

Vol. 15 No. 2

IAPSS

The International Association
For Political Science Students



Politikon

the IAPSS Journal of Political Science

ISSN 1583-3984



9 771583 398006

Volume 15, No. 2: July 2015

**Special Conference Volume of IAPSS World Congress
2015 London, United Kingdom**

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EDITORIAL NOTE

Dear Reader,

You are about to open Politikon Volume 15, No. 2, Special Conference Volume of the IAPSS World Congress 2015 in London.

The World Congress in London, which took place in April 2015, was one of the largest Academic Conferences of IAPSS so far, with over one hundred student panelists presenting their works.

In this volume, you will find eight articles based on the presentations shown in London. These eight articles underwent a careful review process under the supervision of Politikon's new Editor-in-Chief, Cait Bagby, and her Deputy, Laurens Visser. In fact, counting also the feedback they received from the chairs and discussants at the student panels, the authors who wrote these articles faced double scrutiny – one from their colleagues at the World Congress, one from anonymous reviewers of Politikon. The fact that they did not get discouraged by the criticism they sometimes received and carried on through the entire review process until the publication of this volume is to be applauded.

These eight authors should serve an example to our readers too. It is not at all impossible to publish your academic work, if you persevere and do not give up when faced with the well-meant feedback given by your comrades in academia. Look at the variety of topics presented in this volume – from the question of securitization of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean, through the influence of Mexican unions in the legislative process, to a quantitative assessment of water scarcity in the Middle East, all these articles will be interesting to Politikon's readership and read by many IAPSS members as well as non-members.

Do not hesitate and send us your contribution for the next volume! We are looking forward to receiving it!

Yours

Politikon Editorial Board

Energy Security and the Cyprus Question: “Securitization” of Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean

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Abstract

In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration that established certain “ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- could be revived. The main stimulant prompting this evolution was the discovery of new energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially offshore the RoC. In October 2014, Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey would soon perform its seismic surveys in sea areas that encroach on Cyprus’s EEZ, raising concerns on the escalation of the intractable and protracted Cyprus conflict. Aim of this research project is to provide readers with an insight on how the flow between energy and power politics is played out in the Eastern Mediterranean. Suggesting that the existing tensions extend beyond the struggle over the existing material energy assets in the seabed of the Levant Basin, the project casts light upon the notion of energy security by setting forth the indicators it is composed of. While scrutinizing the statements of the leaders on these events and seeking to highlight the security discourses they are coming up with, the project resorts to discourse analysis.

Key Words:

Accessibility and Availability, Cyprus Question, Energy Security, securitization.

Introduction

In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration establishing certain “ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- could be revived. This evolution was arguably prompted by the discovery of new energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially offshore the RoC. Gas had initially been portrayed as a potential catalyst for a restart of the long-standing peace process, and possibly for its successful conclusion. Nevertheless, a couple of months later, it seemed that these discoveries had worked against these aspirations and added chill to the Cyprus conflict. In October 2014, a Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey would soon perform its seismic surveys in sea areas that encroach on Cyprus’s EEZ, raising concerns on the escalation of the existing protracted conflict. Anastasiades withdrew from the negotiations, attributing his decision to these activities.

If someone had to summarize the Cyprus conflict in a few words, he would quote the aphorism of the deceased former President of the RoC, Glafkos Clerides’: “What satisfies their fears is what increases our fears, and so we have this paradoxical situation that unless we can find a way in which the fears of both communities are put at rest, it would be extremely difficult to find a solution to the Cyprus problem” (Coughlan 1991: 92). This phrase seems to capture the very essence of the diachronic security dilemma on the island. Reading into thorough analyses, embedded in the rich literature of the Cyprus studies, we have figured out that the roots of the Cyprus conflict, and other intractable conflicts alike, are mapped more into intangible sociological, cultural, religious and psychological factors rather than scarce resources. These intangible factors have resulted in a sense of mutual suspicion that exerts a significant influence in the tensions unfolding in the present.

The challenge of the current thesis is to comprehend how the legacies, based in the past, come into play in the course of the current developments. The central research objective of this project is to provide readers with an explanatory account on how the interplay between energy and power politics operates. We seek to sketch out a comprehensive framework for energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean, while bringing the intractable Cyprus conflict to the forefront.

In periods of such distress, grassroots expect their political leaders to step up and communicate a narrative explaining what is at stake, who is the threat and why. In other words, the leaders are expected to establish the proper “security discourses”. The research question that this article intends to address is: what are the indicators that formulate these “security discourses”? This question gains currency if we consider that the crisis episodes extend beyond the material resources in the seabed of the Levant Basin. They occur among entities whose relations have been characterized by historically mutual antagonism. In the light of the intractable nature of the Cyprus conflict, we want to learn which factors led the assigned political leaders of the contending parties to “securitize” the recent gas discoveries in the region the way they did. To this end, the current study places the concept of energy security under critical scrutiny by dissecting how the political leaders manipulate it.

To sufficiently tackle this question, certain steps seem necessary. The first part focuses on the very notion of security. Following the constructivist thought, we claim that its formation unfolds in various contexts and refers to various referent objects. The procedure that underscores the formation of its subjective character is “securitization”, meaning the discursive construction of threat (Buzan et al 1998). Using the recent tensions as our case study, the second part explains how securitization discourses unfold within that time frame. To this effect, it sheds light to the related statements and speeches, delivered by the political leaders of the disputants. Blame-games, pointing fingers and assigning the label of security threat to one another are expected to litter the speeches and interviews during these times.

The next step is to proceed with the definition of energy security. For the sake of this article we define it as the embodiment of two indicators that relate to its content and context dependent character respectively: availability and accessibility. Concerning the first, particular attention is paid to the estimations on the amount of the recent natural gas reserves that have been discovered around the island. The accessibility pillar, largely pertaining to the very notion of energy security, contains the geopolitical relations among the actors involved or potentially involved in exploiting these discoveries. Geopolitical relations as a notion, though, are too broad and vague. Therefore, we squeeze them into two contexts: legal and historical. As to the first, we try to identify how the disputants adopted international law to give legitimacy to their course of action, with particular reference to certain provisions of UNCLOS. As to the second, the paper embarks upon

the historical journey that explains the diachronically incompatible objectives of the disputants.

Theoretical Framework: understanding energy security in the constructivist thought

The notion of security in the realist thought

Edward Azar (1986: 28), a pioneer in the field of conflict studies, describes “denial of security needs” as an important variable in the genesis and the crystallization of protracted conflicts. The heartbreaking plight, in which the divided island of Cyprus finds itself today, is the manifestation of a dilemma which human societies have had to grapple with since the dawn of history: the security dilemma, coined by Herz (1950: 157). Security dilemma describes a constellation wherein an actor, seeking to increase his security, triggers the unintended effect of decreasing the security of the other. Groups, being “trapped” in such a predicament, are worried about their security “from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups or individuals.” (ibid) Seeking to attain security from such an attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power aiming to alleviate the impact of the others’ power. This in turn, renders them more insecure and urges them to get prepared for armed conflicts or even for wars.

The quest for security -whether economic or military- raises a sense of urgency to politics and, thus, it constitutes one of the enduring sources of passion in policy controversies (Stone 2002: 88). Nonetheless, security is not devoid of meaning. It may be perceived for instance, as the preservation of a group’s or a nation’s core values. Such a broad and vague definition of security, though, does not sufficiently throw light on the identity of the groups, on the content of their core values and on where threats to these values come from (McDonald 2008: 61). The idea that security can be reduced to objective and countable needs is politically problematic. As Wolfers (1952: 491-92;) first postulated: states vary widely in the value they place on security while some of them may be so dissatisfied with the status quo that they are more interested in acquiring new values than in securing the values they already have. On account of these theoretical loopholes, we infer that although the realist thought has provided us with an intellectual insight into the overpowering effect of security in the bilateral relations, this concept is not as straightforward as it appears in their analyses. Therefore, we might lose a great deal when we squeeze the actor’s behavior

into the universalist and abstract categories that the realist thought provides (Jervis 1988: 344).

The contribution of constructivism and the concept of securitization

This is where the school of constructivism steps in. For constructivists, answers to these questions are different depending on the context and evolve through social interaction between the disputants. Specifically, constructivists treat security as a context-specific social construction. Instead of developing abstract definitions of security, constructivists and especially the Copenhagen School (CS), have focused on how security itself is given meaning through the inter-subjective processes that unfold between the disputants in geographically and historically specified contexts.

What animates the CS is the concept of ‘securitization’ that refers to the discursive construction of threat (Buzan et al 1998). More concretely, securitization may be identified as a process in which an actor assigns the label of an existential threat to a particular issue, dynamic or actor. The invocation of security opens the window for the political leader to mobilize special powers in order to handle existential threats (ibid: 21). Therefore, the meaning of security is not located in a philosophical and abstract universe, but lies in its very usage by the authorized political leaders.

The way to study securitization is to study discourse constellations. In security discourse, a topic is dramatized and presented by the political leaders as a topic of supreme priority. Hence, by framing an issue as security, a political leader claims a need for and a right to treat it even by extraordinary means.

Despite its subjective character, in order to adroitly direct the audience’s attention towards an event- construed as dangerous, the words of the leader need to resonate with the framework within which his reactions are collocated. This means, that the security statements of a political leader, aiming to win an audience must be associated with an existing external reality, for instance an evidently aggressive course of action performed by the opponent (Balzaq 2005: 182). This action must be perceived by the public as an action that violates the sovereignty and/or the resources of the state entity.

General observations on energy security

A field that could easily become subject to “securitization” is energy. The drive to control oil and natural resources is frequently said to be a cause of wars between states and within states. Energy trends and international politics are innately interconnected and energy security is an integral part of the foreign and national security policies of states. A country’s ability to access energy supplies and the ways in which it uses energy determine the state of its national security (Shaffer 2009). Rooted in the industrialization of the society, the very notion of energy security has traditionally been identified as the “safety and source diversification of energy fuels and services” (Sovacool& Brown 2009: 7).

Nevertheless, the meaning of energy fuels and services has been contingent upon content perspective. For most of the 20th century, public security concerns were almost exclusively concentrated on oil and coal supply. World War I and World War II had starkly highlighted the prominence of oil and coal in high politics (Yergin 2009: 773). Some decades later, these concerns had reached their peak during the 1970s when Western society, almost in its entirety, struggled to overcome the economically disastrous implications of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 oil crises¹. The shortages and spiking prices that resulted from the embargoes functioned as a critical juncture for many European countries to change their then dominant path of energy dependence by diversifying their resources away from Middle East oil.

Natural gas at the forefront

These oil crises expanded the nation-state laden and traditional concept of energy security to cover energy sources other than oil. The reason is that new natural gas discoveries and rising demand have shifted gas from a cluster of regional markets into a global marketplace (Gloystein 21.11.2012). Natural gas is currently the third most important energy source, after oil and coal, and is rapidly gaining prominence in global energy markets. Attributed to its relatively clean and efficient combustion, natural gas is emerging as the fuel of choice for a wide array of uses, like the generation of electric power (Barnes J. *et al* 2006: 1).

¹ With the nationalization of much of the Middle East’s oil industries, the oil embargoes triggered inflation in many OECD countries and ultimately resulted into economic recessions, substantial losses of GDP and high unemployment (Yergin 1988).

As a traded good, natural gas is supplied with permanent infrastructure and long-term supply arrangements, like pipelines and LNG² infrastructures. These infrastructures are extremely costly to build and require long-run horizons as well as a predictable geopolitical and economic context for investors to “sink their capital and knowledge” (Barnes *et al* 2006: 3). The required long-term supply relationships and the permanent infrastructure offer a window of much greater opportunity for (geo)politics to come into play (Shaffer 2013: 114-115). Due to the state-regulated sphere, within which the gas market is operating (ibid.), governments are urged to play a larger role in the natural gas trade. Infrastructure projects link states and mirror the geopolitical relations among them. Thus, states in choosing routes to export their commodities and import their energy supplies naturally consider and promote their political ramifications of various route options (ibid.). Decisions on natural gas export projects are especially likely to be affected by political considerations because they can be quite risky otherwise (Shaffer 2009: 2).

Operationalizing “securitization” of natural gas in the Cyprus conflict

We observed above that the concept of energy security is not as straightforward as it might appear in various analyses. How it is conveyed is context dependent and springs from patterns of the anarchic international politics (Ciuta 2010: 130). What begs the question is how we narrow down the concept of energy security and comprehend it in the imbroglio of the Cypriot realities? Making use of the definitions of APERC (2007) and Kruyt et al (2009: 2168), this article treats the concept of energy security as the embodiment of two main indicators, two A’s:

a. the *availability* of gas reserves in the region, which, in general, pertains to the classical notion of geological or physical availability of hydrocarbon resources in the region³. The indicator here is the exploration context. By exploration context, we mean here the amount of gas reserves, reported, estimated and/or discovered offshore the RoC.

b. the *accessibility* that signifies the political and economic “barriers” to ensure that energy supplies remain accessible (APERC 2007: 19). Energy security largely pertains to this indicator, since a depletion of energy reserves has seen countries struggle to maintain

² Liquefied Natural Gas

³ It should be stressed that large uncertainties surround the amounts of hydrocarbon resources and their extraction potential. Few studies provide estimates of fossil fuel resources and the most significant one is that of the US Geological Survey.

steady and accessible energy services. Factors that influence accessibility include the relations between the surrounding countries, especially when they are disputing over the “availability” of the resources. In order to understand how this indicator works in the current study, light will be cast upon the:

i. Legal context: we sketch out here the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the Eastern Mediterranean, with special reference to the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. Setting out the legal framework is instrumental in comprehending the legal positions and constraints within which the “securitization discourses” of the disputants evolve.

ii. Historical context: the paper will lay out the historical background that has shaped the relations between the contending parties. The challenge here is to identify and document if and how the lexicon of the protracted Cyprus conflict encourages modulations and transpositions in the meanings that the authorized political leaders assign to energy security.

Methodology and Data: securitization of natural gas discoveries through the statements of the political leaders

Data

To identify the securitization of the gas discoveries around the island, the current paper resorts, first of all, to the statements that the leaders in Cyprus delivered during the period of the tensions. It was in October 2014 when the President of RoC decided to pull out of the re-unification negotiations, after the Turkish seismic vessel *Barbaros* illegally entered RoC’s EEZ. Security issues, particularly energy security issues came to the spotlight. It is interesting to observe how the political leaders articulated their security concerns vis-à-vis each other through the statements delivered at that time (Table 1).

Why do we pay attention to these figures? Irrespective of whether these leaders activate their constituencies, they engage in opinion-making behavior. As Rosenau (1963: 6) underlines, national opinion-makers are considered to be those members of every society who occupy positions which enable them to transmit, with some regularity, opinions about national security issues to their constituencies and to point to what is at stake.

Why do we explicitly concentrate on the above-mentioned periods? People experience tensions, like the ones in October 2014, as episodes of threat and uncertainty. They face them as a grave predicament requiring urgent action (Rosenthal et al 2001). It is a natural inclination in such distress to look to their political leaders to step up and communicate a message or a narrative that explains what is at stake, who is the threat and why. The perceptive quality of these tensions is what we want to bring into scrutiny during these kinds of periods by documenting the phraseology that the leaders adopt. Within this time-frame of tensions we seek to identify and highlight “existential language as an indicator of securitization through the suggestion of a sense of urgency and prioritization” (Fischhendler& Nathan 2014: 155).

Table 1: Statements of political leaders in October 2014

Date	President of the RoC Anastasiades	Turkish Cypriot Leader- Dervis Eroglu
3/10/2014		Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Television Channel)
7/10/2014	Response Letter to Eroglu (Press and Information Office-PIO)	Interview with Turkish Cypriot Newspaper Diyalog)
8/10/2014	Letter to the UN Secretary General	Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Television Channel)
10/10/2014	Statement on the occasion of the celebration of the 54th anniversary of Cyprus Independence	
13/10/2014		Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Star Kibris Newspaper)
14/10/2014	Official statement (Press and Information Office)	Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Gunes Newspaper)
15/10/2014	Statement on the occasion of “Stelios Bi-communal Business Awards” 2014	Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Newspaper Kibris)
17/10/2014		Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak Television Channel)
19/10/2014	Statement at the unveiling in Pachna village of the bust of Kyriacos Stylianou	Letter to the UN Secretary General
22/10/2014	Response to the statement of Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu	Statement during a meeting with union of veteran fighters (according to Turkish Cypriot newspaper Vatan)
24/10/2014		Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot daily newspaper Kibris)
27/10/2014	Statement on the occasion of an official lunch in honor of Archbishop of America Demetrios	Statement on the occasion of a meeting in Istanbul
30/10/2014		Statement on the occasion of the 91st anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey

Source: Author

Discourse analysis

By examining the “securitization” procedure or otherwise the “discursive construction of threat”, this project will resort to discourse analysis in order to generate the categories of meaning (George 1994: 29) by which energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean can be understood and explained. Discourses refer to communication practices that systematically construct our knowledge of reality. A discourse “embodies a shared set of capabilities which enable the assemblage of words, phrases and sentences into meaningful texts intelligible to the readers” (Dryzek 1988: 710). By critically reflecting upon these statements, we seek to map out what “truths” on energy security issues these documents establish.

We document expressions centered on blame games, threats and referent object (the gas discoveries). The specific words and phrases will explain how and why the one side portrays the other as a danger to its security. We aspire to understand how securitization unfolds within these speeches, and what historical as well as legal dynamics underlie the leaders’ energy security discourses. More particularly we highlight two variables within specific sentences of the statements. The first, the dependent one, is composed of key words and phrases that unveil the articulations of the leaders’ energy security concerns (who is the threat, what is at stake). The second, the independent one, is prognosticative of the legalistic argumentation and consists of references to the experiences of the past. The independent variable, which refers to the legal and historical context of the accessibility pillar, will be analyzed in the following sections.

The securitization discourses by the President of the Republic of Cyprus: Turkish drilling activities as a reason for the negotiations to collapse

The most significant document at our disposal, signifying the securitization procedure on behalf of the Greek-Cypriot side, is the protest letter that President Anastasiades sent UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in October 6, 2014 (Christou 21.10.2014). In this letter, he demonstrated his decision to pull out of the then-running negotiations. Turkish activities (of the seismic vessels) were recalled as the reason for his withdrawal and portrayed as the main threat torpedoing any possibility for the re-unification of the island.

His very words were that Turkish actions “strike a heavy blow against the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem”. He claimed that the Turkish encroachment on the island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has been articulated as a determinant factor, which had brought the negotiations into collapse. Pointing a finger to the Turkish side, he stated that their activities “destroy the efforts of creating a good and positive environment and actually derail the whole negotiating process”. “The increasingly aggressive nature of Turkey’s actions in areas in the eastern Mediterranean under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus” was one of the key phrases in his statement. He added that “negotiating under constant threat and blackmail that undermine all efforts to create the good environment necessary for a successful outcome of the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem is not just counterproductive. “It also has a negative effect on public opinion,” he noted in the letter.

In order to further highlight the portrayal of Turkish actions as a threat, he used the adjective “provocative” characterizing “Turkey’s decision to reserve areas, including parts of Cyprus EEZ for seismic surveys”. He adopted the same adjective to claim that these Turkish activities “had been the culmination of a continued provocative policy of disputing and interfering with the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its exclusive economic zone”. In this context he described that “this provocative policy included, apart from continued verbal threats and rhetoric, the harassment of vessels performing lawful activities authorized by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, by Turkish warships and military aircraft, and unlawful seismic surveys within the western exclusive economic zone of Cyprus by Turkish vessels”.

While the security discourses have been set forth above (the dependent variable), special attention will be paid to the last words of the last sentence. In this sentence, we realize how the legal pillar of energy security, one aspect of the independent variable comes into play amid the securitization procedure. Additionally, he stressed that Cyprus’ EEZ was delineated in 2004 in accordance with international law.

On Tuesday 7.10.2014, Anastasiades delivered a statement confirming his decision to suspend his participation in the UN-led re-unification talks. He justified his withdrawal, among other reasons, in the positions expressed by the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Dervis Eroglu (that will be underlined later). In this statement, the blame is not solely laid on

Turkey, as before, but also on the Turkish-Cypriots. While pointing a finger, he questioned whether the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot actions served any pre-electoral objectives⁴ or any other expediency. He added that the Turkish activities, which blatantly violated the sovereign rights of the RoC (legal pillar as the independent variable), underrated any potential benefits that the country would gain from a solution of the Cyprus question and torpedoed the efforts to find a just, viable and functional solution for the benefit of all the Cypriot people.

Two days later,⁵ Anastasiades expressed his hope that the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey would redress “the recent provocations and undertake the necessary practical and substantial steps towards this end”. Furthermore, he acknowledged “that although the Cyprus problem has been decisively shaped by a number of external factors, we, the Cypriots, have also committed mistakes”, adding that “we must have the courage to admit that we have failed to adequately address the challenges posed by the growing tensions that infiltrated the two communities and resulted in a deterioration of inter-communal bonding”.

The last statement of Anastasiades deviates content-wise (not significantly though) from the previous ones. He used the term “Cypriot” to connote common characteristics that the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots share while potentially portraying Turkey as an “external factor”⁶. In any case, the reference to the history that connects and divides the grassroots constituencies on the island reflects a statement, wherein history, as an independent variable, comes into play in the securitization procedure.

The securitization discourses by the Turkish Cypriot leader: “Greek Cypriots are responsible for the current impasse”

Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, in his turn, was pointing fingers at the Greek Cypriot counterpart for the stalemate of the re-unification talks. He stated that “Anastasiades has left the talks in order to escape from a unified solution” (KP Daily News 7.10.2014). He portrayed the Greek Cypriots as being the problem since they are the ones “embracing diversion tactics to withdraw from the talks.” Besides this, he strongly advocated the presence of the Turkish vessel in the region: “it is not right to expect the

⁴ It was not clear during that moment whether Eroglu would run for the upcoming elections in the Turkish Cypriot part of the island.

⁵ On the occasion of an event at the English School during the celebration of the 54th anniversary of Cyprus' independence <http://www.parikiaki.com/2014/10/cyprus-hopes-that-turkey-will-redress-its-provocations/#sthash.XS45WRJm.dpuf>

⁶ This term can be attributed to other countries, given the geopolitical complexity of the Cyprus question.

Turkish Cypriots to abandon their rights and for Turkey to stop activities that work on the benefit and the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, while the attitude of south Cyprus is not cooperative” (ibid.)

In another interview he (again) held the Greek-Cypriots accountable for the current tensions by stating that “President Nicos Anastasiades finds himself in the delusion that southern Cypriots are the only sovereign owners of Cyprus”. He portrayed the Greek Cypriots as being the threat to Turkish Cypriots justifying his opinion in the performance of search-rescue activities carried out by Israel and Russia in the East Mediterranean (in cooperation with the Greek-Cypriots), and the tension and diplomatic initiatives taken by the Greek Cypriots, who, according to his view, would like to use their diplomatic leverage to impose their will on the Turkish Cypriots.”

He said “in the negotiations with south Cyprus we have come to an agreement, according to which the natural resources and petrol in the seas will belong mutually to the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, that the usage of these will be left to the authority of a federal state and that the agreements regarding the management will pass through the parliament with a qualified majority vote, which means that the Turkish side will have a right” (KP Daily News 14.10.2014). He characterized “the south Cyprus’ one sided sovereignty claims as a signal of their insincerity. Stressing the legal pillar of the energy security discourses, he claimed that, in alignment with the principles of the Sea Laws, “in half closed seas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the boundaries of the sea areas can only be determined when the bordering states agree upon the delimitation of the sea management areas”. He evoked again the legal pillar by saying that, “south Cyprus does not have such an agreement with Turkey or with the Turkish Cypriots”. Due to this lack of agreement the Greek Cypriot cannot raise any claims with respect to the “illegality” of the Turkish-Turkish Cypriot agreements. He also underlined that these agreements have emerged as an outcome of Greek Cypriots’ reluctance to come to terms either with them or Turkey. On these grounds he justified his decision to pass the management of the natural resources on to Turkey Petrol Anon Partnership (ibid).

Explaining the pillars of “energy security” in the Cyprus QuestionThe previous part set forth the energy “securitization discourses” of the disputants. It depicted how the leaders have articulated the recent gas discoveries as a security issue, how they

portrayed the threats and stressed what is at stake. This part concentrates on these indicators that have potentially contributed to these modulations of energy security. As stressed above, these indicators are to be found in the notion of energy security as the embodiment of the two pillars: availability and accessibility. Due to the content and context dependent character of energy security, we need to know how these indicators are operationalized in the context of the Cypriot realities.


The availability pillar of energy security: the exploratory context

This section sheds light on the availability indicator that is embodied in the notion of energy security. More particularly, this part focuses on the documented and estimated amount of gas reserves in the region that surrounds the island of Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean. Until the past decade, much of the hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean went undiscovered because the resources lie in very deep waters (known in the industry as “ultra-deep-water”), with depths exceeding 2 km(1,24 miles) in some locations (Gurel et al. 2013: 1). This made it technically difficult, risky and expensive to carry out drilling activities in the area. Nevertheless, technological advances, accompanied by high international oil prices, which tended to encourage oil and gas companies to invest in these activities, prompted new exploration initiatives at the dawn of the 21st century. Employing a geology assessment methodology, the U.S Geological Survey in March 2010 estimated a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the Levant Basin Province⁷. The Levant Basin is located along and off the coast of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the Gaza Strip, extending westward into Cypriot waters (see Picture 1). The basin comprises a total sea and land area of 32.000 square miles, most of which is offshore and bounded by three distinct subsea features:

- a) the Tartus Fault to the north
- b) the Erostrhenes Mount to the West
- c) the Nile Delta to the south

⁷ It should be noted that in the oil and gas industry, the USGS reports are considered merely indicative and are not taken as a reliable indicator of expected volumes. The outcomes of further exploration efforts are a prerequisite to estimate with greater accuracy the extent of oil and gas volumes in the region. See Shaffer B. (June 2012) “Energy Resources and Markets in the Eastern Mediterranean Region” *GMF Policy Brief*

Picture 1: The Levant Basin




Source: US Geological Survey (March 2010):

<http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf>

By global standards, the Levant Basin's gas resources are significant but not predominant. Russia for example, holds the world's largest natural gas reserves at 1,680 tcf, accounting for about 25% of global gas reserves. By Mediterranean standards, the Levant Basin's offshore natural gas reserves are sizeable, but they are less than the gas resources held by key North African producers, like Algeria (Paraschos 2013).

In the early 2000s, the government of the Republic of Cyprus had hired the Norwegian company PGS to perform a preliminary assessment of Cyprus's hydrocarbons potential through seismic surveys. These kinds of surveys would contribute to determine whether it would be worth performing much more costly exploratory drilling (Giamourides 2013). PGS's research outcomes proved favorable to this direction. In 2006 the Republic of Cyprus began prospecting for hydrocarbons in an exploration area of 51,000 sq km offshore the island (Gurel et al 2013: 3). Having proclaimed their EEZ, RoC (a topic that we will touch upon below) divided its exploration area into 13 blocks, as illustrated in Map 1.

Map 1: The RoC's present offshore exploration area along with its proximity in the south-east to the gas fields discovered by Israel



Source: Petroleum Gas Geo-Services (PGS), cited in Gurel et al 2013, p. 4

In February 2007 and relying on the available seismic data, the RoC initiated its first international tender for three-year gas exploration licenses offering 11 out of 13 blocks (3 and 13 were excluded). Nevertheless, only three small to medium-sized companies made bids. Larger international companies, due to their access to more attractive opportunities around the world, did not manifest any interest in the Cypriot hydrocarbons. As an outcome, the government of Cyprus awarded only one license in October 2008 to Noble Energy that had already been operating offshore Israel. After multiple seismic surveys, the first exploratory drilling unfolded in Block 12 in September 2011. Two months later, the company indicated a 5-8 tcf natural gas deposit in deep waters of about 1,700 meters (Ashurst 2012). This range of estimates seems too broad to confirm the commercial viability of the field. However, this discovery, in alignment with large findings in the Israeli Leviathan block, triggered a significant interest for the second Cyprus offshore licensing round that started in February 2012 with the participation of 15 bidders, including International Oil Companies⁸, upstream independents, natural gas buyers, as well as gas and LNG traders. Licenses were awarded for five offshore blocks out of twelve on offer. The Italian ENI and Korean Kogas are drilling in Blocks 2, 3 and 9 of Cyprus' EEZ since the third quarter of 2014, followed by Total expected to drill in Blocks 10 and 11 of Cyprus' EEZ in 2015.

⁸ The most significant ones were: Total of France, ENI of Italy, Gazprombank of Russia, Petronas of Malaysia and Kogas of South Korea, cited in Gurel et al (2013); 4

The legal context as an accessibility pillar of energy security

The aim of this section is to explain how the legal framework of availability indicator comes into play within the securitization procedure of the natural gas reserves. We outline the “official rules of the game” by which the state-protagonists in the current tensions are supposed to abide, in order to grasp an understanding of the legal context within which the “security discourses” are unfolding.

There is a well-developed body of international law governing maritime boundaries and rights to undersea resources. The basic rules are set out in the 1982 UNCLOS with arbitration and judicial facilities available to resolve disputes, notably through the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As of January 2015, 166 countries and the European Union have joined the Convention. The four states that voted against its adoption back in 1982, and are not still parties to it, are Israel, Turkey, USA and Venezuela. It should be underlined, though, that certain provisions of UNCLOS III have acquired customary international law status.

UNCLOS III divides the marine space that is within the limits of national jurisdiction into several zones.

- a. the territorial sea (up to 12nm from the baselines⁹)
- b. the contiguous zone (up to an additional 12nm)
- c. the EEZ (up to 200nm)
- d. the continental shelf (up to 200nm or 350 nm under certain conditions).

Part five of that convention, more precisely Articles 55 to 75, entitles coastal states to an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles. In accordance with Article 56, these rights confer to the purpose of “exploring, conserving, and managing living and nonliving resources of both the waters and the seabed and subsoil”. The rules in question apply to all oceans and seas, including enclosed or semi-enclosed, such as the Mediterranean or parts of it. In this kind of sea, issues of maritime boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts are likely to unfold for various reasons, ranging from the geographical peculiarities of the coastlines in question to the poor political relationship between the states concerned (Scovazzi 2012: 4-5).

⁹ UNCLOS III Art. 5 “Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State”.

In 1988 the RoC ratified UNCLOS. The RoC delimited its EEZ in the south-western, southern and south-eastern direction through separate bilateral agreements, respectively with Egypt, Lebanon (that are contributing parts of the UNCLOS) and Israel (that has not become a contributing part of the UNCLOS). All three agreements contain more or less identical provisions, and according to all of them, boundaries are delineated in the spirit of the median line principle (Gurel et al 2013: 26).

On February 2003, RoC and Egypt signed in Cairo an Agreement on the Delimitation of the EEZ. The coastlines of the parties are opposed and located quite far away one from each other (Scovazzi 2012:6). The parties clearly stated in the agreement that the delimitation “is effected by the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of the base line of the two parties” (Article 1, para a). In 2007, RoC made a similar agreement with Lebanon (Karyotis 2011; Scovazzi 2012: 7). The agreement, not ratified yet by the Lebanese parliament, and relating to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, delimits most of the EEZ between the opposite coasts of Cyprus and Lebanon. Finally, in December 2010, RoC and Israel signed a bilateral agreement delimiting the EEZ between them. The distance from Israel to RoC is 230 nm and both parties had to adopt the median line method, meaning that each side would use 115 nm of EEZ (Scovazzi 2012: 7).

Map 2: RoC's EEZ boundaries as agreed with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel



Source: Cited in Burel et al 2013, p. 27

From the very beginning, Turkey had manifested its opposition to these agreements. First of all, Turkey, together with Turkish Cypriots, does not recognize the existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the international community's perception of the present political

status quo in Cyprus (the historical section will explain why). They believe that Greek Cypriots cannot legitimately represent the RoC as a whole, as this contradicts the 1960 Treaties. Based on this, they fiercely object to all relative actions performed by the RoC relating to EEZ and offshore hydrocarbons development (Gurel & Le Cornu 2014: 18). They argue that any unilateral Greek Cypriot action in this field, before a settlement, does not only ignore the legitimate rights of Turkish Cypriots, but also establishes a *fait accompli* that prejudices the terms of a prospective settlement on sovereignty issues to the disadvantage of the Turkish Cypriots (ibid.). Addressing these objections, the Greek Cypriots, being in charge of the internationally recognized RoC government, claim that, as a contributing part of the UNCLOS, have the “inalienable and non-negotiable” right to explore for and exploit the natural resources in their EEZ. They underline that this right is non-conditional upon a settlement and should not be considered as a bi-communal issue to be put on the negotiation table for the unification talks. It should be stressed though, that Greek Cypriots, in alignment with the opinion held by the international community, accept that the management of the island’s natural resources should be for the benefit of all the original residents of the island.

To understand the second reason why Turkey and Turkish Cypriots hold this negative standing vis-à-vis the above mentioned agreements, one must go back to the year 1982. Although Turkey participated in the UNCLOS negotiations, Turkey has not signed either ratified UNCLOS, primarily because of its dispute with Greece over maritime boundaries it has unilaterally raised in the Aegean Sea. Turkey is not a party to UNCLOS. The Turkish perspective is that certain provisions of UNCLOS¹⁰, with special reference to Articles 3, 33, and 121 of the Treaty, puts vital interests of Turkey in the Aegean into jeopardy.

Utilizing the customary character of the international sea law, Turkey applies a territorial sea law that in general, delineates the breadth of its territorial sea at 6 NM (Gurel et al 2013: 31). Nevertheless, this delimitation is conditioned on a proviso authorization by the Council of Ministers (CoM) ‘to establish the breadth of the territorial sea, in certain seas, up to a limit exceeding six nautical miles, under reservation to take into account all special

¹⁰ Which do not fall under the scope of the current project despite their relative importance

circumstances and relevant situations therein, and in conformity with the equity principle'¹¹ (ibid.). For the time being, Turkey applies a 6 NM limit to the territorial sea in the Aegean Sea while the limit in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea is 12 NM, as provisioned in a CoM decree (ibid)¹². Turkey has no continental shelf- or EEZ-related legislation. A CoM decree established the Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea at 200 NM (ibid.) but no EEZ proclamation exists.

As a reaction to the commencement of exploratory drilling authorized by the RoC government off the island's southern coast, and aiming at restoring the "balance of powers" in the region, on 21 September 2011 the Turkish Cypriots signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey. The contributing parts drew a boundary line between the northern coast of Cyprus and the southern coast of Turkey in the Mediterranean seas. In doing so, Turkish Cypriots issued licenses to TPAO¹³ to conduct three-dimensional seismic research along with onshore and offshore drilling around maritime borders between the northern part of the island and Turkey.

The historical context as an accessibility pillar of energy security

This sub-part addresses the second parameter of the accessibility pillar, the historical context. Rather than treating history as a dead subject, irrelevant of the current energy tensions, we should conceive it as a living process, as a continuous path dependence, that links developments throughout decades and encourages us to concentrate on such linkages and their influence in the securitization procedure of the current events.

Geography

Throughout recorded time, the political experience in the island has reflected the interlocking impact of two utterly basic geographic factors: size and location (James 2002:3). The total area of the island is 9.251 square kilometers, 10 square kilometers of

¹¹ Act No. 2674 of 20 May 1982, on the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR.htm> (Retrieved at 27.2.2015),

¹² Decree No. 8/4742,

<http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR.htm> . This decree preserved the erstwhile limits in the Mediterranean and Black Seas which applied in accordance with a previous law and were determined on the basis of 'reciprocity'

¹³ Turkish Petroleum Corporation

which is covered by water and the rest by land. It measures 149 miles latitudinally and 62 miles longitudinally. Its coastline amounts to 648 kilometers (CIA World Factbook). With respect to its demographic status and according to the last census, the Greek Cypriots form around 77% of the population, Turkish Cypriots¹⁴ more than 18% (CIA World Factbook) and other ethnic or religious groups (mainly Maronites, Latin Catholics, Armenians and the non-officially recognized Gypsies and others) the remaining 5%.

