A faint, light blue background image of a globe, centered on the Americas, with the continents of North and South America visible in a slightly darker shade of blue.

Politikon

the IAPSS Journal of Political Science



2414-6633

Volume 18 Number 3: September 2018

ISSN 2414-6633

<https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.38>

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief: Max Steuer (Slovakia)

Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Rafael Plancarte (Mexico)

Justinas Lingevičus (Lithuania)

Andrés Lopez Rivera (Ecuador)

Ana Magdalena Figueroa (Brazil)

Stephanie Mojica (USA)

Gergana Tzvetkova (Bulgaria)

Editorial Assistants

Ngoc Anh Khoa Doan (Vietnam)

Dana Rice (Australia)

Bruna Veríssimo (Brazil)

Table of Contents

Editorial Note.....	4
---------------------	---

Articles

Mission Accomplished? Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Financial Action Task Force's War on Terrorist Financing / <i>James Ferencsik</i>	6
The Formation of Electoral Alliances in the Republic of Armenia: A Case Study of the 2017 Parliamentary Elections / <i>Gayane Shakhmuradyan</i>	31
The Challenge of Unintelligible Life: Critical Security Studies' Failure to Account for Violence Against Queer People / <i>Alexander Stoffel</i>	48

Book review

'The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It by Yascha Mounk / <i>David W. Choi</i>	64
Call for Papers	67

Editorial Note

<https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.38.0>

Politikon, the flagship journal of the International Association for Political Science Students (IAPSS), welcomes submissions from scholars and students of all academic levels. Run by students and junior researchers, the journal occupies a prominent space in ‘student publishing’ in Political Science and International Relations. A recent study comparing *LAPSS Politikon* to two other student-run journals in the field found that it not only published the highest number of articles among the three in the period from 2005 to 2015, but it also attracts authors from a diverse set of countries and institutions from almost all continents (Cox and Kent, 2018: 807–8). While there are limitations to this analysis, it indicates the impartiality and openness of the submission evaluation process where what matters is the quality of the scholarship rather than the ranking of the author’s institution.

The present issue consists of three research articles that succeeded in the double-blind peer review process and one book review. The issue starts with James Ferencsik’s study of one of the less known international organizations, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Contributing to the scholarship about the trends in (non)compliance with the decisions of such organizations, he conducts a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of selected recommendations of the FATF in terms of reducing the instances of terrorist attacks and restricting terrorist financing. The conclusions give grounds to some scepticism about the FATF’s effectiveness in selected areas and give rise to questions about the factors standing behind these trends. Secondly, Gayane Shakhmuradyan directs our attention to the 2017 parliamentary elections in Armenia which witnessed an unusually high number of electoral alliances. Her analysis of original data obtained through interviews and a survey gives some support to the prevalence of strategic, as opposed to ideological, motivations of the parties in forming these alliances. Recognizing some methodological limitations, the article contributes to the scholarship about electoral alliances and electoral studies more generally. Thirdly, the academic subfield of critical security studies is subject to scrutiny by Alexander Stoffel, who argues in his article that the scholarship in this field does not currently possess appropriate tools for comprehending the phenomenon of violence against queer people, and explains this by the specific features that ‘queerness’. Hence, a more refined theoretical frameworks is needed to decrease the risk of violent acts going unnoticed even at the level of academic analysis. Finally, David W. Choi reviews the book *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It* by Yascha Mounk, pointing to some of its core claims as well as limitations of the framework the author used.

Congratulations to all *LAPSS Politikon* manuscript authors who took the comments from the reviewers seriously and worked with them in the revision process. The significance of the peer review

process (which in *LAPSS Politikon* operates on a double-blind basis) cannot be overstated since it is a core vehicle towards academic excellence. The Editorial Board hopes that even if the peer review process does not end with publication, the authors will benefit from the feedback obtained, and this experience (the first for many *LAPSS Politikon* authors) will encourage them to contribute further to the areas of their research interests.

From this issue, *LAPSS Politikon* has a new member of its Editorial Board (Stephanie Mojica) and has been collaborating more actively with the IAPSS Editorial Assistants, who contribute to increasing the quality of its presentation. Furthermore, the Editorial Board is very grateful to those senior and high-profile scholars who accepted the invitation for membership in the International Advisory Committee of the journal and are willing to invest their time and effort to advise the journal on selected questions pertaining to its further development. Last but definitely not least, special thanks in this issue goes to outgoing *LAPSS Politikon* Editor Andrés Lopez Rivera who significantly contributed to the quality of this issue as well as previous ones.

As always, we look forward to receiving new submissions from aspiring as well as more experienced students and researchers fascinated by puzzles in the societal reality that social sciences endeavour to unpack.

Max Steuer
Editor-in-Chief

References

Cox, Michaelene, and Jaimie M. Kent (2018): 'Political Science Student Journals: What Students Publish and Why Student Publishing Matters', *PS: Political Science & Politics* 51(4): pp. 804-810. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096518000057>

Mission Accomplished? Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Financial Action Task Force's War on Terrorist Financing

James Ferencsik

<https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.38.1>

James Ferencsik 23, from Savannah (United States), received his Bachelor's degree in Political Science from Duke University and is currently studying for a Master's degree in International Security at L'Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). His master's and undergraduate theses have explored jihadist radicalization in Europe. He has co-translated a treatise-condemning jihad from Arabic to English. His interests include radicalization studies, terrorism studies, security studies, and international relations. E-mail: James.ferencsik@sciencespo.fr.

Abstract

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body accountable to the Finance Ministers from its member states, has been at the forefront of the war to counter terrorist financing (CTF). It has issued nine recommendations and “named and shamed” those who have failed to comply. While this strategy has convinced all states or countries, except North Korea, to cooperate, the effectiveness of the recommendations still remains unclear. This article seeks to answer the question: is compliance with the FATF recommendations associated with a) fewer terrorist attacks and b) a lower proportion of attacks using expensive weaponry? Through analysis of 138 countries' records of FATF compliance and terror attacks, this article finds neither a statistically significant relationship between compliance and the number of attacks nor between compliance and the cost of attacks. These results cast doubt upon the FATF recommendations' effectiveness recommendations and the global war on terrorist financing.

Keywords

Counter-Terrorism; Financial Regulation; International Organizations; Terrorism; War on Terror

Introduction

As American troops mobilized to enter Afghanistan, the United States (U.S.) opened a financial front in the Global War on Terror. By emphasizing, “money is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations,” President George W. Bush froze the assets of “suspected Islamic terrorist groups” with Executive Order 13224 (Kahn and Sanger, 2001). The Bush Administration then sought to internationalize this effort (Hayes, 2012). Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (ICSTF), a 1999 treaty that criminalized terrorist financing, became a top priority for American diplomats (Hayes, 2012). Responding to American pressure, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) accelerated the efforts to incorporate counter terrorist financing (CTF) into their work (Hayes, 2012). However, the global war on terrorist financing centered on a little-known (or uncommon) intergovernmental organization, called the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

The Finance Ministers attending the July 1989 G-7 Summit in Paris initially created the FATF to continue the Summit’s mission to counter money-laundering (FATF, 2017a). In April 1990, the FATF released a list of 40 recommendations, which focused on laws that countries could adopt to combat money laundering (FATF, 2017b). By 1992, the FATF grew to 28 members (Hayes, 2012). Membership has been based on compliance with the recommendations and “strategic importance,” as determined by GDP, financial sector size, and other factors (FATF, 2017c).

In the effort to internationalize American CTF policies, the FATF offered several advantages comparing with the IMF, the WB or the United Nations (UN). Although IMF and WB loans could include CTF provisions, countries would first need to approach those organizations. Similarly, ratifying additional treaties would be voluntary and slow. Once ratified, enforcement would pose a problem. G-7 countries tried to use these channels to combat terrorist financing in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration learned from the shortcomings of these efforts (Hayes, 2012). In contrast, the FATF centralized “rule” making in the hands of a few countries while ensuring nearly universal cooperation.

The FATF considers itself as a “policy-making body that works to generate necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas” (2017a). It generates political will through a blacklist. The FATF or one of its regional affiliates evaluates whether countries are compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, or not compliant with each recommendation (FATF, 2016). The evaluations are public, and a poor evaluation can undercut a country’s status in the global financial sector. Then the organization “names and shames” those who fail to comply with a substantial portion of the recommendations or cooperate with the FATF in a public statement on “high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions,” better known as the blacklist

(FATF, 2016). The FATF instructs its members and other co-operative non-members to enhance due diligence measures when dealing with blacklisted countries (FATF, 2016). As a result, international trading partners face higher costs when dealing with blacklisted countries and may stop trading with them (FATF, 2016). If these negative economic consequences fail to induce cooperation, the FATF calls for its members - and non-members - to apply “counter-measures,” a financial quarantine tied to economic sanctions (FATF, 2016). In order to be removed from the list, a country must develop a FATF-approved plan of action with support at the ministerial level to become compliant (FATF, 2016).

The Bush Administration noted the immediate impact of the first blacklist published in June 2000 (Hayes, 2012). The member states could make a decision, leverage their financial influence, and present all other states with the option: comply or be isolated from the world’s largest economies. The efficient decision-making process and global impact of the blacklist distinguished the FATF as the ideal organization to internationalize CTF measures. Faced with pressure from the Bush Administration, the 2001 FATF meeting in Washington, D.C. revised the organization’s mandate to include CTF and adopted eight new recommendations within the scope of that new mission (FATF, 2017b). In October 2004, the FATF added a ninth special recommendation (FATF, 2017b).

With 198 countries publicly committed to implementing the recommendations, it is hard to question the success of the strategy to use the FATF as a platform to internationalize the war on terrorist financing (FATF, 2016). The FATF Executive Secretary David Lewis boasts that within the 53 countries named and shamed since 2007, “43 of these countries have made the necessary reforms” (FATF, 2016). Today, only two countries - North Korea and Iran - remain on the blacklist, but Iran has adopted a plan of action (FATF, 2016).

The FATF’s success in inducing cooperation and some compliance; however, it does not necessarily equate to eliminating the financial resources of terrorist organizations. To date, policymakers and academic experts know surprisingly little about whether the special recommendations have achieved their ultimate aim, including reduce the prevalence and lethality of terrorism. The failure to evaluate the FATF’s special recommendations represents a critical deficiency in the global war on terrorist financing. An evaluation indicating that the special recommendations were ineffective would likely provoke changes to the recommendations. In the long run, this process of evaluation and reform would increase the probability that the FATF’s CTF efforts would cripple the operations of terrorist organizations. Some scholars also question the cost-effectiveness of the measures recommended. For example, Ben Hayes (2012) notes that the FATF evaluation process reduces the sovereignty of non-FATF members and legitimizes strict financial controls on non-governmental organizations in non-democratic countries. These costs raise a crucial

question: is compliance with the FATF special recommendations associated with a) fewer terrorist attacks and b) a lower proportion of attacks using expensive weaponry?

This article represents the first attempt to rigorously and quantitatively answer that question. To that end, the remainder of this article is divided into four sections. Section 2 surveys past research on the FATF's CTF recommendations. Section 3 describes the quantitative, comparative methodology used to analyze the special recommendations' effectiveness. Section 4 discusses the results of the regressions conducted. Based on those results, Section 5 notes this article's limitations and argues that there is no evidence suggesting the recommendations are effective. The section calls on the FATF to conduct an in-house evaluation on the CTF recommendations' impact on terrorism as well as adopt two new CTF recommendations.

Literature Review

The literature examining the effectiveness of the FATF's CTF recommendations is scant and generally critical of the recommendations. Most critical articles focus on countries' low compliance rates with the recommendations or the FATF's inability to regulate transactions in informal or crypto-currency markets. However, Peter Neumann's *Foreign Affairs* article takes a clear position on the impact of the special recommendations. The critical articles with a more positive bent emphasize the number of countries cooperating. In addition, the responses to Neumann's article on *Foreign Affairs* rely on a few concrete examples in an effort to refute Neumann's arguments.

From the critical literature, there is a clear consensus that compliance is low. This trend began with an article by IMF staffers Jean-François Thony and Cheong-Ann Png (2007: 160) who conclude that the recommendations "are slow to be implemented effectively". The following year, Jackie Johnson (2008: 47) analyzes compliance before and after the FATF adopted the nine special recommendations, and she finds that the worthy has decreased since 2003. Three years later, Png (2011: 110) looks at compliance among members of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and determines, "the general level of compliance is quite limited". Verdugo Yepes (2011: 1) indicates in an IMF working paper, "overall compliance is low". Most recently, King Kwang Choo (2013) summarizes the compliance record of countries as of 2013 and similarly notes the low compliance.

Some scholars, however, strike a more positive perspective on the FATF's recommendations by focusing on cooperation rather than compliance. Kathryn Gardner's (2007: 325) article on "Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way" stresses the number of countries cooperating, "the FATF has become adaptive, facilitating transnational effectiveness in the fight to counter terrorist financing". Similarly, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal (2000: 440) note the number of countries cooperating and argue that the FATF has manufactured "a significant degree of convergence" by permitting national diversity, creating an expectation of political costs for non-compliance, and legitimizing its

work through legal discourse. Gardner, Abbott, and Snidal rely less on quantitative data than their peers criticizing compliance rates and fail to address the point that cooperation with low compliance impedes an effective CTF regime.

The newest approach in the literature criticizes the FATF's inability to respond to the rapidly changing nature of financial transactions. William Vleck (2018: 260) argues that the FATF's work has pushed terrorist financing into the informal economy and the FATF's "rule-based approach lacks the flexibility necessary for dealing with the nature of an informal economy". Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn (2018) finds that the FATF guidance on countering money laundering and terrorist financing via crypto-currency is insufficient and relies too heavily on self-regulation by the private sector. All of these works; however, do not mention about the effectiveness of the CTF recommendations.

One cannot say the same thing about Peter Neumann's article in *Foreign Affairs*. His conclusion is clear: the war on terrorist financing has been a failure (Neumann, 2017). His key point compares the size of budget for the Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS) and the quantity of money frozen in CTF efforts (Neumann, 2017). According to estimates from King's College and Ernst and Young, ISIS had a budget of \$1 billion in 2016 and \$1.9 billion 2014 and the total terrorist assets frozen in 2017 amounted to \$60 million (Heißer et al, 2017). Therefore, international CTF efforts have not stopped terrorist organizations from amassing large amounts of money (Neumann, 2017). Then he explains why CTF efforts do not affect ISIS's main streams of revenue: raiding local banks, taxing those living under its banner, maintaining a monopoly on oil production in its territory, and ransoming individuals (Neumann, 2017). Noting the costs of compliance with the FATF recommendations, Neumann (2017) calls for policymakers to rethink the financial front in the War on Terror.

Neumann's article provoked a wave of responses in the next issue of *Foreign Affairs*, primarily from former senior civil servants involved in CTF efforts who defended CTF as part of a multipronged strategy. Among the responses, Matthew Levitt and Katherine Bauer provide concrete, albeit anecdotal evidence, in response to Neumann. They mention how financial intelligence allowed authorities to track down the mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombing and foil plots in the United Kingdom and Germany (Bauer and Levitt, 2017). They also cite Al-Qaeda's finance chief, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, in a propaganda video complaining about the lack of funds to achieve its goals. (Bauer and Levitt, 2017). Although these responses do not mention the FATF, this debate raises a simple question: who is right?

Compliance is clearly low, but what is the advantage of compliance? Does it actually reduce terrorism? There are well-articulated responses for and against, but the quantitative evidence to

support each argument is minimal. This review of past research on the effectiveness of the FATF's recommendations underscores the need for quantitative, comparative analysis on the subject.

