nd ed.) London: Verso.

Blaikie, N. 2007. Approaches to social enquiry. (2nd ed.) Cambridge (UK): Polity Press.

Bryman, A. 2001. Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chernoff, F. 2007. Theory and metatheory in international relations. Concepts and contending accounts. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crotty, M. 1998. The foundations of social research. London: Sage.

Flew, A. 1984. A dictionary of philosophy. London: Pan Books Ltd.

Furlong, P. and Marsh, D. 2010. 'A skin not a sweater: ontology and epistemology in political science.' In Marsh, D. and Stoker G. (eds.) 2010. Theory and methods in political science. (3rd ed.) Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grix, J. 2002. 'Introducing students to the generic terminology of social research.' Politics. 2002. Vol 22 (3). 175-186.

Gunnell, J.G. 2011. 'Social scientific inquiry and meta-theoretical fantasy: the case of international relations.' Review of international studies. 2011. 37. 1447-1469.

Hallowell, J.H. 1954. The moral foundation of democracy. The University of Chicago Press.

Hay, C. 2002. Political analysis. A critical introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hay, C. 2007. 'Does ontology trump epistemology? Notes on the directional dependence of ontology and epistemology in political analysis.' Politics. 2007. Vol 27 (2). 115-118.

Jackson, P.T. 2008. 'Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism, and IR theory.' Review of international studies. 2008. 34. 129-153.

Lunn, A. 1950. The revolt against reason. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.) 2010. Theory and methods in political science. (3rd ed.) Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Monteiro, N.P. and Ruby, K.G. 2009. 'IR and the false promise of philosophical foundations.' International theory. 2009. 1. Cambridge University Press.

Moses, J.W. and Knutsen, T.L. 2007. Ways of knowing. Competing methodologies in social and political research. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mounce, H.O. 1977. 'Philosophy, solipsism and thought.' The philosophical quarterly. 1977. Vol 47. No 186. 1-18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2956468. Accessed 08.03.2012.

Neale, J.M. and Liebert, R.M. 1986. Science and behaviour. An introduction to methods of research. (3rd ed.) Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Rand, A. 1961. For the new intellectual. New York: Signet.

Rand, A. 1982. Philosophy: who needs it. Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc.

Rawnsley, M.M. 1998. 'Ontology, epistemology, and methodology. A clarification.' Nursing science quarterly. 1998. 11. 2. Sage. http://www.sagepublications.com) http://nsq.sagepub.com/content/11/1/2. Accessed 16.02.2012.

Ryle, G. 1988. The concept of mind. London: Penguin Books.

Sartori, G. (ed.) 1984. Social science concepts. A systematic analysis. London: Sage.

Spencer, N. 2000. 'On the significance of distinguishing ontology and epistemology.' http://www.ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/neville.htm. Accessed 25.05.2012.

Stove, D. 1991. The Plato cult and other philosophical follies. Oxford (UK): Basil Blackwell.

Trigg, R. 1980. Reality at risk. A defence of realism in philosophy and the sciences. Sussex: The Harvester Press.

Trigg, R. 1985. Understanding social science. A philosophical introduction to the social sciences. Oxford (UK): Basil Blackwell.

Trigg, R. 2002. Philosophy matters. Malden, MA (USA): Blackwell Publishers.

A Formula for the Measurement of Freedom

Mehran Mazinani

Mehran M. Mazinani is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Utah. He is currently finishing his dissertation titled "On Liberty in the First Iranian Constitution." His research interests include political history of Iran, comparative politics of the Middle East, and philosophy of social sciences, particularly hermeneutical methodologies.

Abstract

In this paper I shall explore how it is possible to measure freedom defined as whether or not a definite set of choices are actually available to a people, who have enough effective power to exercise them, regardless of whether they may or may not wish so. At first, two sets of data produced by two leading organizations—Freedom House and Human Development Programme—will be examined. Then, it will be suggested how it is feasible and advantageous to couple these two methods in order to set forth a more comprehensive formula. The primary objective of this paper is to present this formula.

Keywords: Human Development Programme; Human Rights; Freedom House; Freedom; the Middle East

Introduction

There are two basic ways to define the concept of liberty: (i) liberty has two interrelated negative and positive concepts (Berlin's theory), or (ii) liberty is only one concept but has various conceptions (McCallum's theory). Since the publication of Isaiah Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty,' liberty is more often than not split into two spheres: good versus bad, liberal versus totalitarian, negative versus positive, and freedom from versus freedom to (Berlin 1969). According to Berlin, the answer to 'what is the area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons' demarcates the area of negative freedom from; and the answer to 'what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that' designates the extent of one's positive freedom to (Berlin 1969, 121-2). This view has been extensively criticized, most brilliantly by McCallum, Feinberg, and Taylor (McCallum 1967; Feinberg 1973; Taylor 1979). McCallum proposes that freedom means freedom of something (the agent=X) from something (constraint=Y) to do or be something (objective=Z). A true statement of freedom ought to contain all three elements: X is free from Y to do/be Z (McCallum 1967, 315). Although McCallum's formula has its own shortcomings, it has attracted many philosophers (Gray 1980; Gray 1991). If we agree that liberty is one concept (as against two negative versus positive), then it constitutes several conceptions, such as self-determination, self-mastery, absence of impediments, availability of choices, effective power, and status. All in all, what these scholars, notably Berlin and McCallum, try to accomplish is to explain the *meaning of freedom*.

Here freedom is defined as whether or not a definite set of choices are actually available to a people, who have enough effective power to exercise them, regardless of whether they may or may not wish so. Freedom, to put it most concisely, means to have options. Freedom of expression, for instance, is not the act of expressing my beliefs, thoughts, and feelings. I may remain silent. It rather means having the option of expressing myself. Freedoms are analogous to a set of doors that one can walk through whether or not one wishes to do so. Here I am concerned with the availability of the doors that could be walked through, regardless of whether one may or may not want to walk. Thus, freedom is understood as the availability of a set of options (i.e., doing X, having Y, and becoming Z) to a people, who have enough effective power to exercise them, regardless of whether they may or may not wish so.

Having defined freedom, the main concern then becomes the *measurement of freedom*. We know what freedom is, but how can we measure it? In this regards, there are two main approaches:

abstract approach, which is itself divided to philosophical speculation (Steiner 1983) and mathematical examination (Gabor and Gabor 1954), and empirical approach (Humana 1992). Here I concentrate on the empirical approach, particularly by focusing on two sets of data produced by Freedom House and Human Development Programme. After explaining how these two organizations measure freedoms, while using twenty two Middle Eastern countries as case studies, it will be suggested that it is possible and indeed advantageous to couple these two approaches in an attempt to put forth a more comprehensive formula which, if the argument is sound, deserves to be expanded and utilized as a better tool in the measurement of freedom.

Freedom House

On December 10, 1948, the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR's self-claimed objective is to put forth a set of 'a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations' (cf. article 2).[2] Similar statements are declared in other manifestos, such as The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (articles 9 and 10), The International Covenant on Economics, Social, and Culture Rights, The American Convention on Human Rights (article 7), The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (article 6), and The European Convention on Human Rights (article 5), and in its Protocol IV (article 1, 9, and 10) (Lawson1996, 969-70). The UDHR also proclaims that

> Article 21: Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 21 is crucial in the measurement of freedom, when it is empirically employed as the underlying assumption by relevant organizations, particularly Freedom House (FH), which is 'the most used tool for measuring democracy'(Giannone2010, 69 and 75-6). FH declares that its methodology is driven from related portions of the UDHR. In line with the UDHR's article 21, the foundational assumption held in writing the FH's surveys is that freedom of all peoples is attainable most effectively in liberal democracy. Thus, 'a country cannot be an electoral

[2] Throughout the paper every quote, concerning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as its articles is found at the United Nation's official website (www.un.org) accessed March 20, 2012, unless otherwise stated.

democracy if significant authority for national decisions resides in the hands of an unelected power, whether a monarch or a foreign international authority.'[3] The UDHR's 17th article, as another example, is the basis for the FH's survey on freedom of press (i.e., opinion, expression, etc.). Similar to the UDHR, FH asserts that its focus is on individuals' freedoms, regardless of cultural differences across the globe. Lastly, FH asserts that it does not suffice to measure freedom as claimed in a given country's constitution, or institutional laws, and 'places a greater emphasis on whether these rights are implemented in practice.' That is, it calculates the actualized state of freedom as enjoyed by individuals.

FH measures freedom in accordance with two categories: political rights (i.e., electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government), and civil liberties (i.e., freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights). The political rights (PR) category consists of 10 questions and civil liberty (CL) includes 15 questions for each of which a country could gain a score between 0 to 4. So, the maximum for PR is 40 (10 questions times 4) and for PL is 60 (15 questions times 4), and the possible total number of summed scores is 100.The information based on which these questions are scored 'comes from the US State Department and Amnesty International country reports'(Landman, 2004,921-922). FH's website also displays an extensive list of other public sources, including publications, broadcasts, and organizations. Then, each PR and CL is averaged in order to determine an overall status, which could be Free, Partly Free, or Not Free (ranging from 1 to 7). According to FH,

i. A Free country [1.0 to 2.5] is one where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.
ii. A Partly Free country [3.0 to 5.0] is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism.
iii. A Not Free country [5.5 to 7.0.] is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.

Having a liberal democratic model in mind, the majority of the Middle Eastern countries are given a low level of freedom (2011), as demonstrated in Graph 1.

[3] Throughout the paper every quote, concerning the Freedom House is found at the Freedom House's official website (www.freedomhouse.org) accessed March 20, 2012, unless otherwise mentioned.

Graph 1: FH



Several criticisms have been made against FH, particularly its biases against communist and Islamic countries (Scoble and Wiseberg 1981; Bollen 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000; Giannone 2010). Some have tried (yet failed) to put forth a mathematically objective formula (Gabor and Gabor 1954), and other accept the subjectivity in their measurement of freedom (Humana 1992). Despite all of the criticisms and suggestions, FH is still the most used source currently available—in the measurement of freedom as long as it is used to demonstrate the extent of freedoms accessible to a people (i.e., availability of options/freedom with no value-judgment) within certain civic and political spheres. This approach, nevertheless, can be improved by linking it to other aspects of freedom that has been covered by Human Development Programme.

Human Development Programme

There are things like health, education, affiliation, leisure, etc., without which life of a normal individual is damaged. These are called 'human core activities' by David Miller (2007, 127-32), 'welfare interests' by Joel Feinberg (1973, 32), and more commonly 'capabilities,' particularly developed by Amartya Sen. I shall focus on Sen's concept of capability, since it is better articulated and empirically applied by Human Development Programme in an attempt to represent his theory of freedom in light of his broader conceptual framework.

According to Sen, functioning is what a person *wants* to do and be; or, what is conceived as valuable to do and be, such as being well-nourished, or participating in communal life. Functioning(s), therefore, plays a constitutive role in making one's being or identity. Capability is what a person *can* do and be, that is, the ability/opportunity to achieve what is conceived as valuable to do and be. Sen defines capability as 'the opportunity to achieve valuable combinations of human functioning—what a person is able to do or be' (2005, 153). Freedom consists of two aspects: opportunity and process. The opportunity aspect of freedom, similar to capability, indicates the ability of a person to gain what is aimed to be gained. The other aspect of freedom indicates the actual actions (i.e., process) of gaining the desired functioning(s). When, for instance, I am forced to be and/or do something when someone puts a gun to my head (i.e., interference), the process aspect of my freedom is violated; when I try to be and/or do something because there is no alternative choice, the substantive or opportunity aspect of my freedom is violated. The capability approach is helpful, if the opportunity aspect of freedom is under examination (Sen 2005, 153, also see the end note 3 on p. 164). 'The term freedom, in the form of capability, is used here to refer to the extent to which the person is free to choose particular levels of functioning (such as being well-nourished), and that is not the same thing as what the person actually decides to choose'(Sen 2005, 155). In a nutshell, Sen distinguishes between doing and being able to do.

Sen famously illustrates his theory by a simple example: a person who willingly practices fasting is different from a person who suffers from a famine, even though the outcome (starvation) is the same. Consider another example: in a desert I am allowed to go everywhere that I wish and drink everything that I like, but where I live (Slat Lake City), I must constantly stop at the stop lights. Yet, there is no reason to believe that I can actualize my freedoms in the desert, say, by going everywhere that I wish in the stifling heat, and drink water that I cannot find in reality, though I am theoretically allowed to do both. There are virtually countless things that I can do in Salt Lake (that I cannot do in the desert), such as drinking water at any time that I wish. I enjoy more things in Salt Lake because it provides me with more freedoms than the hypothetical desert in which freedom is unattainable.

Sen narrows his analysis to the most basic and necessary aspect of development, which is human development consisting of the state of health (long and healthy life), education (being knowledgeable), and income.[4] These factors are not freedoms *per se* but they are helpful in

[4] Throughout the paper every note, concerning Human Development Index is taken from its official website (http://hdr.undp.org/en/) accessed March 20, 2012, unless otherwise mentioned.

gaining freedom. For example, a person with better education and health is more likely not only to earn more income, but also to drive more utilities from it, which means having more choices and less constraints (i.e., freedoms). The following table presents Human Development Indicators (HDI) under the Islamic Republic of Iran, as an example. It is then followed by the HDI's formulas applied to the case of Iran in an attempt to demonstrate the aggregation of the human development indicators:

Table1: Iran's HDI (1980-2011)

Iran	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Means years of schooling	GNI per capita (PPP$)	HDI value
1980	51.1	8.4	2.1	7,113	0.437
1985	50.1	8.4	2.8	7,119	0.454
1990	61.8	9.3	3.7	6,248	0.534
1995	68.2	10.9	4.4	6,791	0.596
2000	69.8	12.2	5.1	7,678	0.636
2005	71.3	12.2	6.1	9,140	0.671
2011	72.7	12.7	7.3	10,339	***0.707***

$$\text{Dimension index } (x) = \frac{Actualvalue - Minimumvalue}{Maximumvalue - Minimumvalue}$$

(The maximums and minimums are given by the HDI.[5])

Life expectancy index (L) = $\frac{72.7-20}{83.4-20}$ = 0.831

Mean years of schooling index (e_1) = $\frac{7.3-0}{13.1-0}$ = 0.557

Expected years of schooling index (e_2) = $\frac{12.7-0}{18-0}$ = 0.705

Education index (E =e_1+e_2) = $\frac{\sqrt{(0.557).\ (0.705)}-0}{0.9778-0}$ = 0.640

Income index (I) = $\frac{\ln(10{,}339)-\ \ln(100)}{\ln(107{,}721)-\ln(100)}$ = 0.664

Human development Index = $\sqrt[3]{(\mathrm{L}).(\mathrm{E}).(\mathrm{I})}$ = $\sqrt[3]{(0.831).(0.640).(0.664)}$ = 0.707

[5] The numbers for minimum and maximum, as well as the formula could be found at the Human Development Index's official website (http://hdr.undp.org/en/), particularly see its section on 'Technical Note.'

Graph 2: HDI



It must be noted that HDI is not a purely economic calculation. Human development defends that 'human beings are the real end of all activities […] Income, commodities ('basic' or otherwise), and wealth do of course have instrumental importance but they do not constitute a direst measure of the living standard itself' (Anand and Sen 1994, 1). Focusing on Gross National Income (GNI) as the primary source for evaluating the state of development, as it has been traditionally done by economists, conceals how the income is spent, for instance whether it is used to promote health and education, or equipment's for torture (Sen 1987). Although HDI does not provide 'a direct measure of rights protection *per se*,' Landman suggests, 'such measures can elucidate the degree to which governments support activities that have an impact on human rights. In addition, development indicators have been increasingly employed as proxy measures for the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights'(Landman 2004, 925). All in all, although, the HDI is an improvement, it self-admittedly does not include socio-political freedoms, such as political participation or freedom of expression and association in its calculation. The capability approach basically targets the opportunity aspect of non-political freedoms.

Needless to say, there are differences between FH and HDI; for example, the UDHR, on which FH relies, is the continuation of the philosophy of contractualist liberal thinkers, such as Hobbes and Locke (Odello 2011, 110); whereas, the capacity approach is a non-contractualist theory (Chatterjee and Sieger 2011, 987-993; Sen 2005, 151, 155-6). Regardless, these two could complete each other because their unit of analysis is individuals, and not cultural groups. Moreover, they do not reject each other's fundamental assumptions (e.g., concerning the desirability of education, health, income, civic and political freedoms); rather, they target two different but related sets of factors. The difficulty is how to couple them in order to reach an enhanced measurement of freedom. This shall be done in the remaining section.

Full Freedom

The data from FH is organized such that 1 presents the highest and 7 the lowest possible grade of freedom in a given country. The spacing between 1 and 2 all the way to 7 is assumed to be linear and constant (i.e., 1 - 2= 1; 2 -3 = 1; 3 – 4 = 1; etc.). In this manner, improving from 7 to 6 is as easy (or difficult) as improving from 3 to 2, or 2 to 1. FH approach is stationary in the sense that it calculates the state of freedom, rather than the necessary effort required to reach a 'status.' The following example attempts to plainly prove the logic behind my suggestion. In bicycling industry an average mountain bike cost approximately $500. It is the lower end, though still standard. If someone wants to improve the brake system, it can be easily done (minimal cost). If someone wants to improve brakes, seat, tires, tubes, and other typical components, the total cost would go up perhaps to $700. In practice, with some minimal effort, the quality has gone up significantly. At this point, everything that may be improved (cost effectively) is considered. Next, if one decides to improve the gear system and weight of the bike, specialized material and redesigning of the system will be required. But, doing so will increase the cost significantly, perhaps up to $3000. If we are going to participate in the Tour of France, incredible amount of study, including aerodynamics, contact friction, human efficiency, comfort, etc. has to be performed to optimize the system (bicycle and the rider). Even though the technological improvement might seem insignificant to unprofessional riders, since simpler improvements have been already implemented, every little change and improvement will be extremely costly. The cost of the bicycle, say, may go up to $15,000 to $20,000. In sum, at the cutting edge of the technology, the cost of improvement increases drastically; that is, the slope of cost becomes higher. In other words, the degree of improvement is increasingly decreasing, although the cost increases.

Following the same logic, it appears that the uniform spacing (i.e., 1 to 2, 2 to 3, etc.) presented in FH system may not be applicable in all cases. If it is desired to correct the slope (from a constant slope to a variable slope) the proper approach would be to collect data in a specific case (e.g. education improvement at a specific year); plot them and fit the data to a 'trend.' It may be logarithmic, exponential, polynomial of degree 'x,' or other forms of a trend. This approach is accurate and provides data about the variable slope between points. The drawback of the accurate system may be not having enough data due to cost, man power, or lack of collaboration of the country. It also may change every year.

The alternative approach may be to use the scale analysis, also called order of magnitude analysis (order of magnitude of one is from 1 to 9. Order of magnitude of 10 is from 10 to 99, etc.) The order of magnitude analysis provides the general shape of the changing slope or curve. This approach is utilized to convert the constant slope of FH system to a changing slope. By doing so, it will consider, in a general sense, the effort that would take to go from a lower 'grade' to a higher one. This trend may simply be reached by inversing FH grading system. This means that 7 becomes 1/7, 6 will be 1/6, so on and so forth. In this manner, the effort of a given country in a given year to get to a higher grade is considered as shown in Graph 3 (in which the y axis represents the cost or effort, and the vertical axis represents the 1/FH grade.) In this figure, the slope of improving the system to go from 7 to 6 (on the horizontal axis) is much smaller than going from 2 to 1. Note that the slope is defined as the vertical length dividend by the horizontal length. Since the horizontal length is divided uniformly and are equal, the slope simply may be referred to as the vertical length. (The longer/taller the vertical length, the higher the slope.) Next the data obtained from FH (2011) was compared to a several trends. The best trend obtained was the polynomial degree four as shown in the equation below.

$$Y = 0.003x^4 - 0.059x^3 + 0.4276x^2 - 1.4022x + 2.0282$$

Where Y is the grade of the system (including the 'effort') and x is FH grade. The result is presented in Graph 3 and 4.

Graph 3: FH Grading



Now consider the FH trend juxtaposed to the polynomial degree 4 trend presented in Graph 4.

Graph 4: The FH Grade and the Polynomial Degree 4 Trend.



Regarding Graph 3, consider the areas of the two triangles at each end of the trend. The areas show the amount of effort needed for an improvement. Clearly, as it goes up from 7 to 1 the areas of triangles increase, and therefore the development becomes more costly and less easy to achieve. (Recall the example of the bicycle and how improvement takes more effort since the system is already saturated, that is, going from 7 to 6 takes less effort than going from 2 to 1.)

Regarding Graph 4, the trends show that the polynomial degree 4 closely matches the FH slope, and may be used to evaluate the effort that takes to reach a fraction number (e.g. 3.5 or 5.75, etc.). Having said this, in order to lay out a simple mathematical correlation between FH's factors and those of HDI in an attempt to set forth a formula in which FH's and HDI's rankings are incorporated, FH and HDI should be scaled. That is, HDI's range is from 1 (maximum or best) to 0 (minimum or worst), whereas FH's results goes from 1 (maximum, or best) to 7 (minimum, or worst). By inversing 1 to 7 (i.e., 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{5}$, $\frac{1}{6}$, $\frac{1}{7}$), as explained above, FH's results increase ($\frac{1}{7}_{min}$ → 1_{max}) in the same fashion as HDI (0_{min} → 1_{max}). Note that although HDI theoretically considers 0 to be its starting point, in practice, it never begins from 0 because when it is multiplied by the other factors, the final outcome will be 0. This combination of FH and HDI, as presented in the following formula, depicts an incomprehensive picture of the state of freedom in a given country.

$$Full\ Freedom\ (FF) = \sqrt[5]{\frac{L.E.I}{PR\ .CL}}$$

(PR . CL) is FH, and (L . E . I) is HDI's original formula. It is helpful to juxtapose the level of PR and CL, as measured by FH, the calculation of HDI, and results obtained according to the suggested formula (FF). Pay special attention to the ordering of the countries as presented in Graph 5 (compare the ordering with Graphs 1 and 2).

Graph 5: FF



Evidently, the counties' ordering changes, as the criteria for the measurement vary.

i. FH (Graph 1): Turkey (no. 2) > Pakistan (no. 6)> Iran (no. 16) > Saudi Arabia (no. 19)

ii. HDI (Graph 2): Saudi Arabia (no. 5)> Iran (no. 9) > Turkey (no. 11)> Pakistan (no. 19)

iii. FF (Graph 5): Turkey (no. 2) > Saudi Arabia (no. 11) > Iran (no. 13) > Pakistan (no. 17)

The key is not that the ordering just changes. It is obvious that it has to change, since more factors are taken into the calculation. The key is that the ordering is better modified and more sensible (e.g., unlike FH's calculation, Pakistan is not ranked highly any longer, and unlike HDI, Saudi Arabia does not occupy such a high place in comparison to other countries like Turkey.) It is absolutely critical to mark that the formula shows the magnitude of order, that is, countries rankings without being too much concerned with the precise number of any given country. In brief, the strengths of the new formula are its comprehensiveness (i.e., being sensible to standard of living as well as political and civic liberties), which increases its sensibility and simplicity. Being simple, however, should not be understood as being vulgar. In fact, even taking it as vulgar does not disvalue the formula as far as it is not falsified and replaced by a better formula. When Amartya Sen was asked by economist Haq to calculate and present the state of human development in given countries by a number, 'Sen says with a smile, 'I told him that this would be very vulgar." Haq replies, "Yes, I want a measure that is just as vulgar as GNP except it is better" (Sen 2004, 5). I hope FF advances the measurement of freedom, even if it is vulgar.

Bibliography

Anand, Sudhir, and Amartya Sen. 1994. "Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement." Human Development Report Office Occasional Paper. New York. Seen at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/papers/oc12.pdf (20 October 2012).

Berlin, Isaiah. 1969. *Four Essays on Liberty*. London: Oxford University Press.

Berlin, Isaiah, and Ramin Jahanbegloo. 1991.*Conversation with Isaiah Berlin*. NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Bollen, Kenneth A. 1986. "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: an Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (4):567–91.

Bollen, Kenneth A., and Pamela Paxton. 2000. "Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (1): 58–86.

Chatterjee, Deen, and Lynette E. Sieger. 2011. "Sen, Amartya." In *Encyclopedia of Global Justice*, edited by Deen Chatterjee, 987-993. New York: Springer.

Feinberg, Joel. 1973. *Rights, Justice, and the Bunds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy*. NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gabor, D. and A. Gabor. 1954. "An Essay on the Mathematical Theory of Freedom*," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, General, 117 (1): 31-72.

Giannone, Diego. 2010. "Political and Ideological Aspects in the Measurement of Democracy: the Freedom House case." *Democratization* 17 (1): 68–97.

Humana, Charles. 1992. *World Human Rights Guide*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Landman, Todd. 2004. "Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy." *Human Rights Quarterly* 26 (26): 906-931.

Lawson, Edward. 1996. *Encyclopedia of Human Rights*. Washington, DC: Taylor and Francis.

McCallum, G. C. 1967. "Negative and Positive Freedom." *Philosophical Review* 76(3): 312-334.

Miller, David. 2007. "National Responsibility and International Justice." In *The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distance Needy*, edited by Deen Chatterjee, 123-147. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Odello,Marco. 2011. "Indigenous Rights in the Constitutional State." In *Emerging Areas of Human Rights in the 21st Century: The Role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, edited by Marco Odello and Sofia Cavandoli, 106-128. London: Routledge.

Sen, Amartya. 1987. "Food and Freedom." In *A World to Make: Development in Perspective*, edited by Francis X Sutton. NJ, 1990.

Sen, Amartya. 2004. "Freedom as Progress." In *Finance & Development*, interviewed by Laura Wallace, 4-7. Seen at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/09/pdf/people.pdf (20 October 2012).

Sen, Amartya. 2005. "Human Rights and Capabilities." *Journal of Human Development* 6 (2):151-166.

Scoble, Harry, and LaurieWiseberg. 1981. "Problems of Comparative Research in Human Rights." In *Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures and NGO Strategies*, ed. Ved Nanda, James Scarritt, and George Shepherd, 147–71. Boulder, C.O.:Westview.