Concerning the second factor, Cyprus possesses a central position in global politics since it is located at the juncture of Eurasia with Africa. Turkey is the closest neighbor at 50 miles north of the island, while Syria and Lebanon are approximately 70 miles to its eastern side. Other neighboring territories include Egypt in the south (240 miles) and Israel to the southeast (124 miles). In the westward direction, the nearest Greek Dodecanesian island, Castellorizo is 170 miles away while its distance from the Greek mainland is close to 500 miles. The island's main natural resources (besides hydrocarbons) are copper, pyrites, asbestos, gypsum, timber, salt, marble and clay earth pigment (CIA World Factbook).

From antiquity to the British administration

This place has witnessed the invasion, the establishment and the interaction of all the ancient civilizations of pre-history and proto-history projecting it into a “crossroad of civilizations”. Hellenic tribes (Arcadians, Achaeans and Mycenaeans -the latter arrived at the island during the middle Bronze Age, meaning 2000 BC- 1500 BC) - settled in Cyprus contributing to the formulation of the Hellenic character of the island. Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians (Epigones of Alexander the Great's legacy, the Ptolemaic dynasty), Romans, Eastern Romans (contributing to the Hellenic Orthodox character of the island's spiritual and cultural identity), Venetians and Ottomans had also settled on the island in the past. Between 1571 and 1878 the Ottoman Empire ruled over Cyprus, playing a crucial role in the formulation of the Turkish Cypriot identity. During the dawn of the 19th century Greek Cypriots constituted more than 80% of the total population.

From the beginning of the British Administration to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

¹⁴ Without including the Turkish settlers whose case will be briefly depicted below in this section

In 1878 the Ottoman rule over Cyprus came to a substantial (but not official) end. The Sultan Abdul Hamit II, at the culmination of the Great Eastern Crisis and under the fear of an eventual Russian expansion into his territories decided to assign the administration of the island to the British as an exchange for formal guarantees to protect the integrity of the Ottoman borders from any Russian expansionism. According to Article VI of the Annex to the secretly signed Cyprus Convention in the context of the 1878 Berlin Congress, England was supposed to return Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire in case Russians had restored their territorial possessions in the Ottoman Empire. England was exercising *de facto* and the Ottomans *de jure* sovereignty over Cyprus. In 1914 the British annexed the territory justifying their action in the outbreak of the First World War and the Ottomans' decision to align their forces with the opponents of the British during that time, the Central Powers. In 1923 they ratified the *de jure* annexation of Cyprus, through the Lausanne Treaty that was officially terminating the Greek-Turkish war of that time. In 1925 Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown Colony and Greek Cypriots envisaged in this evolution the potential "outlet" for the realization of their aspirations for *enosis*, meaning the self-determination and unification of the island with Greece. In 1931 these aspirations boiled over with a spontaneous rebellion against the British rule, leaving Government House in flames (Anderson 2008). As a response, the British administration suspended the colony's constitution and decreed any agitations related to *enosis* punishable.

The *enosis* challenge to British authority got more intense in the aftermath of World War II. Under the aegis of Michael Mouskos-elected bishop of Kition in 1948 and archbishop Makarios III (since 1950)-the Church in 1949 mobilized mass popular support for *enosis* in a 'plebiscite' that was conducted in churches throughout the island in January 1950. 96% of the participants supported the union with Greece. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot separatism had never assumed any significant form till 1950s, when KATAK¹⁵, the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus, established in 1943, came to embrace partition, *taksim*, as the main goal of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism in contrast to the Greek-Cypriot claim for *enosis*. Greece, under the leadership of Prime Minister Papagos (ex-field marshal), sought unsuccessfully to project the Cyprus question into the agenda of the 9th session of the General Assembly in the UN. Great Britain unveiled its concerns that a potential internationalization of the issue by the Greeks, without first

¹⁵ The initials stand for *Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlık Kurumu*

informing the Turkish government, would flare up the Turkish fears that Greece was making a territorial claim for the island. This gave the British an ally in the UN (Turkey) on the one side and raised the claims for self-determination from the Turkish side on the other. As a result, the Turkish involvement in the Cypriot state of affairs revitalized the above-mentioned Turkish Cypriot nationalistic sentiments for *taksim*.

In 1955 an outbreak of anti-British military activities under the banner of EOKA¹⁶, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, took place urging the search for a self-rule scheme with respect to the administration and sovereignty of the island. Under this pressure, Great Britain initiated a Tripartite Conference in London for the island's political future but no solution was reached. It remained, however, significant since it has marked the beginning of the active participation of Turkey in the Cyprus question (Blay 1981: 80). Gradually the concept of double self-determination (*enosis* for Greece and *taksim* for Turkey) was gaining momentum as an option for the future of the island. Turkey adopted this idea and established partition as the cornerstone of its Cyprus policy for almost five decades. Greece and Turkey, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots became the main actors in the dispute while Britain assumed the role of an arbiter among them. The inter-communal relationship was mainly captured by mutual antagonism and resulted in occasional violent incidents. In November 1959 the Labor party initiated preliminary negotiations between Greece and Turkey aiming to resolve the Cyprus question. The main features of a settlement on this issue and agreed upon by the main actors (Greece, Turkey and Great Britain) rested on three pillars: the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, according to which the island would gain its independence, the Treaty of Guarantee, according to which three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and UK) would defend *la raison d'etre* (excluding *enosis* and *taksim* as future options) and the Treaty of Alliance according to which the parties would take over the obligation to resist any attack or aggression against the independence of the state.

The birth of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1974 developments

With the London Agreement in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus came into existence. Nevertheless, the multiple checks and balances, provisioned in the Treaties, inhibited the functional operation of the constitution. The amendments proposed by the President

¹⁶ The initials stand for Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston

Archbishop Makarios III faced the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot vetoes. This resulted in a constitutional deadlock situation, which led in its turn to the paralysis of the state. These disagreements lit the spark for widespread inter-communal violence, as a result of a quarrel that broke out in December of 1963 between a Greek Cypriot policeman and a Turkish Cypriot citizen that ended to the death of two Turkish Cypriots. British troops intervened, establishing the buffer zone, which is marked by a 'green line' between the opposing groups and then paved the way to the UN peacekeeping mission in 1964.

The political developments in Greece -the establishment of the military junta in 1967 and the inter-communal tensions in November 1967 (with the bombing of villages and forces in both sides)- brought the talks to the breaking point. In May 1968 the dialogue was resumed again and negotiations took place for almost six years but were terminated on 15 July 1974. A coup d'état attempt against Macharios III, supported by the then Greek military dictatorship, was followed by the Turkish invasion which altered the demographic structure of Cyprus and resulted to a massive social dislocation. Turkish forces occupied 37% of the island, including the towns of Famagusta, Kyrenia and Morphou and an important proportion of the agricultural land. Approximately 3,500 people were killed during the coup and invasion. The location of the bodies of almost 2,000 missing people (mostly from the Greek Cypriot side) is still under investigation. 180,000 Greek-Cypriots were obliged to flow to the south, relinquishing their homes and properties, whereas approximately 65,000 Turkish-Cypriots did subsequently move north and took their place (Souter 1984: 660). In the aftermath, Turkey established a presence of 35,000 Turkish occupation troops on the island.

Furthermore, the Turkish authorities, seeking to further alter the demographic status of the island and enhance the Turkish element in the Northern side, were continuously moving settlers from the Turkish mainland to the northern territories of the island¹⁷. The number of the settlers, thus residing in the island, is disputed while a significant number of Turkish Cypriots were emigrating from the island. These policies have been continuously condemned by the international community as violating international human rights' provisions.

¹⁷ This can be confirmed by reports circulated in both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot press

From 1974 until today

In the light of these events, the Security Council immediately reacted and passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire, an immediate termination of the foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all the forces besides those whose presence was authorized by the 'Treaties' provisions. Amid negotiations between the primary stakeholders, a second wave of a Turkish invasion was launched consolidating the Turkish military presence on the island. The Security Council passed several resolutions calling Turkey to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus Republic. The UN established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone between the areas controlled by the opposing forces. The difficulties in reaching a peaceful settlement became greater when on 15.11.1983 the Turkish Cypriot administration in the North unilaterally declared its independence and only gained recognition from the Turkish Republic. The condemnation by the international community was manifested in the Resolution 541 of the UN SC (1983) that clearly stated that the unilateral independence declaration had no legal grounds and should be withdrawn. Since this condemnation has not been echoed by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the island remains divided through a "green-line" between the southern part (Republic of Cyprus) on the one side – being recognized by all members-states of the UN, except for Turkey- and the northern part, ruled by the Turkish Cypriots, whose entity has not been legally recognized by any UN member state, besides Turkey.

Continuous efforts initiated by the international community to bring about a solution were fruitless, mainly attributed to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence to conform their policies to UN SC resolutions. One of the milestones of these efforts was noted in 2004 when the UN came up with the decision to put the Annan Plan¹⁸ to referendum. Nevertheless, 76% of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan while 65% of the Turkish Cypriots side favored the plan. In the aftermath, the negotiations conducted between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leaders Mehmet

¹⁸ The Annan Plan was conveying the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic covering the entire territory of the island with the exception of the British Sovereign Base Areas. It would constitute a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal republic with federal and constitutional laws. A national anthem and a new national flag were also depicted. There would be a single common state that would be formed by two component states-federal units (the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot) which would hold a political equality. Under the plan, some 8% of the land would be returned to the Greek-Cypriots, diminishing the Turkish-Cypriot share from 37% to 29%

Talat (2008-2010) and Eroglu (2010-2012) led to the drafting of common positions or joint declarations but no evident progress was to be noted.

In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration that laid out certain “ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- could be revived. The perspective to cooperate on the exploitation of the natural gas reserves (analyzed below), detected off the southern side of the island was considered by the international community (UN, EU) as a carrot or “window of opportunity” to reach a settlement. However, as shown below, these reserves added extra chill to the Cypriot question.

Conclusions: Policy paradigm as an alternative route to examine security discourses

The aim of this research was to prove how the accessibility pillars, the historical and legal contexts, lend their perennial attributes to the securitization discourses of the leaders. By briefly presenting the energy discourses performed by the leaders and by analytically delineating the pillars upon which energy security is built, the first assumption of this paper is that the historical vocabulary of the Cyprus conflict has not captured the lexicon of the current tensions as it was expected to since the references to history were not as frequent as anticipated. The second assumption was that the leaders did recall provisions of UNCLOS to justify the validity of their securitization discourses.

In order to assert the impact of history on these discourses, a future research should broaden the amount of data. This means that another project could use more statements evidential of portraying the links between history and securitization, as the framing of the current tensions. The statements of the Turkish authorities, which have played an active role in the actual tensions, should be also included, although in rhetorical terms, the “securitization” discourses do not appear that often in the radar.

Besides this, an alternative theory could have been put in place in order to highlight the significance of history in the formulation of these discourses. By theorizing that much of these discourses are conducive to the formation of the leaders’ preferences, we have to cast light upon the driving forces that form them.

There is no doubt that the way in which the political leaders of nation-states view each other, as well as the nature of the conflict, is of fundamental importance in determining the discourses they resort to. According to George (1969), a political actor perceives and simplifies the reality through the prism of his own “cognitive map” of politics. This includes the belief system that has been referred to in the past and is called “operational code”. Following this line, Weir and Skocpol (1985) assert that the ideals, which leaders pursue at any moment in time, are shaped by “policy legacies” or “meaningful reactions to previous policies” and/or crises. Attributed to the lessons they draw from these experiences, they develop a “policy learning process” that deliberately attempts to “adjust the goals or techniques of policy in the light of past experience and new information” (Hall 1990: 7). Hence, they establish a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient them towards a policy sphere. This set works as a tool identifying problems, specifying and prioritizing leaders’ interests and goals (Bleich 2002) and thus, making their discourses comprehensive, convincing and legitimate (Campbell 1998: 381).

Coined by Peter Hall, we are referring to this system as the “policy paradigm”¹⁹. Paradigms constitute broad cognitive constraints on the range of solutions that actors perceive and deem serviceable for solving problems. They generally reside in their cognitive backgrounds as underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about the nature of the conflict. Their effects are profound here in the sense that they define the terrain of the “securitizing discourses” (Hall 1993; Lau et al 1991). For Hall, policy paradigms guide learning processes through which existing policy legacies are evaluated and criticized.

Through the delineation of the contexts mentioned above, we could identify and document these historical and legal lessons that the leaders have pulled up in order to draft their line of argumentation in the light of the recent developments. Via the discourse analysis we conducted, and by broadening the amount of data, we could figure out how the “legacies of history” and “traumas of the past” might have come into the leaders’ phraseology while facing current challenges. We could find out whether and in which manner historical examples, deriving from the past, had been used by the leaders in order to establish their energy security discourses. This could, thus, illustrate the functionality that the historical context displays, as part of the “accessibility” indicator.

¹⁹ From the latin word “paradigma”, which, in its turn from the Greek word “παράδειγμα” that means pattern or model.

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Armed Conflict in Mozambique in 2013: Another Resource Curse?²⁰

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Abstract

In the context of an investment boom in the extractive sector, Mozambique recently experienced another armed conflict. The correlation between natural resources abundance and dependence and violent conflict is widely known as ‘resource curse’. This study examines whether the outbreak of armed conflict in Mozambique is a resource curse. The research finds that natural resources are related to but insufficient to explain the outbreak of armed conflict. The new discovery of natural resources changes both the magnitude and distribution of rents what threatens the existing power distribution between the warring parties, Frelimo and Renamo. The change in power distribution changes the socio-economic and political context, or political settlement, and when these changes give rise to certain conditions, violent conflict emerges. These conditions explain the outbreak of armed conflict in Mozambique.

Key Words:

Armed Conflict, Distribution of Power, Mozambique, Natural Resources, Political Settlement, Rent-Allocation, Rent-Seeking, Resource Curse, Resource Rents

²⁰ I want to thank Prof. Mushtaq Khan for supervising this project.

Introduction

From 2013 to 2014 Mozambique was shaken by a new wave of violence between Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), the party in governance, and Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique), the country's main opposition party. These are the same parties who fought in Mozambique's bloody civil war from 1977 to 1992. The causes of this recent conflict in Mozambique are hitherto unexplored. Referring to general developments in Mozambique, various scholars argue that the unprecedented expansion of the resource sector has unsettled Mozambique's political economy and political stability is undermined by various actors attempting to capture resource rents (Perez-Nino and LeBillon, 2013, Castel- Branco, 2010a; Castel- Branco, 2010b; Castel- Branco, 2011; Castel- Branco, Sulemane et al, 2005; Massarongo and Muigana, 2011).

In fact, the extractive sector has expanded considerable since the mid-2000s: with 22% growth in 2013, the resource sector is the fastest growing sector in the economy (African Economic Outlook, 2014; Worldbank, 2014). Moreover, Renamo, whose attack on a police station in April 2013 initiated further violent clashes between Renamo and government troops, justified their attack by accusing the government to exclude Renamo and the wider population from the country's economic growth and to amass the benefits from the extractive sector for its own profit alone (AFP, 2013; Dzinesa and Wache, 2014).

The timely coincidence of natural resource discoveries and the sector's rapid expansion with incidences of armed conflict is a well-known phenomenon in academia and among international development practitioners, described as the resource curse. The resource curse circumscribes the frequent observation made that natural resource abundance in developing countries is not a blessing that fosters general and economic development, but that turns into a “curse”, causing economic breakdown and civil war. While the exact definitions of the resource curse vary, in this paper it is defined as the correlation between natural resource abundance and dependence and a higher risk of outbreak of civil war (Wenar, 2008).

This paper seeks to understand the causes of the outbreak of armed conflict in

Mozambique, and asks “Is the recent outbreak of armed conflict in Mozambique in 2012 a resource curse?” It is argued that natural resource rents are indeed related to the outbreak of armed conflict but that they are by themselves an insufficient explanation. Rather, the new discovery of natural resources changed the magnitude and distribution of rents and thereby the political settlement, i.e. the distribution of power between Renamo and Frelimo. As this changed general socio-economic and political conditions, violence became a realistic but also the only option for Renamo to achieve what they consider their fair share of rents. Thus, the research contributes to theory development in the resource-curse literature: to understand the causes leading to armed conflict in the context of natural resource abundance/dependence, it is necessary to analyse how resource rents change the underlying power structure in society.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews literature on the natural resources-conflict correlation. Section III shows that orthodox theories explaining the natural resource curse are insufficient, as they neglect the socio-economic and political context within which natural resource abundance or dependence become a "curse". It introduces a framework to analyse under which conditions violence results in a natural resource context. Section IV describes the hypotheses to be tested and explains the methodology and data used; section V tests the hypotheses. Section VI discusses the results and section VII concludes.

Literature review

Empirical studies found evidence that natural resource-rich²¹ and resource-dependent countries²² are more likely to experience outbreaks of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998;

²¹ The correlation between natural resources and conflict is statistically significant for gemstones, timber, narcotics and minerals but not for agricultural products (Ross, 2004; 2006).

²² Resource abundance and dependence are two distinct phenomena: Resource abundance regards the absolute amount of resource rents available in per capita terms, irrespective of other sources of income. In contrast, resource dependence means that resources rents are the most important income source compared to other value-adding activities (de Soysa, 2000; de Soysa 2002; Ross, 2006). It implies a "mineral economy", where mineral production constitutes at least 10% of GDP and mineral exports least 40% of total exports, according to a Worldbank-definition (Nankani, 1979).

2002; de Soysa, 2002; Ross, 2004; 2006)²³. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2002) examined 52 civil wars from 1960 to 1999 and discovered an inverted U-shaped relationship where the likelihood of conflict increases until the resource exports-to-GDP ratio is 32%, where the risk of rebellion is highest. They also found a statistically significant correlation of 18.9% and 30.5% between primary commodity exports, and the likelihood of civil war initiation and separatist wars, respectively. Mineral and especially oil abundance and dependence play a distinct role in this correlation. De Soysa (2002) finds a statistically significant correlation between mineral wealth and the risk of conflict: a standard deviation increase in the logged value of the squared per capita mineral wealth increases the risk of conflict by 78%. Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that where countries derive at least one-third of export revenues from fossil fuels, the likelihood of civil war outbreak more than doubles. Ross (2006) found that a country with no fuel rents had a conflict risk of 0.92%, whereas a country with fuel rents had a risk of 0.995% to 1.85%, for oil rents per capita ranging from 100US\$ to 1000US\$, after subtracting extraction costs.

Economic-based theories vary in explaining this correlation. The grievance theory argues that resource-rich countries are often characterized by poor economic policies and consequentially suffer from slow growth and poverty. Resulting economic inequalities cause grievances among some parts of the population, what eventually results in rebellion to remove the government responsible for these poor policies (de Soysa, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2001). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) challenge the grievance-causing theory. They argue that since primary export dependence and not economic inequality is statistically significant for civil war outbreak, the resource- conflict relation is explained through greed.

Two versions of the greed-theory exist, loot-seeking and state-capturing wars. In loot-seeking wars, so-called "point" resources (i.e. diamonds or timber), which are easy to loot, provide a motive for rebellion, as rebel groups form to loot these resources and profit through selling them as contraband. State-capturing wars are more relevant to capital-intensive resources, such as offshore gas reserves, which are difficult to loot. Here, tax income from commodity exports increase the state revenues and henceforth make state

²³ Literature is not always clear on the distinction between resource abundance and dependence. Often, resource abundance is measured in terms of dependence and both are used as synonymous (Basedau, 2005; Basedau and Lay, 2009; Ross, 2006).

capture and control more valuable, inspiring revolts (Basedau, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Faeron and Laitin, 2001).

Political perspectives explain the natural resource curse through different versions of the rentier-state theory. According to Mahdavy (1970), rentier-states are countries whose public revenues accrue mainly from natural resource rents instead of taxation. As the state earns income mostly from natural resource rents, the government is independent of distributional demands of interests groups in society and henceforth establishes no bargaining relationship with them²⁴ (Karl and Reno, 1997; Moore, 1998). In this setup, conflict arises for various reasons, depending on the respective theoretical assumptions. For instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue as there is no democratic accountability on how resources are allocated, governments become predatory, with short time horizons, and extract resources from the population for elite plundering and political redistribution, instead of investing into long-term growth. Other versions build on neo-classical theory and implicitly assume that as rents are higher in resource-abundant countries, the level of rent-seeking is also higher, leading to more waste and inefficiencies. As resources are no longer allocated to investment and growth²⁵, the economy remains stagnant at low income levels and grievances and opposition to the government mount, rendering the country prone to conflict (Chaudhry, 1994; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Karl, 1997; More, 1998; Weinstein, 2005).

Introducing the framework of analysis

While literature on the resource curse suffers from several weaknesses, the most profound one is that the above presented theories falsely presume that greed, grievances or rent-seeking ultimately lead to the outbreak of violence. The theories fail to explain under which socio-economic and political circumstances grievances, greed or rent-seeking result into

²⁴ Here, the distinction between resource abundance and dependence is especially important. Resource abundance might not necessarily create conditions in which conflict breeds, as other viable economic alternatives exist, and the government receives tax income from other, not only natural resource, income streams. The case of resource dependence is different, as it implies a monolithic economic structure that reduces alternatives to earn income. This incites grievances and clientelist networks what makes conflict likelier (Basedau, 2005; Bausedau and Lay, 2009).

²⁵ The exact reasons for waste and inefficiencies vary: Murphy et al. (1993) for example argue that resources are wasted in the attempt to influence public authorities, as economic opportunities no longer arise over market competition but over political relationships. Krueger (1974) argues that resources are no longer allocated to the most efficient user but to the most corrupt agent, i.e. who pays the highest bribes.

violence (Basedau, 2005; Di John, 2002). The rentier-state theory, for example, does not specify under which socio-economic and political conditions reductions in investment, low growth and conflict result. There is a distinction between costs of rent-seeking and their outcomes, which depend on the socio-economic and political conditions under which rents are allocated. Rent-seeking under strong patrimonial states for instance lead to significant economic growth rates and developmental outcomes (Khan, 2000b).

The rentier-state theory also ignores how rulers maintain power. In the process of building a durable coalition, state leaders in mineral rich economies may prevent violent conflict by buying-off the opposition (Basedau and Lay, 2009; Di John, 2007; Wantchekon, 2002). Yet, the theory does not explain under which circumstances political violence results instead of the above-described process of building political stability. Furthermore, it comprises no analysis of when predatory behavior dominates developmental behavior in a mineral rich economy (Di John, 2002). Olson (1993) shows that "stationary-bandits", i.e. rulers, who have a long-term horizon to be in power, have an incentive to invest in growth as this maximizes the state's and hence the ruler's revenues in the long-run.

Di John (2007) criticizes the greed-theory from a rent-seeking perspective, arguing that it falsely assumes that non-violent forms of rent-seeking are ineffective in mineral rich economies and that rent-seeking is ultimately violent. In the context of natural resources, rents are income earned from their exclusive ownership (Khan, 2000a). Since rents award higher-than-normal income, they also create the incentive to change, create, maintain or defend the rights and institutions they are based on (Khan, 2000b). According to Khan (2000b), rent-seeking is an input-output process, where the input of rent-seeking is the expenditure of resources and effort in creating, maintaining and changing the rights and institutions particular rents are based on. Activities include *influencing* the state to be granted rents, *capturing* the state to be able to directly create and allocate rents, or activities to *control* the state to create and protect rents. These activities can be legal or illegal, formal or informal, and range from political lobbying, bribing to engaging in armed conflict²⁶ (Khan, 2000b). Thus, a priori, greedy rebels dispose over a wide range of rent-seeking activities;

²⁶ While neo-classical theories argue that since the availability of rents causes rent-seeking and corruption, rents need to be abolished through competitive markets, heterodox theories argue that rents are always present, even in competitive markets (Mauro, 1995; 2004; Khan, 2000a).

yet the greed theory does not specify why rebels would opt for violent instead of non-violent forms of rent-seeking. The same critique can be extended to the other presented theories: they do not explain why grieving rebels or oppositions in rentier-states would not employ non-violent forms of rent-seeking.

Based on the discussion on rent-seeking, the natural resource curse can then be conceptualized as the result of different groups competing for natural resource rents and for this purpose, engaging in violent forms of rent-seeking. From this discussion it becomes clear that the socio-economic and political context is important to define which strategies, or choices over types of rent-seeking activities, rebels employ. A convincing analytical framework must address the socio-economic and political conditions under which groups competing for natural resource rents employ violent instead of non-violent rent-seeking. Conceptualizing natural-resource conflicts as chicken games based on Knight (1992) and placing them into Khan's political settlement analysis (2010) provides such a framework. The political settlement analyses the distribution of power across organizations within a certain socio-economic and political context. The political settlement is the distribution of *holding-power* across political, economic and bureaucratic organizations that is *reproducible over time*. It is the result of a historical process during which organizations created and modified institutions to derive a reproducible power structure. Olson (2009) argues that the organizational capabilities of successfully coordinating collective action and raising resources from members are the basis of holding-power. Khan (2010) adds that success in mobilizing based on ideologies and the broader organizational configuration of society, which also affects the success of a particular organization in coordinating collective action, to Olson's definition.

In developing countries, activities based on formal property rights are often not productive enough to generate the necessary income to fully protect and sustain formal institutions. Therefore, income based on formal institutions is often a less important basis form holding-power in developing countries (Khan, 2010). Rather, informal income-distributions based on patron-client networks are much more important, where patron-client networks are defined as "repeated relationships of exchange between specific patrons and their clients" (Khan and Jomo, 2000, p.10). Patron and clients are usually distinguished by status and power (Khan and Jomo, 2000). Formal institutions are therefore informally

adjusted to bring them closer to the actual power distribution across organizations. In this context, organizations that have historically given power to organize groups along particular tribal, ethnic, caste or other ideology-based lines can be much more successful in organizing collective action in developing countries (Khan, 2010).

Holding- power defines how long organizations can hold out in distributive conflicts over rents with other organizations and defines the strategies different organizations use. The overall distribution of holding-power defines how rents are allocated through rent-seeking. The overall societal outcome of the rent-seeking process depends on the net-effects of this input-output process, where the rent-seeking cost is the input cost, and the outcomes associated with the rent-allocation are the outcomes or 'outputs' of the process (Khan, 2000b). As the rent-allocation implies particular economic and political outcomes, it can help to explain whether the country experiences political stability or instability. If the relative distribution of holding-power across organizations is such, for example, that organizations are able to consistently challenge each other and the current rent-allocation, then this political settlement implies considerable social conflicts and political instability. Hence, the political settlement should not be interpreted as a necessarily stable pattern of social interaction, as it can even be an 'equilibrium' that entails patterns of repeated instability.

When new rents emerge through the new discovery of natural resources, competition to define the rights over these rents and determine their allocation might intensify, as they have not yet been incorporated into the current pattern of rent-allocation. This can lead to the outbreak of violence when following conditions are satisfied. To exemplify these conditions, distributive conflicts over the allocation of newly discovered resource rents are framed as a chicken game based on Knight (1992). In the context of natural resources, they are zero-sum games, where property rights over resources are exclusive and the gain of one group equals the loss of the other²⁷. A priori, distributive conflicts, or chicken games, are never-ending conflicts. As one group's dominant strategy implies its gain in the

²⁷ This assumption is based on the rational that the direct benefits of the newly discovered resource rents go into the pocket of that group that succeeds in enforcing exclusive property rights over the natural resources. This way that group receives all direct benefits from these resource rents and control how the rents are further allocated. Indirect benefits accruing from re-inducement of these rents into the overall economic cycle when the rents are further spent are hence excluded from this analysis.

distributional outcome and a loss for the other group, it induces the losing group to change its strategy to enforce its own dominant strategy and secure distributional gains, and so on. The conflict continues until one group can enforce its dominant strategy on the other group and set the distributive outcome in its favour.

This, in turn, depends on the relative distribution of holding-power, as it defines how long a particular organization can hold-out in the rent-seeking conflict with other organizations or the state (Knight, 1992). Usually, the final rent-allocation of the distributive conflict would then correspond with this distribution of holding-power, such that powerful groups receive more rents and less powerful groups receive less or no rents. Yet, the strategy a group chooses to employ also depends on the opposing groups' *perceptions* of the relative distribution of holding-power. It is this perception that defines whether a group believes that violent or lengthy forms of rent-seeking will be successful or whether it believes that the other group's holding-power is larger than its own and hence agrees to accept a less-favourable distributive outcome. For violence then to arise in distributive conflicts, violent forms of rent-seeking must be perceived as a successful strategy to change the distribution of rents. This is the case when the opposing group's share of holding-power is perceived to be too weak to withstand violence and/or if the aggressing group perceives its own share as strong enough to exercise violence and if the aggressing group is able and willing to absorb the cost and pain of violence long enough until it sets the distributive conflict in its favour.

The discussion illustrates two conditions necessary for distributive conflicts over newly discovered natural-resource-rents to result in violence: i) there is a zero-sum distributive conflict between two (or more) significantly powerful organized groups that have holding-power to mobilize wider support in conditions of conflict; ii) both sides believe they can win or the one side believes it can hold out long enough in a conflict to mobilize its potential supporters sufficiently to change the balance of power. These conditions alone are, however, insufficient for violence to arise; further conditions are: iii) there must be some event that is perceived as unjust and/or can be presented as such and that serves as a trigger for violence to breakout; and vi) violence is the only effective way or a much more effective way compared to alternatives in changing the terms of rent-allocation. The last condition implies two sub-conditions: iv) non-violent forms of rent-seeking have been

tried and have failed for one or both groups in achieving what they perceive as their just share of rents; v) violence is perceived as an effective way of changing the terms of rent-allocation.

The new discovery of natural resources can function as such a trigger, when it produces a new rent-allocation that changes the operational equilibrium based on the current power distribution. If these rents are disproportionately captured by a group and if that is perceived as illegitimate by another group or the broader population, or if the group is not yet powerful enough to defend the property rights over the natural resource rents captured, in proportion to the rents it has captured, the perceived injustices or weakness of that group can motivate other groups to challenge the beneficiaries of rents. It is important to emphasize here, that the existence of a trigger does not ultimately lead to violence. Rather, violence is only likely to break out if this trigger emerges in a context in which non-violent forms of rent-seeking have been tried and failed or are perceived as ineffective for groups to achieve what they perceive as their fair share of rents. For instance, violent rent-seeking can be thought as the only effective strategy vis-a-vis an otherwise superior opponent, whose legitimacy would, however, be severely affected if it engaged in violence (Wantchekon, 2002). Whether this occurs or not is determined by the general socio-economic and political context, or, as it is defined here, by the political settlement.

To give the example of a political settlement of a strong patrimonial state, where both, the lower-level opposition within the ruling coalition and the opposition outside the ruling coalition are weak, the country is usually politically stable, and *ceteris paribus*, violence is unlikely. When resource rents change the current rent-allocation, however, the previously weak opposition groups outside the coalition might perceive this as injustice to a sufficient extent to mobilize their supporters ideologically in more aggressive ways. Lower-level individuals within the ruling coalition may feel that they have a bigger claim to rents that they can pursue by forming alliances with some of the groups that are excluded. If the leadership of the ruling coalition suppresses non-violent forms of rent-seeking to the extent that the excluded believe that non-violent rent-seeking will be ineffective in changing the allocation of rents sufficiently, the newly empowered opposition might gradually resort to violence to influence the state or to capture it (Khan, 2010).

Conceptualization, hypotheses, methodology and data

The conflict in Mozambique shows the characteristics of a natural resource curse. Mozambique is resource abundant and, to an extent, resource dependent. Its mineral deposits are vast, as current estimates of recently discovered offshore natural gas reserves project Mozambique fourth in the ranking of global natural gas reserves. Coal reserves are similarly impressive with total estimates amounting to 25 billion tons and the Moatize basin in Tete holding one of the world's largest known coal deposits (Abrahamson et al., 2013; UNICEF, 2013). Mineral production contributed more than 20% to GDP from 2003 to 2008 and 19.4% from 2009 to 2012 (UNCTAD Dataset, 2014). The main driver of GDP growth has been foreign direct investment (FDI) in mega-projects in the resource sector since the mid-2000s (African Economic Outlook, 2014). Yet, mineral exports do not reach 40% of exports nor does the resource sector considerably contribute to public revenue due to substantial tax exemptions. Yet, with the introduction of the new tax code and several coal mines soon becoming operational, these figures are expected to increase (UNCTAD, 2012; UNICEF, 2013). As battle-related deaths were more than 25 in 2013, the conflict can be defined as armed conflict (UCDP, 2014a;b).

Based on the above derived theoretical framework, following hypotheses are tested:

- a) The new discovery of natural resource rents increased the total amount of rents in the country.*
- b) Natural resource rents are almost exclusively allocated to Frelimo members.*
- c) The incorporation of natural resource rents changed the power distribution between Frelimo and Renamo.*

George and Bennett (2005) define a case study as “an instance of a class of events” (p.17), where a class of events is chosen to be studied with the aim of developing a theory or generic knowledge regarding. A case study is hence a well-defined historical episode and not a single historical event. They were also the first to outline process-tracing in a systematical manner. According to George and Bennett (2005), process-tracing attempts to establish which combination of events XYZ had a causal effect on outcome W, while drawing data from different sources (documents, archives, interviews). The hypotheses are tested by looking at the facts and sequence of events and evaluating them against the theoretical claims, debating their explanatory power in comparison to viable, alternative theories, thereby assessing the (in)validity of the proposed theory. The timeframe examined in this case study begins with the Peace Agreement in 1992 that solved the civil war (1977-

1992) and ends with the outbreak of the recent armed conflict. The outbreak of armed conflict is defined by the first incidence of using armed force when RENAMO attacked the police station in April 2013. The data examined are historical accounts on the peace-building process after the end of the civil war, archives and data from national government and non-governmental agencies and data from international organizations.

Critics of case-study-methods point out that process-tracing is an invalid scientific method because the variance of the independent variables cannot be controlled. Therefore, it cannot be determined if the resulting variance in the dependent variable is because of variances in the independent variables and causal relationships can be established (King et al., 1994). George and Bennett (2005) counter that statistical methods are evenly incapable of establishing causal relationships, as correlation is not causation. Moreover, the epistemological logic of interference is the same: deriving testable implications from the theory, testing these implications against the data and based on that, rejecting/accepting/modifying the theories in accordance with the results.

King et al. (1994) further outline that because of the single-observation research design of case studies, it is impossible to know how representative the case is for the broader population, and generalizations would lead to incorrect inferences. George and Bennett (2005) highlight that the aim of case studies is not to generalize but to be specific and nuanced about the causal mechanisms suggested by theories that were established through large-n studies and find refinements to their general-held explanations. In this regard, large-n studies risk “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970) through oversimplification, losing specificity and neglecting differences within the sample or special cases (outliers, deviant cases). Thus, it is a choice with a trade-off between greater explanatory richness within one case versus less explanatory power across other cases.

Overall, the choice of which scientific method to choose depends on the researcher’s aim. George and Bennett (2005) argue that if the aim is to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms within the context of an individual case, to allow for causal complexities such as equifinality or if variables are otherwise difficult to quantify, case-study-methods are more advantageous than other scientific approaches. Yet, if the aim is to identify the average causal effect, i.e. how much do the respective independent variables

contribute to the variance in the dependent variable, then statistical methods but not case studies are the scientific method to choose. A cautionary note must be added to when using data such as documents or archives in the process-tracing method. Data such as documents or archives might show only an incomplete course of events or might even be misleading. Especially official archives might have been deleted or certain events were not documented in the first place if it regards sensitive issues or if the respective event was judged as too insignificant to be documented. Therefore, it is indispensable to check across different sources to ensure that data are complete and correct (Tansey, 2007).

Testing the hypotheses

Have the new discovery of natural resource rents increased rents in Mozambique?