Theory and Methodology

The FATF special recommendations aim to combat terrorism by reducing the funding available to terrorists and their ability to move that funding internationally. With funding reduction, terrorists would have less money to pay subordinates. Although ideology drives terrorists, some still need financial motives as Peter Neumann (2013: 67) analyzed in his book *Radicalized*. If the groups did not have the finance to pay competitive wages, Neumann's research indicates that these groups would lose the opportunists who join for livelihood. Since attacks require individuals to shoot, set or detonate explosives, or take other actions, fewer fighters translate to a reduced capacity to carry out attacks. That reduced capacity – all else remaining constant – should lead to fewer attacks. With reduced funding, terrorist groups would also have less money to buy or make weapons. As a result, these groups would resort to cheaper weapons, which are typically less lethal. While some groups may capture expensive weapons, not all groups would be able to and the captured weapons are unlikely to arm every fighter in a group. If the recommendations reduce terrorism by reducing their funds, one should observe two negative correlations: one between recommendation compliance and the number of attacks and another between recommendation compliance and the cost of weaponry used. One should be able to observe these correlations globally and within a given country over time.

The state-centric approach of this theory has limitations in a world increasingly plagued by transnational terrorism. Nevertheless, many terrorist groups remain clustered in one country or have branches in different countries that do not pool resources. Furthermore, if compliance with the recommendations decreases funding for terrorist groups, Country A's weak compliance record would not erase the impact of Country B's strong compliance record. If the recommendations achieve their goal and a group operates in both countries, Country B's compliance would reduce the group's short-term budget in Country B and its overall budget. Unless the group replenishes the funds lost in Country B with funds from its branch in Country A, the group's long-term budget in country B would decrease, and its number of attacks should reflect that. Furthermore, the recommendations seek to stop terrorist groups from transferring funds internationally. If the recommendations are effective, the group should struggle to shift substantial funds from Country A to B. Thus, it remains unlikely that the compliance of one country, if the recommendations were effective, would eliminate a statistically significant effect of compliance in another country.

Similarly, porous borders between countries could allow expensive weaponry to pass from Country A to Country B, and that possibility constrains the conclusions from this article. However, the Special Recommendation 9 outlines measures to detect the physical cross-border transportation

of currency and seize the money if related to terrorist financing. If a country complies with the recommendation, it is reasonable to assume that a country can detect and stop the cross-border transportation of most expensive weapons, especially considering that the FATF considers enforcement as part of compliance. Given that link between stopping the physical transportation of weapons and funds, the weak compliance record or ability to counter terrorism of one country would not necessarily lead to weapons flowing into a country with a strong compliance record. Therefore, the limitations of this state-centric approach are not crippling.

To operationalize this theory, this article examines compliance with the FATF's CTF recommendations, the number of terror attacks between 2004 and 2016, and the financial cost of the attacks between 2004 and 2016 in 138 countries. In the 33 countries with two publicly accessible mutual evaluations, this article also examines the change in compliance, the change in the number of attacks, and the change in the weaponry used. The start and end years reflect the adoption of the last CTF recommendation in 2004 and the last update in the terrorism data used for this article.

Countries

The 138 countries analyzed for this article met two criteria. First, they were subjects to a mutual evaluation by the FATF or a regional body. Second, they must have suffered at least one terror attack between October 2004 and the end of 2016 as defined by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). If a country has not suffered a terrorist attack in that twelve-year timespan, it is reasonable for that country to consider terrorism as a distant threat and to dismiss the importance of CTF compliance. These criteria are as inclusive as possible to reduce the impact of geographic and cultural factors and improve the statistical power of the analysis. While the countries analyzed are not a random sample, a given country's mutual evaluation score does not affect another country's score, and different staff are used to carry out each evaluation (FATF, 2012). Hence, there is little possibility of correlated measurement error that could bias the independent variable.

The thirty-three countries with two mutual evaluations examined in the secondary analysis are a subset of the original 138 countries. Here, the independent variable is the change in compliance over time. This variable in one country does not affect the change in another country. As with the full set of 138 countries, the two evaluations in one country do not affect the two evaluations in another country, and most of the staffs conducting the evaluations are different. While a country's first score likely affects its second score and a country's compliance could influence another country's compliance over time, the possibility of correlated measurement error that could bias the independent variable is negligible.

Compliance Score

The number of the nine CTF recommendations with which a country is compliant or largely compliant in their most recent mutual evaluation determines compliance score. The FATF or one of its nine regional affiliates determines compliance with each recommendation and summarizes the results in the first table of every mutual evaluation report. Largely compliant signifies that a country has followed the majority of guidelines for a particular recommendation (FATF, 2012). The two other ratings, non-compliant and partially compliant, will be categorized as non-compliant. While partial compliance can signify that a country followed a substantial minority of the guidelines to follow a recommendation, it also includes minimal effort towards compliance. For the subset of thirty-three countries, the change in compliance will be measured between each country's most recent and second most recent evaluations. The first approach is ultimately non-binary with a maximum score of nine and a minimum score of zero. The second approach has a maximum score of plus nine and a minimum score of negative nine. While the compliance score is not an interval scale given the nature of the recommendations, the recommendations are similar in scope and content with each one suggesting a concrete legislative action in a particular area. Each recommendation also has the same goal, approach, and creator, so compliance with a recommendation is a comparable qualitative measurement. There; however, is one important exception.

The nine "special" recommendations, specifically addressing CTF, were re-numbered in 2012 and integrated into the broader forty recommendations on money laundering for the most recent round of evaluations (FATF, 2012). The harmonization of the recommendations is summarized below:

Chart 1. FATF's CTF Recommendations

Recommendations (Rounds 1-3)	Recommendations (Round 4)
Special Recommendation 1 – Ratify international CTF instruments Recommendation 35 – Ratify international instruments on money laundering	Recommendation 36 – Ratify international instruments on money laundering and CTF
Special Recommendation 2 – Criminalize terrorist financing	Recommendation 5 – Criminalize terrorist financing
Special Recommendation 3 – Allow authorities to seize terrorist assets	Recommendation 6 – Allow authorities to seize terrorist assets

Special Recommendation 4 – Require reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism Recommendation 13 – Require reporting suspicious transactions related to money laundering	Recommendation 20 – Require reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism and money laundering
Special Recommendation 5 – Provide legal assistance to other countries on CTF Recommendation 36 – Provide legal assistance to other countries on money laundering	Recommendation 37 – Provide legal assistance to other countries on money laundering and CTF
Special Recommendation 6 – Require a license and CTF compliance for money transfer services	Recommendation 14 – Require a license and CTF compliance for money transfer services
Special Recommendation 7 – Mandate due diligence for wire transfers	Recommendation 16 – Mandate due diligence for wire transfers
Special Recommendation 8 – Oversee non-profit funding	Recommendation 8 – Oversee non-profit funding
Special Recommendation 9 – Detect cross-border cash couriers and stop funds for terrorists	Recommendation 32 – Detect cross-border cash couriers and stop funds for terrorists

Source: FATF, 2012

In the process, the content of three CTF recommendations has changed. Special Recommendation 1, requiring the “ratification and implementation of UN instruments” on CTF, including the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and UN Security Council Resolution 1373, was combined with elements of Recommendation 35, which called for the ratification of several anti-money laundering treaties, to produce Recommendation 36. Special Recommendation 4, requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions possibly connected to terrorism, was combined with Recommendation 13, requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions possibly connected to money laundering, to create Recommendation 20. Special Recommendation 5, calling for mutual legal assistance on CTF, was fused with Recommendation 36, encouraging mutual legal assistance to counter money laundering, to create Recommendation 37. These changes complicate the variable of compliance.

For this article, recommendations 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 20, 32, 36, and 37 determine the compliance score for fourth round evaluations whereas Special Recommendations 1 through 9 determine the compliance score for the previous rounds. Other recommendations fused with the special recommendations for the 4th round are excluded from compliance scores for earlier rounds in order to maintain equivalent maximum and minimum scores for all rounds. While the fourth round changes limit the ability to precisely compare mutual evaluations from this round with prior evaluations, there is only Special Recommendation 1's content significantly changed with the addition of other international conventions. The other two changes – to Special Recommendations 4 and 5 – only added anti-money laundering to the existing content on terrorist financing. While anti-money laundering efforts address the source of funds and CTF efforts address the use of funds, those efforts sometimes overlap. With the second change on suspicious transactions, reporting suspicious transactions for money laundering and reporting suspicious transactions for terrorist financing both require scrutinizing the transactions based on similar criteria and reporting them to the same financial intelligence unit (FATF, 2012: 17). It is reasonable to assume that compliance with the money laundering reporting recommendation often coincides with compliance with the CTF reporting recommendation. With the third change, mutual legal assistance on money laundering and CTF requires laws enabling international co-operation on financial crimes, removing possible impediments like secrecy laws, and creating similar institutions to act as vehicles for co-operation (FATF, 2012: 25). If a country has complied with the CTF recommendation, it likely has complied with the money laundering recommendation because the laws and institutions for that assistance are already in place. Considering the limited nature of these changes, this approach is preferable to a) assessing only countries evaluated in the fourth round, which would constitute a very small dataset, and to b) assessing countries evaluated before 2012 and thereby ignoring the most recent data.

Terrorism

The University of Maryland's (START) Global Terrorism Database provided this article's data on the number of attacks and the weaponry used (START, 2017). The data for each country spans from the start of the year before its evaluation was released until the end of the year when the evaluation was released. This timeframe mirrors the evaluation period, which takes approximately two years. The evaluations do not indicate the day they began, precluding a more specific timeframe for terrorism attack data. For countries evaluated in 2017, there is not corresponding START data as of this writing, so 2015-2016 will be used to keep a consistent two-year timeframe for all countries.

This article uses START's three criteria for defining a terrorist attack:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;
2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and

3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law (START, 2016).

While START directly indicates the number of attacks in a given period, the cost of the weaponry comes from the START database's weapon-type variable, which categorizes weapons as biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, firearms, explosives/bombs/dynamite, fake weapons, incendiary (a Molotov cocktail or gasoline), melee (non-projectile weapon like a club or knife), vehicle (without explosives), sabotage equipment, other, and unknown. This article codes biological weapons, chemical weapons, radiological weapons, nuclear weapons, firearms and explosives/bombs/dynamite as expensive weapons and all other weapons as inexpensive weapons. While some cheaper explosives are possible to produce, the START categorization does not allow for a more precise distinction based on the cost of explosives. While firearms are cheaper than the other "expensive" weapons, they still cost significantly more than fake weapons, gasoline, knives, or rented vehicles. If multiple weapons are used, the attack is coded as expensive if any "expensive" weapon was used. While the proliferation of weapons like firearms and explosives in some countries has reduced their price in those places, the lack of accurate, public black market prices for weapons in every country precludes a country-specific categorization of weapons as expensive or not expensive.

Hypotheses

With this data and methodology, this paper considers four null and alternative hypotheses in an effort to determine the effectiveness of the special recommendations. Those are summarized below:

Chart 2 – Hypotheses

Null Hypotheses	Alternative Hypotheses
H1: No association between compliance score and number of attacks	HA1: Association between compliance score and number of attacks
H2: No association between compliance score and proportion of attacks using expensive weaponry	HA2: Association between compliance score and proportion of attacks using expensive weaponry
H3: No association between change in compliance and change in the number of attacks	HA3: Association between change in compliance and change in the number of attacks

H4: No association between change in compliance and change in proportion of attacks with expensive weaponry	HA4: Association between change in compliance and change in proportion of attacks with expensive weaponry
---	---

Source: Author

Considering the many factors impacting terrorist activity and this article's limitations, rejecting these null hypotheses would not prove a causal relationship between compliance and terrorism; however, if there were a causal link, one would expect to see associations between these variables. Thus, the article cannot show a causal relationship but it can suggest the lack of one.

These hypotheses test both components of the theory: that complying with effective recommendations would a) reduce the number of attacks in a given country and b) reduce the proportion of attacks with expensive weapons. The two approaches, looking at compliance and change in compliance, take into consideration that the recommendations might take time to have an effect. A mutual evaluation soon after the implementation of the recommendations may not reflect their impact on terrorist financing, but examining change in compliance should reflect it. However, the FATF has not yet evaluated many countries twice, so the global approach incorporates more data to improve statistical power. The two approaches allow this article to leverage the comparative advantages of each approach.

While the initial components of compliance score are binary, the score itself and the change in score have nine and nineteen levels, respectively. Given the nature of these variables, regressions represent the best tool to analyze the statistical relationship between the two variables. This article will use negative binomial regression analysis to evaluate the first hypothesis,¹ a logistic regression to evaluate the second hypothesis, and simple linear regressions to evaluate the third and fourth hypotheses.

Results

This section summarizes the data collected and assesses the article's four hypotheses. In terms of compliance, only Armenia and Malaysia received a perfect 9 for compliance. There are fifty countries, which had compliance scores of zero, and the median compliance score was 2. The number of terrorist attacks ranged from one attack for eleven countries to 21,863 in Iraq with a median of 17 attacks. The median proportion of attacks with expensive weapons was .8. Although overall compliance appears low, compliance increased by a median of one special recommendation from the first evaluation to the second evaluation for the subset of thirty-three countries. Likewise,

¹ After using Poisson regression analysis, it became clear that the data was over-dispersed. A negative binomial regression is the appropriate correction for over-dispersion.


the number of attacks increased by a median of one attack for that subset. In contrast, the median change in the proportion of attacks with expensive weapons was zero.

Chart 3 – Summary Data

	Median (198 countries)	Median Change (33 countries)
Compliance	2	1
Number of Attacks	17	1
Proportion with Expensive Weapons	0.8	0

Source: Author

Chart 4 – Compliance and the Number of Attacks




Source: Author

The negative binomial regression conducted with H1 indicates a statistically significant regression coefficient between compliance and the number of attacks of -0.2239 with a p-value of 0.000345. Chart 4 graphs this relationship. Chart 5, however, identifies three outliers – Afghanistan (1), Iraq (57), and Pakistan (93). At the time of their mutual evaluations, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan's Waziristan region were active war zones where multiple jihadist groups were operating.² These factors underscore the unique situation in these countries and necessitate additional regression analysis without these three outliers. After removing these three countries from the database, the correlation coefficient shrank to -0.09986 with a p-value of 0.087. Using a $p=0.05$ threshold for

² The FATF published evaluations for Pakistan in 2009, Afghanistan in 2011, and Iraq in 2012. Syria's last evaluation, in 2006, and Yemen's last evaluation, in 2008, preceded their civil wars. Libya has yet to be evaluated.

significance, this coefficient is not statistically significant. Therefore, I fail to reject the first null hypothesis (H1).


Chart 5 – Outliers for Compliance and the Number of Attacks



Source: Author

Moving to H2, binomial regression for compliance scores and the proportion of attacks with expensive weaponry indicates a regression coefficient of -0.04588 with a p-value of 0.2487. Chart 6, below, plots these variables and shows no clear linear relationship. Using the same threshold for significance, I fail to reject H2.


Chart 6 – Compliance and Weapons Used



Source: Author

Simple linear regression for the change in compliance and the change in the number of attacks yields a regression coefficient of 9.932 with a p-value of 0.166. Chart 7, plots the two variables. As shown in Appendix A, the conditions of linearity, homoscedasticity, and a nearly normal distribution of residuals are not satisfied. As the regression coefficient is not statistically significant and the conditions are not met, I fail to reject H3.


Chart 7 – Changes in Compliance and Number of Attacks



Source: Author

With H4, the regression coefficient between the change in compliance and the change in the proportion of attacks using expensive weaponry is 0.0162 with a p-value of 0.667. Appendix B shows that the conditions for linear regression of linearity (top left), homoscedasticity (top right, bottom right), and nearly normal distribution of residuals (bottom left) are not met. In light of this information, I fail to reject H4.