Taylor, Charles. 1979. "What's Wrong with Negative liberty?" In *The Idea of Freedom*, edited by Alan Ryan, 175-93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ideal and Beyond:

Idealist International Relations Theory Contrast to Realist One

Hakan Mehmetcik

Hakan Mehmetcik, 32, is a graduate student who received his BA in "International Relations" at the Istanbul University, in Turkey, in 2006. In 2009, he obtained an MA in Economics at the Dalarna University, and another MS in Eurasian Studies at the Uppsala University in 2010, in Sweden. He currently studies at the Yildiz Technical University as a Ph.D. student and works as a research assistant at the Department of International Relations at Isik University in Turkey. His interests cover security studies, regionalism, theory of international relations and peace and conflict studies in general. On his Ph.D. studies, he specializes on coercive diplomacy, deterrence and nuclear extended deterrence issues.

Abstract

There is now a substantial body of theory on international relations. However, to understand theories of International Relations, we need to focus on the history of the discipline, which somehow always starts with idealist theory of International Relations. Therefore, it is worth to plunging into the debate on the structure of idealist International Relations theory to grab the essence of the dynamics and aims of the attempts that theorists try to address in the International Relations. This effort also consists of finding out the use and abuse of theory within the discipline as an attempt to point out the myth functions in International Relations theories. The paper aims to present idealist theory of International Relations by pinpointing differences with realist impulses on human nature, the nature of international relations, and cyclical view of history.

Keywords: Idealist International Relations Theory; Theory of International Relations; Realist – Idealist Debate

Introduction

There are certain debates on International Relations. The first debate is on the context of IR. What is the study of IR? Is it about just the relations between states or does it consist of many other things? Some argues that it was about international relations, yet as globalization push forward now it consists of many other relations and actors. Even some argues the very name of international relations should be changed (Holsti 1985). Is it a science or an art? What should an IR scholar focus on and how should he/she do that? These sorts of questions are common for all social sciences while it is more relevant for IR. Wight argues that IR is not a science (but a pseudoscience as Kuhn put it) and therefore there is no international relations theory (Wight 1960). Who are the main actors? What are the borders of IR with other disciplines such as History, Economics, or Sociology? All these are interrelated with the debates of behaviorists and traditionalists. The second debate is on the discipline itself (Schmidt 1997). When did it flourish? Where did it start and why there? Some argue that it flourished in ancient Greek city states (Eralp 1996:37) as some others argue that its roots could be detected back at the times after the French Revolution (Derian 1998:3). There are views that point to its beginning at the Westphalia Peace, which led the birth of modern nation states (Bull 1972:30-55) as another very large group of scholars argue that it has started in the early 1900s. This "debate culture" has been so penetrated within the discipline that the history of the discipline has always been explained by some uncertain and imperceptible debates—the so called "great debates" (Maghroori and Ramberg 1982; Arend 1974; Derian 1998; Holsti 1985; Viotti and Kauppi 1998).

Idealist international relations theory is a by-product of one of these so-called great debates in the discipline. Even though there is no one who calls himself an idealist (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith 2010), idealist theory of IR has rich historical roots which uncover both the history of the discipline and most of the answers to the questions above. Therefore it is not just a coincidence that almost any book on IR theories starts with idealist IR theory. However, as like everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, has an opponent, an anti-thesis as Marx put it using a Hegelian philosophy (Kaufmann 1988). Idealist theory has its own—realism—and the best way to understand idealism is to compare to realist IR theory. With regard to this interpretation, in this work, I aim to explain idealist theory by contrast to realism. To do that, however, I will touch upon firstly the history and the context of the conditions that bring up idealist theory at the beginning of the early 1900s as a first theory of IR and the reasons that pave the way for idealist return after the end of the Cold War.

The Birth of Idealist Theory

Every theory is a child of its time (Maalouf 2011:170). It is, thus, highly instructive to look at the conditions that pave the way for a theory emerging as a tool for understanding the essence of dynamics in world affairs. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the history of the discipline to understand any IR theory. In this sense, IR is a child of early 1900s as a scientific discipline beginning in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War just as like idealism as a child of the same times. The first Department of International Politics was founded at Aberystwyth University in the United Kingdom. A similar development was taking place in the United States in 1919. Just months after the establishment of the first department of IR in UK, Georgetown University founded the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the oldest program in International Relations in this country, whose initial aim was actually to provide education for the prospective diplomats. In 1920, the London School of Economics followed suit, founding its own Department of International Relations and, in 1928, the University of Chicago founded the Committee on International Relations as its own department of IR. After these first attempts to boost scientific support for world peace, within a decade more than ten schools had been established. The aim was simple—to prevent any other possible devastation like World War I. Even David Davies, who was an industrialist and supported the first department at the Aberystwyth University by a huge financial support, indented bringing worldwide peace and preventing future war. Sir Alfred Zimmern, the first holder of the chair in this very first faculty of IR at that department as well as the most polished idealist writers of his time, pursued this pacifist vision eagerly (Markwell 1986). They all were very much men of their time, products of the pacifistic tendencies of the interwar period. There were other attempts as well. Establishing international organizations such as the League of Nations, which was the first international organization whose principal mission was to maintain world peace, was one of them. The President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson was one of the leading statesman who promoted idealism and his 14 points was kind of "Magna Carta" for idealist agenda. Even popular movies of the era, such as "All Quiet on the Western Front" promoted the view that war was futile and should never happen again (Milestone 1930). It is not a surprised that Norman Angell's book Great Illusions, (Angell 2009), one of the best-known works prior to WWI, argued that war became futile between industrial nations because it did not pay off. All in all, at the backbone of idealist birth lays the necessity of the times. Just after the devastation of World War I, scientist, leaders, artists, human rights promoters, civil societies and all others could only think about preventing another devastation by being equipped with international law, institutions, and peaceful engagement believing in idealism.

The Core of Idealist Theory With Contrast to Realism

Nonetheless, the idealist agenda was not enough to prevent upcoming wars and devastations. All of a sudden many turned their back to idealism and started speaking the realist language with the beginning of World War II. E.H. Carr, a British Scholar, one of the father of realist theory of IR, the producer of the very name "idealist", criticized idealists as being "utopian" who profoundly misread the facts of history and misunderstood the nature of international relations (Carr 2001). According to him, international relations are far more about conflict than about cooperation (Jackson and Sørensen 2010:37). The other realist scholars followed suit one after another such as Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Kennan, Wolfers, etc. Here I will not plunge into the realist inside debates or their assumptions on the world politics. Some of what is proposed by realism, however, is the key to understand, I think, very core of idealist assumptions. In this regard, lets look at basic assumptions of idealism on light of realist critics within three categories: human nature, the nature of international relations, and cyclical view of history.

The first assumption is on human nature. In particular, in Morgenthau's writing, human nature plays an important role in the reason to understand why international politics is so conflictual. Using Hobbes interpretation of "state of nature" in which human life is poor, nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes 2013), Morgenthau puts the absolute centrality of power relations in his scheme of human affairs (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 2005). As a result of this interpretation of human nature realists see international affairs as power politics in which every states takes part on their own. It was not difficult to find evidence to think in this way in the late 1930s. On the other hand, idealist thought that human nature is actually changeable using Kant's argument on human philosophy. Kant basically argues that we all shape our experience of things through the filter of our mind. That is, it is possible to determine our future experience, that is, it is possible to teach and learn peace, in practical terms. Furthermore, in a well-known essay, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" Kant described his proposed peace program. Perpetual peace is arguably seen as the point of departure for idealist agenda. But later on, one of the most important figure in the Neo-Realist circles, Kenneth Waltz, would argue that even if it is possible to spread peace through educations, institutions, laws, any state could not wait for that times comes and trust such an agenda to leave its security (Waltz 2001). In a similar fashion, Niebuhr pointed out that realists (the children of darkness) are evil because they know no law beyond the self. They are wise, though evil, because they understand the power of self-interest. Idealists (the children of light) are virtuous because they have some conception of a higher law than their own will. They are usually foolish because they do not know the power of self-will. They underestimate the peril of anarchy in both the national and the international community (Niebuhr 2011).

The second assumption is on the nature of international relations. Realists see international politics, like all politics, as a struggle for power. As long as there is no supreme power, no higher authority and no world government, international politics would be anarchic in which sovereign and armed states faces each other. So, the regularity element in this system of state is "international anarchy". Sole response of states to this international anarchy rhetoric, from a realist point of view of course, is to maintain power to secure survival and other national interests within a self-help system (Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton 2005; Waltz 2010; Mearsheimer 2003; Bull 2002). For idealist, there are reasons to believe in the other way around, since international relations, from an idealist point of view, are not just about a struggle for power and survival or simply national interests. Therefore, there are many ways to tame the conflictual aspects of international politics through trade, international laws, and international institutions, building trust and cooperation, mutual benefits and understanding. Liberal idealists or democratic peace theorists argue that there are many reasons to believe that international relations could be tamed. For instance, Russett and Oneal describe a "Kantian Triangle" which consists of democracies, international institutions and economic interdependence. For the past couple of decades, all these three phenomena are rising by mutually reinforcing each other and by creating multidirectional relations among both sates and non-states actors (Oneal and Russett 2000). Thus, there are many reasons to believe that international relations are more about cooperation than conflicts.

The last assumption is the cyclical view of history. For realist, history is nothing more than a vicious circle. Each generation tends to make the same mistake as previous generations have done (Jackson and Sørensen 2010:39). Change is possible only in terms of balance of power. Contrary to this pessimistic view of realism, idealists see that qualitative change for the better is possible. Hegel regarded history as progressive and reason (freedom) was something that would self-actualize in the world. Freedom, the essence of reason, was to be realized along with the development of history. Departing from this Hegelian reading of progressive history, Fukuyama even claimed that Western liberal democracy is the final form of human government (Fukuyama 2006). In sum, idealist view of history is a progressive one (a journey from good to the best) which is to be seen as bringing global peace.

Conclusion

Popular wisdom during the early period of the academic discipline of IR was that international peace was only possible if classical ideas about the balance of military power were replaced by a system of collective security. President Woodrow Wilson famously articulated similar ideas in his 1918 "Fourteen Points" speech, which later became the foundation for the League of Nations. The key issues emphasized by Wilson were the need for open diplomacy, a reduction in armaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety," and respect for the territorial integrity of all sovereign states. (Burchill et al., 2013). However, Robert D. Kaplan warns us about these kinds of expectations that emerged after almost all victories. He argues that "Victory in World War I saw a burst of such idealism under the banner of "Wilsonianism," a notion that took little account of the real goals of America's European allies and even less account of the realities in the Balkans and the Near East, where democracy and freedom meant heightened ethnic awareness. The same pattern followed the West's victory in the Cold War, which many believed would bring simply freedom and prosperity under the banners of "democracy" and "free markets." But just as after World War I and World War II, our victory has ushered in the next struggle for survival, in which evil wears new masks."(Kaplan, 2001: xi). Layne points out that wars had been usually avoided not because of peaceful dispute resolution as democratic peace theories suggest but because of the factors that realist school of IR bring about such as deterrence, coercion and force (Layne1994). And finally Mead draws our attention to that latest developments suggest old power politics back on the stage by saying "So far, the year 2014 has been a tumultuous one, as geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage. Whether it is Russian forces seizing Crimea, China making aggressive claims in its coastal waters, Japan responding with an increasingly assertive strategy of its own, or Iran trying to use its alliances with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East, old-fashioned power plays are back in international relations." (R. Mead, 2014). Or in a similar direction Robert Kagan put it as following "Hopes for a new peaceful international order after the end of the Cold War have been dashed by sobering realities: Great powers are once again competing for honor and influence. Nation-states remain as strong as ever, as do the old, explosive forces of ambitious nationalism. The world remains "unipolar," but international competition among the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, and Iran raise new threats of regional conflict. Communism is dead, but a new contest between western liberalism and the great eastern autocracies of Russia and China has re-injected ideology into geopolitics. Finally, radical Islamists are waging a violent struggle against the modern secular cultures and powers that, in their view, have dominated, penetrated, and polluted their Islamic world. The grand expectation that after the Cold War the world would enter an era of international geopolitical convergence has proven wrong." (Kagan, 2009:115).

All these interpretation of the world affairs are byproduct of very core assumptions on human nature, the nature of international relations, and cyclical view of history, on which idealists and realists differ greatly. Jean-Jacques Rousseau described a situation in which five primitive man go out for a hunt. At this group of people hunting a stag collectively, a hare comes within the reach of one hunter. He can certainly get the hare by himself, but this action would ruin the stag hunt. Rousseau argues that he would ruin the hunt in any way: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." (Rousseau 2010:98)

This is taken to be an important analogy for realist to explain why cooperation is not possible. What if, then, we try to complete the story? What would happen the day after the hunt? The hunter who hunts the hare would be hungry again. The rest of the group would be angry with him for obvious reasons. Would he not regret what he had done on hunting day? Would he not try to convince the others come together and go out for hunt again? There are thousands of possibilities that you can find. However, it all depends on your perception. Like it depends on which theory you would choose to explain and understand international relations.

Robert Cox claims that every theory speaks for someone and for some purpose (Cox 1981). Cynthia Weber proclaimed that if IR theory narrates a particular view of the world from the perspective of various IR traditions, an IR myth is what helps make a particular view of the world appear to be true. The myth function in IR theory is the transformation of what is particular, cultural, and ideological (like a story told by an IR tradition, or a story Rousseau told us) into what appears to be universal, natural, and purely empirical. It is naturalizing meanings, making them into common sense, that are the products of cultural practices. Put another way, the myth function in IR theory is making a fact out of an interpretation (Weber 2009:6-7). The debate between realism and idealism does the same thing in the same way. It naturalizes different meanings, by making them into different common sense, that are the products of different cultural practices. That is, they create different myth functions in IR theory to make a fact out of an interpretation.

Bibliography

Angell, Sir Norman. 2009. *The Great Illusion*, 1933: A Summarized and Rearranged Version of "the Great Illusion" Published in 1910. Cornell University Library.

Arend, Lijphart. 1974. "International Relations Theory: Great Debates And Lesser Debates." *International Social Science Journal* 26: 11–21.

Bull, Hedley. 1972. "The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969." In Brian Porter *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics* 1919-69, Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2002. *The Anarchical Society*. 3rd ed. Columbia University Press.

Burchill, Scott et al., 2013. *Theories of International Relations*, 5th edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carr, E. H. 2001. *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Edited by Michael Cox. Palgrave Macmillan.

Cox, R. W. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 10 (2): 126–55. doi: 10.1177/03058298810100020501.

Derian, James Der. 1998. *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics*. Edited by Michael J. Shapiro. 1st Edition. Lexington Books.

Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. 2010. *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Second Edition. Oxford University Press, USA.

Eralp, Atilla. 1996. *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*. Atilla Eralp. istanbul: İletişim.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2006. *The End of History and the Last Man*. Reprint. Free Press.

Hobbes, Thomas. 2013. *Leviathan*. Empire Books.

Holsti, K. J. 1985. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. HarperCollins Publishers Ltd.

Jackson, Robert, and Georg Sørensen. 2010. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press, USA.

Kaplan, Robert D., 2001. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, Reprint edition, New York: Vintage.

Kagan, Robert, 2009. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Vintage edition, New York: Vintage.

Kaufmann, Walter. 1988. *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*. University of Notre Dame Press.

Layne, Christopher 1994. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19(2) (October 1,1994): 5–49.

Maalouf, Amin. 2011. *Disordered World: Setting a New Course for the Twenty-First Century*. Tra. Bloomsbury USA.

Maghroori, Ray, and Bennett Ramberg. 1982. *Globalism versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate*. Westview Press.

Markwell, D. J. 1986. "Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On." *Review of International Studies* 12 (4): 279–92. doi:10.2307/20097090.

Mead, Walter R., 2014. "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 93(4): 115–25.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2003. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Reprint. W. W. Norton & Company.

Milestone, Lewis. 1930. *All Quiet on the Western Front*. Drama, War.

Morgenthau, Hans, Kenneth Thompson, and David Clinton. 2005. *Politics Among Nations*. 7th ed. McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. 2011. *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense*. University Of Chicago Press.

Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 2000. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. W. W. Norton & Company.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. 2010. *A Discourse On Inequality*. Kessinger Publishing, LLC.

Schmidt, Brian C. 1997. *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations*. State University of New York Press.

Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. 1998. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*. 3rd ed. Pearson.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. 1st ed. Waveland Press Inc.

———. 2001. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Revised. Columbia University Press.

Weber, Cynthia. 2009. *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*. 3rd ed. Routledge.

Wight, Martin. 1960. "Why Is There No International Theory?" *International Relations* 2(1): 35–48. doi: 10.1177/004711786000200104.

The Pattern of China's Global Activity:

Foreign Policy Instruments in Central Asia and Africa

Akbikesh Mukhtarova

Akbikesh Mukhtarova, 30, is a graduate who received her Bachelor Degree with Merit at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan in 2008. In 2010, she obtained a Masters Degree in Peace and Security Studies (M.P.S) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH)/University of Hamburg. She wrote her Master thesis on "A Comparative Analysis of Confidence and Security Building Measures in European and Asian Security Structures: the OSCE and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization" and currently as an Erasmus Mundus scholarship holder (2012-2014) she is doing her second Master`s Degree in Public Policy at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), the Hague, the Netherlands and the Institut Barcelona d`Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), Barcelona, Spain. Her research interests include peace and conflict studies, public policy, in particular, institutions and institutional change and political behavior.

Abstract: In this work, first, the question of conceptualization of "Power" in the Theory of International Relations will be analyzed. Secondly, I will investigate which type of "power" China is exercising in the neighboring Central Asian region as well as the geographically remote African continent. To be exact, I will apply the classification of power suggested by researchers Barnett and Duvall (2005): ***compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power*** to analyze the question: which instruments or type of power is using China in order to spread its influence in the aforementioned areas? In closing, this paper argues that both in Central Asia and Africa China is not using any kind of compulsory power instead prefers to exercise other forms of power such as, for instance, institutional and productive powers.

Keywords: Africa, Central Asia, Foreign Policy Instruments, Classification of Power

1. Introduction.

In the present paper, I have an intention to answer the following ***research questions:***

- Does China use a similar pattern: the same foreign policy instruments to spread its political, economic and cultural influence in the neighboring Central Asian region and the geographically remote African continent?
- What are the main limitations the Realism school of thought (e.g. John J. Mearsheimer 2014) to explain China's influence in Central Asia and Africa?
- What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the concept of power suggested by researchers Barnett and Duvall (2005) to analyze China's foreign policy patterns and instruments?

Hypothesis:

Could we assume that due to historical, political and cultural environment differences (in Central Asia and Africa), China is using different instruments to spread its influence in the aforementioned areas or is the present assumption wrong, and China uses the same pattern: foreign policy instruments in both regions.

2. Conceptualization of Power in Theory of International Relations

The concept of power is widely used in International Relations terminology. I concur with the statement of the researcher K. Boulding: "because power is a multidimensional concept, it is difficult to quantify and measure it." (Boulding 1989, 20). Since power is a multidimensional concept, International Relations theorists suggest different typologies of power such as: Civilian Power (Duchêne 1972; Duchêne 1973), Destructive, Productive and Integrative Power (Boulding 1989), hard and soft power (Morgenthau1950a; Morgenthau 1950b, 833-54; Nye 2000, 153-71), Normative Power (Manners 2002, 235–58; Manners 2008, 45-60), direct and indirect power; as well as the classification of different dimensions: political, military, economic, informational-technological power.

How is it possible to define "Power"? The notion of hard or real power presumably means consideration of power from the realist theoretical school perspective. Meaning consideration of power as availability of particular political, economic instruments, in order to "influence another to do what it would not otherwise do." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 13) The present assumption of consideration of power from the realist school perspective was dominant for many years among International Relations scholars. However, one limitation of this approach was the confusion of the notion of "power" with "force." As Boulding correctly mentions: “Force is linked to the concept of domination, which indeed, is only a small part of the general nature of power. There is a certain tendency among humans to identify power with the capacity for victory that is, overcoming some other person, will, or institution.” (Boulding 1989, 16). The researcher Boulding suggests his own classifications of power, adding destructive and also productive and integrative power. Under destructive power he understands “different aspects, reflected in means of destruction (arms forces, weapons etc.)” (Boulding 1989, 24), in contrast *productive and integrative power* he defines as powers that: “involve the capacity to build organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire loyalty, to bind people together, to develop legitimacy.” (Boulding 1989, 25)

Thus, as we see, Boulding goes beyond the realist notion in understanding power. Already by the beginning of 1970's ideas of consideration of power not only as an instrument of political pressure, but also in other forms such as economic cooperation were becoming more popular. In 1972 François Duchêne suggested to consider Europe as a „civilian power‟ which was „long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne 1973, 19) As it is visible the researcher argues that power could be considered not only in its narrow, but in a broad meaning: as power to spread values, civilian norms and particular models of political institutions. At the beginning of the 1990's an American researcher Joseph Nye coined the notion of “soft power” which he defines as “power to make other want the same as yourself.” (Nye 1990, 153-71)

The understanding of power in the works of Ian Manners (2009) “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms” is also alluring. He suggests the consideration of the power of Europe not from the realist or liberalist schools, but from the English School perspective. Manners assumes that member states of a pluralistic security community, to be exact of the European Union, not just form a particular type of identity that distinguishes them from others, but also exercise a different type of power –normative power in its external relations. Thus, Manners distinguishes different types of actions/powers that the EU uses such as Persuasion and argumentation; Invoking norms; Shaping the discourse; Showing example; Conferral of prestige or shame. (Manners 2002 in Gerrits 2009, 31).

Evidently, American and European researchers distinguish different dimensions of power. However, the question may arise: why is there such a long discourse to the problem of conceptualization of Power and how does this relate to China’s foreign policy? I suppose some of aforementioned definitions of power have certain limitations. One of them, from my point of view, is the consideration of power only in one dimension, for instance, hard power as a military strength and/or pressure, soft power as a spread of influence due to culture and education, normative power as invoking and shaping norms.

In this paper I would like to draw your attention to and suggest considering the question of China's influence in Central Asia and Africa through the typology of power, which was elaborated in year 2005 by researchers Raymond Duvall and Michael Barnett. I concur with the statement of these authors that: "power is essentially contested concept…and works in various forms and has various expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2).

Barnett and Duvall suggest the following typology of power: *compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power*.

Compulsory power concept in Barnett and Duvall understanding resembles a realism school approach: "it operates, for example, when one state threatens another and says: "change your policies or else."(Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3).

In contrast to Compulsory **- Institutional Power** refers to "indirect control over others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long term advantage and to the disadvantage of others." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3) Actors, while exercising this type of power, are paying more attention to formal and informal institutions, norms and practices.

Institutional Power should not be confused with **Structural Power**; that operates with broader concepts and instruments such as "one expression of this form of power is the working capitalist world-economy in producing social positions of capital and labor with their respective different abilities to alter circumstances and fortunes." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3) Structural power is not just about exercising indirect control through institutions, but rather about construction and promotion of particular models of social – economic development such as, for example, The Washington Consensus or in our case the Beijing Model, etc.

Lastly researchers distinguish **Productive Power**, which is "the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification." (Barnett and Duval 2005, 3). Put simply, it means operationalization with particular norms and standards or "labels": such as: "civilized", "rogue state", "European", "unstable" "Western", "Democratic" etc. (Ibid. 21).

It is a visible present typology of power suggested by Barnett and Duvall and is quite comprehensive and encompasses different dimensions of power. To my point of view, the usage of this typology of power gives more possibilities to unpack the problem and to consider the influence of China in Central Asia and Africa in all its manifestations.

3. China's Foreign Policy Concepts and Limitations of the Realism School

Before making an extensive analysis of China's exercise of power in Central Asia and Africa based on Barnetts and Duvall's classification, let us pay attention to the evolution of foreign policy concepts of China. I suppose such a short overview is essential, as it will give us the possibility to understand how the notion of "Power" is differently interpreted or comprehended by Chinese foreign policy makers rather than by their Western colleagues.

The American scholar John J. Mearsheimer (2010) argues that: "Beijing does not possess ***a formidable military*** today, and it is certainly in no position to pick a fight with the United States. This is not to say that China is a paper tiger, but it does not have the capability to cause much trouble, even in the Asia-Pacific region. However, that situation is expected to change markedly over time, in which case China will have ***significant offensive capability***. Then, we will see how committed it is to the status quo. But right now we cannot tell much about China's future behavior because it has such *limited capability* ***to act aggressively***." (Mearsheimer 2010, 381–396)

As is visible from the position of Mearsheimer, he understands and measures the power of China (and the US) only in terms of offensive capability. To my point of view such understanding of power has certain serious limitations such as a serious underestimation of other capabilities of China. Probably what Mearsheimer sees as the weakness could be considered as a strength and a key to success of China. If we look to foreign policy concepts of China it is clear that China currently has enough capabilities to act both peacefully and aggressively, but to act aggressively seems to China to be unnecessary as such behavior could cause unnecessary fear of the world community and may alienate both developed and developing countries from China.

For many years China has been following foreign policy strategy which is based on works such politicians as Zheng Bijian as well as Deng Xiaoping (1970-s of "Peaceful Rise Concept" which main slogan sounds: "Hide Brightness, Nourish Obscurity" (Leonard 2008, 112)

As the researcher Leonard writes that ancient Chinese scholars distinguish between two kinds of order: ***The Wang-*** "centered around a dominant superpower, but its primacy based on benign government rather on coercion or territorial expansion." (Leonard 2008, 112). This concept was applied to neighboring countries. And also **The "Ba"** concept was a classic hegemonic system: "where the most powerful nation imposed order on its periphery through force" (Leonard 2008, 112)

For many centuries, China was following present foreign policy concepts in relation to foreign countries. If we look to the 20th century, after 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China, we see that Chinese scholars and politicians intentionally followed the course directed on hiding the rise and economic development of China from the outer world. For instance, in 1970 the scholar Zheng Bijian and later, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the "Peaceful Rise Concept" of China, which was based on principles: "Hide Brightness, Nourish Obscurity" (1970-s). In order for the world not to see the Chinese rise as a threat, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed a foreign policy concept, which later became known as the foreign policy formula of "24 hieroglyphs." Xiaoping argued that China in order to be successful both in domestic and foreign policy the country has to follow only few rules: to stay "in the shadows", "calmly observe", "stay strongly on feet's", "behave modestly", "do not pretend to be a leader" (or "do not show that the country is pretending to become a leader." (Shestakov 2012)

In his public speeches Deng Xiaoping has stressed that China will not follow the road of Germany and Japan after the First and Second World Wars. Also, it will not act as the Soviet Union which cut off relations with other countries. On the contrary, "China would be integrated into economic globalization, providing markets and economic opportunities for the rest of the world." (Leonard 2008: 89) Following this wise strategic foreign policy concept China achieved remarkable results in a very short period. A discourse analysis of speeches of Chinese politicians at 1980, 1990, and later 2000 on official diplomatic visits to Asian countries, Latin America, Africa would reveal often used words such as "win-win situation," "development and aid," "mutual understanding." (Hu Jintao 2005, Xi Jinping 2014). However, currently (approximately after 2010) it feels like a change in the discourse. For instance, proclamation of such concepts of development as a "Chinese Dream" (2012) could signalize a significant shift from the principle of hiding of the leadership to acknowledgement of China's superior role in the world economy and politics. Currently, military experts argue that China should play a more active role and: "abandon its victim complex" (Leonard 2008, 89).

