The International Win-Set: Boundaries for Influence

Shayna Servillas

doi:10.22151/politikon.36.2

Authors

Shayna Servillas Northwestern University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22151/politikon.36.2

Keywords:

AIPAC, Cuban missile crisis, domestic actors, international win-set, rational actor model, structural realis, U.S. privileges

Abstract

In line with the structural realist school in international relations, this paper argues that while being considerable, the power domestic actors have in the foreign policy sphere is bounded by international constraints. The argument proceeds by extrapolating the concept of a ‘win-set’ constraint from the Robert Putnam’s 1988 two-level model on negotiation onto a decision structure of foreign policy actors. Hence it explains the unusual strength of domestic influence in the U.S., relative to other states. Through the use of applied game theory and the case studies of the Kennedy Administration’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bush Administration’s response to the Israeli ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, this research attempts to demonstrate how domestic groups exercise influence within the boundaries created by the international power structure.

Author Biography

Shayna Servillas, Northwestern University

Shayna Servillas, 20, is a third-year undergraduate pursuing her Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Political Science at Northwestern University, and currently studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) at St. Catherine’s College in Oxford University. She has spent two years on foreign policy research for the London-based Human Security Centre and her most recent summer on human rights research for the Tehran-based Tavaana Institute. Her research interests include domestic and international Iranian politics, strategic applications of game theory, and international political economy.