Chart 8 – Changes in Compliance and Weapons Used



Source: Author

The hypotheses and the corresponding result are summarized in Chart 9.

Chart 9 – Summary of Hypotheses and Results

Null Hypotheses	Results
H1: No association between compliance score and the number of attacks	Failed to reject the null hypothesis
H2: No association between compliance score and proportion of attacks that use expensive weaponry	Failed to reject the null hypothesis
H3: No association between change in compliance and change in attacks	Failed to reject the null hypothesis
H4: No association between change in compliance and proportion of attacks that use expensive weaponry	Failed to reject the null hypothesis

Source: Author

Conclusions, Limitations, and Recommendations

The methodology and results have six limitations. First, not all of the evaluations were carried out and published simultaneously. However, unless the FATF begins to do so, any form of comparative analysis will have to accept this limitation. Second, the fourth round recommendations had several differences compared to earlier rounds. As mentioned in the methodology section, assessing the round data along with previous rounds is preferable to using data solely from the 4th round or from earlier rounds. Third, there is not 2017 terrorism data from START as of this writing yet. Consequently, this article uses 2015-2016 data as the terrorism data for countries evaluated in 2017. The updated data can eliminate these last two limitations. Fourth, it was not possible to precisely assess the cost of weapons. All bombs or guns do not cost the same and prices vary by country, but there was no way to incorporate that nuance into the article's methodology with the START statistics. Additionally, the article's state-centric approach does not completely account for the possibility that terrorist groups could transfer funds and weapons across borders. Last but not least, this paper's approach has looked for statistical associations and not pretended to assert a causal relationship, given the complicated nature of terrorism and these limitations. In contrast, it has relied upon the logic that whether a causal relationship between compliance and reduced terrorism exists, a statistically significant relationship should be discernible.

While tempered by these limitations, the logic and the results of this paper lead to a clear conclusion. After failing to reject all four null hypotheses, this paper found no evidence indicating that the FATF recommendations are effective. When considering in conjunction with the literature,

there is nothing beyond anecdotal evidence suggesting that the FATF's special recommendations ultimately reduce terrorism. With this evidence in mind, the FATF's special recommendations do not appear to have accomplished their goal in reducing terrorism. These results should alarm the FATF and warrant further study.

For far too long, cooperation and compliance have served as the lone metrics of the FATF's effectiveness. It is ironic that an organization conducting hundreds of compliance evaluations does not evaluate the special recommendations. There are some recent indications that the FATF understands this irony. With the most recent evaluations, the organization has started to add intermediate effectiveness measures (FATF, 2013). At present, the two CTF effectiveness measures are whether CTF offenses are investigated and prosecuted and whether terrorist organizations cannot raise money in the country (FATF, 2013). These measures, however, still fail to analyze the impact of the recommendations on terrorism itself. Without this analysis, the international community does not know whether the centerpiece of the global war on terrorist financing is working.

To remedy the critical deficiency, the FATF should develop its own methods for evaluating the impact of the special recommendations on terrorism. To do so, it can adopt the two strategies used in this paper: examine the global relationship between compliance and the prevalence of terrorism or the relationship between changes in compliance and terrorism. If this evaluation arrives at a similar conclusion to the one reached in this article, the FATF should consider adopting two new special recommendations.

The first special recommendation would evaluate the financial resources in a given country to enforce the FATF-recommended legal infrastructure on CTF. To date, FATF recommendations only address legal infrastructure. However, if a country's authorities do not have the financial resources necessary to conduct thorough investigations, that legal infrastructure will do little to reduce terrorist financing. Thus, this new recommendation would specifically examine funding for a country's financial intelligence unit or other law enforcement entities targeting CTF.

The second special recommendation would evaluate compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2133 (2014) on ransom payments to terrorists. David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury Department's top CTF official under President Obama, stated that ransom payments are the principal source of terrorist financing (Callimachi, 2014). Al-Qaeda's second in command claimed that ransoms provide half of the organization's funding (Callimachi, 2014). Similarly, the New York Times, citing the U.S. Treasury, calculated that European governments paid at least \$165 million in ransom payments to terrorist groups between 2008 and 2014, including \$125 million to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates (Callimachi, 2014). UNSC Resolution 2133 was adopted precisely in response to this

trend “calling upon all Member States” to not pay ransoms to terrorist groups and prevent their citizens from doing so (United Nations, 2014). Compliance, however, remains low. If past is precedent, FATF’s blacklist could pressure governments around the world to end ransom payments and eliminate a major source of terrorist funding. These two recommendations represent common sense steps that are widely supported by the international community and could turn the tide in the global war on terrorist financing.

References

Abbott, Kenneth and Duncan Snidal (2000): ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, *International Organization* 54(3): pp. 421–456. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551280>

Bauer, Katherine and Matthew Levitt (2017): ‘Can Bankers Fight Terrorism? What You Get When You Follow the Money’. *Foreign Affairs* 96(6). Accessible at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/can-bankers-fight-terrorism> (11 August 2018).

Callimachi, Rukmini (2014): ‘Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror’. *The New York Times*. Accessible at <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html> (11 August 2018).

Campbell-Verduyn, Malcolm (2018): ‘Bitcoin, Crypt-coins, and Global Anti-money Laundering Governance’, *Crime, Law, and Social Change* 69(2): pp. 283-305. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9756-5>

Choo, Kim-Kwang (2013): ‘New payment methods: A review of 2010-2012 FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports’, *Computers and Security* 36: pp. 12-16. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2013.01.009>

Financial Action Task Force (2008): ‘FATF IX Special Recommendations’. Accessible at <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/fatf-9specialrec.pdf> (1 March 2018).

Financial Action Task Force (2012): ‘FATF Recommendations’. Accessible at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf> (1 March 2018).

Financial Action Task Force (2013): ‘Methodology’. Accessible at <http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf> (1 March 2018).

Financial Action Task Force (2016): ‘Annual Report: 2015-2016’. Accessible at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF-annual-report-2015-2016.pdf> (1 March 2018).

Financial Action Task Force (2017a): 'Who We Are'. Accessible at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/> (1 March 2018).

Financial Action Task Force (2017b): 'History of the FATF'. Accessible at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> (1 March 2018).

Financial Action Task Force (2017c): 'FATF Membership Policy'. Accessible at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html> (1 March 2018).

Gardner, Kathryn (2007): 'Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way', *Global Governance* 13(3): pp. 325-345.

Hayes, Ben (2012): 'Counter-Terrorism, Policy Laundering, and the FATF', *The International Journal for Non-Profit Law* 14(1-2).

Heißen, Stefan, Peter Neumann, John Holland-McCowan, and Rajan Basra (2017): 'Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State's Financial Fortunes', *International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation*. Accessible at <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICSR-Report-Caliphate-in-Decline-An-Estimate-of-Islamic-State%E2%80%99s-Financial-Fortunes.pdf> (15 February 2018).

Jensen, Neil and Cheong-Ann Png (2011): 'Implementation of the FATF 40 + 9 Recommendations', *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 14(2): pp. 110-120. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/13685201111127777>

Johnson, Jackie (2008): 'Third round FATF Mutual Evaluations Indicate Declining Compliance', *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 11(1): pp. 47-66. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/13685200810844497>

Kahn, Joseph and David Sanger (2001): 'A Nation Challenged'. *The New York Times*. Accessible at <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/25/world/nation-challenged-overview-bush-freezes-assets-linked-terror-net-russians-offer.html> (3 March 2018).

Khalid, Imran, and Arooj Naveed (2015): 'Conflict in Waziristan', *South Asian Studies* 29(2), pp. 559-582.

Lindholm, Danielle (2017). 'Can Bankers Fight Terrorism?: Money Talks', *Foreign Affairs* 96 (6). Accessible at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/can-bankers-fight-terrorism> (11 August 2018).

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) (2016): 'Global Terrorism Database'. Accessible at <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd> (28 February 2018).

Neumann, Peter (2013): *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West*. London: I.B. Taurus.

Neumann, Peter (2017): 'The Problem with the War on Terrorist Financing', Foreign Affairs, Accessible at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/dont-follow-money> (2 March 2018).

Png, Cheong-Ann and Jean-François Thony (2007): 'FATF Special Recommendations and UN Resolutions on the financing of terrorism: A review of the status of implementation and legal challenges faced by countries', Journal of Financial Crime 14(2), pp.150-169. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790710742645>.

United Nations. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing. December 9, 1999. Available at <http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm> (19 January 2018).


United Nations Security Council. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2133: Calling Upon States to Keep Ransom Payments, Political Concessions from Benefitting Terrorists. January 27, 2014. Accessible at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11262.doc.htm> (19 January 2018).


Vleck, William (2018): 'Global Financial Governance and the Informal: Limits to the Regulation of Money', Crime, Law, and Social Change (69): pp. 249-265. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9754-7>

Yepes, Verdugo (2011): 'Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons from a Cross-Country Analysis', International Monetary Fund. Accessible at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11177.pdf> (15 January 2018).


Appendices

Appendix 1 – Hypothesis 3 – Conditions for Linear Regression





Appendix 2 – Hypothesis 4 – Conditions for Linear Regression



Appendix 3 – Compliance, Number of Attacks and % Expensive Attacks

Country	SR Compliance	Number of Attacks	Country	SR Compliance	% Expensive attacks
Afghanistan	3	11016	Afghanistan	3	0.922839506
Albania	4	10	Albania	4	0.9
Algeria	0	878	Algeria	0	0.962414579
Angola	1	5	Angola	1	0.4
Argentina	0	17	Argentina	0	0.823529412
Armenia	9	7	Armenia	9	0.714285714
Australia	7	39	Australia	7	0.179487179
Austria	6	17	Austria	6	0.176470588
Azerbaijan	2	10	Azerbaijan	2	0.6

Bahamas	7	1	Bahamas	7	1
Bahrain	3	146	Bahrain	3	0.671232877
Bangladesh	8	990	Bangladesh	8	0.729292929
Belarus	2	8	Belarus	2	0.625
Belgium	6	11	Belgium	6	0.727272727
Belize	0	1	Belize	0	1
Benin	0	6	Benin	0	1
Bolivia	0	8	Bolivia	0	0.875
Bosnia & Herzegovina	4	21	Bosnia & Herzegovina	4	0.761904762
Brazil	4	16	Brazil	4	0.875
Bulgaria	3	13	Bulgaria	3	0.769230769
Burkina Faso	0	17	Burkina Faso	0	0.823529412
Cambodia	6	4	Cambodia	6	1
Cameroon	0	215	Cameroon	0	0.651162791
Canada	7	36	Canada	7	0.777777778
Central African Republic	0	224	Central African Republic	0	0.799107143
Chad	0	63	Chad	0	0.619047619
Chile	1	73	Chile	1	0.698630137
China	4	110	China	4	0.590909091
Colombia	6	1368	Colombia	6	0.877192982
Croatia	2	6	Croatia	2	1
Cuba	8	1	Cuba	8	1
Cyprus	5	22	Cyprus	5	0.954545455
Czech Republic	5	16	Czech Republic	5	0.625
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0	599	Democratic Republic of the Congo	0	0.50918197
Denmark	6	8	Denmark	6	0.75
Ecuador	1	12	Ecuador	1	0.833333333
Egypt	3	1690	Egypt	3	0.984615385
Equatorial Guinea	0	1	Equatorial Guinea	0	1
Estonia	7	3	Estonia	7	0.666666667
Ethiopia	4	68	Ethiopia	4	0.852941176
Finland	3	15	Finland	3	0.066666667
France	8	280	France	8	0.817857143
Georgia	4	92	Georgia	4	0.902173913
Germany	6	151	Germany	6	0.258278146
Ghana	0	2	Ghana	0	1
Greece	1	439	Greece	1	0.437357631
Guatemala	5	13	Guatemala	5	1
Guinea	0	6	Guinea	0	0.833333333
Guinea-Bissau	0	7	Guinea-Bissau	0	1
Guyana	0	6	Guyana	0	1
Haiti	0	9	Haiti	0	1
Honduras	8	14	Honduras	8	1
Hungary	4	6	Hungary	4	0.833333333
Iceland	3	2	Iceland	3	0.5
India	4	7146	India	4	0.840610132
Indonesia	0	255	Indonesia	0	0.843137255
Iraq	0	21863	Iraq	0	0.975117779
Ireland	5	147	Ireland	5	0.836734694
Israel	5	930	Israel	5	0.932258065
Italy	8	72	Italy	8	0.777777778
Ivory Coast	0	42	Ivory Coast	0	0.833333333
Jamaica	6	2	Jamaica	6	1
Japan	2	20	Japan	2	0.6
Jordan	0	26	Jordan	0	0.923076923
Kazakhstan	1	17	Kazakhstan	1	0.294117647
Kenya	0	489	Kenya	0	0.842535787

Kuwait	0	6	Kuwait	0	0.833333333
Kyrgyzstan	1	16	Kyrgyzstan	1	0.75
Laos	0	7	Laos	0	1
Latvia	5	1	Latvia	5	1
Lebanon	0	555	Lebanon	0	0.918918919
Lesotho	0	3	Lesotho	0	0.666666667
Liberia	0	3	Liberia	0	0.666666667
Macedonia	3	22	Macedonia	3	0.863636364
Malaysia	9	54	Malaysia	9	0.592592593
Maldives	0	18	Maldives	0	0.611111111
Mali	0	384	Mali	0	0.776041667
Malta	7	2	Malta	7	1
Mauritania	1	13	Mauritania	1	0.846153846
Mexico	0	88	Mexico	0	0.795454545
Moldova	2	4	Moldova	2	1
Montenegro	4	4	Montenegro	4	0.75
Morocco	1	8	Morocco	1	0.875
Mozambique	0	128	Mozambique	0	0.71875
Myanmar	0	222	Myanmar	0	0.774774775
Nepal	0	795	Nepal	0	0.657861635
Netherlands	6	16	Netherlands	6	0.1875
New Zealand	4	7	New Zealand	4	0.714285714
Nicaragua	1	2	Nicaragua	1	1
Niger	0	99	Niger	0	0.505050505
Nigeria	0	3311	Nigeria	0	0.634249471
Norway	7	5	Norway	7	0.8
Pakistan	1	11640	Pakistan	1	0.92362543
Panama	0	2	Panama	0	1
Papua New Guinea	0	1	Papua New Guinea	0	1
Paraguay	0	69	Paraguay	0	0.623188406
Peru	2	56	Peru	2	0.732142857
Philippines	0	3887	Philippines	0	0.844095704
Poland	4	2	Poland	4	1
Portugal	6	2	Portugal	6	0
Qatar	1	2	Qatar	1	0.5
Romania	5	1	Romania	5	0
Russian Federation	4	1392	Russian Federation	4	0.924568966
Rwanda	0	26	Rwanda	0	0.961538462
Saudi Arabia	3	280	Saudi Arabia	3	0.896428571
Senegal	0	31	Senegal	0	0.774193548
Serbia	6	11	Serbia	6	0.909090909
Sierra Leone	0	1	Sierra Leone	0	1
Slovak Republic	2	1	Slovak Republic	2	1
South Africa	4	72	South Africa	4	0.666666667
South Korea	2	3	South Korea	2	0
Spain	7	164	Spain	7	0.792682927
Sri Lanka	4	701	Sri Lanka	4	0.87446505
Sudan	0	756	Sudan	0	0.575396825
Swaziland	0	4	Swaziland	0	0.5
Sweden	6	69	Sweden	6	0.217391304
Switzerland	7	8	Switzerland	7	0.75
Syria	0	1803	Syria	0	0.799223516
Taiwan	3	6	Taiwan	3	0.833333333
Tajikistan	0	14	Tajikistan	0	0.142857143
Tanzania	0	38	Tanzania	0	0.631578947
Thailand	0	3406	Thailand	0	0.871109806
Togo	0	1	Togo	0	0
Trinidad & Tobago	6	7	Trinidad & Tobago	6	0.428571429
Tunisia	6	88	Tunisia	6	0.795454545