Summarizing some points for this sub-Chapter it possible to come to the conclusion that the argument of Mearsheimer is not convincing enough. China is capable of showing its power and already is indeed showing it, but in different manifestations using different rhetoric and foreign policy instruments.

In the next Chapter using Barnett and Duvall's classification of power, we will analyze the question: what kind of instrument and types of power is China applying in Central Asia and Africa?

4. China's Exercise of Power in Central Asia

It is possible to distinguish different periods in the development of mutual relations between China and the five Central Asian Republics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the appearance on the political map near the Chinese border of newly independent Central Asian states, all sides were interested in clarification of the questions concerning border issues. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (countries bordering China) created one joint delegation in their negotiations with China. On the agenda were not only the questions of delimitation and demarcation of borders but also confidence-building measures (CBMs) and reduction of military forces in border areas. After six years of negotiations, finally on 26 April 1996 in Shanghai during the Summit meeting by the Heads of Russia, three Central Asian states and China the Shanghai agreement of 1996 was signed. One year later, the Moscow Agreement 1997 was signed with four additional protocols defining the area of CBMs application, verification and compliance measures. Those documents became cornerstone documents of the Shanghai Five. After the joining of Uzbekistan in 2001, the country that does not have common borders with China, the Shanghai Five was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The next period starting from 2001, after 9/11 and the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, China was mainly concerned with military-security questions in its relations with Central Asian countries. Afghanistan has common borders with three SCO full member states: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China and two the SCO observer countries: Pakistan and Iran. This means that Afghanistan is surrounded almost from all sides by the SCO countries. Officially Afghanistan does not request observer status or full membership in the organization till 2011. [6]Instability in Afghanistan leads to increasing the flow of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorist

[6] Shanghai Cooperation Organization granted Afghanistan observer status in 2012.

networks. Taking into account these facts, China as well as Russia during this period was concerned mainly with security issues, and in 2001 countries decided to establish the SCO Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RAS). The main aim of RAS became: the fight against "3-isms": terrorism, extremism and separatism.

If we look at the period starting from 2011until the present time, it is possible to observe a further institutionalization process of the SCO, in particular in the economic field. For instance, on the 6 th of December 2013 the SCO members as well as observer states and dialogue partners (Afghanistan, Belarus, India, Mongolia, Shri-Lanka, Turkey) signed the Memorandum on establishment of the SCO Energy Club. Unfortunately, the text of the Memorandum was not published in the media and also was not available on the official web-site of the Organization. From media sources and interviews of government authorities it is known that the Energy Club has the following goals: "to enhance dialogue among member states to ensure energy security, harmonization of energy policies, coordination and comprehensive discussion of strategies for cooperation in various energy sectors." (Yanovski 2013) In spite of skepticism towards functionality of the present structure, some European authors argue the Energy club cannot become Asian alternative of OPEC, the role of the SCO Energy Club should not be underestimated. At least taking into account that: "The SCO members states together hold about 25% of world oil reserves, more than 50% of global gas reserves, 35% of coal, and about half of the world's known uranium reserves." (Bushyev and Pervukhin 2013)

After this overview, the question may arise: how is it possible to measure the power and influence of China in CA region? Let us now apply Barnett and Duvall's classification of power to analyze this question.

Compulsory Power: As mentioned above, compulsory power is better explained by the definition of Robert Dahl: "as the ability of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 13). This could include the use of political, economic resources of "pressure." As already mentioned in the second Chapter while making analysis of foreign policy concepts of China, a country in their relations in particular with neighboring countries avoids using any types of direct pressure, threats and intimidation or punishment measures. This could be explained first of all by the fact that in general China's foreign policy concepts are based on principles of hiding brightness, calm observation, non-interference in internal affairs, etc. Secondly, from my point of view, one of the reasons could be an unwillingness of China to directly confront Russia. China understands that the CA region still remains under the sphere of direct influence of Russia. Thus, any kind of offensive behavior towards any of CA country could be interpreted by Russia as a direct threat to their national security. Thus, China certainly is not using and probably is not intending to use any kind of compulsory power in this region.

Regarding **Institutional Power,** as Barnett and Duvall argue, **"**the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or non actions) and conditions of existence of others." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 51). Establishment of such an Organization like the SCO and now within the SCO creation of such sub-structures in different dimensions like the SCO Energy Club, the SCO Bank,[7] the SCO Antiterrorist-structure, the Consortium of the SCO Universities etc., shows that China definitely exercises this type of power.

Structural Power: As mentioned above, structural power is more than just the establishment of institutions or the exercise of direct control over actions of others. "Structural power concerns the determination of social capacities and interests…It operates covertly to the extent that it generates the social powers, values and interpretations of reality that deeply structure internal control)." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 19). In contrast to European actors such as European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE etc., which often use "political conditionality", "carrots and sticks" policy (Youngs 2001) and demanding from CA leaders to improve national legislation to strengthen democratic participation of citizens and protect human rights, China never uses such rhetoric in its relations with CA country leaders. Thus, certainly in the eyes of Central Asian politicians China seems a generous and agreeable friend.

Productive Power: is one of the interesting dimensions in the typology of Barnett and Duvall, because it deals with the "discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed." (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 13). If we look at the legal framework of mutual cooperation, usually almost in all official documents/declarations, China uses such expressions as "strategic partnership", "mutual trust", "mutually beneficial relationships." (China Central Television 2013) Except from this

[7] A decision on setting up an SCO Bank for Development and a Development Fund was signed on 5-th of December 2012 during the meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of Government in Bishkek.

standard diplomatic language China spares no compliments towards its neighbors, for instance, “China and Kazakhstan - are good neighbors, friends and partners! China has always attached great importance to the development of mutual relations with Kazakhstan. China is willing, together with Kazakhstan to expand the actual cooperation in various fields in order to bring to a new level of development our bilateral strategic partnership.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People`s Republic of China 2010). Certainly it is possible to provide other examples, in general, to stress that China never criticizes CA states and tries to use expressions such “friends and equal partners." (Ibid)

5. China’s Exercise of Power in Africa

China has recently become very active in such geographically remote area as the African continent. To provide a short overview to mutual relations, Chinese historians argue that Chinese traveler Zhang Tian in 138 BC brought information about the town, the description of which coincides, according to scientists, to the description of Alexandria capital of the Ptolemaic dynasty. Other scientists believe that China and African relations started in fifteen century, the era of the Ming Dynasty, when Admiral Jiang Xe discovered the continent during one of his trips. The Russian researcher Deych stresses that since the beginning of the colonization of Africa, relations with China were not developed, but revived again in the mid-nineteenth century, when colonists began to send Chinese workers to the continent, who together with Africans built a railway line in Senegal and also worked in Tanganyika and gold mines of the Transvaal. (Deych 2008)

China's relations with African countries received a boost after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, which was attended by some representatives from African states, it has become obvious that China and some African countries share the view on some international problems. Together with the delegation of India Chinese representatives participated in the elaboration of "five principles" ("Pancasila"). “An important milestone in the development of Sino-African relations was the visit to Africa during 1963-1964 of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who stressed that China will provide support to African people in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and their national independence, will support a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment, will respect their sovereignty and will not-interfere in their internal affairs.” (Deych 2008,105).

Later, in the 1990's and 2000's, China paid more attention to the economic dimension in its relations with African countries, as growing industry in China required more energy and mineral resources and its thriving business needed output to external markets.

Since 2000, it is visible that there have been attempts from China to institutionalize their relations with Africa, through e.g. establishment of the Forum on China-African Cooperation. In 2006, the government published the document "PRC policy towards Africa "which outlines a plan of cooperation with African countries in various fields. "The document includes six sections: "The position and role of Africa","" Sino-African relations, "" African policy of China"," Expansion of comprehensive cooperation between China and Africa "," Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and its follow-up "," Relations between China and African regional organizations." (Deych 2008, 107).

In the framework of one article certainly it is not feasible to cover all trends in mutual relations between China and all countries of the African continent since the continent is very diverse. It is however possible to mention that relations and attitudes of some African countries towards China vary depending on political and economic factors. For instance, China established diplomatic relations with about 50 countries of the African continent; however, four countries such as Burkina Faso, Gambia, Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe gave the preference and recognized the independence of Taiwan and regularly participate in the Forum of Taiwan-African Cooperation, a fact that strongly irritates China.

Let us now proceed to consider the exercise of power using Barnett and Duvall's classification:

Compulsory Power: On the African continent China is also not using any kind of compulsory power, even in relations with those countries that recognized the independence of Taiwan. In the case of Senegal and Chad, China decided to use different instruments, such as persuasion and demonstrating the economic profits of being friends with China rather than with Taiwan. In 2005, Chad and some other Africa countries suggested at the session of the UN General Assembly the question of Taiwan's participation in this organization and a more active role of the UN in maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait. At that time the Permanent Representative of China to the UN Wang Guangya said that these proposals violate the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and those other countries should accept the fact that the only lawful representatives of China to the UN are representatives of PRC. After 2006, Chad drastically changed its foreign policy orientations in favor of China (PRC) and recognized China's One China Policy. Some researchers as Dittgen and Large explain these shift by political and economic profits: "recognizing Beijing would bring myriad short- and longer-term advantages. President Déby stood to be empowered by aid, investment and military assistance from China." (Dittgen and Large 2012, 1-2). Senegal also shifted it foreign policy orientations towards China, and in the long run, China expects that four other countries will follow these examples.

Institutional Power:

An important phenomenon in China's relations with Africa was the China-Africa Forum on cooperation in Beijing in 2000 at the ministerial level. Speaking at the opening of the first meeting of the Forum in Beijing in October 2000, President Jiang Tse-ming called this Forum "a great undertaking in the history of Sino-African relations" (Deych: 2008, 113) In these Forums a Program of China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social development was adopted. At this point of time, we do not see any attempts from China to establish joint institutions or a separate organization with African countries, but probably in the long run such attempts could be expected.

Structural Power: absence of democratization and human rights rhetoric in their speeches and the principle of conditionality makes China, an attractive partner in eyes of African leaders. Some African leaders even argue that they should follow the path of China, which was also colonized by Westerners, but later, achieved remarkable economic success (even with an authoritarian system of governance).

Productive Power: Chinese leaders attempt in their public speeches to emphasize that China in comparison to Western countries has never colonized Africa and that both China and Africa suffered a lot during the times of Western colonization. "China will always be a friend, partner and brother of Africa - said President Hu Jintao- our cooperation will be based on "win-win" relations." (Kurlantzick 2007: 43). These words usually find a sincere response of African leaders, for example, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe urged Africa: "to turn from the West and to focus on the development of relations with China, which is always respected Africans." (Deych 2008, 113)

6. Conclusion

In this article, I attempted to answer the following main question: does China use a similar pattern in its foreign policy instruments in the neighboring Central Asian region and the geographically remote African continent?

In closing, it is possible to come to the following conclusion: both in Central Asia and Africa China is not using any kind of compulsory power or direct pressure. This could be explained by the fact that China is still following foreign policy concepts based on elaborated at the 1970's by Deng Xiaoping such as "24 hieroglyphs" formula. It was revealed that China prefers to exercise other forms of power such as, for instance, institutional power. Almost at the same period 2000, the Forum on China–African Relations was established as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asian region in 2001. In comparison to Central Asia, China has not yet established the separate Organization in African continent, however, in the long run, China could follow this tactic and create as in Central Asia within the SCO, a separate China–African Development Bank or the Energy club. After studying the works and interviews of many Central Asian and African leaders it has become obvious that political leaders prefer to deal with China rather than with Western partners due to the absence of the political conditionality principle in China's foreign policy. China provides grants without asking CA and African leaders to democratize their countries; this fact is certainly regarded as a friendly act by leaders of CA and African countries. In terms of Productive power, it is visible that China uses almost the same bouquet of compliments towards both Central Asia and Africa such as: "We are friends, brothers and strategic partners", "We have a common destiny", "we developing countries should support each other", "Developing country cannot colonize another developing country." etc. (China`s Africa Policy 2006 in Zuolan 2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People`s Republic of China 2010).

In general, policies of China are very wise, and it is visible that the country has a long-term strategy in its relations with both regions. However, to my point of view, one of the serious weaknesses of China's policies is that they are dealing only with political elites, but not with societies in these countries. China supports regimes and elites (both politically and financially) however;, if the country is striving to become a global player they should not underestimate the demands and opinions of individuals and societal groups. I suppose such an underestimation of the role of societal groups could in the future cause some problems to China. Since, both in Central Asia and Africa there is growing discontent of the population towards China's policies. For instance, both in CA and Africa the populations are against migration of Chinese workers to their countries. In some African countries, people are saying that Chinese workers take their workplaces, and local industries are not developing because of the flow of Chinese production. Besides, violation of workers labor rights by some of Chinese companies cause protests in a number of African countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia. (Bardsley 2010). Moreover, enmity causes environmental pollution while extraction of energy resources by some of Chinese companies both in Central Asian countries and Africa (Bosshard 2008); these could be a hotbed of future tensions in mutual relations.

In general, possible to agree with the statement of Yan Xuetong who while answering the question of why the Chinese model of development is not as attractive as the US or European model, said:"The reason that other countries will accept it (US model) is that it would build it through domestic policy by becoming a model society that people what to be part of. We don't have it yet. At the moment, all of China's attractiveness comes from its economic power, but that cannot last. Money worship is not attractive enough. You need moral power." (Leonard 2008, 112). Thus, in closing it is possible to stress that in spite of rapid economic development of China, the concept of the 'Chinese Dream" is and probably will not become as attractive as the "American Dream" in the 1990's because of the absence (according to Xuetong) of "moral power." (Ibid.).

Analyzing the question of what are the main limitations the Realism school of thought possible to argue that some of the US scholars (e.g. Mearsheimer) while trying to measure capacities of China, pay more attention to military capabilities of China, however, China uses different foreign policy instruments and exercises in both regions/areas different types of power. Thus, answering the last question of what are the main strengths and weaknesses of the concept of Power suggested by Barnett and Duvall to analyze China's foreign policy patterns and instruments, I think that the present classification has good potential, as it has the possibility to measure power in different dimensions. In terms of limitations of this typology, possible to argue that in spite of the fact that Barnett and Duvall distinguish four types of power, however present division of powers requires further elaboration. For instance, objective questions may arise: how should we classify economic help or economic aid, should economic help be considered as a compulsory or structural power? Thus, division among different typologies of power seems to my point of view rather conditional.

References:

Bardsley, Daniel. 2010. "Zimbabwean Workers Protest over Treatment by Chinese Companies" The *National.* November. 2010. http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/asia-pacific/zimbabwean-workers-protest-over-treatment-by-chinese-companies

Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. *Power in Global Governance.* Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bellamy, Alex. 2007. "The English School", In *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*: 75-87, Edited by Martin Griffiths. London: Routledge.

Bellamy, Alex, and Paul Williams."The New Politics of Protection? Coite D'Ivoire, Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect", *International Affairs.* 87, no. 4 (2011): 825-850.

Boulding, Kenneth. 1989. *Three Faces of Power.* Newbury Park, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Bosshard, Peter.2008. "China's Environmental Footprint in Africa." *PambaukaNews.* May, 29. Issue 376. http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/comment/484422.

Brautigam, Deborah. 2009. *The Dragon's Gift. The Real Story of China in Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bushyev, Vitalyi and Valerii Pervuhin. "The SCO Energy Club". *In the SCOINFO* (2013) https://www.google.ru/url?Sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0cbwqfjaa&url=http%3A%2F%2Finfoshos.ru%2Fru%2F%3Fidn%3D9616&ei=lhuhvl-1naaczaod1ikadg&usg=afqjcneihjyqpxdhenb4llsddftteihmog&bvm=bv.75775273,d.bgq&cad=rjt

China Central Television. 2013. "China, Kyrgyzstan lift ties to strategic partnership." 09-12-2013. http://english.cntv.cn/program/china24/20130912/101181.shtml

Deych, Tatiana. 2008. *Africa in the Strategy of China*. Moscow: The Institute of African Studies. The Academy of Science of the Russian Federation. http://www.inafran.ru/sites/default/files/page_file/afrika_v_strategii_kitaya.pdf

Dittgen, Romain and Daniel Large."Refining Relations: Chad's: Recommendations rowing Links with China." *South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)Policy Briefing* 48 (2012): 1-4. Https://www.google.ru/url?Sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.saiia.org.za%2Fdoc_download%2F184-refining-relations-chad-s-growing-links-with-china&ei=sgsvu4opdmtg7qafg4hgdw&usg=afqjcnhwpe3qi9cesokzllezkykkmvrxua&bvm=bv.68445247,d.bgq&cad=rjt

Duchêne, François.1972. *Europe's Role in World Peace.* In *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead.* Edited by Richard Mayne. London: Fontana,

Duchêne, François.1973.*The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence*. In *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign- Policy Problems before the European Community*. Edited by Kohnstamm, M. And

W. Hager (1973) Basingstoke: Macmillan,

Gerrits, Andre. 2009.*Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion.* The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Goldstein, Avery. 2005. *Rising to the Challenge. China's Grand Strategy and International Security.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Gries, Hays Peter. 2004. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy*. Burkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press

Hu Jintao 2005 Full Text of Hu Jintao's Speech at Asian-African Business Summit Reception 2005-04-22. China.Org.Cn. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/184793.htm

Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2007. *How China's Soft Power is transforming the World. Charm Offensive.* . New Heaven and London: Yale University Press. A New Republic Book.

Leonard, Mark. 2008. *What Does China Think?* London: Fourth Estate.

Lijphart, Arendt. 2008. *Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.* In Comparative Political Science Edited by Alan S. Zuckerman, Volume 1. Los Angeles-London-New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Library of Political Science.

Lucarelli, Sonia, and Ian Manners. Eds. 2006. *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy.* London New York: Routledge.

Manners, Ian. 2008. The Normative Ethics of the European Union*, International Affairs* 84: 1 (2008): 45–60 http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/International%20Affairs/2008/84_145-60.pdf

Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* Volume 40. No. 2.: 235–58.
http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/5B_Manners.pdf.

Mearsheimer, John, J. 2010. "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics,* Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 2010): 381–396 http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/4/381.full

Mearsheimer, John, J. 2014. "Can China rise peacefully? "*The National Interest.* 8 of April, 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People`s Republic of China. 2010. Meeting of the Chairman of the People`s Republic of China Mr. Hú Jǐntāo with a Speaker of the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan Mr. Kasym Zhomart-Tokayev.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/ziliao/zt/hjtru/t708523.shtml.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1950a *Politics among Nations.* 6th edition. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. New York: Knopf, 1985

Morthenthau. J. Hans.1950b."The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions " *American Political Science Review* 44, no. 04 / December (1950): 833-854

Nye, Joseph. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*. (1990), No.80 Twentieth Anniversary: 153-171 http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-27/Nye%201990.pdf

Shestakov, Evgenii (2012) Interview with Sergey Lusyanin – the Vice Director of the Institute of Far East Studies. The Academy of Science of the Russian Federation. "Beijing is changing the world. In the coming 10 years, China is asking to consider it as a "developing country". RG.Ru Russian Magazine. (own translation from Russian) "Пекин меняет мир.
В предстоящие 10 лет Китай просит считать его "развивающимся государством"
http://www.rg.ru/2012/11/23/kitay-site.html

Waltz, Kenneth.1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: Mcgraw Hill.

Xi Jinping. 2012. Xi Jinping's India Visit, day 2: as it happened. By Biplob Ghosal. In *Zee Media Burea India*. September 18, 2001 http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/xi-jinpings-india-visit-day-2-as-it-happened_1471881.htmll

Yanovski, Anatolii. 2013. SCO member countries created an Energy Club. *Vzglyad. Delovaya Gaseta*. 06.12.2013. http://vzglyad.ru/news/2013/12/6/663173.htmll

Youngs, Richard. "Democracy Promotion. The Case of European Union Strategy." Center for European Policy Studies. Working Document. No. 167. October (2001): 1-57

Zuolan, Xu. 2007. "Don't confuse Africa ties for colonialism." *China Daily*. September 23. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/17/content_6142420.htm.

America:

A Liberal Imperial Power

Lana Perić

Lana Perić, 20, is an undergraduate student going into her fourth year at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. She is expecting to graduate in 2015 with an Honour's Bachelor of Arts degree majoring in Political Science, with a concentration in International Relations and a minor in European and Russian Studies. She spent her third year abroad studying at Università Luiss Guido Carli in Rome, Italy, taking classes through their Masters in International Relations program. Her interests include foreign, defense and security policy, international relations and affairs, EU foreign policy, and gender and development studies within international relations.

Abstract

The topic over whether or not the U.S. can be considered an imperial power has been largely debated over since the aggressive foreign policy tactics observed by former President George W. Bush. Since then, an anti-American attitude has had many accusing the U.S. of attempting to build an empire. The problem with many arguments is that they often inaccurately portray the idea of imperialism or the arguments are made with little understanding of the American institutions and how foreign policy is made. This research paper hopes to present the idea that there are various branches of imperialism to consider and that the United States have exhibited a liberal imperialist behaviour. To prove this thesis, this paper will show how the foreign policy system of the United States is altered to the external events in the world and that has assisted the United States in acting as a liberal imperial power.

Keywords: American Institutions; Foreign Policy; Imperialism; Liberalism; United States

Introduction

Historically speaking, the idea of imperialism was a clear-cut concept with little to debate on its meaning. In recent decades, there has been a shift that has split the notion of imperialism into various subtitles and definitions, which depend on the scholar in question. Despite the confusion it may cause to those outside the political academic community, it is with good reason to branch out from a single definition. With the change in times, impacts of globalization, along with the memories left from political history, "imperialism" no longer holds the same meaning it did before the creation of the Westphalian system. The debate on what can be considered a modern day imperial power has been sparked since the United States (hereafter referred to as the U.S.) dismantled the international bipolar system at the end of the Cold War, and entered into a new realm of international problems. What followed was a decade of "schizophrenic power" within the U.S.'s institutions, which led to misconceptions of what kind of actor the U.S. will play on the word stage (Fabbrini 2008:154).

The purpose of this paper will be to demonstrate that the U.S., as a hegemonic superpower, has used its foreign policy structure to exhibit imperialistic behaviour despite not being an "empire" in the classical sense. The U.S. can be considered a liberal imperial power in an asymmetric multipolar world, as it exerts military, cultural and economic influence onto other countries. I will be using several case studies throughout my research to demonstrate how U.S. foreign policy has been played out during various points in history, and to which extent that has affected their exhibition of liberal imperialistic behaviour. In order to make my case, first it will be necessary to provide the definitions of the concepts used to make this argument. As the focus for this research is the role of the U.S.'s foreign policy structure, I will follow up with a description of the relationship between the decision-making institution for foreign and domestic policies, and the debate between multilateral and unilateral foreign policy approaches. Afterwards, I will go on to present the counterargument to my thesis and I will then apply my research to show that it is in the internal structure of the U.S. to act as a liberal imperial power and that they do have the mentality that allows for it, and what that mentality entails. I will then present how external events after the Cold War affected American foreign policy and how in the end, multilateralism has played in their favour of acting as a liberal imperial power.

Defining Concepts: Branches of Imperialism

Imperialism derives from the concept of "empires" and it is often seen as the behaviour exhibited by empires in order to benefit from their gains. The definition given by the Merriam-Webster dictionary tells us that imperialism is "the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation especially by direct territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas; the extension or imposition of power, authority, or influence". It also defines imperialism as "the effect a powerful country or group of countries has in changing or influencing the way people live in other poorer countries". The former definition has an emphasis on territorial acquisition, which makes it more on par with both old imperialism and neo-imperialism. Today, due to the age of globalization and an increase in multilateral cooperation, it no longer makes sense to limit the idea of imperialism as something that necessitates force. Imperialism has become such an imbued concept that it feels as if the meaning as been lost from it all together, making it necessary to mention subcategories for a more accurate portrayal (Grondin 2006:8)

There are three branches of imperialism that I would like to clarify for this paper: old imperialism, new imperialism (which is sometimes referred to as "neo-imperialism"), and liberal imperialism. Old imperialism refers to the period of rapid expansion of European states in the early eighteenth century, where the focus was on indirect control of countries being dominated for the purpose of benefitting economically and spreading their religious influence (Scammell 2004:15). New imperialism took place during the mid to late nineteenth century, and the U.S. played more of a role during this era of colonization. Imperial powers were driven to expand because of the industrial revolution, and this brought upon more political control and the establishment of colonial governments (Scammell 2004:145). Political control is the main difference between old and new imperialism. Finally, liberal imperialism is the theoretical idea that a hegemonic power (the U.S. in this case) will continue to impose the ideas of democratization and the market economy onto other countries, albeit with less direct interference (Walberg 2011: 157). The concept of liberal imperialism is a result of the U.S.'s foreign conduct and their attempts to democratize states and spread the idea of the free market economy. Liberal states can exist without necessarily enforcing their ideologies upon other states. There are plenty of democratic free market countries that do not attempt to spread those liberal ideas forcibly. Countries that were part of the old and new imperialist traditions did not have ideological goals in mind - it was all about territorial control in order to spread their influence. The U.S.'s liberal imperialistic behaviour is all about ideology. The most comparable "empire" would have been the Soviet Union spreading their communist ideologies in the East.

Throughout my research I also discuss the concepts of "mentality" and "structure" and I would like to present clarifications on them. I will illustrate "mentality" as a collective mindset that dictates actions and discourse, and is affected by experiences, subjective opinion, and the values that the state (in this case, the U.S.) would hold. When discussing "mentality", I will be referring to an imperial mentality. When discussing "structure" (especially "foreign policy structures"), I am referring to the institutional mechanisms that form the U.S.'s foreign policy.

From the definitions of the various forms of imperialism, we can already see how liberal imperialism is the only one that can accurately describe the present day American hegemony, as it does not entail direct political control over another territory. The liberal imperial approach is easily applicable to the American case because we can see (in both the historical and contemporary context) how the U.S. foreign policy approach has led to them imposing their ideas of liberalized trade and democracy onto other territories.

