The Relationship between the Spanish Government and the Pharmaceutical Company (Gilead) during the Hepatitis C crisis in Spain
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.45.5Keywords:
Gilead, Hepatitis C, Patent, Private-Self Regulation, Sovaldi™, TRIPS Agreement, Welfare StatesAbstract
This research note investigates the pattern of governance that underpinned the management of the Hepatitis C crisis that took place in Spain in 2014. By navigating through the facts, one can see how the private interests of a multinational company – Gilead, the patent holder of the new treatment for the Hepatitis C virus – were capable of exerting pressure on Spain, a highly developed state, to a point where the government applied measures that contradicted the country’s Constitution and caused 4000 avoidable deaths. Different theories of governance will be used to try to explain the new dynamics. The main conclusion of this research note is that the power of the state is diminishing in many cases, and that this has consequences for the public interest and the population in general.
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