Turkey	1	1539	Turkey	1	0.796621183
Turkmenistan	2	1	Turkmenistan	2	1
Uganda	1	72	Uganda	1	0.486111111
Ukraine	3	1619	Ukraine	3	0.844966028
United Arab Emirates	3	5	United Arab Emirates	3	0.8
United Kingdom	8	733	United Kingdom	8	0.422919509
United States of America	7	264	United States of America	7	0.878787879
Uruguay	0	2	Uruguay	0	0.5
Uzbekistan	4	10	Uzbekistan	4	0.8
Venezuela	1	20	Venezuela	1	0.8
Yemen	0	2970	Yemen	0	0.798316498
Zimbabwe	6	13	Zimbabwe	6	0.384615385

Appendix 4 – Years and Changes in Compliance

Country	Compliance1	Compliance2	ChangeCompliance	Year1	Year2
Argentina	1	0	-1	2004	2010
Armenia	3	9	6	2009	2016
Australia	5	7	2	2005	2015
Austria	3	6	3	2009	2016
Bahamas	4	7	3	2007	2017
Bangladesh	0	8	8	2009	2016
Belgium	7	6	-1	2005	2015
Bolivia	0	0	0	2006	2011
Brazil	4	4	0	2004	2010
Canada	7	7	0	2008	2016
Cambodia	0	6	6	2007	2017
Chile	2	1	-1	2006	2010
Colombia	1	6	5	2004	2008
Denmark	4	6	2	2006	2017
Ecuador	0	1	1	2007	2011
Guatemala	5	5	0	2012	2017
Honduras	1	8	7	2009	2016
Hungary	3	4	1	2010	2016
Ireland	3	5	2	2006	2017
Italy	7	8	1	2006	2016
Jamaica	5	6	1	2005	2017
Malaysia	5	9	4	2007	2015
Norway	3	7	4	2005	2014
Paraguay	1	0	-1	2005	2008
Peru	5	2	-3	2005	2008
Serbia	2	6	4	2009	2016
Spain	8	7	-1	2006	2014
Sri Lanka	0	4	4	2006	2015
Sweden	4	6	2	2006	2017
Switzerland	4	7	3	2005	2016
Tunisia	5	6	1	2007	2016
United States	9	7	-2	2006	2016
Uruguay	0	0	0	2006	2008

Appendix 5 – Change in the Number of Attacks and Proportion of Attacks Using Expensive Weaponry

Country	Compliance1	Compliance2	ChangeCompliance	Year1	Year2	Country
Argentina	1	0	-1	2004	2010	Argentina
Armenia	3	9	6	2009	2016	Armenia
Australia	5	7	2	2005	2015	Australia
Austria	3	6	3	2009	2016	Austria

Bahamas	4	7	3	2007	2017	Bahamas
Bangladesh	0	8	8	2009	2016	Bangladesh
Belgium	7	6	-1	2005	2015	Belgium
Bolivia	0	0	0	2006	2011	Bolivia
Brazil	4	4	0	2004	2010	Brazil
Canada	7	7	0	2008	2016	Canada
Cambodia	0	6	6	2007	2017	Cambodia
Chile	2	1	-1	2006	2010	Chile
Colombia	1	6	5	2004	2008	Colombia
Denmark	4	6	2	2006	2017	Denmark
Ecuador	0	1	1	2007	2011	Ecuador
Guatemala	5	5	0	2012	2017	Guatemala
Honduras	1	8	7	2009	2016	Honduras
Hungary	3	4	1	2010	2016	Hungary
Ireland	3	5	2	2006	2017	Ireland
Italy	7	8	1	2006	2016	Italy
Jamaica	5	6	1	2005	2017	Jamaica
Malaysia	5	9	4	2007	2015	Malaysia
Norway	3	7	4	2005	2014	Norway
Paraguay	1	0	-1	2005	2008	Paraguay
Peru	5	2	-3	2005	2008	Peru
Serbia	2	6	4	2009	2016	Serbia
Spain	8	7	-1	2006	2014	Spain
Sri Lanka	0	4	4	2006	2015	Sri Lanka
Sweden	4	6	2	2006	2017	Sweden
Switzerland	4	7	3	2005	2016	Switzerland
Tunisia	5	6	1	2007	2016	Tunisia
United States	9	7	-2	2006	2016	United States
Uruguay	0	0	0	2006	2008	Uruguay

The Formation of Electoral Alliances in the Republic of Armenia: A Case Study of the 2017 Parliamentary Elections

Gayane Shakhmuradyan

<https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.38.2>

Gayane Shakhmuradyan, 22, from Yerevan (Armenia) is a Master's student at the American University of Armenia, Political Science and International Affairs program. She holds a Bachelor's degree in Political Science from Yerevan State University (2017) and currently is working on her Master's thesis. Her research interests include the formation of electoral and post-electoral coalitions, energy politics, and administrative ethics. Email: gayane_shakhmuradyan@edu.aua.am.

Abstract

This article examines how electoral alliances were formed in the 2017 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Armenia. It hypothesizes that alliances were formed among parties that are ideologically compatible and could not individually overcome the electoral threshold. Contrary to the established theory in the field, the data collected and analyzed from February to May 2018 reveal that ideological and programmatic similarities were not the primary factor that influenced the party leaders' decision to cooperate with others. Instead, parties converged because of the short-term objectives of overcoming the electoral threshold and gaining more seats in the parliament.

Keywords

Electoral Alliances; Electoral Rule and Threshold; Experience of Cooperation; Ideology; Parliamentary Elections; Parties; Party Platforms; Republic of Armenia

Introduction

The 2017 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Armenia were unprecedented in two important respects. These were the first elections to the National Assembly after the country made a transition from a semi-presidential form of government to parliamentary (December, 2015), and starting from December 2016 to March 2017, a process of alliance formation took place, as a result of which ten parties coalesced into four alliances: “*Yelq*” (“Bright Armenia,” “Civil Contract”, and “Republic” parties), “*Tsarukyan*” (“Prosperous Armenia”, “Alliance”, and “Mission” parties), “*Oskanyan-Raffi-Ohanyan*” (“Heritage” and “Unity” parties), “*Congress-PPA*” (the Armenian National Congress and Peoples’ Party of Armenia).

This paper aims to reveal how these alliances were formed, i.e. what were the main factors that party leaders took into consideration while negotiating with potential allies. In order to accomplish that, a review of the literature was conducted (section 1), and both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered and analyzed in the light of theoretical framework on the formation of electoral alliances (sections 2-4). Data analysis was followed by interpretation and discussion of findings (section 5). Finally, conclusions from the inquiry were drawn and related back to the literature.

1 Literature Review

As a field of study within Political Science, the formation of electoral alliances has a history of slightly more than a decade, but substantive work has been done. Sona Golder, one of the pioneers and the most influential authors in the field notes that this is an important topic to study for several reasons. Firstly, electoral alliances have impact on election results and thus, the policies that are subsequently implemented. Secondly, the formation of alliances has ‘normative implications for the representative nature of governments’. Finally, as a political phenomenon, the formation of electoral alliances is quite common in many countries of the world (2006: 193-194). The theories on the formation of electoral alliances that have thus far been advanced and developed can be grouped under four categories or themes: *ideological compatibility and programmatic similarities*; *electoral rule and threshold*; *electoral support and representation*; and *post-election bargaining and government formation*.

1.1 Ideological compatibility and programmatic similarities

A number of authors researching the formation of electoral alliances state that alliances form among ideologically compatible parties (Allern and Aylott, 2009; Debus, 2009; Gandhi and Reuter, 2013; Golder, 2006; Greene and Haber, 2016; Ibenskas, 2015; Kellam, 2015; Machado, 2009; Wahman, 2011). Some add to this that alliances among ideologically similar parties are more likely if they have prior experience of cooperation (Debus, 2009; Gandhi and Reuter, 2013; Greene and

Haber, 2016; Ibenskas, 2015). Ideological compatibility, as all these authors acknowledge, makes electoral co-ordination easier and more successful.

Along with ideology, party platforms are also considered to be a factor that influences the formation of alliances. Distinguishing between *policy-seeking* and *office-seeking* parties, some authors (Ibenskas, 2015; Kellam, 2015; Spoon and West, 2015; Wahman, 2011) argue that parties that are policy-seeking, i.e. strive to win legislative seats in order to implement their programs, form alliances more often. Wahman (2011) states that opposition parties form alliances only when they are able to present clear policy alternatives to the incumbent. By contrast, there are authors (Lefebvre and Robin, 2009; Rakner et al., 2007; Sridharan, 2004) who argue that parties act as vote-maximizers and generally form alliances irrespective of ideological and programmatic differences.

1.2 Electoral rule and threshold

As a complement to theories that consider ideology, platforms, and prior experience of cooperation to be the main determinants of alliance formation, a group of authors have advanced theories that stress the importance of the electoral rule and the electoral threshold (Blais and Indridason, 2007; Carey, 2017; Ibenskas, 2015; Kaminski, 2001; Lefebvre and Robin, 2009; Golder, 2005, 2006; Parigi and Bearman, 2008; Sridharan, 2004). Whether alliances will form or not, as well as how they will form, according to these authors, largely depends on the type of the electoral rule (majoritarian or proportional) that a country has adopted, and the threshold that has been set. The dominant theory is that parties form and join alliances more often in countries that have systems favoring large parties, i.e. employ majoritarian electoral rule or set high electoral thresholds (Blais and Indridason, 2007; Golder, 2005, 2006; Lefebvre and Robin, 2009; Parigi and Bearman, 2008; Sridharan, 2004).

There is a consensus in the literature that proportional representation (PR) systems favor the formation of electoral alliances less than majoritarian systems. However, Ibenskas (2015) has found, based on a study of eleven post-communist countries, that alliances form more often under closed PR systems where voters do not have the opportunity to express preferences for individual candidates. Carey (2017) has found that as opposed to the widely used D'Hondt divisions method for translating votes into seats, the formula known as Hare Quota with Largest Remainders (HQLR) discourages the formation of alliances.

The authors who stress the importance of the electoral rule and the threshold in the formation of alliances also speak about party size. According to Golder (2006), alliances are more likely among parties that are similar in size and have compatible levels of electoral support. Alternatively, Ibenskas (2015) argues that alliances among one medium-sized and several small parties are more natural to form. Small parties, as is acknowledged, form and join alliances more

often than medium-sized and large parties because by doing so they have greater opportunities to overcome the threshold and gain seats in the parliament (Ibenskas, 2015; Spoon and West, 2015). Medium-sized and large parties may form alliances with the goal of gaining a majority in the parliament and forming the government (Ibenskas, 2015).

1.3 Electoral support and representation

A group of authors (Blais et al., 2014; Decker and Best, 2010; Duch et al., 2010; Eichorst, 2014; Golder, 2005; Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008; Plescia, 2016; Tillman, 2013) explain the formation of electoral alliances by voter behavior. Alliances, according to them, are ‘electorally motivated’ (Eichorst, 2014: 107) and provide valuable cues to the electorate with regards to future governments and policies.

Golder (2005) has argued that the formation of electoral alliances reduces voter uncertainty with respect to future governments and creates an incentive to turn out. Following her, Tillman (2013) has found that the presence of alliances increases voter turnout by 1.5%. Others (Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008; Plescia, 2016; Fortunato, 2017) have shown that voters tend to choose alliances over individual parties in case of perceiving them as ideologically homogenous and deny support to parties which they believe have made significant concessions by forming an alliance.

Some of the authors who stress the importance of electoral support and representation in the formation of alliances note that often, the phenomenon of “strategic voting”, as opposed to “sincere voting”, occurs, i.e. voters cast votes not for the alliance of their genuine choice, but for the one that seems more likely to win (Blais et al., 2014; Bowler et al., 2010; Duch et al., 2010). Blais et al. (2014) state that this is conditioned by *electoral history*: voters tend to cast votes for the alliances that have been successful in the previous elections and/or in the previous round of elections if the electoral system is majority run-off. Bowler et al. (2010) add that strategic votes are specifically cast for the parties that are the most expected to form the government. As they mention, ‘voters cast a vote to promote a policy outcome rather than a party platform, and that policy outcome will be the consequence of coalition bargaining’ (Bowler et al., 2010: 351).

1.4 Post-election bargaining and government formation

A final group of authors links the process of electoral coalition formation to the processes of post-election bargaining and government formation (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011; Carroll and Cox, 2007; Chiru, 2015; Christiansen et al., 2014; Debus, 2009; Decker and Best, 2010; Eichorst, 2014).

Carroll and Cox (2007) state that parties form alliances with the goal of having shares in the distribution of cabinet posts. As an explanation, they refer to Gamson’s law, according to which coalition governments distribute posts proportional to each member’s contribution. Bandyopadhyay

et al. (2011) develop a game-theoretical model of alliance formation and argue that ideologically distant parties may also form electoral alliances.

Trying to explain the legislative behavior of the parliamentarians after the formation of alliances, Christiansen et al. (2014) have found that MPs representing alliance member parties tend to vote similarly thus signaling that they can govern together. Eichorst (2014) and Chiru (2015) have looked at the effects of alliance formation on government durability and revealed that largely due to the prior experience of cooperation among member parties, governments based on electoral alliances last longer.

2 Theoretical Framework

Two theories, one emphasizing the role of ideological compatibility and the other- that of the electoral rule and threshold, served as the theoretical framework for this study. As noted by Golder (2005), electoral systems that favor large parties also favor the formation of electoral alliances, and parties that are ideologically compatible, i.e. have similar orientations towards issues of social and political significance, are more likely to form or join alliances (Golder 2006). These two theories were chosen for the analysis of alliance formation in Armenia because of the following reasons.

Firstly, ideology and programmatic similarities are often viewed as the ‘natural’ and indeed the decisive factor that makes cooperation among parties possible. Except for one (“Yelq”), alliances in Armenia did not promulgate joint statements, and thus, the basis for cooperation was not explicit.

Secondly, in May 2016, a year before the 2017 parliamentary elections, a new electoral code was adopted by the National Assembly: transition was made from a mixed electoral system to a fully proportional one³. The change in the electoral code could be one of the reasons for the formation of an unprecedented number of alliances (four) in Armenian history since independence in 1991.

No studies have been conducted on the formation of electoral alliances in Armenia. Thus, this study aims to make a small contribution to the literature by examining the patterns of alliance formation in a post-Soviet Caucasian country.

3 Research Design and Methodology

This study used a mixed-method research design to reveal how alliances were formed in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections. The following hypotheses were advanced:

H₁: Electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections were formed among parties that are ideologically compatible.

³ Instead of electing 90 MPs through proportional system of closed party lists and 41 MPs through single member constituencies, now 105 MPs are elected through a proportional system.

H₂: Electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections were formed among parties that could not individually overcome the electoral threshold.

As the decision to form an alliance is a matter of party leadership, in-depth interviews were chosen as the primary method for data gathering and analysis. The sampling approach was purposive, i.e. party members that had been directly involved in the decision-making process and thus, could provide better insight into the respective party's decision to form or join an alliance, were chosen. After the analysis of interview transcripts, a survey among the general public was conducted to reveal the attitude of franchised citizens towards factors that influenced the formation of electoral alliances in Armenia. For the survey, non-probability, convenience sampling was used, and thus, the findings were not deemed to be generalizable, neither correlations were established.