Background of the U.S.'s Foreign Policy Structure

It is impossible to be able to claim that the U.S. is any kind of imperial power without first looking at the foreign policy structure and the close relationship it has with domestic politics. There is the misconception that the U.S. has a presidential system like France, where the President holds all of the power and decisions in foreign and domestic policy. This has led to many anti-American theories from people who do not understand the system. The Constitution established a system of separation of powers based on checks and balances in order to prevent a tyranny rising up in the country. In regards to foreign policy, this means that the executive (presidential administration), legislative (Congress) and the judiciary (Supreme Court of the Unite States) each have a veto vote, and all have a role in deciding on foreign policy, not just the President. Although this system has good intentions to maintain a democratic system, shared powers end up creating a system where the Congress and President are often teamed up against each other when it comes to policy making.

Between the Civil War and the Second World War, the U.S. began to internationalize their foreign policy slightly, but still preferred isolationism. When they finally came to the centre of international affairs during WWII, it was decided that the President's role needed to be increased. The Congress delegated powers to the President for foreign policy, while still maintaining their own as advisors to the executive. The threats presented by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin made it necessary to centralize powers for foreign policy, it would make no sense to send hundreds of members of Congress to negotiate on behalf of the state. Thanks to this new role, the president has utilized this radical change for promoting the institutional interests of the presidency. As the strength of the presidency increased, so did the growth of the U.S. as a global power (Fabbrini: May 6, 2014).

Since then, the President has acted as the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy and has the power to make war, but it is the Congress' power to declare war. This is where domestic politics come into play and can affect the decisions being made in foreign policy. Americans are more likely to vote based on domestic policies, therefore, if the party ideology of the Congress is opposite of the President's, it becomes difficult for the President to pass any decisions when the Congress continuously vetoes them. The President may be in charge and is the central figure in foreign policy, but even they can be constrained by the system of separation of powers. No other democratic system has such close connections between their domestic and foreign policy institutions, which is why it is often difficult for other countries to understand the structure for foreign policy in the U.S.

The struggle for power between the Congress and the Presidency has also brought up a continuous foreign policy issue regarding interventionism: whether the United States is using a multilateral or unilateral approach. The multilateral approach was developed after WWII when the U.S. established a highly institutionalized order to promote cooperation between the European states and to become allies with the states as the Soviet threat began. This approached was justified by the theory of multilateral cooperation with industrial democracies (Fabbrini 2008: 144). The unilateral approach, which was preferred by the neoconservatives (especially those who worked under Reagan), is based on the idea that "international stability can only happen as an outcome of an appropriate military strategy by the military strategy by the big powers, and by America first of all" (Fabbrini 2008: 154).

With a better understanding of the various imperialist approaches and the structure of foreign policy in the U.S., I can now continue to discuss why the U.S. can be considered a liberal imperial power in an asymmetric world.

America unable to become an imperial power?

Counter-Argument

Sergio Fabbrini makes a plausible counter-argument to my thesis in "America and its Critics", stating, "America has neither the necessary mentality nor the internal structures to become an imperial power" (Fabbrini 2008:169). By internal structure, Fabbrini refers to the U.S.'s domestic policies coinciding with their foreign policy and applying isolationism to their foreign policy (which will be discussed further below). He does not deny the foreign interventions that Americans have participated in, but he argues that isolationism has prioritized internal development in the U.S. This then ties in with their mentality, which tends to be focused within themselves. The U.S. cannot be viewed as an imperial power because their concerns were domestic. They wanted to expand their sphere of economic influence only, and they had no desire for the territorial acquisition goals of the old and new imperialism (Fabbrini 2008:138).

This is understandable because in order to be an imperial power in the tradition sense, there needs to be a strong and visible central leader. The shared powers in the U.S. have made it difficult for the President to exercise their power in foreign policy if the Congress disagrees. In academic literature, it is often considered that unilateralism and exhibition of an imperialistic attitude was at its strongest during the George W. Bush presidency when he also had a large number of neoconservatives supporting him in Congress. This short-term imperial attitude has been argued to fail because it was incompatible with the multilateral institutions that organize the international system (Fabbrini 2008:168). It is important to keep in mind that two characteristics of liberal imperialism involve imposed trade liberalization in states, and imposed democratization. The next section will cover trade liberalizations and how that depicted the U.S. as a liberal imperial power. Further below during my discussion of post-Cold War events, I will discuss how the U.S.'s imposed democratization had also continued to brand them as a liberal imperial power.

Throughout the rest of my research, I would like to argue that, despite the difficulties made by the decision-making procedure, the U.S. has historically always intended on becoming a liberal imperial power, and that the institutions set up by them has actually assisted them with attaining this goal. Following that, I will also make my case as to why the mentality of the U.S. does prove them a liberal imperial power.

Internal Structure - Historical Perspective: Trade liberalization

Traditionally, you can say that the U.S. has been an "empire" so to speak, since Thomas Jefferson purchased the state of Louisiana in 1803. On more than one occasion in the nineteenth century, Jefferson has referred to the U.S. as an "empire of liberty". He has made references about adding the former British Province of Canada to their "empire of liberty" in 1780 and in 1809, right before the U.S. tried to take Canada by means of warfare in 1812 (Boot 2003). The U.S. interest in expansion also went south: American foreign policy, particularly isolationism, come into play here because their interest in Latin and South America stemmed from the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This essentially declared that the U.S. would not tolerate any more intervention from European colonizing powers (other than the Spanish colony of Cuba at the time) and allowed them to have more control of the America's and keep themselves distanced from the European empires. Through this desire for the expansion and protection of the market interests, it shows that at the time the U.S.'s foreign policy approach adapted to what they wanted to accomplish through their imperialistic actions.

Despite the isolationist foreign policy that was practiced in the nineteenth century, when the U.S. began to internationalize slowly towards the end of the century, they participated in wars that would gain them new colonies during this period of new imperialism. Although the expansion of U.S. territory was not on par with the size and numbers of the British and French colonies, it still served an important purpose for the country. While the European colonizers were focused on expansion in terms of gaining political control of territory, for the U.S., imperialism was driven by economic necessity. This period of new imperialism actually allowed them to begin to act as a liberal imperial power as they were able to impose their market into new territories. After the Spanish American War and the Philippine-American War, the U.S. gained control of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippine Islands, which allowed them to begin to extend their market into Latin America and Eastern Asia, respectively.

The U.S.'s market relations with East Asia are prevalent in both a historical and modern context. In 1898, the same year that the U.S. obtained the Philippine Islands as a colony, Indiana's Senator Albert Beveridge stated, "America's commerce must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers our question. China is our natural customer." Gaining a colony in Eastern Asia was beneficial to the U.S. for them to be able to continue to spread their market, which shows that from the beginning, despite expanding their territory, it has always been about trade and continuously searching for a larger market. The argument that can be made against this is that the U.S. did not attempt to impose their ideas of a democratic system upon Eastern Asia - but they were spreading the idea of trade liberalization. Simply wanting to expand their market through new colonies acquired by war so soon after the Second Industrial Revolution is enough to demonstrate that the U.S. had ambitions for building a liberal empire based on their idea of a liberalized market economy. Brooks Adams (American Historian 1848-1927) supports this idea in his book The New Empire where he declares that the U.S. would soon outweigh any single empire, if not all Empires combined, and that "within twenty years, the U.S. will be the world's leading economic empire" (Adams 1902:209). With the U.S. trying to establish this "economic empire" in cheaper markets such as Latin America and Eastern Asia, they were tapping into the application of comparative advantages, which underlies the entire liberal theory of free trade (Shaffaeddin 1998:23).

In sum, the U.S. exhibited liberal imperial power when they gained these smaller colonies as it allowed for them to tap into larger areas. This then spurred industrial revolutions in these non-European sectors in which their industrialization and newfound trade liberalization would benefit the U.S. "economic empire". The American foreign policy of isolationism at this time actually assisted them in promoting trade liberalization theory, showing that even in the historical context, it is in the U.S.'s foreign policy structure to act as an imperial power.

Mentality - Modern Perspective

After analyzing the U.S.'s historical cases for imperialism, we can see a justification that there was obviously an imperialistic mentality behind the expansion for territory in order to promote their economy. While there may have been some altercations to that mentality, it still persists in the modern day context. The idea of spreading trade liberalization persisted, which would continue benefitting the U.S. economy, but imposing this theory was now based on a different approach - attaining peace. Since WWII, the U.S.'s role in international affairs surged dramatically and they took on a new role that would spread their ideologies. First, it was the idea of developing a multilateral world. In recent decades, it has been about spreading democracy through various means.

The emergence of a bipolar world after the Second World War brought upon an institutionalized international system, which allowed the U.S. to practice two different types of foreign policy in this new international order: a highly militarized order (focused on the bilateral relations of the U.S. and Soviet Union) and a highly institutionalized order (focused on the western multilateral relations). The U.S.'s foreign policy approach of multilateralism was fitting for the circumstances followed WWII and the Berlin Split. Their strategy was to instill a highly institutionalized order in which the European states involved in the war could cooperate to prevent future conflicts (Fabbrini 2008:142). By instilling a multilateral approach and these behaviours upon the Western European countries, it would spread American ideas that liberalized market democracies do not get into conflicts with one another. Stabilizing this region was important for the U.S. as the Soviet threat was increasing, because it allowed the U.S. to build allies and bridge a geographically closer connection. This established a reciprocal recognition that was institutionalized into the multilateral system, and in which the U.S.'s European partners recognized its leadership and strategic interests (Fabbrini 2008:143). Argumentatively, during this time the U.S. was only displaying their hegemonic powers and not imperial power. With the negative connotation attached to the colonial past, it's no wonder that some academics and politicians steer clear of labeling the U.S. as an imperialist power. If we look back at what constitutes imperial behaviour, it involves imposing and embedding the imperial powers' values onto another country in any means necessary. There is no denying that the multilateral approach the U.S. took in order to impose their ideologies was a negative act - without the U.S. "assisting" Europe in this case, cooperation between the Allies and the Axis countries may have been impossible. In that sense, the U.S. had the mentality for become a liberal imperial power in particular, because they believed they had the right methods for fixing Europe's problems.

Some scholars attribute the U.S.'s imperial attitude to their unilateral foreign policy approaches that the neoconservatives advocated for - especially those who worked under former President Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. The foreign policy that the neoconservatives fought for was definitely an aggressive imperialistic mentality. Under the Reagan presidency, he adopted a modern stance to a "Jacksonian" foreign policy. This meant that the U.S. would not "limit itself to containing the adversary" and that instead, they would actively seek to pursue a strategy of confrontation (Fabbrini 2008:148). The neoconservatives left over by the Reagan presidency tried to shred up the idea of multilateralism throughout the 1990s. This unilateralist attitude did not bode well in an international system that has already been set up to accommodate the multilateral institutions; neoconservatives believed that as "winners" of the Cold War, the U.S. needed to pursue their new international role as a global police force. The new threat that the U.S. would need to face were "rogue" states that would challenge the U.S.'s new superiority. These "rogue" states were also often non-democratic states that the U.S. believed needed to be democratized. This view that that the U.S. was a victor in history and were now the Chosen One to propagate democracy everywhere demonstrates their exhibition of neocolonialist attitude (more precisely, a liberal imperialist attitude) in which they wanted to impose a certain system onto countries thinking it's the only correct system.

Harvard's Professor Stephen Walt describes liberal imperialists as "kinder, gentler neoconservatives" and that in general, they both believe it is the U.S.'s "responsibility to right political and humanitarian wrongs around the world" (Walt 2013). From that statement we can gather that despite the position of the political spectrum, the mentality is same and it's the preference of strategy that differs (this is where the multilateral vs. unilateral foreign policy applies). Therefore, although the constitution may make decision-making difficult because of the shared powers, we can see through historical cases that the internal structure still allowed the U.S. to behave as a liberal imperial power in order build their "economic empire". Furthermore, it was shown that the mentalities of those who support either multilateralism or unilateralism are conjoined by similar goal of expanding the American liberal ideologies.

Post-Cold War Events: Balkan Crisis, Foreign Policy after 9/11

Major external events that occurred both internationally and domestically shaped the foreign policy of the U.S. in the post-Cold War world. As we have seen from the historical cases, the U.S. decision-making process remains constitutionally consistent - it is the international affairs combined with the political majorities in government and Congress that dictate what is the U.S.'s foreign policy. Whether they have been unilateral or multilateral approaches, the foreign policy presented during the 1990s and early 2000s have displayed the U.S.'s liberal imperial power. The following events also went on to show that the U.S. had a "mission", so to speak, to "spread democracy". Imposing democracies on other states is another prime characteristic of liberal imperialism, as mentioned earlier in my research.

The Balkan Crisis of the 1990s

The Clinton administration in the 1990s faced many policy-making problems as the Congress had a neoconservative majority. This domestic struggle between the majorities made it extremely difficult for cooperation, because Clinton wanted to apply multilateral approaches to foreign policy, but the Congress would shoot it down in favour of unilateral approaches. While Clinton was willing to reduce the U.S. role as a "global policeman" and entrust the institutions of international cooperation, Congress wanted to maintain a big role on the international stage without cooperating with these institutions (Fabbrini 2008:156). Congress was willing to display the U.S.'s hyperpower to handle any international crisis because they believed that the role of multilateral institutions would only get in the way of the U.S. getting things done.

There were three major decisions that the Congress agreed on with Clinton - the establishment of NAFTA, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 after the Balkan Civil Wars, and the NATO airstrikes in Serbia in 1999. Despite Clinton's desire to maintain a multilateral approach, which is evident through his negotiations for NAFTA and the Dayton Peace Accords, this no longer seemed to apply in 1999. The U.S.'s approval of airstrikes on Serbia did not receive UN approval and caused debates because it was against international law. Although Clinton was considered to an advocate for multilateral approaches despite the rift between Congress, the external events of 1999 proved that the U.S. would act unilaterally if they deemed it necessary. For this period of time, this disproves the argument made in "America and its Critics", which stated, "American unilateralism has proven to be incompatible with the structure of multilateral institutions". The

U.S. regarded these airstrikes as a humanitarian intervention, which can be considered an action that is displayed by a liberal imperial power (Davidson 2012: 130). Acting as a liberal imperial power, they believed it was their duty to intervene "to protect Kosovo" as they claimed. The paradox that is evident in humanitarian intervention is that liberal democracies (e.g. the U.S. in this case) are willing to wage war against human life in order to protect human lives. The act of a humanitarian intervention by the U.S. demonstrates their actions as liberal imperial power, as they uphold the idea that societies that do not conform to Western liberalized standards are a threat to society as a whole (Davidson 2012:141). This does not only apply to the Serbian intervention but also sets a theme for the U.S. throughout the new century as they begin to increase their missions to spreading peace and democracy.

Notwithstanding Clinton's unilateral actions in 1999, throughout his presidency, he sought multilateral strategies that would increase and spread democracies, based on theory that the "international promotion of democracy through institutions" would prevent democracies from waging wars and conflicts with one another (Fabbrini 2008:157). This is another neocolonial thought presented by a liberal imperial power that assumes that countries need to become market democracies in order to function. The idea eventually paves a path for the Bush administration, albeit, his approach was aggressively unilateral for a majority of his presidency.

Foreign Policy After 9/11

Under George W. Bush and the neoconservatives in Congress, the foreign policy approach of the U.S. became explicitly aggressive and unilateral, which established the idea internationally that the U.S. wanted to become an empire. The internal structure of the U.S. allowed for decisions in domestic and foreign policy to be made with ease. After the 9/11 attacks, the neoconservatives saw unilateralism as the "only feasible solution" to the new global threat. It allowed for the U.S. to continue acting as a liberal imperial power, claiming their intentions were to protect American security and the only way to do that was to instill democratic values into "rogue" states.

Reintroducing fundamental threads of Jacksonian foreign policy showed actions that proved the U.S. to act as a liberal imperial power. Assertive nationalism mixed in with the idea of democratic imperialism (imposing democracy throughout the world even through military means - this is on par with liberal imperialism) was part of the aggressive unilateral foreign policy that Bush promoted (Fabbrini 2008: 160). The rhetoric Bush used ended up merging the ideas to promote democracy and peace with military strength and power. He believed that the U.S. was above multilateralism and the only way to protect American security and continue the "democratic project" was to establish a unipolar world in an emerging multipolar world. This meant to challenging the international status quo and justifying that the U.S.'s military power cannot be constrained by the multilateral institutions if they wanted to promote democracy in order to protect peace.

"America and its Critics" argues that the unilateral actions that constituted as imperialistic behaviour were shown to have failed after the Iraq invasion in 2003, as the U.S. had no chance but to "work within the constraints of the multilateral system" and the president had to work within the constraints set by those of separated government (Fabbrini 2008:169). This failure of unilateralism demonstrated to the people of the U.S. that they needed to revise their domestic politics in order to target foreign policy. After the midterm congressional elections in 2006, with the Democrats winning back Congress, the U.S. began making strides towards multilateralism. Multilateralism as a foreign policy approaches proves to be more effective for the U.S. as it allows for them to act as a liberal imperial power. The international institutions that the U.S. had set up since the beginning of the Cold War has allowed for them to act as a liberal imperial power in an asymmetric multipolar world that they set up for their benefits. Asymmetrical power has allowed for many countries to have a role in multilateral relations, but above all, the U.S. has demonstrated that they are the necessary component for multilateralism to work. When the U.S. does not comply with international law set out by these institutions, evidently, cooperation fails or other democracies establish anti-American attitudes within them that makes cooperation difficult to adhere. These institutions that were set out by the U.S. allowed for them to legitimize and conceal imperialistic ambitions during the Cold War, and were useful again when they dropped unilateralism as foreign policy. As Negri and Hardt put it, by establishing these U.S. centric institutions, it was possible for presidential administrations to open up areas of the world that were previously closed to corporate and economic penetration (Negri & Hardt 2000). It allowed for the U.S. to impose liberalized ideologies onto these new countries that decided to cooperate with them, which fundamentally allowed the U.S. to maintain a level of control over these economic regions. Therefore, although the unilateral approach after 9/11 failed, reverting back to multilateralism works more in favour for the institutions and constraints that the U.S. have set up for themselves in the new international system.

Conclusion

Since President Obama has entered into office, he has made it a priority to deploy troops from the Middle East and ease up on the aggressive foreign policies that were set up by his predecessor. Recent literature, by scholars such as Stephen Walt and David Rieff, has pointed towards an increase in theories that under the Obama administration, the U.S. is indeed displaying a liberal imperialist mentality. With the negative history surrounding imperialism and colonialism, it is no wonder that some actively avoid labeling the U.S. as an imperial power. However, whether or not the imperialist behaviour that the U.S. exhibits can be deemed "good" or "bad" only sets out a more philosophical question. In terms of political science and through analyzing how foreign policy has been steered in terms of external events, we can see that the U.S. has acted as a liberal imperial power in an asymmetric multipolar world that they have established. Their internal structure, which has been consistent by the constitution, may make decision-making difficult, but it has allowed foreign policy to be malleable according to how the international system is set up and the events taking place in it. From historical cases to modern day foreign policy approaches, we can see that the mentality for imperialism exists in all sides of the political spectrum and it's the strategy to obtain that power that differs above all else.

Bibliography

Adams, Brooks. 1902. *The New Empire*. New York: MacMillan Company.

Boot, Max. 2003. "American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away From the Label." *USA Today*, May 6, 2003. Accessed May 18, 2014. http://attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot_Imperialim_fine.pdf

David, C.P. and Grondin, D., ed. 2006. *Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush*. Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company,

Davidson, Joanna. 2012. "Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Force for Good?" *POLIS Journal*, vol.7 (2012): 128-164. http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/joanna-davidson.pdf

Fabbrini, Sergio. 2008. *America and its Critics: Virtues and Vices of the Democratic Hyperpower*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Fabbrini, Sergio. 2014. "Foreign Policy-Making Structures in the US." LUISS University. Rome. May 6, 2014.

Hardt, M. and Negri, A.2000. *Empire*. Boston, USA: Harvard University Press.

Merriam-Webster Online. Accessed 16 May, 2014. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/imperialism?show=0&t=1400368640

Rieff, David. 2014. "Obama's Liberal Imperialism." *The National Interest*, February 11, 2014. Accessed on May 18, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/obamas-liberal-imperialism-9861

Scammell, Geoffrey Vaughn. 2004. *The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c.1400-1715*. London: Routledge.

Shaffaeddin, Mehdi. 1998. "How Did Developed Countries Industrialize? The History of Trade and Industrial Policy: The Cases of Great Britain and the USA." *UNCTAD Review*, no.139. www.iatp.org/files/HOW_DID_DEVELOPED_COUNTRIES_INDUSTRIALIZEThe_H.pdf

Walbery, Eric. 2011. *Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the Great Games*. Atlanta, USA: Clarity Press, Inc.

Walt, Stephen. 2013. "Top Ten Warnings Signs of 'Liberal Imperialism'." *Foreign Policy*, May 20 2013. Accessed on May 18, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/20/top_ten_warning_signs_of_liberal_imperialism

Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism:

An application to post-1980 coup Turkey

Esra Simsek

Esra Simsek, 23, is a senior student who expects to receive her Bachelor in "Political Sciences and Economics" at the Bogazici University, Istanbul in 2015, January. Her interests include political economy of development and global political economy.

Abstract

This article provides an application of O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarianism theory in Turkish context though a survey of political unrest of 1970s and 1980 military coup. The theory is reappropriated through formal modelling in order to amend its previous weakness. Although BA theory is strong in explaining the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers, it lacks an actor level analysis. Thus, this paper takes political parties as active agents which instrumentalizes political violence and considers military as an institution bearing private interests. The formal design constitutes a break from traditional BA model and yields a "paralysis" equilibrium which is supported by historical account. Thus, the convergences and divergences between Turkish and Latin American context, reveals the need of recontextualization and reappropriation of BA theory, especially through inclusion of an agency-level analysis.

Keywords: Bureacratic-Authoritarianism; Coup d'état; Formal modelling; Turkish political economy

Introduction

Guillermo O'Donnell's "Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics", published in 1973, initiated a new phase in the debate over the relationship between social change and politics, in the context of Latin American Politics. He argued that social and economic modernization in the late developing countries tend to lead to authoritarianism instead of democracy. His focus was the emergence of military regimes in Argentina and Brazil in mid-1960s. These regimes were called "bureaucratic-authoritarian", as distinguished from oligarchical and populist forms of authoritarian rule. O'Donnell suggests that an "elective affinity" exists between modernization and the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in South America (12), as exemplified by the military takeovers of 1970s in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. This paper uses his framework of bureaucratic-authoritarianism to understand increasing political unrest in Turkey in 1970s, the subsequent military coup of 1980 and the following structuring of the state apparatus, as well as the radical change in economic policies toward liberalization. In the preceding period, Turkey adopted ISI regime in order to industrialize and reach substantive levels of economic growth. O'Donnell's BA theory is especially strong in explaining the economic-politic scene and the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers. In the light of the arguments of this book, this paper assesses whether if Turkey witnessed the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the aftermath of 1980 coup, given the economic policy change and the class alignments that also shaped the post-coup redistribution patterns.

Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Theory in Context of Turkey

In the literature, bureaucratic-authoritarianism (BA) model is applied into contexts of Greece, South Korea, the Philippines, Poland and various other countries. Nevertheless, there are limitations to O'Donnell's explanations of BA economic and politic structures. In each country, the development of institutions somewhat diverged from the "idealized" case presented by O'Donnell (Remmer and Merkx 1982, 4). This underlines the necessity of a revision of the theory in the specific context of each country, by inclusion of factors such as institutional autonomy of the state structure, the institutional and historical background and level of mobilization of popular sectors as well as the level of perceived threat. For instance, the institutional role and the alleged mission of armed forces in the decision-making process would be of particular interest in Turkish context. On the other hand, the ISI regime increased the level of social mobilization through the emergence of an urban working class in Turkey that is organized under the relatively liberal constitution of 1961. This in turn exacerbated the political unrest. Moreover, the merits of Turkey's ISI economy is largely questioned towards the end of 1970s. For instance TUSIAD, a major businessmen association, blamed the import substitution strategy as the main culprit for rapid deterioration of the economy (Barkey 1984, 158). The January 24, 1980 decisions would be the major attempt of transforming economy (Amelung 1988, 98) although its strict implementation would only be possible after the 1980 military coup. In Turkish case, such pattern of military coup following the failure of deepening of ISI conforms to the O'Donnell's explanation of the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, this paper shows that the Turkey example requires a different theoretical framework to understand the implementation of liberal policies. O'Donnell's theory was developed based on the case study of 1966 Argentine military take-over. Thus, it has shortcomings in explaining the Turkish economic liberalization move, taking place almost two decades later, in an entirely different international context.

In the first section, an overview of O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarianism is provided along with the critics in the literature. The following second part contains a summary of the literature on coup d'états. The third section analyzes the political, social and economic context of 1970s leading to 1980 military coup. The political unrest and crisis of ISI would be essential for understanding of the reasons of military takeover. In the fourth and fifth section, a simple game is modelled to account for the political impasse of 1970s and it is played. In the last section, the newly emergent regime in Turkish context is analyzed with a particular emphasize on the liberalization attempts and the peculiar positioning of bureaucracy, as differentiated from Latin America examples. The paper concludes that the political crisis was not merely a reflection of an economic crisis or the tension created by modernization. Those had a considerable impact upon the internal dynamics, but the crisis itself cannot be understood without a careful consideration of political actors, their motives, interests, tools they employed. Moreover, in the aftermath of coup, instead of an amendment to bureaucratic-authoritarianism, a new framework must be developed to assess the rising authoritarianism and liberal economic transition.

An Overview of O'Donnell's Theory

O'Donnell argues that economic development is likely to generate greater political plurality that does not necessarily generate political democracy. Nevertheless, in South America "political authoritarianism – not political democracy – is the more likely concomitant of the highest levels of modernization" (O'Donnell 1974, 8). Thus, authoritarianism become a "byproduct" of development (Duggan 2001, 1). In order to operationalize the degree of modernization, he distinguishes between the centers, characterized by urbanization and unionization, and the periphery that remained rural and underdeveloped. Through this distinction, his measures yield a controversial fact: democratic government arises when the level of modernization is found to be intermediate. High and low modernity engenders non-democratic systems. He introduces a binary characterization of political systems, which is either "excluding", where the government deprives the urban popular sector from reaching power, or it can be "incorporating", where the government incorporates and represents the demands of this sector. The excluding political systems lead to the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes that is exemplified by cases of Argentina and Brazil, argues O'Donnell.