Natural mineral deposits have been discovered in the 1960s but commercial exploitation only started in the mid-2000s. In cooperation with Mozambique's energy company ENH, the South African company SASOL exploits the onshore gas resorts in Inhambane province (est. 3.5 tcf) since 2004. The game-changing natural gas deposit offshore the Rovuma Basin (est. 250+ tcf) is being commercially explored since 2011-2012. The US oil-and-gas company Anadarko, India's Videocon Industries Limited and Italy's energy conglomerate ENI are the main investors in these gas fields. Sales of exploration licenses have also attracted China National Petroleum Corporation and interest has been expressed by Petronas, Vitol Group, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell plc and BP plc. Vale, a Brazilian mining company, and Rio Tinto, a British-Australian company, have mostly invested in the coal sector, and the Moatize basin (est. 25 billion tons) has further attracted over 30 other international mining companies. SASOL also possesses exploration licenses for offshore gas reserves in the Mozambique Basin (Abrahamson, et al., 2013; UNICEF, 2013). Correspondingly, foreign direct investment (FDI) has significantly increased since 2005 (figure 1). Illustrating FDI inflows per sector from 2001-2009, figure 2 shows that with 43%, or \$1416 million, the extractive sector received the biggest share of total FDI. Figure 1 also shows that most FDI was directed towards mega-projects in the resource sector.

Supposedly the investment boom in the natural resource sector has increased the availability of rents through business opportunities around the extractive industry, acquiring ownership shares of the investing companies or obtaining exploration licenses.

Yet, when looking at the formal economy, it is unclear to what extent this increased the availability of formal rents. Figure 3 shows low levels of oil, mineral and gas rents, partly explained through high initial investment costs. Figure 4 shows companies' payments made to Mozambique's government and the value received as stated by the government. Stated payments include all benefits the government receives from the respective company (profit taxes, royalties, dividends, licenses, concessions, payments in-kind and other significant payments made to the government) (ETTI, 2008).

However, the share of government revenues from natural resources of total government income is low (figure 5). The small contribution of natural resource revenues in total government revenues can be explained by the unfavourable contract terms of gas contracts. The contracts follow the Production Sharing Agreement model where in the first 5-10 years of exploitation, companies retain the larger portion of gas to compensate their high initial investment costs during the exploration period with the sale proceeds.




Figure 1: FDI inflows to Mozambique and share of mega-projects from 1990 to 2010 in Million Dollars (source: UNCTAD, 2012)




Figure 2: FDI inflow by sector in % from 2001 to 2009 (source: UNCTAD, 2012)




Figure 3: Natural resource rents as a share of GDP. Rents are calculated as the commodity price unit minus the average unit production cost, multiplied by the production volume (source: World Bank World Development Indicator, 2015)




Figure 4: Company payments and government receipts in extractive sector from 2008 to 2012 (source: data compiled from EITI reports)




Figure 5: Share of natural resource revenues in total revenues excluding grants in % (source: data compiled from EITI reports and World Bank World Development Indicator)

Secondly, most gas contracts, including those regarding the Rovuma Basin, were negotiated before 2007 where major tax exemptions on corporate income were granted to attract foreign investment through tax incentives. Revisions of the laws governing the natural resource sector that are to improve the contract terms for the government are still pending in the parliament (UNICEF, 2013). Moreover, the extractive sector is an enclave with few linkages to other economic sectors and presents few economic opportunities to the country. The country's formal employment structure is weak: only 500,000 people out of a total labour force of approximately 10 million are employed in the formal sector, indicating a large informal economic sector (Abrahamson, et al., 2013). Based on this evidence it seems that formal rents have not increased substantially because of the resource boom.

Informal natural resource rents are almost exclusively captured by Frelimo party members

There are indications, however, that informal rents have substantially increased and that individuals associated with the party in governance, Frelimo, have almost exclusively benefited from those. The National Petroleum Institute (NPI) is in charge of granting hydrocarbon licenses through public tender, simultaneous negotiations or direct negotiations, yet it is frequently criticized that contracts are negotiated on a case-to-case basis behind closed doors without public consultations (Revenue Watch Institute, 2013; UNICEF, 2013). While the General Tax Directorate of the Finance Ministry collects royalties and taxes from extraction companies, the NPI collects the company payments designated for social and capacity-building funds. These payments are not listed in the treasury and information on their management is not publicly available (Revenue Watch Institute, 2013). Details on natural resource contracts are not publicly available and the state insists on keeping the contract specificities secret (CIP, 2013a; CIP, 2014; UNICEF, 2013; Revenue Watch Institute, 2013). Against this background it is very difficult to assess the precise contribution of natural resource rents to overall rents available in Mozambique's economy and it provides ample opportunities for informal rent-seeking activities.

There is evidence that Frelimo members have almost exclusively benefited from the natural resource boom by using their position as a state official or their network constructed while holding political office. A number of national holding companies were created that hold

exploration licenses or ownership shares of international extraction companies. Other companies furnish the natural resource industry with the services needed, such as construction, infrastructure, security and housing. The companies are headed by former bureaucrats or politicians, who are all Frelimo party members. A striking example provides the ENH state company itself, where the current director Paulino Gregório, the former director Victor Julien and the current head of the legal department, Iolanda Matsinhe, set up the company Investments and Hydrocarbons Ltd, whose objective is to acquire and manage holdings in the hydrocarbon area (CIP, 2012a;b;c; CIP, 2013b).

Another illustrative example provides President Guebuza who set-up a number of investment and holding companies with business associates and family members (figure 6). Evidently, state officials use their position to control developments in the extractive sector. They act as gatekeepers in joint ventures with foreign investors to facilitate the acquisition of licenses, induce MNCs to hire politically connected contractor firms in engineering, equipment supply or procurement and influence relevant public policies and law-making (Besseling, 2013; Castel-Branco, 2010a; Levy, 2013). Evidently, Frelimo members use their position in state and politics to capture resource rents.

The incorporation of the new resource rents changed the power distribution between Frelimo and Renamo and made violent rent-seeking a viable strategy

Mozambique's political settlement before the resource boom originates in the peace-building process and subsequent socio-economic and political developments following the Peace Agreement that ended the civil war in 1992. Since the first general elections in 1994, electoral support for Frelimo has been high, and Frelimo continuously receives the majority in parliament and provides the President. Since the government is composed of Frelimo members, Frelimo's Political Committee, the party's political-advisory organ, can exercise direct influence on the government and policy-making. Moreover, party membership is

Figure 6: Business connections of Guebuza, family members and close business and political associates and their links to the extractive sector (sources: data compiled from AllAfrica, 08.05.2012; AllAfrica, 22.08.2013; AllAfrica, 15.10.2013; Besseling, 2013; Mail and Guardian, 06.01.2012; Frelimo, 2012a; Frelimo, 2012b; World Finance, 04.03.2024; <http://www.igepe.org.mz>; <http://www.insitec.co.mz/>)

Armando Guebuza <i>President of Mozambique</i>	• Stakes in Intelec Holdings, in gas joint venture with SASOL, Trans African Connection (road) and Cornelder (Beira and Quelimane Port operator) • Holds seven mineral exploring licenses in Rovuma Basin through Intelec Holdings and TATA Moz; licenses were assigned when Guebuza became President
Celso Correia <i>Chairman of Insitec Holdings and Banco Comercial e de Investimentos</i> <i>Member of the Central Committee of FRELIMO</i>	• Guebuza's close business and political associate • Partner for joint ventures with Brazil • Insitec and Celso Correia have 40% stakes in Mphanda Kkuwa hydroelectric dam • Currently lobbying to construct a Liquefied Natural Gas plant
António Sumbana <i>Minister in the Presidency</i>	• Guebuza's right-man in politics • Owns Mbatine Investimentos Ltd, which co-owns Idopetro SA (oil and gas sector management)
Salimo Amad Abdula <i>Chairman of Intelec Holdings</i>	• Guebuza's key ally: Intelec is chief-service provider to Electricidade de Moçambique • Involved in joint ventures of energy transformation for gas and oil
Mussumbuluko Guebuza <i>Board member of Intelec Holdings</i>	• Son of Guebuza • Has stakes in gas sector, together with his sister Valentina Guebuza
General Tobias Dai <i>Former Defence Minister</i> <i>Member of the Central Committee of FRELIMO</i>	• Guebuza's brother-in-law • Has shares in Intelec • Part of deal with ENRC, Eurasia Natural Resources, to obtain coal exploitation license
Valentina Guebuza <i>Daughter of Armando Guebuza</i>	• Amongst others stakes in logistics, trade, mining • Created the mining company Dai Servicon Limited together with Tobias Dai and Mussumbuluko Guebuza • Co-Director of import-export company Mozambique Investment and Development Limited
Nuno Oliveira <i>Head of Petromoc, state-owned oil company FRELIMO member</i>	• Petromoc is involved in the joint venture pipeline with South African firms
Apolinário Panguana <i>Chairman of Igepe</i> <i>President of Council of Ministers</i> <i>Member of Political Committee of FRELIMO</i>	• Close political associate of Guebuza • Igepe has shares in transport and mining sectors • In 2013, investments in gas transformation plant • Shares in Petromoc, state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Moçambique

wide-spread within the population. This way, Frelimo was able to fill ministry and other important public positions within the civil service, police and military with Frelimo members. Essentially, Frelimo captured state institutions and has almost exclusive control over the policy-making and legislative process, using public- policy to consolidate its power (Besseling, 2013; Castel-Branco, 2010a; Funada-Classens, 2012; Levy, 2013; Pitcher, 2001).

For example, Frelimo used the privatization process to enhance the party's influence in the private sector. In the 1990s, Mozambique privatized about 1100 companies, 90% of which were sold to nationals (Pitcher, 2001). Former Frelimo combatants and government officials, Frelimo party supporters, former managers of state companies and military officers obtained ownership and/or management positions in the privatized firms. Most of the total pledged national private investment (about \$328million) was allocated in Maputo, which is Frelimo's stronghold until today. Investment comprised all main economic sectors, ranging from agriculture, industry, trade to service (banking). Frelimo ensured that companies that were not privatized are headed by Frelimo members; they are used to invest into private companies and the banking sector. Thus, a new class of capitalists emerged from the privatization process with strong links to Frelimo and who dominates economic processes in the country until today (Castel-Branco et al., 2001; Pitcher, 2001). These developments resulted in Frelimo providing the only pathway for social mobility: Loyal and worthy party members ascend the ladder of hierarchy within the government and the party, with corresponding increases in salary and business opportunities to acquire wealth (Sumich, 2010).

In contrast, Renamo lost electoral support over time (figure 7) and was unable to fill public positions with Renamo members to use those for their economic and political benefit (Castel-Branco, 2010a; Funada-Classen, 2012). Its domain of influence remained in the regions it also controlled during the civil war: the North and center (Levy, 2013). These regions are characterized by unproductive economic activities, such as subsistence farming in mostly rural communities and were hence unable to provide Renamo with (in)formal income sources (Funada-Classen, 2012). Renamo's income came mostly from donors who provided funding to support Renamo's transformation into a political party; yet, this support also declined over time (Manning and Malbrough, 2010).

Thus, already before the natural resource investment boom, the distribution of holding-power was already favourable to Frelimo and disfavourable to Renamo. Clearly, Frelimo has captured state institutions and uses its organizational capacity to mobilize substantial resources and people. Being the party in governance it has access to the public revenues. Frelimo further uses the state to allocate rents based on the patron-client network it has established, where the party members in leadership represent the patron and loyal party

members the clients. Latter benefit from public policies and ascend the hierarchical ladder of the state and in the private sector. Being the historic leader of Mozambique's independence fight has guaranteed Frelimo's electoral support. Renamo's holding-power is more grounded on ideology than organizational capacities or economic resources. Based on the electoral support especially from voters in the rural regions it dominated during the civil war, Renamo wins parliamentary seats, yet, electoral support has declined since the first general elections (figure 7). The regions under Renamo's influence are characterized by unproductive economic activities, unable to furnish Renamo with (in)formal income sources and Renamo has no bargaining-power in political decision-making. Mozambique's political settlement is constituted of a strong patrimonial state, where the excluded coalition is weak and lower hierarchy levels of the included coalition re-enforce the power structure of the party within the state. The private sector depends on the state, and therefore Frelimo, as a business partner.

However, recent developments related to the natural resource sector have changed the distribution of holding-power between Frelimo and Renamo. Although Frelimo has amassed all benefits and further consolidated its state and economic power, it lost support in the wider population. Opposition to the government has been mounting throughout the country over the past few years. Demonstrations in Maputo discredited President Guebuza and Frelimo members as corrupt and the government's policies as prejudicing the country's general social and economic development (Hanlon, 2009; 2010). Indeed, economic growth based on the natural resource boom has not translated into the country's employment structure as shown earlier. Poverty prevails with a rate of 54.7% and a life expectancy of 48 years is below the sub-Saharan average of 52 years (Abrahamson et al., 2013; African Economic Outlook, 2014). At the same time, internal opposition of Frelimo's leading cadre towards the current government has been increasing as party leaders are aware of the risk of losing legitimacy and electoral support within the population (Besseling, 2013; Perez-Nino and LeBillon, 2013). Thus despite Frelimo's continuous control over economic processes, state institutions and policy-making, it has lost its hold within the population. Party-internal opposition to the leadership and the population's opposition increased, making Mozambique to a weak patrimonial state.

October 1994				December 1999		December 2004		October 2009		
Province	Frelimo	Renamo	U.D.	Frelimo	Renamo	Frelimo	Renamo	Frelimo	Renamo	MDM
Niassa	7	4	/	6	7	9	3	12	2	/
Cabo Delgado	15	6	1	16	6	18	4	19	3	/
Nampula	20	32	2	24	26	27	23	32	13	/
Zambezia	18	29	2	15	34	19	29	26	19	/
Tete	5	9	1	8	10	14	4	18	2	/
Manica	4	9	/	5	10	7	7	12	4	/
Sofala	3	18	/	4	17	6	16	10	5	5
Inhambane	13	3	2	13	4	15	1	15	1	/
Gaza	15	/	1	16	/	17	/	16	/	/
Maputo City	17	1	/	14	2	14	2	15	1	/
Maputo	12	1	/	12	1	12	1	14	1	3
Total Seats	129	112	9	133	117	158	90	189	51	8

Figure 7: Results of general elections per party and per province from 1994 to 2009 (source: Funada-Classsen, 2012)

Discussion: Does the change in the distribution of holding-power between Frelimo and Renamo explain the outbreak of armed conflict?

This section discusses to what extent the conditions outlined in section III are satisfied and argues that the incorporation of newly discovered natural resource rents changed the power distribution between Renamo and Frelimo in such a way that violent rent-seeking strategies became the only alternative as well as a strategy with a prospect of success. The allocation of newly discovered resource rents increased Frelimo's holding-power in the state and economic sector to such an extent that violent forms of rent-seeking become the only strategy for Renamo to effectively alter rent-allocation. At the same time, the population's mounting opposition to Frelimo's government and the party itself also weakened the party's hold within the population and ability to mobilize population support. This made Renamo perceive violent rent-seeking as a strategy with prospect of success.

To begin with, the conflict over the distribution of resource rents and control over state institutions between Frelimo and Renamo is indeed a zero-sum distributive conflict. Property rights over natural-resource-exploitation are exclusive and the history of civil war has framed Frelimo and Renamo as two opposing, mutually exclusive groups. The patron-client network around Frelimo ensures that benefits from resource rents are exclusively

allocated to Frelimo members. The zero-sum nature of the conflict disabled the President to buy-off Renamo's opposition. Second, Frelimo has significant hold on the population and can mobilize wider support in conditions of conflict. Frelimo's wide support amongst the population is assured through its historical role as independence fighter. The party mobilizes people through the state's organizational capacity and the exclusionary and coercive channels of social mobility and space-of-negotiation it has created (Sumich, 2010). Renamo's organizational capacities to mobilize people are much more limited than Frelimo's due to their marginalized position in politics and economics (Perez-Nina and LeBillon, 2013). Moreover, Renamo's hold on population is threatened as the electorate growingly discredits Renamo as a credible alternative to Frelimo illustrated by recent election results (Funanda-Classsen, 2012).

Frelimo's superior organizational capacity should affect Renamo's choice of strategies, ranking violent strategies as less effective (Khan, 2010). Where state and insider clients are perceived as powerful enough to resist rent-seeking challenges, rent-seeking expenditure is low. In this regard, violent rent-seeking implying substantial expenditures should not emerge, given that Frelimo is strongly entrenched in state institutions (Khan, 2000b). Similarly, Knight (1992) would argue that because of Frelimo's economic superiority, its intentions to fight Renamo are more credible: if it came to a full-fledged conflict, having more financial means to acquire military equipment, Frelimo could easily wipe out Renamo. In this regard, Renamo should not consider violence a strategic option as the risk of losing is too big.

However, when including recent changes in the distribution of holding-power stemming from the population's and party-internal mounting dissatisfaction with Frelimo and its leadership, it becomes clear why violent rent-seeking is thought to be effective. The population discrediting the government as corrupt and its economic policies as unjust and internal opposition within the Frelimo's leading cadre growing gives Renamo the opportunity to position itself as an alternative to Frelimo (Hanlon, 2009; 2010). They can capitalize on the population's dissatisfaction by presenting themselves as fighting for the population's cause of a fairer distribution of the economic benefits of resource rents, giving Renamo the prospect to mobilize substantial population support if it comes to a full-fledged conflict. Although intensions are difficult to proof, it can be argued that

Renamo is playing this strategy: Dhlakama accused Frelimo of having “systematically concentrated power” and of having amassed economic benefits, while excluding the population (Dhlakama in *Africa Journalism*, 2014; and in Dzinesa and Wache, 2014). Moreover, Dhlakama presented himself as the “voice of the poor”, able to generate democratic change in the country (Dhlakama in Njanji, 2014). The population demonstrated several times for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (AFP, 2014). Consequently, if Frelimo engaged in a long-lasting and broad-based violent conflict, the population might not mobilize on Frelimo's side.

Thus, with Frelimo being perceived to be unable to exercise violence and mobilize masses and having high costs attached to the use of violence, i.e. losing legitimacy, Renamo's perceived holding-power increased. Moreover, the dwindling population support for Frelimo gives Renamo the prospect of mobilizing broad population support. These factors make the use of violent rent-seeking appear to be a successful strategic option. What is

more, non-violent forms of rent-seeking seem to have proven ineffective: Renamo had engaged in several months of negotiations to alter the terms of rent-allocation and influence on state institutions before using violence (Hanlon, 2009; 2010). Yet, because Renamo has to a large extent been marginalized in political decision-making and economic processes, non-violent rent-seeking were ineffective. Against this background, violent rent-seeking now seems a viable but also the only alternative left for Renamo to alter the rent-allocation to their favour.

Overall, the changes in the political settlement satisfy all but one of the above-mentioned conditions. First, there is a zero-sum distributive conflict between two groups that have some hold on the population. Second, the weaker side, Renamo, seems to believe it can hold out long enough in a conflict to mobilize its potential supporters sufficiently to change the balance of power. Third, Guebuza accumulating the newly discovered resource rents is perceived as unjust. This served as a trigger to seek confrontation. The confrontations resulted in violence because non-violent rent seeking has been tried but was unsuccessful, and given the changes in the political settlement, violence was perceived as an effective way of changing the terms of rent-allocation. Merely the condition that violence must be seen as the only effective strategy is neither necessary nor sufficient to

explain the outbreak of armed conflict in Mozambique; the remaining conditions are sufficient to do so.

In contrast, the theories outlined in Section II are insufficient to explain the outbreak of violence in Mozambique. Surely, economic inequalities implied through the resource rent allocation caused grievances among Renamo-members. However, this is insufficient to explain why violence and not other types of rent-seeking (which should be less costly) was believed to be and effective and chosen. The same arguments apply for the greed-theory. The rentier-state-theory seems applicable to Mozambique's case: Guebuza established a patron-client relationship and his government extracts resources from the population. As the economy remains stagnant, violent conflict emerged. Yet the rentier-state theory does not explain under which circumstances violence emerges in a low-growth context, what the framework employed here does. Clearly, a broader understanding of the socio-economic and political circumstances is fundamental to understand the outbreak of violent conflict in

Conclusion

This paper examined whether the recent outbreak of armed conflict in Mozambique is another resource curse. The analysis shows that the conflict is indeed related to natural resources but that the socio-economic and political context defines whether resources become a curse or not. Studying how newly discovered resource rents change the rent-allocation, thereby altering the distribution of holding-power in a specific political settlement and setting the palette of rent-seeking strategies expected to be successful, gives a better account of why violence emerges in resource-rich and dependent countries. If these changes lead to certain conditions violence emerges.

In Mozambique's case, resource rents coming from an investment boom in the mid-2000s enriched President Guebuza and his close allies but has also weakened Frelimo's internal organizational unity and undermined the party's legitimacy within society. While Frelimo withstood non-violent rent-seeking attempts of Renamo the modified political settlement attributed to changes in the magnitude and distribution of rents undermined Frelimo's holding power and made violent rent-seeking an effective alternative strategy for Renamo. The discussion shows that all but one of the above-described conditions arose. They

explain the outbreak of armed conflict in Mozambique.

As one case study can be an exception to general tendencies and is therefore insufficient to deduce theoretical implications, cross-country comparative analysis can enhance the understanding of the theoretical relevance of rent-allocation, holding-power and political settlement theory for causes of conflict. Future research can further improve the analysis by examining how dynamics would specifically change in resource-abundant or resource-dependent countries.

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Sticky Rationality: Rationality in Two Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis

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Abstract

This essay explores the assumption of rationality in Foreign Policy Analysis. Two approaches, neoclassical realism and schema theory, will be highlighted and it will be examined how they incorporate the notion of rationality. Neoclassical realism reacts to the suboptimal outcomes, which realism fails to explain, by adding the domestic level though leaving the assumption of rationality untouched. Schema theory as a part of the cognitive school seemingly "bounds" rationality but then opens a backdoor through which rational agency can be reintegrated in the model. The case study of the sanctions regime on Iraq illustrates that the assumption of rationality can not only lead to unintended but also dangerous policy outcomes. This essay claims that it is almost tragic how those theories hold on to rationality and it offers an underlying explanation for the "stickiness" of rationality assumptions in Foreign Policy Analysis by using Quines concept of confirmation holism.

Key Words:

Cognitive School, Confirmation Holism, Foreign Policy Analysis, Neoclassical Realism, Scientific Method

The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite.

G. K. Chesterton²⁸

Introduction

This essay explores the assumption of rationality in Foreign Policy Analysis.

Two approaches, neoclassical realism and schema theory, will be highlighted and it will be examined how they incorporate the notion of rationality. Neoclassical realism reacts to the suboptimal outcomes, which realism fails to explain, by adding the domestic level though leaving the assumption of rationality untouched. Schema theory as a part of the cognitive school seemingly „bounds“ rationality but then opens a backdoor through which rational agency can be reintegrated in the model. Both models have the assumption of rationality at the center of their theories. A case study of the sanctions regime on Iraq illustrates that the assumption of rationality can not only lead to unintended but also dangerous policy outcomes. This essay claims that it is almost tragic how those theories hold on to rationality and offers an underlying explanation for this “stickiness”.

Rationality and “Physics Envy”

John Lewis Gaddis argues that in freudian terms the social sciences suffer from “physics envy”²⁹. Social sciences from economics³⁰ over sociology³¹ to international relations share the obsession to theorize as closely as possible in the style of this “hard science“. Their envy aims at the fact that physics has the ability to apply the scientific method and by doing this it acquires predictive power.

The scientific method has a twofold capacity: It explains, i.e. helps to understand why things happen the way they do, and it forecasts, i.e. shows how things will happen in the future. Those two tasks go hand in hand: The explanation must use general laws which can be then extrapolated into the future: The Water boiled because it

²⁸ Chesterton (1908) p. 87

²⁹ Gaddis (1996) p.35

³⁰ see Homo oeconomicus

³¹ see Structural Functionalism

reached the temperature of 100°C and if this liquid is water and it will boil once it reached 100°C.

Scientific Method in International Relations

It can't be emphasized enough how much of a holy grail the scientific method is for political science. The method would give the political sciences predictive power. Theory would be essential for actual policy makers.

To obtain this capability, general laws need to be found. Laws which are independent of historical context and which streamline the behaviour of agents in the international system. An attempt is done by (neo-)realists. Their claim is that anarchy is the ultimate driver and the resulting only interest of a decision-maker is the interest in power. In order to make sure that the ways decision-maker follow this unifying goal are identical it is assumed that they act rationally³².

The resulting general laws are:

1. All decision-makers seek in all situations to maximize their power.
2. Decision-makers act following rational principles.

A decision-maker following the principles of rational choice is striving for the optimal outcome by ranking his preferences in order of their importance, balancing them against costs, examining the tools available for the task and calculating the likelihood of their success³³.

This rational actor perspective assumes that "decision-makers usually perceive the world quite accurately and misperceptions can be treated as random accidents"³⁴. A psychological examination of the decision making process can therefore be ignored or assumed away. Hans Morgenthau writes: "(We can) ... consider all decision makers to be alike"³⁵. All agents follow the same goal in the same way. This simplification now offers the ability to use the scientific method. The "physics envy" seems to be sated but it turns out that the scientific method is not working very well.

³² Gaddis (1996) p.33

³³ Bjola (2013) p. 98

³⁴ Jervis (1976) p.6.

³⁵ Morgenthau (1978) p.6.

Realist theory is unable to predict not even to explain why the two most powerful nations of the modern era chose, at certain points during the twentieth century, to relinquish power rather than to retain it – the United States in 1919-1920 and the Soviet Union in 1989-91.³⁶ Realist theory with the assumption of rationality at its heart seems to fail here³⁷.

The assumption of rationality seems counterintuitive because it is assuming that the mind “has essentially unlimited demonic or supernatural reasoning power”³⁸. This idea of computational goal-seeking³⁹ does not match with the basic experiences of anybody observing his own mind. However it is important to point out already at this point that criticizing the assumption of rationality does not lead us directly to an assumption of irrational behaviour. As shown in the quote at the beginning of the paper the point is simply, that strict rationality is not giving us the whole picture.

Neoclassical Realism / Squeezing Rationality into Reality

The insight that realism does not explain foreign policy decisions is the starting point of neoclassical Realism. When a theory clashes with reality it needs to be adjusted. The relevant question within the theory building is: Which hypothesis can stay, which needs to be replaced? W.V.O. Quine shaped the term confirmation holism, which states that no hypothesis can be tested in isolation but theory testing is always embedded in a background of other hypothesis’. In his own words: “Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.”⁴⁰ This offers an illustrating background to neoclassical realism, which preserves the notion of rationality by adjusting another hypothesis in the theory building of realism: It adds the constraint of domestic factors. Neoclassical realism is therefore a hybrid of realism and a domestic perspective.

Neoclassical realists admit that the decision-maker is not reacting to the demands of the international system directly. Between the input of the system and the agent is an intervening variable namely the domestic sphere. Neoclassical realists do not trace the sub-

³⁶ Gaddis (1996) p.37

³⁷ It must be pointed out that realists defend their point by arguing that they explain political outcomes not foreign policy. Waltz (1979) p.121

³⁸ Gigerenzer & Todd (1999) p. 6.

³⁹ Bjola (2013) p.101

⁴⁰ Quine (1961) p. 41

optimal outcomes of foreign policy back to incomplete rationality of the decision-maker. The reason they are giving instead, the „update“ they are offering, is that there is a distorting variable between the decision maker and his decision. In the words of Imre Lakatos, another Philosopher of Science, neoclassical realists do not change the core of the theory, rationality, but build a protective belt of auxiliary hypothesis', the domestic intervention, around it.⁴¹

Angela Merkel might be willing to support the United States in stopping the so-called Islamic State. The group is generating a high number of foreign fighters from Germany, which will eventually come back and harm German stability. Merkel might also be interested in a stable European border in the south and in the prevention of refugee crises. Those considerations can be derived from her interest in power. But there is a variety of domestic constraints: On the level of public opinion she is constrained by the fact that the German population is anti-interventionist and not so keen on cooperating with the United States. On the level of its economy Germany could face a recession very soon⁴². And on the structural level the German army is in an internal crisis caused by major equipment problems⁴³.

One could argue that anarchy is expanding from the outside of the nation to the inside and that the decision-maker has to deal with two variables instead of one. However, neoclassical realists argue that over the long term rational decision making striving for power dominates, because the decision-maker will try to overcome the domestic constraints. In Angela Merkel's case this would mean to get the economy back on track, persuade the German public and to modernize the army.

In the longer term therefore the scientific character of neoclassical realism can be preserved. The assumption of rationality is generally not touched by the addition of domestic factors. The decision-maker can price those constraints in his costs. Interestingly there is one aspect where neoclassical realism does accept irrationality: The perceptions of the public as an intervening variable are not rational or at least not rationally following the same goal as the decision maker.

⁴¹ Lakatos (1978) p.44

⁴² "Sedating, not leading" The Economist, Oct 18, 2014

⁴³ <http://www.dw.de/von-der-leven-catches-more-flak-over-german-defense-troubles/a-17989911>

The step from realism to neoclassical realism is done by adding to the independent variable of power distribution in the international system the intervening variable of domestic perception and domestic constraints while the notion of rationality is not adjusted. This will be contrasted with the contributions of Debora Larson's schema theory. Will the assumption of rationalism be abandoned? To what extent is schema theory a challenge for neoclassical realism?

Schema Theory

Schema theory needs to be seen in the context of the cognitive revolution aiming to "discover ... the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters with the world and ... what meaning-making processes were implicated."⁴⁴ Whereas in realism the misperceptions were seen as a random noise the cognitive school tries to systematize them. It assumes that individuals are acting not in an objective environment but in their own specific "psychological environment"⁴⁵. On first sight it seems that rationality is challenged by the fact that a kind of anarchy now enters the human perception.

Deborah Larson is a part of the second generation of the cognitive school concerned with how the individual processes the vast amounts of data, how he achieves cognitive economy⁴⁶. As the capacity of the human mind is limited, a decision-maker needs to take shortcuts and to simplify. She gives credit to the imperfect human reasoning powers. The individual is a "cognitive miser"⁴⁷ caused by the simple material fact that a conscious evaluation of the costs of any option is beyond the means of human cognition. Instead he uses schemata representing a cluster of options to reduce complexity. A schema is an "abstraction from experience with a subject, rather than a definition or a collection of

cases"⁴⁸. When new information comes in, it will be slotted in a fitting schema. Schemata structure information.

⁴⁴ Bruner (1990) p.2

⁴⁵ Sprout & Sprout (1965) p.119

⁴⁶ Rosati (2001) p.56

⁴⁷ Larson (1994) p.23

⁴⁸ Larson (1994) p.18

It is important to point out that Larson is not offering an alternative to neoclassical realism but adding a level of complexity to the psychological process of decision making. It can be seen as a “software update” to the “hardware” of neoclassical realism.

It seems very plausible that the cognitive restrictions rule out perfect rational behavior. Surprisingly for Larson this is not the case. The devil is in the detail how schemata are chosen. Larson allows us to test our schemata by their utility, rank them and switch them consciously like eyeglasses⁴⁹ i.e. rationally. Instead of treating the outside world rationally like in realism we just operate rationally within our psychological environment. Furthermore “there is no evidence that schemata misrepresent the information available.”⁵⁰ The psychological environment is therefore nothing more than a hyperaccurate translation⁵¹ of the objective environment, which renders the psychological environment also objective. For Larson there is no evidence how information is lost or distorted in this process.

Barack Obama’s information processing in relation to the rising of the so called Islamic State can be expressed in schemata. In the beginning of the civil war the schema for rebel groups could have been “opposition against Assad“. A schema leading to an affirmative perspective as Assad dictatorship led to war and caused risk for example for the American ally Israel. During the rise of militant jihadism within those groups i.e. new information the schema was consciously changed to “destabilizer“ and eventually for the so called Islamic State to “violator of Human Rights and the state system“ leading to air strikes against them.

This process according to Larson would be still shaped by rational agency. Obama would simply choose which schema offers him the highest utility. Instead of arguing for subconscious irrational processes whether they may be social and collective or psychological and individual⁵² she is re-introducing rational choice and “supernatural reasoning power” through the back door.

⁴⁹ Larson (1994) p.21

⁵⁰ Larson (1994) p.25

⁵¹ “hyperaccurate translation” being almost an oxymoron

⁵² Houghton (2007) p.42

As shown before rationality is essential to satisfy the “physics envy“ of social sciences and reach out to the “holy grail“ of predictive power. Ironically Larson herself admits that schema theory „not only explains but also predicts“⁵³.

Is Wladimir Putin rationally choosing schemata when looking at Ukraine and then deciding that the schema „destabilize at any costs“ is the most rational i.e. power maximizing perspective on the conflict? Or isn't there an irrational element making him unable to correctly judge costs and benefits of invading Ukraine? An element rooted perhaps in the ideology of eurasianism or even in the idea that „he is chosen by divine providence to punish liberated Ukrainians“, as his former advisor Andre Illarionov states⁵⁴? The current course of action hints at an irrational element. An element left unexplained by the presented theories.

The use of sanctions and rationality

An interesting backdrop for the stickiness of rationality in analyzing foreign policy decisions is the use of sanctions, which heavily relies on the assumption of rationality. Sanctions are a tool of coercive diplomacy, the attempts to change the behavior of a state by threatening it with the use of force or the actual use of limited force.

Sanctions became very popular after the Cold war. Sanctions were applied in the 1990s alone in Iraq (1990), The former Yugoslavia (1991, 1992, and 1998), Libya (1992), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1992), Parts of Cambodia (1992), Haiti (1993), Parts of Angola (1993, 1997, and 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997) and in Afghanistan (1999)⁵⁵. Sanctions are a standard policy response in the post-cold war world because they lead to pain for the adversary but to almost⁵⁶ no pain for the state applying those sanctions. It is preferred for its subtlety: There are no “boots on the ground” and there is general no cruel footage on CNN about the results of sanctions.

The abstract theory of coercive diplomacy and thereby the framework for sanctions assumes pure rationality in the targeted state. The core idea is to change the cost-benefit

⁵³ Larson (1994) p.26

⁵⁴ Foreign Affairs (2014)

⁵⁵ Dodge (2015)

⁵⁶ however sanctions can hurt the own economy if it is a main trading partner with the targeted state (see Russia and EU sanctions).

analysis of the decision maker or a certain elite. By applying additional costs (in the case of negative sanctions) the ends-means calculation receives another element. It is expected that the targeted decision maker will then refrain to continue (or to begin) certain actions because they became too costly. The theory of sanctions is rationalistic in a mechanistic way: The sanction must damage the targeted decision making elite. This elite must recognize the damage, it must struggle to balance the damage and look that the damage is bigger than the benefits.

It is not too hard to spot the traces of “hard science envy” in the theory of sanctions. Sanctions are based on a paradigm of a positivist cause-and-effect machinery. This would not be problematic if sanctions were successful. However there is a huge controversy over the percentage of success: Some authors state that 35% of the sanctions are successful, some even say only 5%.⁵⁷

What if the targeted state is actually not applying a cost-benefit analysis? This paper states that it is exactly because of this overemphasis of rationality why sanctions tend to fail.

Sanctions on Iraq

The most profound sanctions ever used on a country were in 1990 on Iraq. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 prevented all trade with Iraq. The primary aim of these sanctions was to force Iraq out of Kuwait. The sanctions failed, a large scale military coalition was needed to force the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. But the sanctions were mostly kept in place (UNSC Resolutions 687) to stop Iraq from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction and to weaken the base for Saddam Hussein’s leadership by creating political fracture. The resolution 687 was described as a “christmas tree” because so much “was hung on it” by different actors.⁵⁸ It was expected that the societal suffering would place so much pressure on Saddam’s regime that he eventually would have to resign. The draconian sanctions did indeed result in societal suffering: Child malnourishment went up by 73%, which lead to 6000 dead children in each month.⁵⁹ This traumatized an entire generation.