4 Data Collection and Analysis

4.1 Analysis of In-depth Interviews

The analysis of data collected through in-depth interviews with members of parties that formed alliances (n=5, conducted from February 16 to March 7, 2018) was performed using pattern coding. The interviewees were asked seven questions related to the factors that influenced their party's decision to form or join an alliance (see Appendix 1), and the transcripts were coded by four categories or themes dominant in the literature on the formation of electoral alliances:

- *ideological proximity* - the party chose allies based on the similarity of ideological orientations and agenda priorities;
- *electoral rule and threshold* - the main reason for forming the alliance was the objective of overcoming the threshold;
- *electoral support and representation* - the party formed an alliance (joined one) to appeal to the broader population and gain more seats in the parliament; and
- *post-election bargaining and government formation* - the party formed an alliance in order to have influence on post-election processes, namely the formation of government.

The dominant factor in the formation of electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections, as the analysis shows, was ***electoral support***. Except for one, all the interviewees noted that public attitude is an important factor that has to be taken into account while making important political decisions, such as the one to form or join an alliance. 'People like unity. They vote more for the parties that compete allied with other parties', stressed one interviewee (Interview 4).

The newly-adopted proportional ***electoral rule and the electoral threshold***, set at 5% for individual parties and 7% for alliances, also had a considerable impact on the formation of electoral alliances. All the interviewees noted that the newly-adopted electoral rule, though proportional in

name, is more like a majoritarian rule that favors large parties. However, two of the five interviewees noted that the threshold was not the main factor that influenced their decision to form or join an alliance. As one of them emphasized, 'By forming the alliance, we pursued the goal of not simply overcoming the threshold, but of gaining as many seats as possible' (Interview 1).

Ideology and programmatic similarities played a decisive role in the formation of only one of the alliances, and to some extent had an impact on the formation of another. As the interviewee from the first alliance member party noted, 'The parties in our alliance pursue the goal of building a Western-model state that combines liberal democratic values, such as the rule of law, with long-established national traditions and interests' (Interview 2). The interviewee representing the other alliance noted that their party had declared before the elections that will cooperate with parties that have similar agenda priorities (Interview 5). All other interviewees conceded that ideology was not the primary factor influencing their choice of allies. Instead, the decision to form an alliance was based on either the short-term objective, i.e., overcoming the threshold and gaining more seats in the parliament, or past experience of cooperation.

Finally, the objective of taking part in ***post-election bargaining and government formation processes*** played a role in the formation of only one of the alliances. As the interviewee noted, 'By forming the alliance, we pursued the goal of gaining a majority in the National Assembly and forming the government' (Interview 5). All other interviewees (4/5) noted that their party identifies itself as opposition and did not aim to take part in government formation processes after the elections. In the words of one of them, 'The dominance of one party does not allow the governments that are subsequently formed to represent the popular will' (Interview 3).


Besides the above-mentioned factors, other factors as well, such as *financial considerations related to the organization of the political campaign and the personal ties among party leaders*, played a role in the formation of electoral alliances. All the interviewees noted that the role of leaders in forming the alliance was notable, and the majority (3/5) stressed that it is difficult for a single party, especially an opposition one, to afford the organization of political campaign.

4.2 Survey Analysis

Following the analysis of in-depth interviews, from April 17 to May 6, 2018, a survey was conducted to reveal the attitude of the general public towards the formation of electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections. The questionnaire (see Appendix 2) was administered electronically, through e-mail and social media website (Facebook). Some, mainly with people over 50, were handed in for completion.

Three-fourths of the respondents (n=101) were 18-25 years old, and women accounted for a greater percent than men (58 and 42%, respectively). As the sample size itself, the composition of the sample by age group is not representative of the population.

Charts 1-2. Composition of the Survey Sample by Age Group and Gender



Source: Author

For ideological compatibility as a determinant for alliance formation, data analysis yields the following results (see Table 1 below). The majority of respondents (66/101; “strongly disagree” and “disagree”, as well as “strongly agree” and “agree” attitudes combined) disagree that alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections were formed among parties that are ideologically compatible. Males and females are equally likely to regard ideology as a determinant for alliance formation (8/42 and 11/59, respectively), though females are almost twice as likely to express attitudes of disagreement than males. More than half of the respondents across all age groups are inclined to think that ideology did not play a significant role in the formation of alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections.

Table 1. Contingency for *Ideological Compatibility* as a Determinant of Alliance Formation

		<i>Age Group</i>			<i>Gender</i>		<i>Total</i>
		18-25	26-50	50+	Male	Female	
<i>Ideological compatibility</i>	Agree	14	2	3	8	11	19
	Disagree	50	11	5	25	41	66
	Neutral	12	4	0	9	7	16
<i>Total</i>		76	17	8	42	59	101

Source: Author.

For the electoral threshold, the reverse is true. A great majority of the respondents (71/101) is inclined to think that the threshold, set at 5% for individual parties and 7% for alliances, was the main factor that influenced the formation of electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary

elections. Again, males and females are equally likely to express attitudes of agreement, and the attitudes of disagreement among women outnumber those among men. Across age groups, the pattern is just the reverse of the one found in case of ideological compatibility: more than half of the respondents for each group (54/76; 11/17; 6/8) agree that alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties that could not individually overcome the threshold.


Table 2. Contingency for the *Electoral Threshold* as a Determinant of Alliance Formation

		<i>Age Group</i>			<i>Gender</i>		<i>Total</i>
		18-25	26-50	50+	Male	Female	
<i>Electoral threshold</i>	Agree	54	11	6	34	37	71
	Disagree	11	4	1	4	12	16
	Neutral	11	2	1	4	10	14
<i>Total</i>		76	17	8	42	59	101

Source: Author

A significant number of respondents (42/101) are inclined to think that alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections *were not* formed among parties that have experience of cooperation. The attitude of neutrality for this factor, as compared with ideological compatibility and electoral threshold, accounts for a greater percent (see the chart below). For other factors influencing the formation of alliances, such as *financial considerations* related to organization of political campaign and *leadership ties*, the attitudes of agreement and neutrality split almost evenly, and together account for 80-85 % of responses.

Chart 3. Public Attitude towards Some Factors of Alliance Formation



Source: Author

There is a substantial agreement among respondents (over 90%) that parties in the 2017 parliamentary elections formed alliances to increase the electoral support that they could get. There is also a strong belief that alliances were formed among opposition parties. The majority (95%) of respondents agree that party size has an impact on the formation of alliances, and that small parties form or join alliances to overcome the electoral threshold. A small number of respondents (29/101) disagree that alliances among one medium-sized and several small parties are more likely, and slightly more (35/101) disagree that large parties are less likely, as compared with medium-sized and large parties, to form or join alliances.

Of the four alliances, “Yelq” alliance (“Bright Armenia”, “Civil Contract”, and “Republic” parties) is considered to be the one in the formation of which ideological and programmatic similarities played a decisive role. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (84/101) ranked it the first by the level of ideological compatibility among the member parties.

5 Interpretation and Discussion of Findings

Electoral support and representation, as the analysis of in-depth interviews shows, was the dominant factor that influenced the formation of alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections. Party leaders identified public attitude as an important factor that has to be taken into account while making a decision to form or join an alliance. Likewise, the general public is inclined to think that parties formed or joined alliances to increase the electoral support that they could get. This finding is in line with the view that alliances are often ‘electorally motivated’ (Eichorst 2014).

Ideological compatibility cannot be viewed as a determinant of alliance formation in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections. Only two of the five interviewees noted that their party chose allies based on ideological and programmatic similarities, and the majority of survey respondents (65%) disagree that alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties that are ideologically compatible. As noted by the interviewees from both “Bright Armenia” and “Civil Contract” parties, ideological and programmatic similarities played a decisive role in the formation of “Yelq” alliance, and in public opinion as well, this is the alliance the member parties of which are the closest in ideological and policy orientations.

The electoral threshold, set at 5% for parties and 7% for alliances, as data demonstrate, played a key role in the formation of electoral alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections. The interviewees noted that the newly adopted electoral rule, though proportional, clearly favors large parties and thus, makes small ones to cooperate. In public opinion, as well, alliances were formed among parties that could not individually overcome the electoral threshold. Except for the “Prosperous Armenia”, all the parties that formed alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections had to cooperate with others to overcome the electoral threshold. This finding is in line with the theory

that small parties form alliances to overcome the threshold, while medium-sized and large parties do so with the goal of gaining more seats in the parliament and having impact on government formation processes (Ibenskas, 2015; Spoon and West, 2015).

Conclusion

The 2017 parliamentary elections in Armenia were unprecedented by the number of the electoral alliances that were formed. Prior to elections, ten parties coalesced into four alliances, two of which succeeded in overcoming the threshold and gaining seats in the National Assembly. This study tried to reveal *how* these alliances were formed, and for that purpose, both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered and analyzed from February to May 2018. Despite limitations of the study (small sample size for both the interviews and the survey; non-probability sampling for the survey), data analysis revealed notable patterns for the role of ideology and the electoral threshold in the formation of alliances in Armenia. The first hypothesis (*'Electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections were formed among parties that are ideologically compatible'*) is rejected, while the second one (*'Electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections were formed among parties that could not individually overcome the electoral threshold'*) is accepted. Future research can investigate whether the nature of past cooperation (successful vs. unsuccessful) has impact on the formation of alliances among the same parties in several consecutive elections. Also, hypotheses related to leaders' role in making a party decision to form alliances can be advanced and tested.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Arpie G. Balian for teaching me how to conduct social science research. Her guidance and support were invaluable during the whole process of writing this paper, from doing the literature review in September to December 2017, to gathering and analyzing data from February to May 2018. Also, I would like to sincerely thank the *Politikon* team, the anonymous reviewers and the editors, for helping me by their comments to improve the quality of the paper and ultimately make it publishable.

References

- Allern, Haugsgjerd E. and Nicholas Aylott (2009): 'Overcoming the Fear of Commitment: Pre-electoral Coalitions in Norway and Sweden', *Acta Politica* 44(3): pp. 259-285. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2009.1>
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha et al. (2011): 'Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining', *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6(1): pp. 1–53. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00010043>

- Blais, André and Indridi H. Indridason (2007): 'Making Candidates Count: The Logic of Electoral Alliances in Two-Round Legislative Elections', *Journal of Politics* 69(1): pp. 193-205. DOI: <https://doi/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00504.x>
- Blais, André et al. (2014): 'Strategic Voting and Coordination Problems in Proportional Systems: An Experimental Study', *Political Research Quarterly* 67(2): pp. 386-397. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00504.x>
- Bowler, Shaun et al. (2010): 'Strategic Coalition Voting: Evidence from New Zealand', *Electoral Studies* 29(3): pp. 350-357. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.001>
- Carey, John M. (2017): 'Electoral Formula and Fragmentation in Hong Kong', *Journal of East Asian Studies* 17(2): pp. 215-231. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2016.43>
- Carroll, Royce and Gary W. Cox (2007): 'The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2): pp. 300-313. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00252.x>
- Chiru, Mihail (2015): 'Early Marriages Last Longer: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Government Survival in Europe', *Government and Opposition* 50(2): pp. 165-188. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.8>
- Christiansen, Flemming J. et al. (2014): 'Friendship, Courting, and Engagement: Pre-electoral Coalition Dynamics in Action', *Journal of Legislative Studies* 20(4): pp. 413-429. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2014.907998>
- Debus, Marc (2009): 'Pre-electoral Commitments and Government Formation', *Public Choice* 138(1-2): pp. 45-64. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9338-2>
- Decker, Frank and Volker Best (2010): 'Looking for Ms. Right? A Comparative Analysis of Parties' "Coalition Statements" prior to Federal Elections of 2005 and 2009', *German Politics* 19(2): pp. 164-182. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/096444001003774180>
- Duch, Raymond M. et al. (2010): 'Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies', *American Political Science Review* 104(4): pp. 698-719. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000420>
- Eichorst, Jason. (2014): 'Explaining Variation in Coalition Agreements: The Electoral and Policy Motivations for Drafting Agreements', *European Journal of Political Research* 53(1): pp. 98-115. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12026>
- Fortunato, David. (2017): 'The Electoral Implications of Coalition Policy-making', *British Journal of Political Science*: pp. 1-22. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000430>

- Gandhi, Jennifer and Ora John Reuter (2013): 'The Incentives of Pre-electoral Coalitions in Non-democracies', *Democratization* 20(1): pp. 137-159. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738865>
- Golder, Sona N. (2005): 'Pre-electoral Coalitions in Comparative Perspective: A Test of Existing Hypotheses', *Electoral Studies* 24(4): pp. 643-663. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2005.01.007>
- Golder, Sona N. (2006): 'Pre-electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science* 36(2): pp. 193-212. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123406000123>
- Greene, Zachary and Matthias Haber (2016): 'Maintaining Partisan Ties: Preference Divergence and Partisan Collaboration in Western Europe', *Party Politics* 23(1): pp. 30-42. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068816655570>
- Gschwend, Thomas and Marc Hooghe (2008): 'Should I Stay or Should I Go? An Experimental Study on Voter Responses to Pre-electoral Coalitions', *European Journal of Political Research* 47(5): pp. 556-77. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00787.x>
- Ibenskas, Raimondas (2015): 'Understanding Pre-electoral Coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe', *British Journal of Political Science* 46(4): pp. 743-761. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000544>
- Kaminski, Marek M. (2001): 'Coalitional Stability of Multi-Party Systems: Evidence from Poland', *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): pp. 294-312. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2669342>
- Kellam, Marisa (2015): 'Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?', *British Journal of Political Science* 47(2): pp. 391-411. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000198>
- Lefebvre, Bertrand and Cyril Robin (2009): 'Pre-electoral Coalitions, Party System and Electoral Geography: A Decade of General Elections in India (1999-2009)', *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal Special Issue 3*. <http://samaj.revues.org/index2795.html> (last accessed: August 13, 2018)
- Machado, Aline (2009): 'Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions under Presidentialism: Reality or Fiction? The Case of Brazil', *Latin American Politics and Society* 51(3): pp. 87-110. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00057.x>
- Parigi, Paolo and Peter S. Bearman (2008): 'Spaghetti Politics: Local Electoral Systems and Alliance Structure in Italy, 1984-2001', *Social Forces* 87(2): pp. 623-649. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.0.0147>
- Plescia, Carolina (2016): 'The Effect of Pre-electoral Party Coordination on Vote Choice: Evidence from the Italian Regional Elections', *Political Studies* 65(1): pp. 144-160. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321715607512>

Rakner, Lise et al. (2007): 'Fissions and Fusions, Foes and Friends: Party System Restructuring in Malawi in the 2004 General Elections', *Comparative Political Studies* 40(9): pp. 1112-1137. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006290782>

Spoon, Jae-Jae and Karleen Jones West (2015): 'Alone or Together? How Institutions Affect Party Entry in Presidential Elections in Europe and South America', *Party Politics* 21(3): pp. 393–403. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812473870>

Sridharan, E. (2004): 'Electoral Coalitions in 2004 General Elections: Theory and Evidence'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 39(51): pp. 5418-5425.