Initially, the ISI regime allows a broad coalition among urban and industrial sectors that benefits from protectionism and enjoys the "easy" stage of ISI. When a deeper industrialization cannot be realized, attempts of reform in economy provoke the conflicting interests in the coalition. Increasing mobilization in society results in, what Huntington (1968) "praetorianism", the political degeneration and collapse. Thus, new coalitions arise, especially technocrats grow more confident and coordinated, as emphasized by O'Donnell. With their attempt of coup, a radical restructuring of society would serve to enhance their domination, by means of excessive coercion and repression. The "exceptionally coercive nature" (Schamis 1991, 201) of bureaucratic authoritarian regime would lead to repression of political activity, abolishment of strike rights and restriction of union activity while placing market economics at the core of economic policies. A bureaucratic-authoritarian regime would target the "deepening" of "the productive structure" through private investments, "in particular the transnational corporations, as well as increasing the quantum and multiplier effects of public investment" (O'Donnell 1978, 11-12). Under bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, the state posts are filled with experienced technocrats and state apparatus expands not only to transform the society socially but also to assure the "consolidation of a new order" (O'Donnell 1977,59).

O'Donnell's theory was not without its critics. Przeworski (2000) is skeptical about O'Donnell's main case study, which is Argentine for being "a distant outlier" (101) and he demonstrates a significant relationship between democratic stability and higher GDP per capita. On the other hand, Londregan and Poole assert that "non-constitutional rule" constitutes a significant hindrance on economic growth (Londregan and Poole 1990, 163). O'Donnell questions the authoritarianism in linear terms through measurement of level of threat and subsequent level of coercion. This approach obstructs "qualitative" differences between countries and time intervals and reduces them to a "mere question of intensity". Moreover, it is difficult to operationalize and measure the level of threat or coercion. That difficulty also arises in explaining the use of coercion even when the threat is no longer evident (Remmer and Merkx 1982, 19).

A Summary of Literature on Military Coup

Finer emphasizes the multifacetedness of military interventions whose likelihood of happening could be understood in terms of "military officers and institutions" interests. However, that would not exhaust all the possible ways of understanding such phenomenon, since the tendency of military take-over is "inversely related" to level of political culture (Finer 1962, 47). The structural reasons of military takeover can be enumerated as the weakness of civil society, the loss of legitimacy of rules and previous military coups of recent history (Belkin and Schoffer 2003). Thompson identifies four "non-mutually exclusive" dimension of a study on coups: the weakness of civilian regime, the endogenous structure of military, the external power struggles, and the "push-comes-to-shove grievances" that addresses the internal dynamics of society in pre-coup period (Thompson 1973, 5). According to Huntington, the coups are the result of the inadequacy of existing institutions to contain increasing political participation. Such political change occurs due to rapid economic change and the role of military changes from "reformer" to the "guardians of social order" (Huntington 1957). Luckham emphasizes three aspects: the power of civilian institutions, the organizational strength of army and the traditional role of army vis-à-vis the socio-political scene. He suggests that "as both the military and civilian institutions increase in strength, the capacity of the military for domestic coercion decreases" (Luckham 1971, 6). Thus, military take-over can be analyzed as a "political process". Also, Wyckoff argued that the politicization of military is "a symptom of a condition of political immaturity" (Wyckoff 1960, 752). Thus, prominent scholars such as Janowitz (1964), Pye (1966) and Johnson (1964) regarded military's role as an improving one, correcting the institutional weaknesses and deriving the socio-economic modernization. Thyne and Powell (2013) suggest that coups can lead to democratic transition if they are executed against an authoritarian regime that is unlikely to undergo democratic change otherwise. Nevertheless, such point is highly contested in literature: for instance Barber and Ronning (1966) pointed out the limits of military's role in modernization in Latin America (2), whereas Nordlinger demonstrated the under-investment trend and the decaying socio-economic welfare under military rule (1977, 3). Valenzuela (1985) criticizes the treatment of military takeover as "natural" development given the "vacuum left by civilian institutions". He rather underlines the necessity to treat "civilian side" as a complex institution as much as the military. Moreover, he indicates the "interpenetration" of military and civilian interests, while alluding to the political nature of army and its tendency to "operate" individually or in harmony with other social actors. Lastly, Ibrahim suggests that coups are realized not because of internal cleavages and conflicts of interest in a country, but because of a "wider socioeconomic or political situation" that needs to be accounted for (Ibrahim 2009). In that aspect, Turkish military coup has to be embedded into socio-political context in order to account for the pressure generated by modernization and the subsequent rapid economic change resulting in a wave of immigration and political turmoil in urban areas.

The Social, Economic and Political Background of Turkey

The ISI period of Turkey was initiated by military regime in the aftermath of 1960 coup. With the pressure from Republican People's Party elite and Istanbul bourgeoisie, the elections were held in October 1961 where RPP gained a marginal victory and entered parliament alongside with the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP), claiming to be successors of closed Democrat Party. Between 1961 and 1965, four coalitions were established, the first three headed by the RPP and the fourth by the JP. Due to the political uncertainty of the era, all investment was interrupted until the planned economy came to be seen as the cure. The State Planning Organization (SPO) prepared the first Five Year Development Plan for 1963-1967, adopting an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy accompanied by temporary import restrictions (Dodd 1986, 514). In 1965, JP gained 52.9 percent of votes after "stressing its belief in anti-communism and Islam associating the RPP with communism" and provided the country with much needed political stability, albeit temporarily (Amelung 1988, 21). The private sector in Turkey enjoyed the ISI model where highly profitable durable consumer goods were sold in the protected internal market. The increasing demand for foreign exchange lead to skyrocketing of foreign indebtedness. In the aftermath of 1969 elections, Justice Party led by Demirel was the major political party in the parliament, but the decline in industrial growth resulted in the decay of the support base. The March 1971 ultimatum paved the way for military control indirectly by a threat of coup in case of inability to form a coalition; and directly by establishment of a cabinet including "policy planners, technocrats and managers under Professor Erim". The government declared martial law in order to confront the urban guerilla movements and union strikes. In 1972, a new cabinet was formed, excluding RPP, nevertheless no reform could be implemented because of the discontent of business and landed classes, represented in parliament. In 1973, RPP-National Salvation Party (NSP) coalition introduced minimum prices for agricultural products as well as various social benefits such as unemployment payments. Ramazanoglu points that "the domestic market has developed as far as possible under the conditions of closed economy" (1985, 70) and the only way out of the bottleneck was to opening of the economy.

RPP firmly advocating the interest of working class against the industrialists, could not maintain the coalition with NSP and resigned. Ersan (1981) claims that the breakdown of democracy in 1980 as provoked by the political parties that could not ensure stability in the parliament. Instead of implementation of outward looking policies, the economy took a turn toward the "secondary import substitution" where heavy industries promotion was undertaken by state, leaving the profitable sector to private hands. The initial stage of ISI ended with a slow-down in growth, conflicting interests between various business groups and a certain inward orientation of economy. The fact that, during the implementation of the Second Plan (1968-1972) the import quotas were decreased even further and the third plan (1973-1978) advocated for infant industry protection reveals the protectionist tendencies and shed light on the lack of motivation on the part of business elites for increasing competition.

The increasing exports due to 1970 devaluation and remittances from German workers enabled ISI "to persist politically as well as economically" (Amelung 1988, 25) and survive the first oil shock. The failure to deepen the ISI was accompanied with political unrest and a subsequent declaration of martial law in 1978. In 1974, after Ecevit resignation Demirel's second National Front coalition could not obtain a vote of confidence vote, leading to formation of a minority government headed by Ecevit. During the political turmoil, the economic policy was neglected and was restricted to limiting the imports and indebting in order to close the foreign exchange gap. The real production deteriorated and inflation skyrocketed while the industrial unemployment increased. Daily strikes and lock-outs hindered production and the excessive fiscal spending due to the subsidization of peasants and industrialists lead to increasing budget deficits. Suffering from the impact of second oil shock, the government was compelled to negotiate with IMF and World Bank. The resulting January 24, 1980 decisions introduced devaluation, price increases, elimination of red-tape and subsidies to export industries, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies and the elimination of controls on interest rate. Following the failure to implement these policies due to political unrest and inability to elect a president in parliament, on September 12, 1980 military led by Evren took state power. The National Security Council banned all political parties, imprisoned unionists while the January 24 decisions announced to be still effective. The coup was regarded as an improvement by industrialists, as one of the leading businessmen, Koc admitted that elimination of the "obligation to pass decisions in parliament…[helped] saving of time" (Cumhuriyet, 1982). The deputy prime minister Ozal, commissioned by military, nailed the coffin of ISI leading the liberalization move. He was "a man for all seasons", being politically conservative, economically "middle-of-the-road" liberal and he adopted the populist social policies of he left. He blamed the violence of 1970s on the "socio-economic dislocations of the 1950s and 1960s" and he prioritized economy and cutback in national bureaucracy before any security measure (McFadden 1985, 78). Subsequently, the inflation was reduced to 33.2 percent in 1982 from three-digits, the domestic markets were liberalized thus preventing shortages in basic commodities and relative prices were readjusted. The burden of reforms fell upon the working class due to "drastic regression in labor incomes"(Korkut and Yeldan 2006, 4). There was a gradual move toward liberalization of trade (1984) and capital account (1989).

A General Outline of the Game

This section provides a simple formal model that draws upon the strategic interaction among players in Turkey, that are political parties inside and outside the parliament during 1970s.

Mardin (1975) argued that the "center-periphery" cleavage is the underlying axiom Turkish politics. The political system consists of a body of "nationalist, laicist, etatist, educated, urban, elite" which embodies the "center" whereas the "periphery" consists of "more traditional, conservative, religious, rural and anti-etatist" masses. Kıbrıs argues that the center-periphery cleavage "coincides" with the left-right cleavage where the right-oriented parties appropriated and represented the periphery, while the left-oriented parties appealed to the laicist, etatist center. Kalaycıoğlu (1994) claims that the center-periphery divide remains as a significant determinant of electorate's decisions, while operationalizing this cleavage based on religiosity. Esmer (1995) affirms that religiosity level and left or right identification of oneself constitutes the major elements in deciding on a party choice. Akarca and Tansel (2006) demonstrate that voters also consider government's economic performance as a determinant, although only the one-year period before the election has a significant impact on voting decision.

In the next section, a game is modelled based on the initial game sketched by O'Donnell's "Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics" In this section, it would be sufficient to enumerate the assumptions of the game.

1. Initial Conditions

- Players: Each political party is a player.
- Players' positions: In the start of the game, they are divided along the ideological lines of right-left wing.
- Players' assets:

-*Political power*: If emerged victorious of elections, the political parties could form the government. The minor parties such as "the Workers' Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, the Workingman's Party, the Socialist Revolution Party, and the "Maoist" Peasants' and Workers' Party and the National Unity Party" (Feroz 1981, 17) that lacked electoral strength or National Order Party that was banned in 1971 would not aspire to obtain such asset.

-*Voting strength*: Estimated share of the total vote to be cast for each party in elections.[8]

The Approximate voting strengths are:

Republican People's Party (Left)	30-40 percent
Justice Party (Right)	30-40 percent
National Movement Party (Right)	4-6 percent
National Salvation Party (Right)	10-12 percent
Democrat Party	
Republican Trust Party	
Independents	each 2-4 percent
Turkey Unity Party	
Nation Party	

Definition I: A "winning party" is a party that has not formed a coalition and has plurality over other parties.

Definition II: A "winning coalition" is a combination between two or more parties that having agreed how to allocate pay-offs, has a first plurality in election.

Definition III: A "prospective winning coalition" is a combination made by two or more parties prior to an election according to vote strength and likelihood of being elected. Thus,

1. If no coalition is established, either RPP or JP would have won the election, only one those two major parties could secure the formation of a single-party government.
2. If a grand coalition of leftist wing is formed, the right wing loses; or vise-versa.
3. A coalition of Left or Right wing with one or more other parties is a prospective winning coalition. If (RPP+NSP or NAP) or (JP+NSP or NAP), it is a

[8] See Appendix for results of general elections in 1969, 1973 and 1977.

prospective winning coalition, if the all the other minor parties do not form a grand coalition.

Table 1: The Ideological Spectrum of Political Parties in 1970s' Turkey

Right	**Left**
Justice Party	Republican People's Party
National Movement Party	Turkey Workers' Party
Nation Party	Trust Party
	New Turkey Party
	Unity Party

Source: Author

- Stakes of the game: Parties try to obtain important offices through election victories. Important offices are those in the cabinet, as well as the ability reshuffle bureaucratic positions and fill the administrative cadres with your own clientele. Such payoffs are indivisible. When coalitions are formed, the biggest party in government allocate some side payment to its allies in the parliament, such as ministries.

2. On the motivation of players

- Voters are rational and they vote for the most preferred one. When the choice is between the disliked and strongly disliked, they vote for the former, in order to decrease the likelihood of the second to be elected. When they strongly dislike the alternatives, they abstain.
- Parties are rational in the sense that they try to maximize their vote to be elected and once elected, they seek to satisfy the demand of the electorate. Also, they try to remain in power once elected.

3. Rules

- Bargaining to form coalitions is allowed, but once the coalition is formed, it needs to be announced.
- Minor parties are not allowed to win elections.
- Major parties will have to share the total votes, thus none of them would be able to establish the coalition by themselves. Major parties will not establish a coalition with each other either. They would have to seek alliance with minor parties.

- No party is allowed to change the rules.

Playing the Game

When the game is played, the outcome would be weak coalitions, surging political unrest and in the end, the only feasible outcome would appear to be military take over. The main underlying reason is the political party's strategies that undermine democratic values. The dominant strategy of RPP or JP is to form a coalition with minor parties or being able to form a coalition of single party. In order to obtain such result, they would grant concessions to minor parties, but such coalitions, as it would be clear in the next section, happen to be short-lived and weak. Thus, as an alternative strategy, major parties would resort to aggressive rhetoric and they would focus on the ongoing street violence in their political discourse. The extreme polarization of political scene causes the volatility in elections; the result of elections could not be easily anticipated. The electorate of relatively small parties had a great potential of swinging their votes, thus instead of building any coalition before the elections, all parties sought to employ an aggressive rhetoric, to blame each other for the violence.

Table 3: The possible outcomes of various strategies

		Major Party Choices	
		Coalition with Major or Minor Party	**Adopt Agressive Rhetoric**
Minor Party Choices	**Coalition with a Major Party**	Each benefits; although minor party could secure more benefits if encourages street violence.	Major party resorts to violent rhetoric; if it secures single-part win, no coalition. If it cannot, coalition with minor, minor party loses for not promoting street violence.
	Promote Street Violence	Major party seeks a coalition with minor; minor party is more powerful due to street mobilization, secures more concessions.	Both party promote violence; political system is worse-off and more polarized. Minor party is better-off; major party is forced to be offensive in its rhetoric. Coalition is possible but more unstable.

Source: Author

Table 2: The formal Game illustrating pay-offs for respective strategies

Major Parties \ Minor Parties	Coal.	Agression
Coalition	5 5	15 -5
Agression	-5 -5	15 -2

Source: Author

The tablo above attributes representative numeric values to various payy-offs generated by two strategies available for two players. For Major Parties (RPP or JP) the dominant strategy is to engage in "coalition" in the case where Minor Parties (NSP, NAP, DP, RTP etc.) agree to coalition. However; the coalition in either case is only the weak strategy for minor parties. Even though the final goal for the minor party is to be in coalition with a major party, the minor parties in 1970s are ideologically extremists and very well-organized in street level. Thus, mobilizing this street-level violence brings greater power to minor parties, thus increasing their vote share or more frequently enabling to make themselves heard more clearly. The pressure generated by street violence does not always translate itself into success at ballots; nevertheless, it leads major parties to be more willing to engage in coalition with a particular minor party and thus, secures greater concessions from major party in favor of minor party. This clearly demonstrates why the agression is the dominant strategy for minor parties. In the case where minor parties dominantly prefer to engage in agression, the coalion strategy pays off poorly for major parties. If the minor party mobilizes the street violence, the above matrix reveals the major party gets (-5) for coalition behaviour and (-2) for agressive rhetoric. Thus, rational major parties are obliged to adopt a more agressive rhetoric. The simple Nash equilibrium is unique and it is "Agression, Agression", resulting in (-2, 15) pay-off values. Thus, the formal game illustrates that although at the initial stage the major parties were cooperative, due to the polarization and pervasive violence across the political spectrum, they opt for offensive political discourse.

The minor parties' dominant strategy is to seek alliance with major parties. Alternatively, they can prefer to remain in opposition, but due to the concessions they obtain for joining the major party's coalition, minor parties tend to pursue the dominant strategy. Once the result of election is announced, smaller parties could get side payments from big parties in exchange of coalition partnership with them. Thus, small parties benefitted from adopting "RRP or JP mode" after the election is done. The ideological orientation (being right or left oriented) mattered only moderately, as exemplified by the center-left RRP and religious right NSP coalition on 1974. Due to election threshold, small parties worried little about competition. In order to establish a coalition, major parties would need one or two minor parties depending on their vote share. Thus, once in the parliament, minor parties could bargain with a stronger hand and without fearing of major parties seeking coalition with other parties. Moreover, Rostow indicates that the number of seats occupied by small parties (NSP and NAP) between 1973 and 1980 could swing the balance between RRP and JP, thus small parties could extract greater favors. Nevertheless, in order to guarantee a larger share of total votes to remain as an attractive minor party, the NAP employs a second complementary strategy: despite the formal appearance, arguably NAP had ties with neo-fascist groups that undermined the democratic values. It had close ties with right wing terrorists and such organized mobilization opportunity contributed to enlargement of its impact. NAP without a doubt benefitted from the "accomplishments" of its activist branch. This complementary strategy arguably had a positive impact on NAP's votes which follow an increasing trend in 1970s. The "rightist terror" fueled by political instability and mobilized by grass-root organization of right wing parties, undermined the political power of RPP that had majority of seats in parliament, through an "organized campaign of violence". Ecevit replied by convincing Turk-Is and DISK, two major unions, to work together against "the rising tide of fascism", thus mobilizing the left that lacked "political leadership" due to fragmentation in left politics (Feroz 1981, 15). Thus the left-wing groups replied the right terror in kind. This shows that given the complementary strategy of NAP, the RPP and other left oriented parties adopt a tit-for-tat strategy: a complementary violent strategy is adopted across the political spectrum.

Given that players' stick to their dominant and complementary strategies, it became more difficult for ruling party to stay in power and rule the country. The violence came to be an ordinary feature of daily politics. Moreover, the government had to manage the economy, a challenging mission in the 1970s international economic scene: the liquidity abundance and economic expansion of post-war era was behind, 1970s witnessed two major oil shocks, that proved detrimental for Turkish economics. The following part sheds light on the steps that lead the ruler party into an economic and political impasse during 1970s.

- There is a need of economic management; although first oil shock in 1973 is alleviated through remittances, the fragilities were inherent to the economy. Despite an output growth, the ISI regime of Turkey was not an altogether success and it had seeds of crisis. The unemployment was high, the growth was dependent on consumer demand, and the industry was highly dependent on imports, thus fragile. The oligopolistic structure was encouraged, so the economy lacked competitive drive, and structurally the inflation has been high and TL overvalued (Barkey 1990).

- As the government made attempts to apply necessary economic tools, it became further dependent on the coalition of organized sectors bureaucracy, unions and right-wing groups. The latter two can be mobilized through ideological discourse, although such mobilization leads to further polarization.
- The bureaucrats and business groups measure the level of success of government based on economic-social indicators. These indicators would include the GDP growth, level of inflation, the budget deficit and low level of social unrest (strikes etc.). If these indicators show a significant improvement compared to previous government, the incumbent government would be considered to be successful and unsuccessful if such improvement cannot be observed.
- The current government cannot depend on the support of unorganized sectors. The business group would be divided along regional and importer-industrial lines, thus represent a heterogeneous group that heavily depends on state policies. The same situation is observable to a large extent for the landed interest (Amelung 1988, 98). Subsequently, the bureaucracy, the trade unions and the organized right groups that cultivate street violence have a greater say in politics.
- The achievement of substantive economic performance requires disregard of social pressures, a "negative redistribution of income, neglect of popular consumption demands, and elimination of inefficient producers" (O'Donnell 1975, 103). Thus, government should be able to employ a coercive mechanism.
- If government is able to exert coercion, the business groups and bureaucracy would acknowledge the economic improvement but the deprived sectors would be alienated. The exertion of coercion would lead to further isolation of government that has to rely on a narrow coalition of bureaucracy and some sections in business group. In order to remedy the social cost of coercion, there is a need for an actor outside the ruling coalition, but such mobilization is impossible due to successful implementation of coercion in the first place.
- There would be an increasing discrepancy in the perceived reality of the two parts in the society; those who exert coercion and those who are deprived. If the deprivation level

prevents further improvement in the economic signs the process could stop, but by then the regime would have changed the social context in which it was installed, thus leading to a new game (O'Donnell 1975, 104).

- Considering the opposite scenario where the coercion could not be applied successfully, different results would follow where the government policies would be impeded by popular sector mobilization.
- The social sector increasingly resort to strikes etc. Thus, the government has to negotiate with the most organized actors. The attempt to perform economic policies is further endangered when the government's failure to exert coercion became apparent. This situation would divide the ruling coalition among those who blame the coalition for not taking the reforms seriously and those who seek outside support to coalition, thus opening game to new actors (105).
- In the external front, the search for outside support is likely to remain infertile due to previous attempt of exclusion of various sectors. In domestic front, there are highly mobilized sectors in the society such as unions and right-wing violence-prone groups. Thus government is unable to apply problem solving strategies resort to clientelistic relations and rely on patronage. The state cadres reshuffled every time the ruling party changed, further eroding the confidence into political system. The patronage relations were not a feasible alternative to economic-social policies and they kept RRP or JP in government, they could not remedy for social vulnerabilities and subsequent unrest.

The Historical Outcome of the Game: The Era of Weak Coalitions

The history shows that in the beginning of 1970s, the ruling coalition was formed under Ecevit's RPP with religious NSP. In 1974, the coalition was disbanded to be replaced "National Front" government under prime ministry of Demirel's JP with the NSP and the NAP. Between 1973 and 1980, eight governments were formed and collapsed, out of which five were majority governments, while the remaining three were respectively an all-party cabinet, formed to supervise the 1973 election, a "technocratic government", constituted of diplomats and professors, in order to parliamentary deadlock in 1974 and the last one was a a minority government under Ecevit, who failed to obtain a vote of confidence after 1977 elections. 1977 election witnesses an expansion of the vote share for two major parties, at the expense of minor ones, whereas in its aftermath, another weak Nationalist Front was established under Demirel, consisting of JP, NSP and NAP. This marked the beginning of the end, so to speak, where National Front government was disbanded after resignation of JP deputies, who later joined

RPP, that rewarded them with ministerial positions and could form a new government. The new government survived barely 22 months, only to lose power in 1979 after the victory of JP in partial Senate elections that signaled the loss of popular support in RPP. Demirel formed a new government with NAP and NSP, which would last until military coup of 1980. Evren, the general that led the coup, would argue that the coup was the result of the political violence (around 5000 dead by the time) that political parties failed to prevent. After the electoral defeat of Turkish Labor Party in 1969, left-wing movement started to consider terrorism as a legitimate tool to reach their goals. Cayan, one of the leaders of left movement, stated that there was no alternative beside armed struggle in order to transform the system. Although the numbers of members were around thousands, they managed to terrorize the society and faced the challenge of extremist right. The same conflict had a reflection in political arena, where center-right parties (JP, NAP, MSP) accused center-left RPP of encouraging terrorist actions. The governmental dead-end disgraced the democracy, further pushing activists to engage in street violence. THKO and THKO-C were the leading left groups which resorted to terrorism: on the right wing, there were Idealist Clubs Association (Ulku Ocaklari Dernegi), the Idealist Path Organization (Ulku Yolu Birligi), and the Idealist Youth Organization (Ulku Genc Dernegi), collectively, known as the Grey Wolves (Sayari 2008, 412). They were mobilized under the leadership of a former military officer Alparslan Turkes who was the founder of NAP. There could not be found a parliamentarian solution for violence since each party had a different agenda: JP accused Marxist-Leninist groups' "indoctrination of the university students" and their ideology that aimed at replacing democracy with a socialist regime. On the other hand, RPP located the problem in governments' inability to account for social and economic problems, thus pushing people into despair and violence.

Post-1980 Era in Turkey: A Critique of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model

It is evident from the historical picture that the government increasingly lost its ruling capacities, thus paving way for a military takeover. But, what precisely can we conclude regarding the Turkish political context about the BA model? How the analysis on 1970s and the political unrest helps us to understand the new regime that is established after 1980 coup? What can be said about the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of that regime?

In order to outline the specificities of the new regime established after 1980 coup, it would be essential to underline the commonalities and differences of Turkish regime with the BA model. According to literature, BA regimes were effective "at fragmenting, atomizing and inhibiting potential oppositional collectivities" (Stepan 2001, 317), thus generating a balance where the state grew at the expense of society's power. Indeed, Latin American countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina in 1960s and 1970s, witnessed periods of industrialization, emergence of a more authoritarian rule where the bourgeoisie maintained the "social base" for authoritarian rulers who, at the first instance, used the repressive state apparatus to dismantle working class movement. The attempt to "restructure capitalism" was common, although the means differed. Thus, the comparaison between the Turkish context and BA model coalesce around three points: the growing authoritarian capacity, the technocratic level in regime and the economic restructuring, encompassing a major industrialization move.

Considering the growing authoritarian capacity, Turkey can be considered as a case of "zero-sum" game, where the state expanded at the expense of decline in social capacity for mobilization. The members of allegedly terrorist political organizations, were imprisoned and tortured. The unions were disbanded and once allowed in the aftermath of 1983 elections, they were rendered powerless through legal framework with new constitution. The labor movement was weakened through limited membership opportunities and bans on activities. This manifested itself most radically in labor's real income decreases through 1980s. In 1970s, there were approximately 800 unions out of which, few had nationwide influence. Following the 1980 coup, only Türk-Is was spared from closings that other unions faced. Subsequently, the government allowed the other union groups to resume their activities. Eventually, they were allowed to resume their activities albeit under severe legal restrictions. [9] The following political regime was reluctant to change legal framework since the economic liberalization required weaker labor movements. Thus, there was a certain authoritarian tendency at the expense of social movement capabilities.