⁵⁷ Dodge (2015)

⁵⁸ Brown (1999) p.20

⁵⁹ Dodge (2015)

But it did not result in pressure on Saddam Hussein's regime itself, it even strengthened it.⁶⁰

There are three general lessons from this case. First the imagined cost-benefit-balance, which is meant to be shifted as a result from sanctions, needs to be real. It is not the claim of the paper that Saddams Husseins policy is completely irrational. But the assumption of a strict rationality of the target in form of a mercantile cost-benefit-balance incorporating economic factors, was clearly not that relevant in Baghdad. Maybe it was simply non-existent, maybe there are other factors left unexplained by rationalism-focused theories.

In this case study the assumption of rationality is not only wrong but also dangerous. This case also argues for a more pluralistic idea of "rationalities". Consider the statement by a Putin intimate, who was asked about the sanctions and simply answered: "Putin is not a businessman".⁶¹ How is utility maximized? And whose utility?

The second lesson is that sanctions do not work, when there is no transmission belt between societal suffering and policy change. One reason why the sanctions failed is because the public has no influence on the situation, that there is no mechanism between the public and Husseins decisions. The suffering was achieved by the sanctions but it did not trigger any policy change in Baghdad. Therefore in the case of Iraq again the assumption of a mechanistic rationalistic backdrop proved to be misguided.

The third lesson is that sanctions can even be counter productive, they can lead to the opposite of the intended consequences. A reason is the "rallye around the flag" effect: The conviction of an external conspiracy against the Iraqi people led some to support Hussein more against that threat, to rallye around him.⁶² Based on the idea that the suffering is not the fault of the government but the fault of hostile states, a regime can even lay the blame for issues completely untouched by sanctions on foreign governments: e.g. "We can't reform the education system because of the sanctions". This kind of "guilt export" made possible by sanctions can ultimately stabilize a regime.

⁶⁰ Dodge (2015)

⁶¹ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/europe/it-pays-to-be-putins-friend-.html?_r=0

⁶² Dodge (2015)

This case study illustrates that the strict assumption of rationality is at the root of the problem why sanctions mostly don't work. The mechanistic idea from the imposing of sanctions to the desired policy outcome does not do the political reality justice, especially not of those authoritarian states typically targeted by coercive diplomacy. Sanctions are still chosen because we tend to judge someone by our own standards and the standard not only in Foreign Policy Analysis but also for foreign policy decision makers is rationality.

Conclusion / Overcoming the envy

There are two comforting insights, which shall close this essay and help the political scientist to overcome "physics envy", and eventually the stickiness of rationality.

First, even "hard" science is not hard science. Heisenbergs uncertainty principle proves that attempts to measure phenonema can actually alter them⁶³. Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that even mathematics is an invention not a discovery⁶⁴. And Einstein proved the relativity of time and space. This leads to the insight that even the hard sciences can not offer general laws in their strictest sense. The scientific method in a strict sense cannot even be applied in the natural sciences. The scientific paradigm then, the "physics envy" is based on an outdated idea of the natural sciences from the 19th century.

Second, we can derive comfort from geologists and biologists. They are strong in explaining the past, but much more modest in their claims to forecast the future. They have paradigms of plate tectonics and natural selection but still allow for the impact of unpredictable events. Both do not rely heavily on quantification but they go out in the field look at rocks, describe them and classify them. The accepted means of communication is taxonomy – the careful comparative description⁶⁵. There are sciences, with the reputation of "hard sciences", that don't require the scientific method.

Human irrationality is the elephant in the room of this essay. The acceptance of non-purposive (or at least not always purposive) behavior is a bitter pill to swallow for political theory disabling it to predict the behavior of decision-makers. Neoclassical realism, as shown, avoids the topic by adding complexity on another level. Larson's Schema Theory

⁶³ Cohen & Stewart (1994) pp.44-45

⁶⁴ Putnam (1975) pp.60-65

⁶⁵ Gaddis (1996) p.38.

finally opens the black box of human cognition but closes it again by showing that eventually the human mind and its filter work rationally. The case study of the sanctions regime on Iraq illustrates how the assumption of a strict rationality can actually lead to foreign policy failure.

In conclusion it remains to say that others than neoclassical rationalists and schema-theorists have been more courageous by attacking rationality from a cultural and a psychological perspective. Kahnemann and Tversky introduced prospect theory arguing that actors are risk-prone when they perceive loss and risk-averse when they perceive gain. Fast and frugal heuristics contends that actors use simple heuristics like historical analogies to make sense of the world and that a single clue can suffice for a decision-maker to make up his mind. In contrast to Larson this happens subconsciously and is not subordinated to a rationalist filtering process. Other Authors highlight the emotional dimension pointing out that reason and emotions are always going together and are impossible to separate. Constructivists of course show how the very benchmarks of decision-making are relative, culturally determined and fluid.⁶⁶ But all these insights are heavily rejected by neoclassical realism and schema theory in order to save rationality and to satisfy “physics envy”.

⁶⁶ s. Bjola (2013) p.103

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The Institutionalisation of Power: The Influence of Mexican Unions in the Legislative Process

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Abstract

Existing studies such as those of Pastor and Wise (2005) argue that the democratic period in Mexico has been characterised by serious governability problems derived from divided governments. Nevertheless, the empirical data shows this period has been the most productive in the history of Mexico, but at the same time a series of relevant reforms have been rejected or watered down. This paper focuses on the role played by interest groups in the legislative process, especially labour unions; the hypothesis is that the more powerful the groups, the more likely the legislative process will reflect the interest of that group. To establish how powerful a union is it follows the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and established indicators to measure the concept “de facto political power” then it proceeds to compare this explanation vis-à-vis other hypotheses for the legislative result such as divided governments, fragmentation and polarisation of the party system.

Key Words:


Congress, De Facto Political Power, Institutions, Interest Groups, Reforms

Introduction

Mexico experienced a profound institutional change during the 1990's. Its political regime changed from an authoritarian regime to a competitive democracy and its party system changed from a hegemonic system to a competitive one. These transformations were reflected in the composition of Congress where, for the first time in over 70 years, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) lost the majority of the Lower House. Since then no president or opposition party has held a majority in Congress and while some authors have celebrated the arrival of pluralism, others have pointed out at the governability problems related to divided governments. Among the former are those of Hurtado (2001), Negretto (2003) and Wise and Pastor (2005). The argument of these studies follows that the institutional framework of presidentialism does not provide incentives for cooperation among political parties.

Therefore, according to their argument, Mexico suffers a deadlock between the president and Congress that inhibits the approval of crucial reforms. Among the reforms often cited as examples of the impasses between the executive and the legislative are fiscal, education, labour and energy reforms. These are referred to as “structural reforms” and are used by several authors as dependent variables while the presence of divided governments is presented as the independent variable that explains the failure of the bills. But as Casar and Marván (2014) have demonstrated the legislatures of the democratic period, characterised by the lack of majorities, show the highest number of approved bills in the history of Mexico (Figure 1).

More importantly the reforms approved during the democratic period were supported in 73 per cent of the cases by the three main political parties: Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Even the constitutional reforms, which require qualified majorities, were supported by a coalition conformed by PAN-PRI-PRD in 83 per cent of the cases (Casar, 2014). In other words, the cooperation among political parties is not uncommon in the Mexican Congress. These findings clearly question the paralysis argument. Nevertheless, the structural reforms proposed during this period were often rejected or strongly opposed by interest groups.

FIGURE 1. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN MEXICO 1928-2014

Source: Casar and Marván (2014)

Contrary to the divided government hypothesis, this paper argues that the failure of structural reforms is not related to divided governments but instead it can be explained by focusing on the role played by interest groups. It is relevant to focus on structural reforms because these proposals frequently tried to diminish rents extracted by interest groups. Those rents were established during the authoritarian regime by the hegemonic party to obtain the loyalty of crucial groups as labor unions, peasants and business associations (Bizberg, 2010; Haber *et al*, 2008; Elizondo, 2010). In exchange for the distribution of rents these groups offered political support to the PRI in what has been called “alliance for profits” (Haber *et al*, 2008).

After the debt crisis of 1982, which revealed the enormous fiscal deficits of the Mexican government, the capacity of the PRI to distribute rents substantially decreased. Still, several groups continued to receive benefits from the state, including unions of public workers such as teachers, oil workers and bureaucrats. But contrary to the past, these groups were no longer subordinated to the president and his party. Especially after the transition to democracy these groups gained autonomy and started to deploy strategies to influence the policy making process. Nevertheless, not all groups have succeeded in maintaining their privileges, which leads to the following question: why have some unions been successful in defending or promoting rent extraction while others have failed?

A plausible hypothesis is that the success or failure of these labor interest groups depends on what Acemoglu *et al* (2005) call *de facto* political power. In other words, that powerful unions that 1) have access to vast economic or human resources, 2) who are capable of resolving collective action dilemmas and 3) deploy pressure strategies over political parties and Congress; are more likely to resist or promote reforms that maximize their interests.

Methods

In order to test the hypothesis this paper proposes and operationalization of the concept “de facto political power” comprises fifteen indicators. Based on the operationalisation of the concept it constructs an Index of de facto Political Power (IFPP) for each group analyzed. Then the index is compared to the legislative outcome, whether it is positive or negative to the interest group involved. Five cases were selected to capture variation on the dependent variable, including three cases where the interest group was successful in achieving a positive result and two in which the interest groups failed to defend their prerogatives.

The cases selected involve three labour interest groups: the teachers union: *Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación* (SNTE), the state owned oil company union: *Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana* (STPRM), and the workers of *Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social* (IMSS), a governmental organisation that assists public health, pensions and social security, who are represented by the *Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores del Seguro Social* (SNTSS). Case study of these three groups consisted in document analysis to examine both the characteristics of these groups and the strategies used by the unions prior to the discussion the bill.

Once the values of the IFPP are obtained, then I proceed to use the comparative method, contrasting the variations in the IFPP with other explanations to the legislative result such as the presence or absence of divided governments and the fragmentation and polarization of the party system, using as indicators the Rae Index for fragmentation and the standard deviation of the preferences of political parties in the left-right continuum.

Political Power and Institutions

The belief that institutions matter is shared by many political scientists and economist alike. Nevertheless, as Shepsle (2006) has noticed, most of the studies about institutions focus on their effects and not on their origins. That is, most studies do not address how political actors arrive to institutional equilibriums. Some exceptions are the work of Knight (1992), Acemoglu *et al* (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) who argue that political power play a central role in the conformation of institutional frameworks.

Contrary to the idea that institutions are crafted to resolve collective dilemmas or reduce transaction costs, their argument sustains that institutions reflect power equilibriums. Namely, that the rules of the game are the institutionalisation of power relations in a given time. The theory assumes:

1. Institutions can be defined as the rules of the game which generate constrictions and opportunities (North, 1990; Knight, 1992)
2. Actors are self-interested. Meaning that individuals, groups and parties act in their own interest (Shepsle, 1999; Knight, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 2001)
3. Institutions are endogenous; which means that actors can create and change institutions. It also implies that political outcomes can be identified as equilibriums that are the result of strategic interactions among actors. (Knight, 1992; Shepsle, 2006; Acemoglu *et al* 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006)
4. The most powerful actors are more capable of influencing the decision making process. At the same time two kinds of power can be distinguished: *de jure* political power derived from formal institutions, and *de facto* political power which rest on the resources, aptitudes to resolve collective action dilemmas or capacity of violence of an actor (Acemoglu *et al*, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006)
5. Institutions distribute political and economic resources creating winners and losers. Therefore self-interest actors compete to obtain benefits from those institutions (Knight, 1992; Acemoglu *et al*, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006)

Since reforms are essentially changes in the rules of the game, these assumptions can be useful to analyze the legislative process. One of the advantages is that it takes into account both the distributional conflict surrounding institutional change and the presence of informal actors in the decision making process. Contrary to most of the studies on

legislative process this framework allows us to recognise that political decisions are not only influenced by elected officials but also by stakeholders. Among the informal actors who possess *de facto* political power are interest groups who possess both resources and capacity to resolve collective action dilemmas.

Measuring de facto political power

Once the relevance of *de facto* political power in institutional change is recognised then the biggest challenge is to operationalize the concept. Here I follow the work of Sartori (2012) to reduce the level of abstraction of the concept “*de facto* political power”. This means reducing its denotation and increasing its connotation. By moving down the “ladder of abstraction” it is possible to attach more attributes to the concept. This allows more precision about the attributes shared by labour interest groups in specific cases.

The concept “*de facto* political power” is composed of three dimensions. The first two are taken from the work of Acemoglu *et al* (2005): resources and capacity to resolve collective action dilemmas. Then I add a third dimension called “pressure” which compiles several tactics used by interest groups which have been identified by Grossman and Helpman (2001), Tullock (2005), Schneider (2009) and Baumgartner and Leech (1998). While the first two dimensions indicate the capacities of the groups the third one indicates the strategies actually taken by the interest groups. Once the dimensions are determined, then it is possible to establish indicators for every dimension.

TABLE 1. OPERATIONALIZATION OF DE FACTO POLITICAL POWER FOR LABOUR INTEREST GROUPS

Resources	-High number of union members -Economic resources (union dues) -Political expertise	
Capacity for collective action	Positive incentives	-Distribution of rents -Passing of jobs from parents to their children -Distribution of public offices
	Negative incentives	-Noncompetitive elections -Sanctions to dissidents
	Cohesion	- Impugned internal procedures -Union split-offs
Pressure	-Funding of political parties with veto power -Endorsement of presidential candidates -Capture of congressional committees -Demonstrations in favour or against a bill -Absence of strong opposition	

Source: Own elaboration based on the dimensions of Acemoglu *et al* (2005)

The first source of *de facto* political power identified by Acemoglu *et al* is resources. As Zald and McCarthy (1987) and Schlozman (2010) have shown entering into the pressure system is not something any group can afford, it takes resources for a group to take off and keep it going. Therefore only a minority of groups have the resources to influence the policymaking process. But money is not the only resource a group can possess, other

resources are its numbers and its human capital. In the case of labor unions, at least three indicators can be measured: i) The size of the union, that is if the group is large enough to catch the attention of policymakers, ii) The economic resources of the interest group, that is if the group can be considered as a wealthy group who can sustain the costs of organisation, and iii) Political expertise, this refers to the political professionalisation of its leaders, it takes as a proxy variable if it's leaders have served as representatives in Congress.

The second dimension of the concept is "capacity for collective action". Here I follow the work of Olson (1965) who noticed the consequences derived from the free rider problem. The olsonian solution to this cooperation dilemma lies in the incentives, either positive or negative, provided by the organisations. Among the positive incentives applied by the labor interest groups in the public sector I looked for: 1) Distribution of rents, that is if the groups obtain benefits above the average citizen, the indicator reflects if the unions reach wage increases above the minimum wage raises. 2) Passing of jobs from parents to their children, this indicates whether the union allows for public jobs -such as teachers or nurses- to be treated like private property. 3) Distribution of public offices, in other words, if the union allocates bureaucratic jobs -such as supervisors of state owned companies or ministries- at their own discretion.

In regard to negative incentives I looked for 1) Type of elections, that is if the internal leadership is elected by competitive methods or if a single elite controls the organisation and, 2) Sanctions to dissidents, this indicator shows if there is documented sanctions against the leadership's opposition. In addition to positive and negative incentives, I add a third set of indicators called "cohesion" to measure the capacity of collective action. This set of indicators show the conformity of its members with the organisation: 1) Impugned internal procedures, which indicates documented legal actions against the results of internal elections in the organisation, and 2) Union split-offs, this indicator shows if the union experienced scissions previous to the discussion of the bill.

The third dimension called "pressure" looks for the tactics used by labor interest groups to influence the decision making process. Here I follow the work of Grossman and Helpman (2001), Tullock (2005), Schneider (2009) and Baumgartner and Leech (1998). The indicators are: i) Funding of political parties with veto power, ii) Endorsement of

presidential candidates, iii) Capture of congressional committees, which refers to whether there are members of the union serving as congressman –especially as chairman or secretaries- in such committees, iv) Demonstrations in favor or against a bill and finally, v) Absence of strong opposition, this last indicator is not a tactic but it is worth measuring it since the presence of other groups might decrease the effectiveness of these strategies. The values of the indicators are binary where 0 represents absence and 1 presence of the attribute.

The data for these indicators was collected from the following sources: the number of union members is recollected from the work of Bensusán and Middlebrook (2013) and national newspapers (*Reforma*, *El Universal* and *La Jornada*). The economic resources are an estimation based on the number of members and the union fees as percentage discounted on their average salary. The political expertise is taken from the database of *Sistema de Información Legislativa* (SIL) which compiles information about all the congressman who have served since 1997. The distribution of rents compares the wage raises divulged on newspapers with the increase in minimum wage reported by the *Comisión Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos* (CONSAMI). The indicators for type of elections and sanctions to dissidents are taken from the Report on Labor Human Rights elaborated by CERAL and from newspaper reports.

To measure the presence or absence of the following attributes: passing of jobs from parents to their children, distribution of public offices, impugned internal procedures, union split-offs, funding of political parties with veto power, endorsement of presidential candidates, demonstrations in favor or against a bill and absence of strong opposition I reviewed articles published in two of the main newspapers in Mexico: *Reforma* and *El Universal* for each of the groups analyzed for the period 1996-2012. In the case of SNTE, the teachers unions, I reviewed 7,685 articles in *Reforma* and 9,708 articles in *El Universal*, for the oil workers union (STPRM) I reviewed 491 notes in *Reforma* and 811 in *El Universal* and for the workers of IMSS (SNTSS) I reviewed 389 articles in *Reforma* and 511 in *El Universal*. Finally, the data for capture of congressional committees is taken from SIL.

In the pages that follow, I will develop five cases of reform in Mexico concerning labour interest groups in the public sector. First I look into the potential effects of these bills over the profits of labour unions, that is, whether the proposal enhanced or threatened the rent extraction capabilities of the stakeholders. Second, I analyze the strength of the interest groups previous to the legislative process, in other words, I measure the *de facto* political power of every group before the discussion the reforms.

Mexican Unions in the Legislative Process

As previously stated, during the democratic period several bills were proposed on education, energy and social security issues which involved labor interest groups. Some of these bills tried to enhance the rent extraction of these groups while others tried to restrict them. Here are five cases of reform in which labour interest groups' rents were potentially affected:

- A) A constitutional reform proposal in 2002 to make pre-school mandatory. This bill was proposed by members of SNTE, the teachers unions, who at the time served as representatives in Congress. The approval of the bill can be considered as a positive result for the union since making pre-school mandatory implied the increase in the number of jobs that could be distributed by the union.
- B) A proposal to reform the General Law of Education (LGE) in 2002. The bill, crafted by SNTE members, consisted of an increase in the education budget so that the government would meet the recommendations of UNESCO by investing 8 percent of GDP in education (Loyo, 2006; Góngora and Leyva, 2008)⁶⁷. This bill may seem like a positive reform that would channel resources to the formation of human capital. Nevertheless, in Mexico more than 90 percent of the education budget is spent on teachers' salaries. Therefore, the approval of the bill was beneficial for the union insomuch as it enhanced its rents.
- C) A proposal in 2004 to reform the Social Security Law, in regard with the pension and retirement system (RJP) of the employees of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). The bill intended to resolve the profound financial crisis of IMSS which was due in great part to the generous pension scheme enjoyed by the employees of the institute (IMSS, 2004). As a result, the institute was utilising the

⁶⁷ The amount proposed by SNTE was unviable since 8 percent of GDP amounts to almost the total of income tax and value added tax combined (Elizondo, 2009)

contributions of the 12 million private sector workers to cover the expenses of the RJP. In fact, it was using 70,5 percent of its budget to cover salaries and pensions. The proposal intended to change the pay-as-you-go system to a system of private accounts. The approval of this bill can be considered a negative result to the IMSS' union (SNTSS) considering it reduced its rents.

- D) In 2008 the president presented a proposal to reform the oil owned company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) to improve its productivity. In the early negotiations the president agreed with the PRI to exclude the reform of the pension scheme of the oil workers affiliated to the Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República Mexicana (STPRM) (Serra, 2011). These employees are among the most privileged workers in the public sector and the least productive oil workers in the world (Elizondo, 2010). The result for the STRPM was positive since they maintained the *status quo*, even when the cost of the pension scheme was too costly for PEMEX.
- E) In 2012 a reform was introduced by the president to improve the quality of education by making evaluations on teachers mandatory. The bill intended to generate incentives for teachers to improve their performance by implementing standardised evaluations. The bill included a system of uniform standards for teachers hiring and promotion based on merit. At the same time, the proposal would undermine the power of SNTE over the distribution of jobs and promotions, such as directors and supervisors. Hence, the approval of the bill was a negative result for the union.

As can be appreciated, while some groups were affected by reforms others benefited from the institutional changes. Moreover, in the cases where SNTE was involved we can observe both positive and negative results for the union. The argument of this paper is that those variations are related to changes in the *de facto* political power. In other words; when groups were strong enough they obtained positive results in the legislative process, while the weaker groups were unable of to defend their rents. To capture the power of these groups at the moment of reform I now analyse every group prior to the discussion of the bills.

Resources

The unions created during the hegemonic period held exclusive representation of their respective sectors and a close relation to the PRI. So SNTE represented all the teachers in the country, STPRM agglutinated all the workers in the oil sector and SNTSS did the same for the workers of IMSS. Accordingly the Haber *et al* (2008) and Bizberg (2010) these organisations maintained clientelistic relations with the government where the union provided loyalty and electoral support in exchange for rents. Despite the transition to democracy, the traditional unions remain the prime brokers between the workers of these sectors and the government.

Due to the monopoly of representation these unions are composed of a high number of members and consequently control vast resources. For example, SNTE is the largest union in Latin America with over 1 million 300 thousand members; SNTSS comprises 375 thousand members who operate the largest medical services in the country and STPRM, while only constituted by 114 thousand workers, holds the monopoly representation of the state oil company Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), one of the biggest oil companies in the world. A high number of members results in vast economic resources, especially since union dues are discounted directly from the members' salaries. Consequently, these are wealthy organisations.⁶⁸

Another resource available to these groups is the political expertise of their leaders. In the cases of SNTE and STPRM it can be observed a continuous participation of union members as representatives in Congress both in the hegemonic and the democratic period. In contrast, SNTSS practically disappeared from Congress during the 1990's; hence at the time of reform they lacked a resource available to SNTE and STPRM: legislative expertise. Table 2 sum up the indicators for dimension "resources" for the five cases of reform. As can be observed these groups are very homogeneous in regard to resources, with the exception of political expertise.

⁶⁸ SNTE members are required to transfer one percent of their salaries to the union, STPRM workers contribute two percent of their salaries to the union and IMSS transfers two percent of their employees' salaries to the SNTSS.

TABLE 2. RESOURCES INDICATORS OF LABOUR INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE REFORMS

INDICATORS	SNTE 2002 (+)	SNTSS 2004 (-)	STPRM 2008 (+)	SNTE 2012 (-)
High number of union members	X	X	X	X
Vast Economic resources	X	X	X	X
Political expertise	X	0	X	X

Source: Own elaboration

Code: X= The attribute is present 0= The attribute is absent

Capacity for collective action

Unions are interest groups that face collective action dilemmas. As Olson (1965) pointed out, not all organisations are able to resolve these dilemmas, especially large organisations. The fact that groups are composed of self-interested individuals and that the benefits of the groups are not exclusive leads to the free rider problem. Therefore only the organisation that provide selective incentives are able to stimulate cooperation. In the unions analysed in this study, we can observe several incentives for cooperation.

For instance, SNTE provides positive incentives for cooperation since belonging to the union guarantees access to higher salaries than the average citizens (Guerrero *et al*, 2009)⁶⁹. Furthermore, members of SNTE enjoy better labour conditions than workers in the private sector; including larger vacation periods, flexible schedules and, most importantly: rigidity of the employment contract (Elizondo, 2009). Other incentives used by the teachers union derive from its control over the hiring of unionised personnel and over promotions both in the school system and at the Ministry of Education. This leads to corruption practices and builds networks of loyalty to the leadership (Elizondo, 2009).

STPRM deploys similar incentives to its members. Oil union members are among the most privileged public servants in the country. Their salaries and their wage increases are way above the average worker in the private sector⁷⁰ (Guerrero *et al*, 2009). The productivity of PEMEX's employees is very low in comparison to other oil companies in the world

⁶⁹ Guerrero *et al* (2009) found that a unionized member of SNTE receives a salary 164 percent higher than an average worker and 154 percent higher than a non-unionized teacher.

⁷⁰ By 2005 the average salary of a unionized employee of PEMEX was \$13,870 pesos while the salary of a worker in the manufacturing sector was only \$4,500 pesos (Guerrero *et al*, 2009).

(Elizondo, 2011, Serra, 2011). But despite the low productivity they enjoy benefits such as generous pensions, which has led to an enormous deficit in PEMEX (IMCO, 2013), and access to perks like transfers to cover the market basket, one thousand liters of gasoline *per* month and 135 kilograms of domestic gas. Besides, PEMEX employees enjoy a very rigid employment contract. As a consequence, it is almost impossible to fire an employee no matter how unproductive he is. Finally, just as SNTE, the oil union controls the hiring of new employees and the promotions of PEMEX's workers.

Similar positive incentives can be found in SNTSS, where workers enjoyed better salaries, benefits and pensions than the affiliated workers of IMSS (Levy, 2009). In fact, their generous pension scheme can be considered a case of rent extraction because it was financed by private workers contributions. Finally, a common practice in mexican unions is the passing of jobs from parents to their children, this means that a unionised worker has the prerogative to bequeath his job to one of his children. The inheritance of jobs is practiced in all unions analysed in this paper and it is also a strong incentive to keep in line with the union leadership.

Unions also use negative incentives to control their members. Some of these practices have been documented by CERAL. For example the internal procedures for electing union leaders in SNTE and STPRM are characterised for not being competitive. In the case of SNTE the assemblies for electing new leaders take place in locations of difficult access, also there have been documented cases of violence against the opposition and violation of quorum requirements. CERAL has also documented that STPRM recurs to practices such as electing their leaders by shows of hands or the use of ballots with the name of the employee written on it, precluding the secrecy of the vote.

Moreover, there's documented cases of sanctions against the leadership's opposition in the three unions. For example, members of dissident organisations in STPRM have been unfairly dismissed from PEMEX or accused of being enemies of the union. In the case of SNTSS the union can use negative incentives due to the fact that losing the union membership implies losing their jobs. Despite these positive and negative incentives, all of the union's internal procedures for electing their leaders have been impugned before the authorities, with the exception of SNTE election previous to the reforms of 2002. Finally,

all the unions have avoided split-offs from the organisation with the exception of SNTE previous to the 2012⁷¹. The summary of the collective action dimension can be seen in Table 3.

TABLE 3. CAPACITY FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION INDICATORS OF INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE REFORMS

	INDICADORES	SNTE 2002 (+)	SNTSS 2004 (-)	STPRM 2008 (+)	SNTE 2012 (-)
Positive Incentives	Distribution of rents	X	X	X	X
	Passing of jobs from parents to their children	X	X	X	X
	Distribution of public offices	X	X	X	X
Negative Incentives	Non competitive elections	X	0	X	X
	Sanctions to dissidents	X	X	X	X
Cohesion	Impugned internal procedures	X	0	0	0
	Absence of union split-offs	X	X	X	0

Source: Own elaboration

Code: x= The attribute is present 0= The attribute is absent

Pressure

The groups analysed in this paper can influence the political process through different strategies. The first indicator is funding of political campaigns; this is not a widely used strategy since its illegal in Mexico for unions to provide contributions to candidates and can only be found in STPRM⁷². The second indicator is endorsements of presidential candidates, here all the unions, with the exception of SNTE in 2012, backed one of the presidential candidates proposed by one of the three main political parties⁷³. The third indicator show the presence of union members at the committees where the reforms were

⁷¹ During 2006-2011, SNTE experiences 23 split-off, mostly regional organisations that obtained government recognition by local states.

⁷² The clearest example was the funding provided by STPRM to Francisco Labastida, the PRI's presidential candidate in 2000.

⁷³ SNTE, SNTSS and STPRM openly backed Francisco Labastida (PRI) in 2000, STPRM endorsed Roberto Madrazo (PRI) in 2006 and Enrique Peña in 2012. Finally SNTE broke up his alliance with PRI previous to the 2012 election.

discussed, all the union had representatives at the committees with exception of SNTSS who only had one congressman at the Social Security Committee in the Lower House⁷⁴.

The fourth indicator shows if the unions recurred to demonstrations in favor or against a bill. Here only SNTSS in 2004 and SNTE in 2012 protested against the approval of the bills. Finally, the fifth indicator shows the absence of strong opposition, that is if no other group pressed against the interest of the union. In this regard, SNTSS in 2004 faced the opposition of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) who represented a large number of workers affiliated to IMSS, and whose contributions were used to pay the SNTSS's pensions. SNTE also faced opposition in 2012 from different organisations who sought to promote the standardized evaluations, including powerful business organisations like COPARMEX (Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana), CEE (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial) and civil organisations like Mexicanos Primero and think tanks like IMCO and CIDAC.

TABLE 4. PRESSURE INDICATORS FOR INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE REFORMS

INDICATORS	SNTE 2002 (+)	SNTSS 2004 (-)	STPRM 2008 (+)	SNTE 2013 (-)
Funding of political parties with veto power	0	0	X	0
Endorsement of presidential candidates	X	X	X	0
Capture of congressional committees	X	0	X	X
Demonstrations in favor or against a bill	0	X	0	X
Absence of strong opposition	X	0	X	0

Source: Own elaboration

Code: x= The attribute is present 0= The attribute is absent

⁷⁴ In contrast SNTE had 11 congressman and three senators at the education committees linked to the union in 2002, STPRM had four representatives at the Energy Committee in the Lower House prior to the 2008 reform.

Comparing de facto political power with alternative explanations

Once the indicators are measured, we can proceed to determine an Index of De Facto Political Power (IFPP). The index is the mean of the fifteen indicators used to measure the three dimensions that compose the concept de facto political power: 1) Resources, 2) Capacity for Collective Action and 3) Pressure. Table 5 shows the results for each group.

TABLE 5. INDEX OF DE FACTO POLITICAL POWER

DIMENSION	SNTE 2002 (+)	SNTSS 2004 (-)	STPRM 2008 (+)	SNTE 2013 (-)
Resources	3	2	3	3
Capacity for Collective Action	7	5	6	5
Pressure	3	2	4	2
Total	13	9	13	10
IFPP	0.86	0.6	0.86	.66

Source: Own elaboration

The first observation that can be made about the index is that the groups who had positive results: SNTE in 2002 and STPRM in 2008 obtained higher scores than the negative cases. Also these groups seem be very similar in their resources, but they vary in their capacity for collective action and in the tactics used to influence the decision making process. Table 5 shows that political power can change across time, as in the case of SNTE who lost cohesion across time and failed to make an alliance with a major political party in the 2012 elections. The data also shows that demonstrations against a bill are not an effective tactic: both SNTSS in 2004 and SNTE in 2012 resorted to protest but it had no impact on the legislative result. Besides, it can be observed that the cases where interest groups were successful are those in which there are no rival interest groups.

In order to compare this hypothesis, Table 6 compares this index with alternative explanations about the legislative results. These alternative explanations are: 1) The presence or absence of divided governments, coded binary where 0 means absence and 1 presence, 2) The fragmentation of the party system to measure this variable I use the Rae Index (1971) $F=1-\sum p_i^2$, where p are the percentages of seats obtained by each political party and 3) The polarization of preferences of congressman, the indicator used is the standard deviation of the self-identification of representatives in the right-left continuum, the data is taken from PELA (1997-2012).

TABLE 6. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Case	Interest group's goal	Result	Divided Government	Fragmentation	Polarization	De Facto Political Power
A	Change the SQ	Positive	1	0,66	2,28	0,86
B	Change the SQ	Positive	1	0,66	2,28	0,86
C	Defend the SQ	Negative	1	0,71	2,51	0,6
D	Defend the SQ	Positive	1	0,72	2,96	0,86
E	Defend the SQ	Negative	1	0,72	2,33	0,66

Source: Own elaboration

First, Table 6 shows that divided governments have been a constant over the democratic period. Therefore there's no variation between the legislative results and the absence of majorities in Congress. Second, one alternative explanation could argue that the legislative process is conditioned by the fragmentation of the party system, that is, that a higher fragmentation lead to paralysis. In Mexico, the fragmentation of the party system shows a small increase since 2003. But as can be appreciated in Table 6, interest groups have had positive results both during the highest (case D) and lowest periods of party fragmentation (cases A and B) and both positive and negative results in legislatures with the highest levels of fragmentation (case D and E). Hence, there's no variation between fragmentation and the legislative results for interest groups.

Third, an alternative hypothesis can argue that higher levels of polarization lead to paralysis since the legislators' preferences are not close in the left-right continuum. The polarization of Congress shows fluctuation among the observed cases, but this variation does not appear to have an impact on the legislative result: interest groups have obtained positive results during the lowest (case A and B) and highest levels of polarization (case D), also they've had negative results in legislatures with low levels of polarization (case E). Finally, Table 6 shows variation between the results obtained by interest groups and the scores of the IFPP. The three cases where interest groups had positive results (cases A, B and D) are the ones with higher scores in the IFPP and the negative cases (C and E) show lower scores in the index. Consequently, there appears to be a relation between the levels of de facto political power and the legislative results in the cases analysed in this paper.

Conclusion

The legislative process in México has been studied using divided governments as an independent variable. Nevertheless, institutions can be studied as dependent variables that are the result of distributional conflicts in which power, both formal and informal, play a crucial role. In this regard, institutional equilibriums can be considered as the institutionalisation of power relations. Moreover, in the Mexican case the failure to approve structural reforms could be explained by taking into account interest groups who exercise *de facto* political power.

In this paper I analysed labour interest groups that sought to influence the legislative process, either to promote rent extraction or to preserve the rents created during the hegemonic period. Still, not all groups were successful in the legislative process. The cases studied in this paper show that groups can win and lose in the decision making process and that the influence of groups can vary across time as in the case of SNTE. Hence, interest groups vary in their *de facto* political power and it is possible that this variable has consequences on the legislative process.

This study constructed an Index of *de Facto* Political Power (IFPP) and compared it to alternative explanations: divided governments, fragmentation of the party system and polarization of Congress. Comparing the results only the IFPP varied with the legislative result, this could mean that interest groups are relevant for the decision making process due to their resources, their capacity for collective action and the pressure they exercise over the political institutions. The groups analyzed in this paper were very homogeneous in their resources, but varied in their capacity for collective action and the tactics used to influence the decision making process.

Therefore, it is crucial to study *de facto* political power. Here I presented a first attempt to measure, what some political scientists consider to be unmeasurable because of the ambiguity of the concept. But the results, which for now apply to a small number of cases, can open the door to a wider set of analysis that could include quantitative methods and comparisons between countries. More importantly, taking into account interest groups in the conformation of political equilibriums can enrich the theory of institutions by including informal actors in the crafting of rules.

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Lost in Self-Identification? In Search of NATO's Identity

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Abstract

The main purpose of the research is to analyze how NATO's identity is constructed through the discourses from three NATO Summits – Lisbon, Chicago and Wales. The research is based on post-structuralistic theoretical background which emphasizes the role of identity in the context of security policies. To study identity means to analyze discourse. Therefore, the research is based on discourse analysis searching for the meanings relevant to identity construction. The main representations of NATO's identity discussed include the role of Western values, partnership, threats and challenges, the role in global politics and community building. The research has revealed that an existence of NATO's self-identification relies on complexity and multidimensionality. One of the main reasons affecting the interaction among different aspects is related with fluster between modern and postmodern security logics. Thus, issues in international area and more or less real threats affect how these representations interact and dominate against each other.

Key Words:

Discourse, Identity, NATO, Post-Structuralism, Summit, Self – Other.

Introduction

NATO is usually understood as the Western military Alliance established in 1949 in order to deflect potential threats and contain the Soviet Union. An official web page suggests that NATO's purpose today is 'to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means' ('What is NATO' n.d.). Two elements can be seen – political and military. The first one means that 'NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defence and security issues' ('What is NATO' n.d.). The second one – 'if diplomatic efforts fail, NATO has the military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations' ('What is NATO' n.d.). Do these definitions and combination of the two elements describe what NATO today is?