Tillman, Erik R. (2013): 'Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Voter Turnout', *Party Politics* 21(5): pp. 726-737. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813499868>

Wahman, Michael (2011): 'Offices and Policies – Why do Oppositional Parties form Pre-electoral Coalitions in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes?', *Electoral Studies* 30: pp. 642–657. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.05.009>

Appendices

Appendix 1. Interviews with Party Leaders

1.1 List of Interviewees

- Interview 1. Board member, “Bright Armenia” Party
Held at the central office of the party (Yerevan, 1 Baghramyan Avenue), on 16 February 2018
- Interview 2. Board member, “Civil Contract” Party
Held at the central office of the party (Yerevan, 2 Koghbatsi Street), on 28 February 2018
- Interview 3. Board member, “Heritage” Party
Held at the central office of the party (Yerevan, 75 Yerznkanyan Street), on 5 March 2018
- Interview 4. Board member, “Armenian National Congress” Party
Held at the central office of the party (Yerevan, 38 Saryan Street), on 6 March 2018
- Interview 5. Board member, “Prosperous Armenia” Party
Held at the office of the interviewee, the National Assembly of Armenia (Yerevan, 19 Baghramyan Avenue), on 7 March 2018

1.2 Interview Questionnaire⁴

(Date and Place of Interview / Interviewee / Party)

Thank you for your willingness to contribute to my research on the formation of alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections. The answers you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality, and your identity will be kept anonymous.

1. Why did your party decide to compete in the 2017 parliamentary elections as a part of an alliance rather than independently?
2. What role did ideological orientations and party platforms play in your party's choice of allies?
 - 2.1. How would you rate ideological proximity of your partner parties to your party (close, very close, at a medium distance)?
 - 2.2. Would you still cooperate with the same parties if you had to make concessions regarding the political agenda?
3. How did the newly-adopted proportional electoral rule and the electoral threshold, set at 5% for parties and 7% for alliances, influence your party's decision to form an alliance (join one)?
4. What role did the electoral support that you expected prior to elections play in making the decision to form an alliance (join one)?
5. Did your party form or join an alliance because of the financial considerations related to the organization of political campaign?
6. Did your party form an alliance to gain more seats in the parliament and thus, have an influence on post-election bargaining and government formation processes?
7. What role did the ties among party leaders play in the formation of the alliance that your party represents?

Appendix 2. Public Attitude Survey⁵ Survey Questionnaire

The Formation of Alliances in the 2017 RA Parliamentary Elections

This questionnaire is administered to the citizens of the Republic of Armenia that are 18 years of age and older.

Thank you for your time to take this survey. Your answers will be used for the completion of a research project that is being conducted within the scopes of a graduate research methods course at the American University of Armenia. I urge you to be honest with your answers and assure that your answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

⁴ The interview transcripts are available at <https://www.dropbox.com/s/foy2fu7ry9t53n6/The%20Formation%20of%20Alliances%20in%20Armenia%20Interview%20Transcripts.pdf?dl=0> (28 September 2018).

⁵ The survey data (in Excel spreadsheets) are available at <https://www.dropbox.com/s/l30kkx1lauq4b1u/Alliances%20Survey%20data.xlsx?dl=0> (28 September 2018).

Section I. Descriptive (*this section captures general descriptions that are important in grouping your answers*)

1. Please indicate your age group.

- ☐ 18-25 years of age
☐ 26-50 years of age
☐ 51 and older

2. Please indicate your gender.

- ☐ Male
☐ Female

Section II. The formation of electoral alliances (*this section contains questions related to the patterns of electoral alliance formation in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections*)

3. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1=total disagreement; 2=disagreement; 3=neither agreement nor disagreement; 4=agreement; and 5= strong agreement), please check the box that best represents your position on each of the statements that follow.

	1	2	3	4	5
Alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties that are ideologically similar and share agenda priorities.					
Alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties that have past experience of cooperation.					
Alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties that could not individually overcome the electoral threshold of 5%.					
Alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties that could not individually afford the effective organization of political campaign.					
Alliances in the 2017 parliamentary elections were formed among parties whose leaders have close personal ties.					

4. Please respond 'yes' or 'no' to each of the statements that follow.

	Yes	No
Parties form alliances to appeal to wider segments of the population.		
Parties form alliances to appeal to wider segments of the population and increase voter turnout.		
Parties form alliances to appeal to wider segments of the population, to increase voter turnout, and to gain a larger number of votes.		
Parties form alliances to gain a larger number of votes and increase their chances of overcoming the threshold.		
Parties form alliances to appeal to wider segments of the population and gain majority in the parliament.		
Parties form alliances to gain majority in the parliament and form the government.		

5. Please indicate whether you *agree* or *disagree* to each of the statements that follow.

	Agree	Disagree
Party size affects a party's decision to form or join an alliance prior to elections.		
Small parties form or join electoral alliances to overcome the threshold.		

Medium-sized and large parties form alliances to gain parliamentary majority.		
Alliances between one medium-sized and several small parties are more likely.		
Large parties are less likely than small and medium-sized parties to form or join an alliance.		

Section III. Voter perception of the alliances (*this section contains questions related to your perception of the four alliances that were formed before the 2017 RA parliamentary elections*)

6. If you participated in the 2017 parliamentary elections and voted for one of the four alliances that were formed (“Yelq”, “Tsarukyan”, the Armenian National Congress-People’s Party of Armenia, and ORO), why did you do so?

☐ I am a member of one of the parties that formed the alliance.

☐ I sympathize with the party (parties) that formed the alliance and have a similar vision of future of our country.

☐ I voted for the alliance because it had better chances of overcoming the threshold and gaining seats in the parliament.

☐ I have personal ties with the candidate(s) in the party list(s).

☐ None of the above/Other (please specify). _____

7. Please rank order each of the four alliances that were formed in the 2017 parliamentary elections by the level to which you think they were formed on the basis of ideological and programmatic similarities.

_____ “Yelq” Alliance

_____ “Tsarukyan” Alliance

_____ “ORO” Alliance

_____ Congress-People’s Party of Armenia Alliance

8. On a 1 to 7 point scale, please indicate the level to which you think the parties that formed alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections can be characterized so.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Opposition								Pro-governmental
Established								Newly-formed
Popular								Unpopular

9. In your view, what was the main factor that influenced the formation of electoral alliances in the 2017 RA parliamentary elections? (*Please give your answer as a word or phrase*)

The Challenge of Unintelligible Life: Critical Security Studies' Failure to Account for Violence Against Queer People

Alexander Stoffel

<https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.38.3>

Alexander Stoffel, 22, from Zurich (Switzerland), is a postgraduate student who received his Bachelor's Degree in History and Politics from the University of Oxford in 2017. He is currently enrolled in an Master's Program in International Relations Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he is working on his dissertation on resistance and radicality in poststructuralist IR theory. His interests include critical war/ security studies, continental philosophy, gender and queer theory, and resistance in world politics. E-mail: a.w.stoffel@gmail.com.

Abstract

This article grapples with the inability of Critical Security Studies (CSS) to see and account for violence against queer people. It locates the absence of theorizing on anti-queer violence within existing critical security approaches in the failure to apprehend them as intelligible subjects or livable lives. It demonstrates these theoretical limitations through an exploration of Foucauldian frameworks within CSS, which inform dominant approaches to understanding violence. It also argues that the inability of CSS to account for anti-queer violence can be traced back to the presumption of an intelligible subject of violence on which any theoretical framework necessarily relies. The impossibility to account for anti-queer violence, due to the very nature of 'queerness', provides fruitful avenues for thought within CSS. This article therefore is a call for critical security scholars to take the challenge of unintelligible life seriously.

Keywords

Biopower; Critical Security Studies; disciplinary power; Judith Butler; Michel Foucault; Queer Theory; Subjectivity; Unintelligibility; Violence

Introduction

This article poses the question: Can Critical Security Studies (CSS) account for the global violence perpetrated against queer people? It takes as its starting point the insight that scholarship on anti-queer violence, or on queer people at all, is noticeably lacking within CSS. CSS encompasses a variety of approaches – most notably feminist, postcolonial, and poststructuralist perspectives. These strands of CSS, which draw extensively on the political thought of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, have generated large bodies of literature that investigate both state and non-state violence against a range of marginalized and vulnerable groups, including refugees, suspect communities, women and children, and prisoners of war. Nevertheless, queer people – one of the most targeted groups across the globe – rarely make appearances within this field of study.

More generally, this absence is surprising considering that the discipline of International Relations (IR) has been increasingly receptive to feminist and queer theory in recent years. However, feminist analyses of ‘gender-based violence’ rarely incorporate, or even acknowledge, the violence perpetrated against gender-variant people. Queer IR theory, on the other hand, has been more concerned with developing ‘queer IR methods’ (Weber, 2016b) than exploring the empirical realities and experiences of queer people internationally. Employing what Barthes refers to as the plural logic of the *and/or*, Weber’s formulation of a queer methodology for IR illustrates how the ‘sovereign man’ of sovereign statecraft is always already plural (Weber, 2016a). Weber refers to her theory as ‘queer’ because her entry point into theorizing plural IR figurations is the queer subject who fails to signify monolithically – an analytical move that is neither necessarily required for her theory to work nor retains the commitment to the queer political project. Similarly, Laura Sjoberg (2012) envisions queer IR theory as the ways in which ‘trans-theorizing’ can enrich already-existing debates within disciplinary IR. For Sjoberg, trans-theorizing should be taken seriously by IR scholars because it provides useful heuristic tools (through concepts like visibility, liminality, crossing, and disidentification) that may contribute to the study of world politics. I do not doubt queer analytics have significant implications for the study of migration, genocide, and war. However, it is often unclear how this work relates to the lives of queer people or to the queer political movement. It is the stripping of Queer IR from the traditions of queer theory and practice that led to an outcry against Cara Daggett’s (2015: 362) article entitled ‘Drone Disorientations’, in which she refers to drones as ‘genderqueer bodies’. My intention here is not to make normative pronouncements on the relative merits or dangers of such an approach to queer theorizing, but rather to note that queer IR theory has not been explicitly focused on the lives or emancipation of queer people and, by extension, has not sought to develop theoretical frameworks for understanding violence against queer people.

This insight raises the following question: How might we explain this gap within the literature? Is the absence of scholarship on the issue of anti-queer violence a mere oversight, or are there significant theoretical barriers to the production of such scholarship? This article argues that CSS is unable to account for anti-queer violence because its frameworks for understanding violence presuppose an already-existing, knowable subject, whether that subject be a disenfranchised refugee or an elite securitizing actor. I explore this dilemma in particular in relation to Foucauldian frameworks, which are arguably the most significant within CSS. However, the failure to account for violence against queer people, I argue, is not specific to any theoretical framework. Indeed, this violence exposes the impossibility of any unified theoretical framework that is capable of considering the violence against queer people – that is, those constitutively excluded from any single identity category. This is a challenge that critical security scholars ought to take seriously, and is one that can lead to richer, more instructive conceptualizations of violence.

Defining ‘queer’

The term ‘queer’ does not refer to a natural, singular, stable, and coherent identity, but rather undermines the very notion of identity. ‘Queer’ is associated with the multiplicities, potentialities, and subversions that characterize sexual and gender ambiguity. It is therefore perhaps most usefully characterized as a ‘non-identity’ (Hammers and Brown III, 2004: 95). Eve Sedgwick (1993: 8) captures this sense of non-identity when she describes the label ‘queer’ as ‘the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or *can’t* be made) to signify monolithically’. Importantly, ‘queer’ is not synonymous with labels such as ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, or ‘transgender’. As Sedgwick (1993: 9) notes, these labels still appear ‘as objective, empirical categories governed by empirical rules of evidence’. Furthermore, who counts as ‘queer’ cannot be established *a priori* because the gender and sexual norms that confer coherence and determinacy vary across time and place.

For Judith Butler, the question of who counts as ‘queer’ is a question of who constitutes an intelligible life. There is what Butler (2007: 23-24) refers to as a ‘matrix of intelligibility’ that determines the cultural and historical boundaries of sex/gender. She (2007: 24) writes: “‘Intelligible’ genders are those which in some sense institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire.’ In other words, there are certain normative gender presuppositions to which an individual must conform in order to be ‘intelligibly human’. It is through this notion of intelligibility that I will examine CSS’s (in)ability to account for violence against queer people.

Global violence against queer people

The epidemic of anti-queer violence is a global crisis. Since 2013, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) has documented over 100 killings of transgender people within the US, the vast majority of which were trans women of color (McBride, 2017), and globally the HRC reports hundreds of trans murders each year (Thapa, 2016). Case studies from around the world illustrate the global epidemic of anti-queer violence. To name but a few, in 2006 the Inter Press Service released a report on the plight of trans people in Argentina (Valente, 2006); Human Rights Watch (2006) has investigated violence against Nepalese transgender people; Perry and Dyck (2014) have observed the shocking rise in police-reported hate crimes against gays and lesbians in Canada over the past years.

Regrettably, such investigations are far and few between. It is not simply that media coverage is scarce, but that in many parts of the world, investigations into anti-queer violence are not conducted at all. The available evidence is often anecdotal (Witten and Eyler, 1999). Furthermore, the reports that do exist undoubtedly understate the scale of anti-queer violence globally. First, police data on anti-queer violence often does not exist, because hate crime legislation does not recognize gender identity, and only sometimes recognizes sexual orientation, as a protected category (Perry and Dyck, 2014). Second, activists insist that the police is often uninterested in investigating attacks on queer people (Buncombe, 2017) and is still one of the largest perpetrators of anti-queer violence (Stanley, 2011). Third, these statistics underreport anti-queer violence because many queer people are misidentified in police and news reports. For example, the death of India Monroe, a black transgender woman, remained unknown for a month because she was misgendered in the initial police reporting (Adams, 2017). It can take up to months before the police is informed of the correct gender identity of victims (Buncombe, 2017). Finally, Browne et al. (2001) have noted that reporting within a hate-crime framework is limited in the case of anti-queer violence because many queer people ignore abuse as a self-preservation tactic. Queer people often normalize the persistent abuse they experience, meaning that many incidents will never be reported in the first place.

In sum, reports on anti-queer violence confront numerous difficulties due to the specific nature of such violence. Most importantly, the failure to account for queer violence is not primarily due to a lack of media coverage. The problem is not simply invisibility, but also unintelligibility. How can violence be reported when it is perpetrated against individuals that cannot be conceived within dominant regimes of the human, or what Butler refers to as the 'matrix of intelligibility'? How can a queer life be *represented* when it cannot even be *known* – for example, when 'it' cannot be read as either 'he' or 'she'? This article examines the problems that this unintelligibility poses for CSS.

Unintelligibility: Towards an understanding of anti-queer violence

In *Gender Trouble*, the question that preoccupied Butler was: Whose life is deemed real, true, and original, and whose life is considered 'illegible, unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate' (Butler, 2007: viii). In *Undoing Gender*, she extends this focus to explore the violence that faces those who fail to 'be known' within normative gender presuppositions. She (2004: 24) asks: 'What is the relation between violence and what is "unreal", between violence and unreality that attends to those who become the victims of violence?' Butler's (2004: 30) response to this question begins with the insight that queer people who transgress gender norms are not only demanding the recognition and protection of their own expressions of gender, but are, more fundamentally, calling into question 'what counts as reality and what counts as a human life'. When the naturalness and given-ness of privileged and habitual presumptions of gender and sexuality are questioned, what occurs is a radical challenge to the ontology of gender and sexual norms.

Anti-queer violence forecloses the conditions of possibility for new gender expressions to come into existence. Or, more accurately, it prevents those expressions that have already existed for a long time to be 'admitted into the terms that govern reality' (Butler, 2004: 31). Violence against queer people is therefore violence against something that is already negated, something that was not 'real' in the first place. And, since it is impossible to negate that which is already negated, violence against queer people is not really violence. As Perry and Dyck (2014: 52) put it, violence is always tied to notions of difference, yet 'difference' implies the recognition of an identity that can be 'Othered'. In the case of unintelligible and derealized life, it cannot be assumed that recognition has occurred.