Secondly, the technocratic tendencies should be contested. O'Donnell's model anticipates high level of military and technocrat involvement in establishment of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime, whereas in Turkey and in Middle East, as an historical trend, army's involvement in politics, although heavily present, remained behind the scene. Its essential involvement was structured to maintain "a particular regime in power", that characterizes a "moderator" tendency in Nordlingerian terms (1977). Nordlinger develops a typology of military strategies; first, there are "moderators" that uses "veto power" and "displacement coup" in order to assign more favorable civilian groups to power and maintain their position. Thus, they enforce "political and constitutional ground rules", in Turkish context Kemalist doctrine and oversees political stability.

[9] See for data: http://countrystudies.us/turkey/54.htm

A second type would be "guardian" army, which corrects previous regime's negligence through displacement of civilians and taking control of government. The last would be the ruler type that openly and actively involves into politics in order to rule the constituency by first hand. From that categorization, I would suggest Turkish military forces remained relatively outside the politics and by adopting such policy, it managed to protect its "good image" as the defender of country against state's enemies. Thus, through acting as a "moderator", Turkish military kept its influence intact, although it was not involved with the institutional and economic restructuring of state in the aftermath of coup. Certainly 1982 constitutions granted new, ample powers to army, but the fact that army preserved the 24 January decisions, reveals its economic compliance with previous regimes. Moreover, in 1983 elections, Özal's victory-induced discontent was prevalent in army, however no action was taken. The army was content of its role as "moderator" and it was inclined to leave the restructuring of economic scene to political authorities, as long as the ideological orientation of political power conformed to the needs and interests of military. This constitutes a break from BA model where the military-bureaucrat apparatus is actively involved in political-economic restructuring. Another point that is worth-mentioning would be the reshuffling of bureaucratic cadres. The Turkish politics have a long tradition of clientelistic distribution of bureaucratic posts, thus it was not surprising the existing bureaucracy was replaced by a small group of western (especially US) trained technocrats summoned by Özal, once he became the prime minister. Thus, contrary to Latin American examples where the old bureaucracy consolidated its grasp, in Turkish context the old bureaucracy was eliminated. However, there is a similarity in the sense that the new bureaucracy in Turkey undertook major economic restructuring. The bureaucracy was strictly subordinated to political authority, but it had also an autonomous sphere because of the major responsibilities and technical expertise requirements.

The last comparison line concerns the economic restructuring that should encompass a major industrialization move. Hirschman (1979) questions the "industrialist nature" of bureaucratic authoritarian governments that succeeded military coups in Argentina and Brazil, as well as "deindustrializing" characters of 1970s global economy. Although in the "deepening" stage of ISI, Argentina witnesses a 52.5 percent increase in industrial output between 1966 and 1973, the bureaucratic authoritarian framework is not able to incorporate different phases of development, closely tied to global economy, thus the model cannot explain the slowdown in Argentinian industrialization in second half of 1970s. The late developers such as Argentina and Brazil, benefitted from an expanding world economy in 1960s, an absent phenomenon in 1970s. Contrary to BA model, a deepening of industrialization was reversed and surrendered against the "reemergence of laissez-faire" (Schamis 1991, 209). The economic restructuring scheme, following the military takeover, tended to create a new economic class and a new form of accumulation: in Turkish case, that would be the exporters. The exporter class was encouraged to grow through various subsidies and support mechanisms, among which liberalization emerged as an important component, not only economically but politically. The state was no longer ideologically tolerated for its interventionist tendencies and the bureaucracy, as well as unions, were to take their share of burden under liberalization. The liberalization period of 1980s in Turkey is a peculiar one: the lower rates of unionization was guaranteed through a series of bans on union and strike rights, in compliance with liberal agenda, but SEEs remained largely untouched and continued employing large numbers of workers until 2000s where a true wave of privatization would be witnessed. Thus, the major industrialization move never occurred for Turkey, neither before or after 1980 coup. Beside the structural shortcomings of Turkey, the international economic scene was oriented toward economic liberalization and financialization. Thus, it can be argued that, bureaucratic-authoritarian model tends to exclude the international economic dimension and underestimate "the specific connection" between a specific economy and the international system into which the former is embedded (Schamis 1991, 211). The economic contraction of 1970s disfavored models anticipating an increase in manufacture production. Thus, the BA model was "virtually impossible" (213) to replicate itself through different time spans. Instead, Ozal's big project was to promote exports, thus he hoped, to eliminate the inward-looking tendencies of old ISI elite. However, such competitive edge escaped the ISI elite until the Customs Unions agreement with European Union in 1995. Moreover, the Turkish economy took a turn toward financialization: the banks played an increasingly important role and had close ties with business conglomerates. Turkey increasingly integrated with global market, although strict reliance on short term foreign capital inflows would constitute a major weakness of Turkish economy.

Having established the three points of comparison, this paper demonstrates there are significant divergences from classical BA model in Turkish context. In order to explain the divergence this paper attempted to construct a formal game and draw upon the institutionalist methodology. Such inquiry elucidates that the bureaucratic-authoritarian model does not provide an in-depth analysis of social actors and crisis dynamics leading to the emergence of either civil or military authoritarian regimes. This paper outlines the instrumentalization of violence and patronage relations in consolidation of electorate base. Thus, the political crisis was not merely a reflection of an economic crisis or the tension created by modernization. Those had a considerable impact upon the internal dynamics, but the crisis itself cannot be understood without a careful consideration of political actors, their motives, interests, tools they employed. There is an essential point that needs to be underlined regarding the societal dynamics in 1970s. The previously outlined social cleavage approach, borrowed from Mardin, cannot account for some important aspects of elections, such as "heterogeneity" of the voter base, the absence of class politics, importance of clientelistic relations and volatility of voters' preferences. Contrary to Western Europe where political parties emerged as a result of "bottom-up" movements and thus represented fixed cleavages in society, Turkish political party system is heavily influenced and controlled by authoritarian state elites, thus enabling the dissolution of strict voting patterns frequently and disallowing persistence of societal cleavages (Sayari 2008). The patronage relation played a major role in securing greater vote share in a highly volatile environment. The ISI coalition in Turkey, that was constituted of big industrialists, bureaucracy and unionized labor, was numerically unable to engender winning major parties in 1970s; thus they were "narrow policy coalitions" (Öniş and Şenses 2007). However, the center-right parties successfully broadened their vote base through patronage politics although such coalition proved to be "unsustainable" (Öniş 2010). Beside the patronage relations, the political violence was instrumental in that aspect in order to consolidate the cleavage in the society, thus expanding the extremist parties' electorate base. Political parties can also assume a "society-shaping" role where they not only capitalize upon the already existing conflict of interests, but they can actively redefine "economic and cultural bonds" to utilize them to gather support. Through such "political articulation" process, political parties naturalize the "ethno-religious, racial or class" cleavages as basis of socio-political identities (De Leon, Desai and Tuğal 2009). Thus, political unrest was instrumental not only in consolidating but *creating* the cleavages. The BA model undermines such important institutional aspect due to the failure of not treating political parties and social organizations as *institutions* per se.

Conclusion

When applying O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime model in Turkish context, this paper sketches a formal model relying on the strategic actions between the political parties in 1970s. Having established the three points of comparison, this paper demonstrates there are significant divergences from classical BA model in Turkish context and argues that this difference can be accounted for through an actor level analysis. This enables BA theory to be reappopriated in each individual context.

The BA theory is strong in explaining the destabilizing effect of modernity in late-developers, but it has a major weakness, that is the lack of actor level analysis. For instance, this paper found that there were striking differences in terms of the technocratic level in regime in newly established Turkish regime vis-à-vis the BA model. However, the following economic restructuring era revealed the inadequacy of BA to account for changes if replicated in different contexts. Thus, the comparison of convergences and divergences between Turkish and Latin American context, revealed the need of recontextualization and reappropriation of BA model, especially through inclusion of an agency-level institutional analysis and incorporation of the concern for international economic setting. This paper argued and demonstrated that political parties are active agents that use patronage policies and political violence as efficient tools to consolidate their electorate base. Through such instrumentalization of violence, they contribute to polarization of politics and push the country on the edge of chaos, while actively constructing the cleavages that would benefit them. Thus, it is argued that inclusion of actor-level analysis and institutional methodology permits the BA theory to be improved beyond amendment; it is transformed into a powerful and new methodological tool.

Bibliogrpahy

Ahmad, Feroz. 1981. "Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey", MERIP Reports, No. 93, Turkey: The Generals Take Over: 5-24.

Akarca, Ali and Aysit Tansel, 2006. "Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2004.", *Public Choice* 129, 77-105.

Barber, Willard F. and C. Ronning, 1966. *International Security and Military Power: Counter-insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America*, Columbus: Ohio University Press.

Barkey, Henri. 1984. *The Political Economy of Industrialization:A Case Study of Turkey, 1960-1980*. Unpublished dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.

Barkey, Henri. 1990. *State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey*, cp.5.

Belkin, A. and E. Schofer, 2003. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Boratav, Korkut and Erinç Yeldan, 2006. "Turkey, 1980-2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)-Stability, And Patterns of Distribution" Chp14 (pp. 417-455) in Lance Taylor (ed.) *External Liberalization in Asia, Post-Socialist Europe and Brazil*, Oxford University Press.

Brill, E. 1995. *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in The 1990s*, Leiden, New York.

Çarkoğlu, Ali and Melvin J. Hinich, 2002. "An Analysis of the Ideological Space Underlying Turkish Party Preferences," *Turkish Policy Quarterly Spring*: 89-100.

Cumhuriyet Journal, 24 January 1982,
accessed at http://www.cumhuriyetarsivi.com/monitor/index.xhtml

De Leon, Cedric and Manali Desai and Cihan Tuğal, 2009. ""Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey*", American Sociological Association*, Issue Sociological Theory, Volume 27, Issue 3: 193–219.

Dodd, C. H. 1986. "The Crisis of Turkish Democracy", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Review by: Frank Tachau, Vol. 18, No. 4: 514-515.

Ersan, T. 1981. "Turkey's Battered Democracy," *Index on Censorship*: 1 1-15.

Esmer, Yılmaz. 1995. "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties", In *Turkey-Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, edited by Ciğdem Balım et al.. Leiden; New York: E.J.Brill.

Finer, Samuel Edward. 1962. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. London: Pall Mall Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Ibrahim, Amina. 2009. "Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy? The economic Factors of Pakistan's Military Coups", Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London: LSE Press.

Janowitz, M. 1964. *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Johnson, J. 1964. *Military and Society in Latin America*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 1994. "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey, Changes and Continuities in the 1990s.", *Comparative Political Studies* 27(3): 402-424.

Kıbrıs, Arzu. 2011. "Funerals and elections: The effects of terrorism on voting behavior in Turkey.", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55: 220–247.

Londregan, J. and T. Poole. 1990. "Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power." *World Politics* , 42: 151-183.

Luckham, A. R. 1971. "A comparative typology of civil-military relations", *Government and Opposition* 6(1).

Mardin, Serif. 1975. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," In E.D. Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor, ed., *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* (Istanbul):15– 32. 2.

McFadden, John H. 1985. "Civil-Military Relations in the Third Turkish Republic" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 1: 69-85

Nordlinger, E. 1997. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1977. "Corporatism and the question of the state", *Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America*, Volume 47, University of Pittsburgh Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1978. "Reflections on the patterns of change in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state", *Latin American Research Review*, Volume 12,1:3-38.

Önis, Ziya and F. Senses. 2007. "Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development," ERC Working Papers 0706.

Önis, Ziya. 2010. "Crises and Transformations in Turkish Political Economy", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*.

Pye, Lucian 1966. *Aspects of Political Development*, Boston, Little Brown.

Ramazanoğlu, H. 1985. "A political analysis of the emergence of Turkish capitalism, 1839-1950." In *Turkey in the world capitalist system*, ed. H. Ramazanoğlu.

Remmer, Karen and Gilbert Merckx. 1982. "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited." *Latin American Research Review* 17: 3-40.

Sayarı, Sabri. 2008. "Non-electoral sources of party system change in Turkey", in *Essays in Honor of Ergun Özbudun*, Yazıcı, Serap and Gözler, Kemal and Keyman, Fuat (eds.), Ankara: Yetkin: 399-418

Schamis, Hector E. 1991. "Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic- Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism.", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 2: 201-220.

Stepan, Alfred. 2001. "Introduction" in *Arguing Comparative Politics*.

Thompson, William R. 1973. *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Thyne, C. L. and J. M. Powell, 2013. "Coup d'etat or coup d'autocracy? How coups impact democratization, 1950-2008", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, forthcoming.

Valenzuela, A. 1985. "A Note on the Military and Social Science Theory", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 1:132-143

Wyckoff, Theodore. 1960. "The role of the military in Latin American politics". *Western Political Quarterly* XIII, n. 4.

Social Movements, Autonomy and the State in Latin America

Eric Sippert

Eric Sippert, 22, is a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts Amherst pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science. In 2014, he received his Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs at Eastern Michigan University. His interests include social movements, contentious politics, Latin America, globalization, and political theory.

Abstract

Social movements have become an important part of the political realm in Latin America, overthrowing and installing leaders as well as challenging capitalism and the state itself. This study attempts to classify social movements into four different categories by the amount of autonomy they exercise from the state and then look at the effectiveness of each of these different groups. Through examining different strategies and outcomes from social movements in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, I attempt to ascertain which degree of autonomy is most effective. This study finds that while the weakened state has made autonomous movements more effective, engaging the state can still be beneficial for social movements with achieving their objectives.

Keywords: CONAIE; Latin America; MAS; MST; Social Movements; Zapatistas

Introduction

On January 1, 1994 in southern Mexico the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, commonly known as the Zapatistas, rose up against the Mexican state. After twelve days the Zapatistas retreated back into the highlands and jungle regions of Chiapas. Their goal was to develop an autonomous society, "a world in which many worlds fit." The decision of the Zapatistas to not enter into electoral politics and to accept no aid from the state was seen as ludicrous by many. Although the Zapatistas initially made demands of the state, they did not wait for the state to meet them and instead began building autonomous communities themselves. Others, who were disillusioned with the electoral left as well as the guerrilla movements of the 1960s-1980s, saw it as a new path forward, a new way of doing politics. Over 2,000 miles south and eleven years later in La Paz, Bolivia, Evo Morales, the head of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement towards Socialism-MAS), was elected president of Bolivia. This election was not only historic because Morales was the first elected indigenous president in a country that is approximately 70% indigenous, but also because the MAS is a party constructed from a social movements base, originally primarily the coca growers' movement (Dangl, 2010: p. 13, 16-17). These two movements display opposite sides of the range of autonomy that movements may exercise. The MAS has become fully institutionalized and now even rules, while the Zapatistas have continued to exercise complete autonomy.

The recent historical context of Latin America is important to understanding the current movements of the region, and specifically the movements I will examine. Many of these movements can be traced back to the 1970s/1980s, the era of neoliberalism. Robinson describes neoliberalism as "doctrines of laissez-faire, comparative advantage, free trade and efficiency, [which] became hegemonic in universities and governments across the First World" (Robinson, 2008: p. 16). Neoliberalism in Latin America was often enforced through economic coercion as well as at the barrel of a gun. While neoliberalism began in Chile in 1973 with the US-backed overthrow of the democratically elected Salvador Allende and the free-market economic policies that Milton Friedman and other "Chicago Boys" drafted for the Pinochet dictatorship, it only reached its peak strength during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The enforcement of neoliberal policies was often known as the Washington Consensus, which was a plan described by English economist John Williamson that included "10 policy instruments about whose proper deployment Washington can muster a reasonable degree of consensus" (Williamson, 1989).

The ferocious form of globalization and deregulation of global capital unleashed by neoliberal economics resulted in a decrease of state participation in many spheres and a decline of state sovereignty itself. As Hardt and Negri note:

> [I]n step with the processes of globalization, the sovereignty of nation-states, while still effective, has progressively declined. The primary factors of production and exchange— money, technology, people, and goods— move with increasing ease across national boundaries; hence the nation state has less and less power to regulate these flows and impose its authority over the economy. Even the most dominant nation-states should no longer be thought of as supreme and sovereign authorities, either outside or even within their own borders (2000: p. xi)

The return of electoral politics to Latin America since the 1980s has been a point of contention for many Latin Americans, who question how democratic the region actually is. Robinson argues that true participatory democracy has not been created, but rather polyarchy, "a system in which a small group actually rules, on behalf of capital, and participation in decision making by the majority is confined to choosing among competing elites in tightly controlled electoral processes" (Robinson, 2008: p. 273). These new "democratic" systems have done little to address the deep structural inequality of the region and are often run by elites who had great amounts of power before the "transition to democracy." The "transition to democracy" has aided movements by opening up space for them to express their views, but simultaneously increases the risk of cooptation and demobilization. Many who place themselves on the radical left have now abandoned the guerrilla Guevarist method of taking state power and instead seek alternative paths to accomplish radical change, focusing on transforming society from below (Webber and Carr, 2013). This study will examine how four different social movements in Latin America since the 1990s-- in Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia-- exercise varying degrees of autonomy from the state, in order to determine whether exercising greater autonomy leads to greater success.

Despite the transition to democracy in the 1980s/1990s and the rise of Pink Tide governments in Latin America beginning with the Venezuelan Caracazo in 1989, Latin America is still the most unequal continent on earth (Rimsip – Latin America Center for Rural Poverty, 2011). Neoliberalism and the form of globalization it has unleashed have brought a select few into wealth, but have made an already precarious life even more precarious for many. With what can be seen as the failure of liberal democracy, many are seeking alternative methods of creating change, with social movements being one of the foremost methods. This study is important in that it questions what degree of autonomy from the state is most effective in achieving movement goals. It also exhibits that taking state power is not a guarantee of change. The categories of autonomy that I develop may be useful in classifying movements in other Pink Tide nation-states, as well as throughout Latin America. Further areas of research interest that could be developed from this study include movements using either the state or transnational networks as defensive mechanisms. I further suggest that social movement theorists must focus further on the internal dynamics of movements. While the leaders of vertical movements may have much to gain by cooperation with the state, the base of the movement is left without their goals met. On the other hand, horizontally organized movements may have less to gain from cooperation with the state due to the absence of a strong leader. Social justice activists from around the world must not accept the Pink Tide as inherently good, but rather be mindful of new forms of exploitation.

Literature Review

Social movements have become a driving force in politics in Latin America. The consequences of them, both intended and unintended, have been far reaching. Beginning with the period of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s/1990s, as well as the end of unfettered neoliberalism, we have witnessed a democratic opening in Latin America. This democratic opening along with the dismantling of social programs by neoliberalism has created an opening that social movements have filled and generated a protest cycle with. Some of these movements can be traced back to movements that were active during the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s/1980s while some are more recent. Along with this rise of social movements there has been an increase in left-of-center governments that have come to power in the region, known as the Pink Tide. I will examine the relationships between movements and the state in Latin America, especially regarding autonomy and its influence on the outcomes or success of a movement.

Much of the theoretical academic work done on social movements has unfortunately focused on movements in the developed world. Scholars such as Tilly, Giugni and Gamson have described how to classify the outcomes and consequences of social movements (Gamson, 2003: p. 350-352). Hardt and Negri have provided important theoretical foundation for understanding the phenomenon of increasingly autonomous social movements by analyzing the decline of nation-state sovereignty and its effect on what they call "constituent movements," a term they use to emphasize the process of constituting collective social subjects (2000). Raúl Zibechi, focusing on Latin America, has applied and furthered the work of Hardt and Negri in his description of the space created by neoliberalism and contested by grassroots movements through new, increasingly horizontal processes of organizing. Zibechi has also produced invaluable work on the relationship between the new Pink Tide states and these movements (Zibechi, 2005: p. 13-39). Many scholars have also worked on the current "protest cycle" in Latin America and I will draw heavily on their work regarding not only how movements operate but also why they are now occurring (Tarrow 1994).

William A. Gamson begins with the suggestion that movements do not have successes or failures but rather outcomes. These can include broad cultural and societal changes as well as policy and institutional changes. Gamson proposes that there are four possible outcomes that stem from new advantages gained by a movement and the acceptance of the movement's ideas. From these two categories movements can achieve "many" new advantages or "full" acceptance, with the opposite scenario being no new advantages and no acceptance. Obviously, there are varying degrees of these categories but for the sake of classification we will use Gamson's ideal-types. Many new advantages as well as full acceptance yields what Gamson classifies as **full response**. The opposite of this, no new advantages and no acceptance, yields **collapse**. The two other possible outcomes are **co-optation**, where the movement receives no new advantages but is fully accepted. The last outcome, **preemption**, is achieved when the movement receives no acceptance but does receive new advantages (Gamson, 2003: p. 350-352).

Marco Giugni further expands Gamson's analysis of the outcomes of social movements. Giugni usefully notes that it is imperative that scholars not only note and document the intended consequences of social movements, but the unintended consequences as well. These unintended consequences can be longer lasting and even more powerful. Giugni points out that movement outcomes can have internal or external explanations. This internal/external debate fits into the broader pluralist/elitist debate among social scientists. The pluralist side claims that political systems are responsive to social movements and therefore external pressure is effective. The counter-argument of the elitists is that political systems are essentially unresponsive and therefore movements are ineffective. However, as Giugni notes, the context of protest is also decisive. Sidney Tarrow claims that there are "protest cycles," or moments in time when movements are more likely to succeed (1994). Some have suggested that Latin America is currently in the middle of a protest cycle (Reyes, 2012: p. 1-27). The existence of this current protest cycle along with the assumption that the state acts to prolong its own existence makes external context a parameter in this study, rather than a variable. Giugni agrees with Gamson that looking at movements as simple successes or failures is not beneficial. One of the many reasons for this is that social movements are complex heterogeneous entities (Giugni, 1999: p. xiii-xxxiii). The simple success/failure binary classification assumes that movements are homogenous entities. Giugni further notes that outcomes are not limited to the political realm, but include cultural and societal changes as well. Lastly, Giugni recommends a four-step methodology for the study of the consequences of social movements. These tasks are 1) define the range of movement consequences, 2) specify the types of consequences to be studied, 3) search for plausible relevant causes, and 4) reconstruct causal patterns and history (Giugni, 1999: p. xiii-xxxiii).

Tilly explains the outcomes classified by Giugni's formula *strength = worthiness x unity x numbers x commitment.* If any of these numbers decrease to zero, strength falls to zero as well. Causality is also a problem in that it is difficult to prove that a movement produced the change and not an outside force. Tilly describes this as a three-circle Venn diagram in which "movement claims," "effects of movement actions," and "effects of outside events and actions" all intersect. These claims all rest on what is traditionally known as resource mobilization theory as well as the closely related political opportunity structure or political process theory (Tilly, 1999: p. 253-270).

Many scholars have noted that there are key differences between social movements in Latin America and in the industrialized Global North. However, before addressing this it is important to look at the global phenomenon of the weakening of state sovereignty, or as Hardt and Negri propose, the transfer of sovereignty from the modern nation state to "a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule." They call this new form of sovereignty Empire. The opposite of this new form of sovereignty, or Empire, is described by Hardt and Negri as the Multitude. Instead of making demands of the traditional nation-state, groups that are *within* Empire but struggle *against* Empire must use new forms of struggle. These forces do not simply struggle against the imperial system, but struggle to create a new world as well (Hardt and Negri, 2000). I believe that many current social movements in Latin America embody this form of struggle and are examples of the Multitude that Hardt and Negri describe. George Ciccariello-Maher, as well as others also categorize these forces as constituent movements in that they are "sudden and explosive rebellions from below" in opposition to "constituted processes" or top-down (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013: 126-145).

Raúl Zibechi utilizes this constituent movement model to look at social movements in Latin America and suggests that Latin American social movements are distinct from other movements around the world. One of these historically specific characteristics is a complex mix of ideas that draws from three different currents that have shaped Latin American movements. These three main currents are liberation theology with its grassroots Christian communities, Indian insurgency with its non-Western viewpoint, and Guevarism with its potential for revolutionary militancy. Zibechi, like Hardt and Negri, has perceived the decline in state sovereignty and believes Latin American movements have shifted in accordance with this in order to survive. Before the 1970s, most movements were state centric and relied on what is regarded today as traditional means of organization. This organizing was generally hierarchical and a reflection of how the state is organized rather than horizontal as many movements are today. Many of these traditional movements are now struggling. Instead, there is now an increase in movements from the margins that challenge the state as well as the old Left (Zibechi, 2012). This can also be seen as a reinvention of the Lefts in Latin America (Motta, 2013: p. 5-18). Furthermore, Zibechi lays out seven trends that he believes unite the majority of Latin American movements, and some of which are unique to Latin American movements. These seven common trends are: 1) the territorialization of struggles, 2) seeking autonomy from the state, including political parties, 3) re-valorization of culture and affirmation of identity, 4) the formation of their own intellectuals, 5) inclusion of women in struggles and new gender relations, 6) a new organization of work and respect for nature, and 7) new forms of action to make the movement visible and to assert identity (Zibechi, 2012). At the same time, these so-called new movements do share similarities with movements that preceded them and many can be traced back to older movements (Becker, 2008).

The interactions between the state and social movements in Latin America, especially with the phenomenon of the Pink Tide, lead to a dynamic interplay. Movements must choose between being absorbed into institutional state structures, which in many cases claim to represent them, and fighting for constitutional change through these governments, or remaining autonomous and fighting for change as a constituent force. By looking at four different social movements that are utilizing varying degrees of autonomy, my goal is to shed some light on the advantages or disadvantages that come with working with, or through, the state apparatus.

Methodology

My research regarding social movements in Latin America can be condensed into the following question: are social movements that practice greater autonomy from the state more effective than those that are integrated into state structures? To answer this question I suggest it is necessary to categorize the various degrees of autonomy that movements can utilize. These four categories as already discussed are 1) *complete integration*, the movement becomes or is integrated into a political party, 2) *partial integration*, the movement splits into two separate groups, one of which is a political party and the other a social movement, 3) *separate interaction*, the movement does not enter into the state apparatus but still makes demands of the state, and 4) *autonomy*, the movement is in no way involved in the state apparatus and makes little to no demands of the state.

I will examine social movements in Latin America with my independent variable as the degree of autonomy movements utilize and with my dependent variable as these movements' outcomes/success. The work of Zibechi will help define and operationalize my independent variable (movement autonomy) while the work of Gamson, Giugni, and Tilly will help with the classification of my dependent variable (movement outcomes/success). Movement success is often a subjective measure that can be different for different members as well as different categories of members (leaders vs. base) of the movement. A heterogeneous movement has varied ideas of success. However, for this study, I will use the dominant goals of the movement as defined by manifestos, declarations, etc. as that movement's idea of success. A disadvantage of observing current movements is the time dimension. Movements may change goals and it is difficult to determine the endpoint when one can ask if the movement has succeeded. For this study, movements will be evaluated by outcomes that have already occurred. Close attention will be paid to outcomes that seem probable to materialize in the near future. The goals of movements will be studied with an emphasis on more recent goals but not forgetting past goals.