At the end of the Cold War many predicted that NATO would not last. Because of the loss of the main enemy, the purpose of the organization – to stay allied together in front of the common potential threat – was also gone (Helene Sjursen 2004: 687). But despite the discussion that NATO's survival after the Cold War 'remains something of an anomaly' ('What is NATO' n.d.), the Alliance has not withered away, but remained as the biggest and oldest military alliance in modern times ('NATO Summits tries to tackle' 2010) up until these days. However, the new international order has immersed the Alliance into a deep identity crisis described in terms of inter-alliance strife, messy operations and inaction (Thomas D. Armstrong 2013). Therefore, this situation has raised new challenges – to define what NATO's place in the world order today is ('NATO Summits tries to tackle' 2010), who is protecting whom against whom and by what means (Matthias Gebauer, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp 2008). How to describe NATO's identity today? Is it the world's policeman now? (Matthias Gebauer, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp 2008). Does intense cooperation among members and partners in terms of economic and material help correspond to a vision of NATO?

The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to analyze how NATO's identity is constructed through the discourses from three NATO Summits. In order to attain this goal, speeches and statements of the main leading heads from the three NATO's Summits (Lisbon Summit, Chicago Summit and Wales Summit) have been analyzed. The analysis of period 2010-2014 should reveal tendencies of self-identification and possible alternation through a few years. Changeable international order, crisis in Ukraine, ISIL threat and

potential security challenges to the member-states in Eastern and Central Europe inevitably requires knowledge and understanding of how NATO is understood by its internal actors and what direction they bring the Alliance to. This analysis should also support or contradict to other research analyzing and arguing about NATO's identity after the Cold War and supplement existing scientific web about this issue. Post-structuralism is used as a theoretical background emphasizing the role of identity in the analysis of security policies. Due to a fact that the main material of the research is texts, discourse analysis has been chosen as a methodological tool.

The main tasks: 1) to formulate and explain the main theoretical and methodological principles relevant for this research; 2) to collect necessary material and analyze it; 3) to present the main interpretations according to results.

Structure of the research: 1) Endeavours to define post-Cold War NATO's identity – existing research briefly discussed; 2) Identity, security policy and discourse – the main theoretical and methodological ideas and assumptions introduced; 3) Searching for NATO's identity – the main interpretations presented.

Endeavors to Define Post-Cold War NATO's Identity

Discussion about NATO's identity and its place in international politics is not very new. Mostly constructivists undertook to explain 'anomaly survival' and highlight the role of identity in International Relations. The common idea suggests that NATO's survival was not an anomaly (as realists and neo-realists say), instead, norms, principles and identity should be taken into account in order to explain the persistence of NATO (Helene Sjursen 2004: 701). The main debate is probably composed from two parts: 1) whether NATO has solved the identity crisis and has come into a new one; 2) if yes, then whether the idea about NATO as 'an organization of values and norms' (Frank Schimmelfennig 2007: 201) explains its role and self-identification in the international area today.

In 1990 researchers were talking about 'the absence of plausible threat to Western military security' (Bradley S. Klein 1990: 320). The division between West as 'us' and East as 'them' became unimportant. Thus, at that time researchers mostly fixated the loss of existential threat. Of course, one of the main questions was how NATO would solve this loss in

terms of identity, but searches for an answer were left for the future. However, clear answer has not yet emerged. Both approvals ('NATO was relatively successful in establishing a new identity' (Trine Flockhart 2014: 76)) or disagreements are found within the research.

Some of them suggest that the loss of enemy from East has been replaced with an establishment of the boundaries between 'the West' and 'the rest'. Being a part of the West provides its members with a common identity in a specific place and related norms and values (Andreas Behnke 2013: 2). Thus, this logic would suggest that Other became unnecessary to NATO. But how then to make a division between Self and 'the rest'? The answer could be that NATO as security community before the Cold War has transformed into political community after the Cold War acting together to preserve both security and common interests (Veronica M. Kitchen 2009: 97). This transformation could serve as an explanation of how NATO described itself and constructed dominant identity without having a clear enemy.

However, there is no agreement about this among the researchers. For example, there are disputes that NATO could not be defined as a democratic community because it is not governed in a democratic way. This does not deny a fact that the Alliance can promote and support democratic values and its spread in the world, but it is not based on democratic principles (Helene Sjursen 2004: 702). A question is whether an internal structure of the organization prevents it from constructing such kind of identity in international politics. For example, Veronica M. Kitchen claims that Atlantic community is both security and political community. Common identity also exists and allies identify Alliance with the same terms because their interest is to not destroy their community (Veronika M. Kitchen 2009: 112). However, willingness to sustain the Alliance could not be considered as clear evidence of comprehensively accepted identity.

Others suggest that enlargements are a clear and sufficient argument to acknowledge the importance of values and norms in the context of NATO's identity. Discourse about the enlargement in 2004 shows that the post-Soviet countries sought to 'return to Western world' with a strong identification with the Western values as well as the Western international community (Frank Schimmelfennig 1998: 2016). Thus, NATO is identified

with these narratives by others and the enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe is understood as a perfect example how NATO entrenched itself as a promoter of democratic values in the world.

Furthermore, NATO has had preference to enlarge democratic CEE countries ever since the end of the Cold War in order to expand liberal values and the Western world. This idea supports the argument about NATO as Western community and its promotion. However, Frank Schimmelfennig argues that enlargement was instrumental and selective, it was not the implementation of a 'grand strategy' (Frank Schimmelfennig 2007: 233). Enlargements are also seen as a damaging practice which can undermine and diminish NATO's cultural and civilizational basis (Peter Van Ham 2001: 404). Why have the enlargements been done? Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann explored that institutions were a power for constructing democratic security community and identity related with it despite disagreements among member-states (Michael C. Williams, Iver B. Neumann 2000: 385). According to this, the answer about existing identity could be fixed.

However, motivation of CEE countries is also questionable. Alexandra I. Gheciu claims the Czech Republic and Romania did not share the vision of liberal democracy put forward by NATO (Alexandra I. Gheciu 2006). Despite the fact that NATO political actors sought to educate CEE states according to the norms of Western style democracy, the Alliance was understood as a military power and a guarantor of security from the perspective of CEE countries (Alexandra I. Gheciu 2006). Thus, do the 'new' and the 'old' member-states disagree about NATO? This possible division can illustrate different opinions within NATO, different understandings and expectations of what NATO should be.

This review shows that there is no agreement among scholars about NATO's identity. Different perspectives analyzing more-or-less the same issue does not give a clear answer, but just illustrate the possible complexity of different representations. It is worth noting that the studies discussed come from the years before 2010. Therefore, it is expected that this research analyzing first years of the second decade could supplement or even enlighten one of the controversial claims from the earlier works and at the same time let disassociate from the disputes on identity in the context of enlargements.

Identity, Security Policy and Discourse

Identity can be described as a cognition, who you are and whom you identify yourself with (Misheva Vessela 2008: 35). There are no objective or stable identities (Lene Hansen 2006: 5), but they vary and transform through political practices (Merje Kuus 2007: 97). David Campbell, one of the most influential post-structuralists in the field of International Relations, explains the construction of identity as a distinction between Self and Other, where the latter is radically threatening (Lene Hansen 2006: 6), and the threat is a condition for a state's existence (David Campbell 1992: 12) (other post-structuralists reject the necessity of radical Other⁷⁵). This point is especially relevant in the NATO's case – as the Soviet Union has collapsed, does NATO have any threat proving its liveliness through the concept of identity? Is it relevant to talk about NATO's identity without a presence of a radical Other?

First of all, can a question about an organization's identity be raised? Post-structuralists analyze the relationship between identity and state, its security policy. What about transnational entities such as NATO? Is NATO's identity autonomous, not just a derivative from its member-states and their national identities? This paper holds that if an alliance is understood as an autonomous organism with its institutions and policy practices, then discussions about its autonomous identity are relevant and grounded. Of course, there is no denial that the national states affect and influence NATO. However, the research by Williams and Neumann proves that despite disagreements among the states, identity can be powered and constructed by institutions (Michael C. Williams, Iver B. Neumann 2000: 385).

Post-structuralists would say that the process of mutual constitution exists. No one party (neither member-states, nor NATO) can claim priority, as both are a product of constitutive relationship (Andreas Behnke 2013: 30). Thus, common values, meanings and collective understanding who Other is or who friends are ground the idea about NATO as a sovereign entity and its relatively independent identity. The relationship between identity and security is also constitutive (Lene Hansen 2006: 2). The main idea is that identity is not

⁷⁵ Self – Other distinction can be constructed through differences in civilizational, political or geographical differences (Lene Hansen 2006: 6), contrast between present and past incidents (Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, 2012, p. XIV.).

above security policies, rather it forms and reveals through practices (Lene Hansen 2006: XIV). Hence, security policies are related with reproduction of identity (David Campbell 1992: 76). The practice of security policy is implemented through a construction of borders which also justify the borders of identity.

Going further, identities are constructed through the discourse. Therefore, to study identity means to analyze discourse. The concept can be described in many ways, but in this research discourse is understood as written and spoken texts constructing meanings and social knowledge⁷⁶ (Rawi Abdelal et al. 2006: 14). The concept of intertextuality describes relation among texts. It means that texts 'are situated within and against other texts, <...> they build authority by reading and citing that of others' (Lene Hansen 2006: 49). Therefore, political statements, speeches or interviews are 'located within a larger textual web' (Lene Hansen 2006: 49) and participate in the process of construction and articulation of identity. Intertextuality makes identity intersubjective and constituted from different meanings and interpretations in discursive, relational, changeable entity (Rawi Abdelal et al. 2006: 12).

Lene Hansen suggests a structure for research design, when one has to choose: whether one or multiple Selves are examined (the number of states, nations or other subjects studied), whether a study is based on a particular moment or a longer historical period, and finally, whether one or multiple events are analysed (Lene Hansen 2006: 67). The present research chooses one Self – NATO, and concrete events in concrete time – Lisbon Summit on 19-20 November 2010, Chicago Summit on 20-21 May 2012, and Wales Summit on 4-5 September 2014. These Summits are chosen as they signify the start of the new decade following the enlargements of the first decade of the 21st century. Due to changeable international area and security situation, it is important to research whether changes have affected the process of constructing identity or the key meanings have remained the same. The main material is speeches, statements of the main heads of NATO during the three Summits. While reading those texts, attention is paid to a direct reference to what NATO is, its purpose, biggest threats, etc.

⁷⁶ post-structuralists also consider movies, TV, photography, caricatures or even computer games as a discursive material (Lene Hansen 2006: 55)

The research is based on discourse analysis as a methodological instrument. It could be described in three ways: analysis of ideology, study of social changes and social constructivism (Inga Vinogradnaite 2006: 33). The third one is chosen as a way to identify socially constructed reality within different actors and formulate unique but at the same time intersubjective understanding of the world (Inga Vinogradnaite 2006: 40). This allows to answer how the world is understood and what meanings the texts construct (Inga Vinogradnaite 2006: 33). The main instrument for this method is interpretation. However, at the same time it is one of the biggest weaknesses, as research is based on subjective interpretation (Mark Neufeld 1993: 43).

Doing discourse analysis, based on repetitive meanings within texts, the main categories have been distinguished (i. e. NATO's purpose, important values, threats, partners). As Jennifer Milliken notes, unlimited categorization of texts is possible. Categories can be formulated individually according to the need (Jennifer Milliken 1999: 17). Then different categories are filled with corresponding texts. Then they are compared with each other for finding common meanings. Later interpretation is employed⁷⁷. While interpreting and seeking to find unique outcomes, the principles of induction are taken into consideration. When presenting results, interpretations are separated from actors, attention is paid to meanings only. This strategy corresponds to the main principles of post-structuralism which hold that attention is paid to texts, language and how meanings are constructed.

In Search for NATO's Identity

In order to better understand the meanings it is important to conceive which context they unfold in. Despite the fact that the chosen Summits are situated in quite a short period, they are related with different situations in international area. Changes, processes and crisis inevitably affect the agenda of all Summits. Both Lisbon and Wales Summits have been described as 'the most important in decades' ('NATO Review' 2010) or 'in the history of our alliance' ('Doorstep statement' 2014). During Lisbon Summit the main topics have been the new Strategic Concept, an agreement to establish a missile defence shield in CEE and the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. This Summit has been especially exclusive because of a partnership agreement with Russia and nuclear reduction. Chicago Summit

⁷⁷ Different meanings and different results can be found reading the same texts. It depends on questions of research – other questions require corresponding interpretation of other meanings.

has not been somehow unusual, but has also had its own agenda. Priorities of Chicago Summit have been exit strategy for the war in Afghanistan, enhanced global network of partners and NATO capabilities (smart defence concept) in the context of the age of austerity. Wales Summit has been held in a dramatically different security situation compared to the previous Summits. The Ukraine crisis and the threat of 'Islamic State' has been considered as real security issues and dangers for NATO's member-states. They together with NATO's mission in Afghanistan have been the main topics during this Summit.

This diversity shows how in such a short period of time the issues and the context of agenda have changed. However, the context is important only for understanding what possibly formulates and affects NATO's self-identification and vicissitude. Concrete issues or decisions made are out of the scope of this research. The focus of the research remains on meanings and representations of identity through speeches and statements. Interpretations are presented as results and divided according to the main dimensions of NATO's identity found in the discourse.

Does NATO Have Future?

One of the main keynotes in many statements and speeches are how strong NATO is and where its future lies. Therefore, this part discusses two main aspects: a) NATO's existence and perspectives for the future; b) an importance of community for surviving.

Liveliness of NATO is stressed during all the Summits with pretty much the same vocabulary. Phrases such as 'the strongest and most successful alliance that the world has ever known', 'the times may have changed, the fundamental reason of our alliance has not' ('Press Briefing' 2012), 'this is an Alliance that is strong and united' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014) supports the idea that despite the changeable international arena and agenda, NATO sustains its role in the world.

Similarly, NATO's importance in the future is unquestionable: 'at this summit [Lisbon] we also agreed on radical reforms to make NATO fit for the security challenges of the 21st century ('NATO Summit press conference' 2010); <...> we will take decisions which will frame the future of our Alliance ('Statement by the NATO Secretary general' 2010), '<...>

capable of dealing with the security challenges of the future' ('Remarks' 2012). These claims show that next to the present issues the Summits pay a lot of attention to what NATO will be in the future and how it should adapt itself. The repetitive assertion about NATO's vitality and strength in the future seems like a self-persuasion: NATO remains strong, ready, robust, and responsive to meet the present and future challenges from wherever they come ('Press Conference', 2014). Constant attempts to define the NATO's role for the future reveals problems of self-confidence and uncertainty. At the same time, the future itself becomes an aim to surpass the present and prove that NATO can remain important: 'today NATO is as vital to our future as it has ever been in our past' ('Strengthening the NATO alliance' 2014).

Understanding the fears for the future, community is strongly articulated as the foundation for the Alliance: 'the NATO Allies represent a unique and essential community of nations' ('Opening remarks' 2010). But what does community mean? Is it something more than just a bunch of member-states gathered in order to guarantee security? Is it relevant to claim that 'the Atlantic community is more than just security community' (Veronica M. Kitchen 209: 111)?

NATO is strong only when community is tight and coherent: 'we have done this for over 60 years by <...> getting ready to face the next challenge together' ('Press Conference' 2012); '<...> an Alliance which is committed to transatlantic solidarity and cooperation' ('Remarks' 2012). Only such community which is based on solidarity can survive and exist, being together is a prerequisite for NATO ('together we can face the future with confidence, whatever it holds' ('Opening Remarks' 2012)). Constant repetition of words 'together', 'future' expresses a strong belief in solidarity and assertion that it is the only way to keep NATO alive.

The importance of community and commitments between the allies has especially been stressed at Wales Summit ('no-one will leave here with any doubt that our collective security in NATO is as strong as it has ever been' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014)). This is of course related with a situation in international area. Community building and cohesion is constructed through reassurance of commitments such as Article V and defence of Allies ('Article 5 enshrines our solemn duty to each other. This is a binding, treaty obligation. It

is non-negotiable. And here in Wales, we've left absolutely no doubt -- we will defend every Ally' ('Remarks by President Obama' 2014)). While Lisbon and Chicago Summits have stressed community as a way to face abstract and uncertain future, Wales returns to the primary NATO's tasks, purpose and roots, that of security community ('we have already taken immediate steps to enhance our defence'; NATO protects all Allies, at all times ('Press conference' 2014)). Thus, when faced with real and actual threats NATO builds the community up through coherent defence and security demand ('we have already taken immediate steps to enhance our defence' ('Press conference' 2014)).

Thus, community building within NATO is based on the need for security: 'we gathered to reaffirm our commitment to freedom and security' ('Opening remarks' 2012), NATO's primary responsibility is to keep our people safe and our nations secure' ('Press conference' 2012). Thus, NATO is understood as a strong and powerful alliance seeking and warranting security to its member states. Although security has also been relevant in Lisbon and Chicago Summits, it has been emphasized during the Wales Summit in particular: 'yet today the protection and security that NATO provides is as vital to our future' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014). In this context the phrase 'we need to keep our people safe' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014) perfectly illustrates how security and community are combined as a mean to legitimize the existence of NATO. Attention should also be paid to the fact that a clear definition what security is or what it means to 'keep people safe' is not provided. It could be broadly interpreted-- from purely military security to security of shared values, welfare, etc.

Thus, abstract challenges directed towards the future suggest that NATO should be ready to tackle all possible threats. However, at the same time constant encouragements to develop community as a basis for NATO's existence shows a lack of confidence and uncertainty about the future. What could be said about identity? If the division between Self and Other should be applied, one of the plausible Others could be regarded as having no identity in the present world. Therefore, community is intensively articulated to stress the necessity to survive and have appropriate platform to face future challenges.

Does NATO Face Any Threats?

According to the theory, definition of Self is concurrent from defining the Other. One of the main reasons why NATO's post Cold War identity has been described in terms of crisis is that NATO member-states had no common enemy ('NATO Summits tries to tackle' 2010). Therefore, I am going to focus here on whether NATO has crystalized Other as yet and if so, how it is being described.

Definition what a threat to NATO is reveals the dynamic and changeable context. Firstly, during the Lisbon Summit identifiable threats have been 'terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of missiles that can hit our territory even today, and piracy' ('Closing press conference' 2010). Any threatening state or organization has not been mentioned. These threats show global attitude towards the world's issues. However, abstract threats demonstrate uncertainty towards how to deal with it and what a role of NATO is: 'NATO's security discourse in the age of terrorism no longer re-presents the West as a significant and relevant political space' (Andreas Behnke 2013:18). No clear distinctions can be seen. There are claims that 'we face new threats and new challenges' ('Press Conference' 2010), 'we will step up our cooperation across the board to meet all these challenges' ('Closing press conference' 2010); 'we will gear up to deal with the new threats' ('NATO Summit press conference' 2010). These claims demonstrate to a large extent orientation and action to the future without a clear understanding how and why threats really affect NATO, and how it constructs the division between Self and Other.

As Stephen M. Walt wrote, Until the Ukraine crisis arose, NATO looked like a nearly extinct dodo that had somehow managed to last into the 21st century (Stephen M. Walt 2014). Thus, Ukraine crisis and ISIL bring forth such a phrase in the Wales as 'the NATO Alliance is clear about the threat that we face' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014). The claim that 'we see the greatest number of crises since the end of the Cold War' ('Secretary General' 2014) reveals that the situation in international area is really understood as dangerous to NATO and requires protection of the member-states. The need for protection serves as means to glue community once again. The two main threats ('we face new and evolving dangers. To the East, Russia <...> to the South, <...> from North Africa to the Middle East' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014)) make NATO shift from abstract considerations about potential threats to the real issues the Alliance faces and has to react to ('a climate of chaos

beyond our borders which could have direct implications for us at home' ('Secretary General' 2014)). Knowing clear and concrete threats allows NATO to redefine itself again and to identify its borders that need to be protected. Thus, security once again reappears as the main value produced by NATO's existence ('Nato's core function is still territorial defence of our populations and our member states' (Paul Reynolds 2010)). Clearly fixing Others defines NATO as security organization and returns the purpose to save allies from those who are on the other side of Self borders.

Different risks and threats mentioned during the different Summits show that NATO does not have universally recognized and permanent enemy, therefore understanding what is threatening depends on changeable international area. Lisbon and Chicago Summits have focused on abstract potential challenges while Wales Summit has named concrete threats and risks. Every analyzed Summit reveals efforts to name what the threat is and what the main Other to NATO is. Therefore, NATO cannot identify, characterize itself without knowing what challenges it confronts. This tendency proves the theoretical idea that self-identification is impossible without the distinction between Self and Other.

Western Values and Global Activity

Another important issue that has been observed by other researchers as well is NATO's representation as an active protector's of the Western values in the global world. Therefore, two main aspects are analyzed: a) Western values as bedrock of contemporary NATO's identity; b) NATO as active global actor.

NATO's commitment to the Western values and norms ('united by shared values and a shared purpose' ('Opening remarks' 2012) have been underlined during the Lisbon and Chicago Summits. What are the main values of NATO? Those found in the discourse include: freedom ('determination to defend our freedom' ('Opening remarks' 2012) 'our alliance has been the bedrock of our freedom' ('Message from President Obama' 2012)), prosperity, democracy ('<...> that freedom, democracy, and prosperity that our generation has enjoyed be passed down to the next' ('Opening remarks' 2012)), cultural diversity ('NATO brings together many cultures, it is built upon diversity' ('Remarks' 2012)), peace and security ('NATO is an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values' ('NATO adopts new Strategic Concept' 2010)). Hence, a spectrum of the

mentioned values shows that the Alliance is understood not only as a military organization, but also as a political entity, 'bound together by solidarity' ('Opening remarks' 2010).

Freedom, democracy, respect to diversity and protection of those shared values symbolize a broad definition of NATO. Thus, the continuation of NATO is contingent upon the Alliance's capacity to construct and maintain a cultural space called 'the West' which provides its member-states with a common identity (Andreas Behnke 2013: 155). The Alliance becomes responsible for security of the Western world which is described not only in military, but also in political and cultural terms. This insight refers to the new identity tendencies calling NATO as a political and security organization. The aforementioned commitments to individual liberty, democracy or human rights (Frank Schimmelfennig 2007: 2014) extend the purposes and roles that are traditionally assigned to NATO. However, the discourse of Wales Summit shows somewhat a return from the extended spectrum of values to the ones that are more related with security situation and division between the Western values, 'rules-based security architecture' in Europe and broad agreement on that' ('Press conference' 2014) and 'barbaric and despicable acts' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014). A position about further enlargements ('NATO's door remains open. Each country will continue to be judged on its merits' ('Press conference' 2014)) perfectly reveals the division between Self and Other in terms of values: those whose values correspond or admit to the NATO's values, have a chance to become a part of Self.

A broad self-definition involves not only the protection of the Western values, but also concentration on global politics. Next to dealing with the issues in transatlantic area, NATO is also understood as a global actor actively participating in international processes throughout the world: 'we will continue to play our full part in a world for safety and more security' ('Active engagement' 2012). These claims disclose a few important aspects. One is related with idea that NATO is an open organization. Its actions should not be understood in modern logic just as protection of its borders ('<...> make sure it is ready to tackle the threats that may lie outside its territory' ('PM's closing remarks' 2012); 'threats are no longer confined within national borders' ('Opening remarks' 2012). Despite a definite number of the member states, the Alliance is open to be a reference point in dealing with the issues in the world politics (leaders come together to address global challenges that demand global solutions' ('Press conference' 2012). According to this perspective, NATO

is seen as a global power that is interested in global challenges, rather than placing its focus on the threats for the Western world. Activeness is still based on security to a large extent ('interest of our shared security'; 'allies and partners, share common security concerns' ('Opening remarks' 2012)). Security as well as importance of shared values, no matter in which way it might be defined, is the main purpose of NATO's participation in the global world.

Thus, it seems that by building an image of a political organization based on a spectrum of values NATO seeks to strengthen the ties among the member-states and to improve common actions, whereas in the global arena NATO is still perceived as a globally acting military alliance focused on security issues. Nevertheless, the representation of identity emphasizing the Western values is really very vivid. It could be discussed, whether it is related with an absence of a clear role, but an articulation of the importance of the Western values remains consistent throughout the three Summits. Thus, NATO's identity as a promoter's or a defender's of the Western values is one of the key representations within the discourses. Of course, further question could be raised on whether it means a shift from a military to a more political community, but the role of values in grounding the arguments about NATO existence is essential.

Building Partnership around the World

During the three Summits, an idea about partnership should also be analyzed as one of the key concepts describing NATO as it is today. How does the articulation of networks of partnerships provide insights about the tendencies of NATO's identity? Arguments about partnership and its impact on NATO's representation are analyzed in this part of the paper.

Lisbon Summit has been special because of 'a fundamentally new phase in relations between NATO nations and Russia' ('Closing press conference' 2010). As it has been said, Lisbon Summit was the first time after the Cold War when partnership with Russia was clearly established: 'we help not only bury the ghosts of the past <...> we exorcise them' ('Closing press conference' 2010). Thus, the main Other (and threat?) from East during the Cold War became a partner and a friend: 'NATO nations and Russia will be cooperating to defend themselves' ('Closing press conference' 2010). This break totally overthrown

theretofore existed logic and converted NATO into an ephemeral entity open to the whole world without any mental borders in space.

Generally Lisbon and Chicago Summits have been very much oriented to escalating an importance of partnership and cooperation between NATO and other states ('we will reach out to partners around the globe') ('Opening remarks' 2010). However, explanations what partnership to NATO means, why it is so important, and finally, what the content of being a partner with many different countries is, has been described in quite abstract ways: 'we will offer our partners around the globe more dialogue and more cooperation with NATO than ever before because our partnerships are proving to make a clear, concrete contribution to international peace and security' ('Press conference' 2010). According to the discourse, partnership should basically be based on prevention of possible threats around the world: 'NATO agreed to deepen its cooperation with partners <...>, make sure it is ready to tackle the threats that may lie outside its territory' ('PM's closing remarks' 2012); '<...> we will make our partnerships deeper, broader, and stronger' ('Opening remarks' 2012); '<...> we met with countries <...> strengthen our growing network of partnerships in the interest of our shared security' ('Press conference' 2012). Consequently, such a network including Russia shows that NATO does not confront with any state or organization, but connect with them for tackling global and borderless threats. Of course, a question arises how partners are chosen, but a possible answer has not been detected in the discourse. In this context NATO can be regarded as a common space for discussions and partnership.

Wales Summit has also stressed the need for partnership. It has been assured that 'we must extend our partnerships and build a more effective security network that fosters stability around the world' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014). But this time partnership has not been described as a common good, necessary for both NATO and partners and serving for making NATO a 'sounding board' between the member-states and partners (Andreas Behnke 2013: 18). Faced with real threats and insecurity, NATO feels responsible for others and for global stability this time: 'we agreed to expand the partnership that makes NATO the hub of global security'; '<...> a long-term commitment to help our friends and allies around the world' ('Remarks by President Obama' 2014). The world is not seen as a borderless space, instead a clearer division emerges between those who need help as

partners and those who threaten them. In addition to this, a few concrete measures and examples are proposed over how these relations between NATO and partners will work: 'we can agree to use our expertise to provide training and mentoring of forces in Jordan and Georgia' ('NATO Summit 2014' 2014); 'NATO has agreed to play a role in providing security and humanitarian assistance to those who are on the front lines' ('Remarks by President Obama' 2014). From common and equal cooperation with partners, Wales Summit has changed the rhetoric and NATO's position. It might be that due to the concrete threats, NATO is described as a global policeman, helping its partners and seeking to control situation by keeping it stable and secure.

All in all, what does talking about partnership tell about identity? It shows that NATO is not defined according to its borders or its feeling of concern for its member-states. Partnership and its importance to NATO confirm that NATO is a global actor which creates global network and feels responsible for security all over the world. Other possible interpretation is that making partnership around the world is a way to legitimize interventions where NATO feels the joint of security of its member states is at risk (Paul Reynolds 2010). Wales Summit demonstrates that borders exist and NATO takes responsibility to secure the weaker or more vulnerable partners. Thus, NATO could be described as a global policeman rather than just an open global actor.

Conclusion

Using the main principles of post-structuralism and discourse analysis in International Relations, the main aim of this research has been to analyze NATO's identity and its construction through the speeches and statements taken from the three – Lisbon, Chicago and Wales – Summits. The results of the analysis have been reported by presenting different perspectives on a basis of the dominant meanings and their interpretations. The main findings show that there is no possibility to clearly define what NATO's identity is or what it is not. As it has been suggested, NATO's self-identification is complex and multidimensional. All the tendencies and dimensions discussed constitute the core of NATO's identity.

- 1) Community is understood as a basis for NATO's further existence. Despite the claims that NATO is alive and strong, the uncertainty and concern about the future calls

NATO's readiness to face any possible challenges in the future into question. Therefore, the future becomes the aim by itself – to survive, but not as a wishy-washy entity, but as a self-defined community.

- 2) Nailing down threats or risks is a key in determining what characterizes Self. During Lisbon and Chicago Summits threats have been defined in a broad way, while during the Wales Summit concrete issues raising the need for protection and security have emerged. Thus, in this context two paradigms – modern and postmodern – compete in terms of security. This is probably the key reason why NATO's identity sometimes seems blurred and lacking clear self-understanding.
- 3) Attention to values and partnership is indeed one of the main characteristics of NATO. Of course, questions about instrumentality using the argument about partnership, protection or spread of the Western values exist. However, these concepts show that NATO defines itself as a global actor that tends to be not only a hub for discussions about present issues, but also a policeman helping and tackling security issues in the world.

As it has been mentioned when describing the concept of identity in post-structuralistic background, identity is not a given and stable subject - it varies according to political practices and situation in international area. Different security situation in Lisbon and Chicago Summits on one side and in Wales Summit on the other side let to unveil how the main concepts such as partnership, global action, the role of values, definition of threats diversely connects, differs and varies in terms and identity. The main distinction still exists between a global actor, pretending to be more political, spreading its influence and normative power in the world and an actor, seeking to protect and secure its member states and borders, to build strong community and partnership in order to tackle risks or threats. Which image dominates depends on whether any real or imagined threat exists and how it is defined. However, it is impossible to define an integral and united identity. Those who hold that NATO has an identity, have to pay attention and evaluate all the variety of this puzzle.

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Emerging Actors in International Development: the Case of Brazil and Portuguese Speaking Countries in Africa (2003-2014)

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Abstract

Under the leadership of former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his successor, Dilma Rousseff (2011-), Brazil has emerged as an important donor within the international development system. Within this context, Africa has stood out as a meaningful partner for Brazil's development initiatives. This paper analyses the dynamics of Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI) with Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (PALOP) between 2003 and 2014. It examines both the implementation of initiatives, pondering over the relative importance of the PALOP within Brazil's development assistance to Africa, as well as the dynamics of solidarity and interests that shape Brazilian cooperation with Africa. The analysis of discourse and practice suggests that the PALOP clearly stand out as prominent partners to COBRADI; beyond that, it suggests that self-interest and solidarity are not excluding dynamics in Brazil's development cooperation.

Key Words:

Brazil-Africa development cooperation, Brazil-Africa relations, COBRADI, emerging donors, international development, PALOP.

Introduction

At the beginning of the century, emerging donors (e.g. China, India, Brazil) have come to occupy a more prominent place as providers of development assistance, whereas not long ago they stood out as aid recipients themselves (Cabral and Weinstock 2010; Milani and Carvalho 2012; Fingermaun 2014). This re-emergence of South-South Cooperation (SSC) has become the object of a growing interest on the part of researchers and the media, but its dynamics still merit further study, particularly as more data becomes available. This paper, which is part of on-going research on Brazilian development cooperation, seeks to address some of these knowledge gaps by focusing on Brazilian aid to Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (PALOP)⁷⁸ between 2003 and 2014.

Under former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and his successor, President Dilma Rousseff (2011-), Brazil sought to diversify its international relations by strengthening partnerships with developing nations. In doing so, it prioritized Africa within its foreign policy strategy, albeit more markedly during Lula's tenure. Since then, not only have diplomatic and economic ties with the continent intensified, but development cooperation has also become a major driver in Brazilian engagement and discourse towards the African continent (Amorim 2010; White 2010; Oliveira 2014).

This paper will thus examine Brazilian discourse and practice towards the PALOP. These five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa have become important partners to Brazil since the final moments of their struggle for independence in the 1970s. Since then, not only have bilateral exchanges intensified, but multilateral institutional arrangements have also emerged, such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), established in 1996 (Saraiva 1996; Pimentel 2000; Pinheiro 2007; Amorim 2010). As such, the paper seeks to understand how Brazil implements its development cooperation initiatives in these countries. Precisely, it ponders over their relative importance in Brazilian foreign aid towards Africa. Beyond that, it also examines how Brazil reconciles solidarity and national interest in the context of its development cooperation strategy in Africa and the PALOP. While important contributions have been made to the subject, they remain largely focused on specific issues (e.g. Chichava *et al* 2013) and countries, leaving room for a broader approach. Furthermore, this paper aims to contribute to an expanding literature

⁷⁸ These countries are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe.

on the relationship between self-interest and solidarity in cooperation for development, particularly with regards to Brazil (e.g. Pino and Leite 2010; Milani and Carvalho 2012). The study will be largely based on the analysis of official documents and secondary sources. After introducing the concept of South-South Development Cooperation, the paper presents the main features of Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI). It then analyses Brazilian initiatives in Lusophone Africa and, before its concluding remarks, presents a brief discussion on the dynamics of solidarity and self-interest shaping such cooperation.

Conceptualizing South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC)

As emerging donors have become an influential force on the international development architecture, there has been a greater need to conceptualize the phenomenon of SSDC. Even though a consensual definition is still lacking, with each country proposing its own general vision of the topic (Fingermann 2014), this process can largely be apprehended by the notion proposed by the UN, whereby SSDC can be understood as “(...) a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how (...) for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions” (UN 2012: 5)⁷⁹.

SSDC stands out as a particular dimension of the broader phenomenon of South-South Cooperation as it has evolved since the 1950s. Broadly speaking, collaboration between developing countries can be traced back to the Bandung Conference and the subsequent establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In the following decades, efforts to enhance the development prospects and the negotiating capacity of developing nations continued through the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1964) (and within it of the G-77), with the approval of the Declaration on the New Economic International Order in the UN and a greater emphasis on technical cooperation with the adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries

⁷⁹ Operational definition proposed at the outset of the May 2012 meeting of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation.

(1978)⁸⁰. Nevertheless, in the midst of the debt crisis, neoliberal adjustments, and democratic transitions that marked the following two decades, SSC lost its impetus. It is only recently that it has regained prominence in the international scene under the more active international stance adopted by emerging nations (Chatuverdi 2012; Leite 2012; Milani and Carvalho 2012; Ullrich and Carrion 2013).

In practical terms, SSDC differs from the official development aid (ODA) provided by the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC-OECD) with respect to its modalities and composition, thus standing as a broader concept (Lengyel and Malalcalza 2011)⁸¹. Perhaps more important though, and of particular interest here, are the principles which guide cooperation between developing nations, most notably the ideas of solidarity, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, reciprocity, and the absence of conditionalities (Milani and Carvalho 2012; Fingermaun 2014; UNDP 2014). Beyond that, one must not forget the political implications of the rise of SSC Pursuant to Milani and Carvalho (2012), SSC in the 21st century stands out as

(...) an attempt to ensure a differentiated insertion on the part of some countries from the South in their dialogue with developed countries. Much of the institutional engineering that, since the early 2000, has supported SSC is based on the assumption that developing countries can and must cooperate with one another in order to ensure political reforms on global governance (IMF, WB, UN) and solve their own social and economic problems based on their shared identities (...), common efforts, interdependence, and reciprocity. This is the equivalent of saying that SSC presupposes geopolitical and geo-economic arrangements of the world

⁸⁰ According to Carlos Puente (2010), the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (1978), from which derived the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, was a milestone to technical cooperation within the global South. The document makes 38 recommendations to technical cooperation and focuses on 15 different areas of action.