In sum, violence polices and upholds the norms that render human life intelligible. Because queer lives threaten to undermine or even destroy a social order that is built on the basis of intelligible gender, they are exposed to violence that does not quite count as violence: 'Violence against those who are already not quite lives, who are living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark' (Butler, 2004: 25).

It is worth noting that Butler is providing an analytical account of anti-queer violence, not making *empirical* claims about how this violence is most likely to occur or what form it is likely to take. Moreover, there is an analytical difference between violence against queer people and other oppressed groups. Butler (2004: 30) argues that to be unintelligible is 'more fundamental' than being oppressed: 'To be oppressed you must first become intelligible.'

Butler's analysis is a useful lens for reckoning with the difficulties that plague attempts to report anti-queer violence. Taking the notion of unintelligibility seriously and recognizing that anti-queer violence is not perpetrated after the formation of an identity that can be called 'queer', but

rather to negate the very possibility of identity, prompts the questions: How do we count that which cannot be counted? My intention is not to suggest that reporting anti-queer violence is futile. Quite the opposite: The task of such reports is to *realize* that which has been *derealized*, to render *intelligible* that which was *unintelligible*. As such, the reporting of anti-queer violence has the ability to challenge the delegitimization of certain gender and sexual identities.

Explaining absences within Critical Security Studies

Above, I described the difficulties with representing and reporting the global violence against queer people, and then explored both the nature of such violence and the reasons for these difficulties through Butler's notion of 'unintelligibility'. Unfortunately, her theorization of anti-queer violence has not been incorporated into CSS scholarship. In what follows, I explore queer theory within CSS and examine the reasons why CSS does not, and cannot, account for anti-queer violence.

Disciplinary power

It is possible to find queer perspectives within surveillance studies. Drawing extensively on concepts developed in Michel Foucault's writings, including panopticism and disciplinary power, surveillance studies has been a fruitful field of inquiry for critical theorists. Indeed, the first section of *Routledge's Handbook of Surveillance Studies* is an explication of Foucault's writings on disciplinary power and their influence on the field of surveillance studies (Ball et al., 2014). In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1979) argues that disciplinary power is a modern system of power that brings the human body into the realm of politics through practices of surveillance. Political subjects are placed under scrutiny so that they can be categorized, controlled, trained, rendered docile, and optimized for 'economic production and political subjugation' (Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, 2015: 66). For Foucault, the panopticon exemplified this system of power and, in particular, the inculcation of self-discipline.

Foucault's notion of disciplinary power is also central to Butler's analysis of anti-queer violence discussed above. The normative gender presuppositions that, according to Butler, institute and maintain a matrix of intelligibility are enforced through forms of disciplinary power. Queer people are exposed to violence because they fail to modify their gender performances in order to remain inside the set of disciplinary norms that protect from violence. However, there are two limitations of Foucault's concept of disciplinary power in accounting for anti-queer violence. First, Foucault suggested that the techniques of self-discipline and self-regulation would displace the need for overtly coercive, corporeal violence (Spade, 2015: 55). Although postcolonial scholars (e.g., Spivak, 2010; Stoler, 2002) have convincingly challenged this suggestion, writings on disciplinary power continue to place the emphasis on self-regulation rather than on directly coercive forms of

violence. Second, Foucault is more interested in the categories of people that are produced through disciplinary norms than in those people that cannot be categorized. As Butler (1993: 91) points out, Foucault's analysis focuses on the regulation and control that disciplinary power generates; he does not consider the 'exclusions and erasures' that disciplinary norms effect. An account of anti-queer violence would require a shift in emphasis from considering how disciplinary power produces certain identities, to taking into account those possible articulations of identity that disciplinary power forecloses.

It is for these reasons that the scholarship that combines surveillance studies and queer theory does not explore anti-queer violence. In the *Transgender Studies Reader 2*, for instance, Toby Beauchamp (2013) examines the effects of the US government's expansion of surveillance and security policies in the wake of 9/11. He argues that these measures (re)produce normative understandings of sex/gender and increase queer people's chances of becoming suspects, but does not claim that surveillance policies constitute violence against those individuals. Similarly, in *Feminist Surveillance Studies*, Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) describe the purpose of their edited volume as the illustration of the ways that 'surveillance practices and technologies normalize and maintain whiteness, able-bodiedness, capitalism, and heterosexuality'. The emphasis, once again, is on the discipline and control of certain categories, rather than the ways that disciplinary power impedes the possible articulation of other categories of identity and violently targets those (queer) individuals who are 'uncategorizable'.

Biopolitics, necropolitics, and bare life

The other area within CSS that has incorporated queer theory is the large body of writing on biopolitics – another concept that was developed by Foucault and has since been adopted by queer theorists, poststructuralists, feminist security scholars, international political sociologists, and postcolonial scholars. Foucault argues that biopower is a modern system of power that introduces the population as a category into the political sphere. If disciplinary power operates at the level of the individual, the strategies of biopower target and manage the *population*, a novel political problem (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 67). Biopolitics, Foucault (1976: 241) famously stated, is designed to 'make live and let die'.

Biopolitics has become a dominant theoretical framework for understanding violence within CSS. In *Multitude*, Hardt and Negri (2004) argue that today war has become a 'regime of biopower' – an insight that has been taken up by numerous critical security scholars. For instance, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008) have identified a 'biopoliticization of security' in the twenty-first century that has been amplified by the 'war on terror', and Dillon and Reid (2009) have examined the biopolitics of liberal war. Recently, there have also been attempts to develop a biopolitical approach to genocide

(Fleming, 2003). The reason that biopower better lends itself to analyses of violence than disciplinary power is that its task is to identify and eradicate those forms of life that endanger 'the population'. Biopower is directly involved in the distribution of life chances amongst population groups (Spade, 2015: 60).

Foucault's notion of biopolitics was foundational to the formulation of two concepts, 'necropolitics' and 'bare life', that critical security scholars have drawn on extensively. Achille Mbembe (2003) developed the concept of 'necropolitics' through his engagement with the racial biopolitics of colonialism. For Mbembe (2003: 40), 'biopolitics' did not capture the reality of certain forms of violent subjugation that created '*death-worlds*, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of *living dead*'. In the context of the contemporary 'war on terror', Jamie Allinson (2015) speaks of a 'necropolitics of drone warfare', a form of warfare that draws boundaries between lives worthy of protection and lives that must be disposed to ensure the flourishing of the former. Agamben (1998: 6), on the other hand, inquired into the 'hidden point of intersection between juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power'. For Agamben, the state of exception is a space in which the juridico-political order is suspended and in which individuals are reduced to 'bare life' – i.e., life 'that may be killed but not sacrificed' (Agamben, 1998: 83). Biopolitical mechanisms of governance blur the separation of citizen and bare life, so that everyone is potentially exposed to those exceptional practices that remove them from political protection (Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, 2015: 72). Agamben's writings on bare life and the state of exception have been especially influential within risk scholarship (e.g., de Goede, 2008), critical migration studies (e.g., Doty, 2007; Dines et al., 2014), and postcolonial scholarship (e.g. Sylvester, 2006).

Virtually all queer scholarship within CSS has drawn on biopolitical perspectives on global violence. Jasbir Puar's (2007) *Terrorist Assemblages* is an analysis of the ways that LGBT subjects are absorbed into hegemonic structures of the nation-state, a biopolitical practice that redraws the boundaries that determine which forms of life are worthy of protection and which ones are disposable. Puar (2007: 35) interrogates how homonationalist discourses reproduce 'relations of living and dying', a process she refers to as 'queer necropolitics'. Agamben's emphasis on the mutual constitution of the state of exception and the rule of law – 'something is included solely through its exclusion' (Agamben, 1998: 18) – is crucial to her analysis, because it allows her to challenge the dominant assumption that the nation-state is capable of expanding to include all marginalized subjects. Rather, the acceptance and tolerance of certain queer subjects 'entail deferred death or dying' for those life forms that are deemed unworthy of protection (Puar, 2007: 36). *Queer Necropolitics*, a volume edited by Haritaworn et al. (2014: 2), is inspired by Puar's work and sets out

to examine a contemporary necropolitical cleavage: ‘queer subjects invited into life and queerly abjected populations marked for death’.

This literature seems to suggest that CSS can in fact account for violence against queer people. This impression is, however, misleading for at least two reasons. First, it should be noted that use of the word ‘queer’ here is somewhat ambiguous. If ‘queer’ refers to unintelligible forms of life, it is precisely in the moment that a queer person is integrated into hegemonic structures that they *become* intelligible. It is those very structures that produce coherent, stable, and knowable subjects. As Butler (1993: 86) reminds us: ‘Regulation is always generative, producing the object it claims merely to discover.’ Homonationalism describes the process by which certain previously queer subjects are admitted into the norms that govern intelligible life, thereby reproducing a certain way of life to the detriment of others. Second, neither Puar, nor the contributors to *Queer Necropolitics*, consider how homonationalism produces violence against queer people *specifically*. They analyze how the invitation into, and reproduction of, certain life forms marks certain populations out for death. These populations, no doubt, will include queer peoples and will be discursively racialized and queered. But queer necropolitics is not about the violence against queer people themselves. The fact that the acceptance of certain queer subjects comes at the expense of other *queer people* is rather incidental. For example, Sarah Lamble (2014) argues that by supporting hate-crime legislation, LGBT campaigns in the US have bolstered violent systems of incarceration and policing in the US. Here, however, the focus is on the creation and reproduction of violence against certain lives trapped within the carceral system, not specifically on the queer people that exist within that system. To be clear, at no point do these scholars claim that their aim is to account for the violence against queer people *specifically* that is produced through homonationalism. However, I argue that the analytical focus on the queer people that are folded *into* life (and the general populations that are then left to die), rather than those queer people in particular that cannot be absorbed into the nation-state’s structures and are therefore exposed to violence, is due to the limitations of the biopolitical framework for understanding violence – in particular, its inability to grapple with unintelligibility.

The limitations of a Foucauldian approach to violence

In his late writings, Foucault (1976: 242-246) argued that biopower enabled interventions and forms of governance that were aimed at the shared biological properties of the people. In order to ‘administer, optimize, and multiply life’, biopower must subject it ‘to precise controls and comprehensive regulations’ (Foucault, 1978: 137). In other words, the biopolitical monitoring, auditing, and recording of the population produced ‘different fields of knowledge concerned with life’ and introduced life ‘into the order of knowledge and power’ (Foucault, 1978: 142). Foucault’s emphasis on knowledge is crucial – in fact, Volume I of *The History of Sexuality* is subtitled ‘The Will

to Know'. Biopower is fundamentally about rendering certain lives *knowable*, so that they can then be made to live. A biopolitical approach cannot account for violence against those lives that are *unknowable*. Foucault is interested in the categories of life that power *produces* and places at the center of society's political strategies. Queer people, however, are exposed to violence precisely because they are unable to be categorized and because they expose the matrix of intelligibility that is instituted and maintained through the modern systems of power described by Foucault.

'Necropolitics and 'bare life' both also presume a knowable subject. Foucault's conception of racism as an operative form of power is central to the necropolitical logic that divides populations into livable and killable. It creates 'caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower' (Foucault, 1976: 255), thereby permitting and enabling the death of entire populations. To put it differently, racism functions through an 'Othering' process that divides populations. However, this process of 'Othering' implies a recognition of that form of life that threatens the vitality of the protected population. In the case of queer life, recognition does not occur. The inability to be known as a legitimate, real subject means that one's life is neither folded into life nor is one deemed a dangerous form of life. Rather, one is not intelligible as a life in the first place. Queerness does not describe anti-life, but rather calls into question the category of life itself. Eric Stanley (2011: 15) writes that queerness 'is not simply an oppositional category equally embodied by anyone'. Stanley (2011: 13) proposes the notion of 'near life', in the place of Agamben's 'bare life': if 'bare life' refers to 'a kind of stripped-down sociality', then near life names the 'non-existence which comes before the question of life might be posed'. In CSS literature, common examples of populations reduced to 'bare life' include refugees, prisoners of wars, and other forms of life that the sovereign must 'let die' in order to 'make life live'. Agamben (1998: 133) uses refugees from Rwanda as a telling example of 'bare life'. They are photographed and represented in publicity campaigns in order to gather aid. These refugees may be stripped of their ontological status as political subjects, but they are still intelligible as subjects. They can be *recognized* by humanitarian organizations, and 'a life has to be intelligible *as a life*... in order to become recognizable' (Butler, 2009: 6-7).

The challenge of unintelligible life

Where does this leave us? On the one hand, I have shown that violence against queer people has gone un-reported, un-classified, and un-noticed both inside and outside academia. On the other hand, I have suggested that theorizing or reporting violence presupposes an intelligible subject, since one cannot categorize or recognize that which is neither categorizable nor recognizable. It appears, then, that violence against queer people is necessarily untheorizable. Theorizing violence against queer people would entail assigning a specific content to the subject position 'queer', which the very status of the term as a non-identity makes impossible. In this final section, I argue that the challenge

of unintelligible life is not one that must, or can, be definitively overcome. Rather, unintelligibility challenges existing frameworks for understanding violence and spurs us to continuously consider the instability of all identity categories.

As stated above, queer is most usefully understood as a non-identity – as that which points to the unrealizability and indeterminacy of all identity categories. To posit that identity is performative is to claim that it is a doing and a becoming, rather than a being; that it must be ‘perpetually re-established’; and therefore that ‘it risks itself in the very repetition it requires’ (Butler, 2000: 41). For Butler, one is not born a man/woman, nor does one become a man/woman, but rather one is in a continual process of *becoming* a man/woman. The successful naturalization of one’s gender fails because it is ‘manufactured through a sustained set of acts’ (Butler, 2007: xv). This intervention is crucial because it highlights that the subject is neither *pre-discursive*, nor *determined by* discourse. The subject is not prediscursive, but rather is hailed into a particular subject position that is designated by a particular discourse (Hall, 1996). Neither is the subject determined by discourse, because the absolute success of the interpellation into a discursively allotted subject position is impossible. Because identities demand to be continuously performed, the inevitable failure to iterate the identity properly means that identities can never be fixed, stable, or complete. Identity’s inevitable failure to be wholly realized is the condition of possibility for ‘queerness’, since ‘queer’ refers precisely to those gaps and fissures that emerge from within performative signifying practices. In short, the term ‘queer’ points to the impossibility of the ontological completion of any identity category.

The aim of this article is therefore not to propose a better way of reporting anti-queer violence or a more accurate estimation of how much abuse queer people face, which would require the discursive formation of ‘queer’ as a stable identity. Any effort to expand our frameworks so that every subject, including queer subjects, could be included within them will inevitably falter. The queer theoretical and political project brings to the fore the fact that every identity necessarily forecloses the possible articulation of other identities, because for an identity to be rendered intelligible it must draw boundaries between those included in and excluded from the category, boundaries whose contours are shaped by a particular spatial and temporal context. The challenge of unintelligible life, then, is twofold. First, it exposes the impossibility of a coherent, unified, all-inclusive theoretical framework for conceiving violence. Second, it asks that we embrace epistemological uncertainty and perpetually interrogate the exclusions that make any identity category possible. In other words, it demands a continuous, ongoing project that confronts and contests the reification of identity. On the question of violence, it urges us to consider the role that violence itself plays in the reproduction of illusions of stable, natural identities.