To compare these four different types of movements and examine their effectiveness I believe it is necessary to take a qualitative approach; through using the case study method, with one example of each of the four different classifications listed above using the most similar systems (MSS) method. This small-n case study method is beneficial because it allows an in-depth examination of a single movement for every category (inductive analysis); it also builds the groundwork for a larger examination in the future (deductive analysis). Through using a most similar systems analysis and choosing cases from the same time period (1980s-2010s), the historical context and the economic development of the cases becomes a constant parameter rather than a variable and therefore simplifies the examining of the dependent and independent variable. As Collier and Mahoney note, in small-N qualitative research there is a risk in overestimating the value of results of case studies (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: p. 70-71). However, by recognizing that extreme cases are presumed to be distinguishing, vital knowledge can be gained, which can be applied to other cases.

The first case study will be the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS), Movement Toward Socialism, in Bolivia. The MAS, which can be traced back to mining and coca growers' movements, took power in 2006 through the presidency of Evo Morales (Dangl, 2010: p. 14-17). The case of MAS in Bolivia fits the first category of autonomy, *complete integration*, because it is a collection of movements that has become fully integrated into state structures and institutionalized. Although the government of Morales, like many other left Latin American states, still attempts to mobilize social movements, it is now essentially fully converted into a political party and no longer a social movement.

La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, will be my second case study. CONAIE, a social movement in Ecuador, was founded in 1986. CONAIE, as the name states, is an alliance of indigenous peoples of Ecuador. After staying an extra-institutional organization for almost ten years, members of CONAIE founded the *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik-Nuevo País*, Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity-New Country, a political party commonly known simply as Pachakutik (Becker, 2008: p. 182-186). This split of a movement into a party, or *partial integration*, fits well into the second classification of autonomy where a social movement becomes a political party; however, CONAIE still exists as a separate entity.

The third case study will focus on the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST), Landless Rural Workers' Movement, in Brazil. This movement differs from the first two classifications and fits in the third classification of *separate interaction* because it has not become institutionalized or been co-opted by a political party. The MST is not completely autonomous though, because it still makes demands of the state by occupying land and then demanding legal recognition from the state (Vanden, 2012: p. 38-40).

The last case study, which demonstrates *autonomy*, is most likely the least common of the four classifications. The *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN), Zapatista Army of National Liberation, with their replacement of state functions of education, health, microdevelopment and justice, has come the closest to complete autonomy. Since its inception in 1994 the EZLN has attempted to exist entirely outside of the Mexican state, even refusing aid (Vergara-Camus, 2013). Therefore the EZLN is the logical choice for the fourth case study.

I hypothesize that social movements that exercise greater autonomy from the state are more effective in achieving their desired outcomes. Autonomy from state apparatuses protects movements from co-optation. It also provides new spaces for new patterns of social relation to be created as described by Zibechi (2012). Through examining these case studies with a paired comparison as described by Della Porta and using a most similar systems approach, it will be possible to prove or disprove this hypothesis (2002: p. 297). This approach is possible because of the small number of cases and the general historical traditions, geopolitical location, and economic development that these four states share. Through examining the stated goals of movements through manifestos, declarations, and other documentary evidence and then examining the outcomes caused by these movements, it is possible to test the hypothesis.

The MAS in Bolivia

The first case study of the MAS in Bolivia is unique because it is now wholly a political party even though it attempts to mobilize and use social movements to legitimize itself and maintain power. Although not exclusively an indigenous party, the MAS is the first majority indigenous party in Latin America to be elected into power (Van Cott, 2005). I will first outline a brief history of the MAS from its inception as the coca growers' movement in the 1980s to its transition into a political party. Then by looking at the stated goals of the MAS, primarily voiced through President Evo Morales and his administration, it is possible to observe the outcomes for the MAS and to discern how harmonious they are with their stated goals.

In December 2005, Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia. An Aymara indigenous man, Morales' victory was historic for a nation-state that is 70% indigenous but has never had an indigenous president. Not only is Morales the first indigenous president, but he has also been labeled as a "social movement president" because much of his power is drawn from social movements and his party, the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement towards Socialism-MAS), is made up from a collection of social movements ((Morales, 2012: p. 49).

The birth of the MAS can be traced to the coca growers' movements, which grew as a response to the 1980s neoliberal shock policies proposed by the US and the IMF, as well as the US-led so-called war on drugs. The shock therapy prescribed by the US ended Bolivian government subsidies and privatized much of the Bolivian economy, leading to economic as well as social upheaval. The war on drugs in Bolivia, where the coca leaf is grown as a traditional mild stimulant by many indigenous groups, threatened many coca growers' way of life. The union created by the coca growers' movement played an important role in the Cochabamba Water War of 2000 and the Gas War of 2003. The Cochabamba Water War was caused by a plan to privatize water by the multinational corporation Bechtel, while the Gas War was initially in response to a plan to export natural gas through Chile with little of the revenues going to the Bolivian people. These two events served to mobilize and unite Bolivian social movements and civil society and paved the way for the election of Evo Morales. These mobilizations were spontaneous in that they were in response to two specific problems, but they showed an organization of Bolivian society. Coca growers played an important role in the Water War; and then in the Gas War neighborhood councils (FEJUVEs), which were often made up of unionized miners, led many of the demonstrations. The heavy repression of the state against these protests led to further unity among protesters, even across class lines (Dangl, 2010: p. 16-18). When Morales became president, he inherited a repressive state apparatus, still present from the military rule of 1964 to 1982, that would not be easy to reform.

Webber and Dangl have described the goals of the MAS as anti-capitalist, communitarian socialist, and indigenous liberationist (Webber, 2010). Morales has also spoken extensively on the importance of decolonizing the state; however, in their now nine years in power the MAS government has done little to achieve these broad goals and have instead focused on short term reform-oriented issues (Webber, 2013: p. 152). Four central compact goals of the Morales-MAS government are the nationalization of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), redrafting the constitution through a Constitutional Assembly, indigenous liberation through more rights and power, and a referendum addressing the issue of autonomy (Morales, 2012: p. 60). The following section will examine the degree to which each of these goals has been achieved.

Scholars have debated how to characterize the political economy of Bolivia since the election of Morales. Jeffery Webber has designated the political economy of the Morales regime as a reconstitution of neoliberalism, while Federico Fuentes has stated that Morales and the MAS represent dramatic change. Even though Fuentes correctly exhibits a number of gains by the Morales regime, Webber makes a couple of key rejoinders. First, that the process of neostructuralism sweeping Bolivia is not a break with neoliberalism, but simply an adaptation. Secondly, much of what Fuentes calls the success of the Morales regime has been due to what Webber describes as "a critical left-collection of thinkers" and movements, i.e., concessions forced on the Morales government (Fuentes, 2010). The MAS originally formed itself in opposition to the results of neoliberalism, so to then reconstitute neoliberalism would be a fundamental betrayal of the MAS's original goals. While many saw the MAS as a revolutionary socialist movement, once elected the vice-president García Linera (a former Marxist intellectual) quickly proclaimed that socialism would not be attainable for at least fifty to one hundred years, and that instead Bolivians should follow an "Andean-Amazonian" capitalist model.

The MAS would also focus heavily on indigenous liberation, which the MAS views as separate from economic transformations. This has been a source of contention among indigenous groups, who posit that indigenous liberation is not possible without the ability of indigenous peoples to make their own economic decisions. The Morales regime has been accused of using the rhetoric of indigenous liberation as an election promise that he cannot keep, a problem that non-party social movements do not face (Webber, 2013: p. 169-170). One of the first and most consistently stated goals of the MAS is the nationalization of hydrocarbons. The MAS and supporters of the MAS have claimed that this has happened, but not nearly to the extent that the term nationalization implies. Instead of truly nationalizing the hydrocarbon industry, the MAS-Morales government has cooperated with Indian, Korean, Japanese, Canadian, U.S. and Swiss multinational corporations. To this day multinational corporations own the majority of active mines in Bolivia. The two large exceptions touted by the MAS, the Huanuni mine and Vinto smelter, are results of struggles from below that forced the MAS-Morales government into action. Webber describes the so-called nationalization well: "the presidential decree… did not result in the actual nationalization of the industry but rather signaled a moderate reform to the regime of royalties and taxes owed to the Bolivian state by multinational oil and gas companies" (Webber, 2013: p. 178-179). This has led to an increase in the amount of revenue received by the state because it coincided with an increase in the price of natural gas, i.e., a continued dependence on global market forces and foreign investors. This model has been described as neo-extractivism because while a large scale of revenues goes to social spending it is still top-down, paternalistic, and leaves the country dependent on foreign capital and markets. Governments like the Morales and Correa regimes in Bolivia and Ecuador support this developmental model as a way to increase funding for social programs, but others have noted that it demobilizes grassroots movements.

In addition to failing to nationalize hydrocarbons, the quality of life for most Bolivians has not improved under the governance of the MAS-Morales government. Social spending and fiscal stimulus have been especially low for a party claiming to oppose neoliberalism. Fuentes and Pablo Stefanoni have compared the Morales regime to the progressive time period after the 1952 Bolivian revolution, but total state involvement in the economy is currently only at 32% of GDP, while it was 52% in 1952 by conservative estimates. State employment in the 1960s was at higher levels than it is currently. Income inequality has been slightly lowered, with the Gini coefficient changing from 60.2 to 56.3 between 2005 and 2007. Inequality still reigns in the one of the most unequal countries in the most unequal region of the world. This illustrates that there has been no revolutionary change in the political economy of Bolivia as well as an absence of significant structural reforms (Webber, 2013: p. 176-178).

The goal of re-founding and decolonizing the state through the drafting of a new constitution has resulted in mixed outcomes. The Constituent Assembly was dominated by indigenous and peasant organizations but still faced considerable hurdles. These hurdles stemmed from ethnic, class and regional tensions. This can be seen as an effect of the state, which seeks to co-opt, demobilize, and divide constituent forces in an attempt to control them. After many setbacks the new constitution was approved in 2009 with 61% of the vote. Immediately after the ratification of the new constitution, three departments rejected it and violence broke out across the country (Morales, 2012: p. 67). Many of these tensions are due to the issue of autonomy of the departments of Bolivia; not autonomy from the state apparatus, but instead the desire of the white business elites who control these departments to maintain their privileged status through local control of the valuable hydrocarbon resources concentrated there.

As W. Morales notes, the issue of secession has always been a problem for Bolivia due to its history of being created as a buffer state. Recently, the eastern departments, known as the *media luna*, have been at the forefront in calling for secession. These departments are more prosperous and conservative than the rest of the country, as well as largely non-indigenous. The *media luna* has presented a huge problem for the Morales regime and both the ratification of the new constitution and Morales' reelection have done little to solve the issue (Morales, 2012: p. 61, 63-65). The dissenting voices of the *media luna* region also give the Morales regime an excuse to dismiss grassroots forces as counterrevolutionary and to repress them, including the very coca growers that brought Morales to power (Oikonomakis, 2014). Left grassroots forces in Bolivia must balance criticizing and pushing the Morales regime without inadvertently strengthening the traditional right wing elite in the *media luna*.

The MAS and Morales were elected in 2005 with lofty rhetoric of a radically different future. Since taking power the MAS has had little success in achieving the goals it had set out for itself. The living standards of the vast majority of Bolivians have remained unchanged, and the socioeconomic framework that created the vast inequality remains with few structural changes. Bolivians are still confronting the challenges faced under neoliberalism despite a social movement party being in power. Instead of ending neoliberalism in Bolivia, the MAS have reconstituted it. This can be seen through the failure of the MAS to fully nationalize the hydrocarbon industry. The few changes that have occurred in Bolivia can be attributed to constituent social movement forces from below rather than constituted processes. One of the lone exceptions to this is the ratification of the new constitution, which creates some space for grassroots groups to continue to mobilize as an outside pressure on the state. The MAS also must deal with secessionist forces in the eastern departments that are attempting to tear apart the country, and that wield considerable local electoral clout. Through the case study of Bolivia and the MAS we can see that change is not guaranteed when a social movement becomes a party, even if they are elected into power.

CONAIE and Pachakutik in Ecuador

Ecuador has had one of the most tumultuous recent histories of Latin American states. Heads of state have come and gone, but little fundamental change has occurred. The recent election of Rafael Correa in 2006 and re-election in 2009 provided hope for leftists, indigenous groups and marginalized populations. The largest indigenous organization in Ecuador, *La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador* (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador-CONAIE), is one of the most vocal opponents of the Correa administration after initially supporting him in the run-off election in 2006. CONAIE is a social movement that has attempted to enter the realm of institutionalized politics through the creation of a political party, while also maintaining an extra-institutional movement. The outcomes of their foray into electoral politics provide a valuable lesson for social movements throughout the region.

CONAIE was founded in 1986 as a collection of three indigenous organizations, the *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana* (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon-CONFENIAE), *Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador* (Confederation of Peoples of Quichua Nationality- ECUARUNARI), and *Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas y Negras de la Costa Ecuatoriana* (Coordination of Indigenous and Black Organizations of the Ecuadorian Coast-CONAICE), that had come to the realization that the indigenous peoples of Ecuador were not represented in Ecuadorian electoral politics and needed another method to press their goals. CONAIE was a precursor of many “new” Latin American social movements with its horizontal, participatory democratic and inclusionary style of organizing (Dangl, 2010: p. 44). Becker has noted the distinctive nature of the CONAIE organization, specifically through their use of nationality, or nationalities, as a tool of organization. This idea of indigenous nationalism is a product of years of interaction between leftist and indigenous forces in Ecuador and through the upper Andes. Becker further argues that much of the success of CONAIE can be attributed to their combined use of class, ethnicity and nationalism together, instead of as separate identities as many leftist and indigenous groups attempt in their organizational strategies (Becker, 2008: p. 71).

In 1995, after years of discussion CONAIE formed the *Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País* (Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity – New Country, MUPP-NP) as a political party to participate in electoral politics. Pachakutik is an Andean term that comes from the Inca and is defined as a time of reawakening or the "awakening of a sleeping giant" (Becker, 2008: p. 176). CONAIE originally used the term to describe the 1990 indigenous *levantamiento* (uprising), which consisted of traffic blockades and occupations aimed at pressuring the government to fulfill CONAIE's demands of bilingual education, land reform, and a new constitution. I will use the term as the political party, MUPP-NP. The creation of Pachakutik symbolized a deep change in CONAIE policy. In 1990, at the third congress of CONAIE, it was agreed "not to participate in elections because neither the political system nor political parties were functioning in a way that represented people's interests" (Becker, 2008: p. 184). This shift was partially due to an increase in foreign investment in hydrocarbons, and a perception that para-parliamentary efforts were insufficient. The participation of Pachakutik in electoral politics has yielded mixed results. In 2002, Pachakutik and CONAIE backed the campaign of Lucio Gutiérrez, military leader of a reformist coup two years earlier. While CONAIE and Pachakutik's support of Gutiérrez helped lead to his victory and resulted in Pachakutik politicians being appointed a number of government positions, immediately after being elected, Gutiérrez signed an agreement with the IMF and turned his back on the very people that brought him to power. CONAIE and Pachakutik broke ties almost immediately with the administration, but the damage had already been done (Dangl, 2010: p. 46-47).

The relationship of Correa with CONAIE and Pachakutik has been contentious from the very start. When Correa first ran in 2006, CONAIE and Pachakutik, wary from the fiasco of 2002 decided to run their own candidate in opposition to him. After a resounding defeat for the Pachakutik candidate in the first round, Pachakutik and CONAIE threw their support behind Correa for the run-off election against the right-wing candidate, wealthy businessman Álvaro Noboa. After Correa's election and his efforts to silence indigenous opposition, expand privatization, and utilize neo-extractive policies CONAIE and Pachakutik completely boycotted elections in 2009 (Dangl, 2010: p. 49-53). The decision not to participate can be viewed as a partial withdrawal of CONAIE and Pachakutik from electoral politics, although Pachakutik does continue to and indeed has more success in participating in local elections (Becker, 2012: p. 128).

The broad goals of CONAIE at its creation focused primarily on land, economic development, education, and recognition of indigenous nationalities. They expanded to include the concrete goals of bilingual education, recognition of traditional medicine, the reestablishment of relations with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, agrarian reform, and a new pluri-national constitution (Becker, 2008: p. 166). As already described, CONAIE initially saw a grassroots broad extra-institutional movement as the best way to achieve their goals; however, after almost ten years of struggle the decision was made to enter electoral politics. In relation to this study, the question is then, has the splitting of and entering of CONAIE into the world of electoral politics, through Pachakutik, increased their success in attaining their goals?

One of CONAIE and Pachakutik's goals, as well as many movements from all around Latin America, is land and agrarian reform. During the uprisings of the early 1990s thousands of CONAIE members marched on Quito to demand land reform. They were awarded titles to only half of the land they asked for and "the state continued to legally own and control the subsoil, and… any activity that blocked oil operations would be deemed illegal" (Dangl, 2010: p. 45). This is emblematic of the struggle between CONAIE and the state for land; small victories will take place that can easily be pushed back, but little permanent change happens. This has only continued under the Correa administration. In 2007 indigenous protestors attempted to set up roadblocks to prevent access to oilfields. Correa responded by declaring a state of emergency and brutally repressing protestors (Dangl, 2010: p. 54). This is one example of many of clashes between the Correa administration and CONAIE due to Correa's extractive development policies.

While Pink Tide regimes such as Correa's in Ecuador point to the partial nationalization of industry as a sign of their progressiveness, critics have pointed out that neoextractivism, the extraction of raw natural resources for export with nominal nationalization, is a surface deep reform that has not changed any of the structures of exploitation. As Acosta states,

"As in the past, the lion's share of the benefits of this economic orientation goes to the rich countries, the importers of Nature, which profit still further by processing and selling it in the form of finished products. Meanwhile, the countries that export primary commodities only receive a tiny percentage of the revenue from mining or oil, but they are the ones who have to bear the burden of the environmental and social costs" (2011: p. 74).

The neoextractive development policies of Correa have therefore led to continued clashes between social movements such as CONAIE and the government because of their inability to change the economic inequalities that led to the creation of the movements.

Another large goal of CONAIE and Pachakutik was the redrafting of the state constitution into a constitution that declared Ecuador to be a pluri-national state, gave more rights to indigenous nationalities, and also protected the rights of nature. This was accomplished by the Correa administration in 2008 and was passed by 64% of voters in 2008. The passing of the new constitution can certainly be attributed to constituent movement pressure from below, especially from CONAIE. The new constitution was not without problems though. The constituent assembly, which drafted the constitution, faced harsh criticism for being composed almost entirely of party members rather than members of movements (Dangl 2010, p. 49-53). In spite of this, the new constitution is more progressive and does recognize Ecuador as a pluri-national state. This has not stopped Correa from passing laws that harm the indigenous people of Ecuador as well as attempting to co-opt and divide them. Examples of this include the closing down of the Development Council of the Indigenous Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE), placing the National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education (DINEIB) under state control, and attempting to divide and conquer by backing moderate social movements such as the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI) over more radical movements like CONAIE (Becker, 2013b: p. 50).

CONAIE and Pachakutik have changed the political landscape of Ecuador through their actions. Although Ecuador still faces a highly unequal land system with many problems, the passing of a new constitution and the labeling of Ecuador as a pluri-national state offers hope for permanent change. The entrance of CONAIE into electoral politics was initially disastrous and is still ineffectual at a national level, but CONAIE has made gains at a local level. As Becker notes, "[i]ndigenous movements in Ecuador… no longer see electoral and extra-constitutional paths to power as mutually exclusive" (Becker, 2013a: p. 229).

The Brazilian MST

The recent economic rise of Brazil has attracted international attention and has been accompanied by increased social spending, which has lifted certain segments of society out of poverty. This has not included all however. Historically, one of the most marginalized groups in Brazil has been the landless. Since the creation of the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (Landless Rural Workers Movement - MST) in the 1980s, they have struggled for primarily land as well as other rights. This illustrates the third category of autonomy to be observed, *separate interaction*. The MST is a social movement that has not entered into electoral politics or been co-opted by a political party despite making demands of the state through land occupation, and sometimes entering into strategic alliances with the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party – PT).

The MST began in 1984 in southern Brazil. One of the factors leading to the creation of the MST was Brazil's unions' refusal to allow landless famers into their ranks. This dissatisfaction and exclusion from traditional union methods of land struggle led to the rise of the MST. The

MST also differs from unions through its acceptance of all members of the family as movement members, including children. The primary tactic of the MST has always been the occupation of land. Once the land has been occupied the MST calls on the government to grant them a land title by citing the 1988 constitution, which states that all land must be used for the good of society. The National Colonization and Agrarian Reform Institute (INCRA) must then pay the landowner for the land and appropriate it, and then give the title to the MST members. This mix of autonomy and pressure on the government has made the MST the largest social movement in Latin America and one of the most successful. This is due to not only the MST's success in building links between urban and rural sectors, but also the fluidity provided to them by not being a political party. This fluidity allows the MST to quickly make alliances with other movements and participate in other struggles, such as the recent public transit fare protests (Zibechi, 2012). This appeals to many, even those who are not rural landless, such as the youth in Brazil who are "fed up with this bourgeois way of doing politics" (Vlana, 2013). As Dangl notes, "[the] MST's actions are organized around building democratic, self-managed communities, while simultaneously pressuring the government to grant legal reforms" (Dangl, 2010: p. 123).

Although MST members must often wait between two to four years for land titles to be awarded, this does not stop them from using the land. After occupying the land with large groups of members, male, female, and children, the MST immediately begins cultivating the land as well as setting up schools, health and social services (as reflected in their motto, "Occupy, Produce, Resist"). The use of these direct action tactics makes the MST sustainable and they make it much more difficult for the state to simply evict the occupiers (Wright and Wolford, 2003). Ben Dangl has attributed the growth and what he calls the success of the MST to the structure of the organization. In contrast to many organizations that make demands of the state, such as the unions the MST broke away from, as well as the state itself, the MST is organized in a more horizontal manner. The horizontalism of the MST is an example of a new way of organizing political and societal entities; greatly different from a state-centered hierarchical approach. Members belong to grassroots groups that are participatory and attempt to reach consensus rather than a simple majority. This decentralized structure increases the mobilization potential of the MST. The participatory model of decision-making also increases the legitimacy of the movement with its members and the sustainability of the movement over a long period of time (Dangl, 2010: p. 123-125). This increase in sustainability is due not only to the fact that there is no "strong man" leader, but also to the horizontal bonds fostered and strengthened by the *mística,* the emotional/subjective sense of collectivity of the movement, fostered through symbolic group exercises and activities.

Initially, the goals of the MST focused exclusively on land reform; through the acquiring of land through occupation. Gradually this expanded into creating autonomous schools and health clinics in the occupied settlements. These schools and clinics filled a gap in people's needs that the state had not provided for. Simultaneously to establishing schools and clinics, the MST also participates in marches, blockades, and occupations that demand better education and healthcare from the state. Another point of contention for the MST is the growth of industrial farming and the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The combination of these two practices has threatened MST members' way of life, even if they receive the land they struggled for. Although not all MST members practice organic farming, many have embraced it as an alternative to the industrial farming model (Dangl, 2010: p. 122 and Vanden, 2012: p. 34-48).

As the MST gained strength in the 1980s, another older movement, the Workers Party (PT), which came from union organizing and the movement for democratization after two decades of military rule, grew and eventually entered electoral politics. The last two presidents of Brazil have come from the PT. The PT has faced harsh criticism for their rightward turn and move from being a "workers' party" after entering office; however, they were elected with the help of more radical movements such as the MST. This rightward turn (leaving the PT now in the center of the political spectrum) can be viewed from an international perspective, as an appeasement to global capital and hegemonic powers, evident through the strengthening of bonds with transnational finance and agri-business (Motta 2013a). From a domestic perspective, this rightward turn dampened discontent from the Brazilian right and strengthened the MST's mandate to rule from business and landowning elites. The MST helped Lula win the presidency in 2002, but then declined to take part in the government structure, thus avoiding the co-optation that has taken place in Ecuador with CONAIE and Pachakutik in Ecuador (Vanden, 2012: p. 43-45). The MST not only makes demands of the state, but also throws its support behind political parties when necessary and then withdraws once elections have occurred. This allows the MST to help prevent the election of right wing parties that directly oppose the MST's interests. At the same time, while insuring that the more progressive of the available parties is elected, the MST keeps their distance from the party and utilizes their constituent power to influence and push the left-leaning party in power. Interestingly, members of the MST have entered into electoral politics on the PT ticket, due to the MST's policy not to run their own candidates. Members of the movement must agree upon this before an individual enters an election. The MST and PT generally have had close relations on a small local level, which decrease dramatically as one goes further up the state hierarchy (Vanden, 2007: p.54). However, the MST has moved even further from the PT after what many see as the betrayal by Lula (Vergara-Camus, 2009: p. 187). The MST must face the question whether supporting the PT is worthwhile at all.

This policy of *separate interaction* has led the MST to be one of the most successful social movements in Latin America today. The autonomy that the MST exercises from the state allows them to create a unique culture and identity in their occupied settlements without it being subsumed by the state apparatus. Some of the outcomes achieved by the MST include the expropriation of 35 million acres of land that is now inhabited by almost 400,000 families, one natural medicine factory, 1,600 government recognized settlements, health clinics, 1,800 schools for over 160,000 students, an adult literacy program with 30,000 students, and a university. On top of this there are still 100,000 families waiting for land titles from the state. (Dangl, 2010: p. 121, 136).

An area where the MST has been less successful is in their struggle against industrial farming and GMOs, which raises the question, is the movement actually effective when it expropriates land through the state but then is unable to survive on that land due to outside market forces? Zibechi notes that, "The development and control of new technologies by multinationals has made possible a new type of oppression… the multinationals' dominance is of an 'immaterial' sort, resting upon control over knowledge and the market in order to maximize profit accumulation" (Zibechi, 2012: p. 125). The MST is in a conundrum. They use the state as a tool to achieve their goals and as a defensive tool to protect their gains, but as Hardt and Negri have pointed out, the sovereignty of the state is dissipating. The MST face the constant problem of the state co-optation as well as the state's weakening power to protect the gains the MST has made in the face of increasing global capital or Empire.