⁸¹ Pursuant to the DAC, Official development assistance consists of “(...) those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)” (OECD 2015). The exclusion of export credits from the modalities of ODA is one of the differences between the DAC framework and South-South Cooperation in general (Cabral 2011).

that are not the sole expression of Western priorities (Milani and Carvalho 2012: 15)⁸².

Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (COBRADI) (2003-2014)

Under the leadership of President Lula, Brazilian foreign policy underwent significant adjustments, particularly in its affirmative stance towards the developing world. Such a stance has continued under President Rousseff, albeit with specific characteristics (Amorim 2010; Hirst, Lima and Pinheiro 2010; Milani and Carvalho 2012; Oliveira 2014). An important component of this new strategy has been Brazil's efforts to extend its position as a provider of development cooperation through the expansion of its budgetary and project portfolio, particularly during Lula's second term in office (Rizzi *et al* 2011; Inoue and Vaz 2012) (Figure 1)⁸³.

Figure 1 –COBRADI (2005-2010) (in current US dollars)



Source: Author with data from IPEA (2011) and IPEA (2014).

Brazil defines its international cooperation for development as follows:

⁸² Translated from the original text: (...) *uma tentativa de garantir uma inserção internacional diferenciada de alguns países do Sul no diálogo com países desenvolvidos. Boa parte da engenharia institucional que, desde o começo dos anos 2000, tem sustentado a CSS fundamenta-se no pressuposto de que países em desenvolvimento podem e devem cooperar uns com os outros a fim de garantir reformas políticas da governança global (FMI, Banco Mundial, ONU) e resolver os seus próprios problemas econômicos e sociais com base em identidades compartilhadas, esforços comuns, interdependência e reciprocidade. Isso significa afirmar que a CSS pressupõe uma geopolítica e uma geoeconomia do mundo que não sejam exclusivamente a expressão das prioridades do Ocidente* (Milani e Carvalho 2012: 15).

⁸³ Aggregate data for the period 2011-2014 is currently unavailable.

The total funds invested by the Brazilian federal government, entirely as non-repayable grants, in governments of other countries, in nationals of other countries in Brazilian territory or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development, understood as the strengthening of the capacities of international organizations and groups or populations of other countries to improve their socioeconomic conditions (IPEA 2011: 17).

Noteworthy are the principles that guide development cooperation, such as the ideas of solidarity and of mutual benefits and responsibilities, all of which bring Brazil closer to the discourse shaping SSC. Indeed, Brazil is reluctant to refer to its own initiatives as foreign aid, stating that “(...) in Brazil, when we talk about aid, we are talking about cooperation: South-South Cooperation (SSC)” (Farani 2011: 3). The Brazilian government thus opposes the notion of a donor-recipient relationship, opting for such terms as “exchange between equals”, “international cooperation”, “emerging donor” or “horizontal cooperation” (IPEA 2011; Inoue and Vaz 2012). According to Cristina Inoue and Alcides Vaz (2012), this characterization can be understood both in practical and philosophical terms. Indeed, although subject to change, Brazilian cooperation has not historically relied on loans and grants, which are commonly associated with ODA. Beyond that, Brazil’s bid can be seen as a move that reflects the country’s will to distance itself from images of paternalism, hierarchy and conditionality associated with traditional donors (Inoue and Vaz 2012).

Brazilian cooperation for development officially comprises the following modalities: (i) educational cooperation; (ii) contributions to international organizations; (iii) humanitarian assistance; (iv) technical cooperation; (v) scientific and technological cooperation and (vi) peacekeeping operations (IPEA 2011; 2014). Despite being excluded from the definition, debt relief will be accounted for in this paper. This move is justified by the significant evidence as to its usage and as an effort to increase the intelligibility of future comparisons⁸⁴. Within these modalities, technical cooperation, which is coordinated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), has come to occupy a noteworthy symbolic place in COBRADI, even being termed the “brand

⁸⁴ Independent references to scientific and technological cooperation, as well as peacekeeping operations appear only in IPEA 2014; the former being placed under technical cooperation for IPEA (2011). Carlos Milani and Tássia Carvalho (2012) point to the fact that Brazil’s current characterization of its development cooperation is still incomplete, excluding elements such as cooperation provided by federative units. Other issues concern the inclusion of financial and economic cooperation into Brazil’s official aid modalities (Cabral 2011).

image of Brazilian cooperation” (Cabral 2011: 12; Albuquerque 2013). Officially, this type of cooperation is said to be free of conditionalities and commercial purposes while also serving as an instrument to consolidate Brazil’s external relations (IPEA 2011). Finally, all throughout the period under study, trilateral or triangular cooperation has increasingly become a mechanism to foster development projects, through the establishment of partnerships with developed countries and international organizations⁸⁵. Moreover, since 2008, Brazil has sought to promote structuring or groundwork projects, claiming that they have a greater positive impact on the field (IPEA 2011; ABC 2012c; Inoue and Vaz 2012; Fingermann 2014).

Brazil-PALOP development cooperation (2003-2014): practices, modalities and initiatives

The present section analyses Brazil’s development cooperation with the PALOP. Particularly, it will assess the relative importance of these five countries as development partners in the African continent. It begins with a brief description of the general aspects of Brazilian development initiatives in Africa before focusing on Lusophone Africa in particular.

Brazilian cooperation for development in Africa: general aspects


Upon taking office in 2003, President Lula pledged to make a contribution to the development of Africa’s full potential (Silva 2003), a commitment that was followed by a series of initiatives. Indeed, until 2006, Brazil had relieved more than US\$ 931.8 million of African debt – notably 74.25% of all debt relief initiatives up to that year –, in a move consistent with the Millenium Development Goals and the Paris Club prerogatives. Debt relief measures continued under President Rousseff, benefiting countries like Gabon, Sudan, and Senegal (Presidência 2007; Moura 2013).

With regards to official cooperation modalities, Brazil’s programs and expenses between 2005 and 2010 targeted the African continent and African nationals in the form of humanitarian assistance, contributions to international organizations and banks, and refugee protection (IPEA 2011; 2014). Under the guise of the India, Brazil and South

⁸⁵ According to Inoue and Vaz (2012), Brazil has also began pursuing South-South South trilateral cooperation arrangements.

Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund), functional since 2006, projects in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, among other nations, have been financed (IBSA 2011). On the field of educational cooperation, the Exchange Program for Undergraduate Students (PEC-G) and the Exchange Program for Graduate Students (PEC-PG) stand out as two of Brazil's most prominent educational programs by allowing foreigners to graduate from Brazilian universities. Between 2003 and 2013, Africans from 17 countries benefitted from PEC-G, representing almost 81% of all students enrolled in the program (5149 out of 6377 students); as to the PEC-PG, African participation was considerably lower, slightly over 20% (IPEA 2014; MRE 2014a; 2014b).

Following demands by President Lula, the MRE sought to increment Brazil's network of technical cooperation. In this context, Africa, and particularly the PALOP countries, became a regional priority (Farani 2009; ABC 2014). Indeed, during Lula's tenure, 238 technical cooperation agreements were signed between Brazil and African nations, as opposed to the 33 established by the previous government (1995-2002). Some of these agreements established new partnerships, thus enlarging the geographical scope of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa, an increase of over 318% compared to 2002 (from 11 to 35 countries) (Mendonça 2013). The increase in the number of partners was accompanied by growing expenditure between 2004 and 2010 (from under US\$ 2 million to more than US\$ 22 million), with the exception of 2007; in 2010, the continent accounted for 57% of all budgetary execution on technical cooperation. Despite a large array of themes, most projects focused on agriculture, education and health (52%), but fields such as social protection and biofuels also received great attention, not least on Brazilian discourse towards African development. Over the following two years, budget execution underwent a considerable reduction, as shown below (Figure 2) (ABC 2011; 2013; Cabral 2011; Stolte 2012).

Figure 2 – Technical cooperation with Africa: annual budget execution (2003-2012) (US\$)

Source: adapted from ABC (2013).

That notwithstanding, under President Rousseff, Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa continued to foster some of the innovations devised under Lula. By building on the expertise of public institutions such as the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz), the impetus to develop groundwork projects and foster trilateral cooperation was reinforced by the advancement of projects such as the Capacity Improvement Project on Research and Technology Transfer for Development of Agriculture in the Nacala Corridor (ProSavana) and the production of anti-retroviral drugs, both in Mozambique (Chichava *et al.* 2013; Russo *et al.* 2014).

Brazilian development cooperation with the PALOP : strengthening partnerships

Brazilian development cooperation with the PALOP covers the full range of official modalities of COBRADI, as well as initiatives in debt relief. Given the greater availability of data regarding technical cooperation and its centrality as the “brand image of Brazilian cooperation”, analysis will focus mostly on this particular modality. After a broad overview, attention will be directed towards specific themes in technical cooperation, precisely the fields of education, agriculture and social protection, as well as technical cooperation in health.

Brazilian technical cooperation with Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Guinea-Bissau dates back to the end of the 1970s, when Brazilian foreign policy started advocating for the strengthening of ties with these former Portuguese colonies. By the mid-1980s, all five countries had signed a Basic Technical Cooperation agreement with Brazil; even more so, the late 1990s brought about the allocation of specific resources to finance projects in the PALOP amidst the incremental expansion of efforts to foster Brazilian technical cooperation. Throughout this trajectory, Portuguese-speaking countries remained the main recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation. In fact, only taking into account the period between 1995 and 2005, for which data are available, one finds that they accounted for 94% and 68.9% of projects and actions in Africa, respectively (Puente 2010; Inoue and Vaz 2012; ABC 2012a; 2012b; 2012d; 2012e; 2012f; 2012g).

Despite the geographical expansion of technical cooperation agreements and projects during Lula's tenure, the PALOP have continued to account for the bulk of initiatives in Africa, a reality that is consistent with ABC's stated priorities. According to the agency itself, these countries responded for 55% of resources allocated for projects in Africa (ABC 2010). This trend is even more impressive when one considers that, between 2005 and 2009, as much as 27% of all resources made available for technical cooperation were disbursed in Portuguese-speaking countries⁸⁶. In this same period, Guinea-Bissau alone responded for 6% of expenditures; being closely followed by Angola and Mozambique, each with 4%. In 2010, Lusophone countries accounted for 24% of all budgetary expenses within this modality (IPEA 2011; 2014). The establishment of a complementary agreement on technical cooperation was even a part of the Strategic Partnership established between Brazil and Angola in 2010; the said agreement was signed in 2012 and it envisages action in the fields of energy, health, education, and the justice system (Cruz 2012; ABC 2012a). An assessment of technical cooperation in particular fields allows one to further grasp the importance of the PALOP in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Taking advantage of the shared Portuguese language, technical cooperation in education has seen some interesting initiatives in professional education, which responded for 61.96% of all technical cooperation projects in education between 2000 and 2012 with

⁸⁶ Timor Leste is included in this calculation.

Africa, for when data is available (Ullrich and Carrion 2013). According to Ullrich and Carrion (2013), the impetus to foster professional education in these countries stems from the lack of specialized *main d'oeuvre*. Central to this strategy has been the implementation of vocational training centers by the Brazilian Service for National Apprenticeship (SENAI), which began even prior to Lula's administration. In Angola, for example, where a center has been active since 2000, courses are offered in the fields of mechanics, masonry, and sewing, among others. Its administration was transferred to the Angolan government in 2005. Beyond that, other units exist in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and implementation is under way in Sao Tome and Principe and Mozambique. Concerning the latter, this process included the offering of courses to the center's future trainers (ABC 2010; 2012c; Modelo 2011). Furthermore, since 2007, SENAI began to work in association with private Brazilian companies in Africa. The outset of such partnerships came with the establishment of the Odebrecht Center for Technical Education in Angola. In 2013, SENAI and Odebrecht signed a new contract to ensure the training of 770 Angolans from Biocom, a company that operates in the bioenergy and sugar-alcohol sectors. Vale, Brazil's giant mining corporation, has also engaged in educational arrangements with SENAI. Indeed, in 2009, both came to an agreement regarding the qualification of workers for the Moatize mine, a project that has sparked controversy over its social effects⁸⁷ (IPEA and WB 2011; Pires 2013).

From the support for horticulture in Cape Verde, through the strengthening of cashew production in Guinea-Bissau, to the broader collaboration to the development of agriculture in Sao Tome and Principe, Brazil has fostered a series of projects and actions in agriculture and social protection in Portuguese-speaking nations in Africa (ABC 2010; ABC 2014a). Brazilian cooperation in agriculture and social protection with the PALOP also provides a good illustration of the patterns that characterize Brazil's more general approach, such as reliance on the country's own expertise and experience, and the usage of long-established public institutes to provide cooperation (e.g. EMBRAPA). Furthermore, it allows one to probe into the more recent trends of mixed-modality arrangements, groundwork projects and trilateral cooperation, the Mozambican portfolio being a great example (Chichava *et al* 2013). In 2011, Mozambique was one of the five countries which have adhered to the More Food Africa program, a mixed-modality family farming program

⁸⁷ For further information, see 'Mozambique protesters at Brazil-owned Vale coal mine' (2013), *BBC*, April 17th. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22191680>.

that couples technical cooperation with concessional loans for Africans to buy Brazilian equipment and machinery (Chichava *et al.* 2013; Moçambique 2014). Mozambique is also one of the beneficiaries of a program launched in 2012 combining the efforts of the Brazilian government and Britain's DFID, with the support of the World Food Program and the FAO. The Purchase from Africans for Africa program (*PAA África*) stems from an idea put forward by the Brazilian government during the High-Level Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fighting Hunger and Rural Development (2010) and builds upon the Zero Hunger national initiative. The program seeks to enhance access to institutional markets for small-scale farmers while at the same time ensuring food assistance to school children. Phase I, which ended in December 2013, saw 497 farmers and 74,520 children assisted by the program in Mozambique (PAA Africa 2014).

EMBRAPA has been a major supporter in the development and implementation of structuring projects in the PALOP by means of trilateral cooperation. In Mozambique, two programs are noteworthy, the ProSavana and *Pro.Alimentos*. According to Chichava *et al* (2013: 11-2), "ProSavana is perhaps the most ambitious and high profile initiative in the recent history of Brazil's international cooperation for development in Africa". The project was born from a partnership between the Brazilian and Japanese governments back in 2009 and seeks to build upon Brazil's experience with turning its Cerrado region into a productive agricultural zone. Its ultimate goal is to increase food security in Mozambique, a partner sought due to the similar conditions between its Savana region and the Cerrado, through investments in research and extension. The initiative, under implementation since 2011, will be concluded in 2016 (Chichava *et al* 2013; EMBRAPA [2014b]).

Food security is also at the core of the Technical Support to Nutrition Programs and Food Security in Mozambique (*Pro.Alimentos*), a trilateral initiative between Brazil, Mozambique and USAID established in 2010. The project focuses on subsistence agriculture and family farming and operates under the Global Initiative to Fight Hunger and Food Security (GHFSI). Its implementation phase began in 2011 with completion scheduled for December 2014 (Fingermann 2014; EMBRAPA [2014a]). Starting in 2014, a groundwork project is under development in Angola in partnership with the FAO under the Brazil-FAO South-South Triangular Cooperation Program. It seeks to enhance the country's agricultural innovation and research prospects (EMBRAPA [2014c]).

Brazilian technical cooperation in health with the PALOP targets a range of issues, such as projects against malaria, the strengthening of national health institutions, and HIV/AIDS. With 31 active projects in these five countries in 2011, the PALOP were the main recipients of Brazil's projects in health (Russo *et al.* 2013). Similar to agriculture and social protection, structuring projects have been launched in recent years, with some remarkable examples being implemented by FIOCRUZ (WB and IPEA 2011; FIOCRUZ 2014). Noteworthy is the establishment of an anti-retroviral pharmaceutical plant in Mozambique, a project born back in 2003 from a request made by the Mozambican government. Despite delays due to procedural and financial matters, the factory was finally inaugurated in 2012. In the following year, production of five different drugs began and, interesting enough, the Mozambican government intends to move production beyond the initial focus on HIV/AIDS medication. As it stands, it is the sole publicly owned drug plant in Sub-Saharan Africa; Brazilian support is currently scheduled to end in 2017 (Stolte 2012; Roa and Silva 2013; Russo *et al.* 2014).

Other groundwork initiatives include actions to strengthen the public health institutions of the PALOP countries, such as the support for technical health schools in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, as well as the development of national health schools in Mozambique and Angola. Cooperation in health between FIOCRUZ and the PALOP benefits largely from the framework provided by the CPLP. Here, one notes the initiative to establish human milk banks in CPLP countries (2008), with a unit opening in Cape Verde in 2011 (Fonseca 2013; Roa and Silva 2013).

In regard to the other modalities of Brazilian development cooperation, the pattern of expenditures allows one to probe into the importance of the PALOP in Brazil's foreign aid. Even though the African continent only accounted for 7.26% of disbursements in humanitarian assistance, the members of the CPLP combined – thus including Timor-Leste – represent 8% of total expenditure between 2005 and 2009. In particular, Guinea-Bissau received 3.48% of total spending in the period (IPEA 2011). The PALOP were by far the main beneficiaries of PEC-G between 2003 and 2013. Together, they represented almost 84% of all African students awarded scholarships to Brazilian universities; and close to 68% of all students welcomed in the same period. In PEC-PG, they accounted for more

than 92% of African students (MRE [2014a]; [2014b]). In 2010, for when data is available, the Portuguese-speaking countries were the five main recipients of Brazilian development assistance to Africa, receiving almost 77% of all spending (IPEA 2014).

Debt relief measures were also extended to the PALOP. In 2003, President Lula ratified a debt forgiveness agreement relieving Mozambique of 95% of its debt with Brazil (US\$ 331 million), concluding negotiations under way since 2000. With Cape Verde, debt restructuring resulted in the elimination of US\$ 1.2 million out of the US\$3.9 million in interests owed by that country. During Rousseff's first term in office, Sao Tome and Principe was one of the countries whose debt, which amounted to a little more than US\$ 4.3 million, was restructured amidst measures to renegotiate almost US\$ 900 million of the debts from twelve African nations. The formal announcement, made during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the African Union, also includes Guinea-Bissau (Perdão 2004; Em Cabo Verde 2010; AFP 2013; Senado Federal 2013).

Solidarity and national interest in Brazil-Africa development cooperation: insights from the PALOP

The growing role of emerging nations as providers of development cooperation has sparked interest over the motivations guiding their actions. In the Brazilian case, recent studies have sought to engage in this discussion (e.g. Pino and Leite 2010; Inoue and Vaz 2012), with some focusing on relations with the African continent (e.g. Milani and Carvalho 2012). This section seeks to probe into how Brazil reconciles its geopolitical and economic interests with the logic of solidarity attached to SSDC by looking at examples from the PALOP.

As mentioned before, solidarity is a prominent concept in Brazil's discourse on development cooperation. This conception is reflected on official addresses specific to the African continent. Indeed, during his speech at the opening ceremony to the 13th General Assembly of the African Union, in 2009, President Lula stated that:

Brazil is not coming to Africa to expiate the guilt of a colonial past. We also do not see Africa as an extensive reserve of natural resources to be exploited. Brazil wishes

to be a partner in development projects. We want to share experiences and lessons, consolidate efforts and unite capabilities (Silva 2009: 2)⁸⁸.

Even more so, in the African context, solidarity is coupled with an ethical component whereby development cooperation is associated with reparations for slavery (Puente 2010). That notwithstanding, does the notion of solidarity thus exclude the importance national interests can play in Brazil's development cooperation with the PALOP in particular, and with Africa in general? According to Milani and Carvalho (2012), historical, regional and cultural contexts provide the basis for solidarity in South-South Cooperation, though this particular element cannot be dissociated from other interests (i.e. political, social, cultural, economic), and that on the side of both providers and recipients of this said development cooperation. Indeed, Brazil is kin on stating that its development cooperation serves as a foreign policy instrument where its mechanisms can help strengthen Brazil's relations with other developing nations. This is made explicit in regards to technical cooperation (IPEA 2011),

In the Brazilian case, South-South cooperation [technical cooperation] is inspired by the concept of "Diplomacy" whereby Brazil makes available to other developing countries the experiences and the knowledge of specialized national institutions, without the imposition of any conditionalities and detached from commercial interests or lucrative intentions (...) This modality of international exchange represents, moreover, an important instrument to promote Brazil's image and potential abroad. In South-South cooperation, one transfers not only what is best, in terms of competencies and services, but one also disseminates the country's position as an active actor on the international scene, in favor of development and solidarity, materializing a traditional point in Brazilian foreign policy (Farani 2009: 21)⁸⁹.

⁸⁸ Translated from the original text: *O Brasil não vem à África para expiar a culpa de um passado colonial. Tampouco vemos a África como extensa reserva de riquezas naturais a ser explorada. O Brasil deseja ser parceiro em projetos de desenvolvimento. Queremos compartilhar experiências e lições, somar esforços e unir capacidades* (Silva 2009: 2).

⁸⁹ Translated from the original text: *No caso brasileiro, a Cooperação Sul-Sul é inspirada no conceito de "Diplomacia" na qual o Brasil coloca à disposição de outros países em desenvolvimento as experiências e conhecimentos de instituições especializadas nacionais, sem a imposição de condicionalidades e desvinculada de interesses comerciais ou fins lucrativos (...)* Essa modalidade de intercâmbio internacional representa, outrossim, um importante instrumento de divulgação da imagem do Brasil e de suas potencialidades no exterior. Na Cooperação Sul-Sul, transfere-se ao exterior não apenas o que há de melhor no País, em termos de competências e serviços, como, também se difunde a postura do País como ator ativo no cenário internacional, em favor do desenvolvimento e da solidariedade, materializando assim um dos pontos tradicionais da política externa brasileira (Farani 2009: 21).

The “Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development”, held in Brasília in 2010, provides an illustration of the political impetus attached to Brazil’s development cooperation with Africa (Albuquerque 2013). Pursuant to the final document, Africa and Brazil must engage in joint efforts to secure better access to markets, technology and financial resources, as well as the lifting of barriers in international trade in favor of developing countries (MRE 2010). Perhaps more symbolic is the election of José Graziano da Silva to serve as FAO’s director in 2011. Pursuant to a Mozambican official interviewed by Chichava *et al.* (2013: 22), “For his election, Brazil negotiated with Guebuza the support of Mozambique for his candidacy. Brazil pressured the PALOPs to support Graziano by committing to a South-South Cooperation policy”⁹⁰.

The matter of economic interests attached to Brazilian cooperation for African development is harder to evaluate at this stage, although some points of contention are worth highlighting. For instance, the experience with mixed-modality arrangements, particularly the More Food Program, leaves one to ponder over the relationship between Brazil’s technical cooperation and commercial interests. According to Cabral and Shankland (2013), the issue became a point of bureaucratic contention between ministries from economic portfolios, keen on partnering with commercially relevant countries, and the MRE, which rejected the conditionality approach. In the end, demands from African nations emerged as the criteria for selecting partners and terms for concessional loans for machinery were agreed upon. Private sector engagement also plays a role in ProSavana, though not in the official project itself. Besides visits from Brazilian farmers, business events were held to lure private entrepreneurs and farmers into Mozambique, such as the ‘Agribusiness in Mozambique: International Cooperation Brazil-Japan and the Investment Opportunities’ in 2011. Another initiative concerns the establishment of the Nacala Fund, which seeks to mobilize private capital to help develop agribusiness in the Nacala region (Chichava *et al.* 2013). Though not an official modality in Brazilian development assistance,

⁹⁰ Following Miguel Lengyel and Bernabé Malacalza’s (2011), one could apprehend such behaviour through the concept of political conditionalities. Pursuant to them, “(...) the empirical evidence allows us to state that Southern relations also apply political conditionality of the donor (not necessarily exposed to the public) that comes from the use of SSC as an instrument of foreign policy. It is therefore a tacit conditionality related to the donor’s foreign policy; in many cases, it may take the form of an appeal for international support of a particular case, the support to a peacekeeping mission or simply a fulfillment of a particular diplomatic issue by the host/recipient country (Lengyel and Malacalza 2011: 15-6). This is not to say that there is a contradiction with the Brazilian discourse since the country does not impose policy and procedural conditionalities, commonly associated with cooperation by traditional donors.

debt relief measures can also be related to Brazilian economic interests, since poverty relief and the prospects for financing new investments are both envisaged by the Brazilian government (MRE 2013; Brasil 2013; Renegociação 2014). To what extent all these elements pose a challenge to Brazil's conceptual framework and discourse in favor of development cooperation remains to be seen.

Conclusion

Following President Lula's initial commitment in 2003, Brazil-Africa cooperation for development underwent a significant renewal, as seen by the increase in the number of partners and in expenditures until 2010 (the year 2007 constitutes an exception to this trend). Even though the Rousseff years have seen a decrease in expenditures in technical cooperation with Africa, the "brand image of COBRADI", important projects have continued to be implemented, some of them through means of trilateral cooperation. Through it all, the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa have remained prominent partners to Brazil's international development efforts. Their centrality to Brazil's development cooperation in Africa can be apprehended both through quantitative means, as well as qualitative aspects. In 2010, in particular, they responded for 77% of all disbursements made to initiatives in African nations (IPEA 2014). With regards to education cooperation, for instance, the PALOP account for the majority of all Africans enrolled in the PEC-G and PEC-PG initiatives. Technical cooperation provides an even clearer picture of the importance of the PALOP, with these countries being singled-out by the Brazilian government as priorities to development projects. Moreover, they have also been the scenario for the implementation of ambitious initiatives, combining several recent innovations in Brazil's approach to development cooperation. The ProSavana project is but one example of such trends.

To what extent does Brazil engage with Africa and the PALOP in order to express solidarity or in pursuit of self-interest? As the analysis has shown, with illustrations from the PALOP, national interest does play a role in Brazil's stance towards development cooperation, though a clear and coherent vision seems to still be under discussion. Regarding economic interests specifically and exemplified by the internal dispute over the More Food program, different sectors within the Brazilian government disagree over the criteria to be applied when engaging in development projects, a situation that will need to

be addressed as COBRADI expands. This, of course, is not meant to offset the logic of solidarity that underlies discourse and the will to contribute to African development under the guise of South-South Development Cooperation. Even more so, as noted by Pino and Leite (2010), the association between self-interest and development cooperation should not undermine the fact that COBRADI has had positive outcomes through a commitment to international development in regional, interregional and multilateral settings, the passing on of good practices, and the engagement of multiple actors.

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Inter-Local Collaboration: A New Approach Toward the Implementation of the Integrated Coastal management (ICM) Program of Batangas, Philippines

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Abstract

Today, Batangas is one of the only provinces in the Philippines, who have implemented the Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) program successfully alongside with Bataan and Guimaras. It is a mechanism to increase the efficiency of coastal governance in terms of its ability to achieve sustainable use of coastal resources. The Local Government Code of the Philippines encourages cooperative mechanisms and partnerships among stakeholders at the local level. Furthermore, different sectors and stakeholders, from international, national, and local levels, have contributed to the implementation of the program. The Local Government Units (LGUs) of Batangas are among the key actors in the implementation of the program. Using the Model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell & Gash, 2007), and Common Pool Resource Theory (Ostrom, 1990), this paper reveals that the inter-local collaboration of Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province as regards the successful implementation of the ICM program in their province is effective based on the Critical Ingredients for Effective Inter-Local Government Unit (LGU) Cooperation, which was formulated by the Philippine Development Forum Working Group on Decentralization and Local Government's Sub-Working Group on Inter-Local Cooperation. A qualitative approach was used in this research, through the descriptive method following an evaluative design. As such, this research caters contributions to the field of political science, both theoretically and practically by applying the aforementioned theories, and by exemplifying the interactions of the LGUs of Batangas in fulfilling the goals of the ICM program as a successful model which could be adopted by other LGUs in the country.

Key Words:

Batangas Province in the Philippines, Coastal Region, Inter-local Collaboration, Intergrated Coastal Management Program, Local Government.

Introduction

With its thousands of islands, the Philippines has an estimated 36,289 kilometers length of coastline, and is considered to be one of the longest coastlines in the world. The Philippine coastline extends to 2,000 kilometers from north to south of the country, and its 25 major cities are situated on the coast. Further, according to the statistics of The World Bank Group in 2005⁹¹, more than 60 percent of the total population of the Philippines, about 87.8 million people, resides in the coastal zone. Additionally, the Philippine coastal system is renowned as the world's center for tropical marine biodiversity, characterized by extensive coral reefs, sea grass beds and mangroves, with abundant fisheries and marine life (PEMSEA, 2006: 1). The aforementioned data regarding the coastal systems of the Philippines assert that there is a great need for the country to adopt and implement an Integrated Coastal Management to secure a more comprehensive way of governance toward attaining the sustainable development of the coastal regions in the country.

Coastal systems are considered to be complex and an extraordinary environment. It consists of a handful of benefits to offer such as its rich natural resources which are being utilized as mediums for different communities and local governments to lead themselves toward development. Thus, coastal areas are venues where major human settlements and activities take place (Haslett, 2009: 1). In a study conducted by Saguin (2008), the Philippine coasts today are experiencing massive ecological and economic transformations. With the factors of mega-development, excessive harvesting of resources, terribly increasing occurrences of disasters, and climate change, the coasts are being affected directly, and communities situated therein suffer severe economic and ecological damages including the loss of lives, property, imbalances in biodiversity, and serious depletion and degradation of marine resources.

With the effects of the abovementioned factors to the coastal areas, a framework known as the Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) Program has been introduced by an international organization—Partnerships in the Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA)—in order to attain sustainable development for the coasts, and to address the pressing problems of various environmental hazards affecting them. ICM

⁹¹ The Philippines Environment Monitor 2005


Program was first introduced in the Philippines in the province of Batangas⁹², which is considered as one of the emerging sites for development in the country. In the words of Chua (as cited in Provincial Government-Batangas, Philippines and PEMSEA, 2008: 1), ICM is a natural resource and environmental management framework which employs an integrative, holistic approach, and an interactive planning process in addressing the complex management issues in the coastal areas, and also allows economic development to proceed at the same time.

As a management framework, the ultimate purpose of the ICM program is to increase the efficiency of coastal governance of the focus coastal areas. Batangas, being the experimental site in the Philippines for the implementation of the framework, has expressed its huge interest to apply the framework of the ICM program to their province in order to establish a systematic governance for the sustainable development of their marine and coastal areas. Consequently, it is also important to take in consideration the institutionalization of the framework to the provincial government structure of Batangas. The province of Batangas is a very good locale for this research as it possesses several potentials and opportunities which can be utilized to further the development of the province. Among these are the potential of the Batangas bay to be developed as an international port in the country. In addition to this, the existence of the breath-taking beaches and diving sites can supplement to the totality of the performance of the tourism industry of the country. Moreover, the abundant marine and aquaculture present in the coastal areas are also considered as assets of the province.

The Coastal Communities of Batangas Province

The 3,166 km² land area of the Batangas province is home to 34 cities and municipalities in which 14 are coastal municipalities, and one is a coastal city. In addition, it consists of three major bays—Batangas Bay, Balayan Bay and adjacent bays, and Tayabas Bay and adjacent bays—which carry 492 km total length of coastline. In implementing the ICM program, besides the goal to establish a system of governance for the management of their marine and coastal resources, Batangas aims to develop their coastal areas into international ports which can serve as an alternative to the major ports of the country (i.e. Manila Bay).

⁹² Batangas province is located at the Southern Tagalog region (Luzon Island) of the country, bordered by provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Quezon.



Source: Provincial Government-Batangas, Philippines & PEMSEA, 2008

Figure 1: Map of Batangas Province, with emphasis on the 14 coastal municipalities and 1 coastal city which collaborate for the implementation of the ICM Program

Since most coastal areas are contiguous, it is essential to have a binding mechanism for each municipality/city to employ within their borders. Say, the Municipality of Calatagan implements an ordinance institutionalizing the Coastal Clean Up and Zoning of Marine Protected Areas⁹³ as regards the cleanliness and development of their respective coastal area, however, the Municipality of Balayan focuses on establishing major industries in their locale situated near the Balayan Bay which causes pollution to the marine environment. Thus, these pollutants can soon affect the farther regions of the bay because neighboring municipalities are not concerned with the development and maintenance of their respective areas, as well as to the existing policies which their neighbors are implementing as regards to it. In this circumstance, there is in fact a need for the harmonization of the policies that must be implemented in contiguous areas along the bay region.

⁹³ Municipality of Calatagan, Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Office, Institutionalization of Coastal Clean Up and Zoning of Marine Protected Areas.

Inter-Local Collaboration

Inter-local collaboration, on the one hand, encourages cooperative mechanisms and partnerships among stakeholders at the local level. Such collaborative efforts came into existence because of a coordinating structure, common resources, and shared goals of every parties involved. These efforts are done in order to generate efficiency in utilizing the resources available to each stakeholders present.

The Local Government Code of the Philippines⁹⁴, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 7160, gave birth to the idea of devolution of powers of local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines from its central government. It grants every local communities with genuine and meaningful local autonomy in order for them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and enable them to become more effective partners in the pursuance and fulfillment of national development goals. However, there are challenges that have emerged concerning the policies and implementation related to the structure of the local government system, as well as the mismatch between resources and responsibility of government for the delivery of public service (European Union Delegation to the Philippines, & Philippine Development Forum, 2010: 23). As a result, it enabled for the application of inter-local collaboration as an approach to mitigate these policies and implementation constraints of devolution.

A study conducted by White, et al. (2006: 295), shows that there were several ICM projects that have established demonstration sites (such as in Batangas Bay and Bataan Bay) in order to test the viability, effectiveness, and sustainability of ICM programs under the coordination of provincial governments. Moreover, such provincial programs have also promoted public awareness and participation of stakeholders.

The LGUs in the province of Batangas function autonomously from one another. For an intensified implementation of the ICM program in the entire coastline of the province, an inter-local collaboration arrangement has been established. Likewise, since these coastal areas are contiguous, it is necessary for them to harmonize their policies with their neighboring coastal communities. Thus, this paper will provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the inter-local collaboration of Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities

⁹⁴ The Local Government Code of the Philippines was proposed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel. It was passed by the Philippine Congress and approved in October 10, 1991.

in Batangas province as regards their policy, processes and systems, collaborative initiatives, and mechanisms used in order to successfully implement the ICM program in the province.

This paper will likewise prove the importance of two theories—the Model of Collaborative Governance (MCG), and Common Pool Resource Theory (CPRT). The MCG analyzes the relationship of different stakeholders involved in a collaboration. On the other hand, CPRT focuses on the different factors which show how inter-local collaboration arrangements are established.

The assessment of the inter-local collaboration between Batangas City and the 14 Coastal Municipalities of Batangas as regards the implementation of the Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) program entails a wide variety of factors in the local government system. As such, this research has theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, this research will be of great importance in proving Model of Collaborative Governance, and Common Pool Resource Theory. The MCG is essential in analyzing the relationship of different stakeholders involved in a collaboration, while the CPRT establishes the criteria that are grounded for a collaboration to work. In a practical perspective, this research could serve as a model of an effective inter-local collaboration of local government units (LGUs), or different stakeholders, within and outside the Philippines as regards the implementation of a particular project, program, or policy.

This research study commences with the review of related literature regarding collaborative governance, Integrated Coastal Management and Coastal Resources Management. Subsequently, the Model of Collaborative Governance (MCG) and Common Pool Resources Theory (CPRT) are explained together with their relevance to the focus of this study. The next section devoted to the presentation of the Conceptual Framework of the paper. It is followed by the discussion regarding the evaluative design of the study, which is followed by the findings and conclusion of the paper.