Grappling with violence against queer people does not require that we establish 'queer' as a 'third' gender identity, assign subjects to this category within rigid boundaries, and then seek to theorize the violence they face. This project would maintain the fantasy that three identity categories would be more inclusive than two, as if the exclusionary processes of identity formation can be overcome. Indeed, queer scholars have suggested that 'the greater the number of genders the greater their oppressive potential as each may demand the conformity of the individual within increasingly narrower confines' (Agrawal, 1997: 294). More fundamentally, grappling with violence against queer people requires a reconceptualization of violence itself. If within CSS violence is ordinarily understood as a form of harm that is inflicted upon marginalized or vulnerable identity groups, a queer perspective might shift analytical focus towards violence's function in foreclosing the admission of particular subjects into extant identity categories. Taking violence against queer people seriously points critical security scholars towards that dimension of violence which confronts and destroys any threat to the norms that govern reality. Violence, here, is conceptualized as a *(re)productive* force, as that which not only disciplines, controls, and kills subjects, but also naturalizes, maintains, and anchors the norms that determine who will qualify as an intelligible subject.

Conclusion

Critical Security Studies is unable to account for anti-queer violence because frameworks within which understandings of violence are forged presume an intelligible subject of violence. Even Foucault's political thought, often heralded as the origin of queer theory, has difficulties reckoning with violence against queer people since the possibilities of queer subjectivity are foreclosed through the productive effects of power.

This article is a call for critical IR scholars to take the challenge of 'unintelligibility' seriously. Feminist security scholars have already directed their attention to those subjects unable to 'speak security' and to those bodily performances that constitute a form of speech (Hansen, 2000), but they have not been attentive to those bodies that are not coherent or intelligible in the first place and what this means for their ability to become subjects worthy of protection from violence.

I have argued that it is impossible to develop a theoretical framework to account for violence against queer people. Indeed, the very term 'queer' undoes the possibility of a unified and coherent theoretical system. However, this is not a nihilistic admission of defeat. Rather, taking the untheorizability of 'queer' – by which I mean the impossibility of determining a stable, completed queer subject that can become the object of systematic study – seriously can substantially enrich CSS scholarship in at least two ways. Firstly, it requires scholars to continuously resist the essentialization of identity categories (whether they are theorizing violence against 'refugees', 'women', 'children', or 'war prisoners') and to make visible the exclusionary processes through which those very identities

are constituted. Secondly, it would prompt scholars to theorize violence's role in the (re)production of identity categories, indeed of the social order more generally.

References

- Adams, Nick (2017): 'GLAAD calls for increased and accurate media coverage of transgender murders', 14 December. GLAAD. Accessible at <https://www.glaad.org/blog/glaad-calls-increased-and-accurate-media-coverage-transgender-murders> (28 December 2017).
- Agamben, Giorgio (1998): *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics.
- Agrawal, Anuja (1997): 'Gendered Bodies: The Case of the "Third Gender" in India, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 31 (2): pp. 273-297. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F006996697031002005>
- Allinson, Jamie (2015): 'The Necropolitics of Drones', *International Political Sociology*, 9 (2): pp. 113–27. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12086>
- Ball, Kirstie et al. (eds.) (2014): *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*. Abingdon: Routledge. Routledge International Handbooks.
- Beauchamp, Toby (2013): 'Artful Concealment and Strategic Visibility: Transgender Bodies and US State Surveillance after 9/11', in Stryker, Susan and Aizura, Aren (eds.) *The Transgender Studies Reader 2*. New York: Routledge. pp. 46-55. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v6i4.3267>
- Browne, Kath et al. (2001): "'It's Something You Just Have to Ignore": Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans Safety Beyond Hate Crime Paradigms', *Journal of Social Policy*, 40 (4): pp. 739-756. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279411000250>
- Buncombe, Andrew (2017): 'Transgender people in US facing an 'epidemic of violence' as number of murders hit record high', 17 November. *The Independent*. Accessible at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/transgender-people-us-epidemic-violence-discrimination-prejudice-attacks-a8061456.html> (28 December 2017).
- Butler, Judith (1993): 'Sexual Inversions' in: Caputo, John D. and Yount, Mark (eds.) *Foucault and the Critique of Institutions*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 81-98.
- Butler, Judith (2000): 'Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism' in Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto, and Žižek, Slavoj (authors) *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left*. London: Verso. pp. 11-43.
- Butler, Judith (2004): *Undoing Gender*. 2nd ed., New York: Routledge.
- Butler, Judith (2007): *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. 4th ed., London: Routledge.

Butler, Judith (2009): *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* 3rd ed., London: Verso.

Daggett, C. (2015): 'Drone Disorientations: How "Unmanned" Weapons Queer the Experience of Killing in War', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 17 (3): 361-379. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2015.1075317>

De Goede, Marieke (2008): 'Risk, Preemption, and the Exception in the War on Terrorist Financing', in Amoore, Louise and de Goede, Marieke (eds.) *Risk and the War on Terror*. London: Routledge. pp. 97-111.

Dillon, Michael and Luis Lobo-Guerrero (2008): 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction. Review of *International Studies*', 34 (2): pp. 274-275. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210508008024>

Dillon, Michael and Julien Reid (2009): *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*. New York: Routledge. Global Horizons. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203882542>

Dines, Nick et al. (2014): 'Thinking Lampedusa: Border Construction, the Spectacle of Bare Life, and the Productivity of Migrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*', 38 (3): pp. 430-445. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.936892>

Doty, Roxanne Lynn (2007): 'States of Exception on the Mexico-US Border: Security, "Decisions", and Civilian Border Patrols. *International Political Sociology*', 1 (2): pp. 113-137. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00008.x>

Dubrofsky, Rachel E. and Shoshana Amielle Magnet (2015): 'Introduction: Feminist Surveillance Studies: Critical Interventions' in Dubrofsky, Rachel E. and Magnet, Shoshana Amielle (eds.) *Feminist Surveillance Studies*. Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 1-17.

Fleming, Marie (2003): 'Genocide and the Body Politic in the Time of Modernity', in Gellately, Robert and Kiernan, Ben (eds.) *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 97-116. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819674.005>

Foucault, Michel (1976): '17 March 1976' in Bertani, Mauro, Ewald, Francois, and Fontana, Alessandro (eds.) (2004) *'Society Must Be Defended': Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*. Translated by David Macey. London: Penguin. pp. 239-264.

Foucault, Michel (1978): *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Penguin Books.

Foucault, Michel (1979): *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. 2nd ed., New York: Random House.

Hammers, Corie and D. Alan Brown III (2004): 'Towards a feminist-queer alliance: a paradigmatic shift in the research process', *Social Epistemology*, 18 (1): pp. 85-101. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/0269172042000249408>

Hansen, Lene (2000): 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 29 (2): pp. 285-306. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/09502688000290020501>

Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2004): *Multitude: War and Democracy in The Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin Press.

Haritaworn, Jin et al. (2014): 'Introduction', in Haritaworn, Jin et al. (eds.) *Queer Necropolitics*. New York: Routledge. Social Justice. pp. 1-27.

Human Rights Watch (2006): 'Nepal: "Sexual Cleansing" Drive Continues' 18 March. Accessible at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/03/18/nepal-sexual-cleansing-drive-continues> (15 September 2018).

Lamble, Sarah (2014): 'Queer Investments in Punitiveness: Sexual Citizenship, Social Movements, and the Expanding Carceral State' in: Haritaworn, Jin et al. (eds.) *Queer Necropolitics*. New York: Routledge. Social Justice. pp: 151-171.

Mbembe, Achille (2003): 'Necropolitics'. Translated by Libby Meintjes. *Public Culture*, 15 (1): pp. 11-40. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-15-1-11>

McBride, Sarah (2017): 'HRC & Trans People of Color Coalition Release Report on Violence Against the 'Transgender Community'', 17 November. Human Rights Campaign. Accessible at <http://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-trans-people-of-color-coalition-release-report-on-violence-against-the> (28 December 2017).

Peoples, Columba and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2015): *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*. 2nd ed., London: Routledge.

Perry, Barbara and D. Ryan Dyck (2014): "'I Don't Know Where It Is Safe': Trans Women's Experiences of Violence', *Critical Criminology*, 22 (49): pp. 49-63.

Puar, Jasbir (2007): *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Durham: Duke University Press. Next Wave: New Directions in Women's Studies.

Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky (1993): *Tendencies*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Sjoberg, Laura (2012): 'Towards Trans-Gendering International Relations?', *International Political Sociology* 6 (4): pp. 337-354. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12005>

Spade, Dean (2015): *Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law*. 2nd ed., Durham: Duke University Press. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822374794>

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (2010): “‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’” revised edition, from the ‘History’ chapter of *Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, Morris, Rosalind (ed.): *Reflections on the History of an Idea: Can the Subaltern Speak?* New York: Columbia University Press. pp: 21-78.

Stanley, Eric (2011): ‘Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture’, *Social Text* 107, 29 (2): pp. 1-19. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-1259461>

Stoler, Ann Laura (2002): *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sylvester, Christine (2006): ‘Bare Life as a Development/Postcolonial Problematic’, *The Geographical Journal*, 172 (1): pp. 66-77. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2006.00183.x>

Thapa, Saurav Jung (2016): ‘A Global Crisis: Epidemic of Violence Against Transgender People’, 18 November. Human Rights Campaign. Accessible at <http://www.hrc.org/blog/a-global-crisis-epidemic-of-violence-against-transgender-people> (28 December 2017).

Valente, Marcela (2006): ‘Argentina: Transgender Community Faces Uphill Battle for Rights’, 23 March. Inter Press Service. Accessible at <http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/03/argentina-transgender-community-faces-uphill-battle-for-rights/> (28 December 2017).

Weber, Cynthia (2016a): *Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality, and the Will to Live*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Cynthia (2016b): ‘Queer Intellectual Curiosity as International Relations Method: Developing Queer International Relations Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 60 (1): pp. 11-23. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12212>

Witten, Tarynn M. and A. Evan Eyler (1999): ‘Hate Crimes and Violence Against the Transgendered’, *Peace Review*, 11 (3): pp. 461-468. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659908426291>

Book review

The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It by
Yascha Mounk. Harvard University Press, 2018, pp. 400.

<https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.38.4>

David W. Choi

David W. Choi, 27, from Princeton, NJ (USA), received his Bachelor's degree in "Political Science" and "Middle Eastern and Islamic Civilizations Studies" at Colgate University in 2013. In 2018, he obtained a Master's in Political Science at the American University of Cairo where he was in the Comparative & Middle East Politics and Society joint Master's program with the University of Tübingen. He wrote his Master's Thesis on elite consolidation during development and state building in Gamal Abdal Nasser's Egypt and Park Chunghee's Korea. His interests include comparative politics, development studies, elite politics, nationalism, populism, the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia, etc. E-mail: david.w.choi.91@gmail.com.

Keywords

Democracy; Diversity; Economy; Liberalism; Media; Populism

In *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It*, Yascha Mounk claims that unless there are changes soon, liberal democracy as we know it may not survive much longer. Mounk paints a bleak picture fitting of the alarmist title. He focuses on one particular phenomenon: the rise and consolidation of power of populist movements around the world.

Mounk states that populists are gaining in popularity in various places around the world, with some already ruling and consolidating their power. They are democratic as they are offering what the majority of the people demand though perhaps to the detriment of the rights of others. However, established elites would like to strengthen their position, often while being out of touch with the rest of the people. While fighting for the protection of rights, which allows them to solidify their position, they do not expect an expansion of democracy, which may lead them to lose their position.

These phenomena are the results of Mounk's core claim (20): liberal democracy is de-consolidating into "illiberal democracy" and "undemocratic liberalism". Populism is democratic in that it is catering to the majority, but illiberal because it does not protect the rights of everyone. Meanwhile, established elites are entrenching themselves to strengthen their positions. Thus, they become more undemocratic as the gap between them and the rest of the population widens, but they desire their rights (and position) to be protected, so they defend liberalism. Mounk argues that this de-consolidation is not surprising although most people assume democracy and liberalism naturally go together, there is nothing inherent about such a consolidation.

Mounk discusses that while the strength and source of legitimacy of liberal democracy is its ability to honor freedom and equality at the same time, its dominance has not been because of this legitimacy. Liberal democracy “can fulfill some of the deepest and most universal human aspirations” (130) but actually because “it has delivered such good results” (131), like keeping peace and increasing life standards. Hence, as liberal democracies are no longer as adept at delivering for citizens, populist movements are exploiting the opening to dismantle key elements of the system (131).

Mounk examines the major causes of the de-consolidation of liberal democracy. He argues that there are three “scope conditions” of democracy, that is, three areas in which certain conditions brought about the stability of democracy in the past, but these conditions are no longer in place at present. Firstly, it is the media, as social media “weakened traditional gatekeepers,” whereas before the dominance of mass media limited the distribution of extreme ideas. Secondly, the economy, as in the past most people enjoyed a rapid increase in living standards, but many now fear that they will suffer greater hardship in the future. Finally, nearly all stable democracies were monoethnic nations or had a dominant ethnic group but now this dominance is being challenged in many places (135).

Mounk argues that these three issues need to be quickly addressed for the survival of liberal democracy. He offers several solutions such as defending the rights of everyone in a country and advocating for keeping immigration open, but having control over borders (214); creating a “new sense of pride in a very different kind of mass employment,” so that liberal democracies “retain the ability to shape a future in which an openness to the world does not need to be synonymous with a loss of control” (235-36); and having civic education that features “both the real injustices and the great achievements of liberal democracy” (251).

Although the book spells out the problem of liberal democratic de-consolidation clearly and offers solutions, there are some areas where the book shows weaknesses and feels somewhat incomplete. Among them is that its scope is largely limited to the western world, that is, North America and Europe. Perhaps the rise of populism can be seen as a largely western issue, but the few mentions of non-western nations (though usually only in passing) in the book implies that Mounk believes the issue exists in non-western nations as well. However, there is little mention of such cases, and if they are mentioned, it is done imprecisely. For example, when borrowing the 2016-17 Korean protests against the president as an anecdote, there are mis-spellings of names that could have easily been rectified through a simple Internet search (185). This adds to the sense that cases outside of North America and Europe are an afterthought.

Another issue is that it seems Mounk’s remedies are somewhat limited. If the situation is as dire as Mounk argued, this would require solutions beyond the status quo. As alarmist as the title of

the book and the problem it spells out are, the suggested solutions are quite tame in comparison, perhaps even obvious. And they leave many questions. How do you get people fully on board with the idea of continuing to protect rights in the face of populist movements that say otherwise? How do you create this sense of pride of a different kind of employment? What does a civic education that features “both the real injustices and the great achievements of liberal democracy” even look like?

These issues aside, if it is assumed that Mounk’s book is only meant to raise these concerns and bring it to people’s attention in a comprehensive way, then it is timely and allows for further comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon and is a welcome addition to the discussion. However, there is still a sense of regret in the limited scope of the book and of what could have been.

Call for Papers

IAPSS Politikon

IAPSS Politikon is the flagship publication of the International Association for Political Science Students. It publishes papers submitted by students and researchers of all levels of academic qualification with the usual frequency of four issues per year.

IAPSS Politikon publishes:

- Full academic papers with original research based on new primary data or review of existing literature with strong personal input (see Paper submission guidelines) and the length of up to 6,000 words
- Research notes based on field work notes, raw data and observations with first level of analysis and the length of up to 2,000 words
- Book reviews of the length of up to 600 words.

Papers for publication are accepted on a continuous basis. The next deadline for submissions to an individual issue is **15 November 2018**. All articles should respect the formal structure and all requirements stated in the "[Paper submission guidelines](#)" at the publisher's website. The Editorial Board will contact the authors to communicate results of each evaluation (1st Editorial Board Evaluation, 2nd double-blind Peer Review), proposed changes and the planned date of publication.

The Editorial Board will not evaluate articles by authors who already (co-)authored other articles currently under evaluation.

Submissions are to be sent exclusively in electronic format to politikonjournal@iapss.org.


Politikon



the IAPSS Journal of Political Science

ISSN 2414-6633

© 2018



IAPSS

The International Association
For Political Science Students

www.iapss.org