Mexico and the Zapatistas

The *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatista Army of National Liberation – Zapatistas) are perhaps the most well known of Latin American social movements. Their high degree of autonomy from the Mexican state distinguishes them from the vast majority of social movements. This autonomy exercised by the Zapatistas fits them well into my fourth category of autonomy from the state, *autonomy,* in which a movement makes no demands of the state apparatus. The Zapatistas exercise autonomy not only politically through not entering the realm of electoral politics, but also territorially by creating autonomous communities and municipal councils administered by regional *Juntas de Buen Gobierno* (councils of good government), whose members are chosen by participatory assemblies of the communities themselves.

The Zapatistas rose up in 1994 in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Initially, in the First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, the Zapatistas declared war on the Mexican state and called for the people of Mexico to march on Mexico City and seize power (EZLN, 1994). After only twelve days of armed struggle against the state the Zapatistas retreated into rural Chiapas to build their autonomous communities. There they have functioned as more of a social movement than as an armed rebellion. For the last twenty years the Zapatistas have been working on transforming society through a "glocal" approach; concretely living and creating new social relations in a local setting, while utilizing global interest and shared agendas and "frames" of the alterglobalization transnational social movements as a defensive protection and as a tool in their struggle (Stahler-Sholk, 2010: p. 269-271).

The Zapatistas have outlined their goals in manifestos known as declarations from Lacandon jungle. There have been five additional declarations since the initial one for the uprising in 1994. These declarations allow us to trace the trajectory of the Zapatista movement and their shifting goals. The first declaration declares war on the Mexican state and calls on forces to "Advance to the capital of the country, overcoming the Mexican federal army, protecting in our advance the civilian population and permitting the people in the liberated area the right to freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities" (EZLN, 1994a). The second declaration, issued in June of 1994, reflects what was at that time the recently declared ceasefire between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. It urges the protection of civilians as well as the following of ceasefire agreements from all sides, agreements which the Mexican government promptly proceeded to violate with a February 1995 military offensive (EZLN, 1994b). Two years after the initial uprising the Zapatistas released their fourth declaration. This declaration outlined the goals of "Housing, land, employment, food, education, independence, democracy, liberty, justice and peace." It then reaffirms the EZLN as a non-state oriented political force, but instead a peaceful civic social movement struggling not only against the Mexican state but neoliberal globalization as a whole (EZLN, 1996). The fifth declaration, released in 1998, focuses on the rights of the indigenous of Mexico as well as the need for different indigenous groups to unite and work together (EZLN, 1998). The most recent, Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle reaffirms the history of the Zapatistas, explains how they see the world and Mexico, and then calls for the beginning of the Other Campaign. This campaign calls for a wide variety of anti-capitalist alterglobalization groups to work together. The declaration focuses on the need for a worldwide struggle rather than simply a Mexican struggle (EZLN, 2005). The timing of Other Campaign, coinciding with the 2006 presidential election (which produced the dubious victory of Felipe Calderón and policies that reinforced many Mexicans' skepticism about their political system) can be seen as a way for the Zapatistas to shift public attention away from the six-year Mexican electoral cycle. In terms of the immediate goal of solidifying social movement alliances, the Other Campaign had limited success, because of heavy Mexican state repression against groups that declared themselves "adherents" to the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (Mora, 2007: p. 64-77). The Zapatistas essentially closed themselves off from the outside world after the Other Campaign, focusing inward on consolidating their autonomy project until 2013 with the creation of *Escuelitas,* an initiative in which outsiders were invited into their communities to learn first-hand about the movement.

The struggle of the Zapatistas is distinctive in that they are not pressuring the state to give them their goals, but struggling to create them themselves. Therefore it is possible to view the struggle for real autonomy by the Zapatistas as one of their most pressing goals, or needs. As Stahler-Sholk has noted, the desire for autonomy by the Zapatistas has not come without potential problems, including the risk of being shut out from the rest of the world and the availability of resources (Stahler-Sholk, 2007: p. 48-63). The Zapatistas have dealt with this by creating their own government structures including councils of good government and *caracoles* (regional centers of autonomous government). In addition, the Zapatistas have attempted to create economic autonomy, which includes only allowing certain NGO sponsored projects (Barmeyer, 2009). This allows the Zapatistas to guide their own development, rather than it being developed from the outside. Harvey argues that the autonomy claimed by the Zapatistas is "the Zapatistas' most significant political achievement," and that the Zapatistas are moving not only outward, through working with international groups, but also inward through their development of autonomy (Harvey, 2005: p. 15). The Caracoles are the quintessential example of this. They follow the motto of *mandar obedeciendo* ("lead by obeying") and act as regional clusters of autonomous municipalities that are led by the communities themselves, while still interconnected with one another (González Casanova, 2005: p. 79-81).

Zibechi has pointed out that this autonomy has led to a "significant improvement in the quality of life" for those living in Zapatista communities through the self-management of education, healthcare, and agricultural practices (Zibechi, 2012: p. 129). This is an example of success of the goals of housing, land, employment, food, and education facilitated by the Zapatistas' direct action in occupying or "recovering" private lands, and farming some of them collectively in order to generate resources for autonomous social programs. Quantitative measures of success include two hospitals, eighteen clinics, 800 community health centers, and over 500 health promoters, as well as three hundred schools, 1,000 education promoters and a center for secondary education (Zibechi, 2012: p. 132). In an impoverished region like Chiapas, educational and health related advances have often taken priority over economic and political ones. This has not stopped economic advances, which must focus first on breaking out of the neoliberal system. This has been done through cooperatives, fair trade enterprises, and de facto agrarian reform in which the Zapatistas have "recovered" or occupied private lands.

The choice of the Zapatistas to pursue a path of complete autonomy from the state is fraught with challenges and dilemmas. While offering many advantages that movements that deal with the state apparatus do not have, this strategy presents other problems. The autonomy of the Zapatistas from the state has not prevented the state from challenging the Zapatistas. Since 1994 the Zapatistas have had to deal with the constant presence of the Mexican military and the low-intensity warfare that the state is waging. In more recent years the Mexican state has attempted to use co-optation and clientelism to usurp the Zapatistas through giving aid to non-Zapatista peasants and encouraging the "development" of Chiapas by so-called ecotourism and other projects of large-scale capital. Meanwhile, the Zapatistas face the constant question of how much they should open themselves to the outside world in their attempt to create a new one.

Results and Conclusions

The vehemence with which neoliberal globalization was forced on Latin America, started in the late 1970s, changed the political structure of the region immeasurably. The retreat of the state from social and civic spheres created an opening that a new type of social movements filled, but those movements also had to contend with the newly freed forces of global (and mobile) capital. Many of these movements still insisted on organizing themselves in a hierarchical manner as the state does, while others adopted a more horizontal organization, sometimes linking with homologous groups in transnational networks. Some have entered into electoral politics or been co-opted by parties while others have not. As state sovereignty continually shifts, and is assailed by global capital, movements must make difficult decisions with respect to how much autonomy to exercise from the state and what demands to make of the state. Categorizing movements by the degree of autonomy they exercise from the state as 1) *complete integration*, 2) *partial integration*, 3) *separate interaction*, or 4) *autonomy* provides a useful means of classifying movements, but the question of measuring success still remains.

One of the most significant barriers to measuring outcomes of the four movements studied here is that they are all still ongoing and therefore it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions. A second barrier is the specificity of Latin American social movements. While many movements in the industrialized North seek reformist goals that simply seek to change policy, such as mainstream environmental and gay rights groups, many Latin American movements challenge the state itself and seek a broad transformation of society. This is perhaps a consequence of the history of the continent as a testing ground for colonialism, neo-colonialism, neoliberalism, and now unfettered global capital. Through examining movement outcomes and comparing them to stated goals of movements, it is possible to gauge what has been accomplished. Table 1, "Stated Goals vis-à-vis Outcomes," provides a concise summary of stated goals and outcomes. The degree of success is then ranked as "low," "medium," or "high" depending on how closely the outcomes of each movement match the stated goals. From there I will examine my initial hypothesis.

My initial hypothesis was that the greater autonomy that a movement exercises from the state, the more effective they will be in achieving their goals. After examining these four cases I now find this to not be entirely correct, though Table 1 does seem to show a general correlation. Hardt and Negri correctly point out that there is a transfer of state sovereignty, often to international organizations and networks, however the state is not dead. This is illustrated negatively by the low-intensity warfare and outright state repression faced by movements, for example the Zapatistas in Mexico. While movements may withdraw from the state apparatus, the state still attempts to control movements through co-optation, low intensity warfare, or direct conflict. This state response is an additional variable that must be factored in. Global capital and imperialism also can have a devastating effect on movements. Movements in Latin America must face the double-edged sword of global capital, capital that is tearing apart the state and creating spaces for movements but also weakening the ability of movements to fight global capital through the state. William Robinson claims that the state is still crucial and that "[a] confrontation with the global capitalist system beyond the nation-state, moreover, requires national state power" (Robinson, 2008: p. 344). Social movements are still grappling with effective strategies for confronting these dilemmas.

State institutions have been used as a defensive measure by movements such as the MST in Brazil, in that the movement pressures these institutions to issue land titles and provide legal justification and proof of MST members' right to the land. The success of the MST is remarkable; the expropriation of 35 million acres of land that is now inhabited by almost 400,000 families, one natural medicine factory, 1,600 government recognized settlements, health clinics, 1,800 schools for over 160,000 students, an adult literacy program with 30,000 students, and a university. On top of this there are still 100,000 families waiting for land titles from the state. (Dangl, 2010: p. 121, 136). The MST has had a contentious relationship with the PT, but their separation from electoral politics is not total. Through actively participating in Brazilian elections the MST helps insure that rightwing forces do not gain power. For all of the criticism that the PT has faced from within and outside of Brazil, including from the MST, the MST realizes that they are far preferable (in terms of the movement's goals) to a rightwing ruling party or a return to the dictatorships of the 1960s to 1980s.

Out of these four movements I suggest that the MAS in Bolivia has been the least successful. The decision to enter electoral politics, while seeming to be hugely successful at first, has exposed the MAS to a multitude of challenges and pressures, from secessionist groups in eastern Bolivia to US neo-imperialist forces. Even with the passing of a new constitution, the Morales regime has been unable to create deep structural change and has instead focused on shallow reforms. Moreover, by entering electoral politics, the MAS has alienated many of the movements that brought it to power. Given this isolation from part of its movement base the MAS is vulnerable to pressure from all sides, including the rightwing secessionist forces, the U.S. government, social movements that once supported it, and global capital. Its path in the near future will affect the social movements of Bolivia greatly.

Much like the MAS in Bolivia, CONAIE in Ecuador has been negatively affected by entering the realm of electoral politics. The difficulties presented by entering electoral politics can be seen through CONAIE's relationship with the Correa regime. After eventually supporting Correa in his first election, Pachakutik, the political party of CONAIE, was given several government positions. In these positions Pachakutik and CONAIE were unable to make changes they desired, but instead lost support from those who now saw the movement as selling out.

In 2009, CONAIE and Pachakutik completely boycotted presidential elections, which perhaps helped them regain legitimacy. CONAIE now must struggle against paternalistic top-down neo-extractive development policies. They have done this as a movement outside of the state, while Pachakutik still contests and does well in local elections. This new focus on small local elections rather than large presidential ones perhaps illustrates a new approach for movements to enter the state apparatus. While useful on a local level, it has severe limits for structural change due to centralization and concentration of power in the executive branch in most Latin American states.

The Zapatistas are firmly placed as the second most successful, behind the MST, of the studied movements. Although facing constant state repression they have managed to live mostly autonomously. This alone is a huge victory. Examples of their success include two hospitals, eighteen clinics, 800 community health houses, and over 500 health promoters, as well as, three hundred schools, 1,000 educational promoters and a center for secondary education (Zibechi, 2012: p. 132). I suggest that the central problem of the Zapatista autonomy model is that they still must face negative state mechanisms such as repression, extractive development policies, co-optation, and so on, but they do not depend on the state as a defensive mechanism like the MST. It is possible to argue that the Zapatistas, instead of using the state as a defensive mechanism, draw on transnational social movements and NGOs as a defensive mechanism. This can be observed in transnational solidarity groups and transnational human rights groups.[10] I, however, am seeking to examine simply movements and the state. The role of transnational networks in providing a defensive mechanism and/or spreading the ideas of social movements is certainly an issue to be examined.[11]

In our shifting globalizing world, movements must make difficult decisions regarding how to interact with the state. While more autonomous movements have displayed greater success, it is certainly not a guarantee of it. Movements like the MST and the Zapatistas provide a glimmer of hope from what is still the most unequal continent in the world, laboratory of neoliberalism and empires, that another world is possible. Through their innovative tactics and thought they challenge the way we see the world as well. For perhaps the first time in history, the ideas of the MST or Zapatistas can instantly reach the citizens of the industrialized north, allowing for the creation of an international "multitude" (Chabot and Duyvendak, 2002: p. 697-740 and Hardt and Negri, 2010). Although it is indeed tempting to only attribute to movements the immediate outcomes of their efforts, we must also not forget the long-term effects through diffusion, reframing issues, and undermining hegemonic ideologies. As Zhou Enlai said when asked what he thought of the French Revolution, "It is too early to say."

[10] See also: Barmeyer, *Developing Zapatista Autonomy.* Brysk, Alison. Globalization and human rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Oleson, *International Zapatismo.*

[11] (See the discussion of "transnational advocacy networks" in Keck and Sikkink 1998, and "transnational social movements, networks and norms" in Khagram et al. 2002)

Bibliography

Acosta, Alberto. 2011. "Extractivism and Neoextractivism: Two Sides of the Same Curse." In *Beyond Development: Alternative Visions from Latin America*, edited by M. Lang and D.Mokrani, 61-86. Amsterdam: Rosa Luxemburg Institute.

Barmeyer, Niels. 2009. *Developing Zapatista Autonomy: Conflict and NGO Involvement in Rebel Chiapas*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.

Becker, Marc. 2008. *Indians and leftists in the making of Ecuador's modern indigenous movements*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Becker, Marc. 2012. "Social Movements and the Government of Rafael Correa: Confrontation or Cooperation?" In *Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-optation?*, edited by Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry E. Vanden, 116-136. London: Zed Books.

Becker, Marc. 2013. "Ecuador: Indigenous Struggles and the Ambiguities of Electoral Power." In *The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the Empire*, edited by Jeffery R. Webber and Barry Carr, 213-232. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Becker, Marc. 2013. "The Stormy Between Rafael Correa and Social Movements in Ecuador." *Latin American Perspectives* 40, May (2013): 43-62.

Brysk, Alison. 2002. *Globalization and human rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Casanova, Pablo González. 2005. "The Zapatista 'Caracoles': Networks of Resistance and Autonomy." *Socialism and Democracy* 19, November (2005): 79-92.

Chabot, Sean and Jan Willem Duyvendak. 2002. "Globalization and Transnational Diffusion Between Social Movements: Reconceptualizing the Dissemination of the Gandhian Repertoire and the 'Coming Out' Routine." *Theory and Society* 31, May (2002): 697-740.

Ciccariello-Maher, George. 2013. "Constituent Moments, Constitutional Processes: Social Movements and the New Latin American Left." *Latin American Perspectives* 40, May (2013): 126-145.

Collier, David and James Mahoney. 1996. "Research Note: Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 49, no. 1 (1996): 56-91.

Dangl, Benjamin. 2010. *Dancing with Dynamite: Social Movements and States in Latin America*. Edinburgh: AK Press.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2002. "Comparative Politics and Social Movements." In *Methods of Social Movement Research*, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 286-313. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

EZLN. *First Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle*. Jan, 1994.

EZLN. *Second Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle*. June, 1994.

EZLN. *Fourth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle*. Jan, 1996.

EZLN. *Fifth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle*. July, 1998.

EZLN. *Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle*. July, 2005.

Fuentes, Federico. 2010. "Government, Social Movements, and Revolution in Bolivia Today." *International Socialist Review*. 76, March (2010).

Gamson, William A. 2003. "Defining Movement 'Success.'" In *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts*, edited by Jeff Godwin and James M. Jasper. Malden, 350-352. MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Giugni, Marco. 1999. "How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future Developments." In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, xiii-xxxiii. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

González Casanova, Pablo. 2005. "The Zapatista Caracoles: Networks of Resistance and Autonomy." *Socialism and Democracy*. 19, 3(2005): 79-92.

Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Harvey, Neil. 2005. "Inclusion through Autonomy: Zapatistas and Dissent." NACLA Report on the Americas September-October (2005): 12-16.

Hellman, Judith A. 1992. "The Study of New Social Movements in Latin America and the Question of Autonomy." In *New Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy*, edited by Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez. Boulder, 52-61. CO: Westview Press.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Khagram, Sanjeev. 2002. *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mora, Mariana. 2007. "Zapatista Anticapitalist Policies and the 'Other Campaign': Learning from the Struggle for Indigenous Rights and Autonomy. *Latin American Perspectives* 34, March (2007): 64-77.

Morales, Waltraud Q. 2012. "Social Movements and Revolutionary Change in Bolivia." In *Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-optation?*, edited by Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry E. Vanden, 49-87. London: Zed Books.

Motta, Sara C. 2013. "Reinventing the Lefts in Latin America: Critical Perspectives from Below." *Latin American Perspectives* 191, July (2013): 5-18.

Oikonomakis, Leonidas. 2014. "Cocaleros on Morales: 'What a Monster We Created.'" *Roar Magazine*. March 11, 2014.

Olesen, Thomas. 2005. *International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization*. London: Zed.

Reyes, Alvaro. 2012. "Revolutions in the Revolutions: A Post Counter-Hegemonic Moment for Latin America?" *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 111, Winter (2012): 1-27.

Rimisp – Latin American Center for Rural Development. 2011. *Poverty and Inequality Latin American Report 2011*. Santiago, Chile.

Robinson, William I. 2008. *Latin America and Global Capitalism a Critical Globalization Perspective*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Slater, David. 1994. "Power and Social Movements in the Other Occident: Latin American in an International Context." *Latin American Perspectives* 21, no. 2 (1994): 11-37.

Stahler-Sholk, Richard. 2007. "Resisting Neoliberal Homogenization: The Zapatista Autonomy Movement." *Latin American Perspectives* 34, March (2007): 48-63.

Stahler-Sholk, Richard. 2010. "The Zapatista Social Movement: Innovation and Sustainability." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 35, July-September (2010): 269-290.

Tarrow, Sidney G. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1999. "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements." In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly, 253-270. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: the Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vanden, Harry E. 2007. "Social Movements, Hegemony, and New Forms of Resistance." *Latin American Perspectives*, 34, no. 2 (2007): 39-55.

Vanden, Harry E. 2012. "The Landless Rural Worker's Movement and their waning influence on Brazil's Workers' Party Government." In *Social Movements and Leftist Governments in Latin America: Confrontation or Co-optation?*, edited by Gary Prevost, Carlos Oliva Campos, and Harry E. Vanden, 34-48. London: Zed Books.

Vergara-Camus, Leandro. 2009. "The Politics of the MST: Autonomous Rural Communities, the State, and Electoral Politics." *Latin American Perspectives*, 36 no. 4 (2009): 178-191.

Vergara-Camus, Leandro. 2013. "Revolution in Times of Neoliberal Hegemony: The Political Strategy of the MST in Brazil and the EZLN in Mexico." In *The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the Empire*, edited by Jeffery R. Webber and Barry Carr, 95-115. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Vlana, Nilton. 2013. "Brazil's Left Parties are Old and Bureaucratized, Warns MST's Leader." *Brazzil*, July, 2013.

Webber, Jeffery R. 2010. "From Rebellion to Reform: Image and Reality in the Bolivia of Evo Morales." *International Socialist Review*. 73, September (2010).

Webber, Jeffery R. 2013. "From Left-Indigenous Insurrection to Reconstituted Neoliberalism in Bolivia: Political Economy, Indigenous Liberation, and Class Struggle, 2000-2011." In *The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the Empire,* edited by Jeffery R. Webber and Barry Carr, 149-190. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Webber, Jeffery R. and Barry Carr. 2013. *The New Latin American Left: Cracks in the Empire*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Williamson, John. 1989. "What Washington Means by Policy Reform." In *Latin American Readjustment: How Much Has Happened*, edited by John Williamson. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

Wright, Angus Lindsay, and Wendy Wolford. 2003. *To Inherit the Earth: the Landless Movement and the Struggle for a New Brazil*. Oakland, CA.: Food First Books.

Zibechi, Raúl. 2005. "Subterranean Echos: Resistance and Politics "desde el Sótano." *Socialism and Democracy* 19 no. 3 (2005): 13-39.

Zibechi, Raúl. 2012. *Territories in Resistance: A Cartography of Latin American Social Movements*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Appendix

Movement	Degree of Autonomy	Stated Goals	Outcomes	Degree of Success
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) Bolivia	Complete integration	Communitarian socialism Nationalization of hydrocarbons Redrafting of constitution Indigenous liberation Referendum on autonomy	"Andean-Amazonian Capitalism" New constitution Partial nationalization	Low
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) Ecuador	Partial integration	Land/agrarian reform Economic development Bilingual education Recognition of indigenous nationalities Plurinational constitution	Little success with land/agrarian reform Continued neo-extractivism New constitution	Medium
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) Brazil	Separate interaction	Land reform Autonomous schools and healthcare Struggle against GMOs and Agribusiness	35 million acres expropriated, used by 400,000 families 1,800 schools with160,000 students	High
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) Mexico	Autonomy	Housing Land reform Employment Independence (autonomy)	Relative autonomy 300 schools with 1,000 education promoters 2 hospitals, 18 clinics, 800 community health houses	High

Table 1: Movement Outcomes vis-à-vis Stated Goals (Source: Author)

Call for Papers

POLITIKON

Politikon is the flagship publication of the International Association for Political Science Students. It publishes papers submitted by undergraduate and graduate students with the frequency of four issues per year (March – June – September – December). The abstracts of each issue of Politikon are indexed in the IPSA Annual International Political Science Abstracts.

Politikon is accepting papers for publication on a continual basis.

All articles should respect the formal structure and all requirements stated below in "Instructions for Authors".

The Editorial Board will contact the authors in order to communicate results of each evaluation (1st Editorial Board Evaluation, 2nd Peer Review), proposed changes and the planned date of publication.

The Editorial Board will not evaluate articles by authors who already (co-)authored other articles currently under evaluation.

All interested authors should submit their articles to politikonjournal@iapss.org.

Instructions for Authors

Format of the paper

Contents: Title, abstract, keywords, main body of the paper, references, appendices, name and short presentation of the author

Font: Garamond 12, spacing 1.5;

Abstract: Garamond 12, spacing 1.15, italic; Main Title (Heading): Garamond 16, bold;

Subtitles (Section Headings): Garamond 14, bold;

Sub-Subtitles (Sub-section Headings): Garamond 12, bold, italic;

Footnotes: Garamond 10, spacing 1.15;

Presentation: Garamond 12, spacing 1.15, italic.

Paragraphs: First line indentation 1.25 cm, no spaces between paragraphs

Borders: top and bottom 2,5 cm, left and right 3,00cm (default)

Quotes: sectioned off if more than two sentences; Garamond 11, indented 1.25 cm

References and **Appendices** on separate pages

Tables and **Charts** are continuously numbered, each fits on one page at maximum, and all are sourced (if original, use "Source: Author.")

Title of the submission file: LASTNAME_Initial_Title_mm_yyyy_POLITIKON.doc(x)

A good academic paper features:

Academic style of writing and structure (see Section "Recommended Academic Paper Structure");

Grammatically correct English;

Between 3000 and 8000 words in total;

Reference and Bibliography formatted according to instructions found on the Politikon website and below on page 180.

Recommended Academic Paper Structure

Abstract

No more than 150 words. Research question, original parts of research, conclusions.

Keywords

5 to 10 keywords, general and specific, in alphabetical order.

Introduction

What is the research question and why should academics research it, scientific and societal relevance.

Literature review

What has previously been written on the topic, what conclusions others reached.

(Model construction) and Theoretical framework

What theoretical framework and approach is used and why. If applicable, causal model may be shown at this point, or later, after data investigation.

Conceptualization and operationalization

Definition of basic terms and their indicators, choice of variables and their validity testing. Formulation of hypotheses (explicit or implicit) based on the theory/theories. Elaboration of specific claim(s) in the investigated theory/theories. If applicable, description of the causal mechanism, i.e. the chain of events purported to link your explanatory variables to the specific outcome.

Methodology

Description of the specific research method used (i.e., process-tracing, discursive analysis, MLA, etc.), its advantages and weaknesses and why it is chosen.

Data

Description of the data used, number of cases, method of case-selection, source of data, method of data collection, sampling method.

Analysis and findings

What the data show in detail, general tendencies and interesting particularities.

(Model construction) and Conclusions

Causal models may be formulated and general conclusions reached. Conclusions may or may not specifically challenge or support findings in existing literature.

Future research

Possibilities of future research for the researcher or other scholars, promising directions, requirements for future research.

List of References (Bibliography)

- In text : (Author YEAR: page ; Co-author and Co-author YEAR: page ; Co-author et al. YEAR: page)

Bibliography Examples.

Surname, First Name (YEAR): *Title of the Book*. City: Publisher.

Surname, First Name and First Name Surname (eds.) (YEAR): *Title of the Book*. City: Publisher.

Surname, First Name (YEAR): 'Title of the Journal Article', *Journal Name* Nr.(Issue Nr.): pp. XX

Surname, First Name (YEAR): 'Title of the Chapter', in First Name Surname and First Name Surname (eds.) *Title of the Book*. City: Publisher. pp. XX

Surname, First Name (YEAR): 'Title of the Thesis or the Conference Paper', XX thesis, University of XX, City / XX conference paper, City, Date.

Website Owner / News site / Project Leader (YEAR): *Name of the Database / Title of the News Reports*. Accessible at WWW : http XXXXXX (date when last accessed).

Appendices

Every piece of data used shown so as to facilitate potential replications. If possible, data shared publicly and/or presented together with the manuscript.

Presentation of the author:

Please, include a short presentation of yourself (approx. 100 words) in the following style (3rd person singular): Name, age, (hometown), university, degree, focus of your studies/Master or Bachelor Thesis, current employment or study interests, e.g.:

"Françoise Deutsch, 32, is a graduate who received his Bachelor in "European Studies" at the University of Shire in 2008. In 2009, he obtained an LL.M/M.Sc./MA in International Relations at the University of Stadt. He wrote his Master Thesis on ???, and currently interns/works/studies at the WWW. His interests include security studies, human rights, democratic transition, development studies, political philosophy, conflict resolution, etc."

Should you have any questions, please, do not hesitate to contact us at politikonjournal@iapss.org.

Politikon

the IAPSS Journal of Political Science

International Association for Political Science Students
Thomas van Aquinostraat 5
Postbox 9108, 6500HK, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
e: general@iapss.org | w: www.iapss.org