Collaborative Governance as an Approach in Implementing ICM Program

Collaborative governance, according to Bevir (2009: 47), is an attempt to create and conduct policy which involves the participation of different sectors bringing together various interest, perspectives, and knowledge in the policy making process. The study concluded that collaboration can bring advantages in policy-making process, deep explanations of proposed policies, and can innovate and increase the legitimacy of public policy. In contrast, traditional governance, according to Innes & Booher (2010: 201), relies on a concept of bureaucracy characterized by a top-down hierarchy under a central control. It is a process of simple civilian analogue military command: the bureaucrat takes order from above and issues them downward (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011: 234). In 2010 and 2011, Innes and Booher, and Donahue and Zeckhauser respectively agreed that collaborative governance is a structure involving distributive control, open boundaries, and independent nested network cluster of participants. It also brings teams together and help them build their collective capacity to address the problem they are confronting.

Kim (2010: 77) concluded that in South Korea, the national government has acted as a facilitator in the collaborative governance toward the implementation of the principle of sustainable development. This is supported by Banyai (2010: 153), indicating that collaborative governance is more similar to reality through enactment of sound policies, leadership, and promotion of other development strategies. In contrary, inter-personal disagreements and conflicts between partners or potential partners can deter the collaboration, and post as a hurdle in maintaining an existing collaborative arrangement (Catmur, 2008: 259). However, in 2012, Orbista observed in his study that the employment of the collaboration of local governments will lead to an efficient and improved delivery of public goods and services.

The Section 33 of the Local Government Code of 1991 of the Republic of the Philippines⁹⁵ provides that “local government units (LGUs) may, through appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources for purpose commonly beneficial to them.” Alliances are also presented vis-à-vis

⁹⁵ Chapter III, Article III, Inter-Local Government Relations, Section 33, Cooperative Undertakings among Local Government Units. Accessed through: http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1991/ra_7160_1991.html

with inter-local collaboration. This happens when groups of geographically adjacent and contiguous LGUs come together as a group for a long-term basis in order to jointly provide services and implement projects.

Integrated Coastal Management Program (ICM)

Integrated Coastal Management is a holistic management of framework whose ultimate purpose is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of coastal governance in terms of its ability to achieve the sustainable use of coastal resources and of the services generated by the ecosystems in the coastal areas⁹⁶. It envisions to do this by protecting the functional integrity of these natural resource systems while allowing economic development to proceed⁹⁷. It is one of the overall goals and objectives of the Provincial Strategic Environmental Management Plan (SEMP) of Batangas in promoting the maintenance, conservation, and protection of the environment and its natural resources to be of benefit to the existing and future generations.

According to Polunin (2008: 6), coastal systems are economically and ecologically important because any changes that will be occurring in these ecosystems are likely to negatively affect tourism, fisheries and biodiversity in a specific coastal area. It is also economically significant because of the positive contributions to the economic performance of a particular country (Mendoza, 2010). In a data released in 2005 by The World Bank Group⁹⁸, an estimated amount of at least \$1.064 billion have contributed annually to the country's economy only with the lone effort of the Philippine coral reefs. Through proper utilization of coastal and marine resources, these resources become significant assets to the country's economy.

The Philippines, although widely recognized as a global priority for marine conservation, also faces serious problem of the apparent degradation of its marine and coastal environment resources (Weeks, R., et al., 2009: 232). Maypa et al. (2012: 511) pointed out that the marine resources conservation in the Philippines is critical to the maintenance of global marine diversity. However, the Philippines' coastal environment is experiencing degradation caused by a variety of uncontrolled human activities including the

⁹⁶ Provincial Government-Batangas, Philippines and PEMSEA, *State of the Coasts of Batangas Province*, p. 1.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ The Philippines Environment Monitor 2005

overexploitation of fisheries and destructive fishing methods, as well as unplanned, or illegal and improper shoreline development among others (White, et al., 2006: 288). Also, inconsistent laws, inadequate regulations, weak enforcement, lack of funding, poor planning and weak management of the concerned agencies in the country (World Wildlife Fund 2015). With this phenomenon, it suggests for the staggering need for better marine management which led to an opportunistic rush to establish marine protected areas and other forms of marine management (Pendleton & Lotker, 2012: 11). More so, Landry (2010: 3) noted that there is an increasing demand for public, private, and government sectors for a coastal resource management regime which will ensure the sustainability of coastal natural resources while meeting the local needs of the people it serves.

Further, the Philippines has an existing Memorandum Circular enacted by its Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)— Memorandum Circular No. 2008-03 (2008, September 9) which is in support of the sustainable development of the country through proper protection and conservation, utilization and development of natural resources, and provide for a clean and healthy environmental quality. Moreover, there is an existing national policy, under the Executive Order No. 533 series of 2006⁹⁹, which enables for the adoption of the ICM program as a strategy for sustainable development of coastal and marine area in the country. In the Philippines, Davao del Sur¹⁰⁰, Marinduque¹⁰¹, and Zambales¹⁰² are implementing their own programs for coastal management.

The provinces of Bataan and Guimaras show the importance of the implementation of the ICM program in their respective localities. As a matter of fact, these two provinces in the Philippines are in the front run on the successful implementation of the said program. The ICM program of the province of Bataan is considered as one of the best practices which exemplify a strong engagement of the private or business sector in the management of the coastal areas whose function is not only limited to rendering financial support, but also

⁹⁹ Executive No. 533 was signed by the former Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in June 6, 2006 to adopt Integrated Coastal Management as a national strategy to ensure the sustainable development of the country's coastal and marine environment and resources and establishing support mechanism for its implementation.

¹⁰⁰ Mallari, A. L. (2008). *Assessment of Municipal Coastal Database in the Formulation of Coastal Resource Management Plan in elected Municipalities in Davao del Sur (Master's Thesis)*. University of Southeastern Philippines, Davao City.

¹⁰¹ Lim, R. M. (2008). *Water Quality Services and Consumers' Level of Satisfaction at the Local Government Units in Marinduque (Master's Thesis)*. Marinduque State College, Marinduque.

¹⁰² Reyes, J. (2011, October 20). ADB OKs P17.5-M Grant for Coastal Management Projects in Zambales. *Manila Bulletin*, p. 13.

functions as co-implementers of the ICM program in the province (PEMSEA, 2006). Whereas, the province of Guimaras intensifies the implementation of their own version of the ICM program in through establishing partnership with private stakeholders and the national agencies of the Philippine government (Escopel, 2015).

Coastal Resources Management (CRM) in the Philippines

Coastal Resources Management is indeed important for the management of the coastal areas and resources, not only in the Philippines but in the entire world. In 2004, Dr. Israel, in his study of the CRM initiatives in Panguil Bay¹⁰³, has found out that the control over resources and communities compliance to the rules and regulations have improved in the last 10 years of CRM, and will positively continue to improve in the future. However, negative implications of the CRM in the community have also been expressed. As an aid, integration of the CRM with other institutions, procedural certainty and clarity, and inter-agency consultation and cooperation in the development and implementation of policy is needed to achieve a long-term success.

In a research conducted by Espectato (2007: 9), Coastal Resource Management Councils (CRMCs) serve as venue in addressing the common concerns of the LGUs involved, and the resolution of conflicts associated with resource utilization. Additionally, he concluded that in order for partnerships to be sustainable, they should be formalized and institutionalized.

Another research work shows that the Philippines is shifting toward different trends such as the replacement of ICM program to the fisheries development and habitat management which provides emphasis on the need for improved integration and collaboration. Being considered is the effect of decentralization which increases the responsibility and management of LGUs with their municipal waters and coastal resources, as well as the importance of the multi-sector (e.g. public sector, business sector, non-government organizations) collaboration in solving coastal resource management that exist because of several factors (White, et al., 2006: 298).

¹⁰³ Located at the Mindanao island of the Philippines; is connected to Iligan Bay, and possesses extensive intertidal mudflats and mangrove swamps. Provinces of Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Sur, and Lanao del Norte are its land borders.

Coastal Resources Management in other Countries

Coastal resource management is a new world trend that envisions to solve and mitigate the problems in the coastal areas to attain a sustainable development. Lau (2003: 120-124) elucidated that in China, the central government institutions have developed legislation for the coastal zone—Coastal Zone Act and Sea Area Use Law—which provides opportunity to the efficient management of coastal areas. The study pointed out the need for innovation in the local level in order to improve the management of the coastal areas, because local laws and regulations regarding the matter are limited and the presence of regional efforts is still rare. China also practices the concept of public participation in their policy development and implementation which is essential for a successful integrated coastal management. Finally, the study concluded that China's central and local government initiatives should be harmonized—the ICM program of China will partly be centrally controlled and implemented top-down, and partly initiated bottom-up.

On a later year, Hasheela (2008: 36) averred that one of the main problems in the implementation of ICM program in Bahamas is the inter-governmental coordination. The study explained that the coordination between the district councils, town councils, and the national government is unsystematic. With this, there is confusion on the roles and responsibilities of the involved government units for the development of the coastal areas.

In Portugal, relative chaos exists in the implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) which leads to a dispersion of capacities on several entities and lack of coordination. To eradicate this chaos and efficiently implement the ICZM program, the Portuguese government should first solve the complex juridical and institutional framework, resulting with large number of entities with jurisdiction on coastal zones to foster coordination and cooperation (Pinto, 2004: 156).

However, in United Kingdom, the reorganization of local government on the Isle of Wight provided opportunities to reappraise coastal policies, increasing interests, awareness of coastal issues, and the sustainability of the coastal areas. The preparation and implementation of sustainable policies through the employment of collaboration, as well as consultations with organizations and individuals involved in the management of coastal areas are vital (McInness, Jewell, & Roberts, 1998: 305). Also, other countries in the world

are also adopting their own version of coastal management programs such as in Costa Rica¹⁰⁴, Australia¹⁰⁵, Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand¹⁰⁶

Model of Collaborative Governance (MCG)

The Model of Collaborative Governance shows the role of different stakeholders who work collectively in the decision-making process in order to produce an outcome that is embedded by their collaborative actions. In this model, the stakeholders are expected to participate in all stages of the decision-making (Freeman, 1997). Ansell and Gash (2007), moreover, elucidated that the model is a process which stakeholders governed collectively to produce a collective output. Additionally, this model presents the factors which ignited for the creation of the collaborative efforts, the external force affecting the collaboration, and the collaboration process itself which results to the production of outcomes.

MCG begins with several factors which serve as foundations for the establishment of a collaboration (red rectangle). These include the power and resource imbalances, incentives and constraints to participate, and the prehistory of antagonism and cooperation of the stakeholders. Additionally, facilitative leadership (lower yellow rectangle) and an institutional design (upper yellow rectangle) are essential components to integrate different parties together, and to set and maintain clear ground rules in the collaboration. Nevertheless, presence of external influences (purple rectangle) can also affect the collaborative process.

The collaborative process (blue rectangle) is cyclical, and involves stages of which collaboration takes in place in order to produce a collective output among stakeholders (Ansel & Gash, 2007). Collaboration revolves on communication, trust among stakeholders, commitment, shared understanding, and intermediate outcomes. Eventually, collective outcomes (green rectangle) are expected to be produced by the collaboration that has been established.

¹⁰⁴ Honey, M., et al. (2010). *Impact of Tourism Related Development on the Pacific Coast of Costa Rica: Summary Report*. Center for Responsible Travel, Washington, DC.

¹⁰⁵ Human, B. A. (2010). *Strategic Framework for Marine and Coastal Resource Condition Monitoring in the Pilbara and Kimberley Regions of Western Australia*. Department of Fisheries, Government of Western Australia.

¹⁰⁶ Nasuchon, N. (2009). *Coastal Management and Community Management in Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, With a Case Study of Thai Fisheries Management*. Division for Ocean Affairs and The Law of the Sea Office Of Legal Affairs, The United Nations, New York.




Figure 2: Model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash, 2007)

This model shows the structure of collaborative governance which is indeed necessary to understand in analyzing inter-local collaboration. Furthermore, it acts as a guidepost in undertaking the factors which foster and influence a collaboration of stakeholders to arrive into a collective goal. Thus, this model is useful in assessing the effectiveness of the inter-local collaboration of Batangas city and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province in implementing the ICM program.

Common Pool Resource Theory (CPRT)

Ostrom (1990) explicated that dilemmas on common pool resource exist because individuals in interdependent situations do not coordinate their actions. This phenomenon commonly leads to worse outcomes. CPRT suggests that appropriators are capable of generating solutions to these common pool resource dilemmas. This theory likewise represents a significant approach for the governance of natural resources and in providing resolution of critical environmental problems through collaborative and cooperative actions of appropriators in an interdependent situation.




Figure 3: Common Pool Resource Theory (Ostrom, 1990)

This theory of Ostrom, as illustrated above by the authors of this paper, presents the factors in which cooperation and collaboration are established. It shows the vital elements on how inter-local collaboration takes place and how it persists. The inner circle divided into four quadrants indicates the attributions of a common pool resource. These include 'feasible improvement' (first quadrant) which implies that the resource condition should not be deteriorated (which will make it useless to organize, nor underutilized) and only little advantage can be generated from organizing. Second, 'indicators' (second quadrant) constitute the reliable and valid indicators of the resource system which are frequently

available at a relatively low cost. Additionally, 'predictability' (third quadrant) deals with the predictable flow of resource units. Lastly, 'spatial extent' (fourth quadrant) discusses that resource system should be sufficiently small considering the factors of transportation and communication technology.


On the other hand, the theory also provides several attributions of the appropriators who support the establishment of cooperation toward a common pool resource. The six interconnected circles represent the attributions of appropriators in dealing with a common pool resource. This attributions must be present in order to foster cooperation among appropriators governing a common resource. These include salience, common understanding, low discount rate, trust and reciprocity, autonomy, and prior organizational experience and local leadership.

It is presented in Figure 3 that there are two large arrows pointing south. The first arrow consists of the attributions of the common resource, and of the appropriators in fostering cooperation and collaboration. The second arrow is devoted to the eight design principles of cooperation: (1) clearly defined boundaries, (2) congruence of rules in local conditions, (3) collective choice arrangements, (4) monitors are accountable to the resource users, (5) graduated sanctions against violators, (6) ready access to conflict resolution mechanisms, (7) recognition of rights to organize, and (8) nested enterprise. These principles are responsible in creating a well-established cooperation between the appropriators. The by-product of the above-mentioned mechanisms is the establishment of a long-term cooperation (lower circle) or collaboration between appropriators.

Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework is guided by the two theories utilized—the Model of Collaborative Governance, and Common Pool Resource Theory. This framework focuses on the successful implementation of the ICM program through the inter-local collaboration of Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province. In this framework, the MCG is taken into account in studying the effectiveness of the existing inter-local collaboration of LGUs in Batangas in implementing the ICM program in their respective communities. With this, MCG helps to explain the importance of collaborative

process and arrangements of the LGUs of Batangas in achieving a successful implementation of the ICM.



Source: Authors

Figure 4: Conceptual Framework

The coastline of Batangas has been regarded as a common pool resource by most LGUs in the province because of its extensive length. Failure on the proper management of their

respective coastal area affects other LGUs situated on other parts of its coastlines. The CPRT explains that such common pool resource dilemmas emerged because LGUs in interdependent situations do not coordinate their actions together. This theory proposes that common pool resource dilemmas can be solved through establishing a collaborative effort among concerned LGUs. The application of this theory shows the inter-local collaboration of different LGUs of Batangas in implementing the ICM program as part of their collective goal.

The paper will likewise discuss the capacities, capabilities, influences, and initiatives of LGUs in assessing the collaboration. This is done through analyzing the existence of the critical legal, institutional, and financial ingredients in establishing and sustaining a collaboration. Furthermore, the paper will also give emphasis on the effects of this collaboration. The effect of the collaboration consists of the successful implementation of the ICM program through policy-making and implementation in the collaborative process. This, in turn, will create a feedback loop that will bring impacts to the involved LGUs collectively.

Evaluative Design

The descriptive method¹⁰⁷ following an evaluative design¹⁰⁸ using the qualitative approach was the main research technique employed for this assessment. The system of collaboration of Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province as regards the implementation of the ICM program was given focus. Moreover, the inter-local collaboration of LGUs in Batangas has been assessed through an evaluative design of research based on the critical ingredients of alliance formation and strengthening of the cooperation of Local Government Units (LGUs) which was formulated by the Philippine Development Forum Working Group on Decentralization and Local Government's Sub-Working Group on Inter-Local Cooperation (2010). A qualitative approach¹⁰⁹ was used where in-depth interviews were conducted with the City Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City, Municipal Environment and Natural

¹⁰⁷ Attempts to describe systematically and give information about a phenomenon, practices, process, structures, programs, policies, and a particular situation in the society (Kumar, 2005: 4)

¹⁰⁸ Weiss (as cited in Msila & Setlhako, 2013: 1) posited that it measures the effects of a program against the goals it set out to accomplished as a way to contribute subsequently in decision-making for possible improvements

¹⁰⁹ Seeks to discover the underlying motives and desires guiding one's decision in order to generate a larger knowledge on a particular phenomenon (Kothari, 2004; Tracy, 2013; Barbour, 2014)

Resources Office (MENRO) of the 14 coastal municipalities, Batangas Provincial Government Environment and Natural Resources Office (PG-ENRO), and Partnership in the Environmental Management of Seas of the East Asia (PEMSEA), ocular visits and observations, and document reviews were employed to fabricate an empirical basis.

In measuring the effectiveness of the inter-local cooperation, there are three essential ingredients (which also consist of sub-ingredients) namely: legal, institutional, and financial were considered in establishing and sustaining a collaboration as formulated by the Philippine Development Forum Working Group on Decentralization and Local Government's Sub-Working Group on Inter-Local Cooperation¹¹⁰ (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Critical Ingredients for Effective Inter-Local Government Unit (LGU) Cooperation

LEGAL INGREDIENTS

- a) Adoption of a binding legal instrument (MOA);
- b) Concurrence to MOA;
- c) Mandatory review of the MOA;
- d) Adoption of joint resolutions;
- e) Ratification of agreements and decisions;
- f) Harmonization of policies; and
- g) Legal mechanisms to address non-compliance to MOA

INSTITUTIONAL INGREDIENTS

- a) Alliance champion;
- b) A common base;
- c) A common purpose;
- d) Active involvement of Mayors;
- e) Implementing structure;
- f) Trigger issues;
- g) Strategic plan;
- h) Manual of operations;
- i) Transforming projects into essential services; and
- j) Capacity to adapt to changing conditions and challenges

FINANCIAL INGREDIENTS

- a) Commitment to share resources among members;
 - b) Use of an accepted formula for the monetary contributions of members;
 - c) Timely collection of committed funds;
 - d) Capacity and will to generate own resources;
 - e) Capability to tap external sources of funds;
 - f) Matching of resources with goals and programs;
 - g) Proper funds management arrangement;
 - h) Use of approved guidelines in fund utilization; and
 - i) Transparency in financial transactions
-

¹¹⁰ European Union Delegation to the Philippines, & Philippine Development Forum. (2010). *Cooperation in Action: Lessons from the 2nd Inter-Local Government Units Alliances Summit*. Philippines: European Union Delegation to the Philippines

The *Legal* ingredients refer to the adoption of a binding legal instrument for the formation of the cooperation of LGUs. This ingredient will examine if the existing inter-local collaboration of the LGUs of the coastal communities in Batangas adheres to a particular law or agreement.

Institutional ingredients contribute to the effectiveness of the collaboration, which are particularly focused on the factors such as confidence-building, institutionalization, and evolution present in the collaborative arrangement.

Finally, the *Financial* ingredients include the ability of the collaboration to generate funds needed in order to perform its responsibility (i.e. proper allocation of funds, transparent financial transactions, fund management, etc.).

Analysis and Findings

The framework which was formulated by the Philippine Development Forum Working Group on Decentralization and Local Government's Sub-Working Group on Inter-Local Cooperation (2010) as regards the critical ingredients needed in building and sustaining a collaboration was utilized as the criteria in assessing the collaboration. The following discussions present the results of the assessment of the inter-local collaboration of Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of the province as regards the implementation of the ICM program in the province framework. These critical ingredients are divided into three main categories: legal ingredients, institutional ingredients, and financial ingredients.

Table 2: The Assessment of the Inter-local Collaboration between Batangas City and 14 Coastal Municipalities of Batangas based on the Legal Ingredients

LEGAL INGREDIENTS	EXISTING	NON-EXISTING
a) Adoption of a binding legal instrument (MOA);	√	
b) Concurrence to MOA;	√	
c) Mandatory review of the MOA;		√
d) Adoption of joint resolutions;	√	
e) Ratification of agreements and decisions;	√	
f) Harmonization of policies; and	√	
g) Legal mechanisms to address non-compliance to MOA	√	

First, the legal ingredients refer to the legal instruments (i.e. Memoranda of Agreement) which the collaboration adopts in order to establish cooperation among its member LGUs. Moreover, it also includes the capacities of the coastal LGUs to concur with the binding legal instruments which provide them the responsibility to harmonize their policies with other members of the collaboration. The analysis done in prior discussions show that, the collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province as regards the implementation of the ICM program has achieved 6 out of 7 components of the legal ingredients in establishing and sustaining alliances. The collaboration of the coastal LGUs of the province was not able to meet the requirement of a mandatory review of the legal instruments adopted. However, this challenge could still be addressed by establishing a committee whose function is devoted to reviewing the Memoranda of Agreement of the collaboration to prevent some provisions to become outdated.

Table 3: The Assessment of the Inter-local Collaboration between Batangas City and 14 Coastal Municipalities of Batangas based on the Institutional Ingredients

INSTITUTIONAL INGREDIENTS	EXISTING	NON-EXISTING
a) Alliance champion;	√	
b) A common base;	√	
c) A common purpose;	√	
d) Active involvement of Mayors;		√
e) Implementing structure;	√	
f) Trigger issues;	√	
g) Strategic plan;	√	
h) Manual of operations;	√	
i) Transforming projects into essential services; and	√	
j) Capacity to adapt to changing conditions and challenges	√	

The second critical ingredients are the institutional ingredients. These include the institutional structures that exist in the collaboration, and likewise involve the functions and responsibilities of each members in the collaboration. The data gathered shows the active involvement of the respective Local Chief Executives (LCEs) of Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province does not existing in the collaboration. Given this result, 9 out of its 10 components were met by the collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province. The appointment of focal persons in each coastal LGUs in lieu of the non-involvement of the LCEs in the implementation of the ICM program was pursued in order to respond to this problem. Consequently, these

focal persons had been performing their duties and responsibilities efficiently for the ICM implementation in the province.

Moreover, the researchers found out that the inter-local collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province has a particular alliance champion which acts as the main actor in the collaboration. The alliance champion provides facilitative leadership among the other member LGUs in the collaboration. This paper reveals that the PG-ENRO¹¹¹ of Batangas is considered as the alliance champion of the collaboration. Furthermore, the ICM Coordinator¹¹² of the Batangas PG-ENRO discussed that the implementation of the ICM program in their province is divided into three phases: in the coastal area of the Balayan Bay and adjacent bays, Batangas Bay, and Tayabas Bay and adjacent bays. This strategy of a relative specialization in the implementation of the ICM program is employed in order to address the distinct needs of each bay areas of Batangas. Hence, the coastal LGUs situated in a particular bay region collaborate for the management of their respective bay area in accordance to the framework of the ICM program.

Table 4: The Assessment of the Inter-local Collaboration between Batangas City and 14 Coastal Municipalities of Batangas based on the Financial Ingredients

FINANCIAL INGREDIENTS	EXISTING	NON-EXISTING
a) Commitment to share resources among members;	√	
b) Use of an accepted formula for the monetary contributions of members;		√
c) Timely collection of committed funds;		√
d) Capacity and will to generate own resources;	√	
e) Capability to tap external sources of funds;	√	
f) Matching of resources with goals and programs;	√	
g) Proper funds management arrangement;	√	
h) Use of approved guidelines in fund utilization; and	√	
i) Transparency in financial transactions		√

Lastly, the financial ingredients of a collaboration are also essential to be taken into consideration in assessing the effectiveness of the collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas as regards the implementation of the ICM program. The collaboration has convincingly met most of these financial ingredients by achieving 6

¹¹¹ Provincial Government of Batangas Environment and Natural Resources Office is an institution which spearheads the coordination and implementation of projects as regards the issues on environment and natural resources of the province

¹¹² Mrs. Loreta A. Sollestre

out of its 9 components. Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas do not make monetary contributions, and timely collection of committed funds for the implementation of the ICM program as they are only granted with limited funds by the provincial government. On the one hand, as its statutory obligation, the provincial government allots a separate annual budget for each LGUs which is appropriated for the ICM implementation. Also not present is the capacity of the collaboration to generate financial reports of the expenditures related to the implementation of the ICM program in the province. A meeting is instead conducted twice a month in order to discuss the issues and accomplishments as regards the ICM implementation, but is, however, not only limited to discussing transparency in their financial transactions.

In accordance to the qualitative approach of study employed through ocular visits, sets of interviews, and library researches, the paper further reveals that the inter-local collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province as regards the implementation of the ICM program has achieved an overall total of 21 out of 26 ingredients needed in a collaboration. Given this result, the collaboration has dominantly met the critical ingredients in building and sustaining a collaboration. There are, however, five ingredients which the collaboration of the coastal LGUs of Batangas failed to meet, namely: (1) the mandatory review of their binding legal instruments, (2) active involvement of LCEs, (3) monetary contributions of the members of the collaboration, (4) timely collection of committed funds, and (5) transparency in financial transactions. Despite of these, the collaboration is still considered to be an effective strategy in implementing the ICM program in the province of Batangas. Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of the province, through the supervision of the PG-ENRO, were able to respond to these non-existing critical ingredients. These efforts made by PG-ENRO in order to address these challenges are, however, still insufficient in order to meet these ingredients.

Conclusion

The paper reveals that the inter-local collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province as regards the implementation of the ICM program is effective. This is despite of the fact that the paper showed that several critical ingredient were not met—mandatory review of binding legal instruments (legal ingredient); active involvement of LCEs (institutional ingredient); and the monetary contributions of

members, timely collection of committed funds, and transparency of financial transactions (financial ingredients). The overwhelmingly existence of the ingredients under legal, institutional, and financial aspects proved that the inter-local collaboration is effective even with the absence of the five aforementioned ingredients.

Interviews with the PG-ENRO, MENRO¹¹³, and CENRO¹¹⁴ focal persons supported the claim that the implementation of the ICM program in the province of Batangas, through inter-local collaboration approach undertaken by Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of the province, is successful and effective. With this, the collaboration of the coastal LGUs of the province materializes their objectives to properly manage the coastal areas, as well as the conservation, protection, rehabilitation, and development of the coasts and its resources.

The PG-ENRO functions as the alliance champion of the collaboration, and provides facilitative leadership to Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas. In an interview conducted by the researchers, the ICM Coordinator of the Batangas PG-ENRO discussed that the office conducts evaluation and ocular visits in Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas in order to ensure the condition and proper implementation of the ICM program. In addition to that, the PG-ENRO also provides capacity building development, and enhancement of the LGUs through seminars, conferences, trainings, and workshops which is in line with the inter-local collaborative approach of the implementation of the ICM program.

This paper likewise presents that employing relative specialization is part of establishing an effective collaboration toward the different needs of the bay areas in Batangas. LGUs act and respond collectively in addressing the distinct needs of Balayan Bay and adjacent bays, Batangas Bay, and Tayabas Bay and adjacent bays. This suggests that the collaboration between Batangas City and 14 municipalities of Batangas, through its implementing strategies and mechanisms, is effective.

The manifestation of the cooperation between Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas toward the implementation of the ICM program is shown through the ordinances which are followed by the coastal LGUs, as well as the Memoranda

¹¹³ Municipal Environment and Natural Resources Office

¹¹⁴ City Environment and Natural Resource Office

of Agreement which they have ratified as their binding legal documents. Moreover, the existence of common purposes and issues between these coastal LGUs bind them to act collaboratively in order to achieve and address the needs of their respective coastal areas. Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas recognize the inter-local collaboration approach as an essential strategy in the successful attainment of the goals and objectives of the ICM program in their province.

Despite the effectiveness of the inter-local collaboration of Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas, the collaboration is not without problems which weaken its effectiveness. These challenges include the (1) absence of a mandatory review of the different binding legal documents, (2) poor involvement of the LCEs, (3) use of a formula for monetary contributions, (4) absence of timely collection of committed funds, and (5) transparency in financial transactions. However, these challenges are insufficient to consider that the collaboration is ineffective. As majority of the critical ingredients are present, this paper concludes that the collaboration between Batangas City and 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province is effective.

Today, PG-ENRO and the collaboration between Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of the province continue their effective collaboration toward the implementation of the ICM program. Trainings, seminars, conferences, and workshops are conducted for the improvement on the institutional and technical capacities of each coastal LGUs which are in support for the effectiveness of the collaboration. Aside from the provincial government and the LGUs of Batangas, the national government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and development organizations also partake in helping the collaboration of Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas to employ different strategies in their collaboration as regard the implementation of the ICM program.

Future Research

Future research as regards employing inter-local collaboration toward the implementation of a particular project or program could provide a better understanding on the significance of the inter-local collaboration as an approach to governance. Moreover, this paper recommends scholars to apply different theories and methodologies which can be utilized

for the improvement of the study. In addition to this, the integration of external institutions (i.e. development organizations, nongovernment institutions, private institutions, and civil society organizations), which are involved in the implementation of the ICM program, as variables of the study is essential in the assessment of the collaboration between Batangas City and the 14 coastal municipalities of Batangas province.

Acknowledgement

Without the gift of knowledge and virtue of patience poured by God Almighty, this academic study would never be accomplished. To Him, the researchers express their deepest love and gratitude.

The researchers would also like to offer their ocean of thanks to these people who helped and provided them guidance for the completion of this academic piece: Asst. Prof. Ma. Zenia M. Rodriguez, M.EM., the researchers' adviser – who rendered her utmost support and guidance for this academic undertaking. Her experience and scholarly expertise in research have significantly contributed to the success of the study.

To the two notable professors of the Political Science Department of the University of Santo Tomas, Asst. Prof'l Lect. Edwin S. Martin, Ph.D. and Assoc. Prof'l Lect. Noel L. Lansang, Ph.D., who through their opinions and recommendations, the study has been improved. Additionally, the researchers would like to give their sincerest gratitude to the Batangas Provincial Government Environment Natural Resources Office (PG-ENRO) headed by Mrs. Loreta A. Sollestre.

The researchers likewise extend their gratitude to the local government units of Nasugbu, Lian, Calatagan, Balayan, Calaca, Lemery, Taal, San Luis, Bauan, Mabini, Tingloy, San Pascual, Batangas, Lobo and San Juan, as well as the Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) who have provided substantial data which are essential for the study.

Most importantly, the researchers will forever be grateful to their family for their unending support—both financial and moral—and their encouragement to finish this academic study.

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Water Scarcity and Regional Fragmentation in the Middle East: A Quantitative Assessment

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Abstract

The turmoil in the Middle East takes its roots in the sharp incongruence between collective identities and territorial boundaries, but the severe and growing water scarcity significantly affects both the interstate relations and the socio-economic stability of the domestic regimes. Consequently, the access, supply, management and control of water flows are a long-standing source of contention and regional polarization. Nevertheless, the sharing of water resources commands the signing of mutual agreements to determine the parties' grade of exploitation, thus gradually opening to the institutionalization of a cooperative regime or patterns of joint governance. This article aims to provide a quantitative evaluation of the strategic water-related interactions at the interstate level across the Levant. The assessment provides an overview of the regional transboundary water relations with the purpose of determining whether the Middle East is currently moving toward an increased regionalization or exacerbating the existing rivalries.

Key Words:

Conflict; Cooperation; Hydropolitics; Integration; Middle East; Regional; Resources; Scarcity; Transboundary River Basin; Water.

Introduction

Hydropolitics lies at the heart of the Middle Eastern strategic environment. Specifically, two main factors contribute to determine the crucial value of water in the security relations of the area.

Firstly, the Middle East is the most water-stressed region in the world, registering the lowest internal water resources per capita rates, since the region accounts for only 1.1% of the global renewable water resources (FAO, 2008: 31). Water is a renewable but limited resource, with no substitute. While the arid or semi-arid climatic conditions shrink the available quantities of renewable surface water (physical scarcity), the unsustainable use (e.g. over-abstraction, pollution) of non-renewable underground reservoirs is depleting the fossil aquifers that the domestic demand relies on (socio-economic scarcity). Indeed, the UNDP estimates that most Arab countries “have already exhausted their water supply development potential”, with no spare capacity left over (UNDP, 2008: 28). This gloomy picture is even worsened by the growing pressure produced by the combined effects of desertification, population growth, and urbanization. According to the World Bank projections, “per capita water availability will fall by half by 2050” across the MENA region (World Bank, 2007: xxi). Therefore, the growing imbalance between demand and supply is widely recognized as a cause of internal and external instability because of the dangerous consequences of water shortages and/or restrictions – such as tensions among users, disputes over allocations, inadequate sanitation and the rise of waterborne diseases¹¹⁵.

Secondly, especially in the Near East sub-region, most of freshwater sources are parts of transboundary river basins. Hence, geopolitics and hydrogeology make water a shared and contested resource at the regional level: any unilateral action undertaken by a riparian state with the purpose to alter its grade of exploitation of the river system may exert negative externalities on its neighbours – as in the cases of the construction of a dam or the implementation of a massive irrigation project by an upstream state, which might result respectively in lower water quantity or deteriorated water quality for the downstream state. This situation of unavoidable interdependence is often depicted as a zero-sum game and is

¹¹⁵ It should be noted that the recent socio-political unrest in many Arab countries (e.g. Libya, Egypt, Tunisia) was partly triggered by global food price crisis, which was in turn directly and indirectly determined by extreme and unpredictable climatic events in the crop-growing areas of the world.

generally associated with the emergence of – even militarized – conflicts. On the contrary, the needs of reducing insecurity and promoting an efficient management of international water bodies may also lead to cooperative behaviours (Wolf, 2007).

The literature on environmental conflict is rich of remarkable contributions in the field of water disputes. Following the post-'89 widening of security studies (Buzan et Hansen, 2006) and in line with the argument of water as a source of strategic rivalry (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994; Gleick, 1993; Butts, 1997), many scholars have further applied quantitative methods in search of causal relations between water scarcity and organized violence (Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel et al., 2006), as well as on the mitigating function carried out by negotiations and institutions (Conca et al., 2006; Brochmann et Hensel, 2011; Dinar et al., 2011).

This article aims to examine the nexus between water resources and conflicting-cooperative actions at the interstate level. Moreover, we propose a different reading, rethinking the controversial triad water-conflict-cooperation in terms of higher or lower regional integration in the transboundary river basins of the Levant¹¹⁶, where hydropolitics is inserted in major protracted political conflicts and on-going high level of hostility among the riparian states. We argue that an explicative framework of water disputes may provide both a deeper understanding of the regional power struggle and a useful insight on the development of cooperative ties within the Middle East. In this perspective, we share the view that socioeconomic challenges and non-military threats will increasingly determine the patterns of regional security (Korany et. al., 1993).

At least two aspects support the methodological choice of a region-wide assessment. Primarily, Middle Eastern countries historically and culturally securitise water issues as a tool of national unity and external contention (Zeitoun, 2012). In other words, the “blue gold” shapes both cognitive perceptions and decision-making options of the political community. Therefore, water is to be considered as a policy driver of every actor belonging to the security structure of the Middle East. In addition, according to the physical and

¹¹⁶ In this paper we consider the Levant as a sub-region composed by Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Iraq. We excluded Egypt due to its belonging to the Nile River transboundary basin. According to geographical and climatic homogeneity, FAO grouped the same countries in the Near East sub-region. Thus, we use indifferently the notions of Levant and Near East.

economic unity of a river basin, which is irrespective of political boundaries or competing claims of sovereignty (Lowi, 1994), the internationally accepted Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) requires the implementation of coordination standards across vast geographic areas encompassing multiple political entities. Hence, a regionalised approach is *a fortiori* requested in the academic research in order to evaluate the consistency of water policies favoured by the international community with the competitive environment determined by intra-regional relations.

