The Politics of Decision Making in the Council of the EU: Explaining Consensus

Navid Sabet

doi:10.22151/politikon.26.8

Authors

Navid Sabet London School of Economics and Political Science

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.26.8

Keywords:

blocking-coalitions, consensus, Council of the European Union, qualified majority voting (QMV), blame avoidance

Abstract

This paper examines the decision making of the Council of the European Union to gain insight into how consensus decisions emerge and how they change power allocations and influence the behavior of negotiators and voting blocs. It surveys rationalist and non-rationalist accounts of consensus decisions in the Council and concludes that rationalist explanations are more convincing. In this connection, the central argument of the essay is that consensus emerges as rational negotiators (a) coalesce into blocs dominant enough to win over and suppress opposing coalitions and (b) undertake strategies to avoid blame for failing to win consensus around their own preferred policy.

Author Biography

Navid Sabet, London School of Economics and Political Science

Navid Sabet earned a Master of Public Administration in Public and Economic Policy with Distinction from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Since graduating in July 2014, he has been working as a Research Assistant at UNESCO-UNEVOC, UNESCO’s specialized agency dedicated to helping Member States formulate policies and practices to promote technical and vocational education and training. A version of this essay earned a distinction as part of a graduate module at the LSE entitled ‘Organizations, Power and Leadership’.