The article is organized as follows. The first paragraph introduces the main features of the hydropolitical setting of the Near East, comparing the regional actors on the basis of four indices of vulnerability. Then, the second paragraph outlines the theoretical assumptions and the methodology. Consistently, the analysis of quantitative data on water-related interstate interactions in the sub-region is presented in the third paragraph. Finally, the last section develops the discussion on water conflict and cooperation by proposing a set of hypotheses on the relationship between resource scarcity and regional integration, as well as examining some policy options that could be successfully implemented to address the fragmentation of water governance systems in the area.

Hydrogeological and Geopolitical Scope

Middle Eastern countries' water supply mainly depends on shared international watercourses and aquifers. We chose to focus this analysis on three major river basins of the Levant sub-region: the Orontes (also known as Asi), the Jordan, and the Tigris-Euphrates. As illustrated in Table 1¹¹⁷, riparian countries often belong to more than one of these different transboundary basins. Consequently, from a hydropolitical perspective, we unified them into a single strategic water system¹¹⁸.

Before examining the strategic interaction among the riparian states, it is convenient to premise how water affects the national security agenda. To start with, economic growth and social welfare are strictly bound to water availability. While industrial development and

¹¹⁷ Tables and figures are available at the end of the paper; see Annex I, *intra*, pp. 22-27.

¹¹⁸ Considering the Levant as a closed water system is a simplification from both a hydrogeological and a hydropolitical viewpoint. The contentious exploitation of the non-renewable Disi aquifer extending across the Saudi-Jordanian boundary is an example of how complex is the picture of water relations in the Middle East. However, the choice of a subset of riparian countries is validated by the strategic coherence of the selected international basins.

urbanization cause the domestic demand to rise, on average Near East countries devote about 84% of the exploitable water to irrigation usage, leaving the rest to industrial and municipal uses; as a comparison, the global agriculture withdrawal rate stands at 70% (FAO, 2008). Even so, many dry countries in the area depend on food imports. In addition, water allocations are an often-used bargaining tool to maintain social order and political stability: paternalist subsidies and weak rules are common features in the region (Greenwood, 2014; Devarajan, 2014), producing the mismanagement of water resources. Thus, access and control of water flows are perceived as an essential pillar of state's sovereignty and legitimacy – as demonstrated by the Israeli enduring opposition to Palestinian “water rights” – or cleverly capitalized on a broader chessboard – such as the Syrian support to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militants (interrupted with the signing of the Adana Agreement in October 1998) against the Turkish envisioned diversion of Euphrates. Without being the leading cause of conflict, a historical overview of the Middle Eastern relations shows that water issues have been frequently used at a tactical level in order to consolidate (or challenge) both national authority and regional leverage, acting as a medium of exchange, a collective symbol, and even a target of warfare. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the aftermath of the successful onslaught of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the jihadist insurgent group that has brutally conquered territory across Iraq and Syria since December 2013, heavy clashes regularly explode around the Iraqi strategic dams of Mosul, Haditha, and Sudur, while jihadists rule local tribes by commanding water delivery.

To operationalize the importance of resource scarcity in the Near East strategic scenario, Table 2 displays some interesting figures of the water system. It is necessary to consider that reported data are annual averages: each basin records extreme variations both in precipitation and river discharge during the year. In addition, irrigation requirements typically coincide with the drier summer months. Therefore, the degree of water scarcity varies seasonally, due to the hydrological cycle, and even annually, because of occasional droughts. As a result, the inconstant distribution of the available water increases the information asymmetry among neighbours. This condition of uncertainty negatively impacts on the signing of binding agreements about the allocation of variable flows.

Table 2 provides basic information about available water resources by riparian country. According to FAO's criteria for data collection, *natural* total renewable water resources (TRWR) "are the total amount of a country's water resources (internal and external resources), both surface water and groundwater, which is generated through the hydrological cycle" (FAO, 2003). Differently, *actual* TRWR estimates the country's water resources given the existing geopolitical constraints, "taking into account the quantity of flow reserved to upstream and downstream countries through formal or informal agreements or treaties and possible reduction of external flow due to upstream water abstraction". In brief, while the natural value is only potential by definition, the actual one is a more accurate indicator of the relative capacity of each actor in a transboundary river basin. However, *exploitable* water resources are less than the actual TRWR due to a plurality of socio-economic and environmental factors, such as the fragmentation of the hydrogeological system, the economic and environmental feasibility of extracting or storing freshwater, poor water quality, minimum flow requirements for navigational use and aquatic life. For instance, despite high rainfalls, Lebanon's manageable resources are almost half the actual value (2.08 km³/yr against 4.53 km³/yr), mainly because of the very low storage capacity determined by a harsh morphology that prevents the construction of dams. The infrastructural divide between urban and rural areas, the contamination of groundwater reserves, the heavy evaporation rates, the abundant water losses, and the outpacing of old transmission networks are additional factors shrinking the nominal availability and contributing to serious crises of governance (Michel et al., 2012).

Finally, total freshwater withdrawal (TFW) refers to the water extracted by its source for a specific use, without counting non-conventional sources (such as agricultural drainage water, treated wastewater, desalinated seawater). Given that not all uses are consumptive, usage is not equivalent to consumption. In other words, withdrawal does not imply a reduction in water quantity or quality because a major portion of withdrawn water returns to the system after its use. Nonetheless, although Table 2 does not provide data about consumption rates, the above-average withdrawal by agricultural use reveals that water consumption is far more intense in the Near East than in other regions. Indeed, agriculture accounts for 90% of total water consumption and irrigation systems lost on average 40% of withdrawn water. Moreover, MENA countries "tend not to charge agricultural and

urban users for water withdrawals at the full cost of provision, [pursuing] various policies that create perverse incentives for excessive groundwater overdrafts, such as subsidized credit for drilling wells, subsidized energy to fuel well pumps, and domestic price supports and external import barriers that favor agricultural products dependent on irrigation” (Michel et al., 2012: 29).

In order to interpret these figures in terms of reliability and availability of water resources, we put together four indices of vulnerability¹¹⁹. The ratio between TFW and TRWR, known as the Millennium Development Goal water indicator, is an indication of the human pressure on the renewable water sources. The demanding percentages of many riparian countries (notably Jordan, Syria, Israel, Iraq) show the overexploitation of water sources, particularly the underground aquifers that are naturally characterised by low recharge rates. To take just a few examples, it is estimated that the steady growth of Israeli over-pumping of groundwater from early 1970s to late 1990s led to a 2.000 million cubic meters deficit (Zeitoun, 2012), while the unchecked over-abstraction of Jordanian aquifers will shortly compel the Hashemite Kingdom to purchase water to meet the internal demand. The widespread and growing depletion of groundwater sources threatens both the regular supply (most Middle Eastern cities are experiencing water rationing) and the socio-economic development of these parched countries¹²⁰. Introducing the demographic variable, the actual TRWR *per capita* expresses an essential measure of scarcity. Every riparian country in the Jordan River basin (Israel, Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territory) falls short of the traditional threshold of 500 cubic meters/year per inhabitant, which defines the upper limit of a condition of absolute water scarcity (Falkenmark, 1989). If we compare the per capita availability on the basis of the internal resources, it is clearly visible that even Iraq and Syria suffer from a condition of severe undersupply. Focusing on riparian disputes in shared river systems, the fourth index of vulnerability is explicitly significant: the fraction of renewable water resources originating outside the country is a clear parameter of how a downstream state is dependent on an upstream state. Therefore, the higher the percentage of flows entering the country, the higher the grade of

¹¹⁹ Gleick adds another index of vulnerability, the dependence on hydroelectricity as a fraction of total electrical supply (Gleick, 2013), which is particularly important in the Tigris-Euphrates basin due to the large number of hydropower dams and the correlated energy security strategies.

¹²⁰ The World Bank estimates that groundwater depletion equals to 2.1% of Jordanian gross domestic product (World Bank, 2007: 21).

dependency. While the previous indices denote the internally perceived water stress, this last parameter properly designates a benchmark of external vulnerability.

The riparian geographic position, the grade of scarcity, the relative military strength, the socio-economic resiliency, and the patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan, 1991) all determine the hydropolitical dynamics underlying the regional security structure. From this point of view, it is apparent that the water-rich Turkey benefits from a hegemonic stance in the water system. The minimal dependency ratio (1%) exhibits the abundance of internal water resources, while the control on the Tigris-Euphrates headwaters establishes a strategic advantage on the downstream Syria and Iraq. On the contrary, Damascus and Baghdad are heavily reliant upon the Euphrates (and Tigris in the Iraqi case) flows¹²¹. Moreover, in both countries endemic violence is further ruining water infrastructures and is spreading threatening spill over effects at the regional level, where the reception of refugees overburdens water services in Lebanon and Jordan (REACH, 2014).

As far as the Jordan River basin is concerned, growing demands match the unsustainable over-exploitation of groundwater sources. Despite of being the stronger riparian, Israel has experimented from its inception a condition of chronic water insecurity¹²², which is nowadays partially softened by the intensive reliance on non-conventional sources, as well as by the extraction of groundwater from the Western Aquifer Basin in the occupied West Bank. Conversely, Palestinians are denied all access to the Jordan River and they are forced to a relation of absolute asymmetry both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Likewise, the Israeli first-class military and its economic power are overwhelming in regards of Jordan, which is by far the poorest Near Eastern country in terms of available water resources. In addition to an inadequate resource management, Jordan's supply is not only harmed by the Israeli hydropolitical influence in the Upper Jordan River, but it is also threatened by the Syrian upstream position in the Yarmouk River.

Analytical Framework and Research Design

¹²¹ In addition, Iran is another relevant actor given that it contributes 10% of the total volume of Tigris.

¹²² It is emblematic that the PLO first attack ever was directed against the Israeli National Water Carrier on 1 January 1965.

In the previous paragraph water stress indicators were briefly exemplified. Moving from a country-based to a basin-based analysis, the Near East water system appears as extremely vulnerable because of the explosive contradiction between growing resource scarcity and cross-border rivers, which establishes the premises of a competitive environment. However, it is properly the low level of hydropolitical resilience – defined by the institutional capacity of a transboundary river basin (Wolf et al., 2009) – that releases these competitive pressures. From this point of view, an analysis of the regional water disputes cannot ignore that riparian countries in the area have not yet reached any formal multilateral agreements to manage the allocation of shared flows. Furthermore, to be effective and sustainable, the implementation of collective water governance mechanisms necessarily implies the engagement of all parties. Therefore, given its crosscutting importance, water issues might promote a cooperative agenda, “[catalysing] region-wide aspirations for overall governance reform” in a longer term (UNDP, 2008: 15).

The purpose of this paper is to verify which direction at this fundamental crossroads the Middle East is advancing to. We assume that water security relations can be measured on a continuum conflict-cooperation, where the negative end of the spectrum collects interstate tensions over international watercourses, while the positive end gathers cooperative behaviours. Besides, we suppose that a hostile praxis in the water security relations contributes to widen the broader polarization among regional actors through the fragmentation of the transboundary basins’ systems of governance. On the contrary, water-sharing agreements are functionally associated to the development of regional integration.

This last point requires further explanation. The succession technical cooperation-regional integration is undeniably a functionalist thinking, but we apply this theoretical assumption without any determinism. From the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has lacked in restoring strong intra-regional ties. Despite the powerful attraction of supra-state identities, the unstable consolidation of the existing state system over the arbitrary colonial boundaries precipitated in centrifugal forces that have been opposing a convergence of interests at a regional level. As cleverly pointed out by Fawcett, the regionalization of conflict has failed to produce unified response: “there is no Middle East region that corresponds to any existing institution, no successful free trade area, no security community; no longer perhaps a core community of shared ideals” (Fawcett, 2005: 190). So

far, resources and security interdependence has been leading to strife and clashes. Nevertheless, water cooperation is a necessary step in order to relieve a situation of physical and socio-economic scarcity that feeds a costly insecurity for every riparian country. In other words, the pressure on freshwater resources and the sub-optimal management of transboundary flows should appraise water as a public good from a regional perspective (Granit et Joyce, 2012). Joint institutions, in this respect, “can serve as an outlet for conflict management by providing an arena for riparians to resolve their differences, by providing neutral information, reducing uncertainty, and minimizing transaction costs” (Hensel et al., 2006: 389). Therefore, the application of a multilateral approach to water disputes, even though conceived as an instrument of internal governance, may open to increasing coordination and then to valuable improvements in the regional security relations – at least by reducing a cause of friction or easing a negotiating process. This point is in line with the nexus between institutions and hydropolitical vulnerability introduced by Wolf, who states, “the likelihood of conflict rises as the rate of change within the basin exceeds the institutional capacity to absorb that change” (Wolf, 2007: 12). Wolf identifies international agreements and joint institutions (especially river basin organizations), a history of collaborative projects, general positive political relations, and higher levels of economic development as features enhancing resilience in a basin. On the contrary, rapid environmental change, rapid population growth and economic asymmetries, major unilateral development projects, the absence of institutional capacity, and generally hostile relations swing toward an increasing vulnerability.

However, several *caveats* about water cooperation should be added prior to introduce the quantitative analysis. First, in a situation of asymmetry, the arrangements advocated by a stronger country may lend a guise of cooperation to a mere demonstration of power by other means. Second, cooperative measures in the water sector do not exclude the persistence of hostile actions in other sectors. Third, the resolution of a water dispute does not presuppose the resolution of a comprehensive political conflict, in which the former may exert a utilitarian function. As a result, the quantitative assessment will be necessarily weighted by some qualitative considerations.

After having discussed the theoretical foundations of this paper, we can proceed to illustrate the research methodology. In order to conceptualize the Middle East water security relations into an empirical framework, we used the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) developed by the Oregon State University. This relational database is a remarkable and unmatched research tool to study water relations, using a plurality of indicators and levels of analysis (spatial, temporal, country-dyads, etc.). It collects water events in 263 international river basins in the period 1948-2008. Water events are defined “as instances of conflict and cooperation that occur within an international river basin, involve the nations riparian to that basin, and concern freshwater as a scarce or consumable resource (e.g., water quality, water quantity) or as a quantity to be managed (e.g., flooding or flood control, managing water levels for navigational purposes)” (Yoffe et al, 2003a: 1110). In addition, water events are classified according to a conflict-cooperation intensity scale, which devises a categorization system that is consistent with both the theoretical premises and the research purposes of this paper.

The Basin at Risk (BAR) project, built upon the TFDD database, brought some interesting findings to light. Particularly, it showed that “international water relations over the past fifty years have been overwhelmingly cooperative, belying claims that water is mainly a source of international conflict” (Yoffe et al, 2003a; Yoffe et al, 2003b; Wolf et. al., 2003). However, the MENA region was associated to the lowest level of cooperation: indeed, BAR reveals that cooperative events were less than half of total events in the Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates, and Orontes basins; as a comparison, out of the 1800 events considered in the study on a global scale, 67% were cooperative. Furthermore, the Jordan and the Tigris-Euphrates were by far the basins with the highest number of reported events. These annotations are significant because they address the hydropolitical vulnerability of the water system and the strategic value of international rivers in the Middle East. Therefore, they encourage the attempt to deepen a regional understanding of the water-based strategic interactions.

Data Analysis and Findings

The TFDD database codes 783 events and 1089 classified country-pair interactions in the three river basins. The statistical sample is larger than the original one examined in the BAR project, since the current database is updated until 2008, while the previous version

included events through 1999. Out of 1089 interactions measured by the intensity scale, 561 (51.5%) are cooperative, 433 (39.8%) conflicting, and 95 (8.7%) neutral¹²³. Overall, cooperation and conflict on shared water resources were characterised by low levels of intensity, mostly spanning from strong/mild verbal expressions to diplomatic, economic, and technical actions. Indeed, the 87.5% of the riparian interactions falls between -3 and +3 values on the BAR intensity spectrum.

However, this preliminary observation does not report the actual magnitude of water tension in the Near East water system. The distribution across time of interactions with high levels of intensity – including military acts on one side and tactical-strategic agreements on the other side – is quite interesting. It shows opposite trends that are portrayed in Figure 2: while the most violent confrontations took place in the first two decades after the 2WW, the water security relations in the sub-region appears to have been increasingly denoted by cooperative events from the 90's. Nonetheless, the aggregated data is misleading. By analysing each basin separately, we found contrasting trajectories. Both in the Tigris-Euphrates and the Orontes basins the conflict curve exceeds the cooperation curve in the period 1994-2008, thus showing the unresolved composition of long-standing allocation disputes in the former and growing tensions in the latter. Conversely, the graphical representation of the water-related interactions timeline in the Jordan basin indicates a prevalence of cooperative events. This discrepancy deserves a careful explanation.

During the Cold War, the competition over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers reached peaks of violence in the 1975 – with the deployment of troops on the Syrian-Iraqi border following the filling of the Syrian Keban and Taqba dams which would have dragged the two neighbours into warfare without the mediation of Saudi Arabia – and during the Iraq-Iran decennial conflict. Then, the water security relations in the area have been characterised by the formation of an opposition front on the axis Damascus-Baghdad against the Turkish ambitions. Coordination between Syria and Iraq was formalized by ratifying a memorandum of understanding about the provisional division of Euphrates

¹²³ Events and interactions involved the riparian countries, as well as regional actors (Egypt, Saudi Arabia), extra-regional actors (Soviet Union, United States, France) and intergovernmental organizations (United Nations, Arab League, European Union).

flows in 1990¹²⁴, but the bilateral convergence did not succeed in resolving the disagreement with the Turkish position, despite many trilateral talks have been held to settle water disputes. On its side, Turkey firmly rejected the interference of the Arab League, threatened a military intervention against the Syrian backing of Kurdish separatism, and forced the downstream counterparts to separate agreements. Specifically, these agreements were a protocol establishing a joint technical committee signed with Iraq in 1980 and a treaty signed in 2001 recognizing the Syrian compliance to the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (known with the Turkish acronym of GAP) – a huge energy and agricultural development plan concerning the construction of 21 dams, 19 hydroelectric plants, and extensive irrigation systems on the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers that is expected to severely reduce downstream flows after its completion.

Even though in a reverse order, a similar situation originates from the control of the Orontes, which rises in Lebanon and runs for most of its length in Syrian territory before entering in Turkey where it flows into the Mediterranean Sea. Here, Turkey has the disadvantage of a downstream geographic position, while Syria acts as a typical upstream state. As a result, if Lebanon and Syria managed to reach an allocation agreement in 1994, Damascus has occasionally used rights over the Orontes waters to reinforce its claim on the disputed Hatay province. As the border affair fed the water controversy, Turkey (explicitly but uselessly) tied the negotiation on the Euphrates River to the inclusion of the Orontes issues in a comprehensive framework. The Friendship Dam almost resolved the disagreement, but the Syrian civil war halted the realization of the infrastructure (began in 2011) and deteriorated the bilateral relations.

Taking into consideration the Jordan River basin, the *status quo* is preserved by the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (1994) and the Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement (1995). In other words, the operating security structure is shaped on Israeli strategic preferences rather than expressing a multilateral consensus among the riparians. Hence, the cooperative trend should not be overestimated because of the hidden low-intensity tensions covered by the Israeli hegemonic stance in the transboundary basin. Indeed, the minor contention on the

¹²⁴ Syria and Iraq feared that the sudden interruption of Euphrates flows caused by the two-months filling of the Atatürk Dam would have been the prelude of restricted water supply due to the implementation of the GAP project. Consequently, the allocation protocols previously signed with Turkey were perceived as substantially undermined.

Wazzani springs remains an open affair after the Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon, as well as the Kingdom of Jordan critically suffers from the unsustainable overexploitation of the Yarmouk River (the largest tributary of the Jordan River) by Israel and Syria, in the absence of an effective allocation formula. Furthermore, despite the significant recognition of mutual water needs, the cooperative aim of Israeli water policies toward Palestinians should be lowered since the Israeli over-pumping of groundwater in the West Bank fails to comply with the terms negotiated under the Interim Agreement, the Separation Wall acts as a tool of water grabbing, and the Joint Water Commission's procedures are strictly bound to the Israel Defence Forces' authority (Zeitoun, 2012). Besides, water is deeply "related to other contentious issues of land, refugees, and political sovereignty" that fuel the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Wolf et Newton, 2009). Therefore, the recurrence of cooperative interactions does not imply the gradual resolution of the water dispute.

Cooperation and conflict trends assert the balance of power in the water system. This point is supported by the distribution of interactions by country. Countries benefiting from temperate climate and a favourable geographic position have logically no interest in raising a dispute on the management of international watercourses. Consistently, Turkey and Lebanon register few water events (with low intensity level) in comparison to the other riparians in the Near East sub-region. On the contrary, almost one-third of the total country-pair interactions directly involve Israel, a downstream with scarce water resources. Nevertheless, the material capabilities allowed Israel to pursue a condition of predominance in the system, which was fully achieved after the Six-Day War in 1967. Thereafter, Israeli hard power has succeeded in dissuading its neighbours to restore hostile actions and in avoiding the adoption of an aggressive posture, as depicted in the Jordan River strategic interactions timeline.

The distribution of events by issue area plainly shows that water quantity constitutes the bone of contention: 75% of total events refer to the allocation of water flows, while the global average in the BAR project stands at 46%. Conflict also relates to infrastructure and border issues (4% against the global BAR rate of 1%). Besides, these typologies are often tied. For instance, extensive war acts (+6 intensity BAR value) concerned the Israeli attacks to the Jordanian Ghor Canal in 1969 and recurrent clashes in the Huleh Valley during the 50's caused by the Israeli drainage projects. Cooperation events likewise focus on the

negotiation of water quantities and infrastructural plans, but they also include some cases of technical collaboration and joint management (respectively, 23 and 13 instances out of 388 cooperative events). Nevertheless, it should be underlined that these last attempts of cooperative interaction were almost exclusively promoted by external actors and donors – such as the World Bank, the USAID agency, or the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Only the 18% of the total cooperative treaties (intensity BAR value $\geq +3$) in the Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates basins involved at least three riparian countries. Thus, the occurrence of cooperation in technical and governance matters does not indicate the progressive reliance on a mutually accepted basin-wide joint administration. The lack of functional agreements in the field of economic development is a telling symptom of the failure of the regionalization political process.

This argument addresses the relation between conflict-cooperation in water stressed basin and polarization-integration of the corresponding security structure at the interstate level. Despite the prevalence of cooperative interactions evaluated in the TFDD relational database, the water system of the Levant registers a low grade of institutional capacity. The operating treaties that established river basin organizations are not inclusive. Consequently, the non-fulfilment of a multilateral agreement governing the equitable division and utilization of transnational flows downgrades the actual hydropolitical architecture, which dictates the leading role acquired by the regional powers (Turkey and Israel) without solving water disputes. This finding is coherent with a realist reading of the security dynamics in the area, but the inefficient apportionment of shared water resources affects the strategic interests of every riparian country, with no exception. In other words, the distributional issue threatened by the growing scarcity would operate as a conflict multiplier in the Middle East strategic core.

Water Conflict and Cooperation

The analysis suggests that the cooperative result of the quantitative assessment is fragile and spurious. The hydropolitical security structure of the Near East water system is carved by the regional balance of power and, specifically, by the political agendas of the stronger riparian countries. Most of cooperative arrangements concerned neutral issues or implied low commitments, as demonstrated by the lack of multilateral agreements governing the management of shared water resources. In this respect, cooperation efforts often expressed

competitive and even coercive behaviours¹²⁵, reinforcing contradictory strategic interests rather than safeguarding mutual needs. Moreover, missed improvements in the joint governance of transboundary basins signal the absence of a coping mechanism to tackle the increasing water deficit.

Therefore, our thesis of a linear relationship between resource scarcity and regional integration is not supported by the empirical study of water interactions. In fact, the assessment verifies the opposite trend: the perception of acute scarcity encourages the polarization within an international river basin. In other words, if national security is threatened, each country will follow the imperative of take care of itself, even when the net benefits of cooperation could outweigh the absolute gains of a unilateral action (Waltz, 1979). According to neorealism, efficiency does not have a systemic value in the anarchic realm of international politics since no state would risk favouring a competitor (*ibidem*, 104-109). This is consistent with Dinar's hypothesis on a curvilinear relationship that associates the emergence of cooperation to medium scarcity, by virtue of limited transaction costs (Dinar, 2009; Dinar et. al., 2011). It can be added that "the red flag for water-related tension between countries is not water stress per se, as it is within countries, but rather the unilateral exercise of domination of an international river" (Wolf, 2009: 12).

Therefore, many scholars have argued that bargaining efforts on water issues will unlikely come to a cooperative and fair agreement in contexts of intense political tensions. Lowi clearly developed this argument: "when a dispute over water resources is embedded in a larger political conflict, the former can neither be conceived of as a discrete conflict over a resource, nor be resolved as such", since "antagonists in the high politics of war and diplomacy tend not to agree willingly to extensive collaboration in the sphere of low politics, centred around economic and welfare issues" (Lowi, 1993: 8-9). Consequently, functional arrangements need to be promoted and maintained by a central enforcer, but the dominant power in a basin would be interested in leading a cooperative regime only if it can pursue a greater exploitation of water bodies.

¹²⁵According to Zeitoun and Mirumachi, the intertwining of cooperative and conflicting events asserts the unreliability of a one-dimensional continuum conflict-cooperation to study water interactions at the interstate level (Zeitoun et Mirumachi, 2008).

This general assumption indicates that an upstream state with sufficient capabilities will not engage a multilateral negotiation; whereas it will seek to maximise its control on the disputed resource. Turkey is a shining example of this strategic thinking. Benefiting from a superior riparian position and strong assets, Turkey has constantly adhered to a *divide et impera* regional policy in order to handle the intra-basin security dynamics. As a matter of principle, Turkish governments opposed the historical rights of utilization claimed by the Syrian and the Iraqi sides. Furthermore, Turkey voted against the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. As a result, the Tigris-Euphrates watershed is fractured by power asymmetries among the riparian countries. Then, the institutional weakness of Syrian and Iraqi orders is supposed to seriously jeopardize water supply across the region in the short term.

The other dominant power in the Near East scenario, Israel, did not succeed in forging cooperation on the model of the Nile Basin Initiative, where the powerful downstream hegemon (Egypt) advocated the establishment of a multilateral regime. Prior to the Six-Days War and the subsequent annexations, Israel opened to the U.S.-led negotiation that gave birth to the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan (commonly referred to as the “Johnston Plan”) in early 1950s. The agreement dictated national quotas, but despite the technical consensus it was not ratified due to the opposition of Syria, which fostered the Arab League’s resolution on the diversion of the headwaters of the Jordan River. After the 1967 war, the hydropolitical setting shifted toward the Israeli preferences and a treaty binding the riparian countries was no longer in the list of priorities. Besides, the Arab non-recognition deprived Israel of the social capital required to pursue collective interests, acting as a regional water commissioner, given that a hegemonic regime depends on both a condition of primacy and “a general belief in its legitimacy” (Gilpin, 1987: 73; Clark, 2011).

To further interpret the chance of regional cooperation in the water sector, an additional consideration should be appraised. Contrary to Lowi’s rationale on the rise of multilateral treaties in transboundary basins with the presence of a hegemonic actor, the analysis of strategic water interactions in the Near East proves that the stronger riparian is likely to work for bilateral negotiations (Zawahri et McLaughlin Mitchell, 2011). Indeed, in a bilateral agreement the hegemon is able to sanction defectors individually, avoiding the risk of free riding, meanwhile it can “prevent the formation of coalitions that could increase the

power of otherwise weaker riparians” (*ibidem*: 838). Hence, regional powers increase the potential of conflict along international water bodies.

However, a distinction between revisionist and *status quo* riparian countries fails to describe the undergoing water security challenges in the Middle East. With inadequate financing and indefinite coordination measures across the region, every riparian is vulnerable both to the looming climatic change and the rising water demand within the system. Moreover, demographic pressure and over-urbanization are currently unmet by equal improvements in water infrastructures. In this respect, the attempt to overcome the decline of already low water resources wades through the implementation of a participatory approach in the management of water flows. Nevertheless, internal over-centralization and external competition frustrate the adoption of IWRM policies.

How to induce distant and distrustful counterparts at the bargaining table? In the cases of the Johnston Plan and of the Maqarin Dam in 1970s, the involvement of a third party (namely, the United States) did not lead to the peaceful resolution of the distributional deadlock (Lowi, 1993: 194). Similarly, our assessment does not evaluate the hegemonic stance of both Turkey and Israel as a key enabler of cooperation. Despite that, Brochmann and Hensel properly argued that issue linkage and side payments might usefully modify the payoff structure of a basin-wide agreement (Brochmann et Hensel; 2011). The oil deal recently promoted by the Iraqi government – which allows Kurdish regional authorities to export crude oil to Turkey – is a good example of a bargaining chip that could be effectively managed in order to attain guarantees in other strategic sectors. In fact, integrating different interests in a broader negotiation on natural resources may transform the zero-sum situation of a typical distributive bargaining over transboundary waters into a positive-sum outcome. In other words, the presence of multiple relationships of economic dependency may offer the opportunity of connecting water and energy security. From this perspective, it should be primarily noted that in the Middle East oil “predominantly favored aggregation rather than disaggregation, (...) encouraging the definition of boundaries and accepting international arbitration in contested cases” (Fawcett, 2005: 87). Secondly, it has to be stressed the complex interplay between water and energy issues, given that “decisions made for water use and management and the production of energy can have significant, multifaceted and broad-reaching impacts on each other” (UN Water,

2014: pp. 13-14). Accordingly, important integrating water-energy projects are currently underway, such as the Red Sea-Dead Sea water conveyance study programme that will provide electricity and desalinated seawater to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority (Granit & Lofgren, 2010).

Therefore, despite its competitive features, water resources are still essential in shaping cooperative opportunities. In addition, the private sector could offer a decisive contribution in terms of investments and managerial capabilities. Even though water services are usually structured as government monopolies, the “private operation of publicly owned assets” is becoming a common aspect in the domain of water supply (UN Water, 2014: pp. 18-19). In this terms, the involvement of private enterprises helps to decentralize water services, increase efficiency, and manage desalination and wastewater treatment plants. Moreover, private funds are expected to cover the financing of expensive and cross-border infrastructures, which are required to an increasing extent in order to foster the sustainable socio-economic development of most countries in the Middle East. In this regard, however, the integration of diverging hydropolicies into a regional framework would require not only the adoption of good practices and coordination measures, but also the parallel strengthening of chronically weak administrations.

Conclusions

Around 40% of global population live along cross-border watercourses, but the Middle Eastern countries are the most affected by the geopolitical consequences of shared water resources. Several indices of vulnerability foresee that the Middle East faces a concrete risk of water undersupply. In this respect, fragmentation of water management and regional polarization are different sides of the same coin: the analysis of the strategic interactions within the transboundary river basins of the Near East appraises that the relative prevalence of cooperative events is far from shaping mechanisms of joint governance.

Notwithstanding this undesirable finding, we still argue that the nexus between water scarcity and regionalization process offers valuable horizons to both researchers and politicians. For instance, linkages between water and energy issues might contribute in depoliticizing water disputes, thus overcoming informational and power asymmetries among neighbours. Additionally, the involvement of stakeholders from the private sector

might encourage the adoption of constructive measures in a plurality of fields (e.g. infrastructural investments, information sharing, subsidies regulation). From this perspective, the international community has the diplomatic and economic means to induce an effective reform process, promoting water security as a main driver of both capacity building and regional integration.

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Annex I – Tables and Figures

Table 1 - Major transboundary river basins in the Near East sub-region

Basin	Area		Countries included	Area of country in basin (km ²)	As % of total area of basin
	km ²	% of the region			
Euphrates-Tigris	879 790	13.4	Iraq	407 880	46.4
			Turkey	192 190	21.8
			Iran (Islamic Republic of)	166 240	18.9
			Syrian Arab Republic	96 420	11.0
			Saudi Arabia	16 840	1.9
			Jordan	220	0.03
Asi-Orontes	24 660	0.4	Syrian Arab Republic	16 910	68.6
			Turkey	5 710	23.1
			Lebanon	2 040	8.3
Jordan	18 500	0.3	Jordan	7 470	40.4
			Israel	6 830	36.9
			Syrian Arab Republic	1 910	10.3
			Occupied Palestinian Territory	1 620	8.8
			Lebanon	670	3.6

Source: FAO, ACQUASTAT, 2015

Table 2 - Water resources by country in the Near East subregion


Country	average precipitation (mm/yr)	TRWR natural (km ³ /yr)	TRWR actual (km ³ /yr)	TIRWR actual (km ³ /yr)	TFW (km ³ /yr)	Indices of vulnerability			
						Freshwater withdrawal as % of TRWR actual	TRWR actual per capita (m ³ /inhab/yr)	TIRWR actual per capita (m ³ /inhab/yr)	Dependency ratio (%)
Iraq	216	96.61	89.86	35.2	65.99	73.44	2661	1042	61
Israel	435	1.78	1.78	0.75	1.419	79.72	230.2	93.99	58
Jordan	111	1.662	0.937	0.682	0.8662	92.44	128.8	93.76	27
Lebanon	661	4.838	4.503	4.8	1.096	24.34	933.8	995.4	0.7
Palestine	402	0.837	0.837	0.812	0.408	48.75	193.5	187.7	3
Syria	252	55.78	16.8	7.132	14.14	84.17	767.2	325.7	72
Turkey	593	231.7	211.6	227	40.05	18.93	2824	3029	1

Source: FAO, ACQUASTAT, 2015

TRWR: total renewable water resources

TIRWR: total internal renewable water resources

TFW: total freshwater withdrawal



BAR Scale	Events Description
-7	Formal Declaration of War
-6	Extensive War Acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic cost
-5	Small scale military acts
-4	Political-military hostile actions
-3	Diplomatic-economic hostile actions:
-2	Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction:
-1	Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction
0	Neutral or non-significant acts for the inter-nation situation
1	Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions--mild verbal support
2	Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime
3	Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic
4	Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement
5	Military economic or strategic support
6	International Freshwater Treaty; Major strategic alliance (regional or international
7	Voluntary unification into one nation

Source: Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database.

Figure 2 - Timeline of high cooperative and high conflicting water interactions in the Near East sub-region









Figure 3 - Timeline of water interactions in the Jordan River basin







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Presentation: Garamond 12, spacing 1.15, italic.

Paragraphs: First line indentation 1.25 cm, no spaces between paragraphs

Borders: top and bottom 2,5 cm, left and right 3,00cm (default)

Quotes: sectioned off if more than two sentences; Garamond 11, indented 1.25 cm

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What is the research question and why should academics research it, scientific and societal relevance.

Literature review

What has previously been written on the topic, what conclusions others reached.

(Model construction) and Theoretical framework

What theoretical framework and approach is used and why. If applicable, causal model may be shown at this point, or later, after data investigation.

Conceptualization and operationalization

Definition of basic terms and their indicators, choice of variables and their validity testing. Formulation of hypotheses (explicit or implicit) based on the theory/theories. Elaboration of specific claim(s) in the investigated theory/theories. If applicable, description of the causal mechanism, i.e. the chain of events purported to link your explanatory variables to the specific outcome.

Methodology

Description of the specific research method used (i.e., process-tracing, discursive analysis, MLA, etc.), its advantages and weaknesses and why it is chosen.

Data

Description of the data used, number of cases, method of case-selection, source of data, method of data collection, sampling method.

Analysis and findings

What the data show in detail, general tendencies and interesting particularities.

(Model construction) and Conclusions

Causal models may be formulated and general conclusions reached. Conclusions may or may not specifically challenge or support findings in existing literature.

Future research

Possibilities of future research for the researcher or other scholars, promising directions, requirements for future research.

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Appendices

Every piece of data used shown so as to facilitate potential replications. If possible, data shared publicly and/or presented together with the manuscript.

Presentation of the author:

Please, include a short presentation of yourself (approx. 100 words) in the following style
"Françoise Deutsch, 32, is a graduate who received his Bachelor in "European Studies" at the University of Shire in 2008. In 2009, he obtained an LL.M/M.Sc./MA in International Relations at the University of Stadt. He wrote his Master Thesis on ???, and currently interns/works/studies at the WWW. His interests include security studies, human rights, democratic transition, development studies, political philosophy, conflict resolution, etc."

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